ML20090F623
| ML20090F623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1984 |
| From: | Woolever E DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2DLC-7307, NUDOCS 8407230170 | |
| Download: ML20090F623 (83) | |
Text
'Af 2DLC-7307 (412) 787-5141 Nuclear Construction Division (412) 923-t 960 Robinson Plaza, Building 2 Suite 210 To'ecopy (412) 787-2629 Pittsburgh, PA 15205 July 16, 1984 j United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch _3 Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation SUBJECT Beaver Valley Power Staticn - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Response to NRC Questions Gentlemen:
Attached are additional revised responses to Power Systems Branch Mechanical Section questions. These responses were revised to satis fy reviewer's concerns provided informally during a meeting with DLC staff.
Since all review results to date have been provided only on an informal basis during this review and no draft SER was provided, futur a NRC concerns in this area must be submitted to DLC formally and must provide a precise definition of the specific issue remaining to be resolved and its regula-tory basis. This infonnation will provide DLC with the necessary material to provide suitable responses in an ef ficient manner to support NRR revie.w and the licensing schedule.
Also attached is a response to Question 311.9 concerning the probability analysis for the relocated Mobil pipeline. The attached material is presently planned for inclusion in FSAR Amendment 8.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 4
By -
E (jl . 'Woolever Vice President GLB/wjs Attachment ec: Mr. H. R. Denton, Director (NRR) (w/a)
Mr. D. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing (w/a)
Ms. M. Ley, Project Manager (w/a) 7 Mr. E. A. Licitra, Project Manager-(w/a) l' Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a) j Y \)
e40723gC{0 4 O %D2 i
t FDR AD POR a A pdl f *./ s% pp Q
. United Statsa Nuciant R gulatory Copmission Mr. Gzorg? W. Knighton, Chief.
Page.2 GLB/wjs.
NR/NRC/RSP/QSTN Attachment bec: J. J. Carey (w/o attachment)
G. I. Rifendifer W. T. Wardzinski E. J . Woolever i R. E. Dougher C. E. Ewing-T. D. Jones E. F. Kurtz , Jr.
'J. H. Latshaw J. A. . Rocco H. M. Siegel R. J . Swiderski G. L. Beatty E. T. Eilmann K. M. Holcomb J. Lee, Esq.
R. E. Martin S. L. Pernick, Jr . "
D. Skidmore T. J . Zogimann D. E. Burke (CEI)
R. G. Schuerger (CEI) "
E. A. Licitra (NRC) "
G. Walton (NRC)
W. T. Keller (NUTEC)
B. M. Miller (2) (OEC)""
J. Silberg (SPPT)
C. R. Bishop D. Chamberlain (S&W)
P. RaySircar (S&W)(6) "(1)
T. J. Lex (W)
T. P. Noonan (w/ attachment)
NCD File
,/
n1224106sr:82 07/05/84 BVPS-2 FSAR .
[n NRC Letter: May 21, 1984 1.9 V
Question 311.9 (Section 2.2.3) 1.10 Amendment No. 6 of the Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 FSAR provides a 1.11 4
probability analysis of the relocated Mobil oil gasoline pipeline 1.12 based on the failure rate of nuclear reactor grade pipes that is referenced on page 2.2-20 cf the FSAR. 1.13 Since- petroleum product pipelines are subjected to different 1.14 environmental conditions, and are constructed of different materials 1.15 and to different specifications than reactor grade piping, we do not believe that yot use of this probability reference is valid. 1.16 Please provide a pipeline failure analysis based on accident 1.17 statistics from the National Transportation Board for pipelines of 1.18 the same materials and methods of. welding as was in the relocated Mobil oil Company pipeline.
Response: 1.19 The use 'o f the WASH-1400 (Appendices III and IV) pipe failure rate 1.20 data in Section 2.2.3 is valid for the probabilistic failure modeling 1.21 of the Mobil Pipeline. It is valid because the failure rate data 1.23 reported in Table III 2-1 of Appendices III and IV of WASH-1400 is derived from generic industry sources, which includes the nuclear 1.24
/3 industry.
i n/
)
When the WASH-1400 report was prepared in the early 1970s, there were 1.25 few failure rate data available from the operation of nuclear power 1.27 plants. The authors of WASH-1400 acknowledged this situation. The 1.29 authors of the WASH-1400 report clearly indicate the sources of the failure rate data in the following paragraph taken from page III-3 of 1.30 the report:
"The failure rates and demand probabilities used in the study were 1.31 derived from handbooks, reports, operating experience, and nuclear 1.32 power plant experience. The date sources involved Department of 1.33 Defense data (Navy, Airforce, etc.), NASA data, and general industrial operating experience as well as nuclear power plant data. 1.35 The assessment process entailed an amalgamation of this information 1.36 to obtain final ranges which described regions in which the data had 1.37 a high probability of lying."
