ML20206E940

Forwards Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Rept,Per Tech Spec 6.9.1.12

ML20206E940
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	11/14/1988
From:	Hairston W ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
RTR-REGGD-01.108, RTR-REGGD-1.108 NUDOCS 8811180258
Download: ML20206E940 (3)

Text

e Attama Power Company COO North 10th Street Post Off ce Box 2C41

. B rv:ngham, A!abama 352014400 Te ephone 205 2501C>J7 W. G. Hairston, til Senior V.ce Pressdent Nue' ear Operaws gg g) ,

tu vawn asene see n 10CFR50.36 November 14, 1988 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Vashington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen Joseph H. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Report Attached is the Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Report which is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.12. This report provides the number of tests (valid or invalid) and the number of failures for each diesel generator at Farley Nuclear Plant for 1987. Also provided is the informstion identified in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, 1977 for each failure.

Respectfully submitted,

d. d . hit. YE N V. G. Hairstor, III VGH,III/JARapr-1.48 Attachment cca Mr. L. B. Long Mr. H. L. Ernst Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. G. F. Mr.xvell COI 4I pg")$E ES$p p

ANNUAL DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY DATA REPORT FOR 1987 This diesel generator (DG) reliability report for the year 1987 is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.12. Table 1 shows the number of tests (valid or invalid) and the number of failures for each of the five DGs at Farley Nuclear Plant.

Table 1 Diesel Generator 1-2A id 2B IC 2C TOTAL Vslid Successful Tests 43 39 34 43 35 194 Inval3d Tests 14 17 10 14 14 69

• /alid Failures 0 1 1 1 0 3 Invalid Failures 0 0 0 0 0 0 The following paragraph provides the information identified in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108. Revision 1, 1977 for the valid failures identified above.

1B DG Fal?ure on 2-9-87 At 1355 on 2-9-87, an attempt was made to start the 1B DG on the number 1 air header to perform an operability test. The diesel failed to reach 100 rpm. An essential engine protection shutdown occurred due to the failure to start. At 1416, a restart was attempted and achieved. The start time was less than twelve seconds (the Technical Specification requirement) but more than ten seconds (the FNP administrative limit). Following satisfactory completion of the testing, the DG var returned to service at 1500 on 2-9-87. Subsequently, the DG vas removed from service, inspected, and repairs vere made as necessary. Both fuel oil header return line check valves vere replaced. The main air start valves  ;

vere disassembled, inspected, cleaned, and reinstalled. The air start distrib' tors vsre replaced. The ch,ck valves on the engine ( iven fuel pump and above the hand operwted fuel pump vere replaced.

This vas the first failure in the last 100 starts for this sfoe of DG. No change in the surveillance schedule vas necessary. The surveillance interval remained at 14 days in accordance with Technical Specification Table 4.8-1.

t 8

o 2b DG Failure on 7-16-87 At 1444 on 7-16-87, the 2B DG vas started to perform an operability test. When the DG vas ready to be synchroni7ed to the 2G 4160 :(It bus, the plant operator noticed that the DG vas operating at 59.9 Hz and 4150 volts. As he attempted to raise the frequency to 60 Hz, the DG frequency began to decrease and voltage began to increase. Vhen the speed fell to 59 Hz and the voltage reached 4400 volts, the DG vas secured. Maintenance investigated the peoblem with the speed and voltage controls. A slight adjustment was made 'n the electronic governor control in the stability circuit. All contacts and connections in the applicable circuits vere found satisfactory. The DG operated properly during subsequent testing. The DG vam returned to service at 1738 on 7-17-87.

This was the se:ond failure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG. No change in the surveillance interval vat necessary. The surveillance interval remained at 14 days in accordance with Technical Specifications. Technical Specifications require that the surveillance interval be changed to seven days when three or more failures have occurred in the last 100 starts for a particular type of DG.

1C DG Failure on 11-13-87 At 1045 on 11-13-87, the 1C DG vas started for normal surveillance. At approximately 1100, the Diesel Building operator repoeted smoke coming from the exhaust manifold. At 1107, while personnel vere investigating, the DG tripped.

Maintenance personnel investigated but found no problem. The smoke appears to have been unrelated to the DG trip. The DG vas restarted normally. After it had been running loaded at 1000 Kv for about six minutes, the operator observed load oscillations. The load svings vere from 1.5 to 1.8 Hv. The surveillance was completed satisfactorily and more troubleshooting vas conducted. No cause for the trip vas found, but the irvestigation revealed dirty contacts on the TSRX relay. This relay is in the test start circuit. The relay contacts vere cleaned and the DG vas restored to proper operati 9. Further investigation was conducted under the direction of Technical Reprete.tatives from the DG manufacturerr. It was cer luded that the intermittent TSRX relay contact operation could cause tha n.cptoms that the operators observed. Ne cause was found that explained the entire incident. The DG vas returned to service at 2120 on 11-17-87.

Since this was the first failure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG, no change in the surveillance interval vas necessary. Therefore, the surveillance interval remained at 14 days in accordance with Technical Specifications.

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