Engineering literature is replete with examples where the failure 1.38 rate data from WASH-1400 has been used for this type of probabilistic 1.40 risk assessment cf non-nuclear pipeline systems. For example, a 1.41 report entitled " LNG Terminal Risk Assessment Study for Los Angeles California," prepared by Science Applications Inc., has used failure 1.43 rate data from WASH-1400 to evaluate the risk to the general public 1.44 from a natural gas processing and delivery facility located at Los 1.45 Angeles Harbor.
\x )
Amendment 8 Q311.9-1 September 1984
,- ,-- - - , ,.,-,,em,,-m-. , , - - - , - - . - - - - - . . - , - , - - -, --a . . - - - . - . , - -
n1224106cr&8a 07/06/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR fN. The installation procedures and operation of pipelines used for 1.46
\ ) transporting flammable liquids and gases are governed by the code of 1.48 Federal Regulations (CFR). Welds in such pipelines are inspected 1.49 using nondestructive test procedures following CFR 195.234. Also, 1.51 CFR Sections 195.238 and 195.242 require the installation of external
, coatings and cathodic protection on pipelines in order to mitigate 1.53 i corrosion. These regulatory practices are designed to reduce the 1.54 failure rates of pipelines. The Mobil Pipeline near BVPS-2 was 1.55 installed and is operated according to the applicable regulations. 1.56 Because the Mobil Pipeline is a new installation, the ap,clication of 1.57 failure rate data of existing piping taken from WASH-1400 provides a 2.1 conservative estimate of the failure probability. The develc; ment of 2.2 failure rates for buried pipelines using data from the U.S.
Department of Transportation would not necessarily improve the 2.4 accuracy of.the analysis. Because the data would have to be reduced, 2.5 selecting only cases with pipe materials, corrosion protection, and 2.6 length of service similar to the Mobil Pipeline, only a limited 2.8 amount of directly applicable data is likely to result. This would 2.9 create large uncertainties in probabilistic failure modeling. 2.10 The information above provides justification for the use of pipe 2.11 failure rate data from WASH-1400 for the probabilistic failure 2.12 analysis of the Mobil Pipeline. The analysis demonstrated that a 2.13 rupture of the pipeline in the vicinity of BVPS-2 is a low- 2.14 probability event and therefore unlikely. However, a number of 2.15 accident scenarios were postulated to evaluate the consequences should the pipeline rupture. The accident scenarios and their 2.16
(j$
(,, consequences are discussed in response to FSAR Questions 311.6 and 311.7. The results of the analyses show that the pressures and fire 2.17 radiation resulting from gasoline explosions are not a safety concern 2.18 to the BVPS-2 structures.
4
() Amendment 8 Q311.9-2 September 1934
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._.._____m - _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ . . _ _ _ . . -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
n1224106sr&821 07/09/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR f NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.54 (Section 8.3) 1.13 PeriodicLtesting and test loading of an emergency diesel generator in 1.14
- a nuclear power plant is a necessary function to demonstrate the 1.15 operability, capability and availability of the unit on demand.
Periodic testing coupled with good preventive maintenance practices 1.16
-will assure optimum equipment readiness and availability on demand. 1.17 This is the desired goal. 1.18
'To achieve this optimum equipment readiness status the following 1.19 requirements should be met:
- 1. The equipment should be tested with a minimum loading of 1.21 25 percent of rated load. No load or light load operation 1.22 will cause incomplete combustion of fuel resulting in the formation of gum and varnish deposits on the cylinder walls, 1.23 intake and exhaust valves, pistons and piston rings, etc. ,
and accumulation of unburned fuel in the turbocharger and 1.24 exhaust system. The consequences of no load or light load 1.25 operation are potential equipment failure due to the gum and varnish deposits and fire in the engine exhaust system. 1.26 ,
- 2. : Periodic surveillance testing should be performed in 1.31 accordance with the applicable NRC guidelines (R.G. 1.108),
']Q and with the. recommendations of the engine manufacturer. 1.32 Conflicts between any such recommendations and the NRC 1.33 guidelines, particularly with respect to test frequency, loading and duration, should be identified and justified. 1.34
- 3. Preventive maintenance should go beyond the normal routine 1.35 adjustments, servicing and repair of components when a malfunction occurs. Preventive maintenance should encompass 1.37 investigative testing of components which have a history of repeated malfunctioning and require constant attention and 1.38 repair. In such cases consideration should be given to 1.39 replacement of those components with other products which have a record. of demonstrated reliability, rather than 1.40 repetitive repair and maintenance of the existing components. Testing of the unit after adjustments or 1.41 repairs have been made only confirms that the equipment is operable and does not necessarily mean that the root cause 1.42' of the problem has been eliminated or alleviated.
- 4. Upon completion _ of repairs or~ maintenance and prior to an 1.43 actual start, run, and load test 'a final equipment check should be made to assure that all' electrical circuits are 1.44 functional, i.e., fuses are in place, switches and circuit breakers are in their proper position, no loose wires, all 1.45 test leads have been removed, and all valves are 'in the Amendment 4 Q430.54-1 December 1953
n1224106src8:1 07/09/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR
/~ 1 proper position to permit a manual start of the equipment. 1.46 Aft'er the unit has been satisfactorily started and load 1.47 tested, return the unit to ready automatic standby service and under the control of the control room operator. 1.48 Provide a discussion of how the above requirements have been 1.50 implemented in the emergency diesel generator system design and how 1.51 they will be considered when the plant is in commercial operation, i.e., by what means will the above requirements be enforced 1.52 (SRP 8.3.1, Parts II and III).
Response: 1.53 Periodic testing and/or testing after troubleshooting or repair of' 1.54 the emergency diesel generators (EDG) is performed in accordance with 1.55 the appropritte Station Operating and Surveillance Procedures.
Loading of the emergency diesel generators for test purposes is 1.56 performed at tib less than 25 percent and no greater than 100 percent 1.58 of rated load. Refer to the response provided for Question 430.25 2.1 for the applicable time periods when the emergency diesel generator is permitted to operate at no load conditions. 2.3 Surveillance testing and inspection of the emergency diesel 2.4 generators is performed at the required intervals in accordance with 2.5 the appropriate formalized Maintenance Surveillance Procedures and operations Surveillance Test program. (Refer also to the response 2.7 provided for Question 430.25).
v The Maintenance Program requires review of all completed work 2.8 requests for repeat malfunctions. An equipment failure trend 2.9 analysis is performed to identify components that should be examined for possible -placement by more reliable items. This activity 2.11 includes reviews of LERs, other plant common experiences, and communication with vendors to establish root causes and replacement 2.12 criteria. The NPRDS program is also used to document equipment 2.13 failures and maintenance problem areas.
A threefold approach is utilized to ensure equipment is properly 2.14 returned to service following a maintenance cutage. All 2.15 safety-related work involving disassembly, repair, and reassembly is done with prepared procedures to ensure that all equipment repairs 2.16 reestablish initial conditions (wires reconnected, etc). All 2.17 equipment outage requests are controlled utili:ing the station clearance procedures, which document the steps necessary to both 2.18 remove and then return the equipment to service. The equipment 2.19 clearance procedures itemize the specific fuses, switches, breakers, valves, etc. , that must be realigned to return the emergency diesel 2.20 generator electrical and mechanical systems to service. Finally the 2.21 maintenance work request (MWR), which was used as the work authori:ation and control document, identifies the testing required 2.22 to declare the equipment operable. When the MUR is prepared, 2.23 applicable post-maintenance testing requirements, such as operations
\
Amendment 8 Q430.54-2 September 1984 a . -_ . _ _ _ _ _ _
v n1224106sra8bh 07/13/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9
[m Question 430.55 (Section 8.3) 1.13
& ]' The availability en demand of an emergency diesel generator is 1.14 dependent upon, among other things, the proper functioning of its 1.15 controls and monitoring instrumentation. This equipment is generally 1.16 panel mounted and in some instances the panels are mounted directly on the diesel generator skid. Major diesel engine damage has 1.18 occurred at some operating plants from vibration induced wear on skid mounted control and monitoring instrumentation. This sensitive 1.20 instrumentation is not made to withstand and function accurately for prolonged periods under continuous vibrational stresses normally 1.21 encountered with internal combustion engines. Operation of sensitive 1.22 instrumentation under this environment rapidly deteriorates calibration, accuracy and control signal output. 1.23 Therefore, except for sensors and other equipment that must be 1.24 directly mounted on the engine or associated piping, the controls and 1.25 monitoring instrumentation should be installed on a free standing floor mounted panel separate from the engine skids, and located on a 1.26 vibration free floor area. If the floor is not vibration free, the 1.27 panel shall be equipped with vibration mounts.
Confirm your compliance with the above requirement or provide 1.28 justification for norcompliance (SRP 8.3.1, Parts II and III). 1.29 73 Response: 1.30
/
)
s_- / Controls and monstoring equipment,which are not required to be 1.31 ^
directly mounted en the engine or associated piping, will have their 1.32 vibration levels monitored during the diesel generator testing period to ascertain if these vibration level values are within the 1.33 acceptable vibration level vaAles furnished by the vendor. 4 Should these vibrat!on values exceed the vendor's recommended values, 1.34 then the subject equioment will be removed from the engine skid and 1.35 mounted in a free-standing or wall-mounted seimsically qualified configuration.
(
(3)
Lj Amendment 8 Q430.55-1 September 1984
n1224106src8t 07/10/84 103 BVPS-2 FSAR "X NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.56 (Section 9.5.2) 1.13 The information regarding the onsite communications system 1.14 (Section 9.5.2) does not adequately cover the system capabilities 1.15 during transients and accidents. Provide the following information: 1.16
- 1. Identify all working stations on the plant site where it may 1.18 be necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the 1.20 control room or the emergency shutdown panel during and/or following transients and/or accidents (including fires) in 1.22 order to mitigate the consequences of the event and to attain a safe cold plant shutdown. 1.23
- 2. Indicate the maximum sound levels that could exist at each 1.24 of the above identified working stations for all transients 1.26 and accident conditions.
- 3. Indicate the type of communication systems available at each 1.27 of the above identified working stations. 1.28
- 4. Indicate the maximum background noise level that could exist 1.29 at each working station and yet reliably expect effective 1.31 communication with the control room using:
zm
! )
x ,' a. Page party communications systems, and 1.33
- b. Any other additional communication system provided that 1.34 working station.
- 5. Describe the performance requirements and tests that the 1.36 above onsite working stations communication systems will be 1.38 required to pass in order to be assured that effective communication with the control room or emergency shutdown 1.39 panel is possible under all conditions (SRP 9.5.2, Parts II 1.40 and III).
Response: 1.42
- 1. The working station on the plant site where it may be necessary 1.44l for plant petsonnel to communicate with the main control room or 1.46 the emergency shutdown panel area during and/or following transients and/or accidents (including fires) in order to 1.48 mitigate the consequences of the event and to attain a safe, cold plant shutdown is tabulated in Table Q430.56-1. 1.49l
- 2. The station is located in a totally enciesed area which 1.51 4
contains electrical panels and other switching devices required 1.52 for a safe shutdown of BVPS-2. No increase in noise levels is 1.54 expected in this area during transient or accident conditions.
( )
~'
Amendment S Q430.56-1 September 1984
\
n122410&sra8t -
07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR
(5 The estimated maximum ambient sound level that could exist at the 1.56 working station is tabulated in Table Q430.56-1.
s_f /
The estimated maximum,scund level that could exist at task areas 1.57 (specific event-related tasks) which are identified in 1.58 Table Q430.56-2 are b sulated in Table Q430.56-3.
, 3. The types of communication systems available at each of the above 2.2 working stations are tabulated in Table Q430.56-1, 2.4
- 4. As. indicated in item 2 above, the maximum expected noise level in 2.5 l these areas under all plant conditions -will be below 75 dBA. 2.7 Effective communications 'can be expe cted for noise levels of 90 2.8 dBA for the loudspeaker portion of the page party communication 2.9 system. _ The 1]andset portion of this system would be effective 2.10 under higher noise levels. Effective handset communications can 2.11 be expected for the fixed radio and PAX telephone systems for 2.12 noise levels of 87 dB (flat response scale). Effective 2.13 communications can be expected using the double ear-cup headsets of the calibration jack system for noise levels up to 110 dBA. 2.14 Estimated manimum sound-levels that could exist at work stations 2.16 listed in Table Q430.56-1 while permitting effective 2.17 communication are tabulated,in Table Q430.56-1.
Estimated maximum scund levels that could exist at task areas 2.18
(h (specific event-related tasks) which are identified N/ -
in m Table Q430.56-2 while permitting effective communication are 2.19 tabulated in Table Q430.56-4.
Preoperational testing of the page party system, calibration jack 2.20 system, and PAX telephone system will verify _that effective 2.21 communications can be established from all work stations and task areas.
- 5. The performance requirements and tests -are outlined in test 2.23 specificatiens for the communications systems, TS? No. 2~-TSP-COS- 2.24 40A.A- through -ISP Ho. 2-C05-40K-H, and includes insulation 2.25 resistance tests.of all J' power and communications caoles and operability tests for paging ar.d voici telephone communications. 2.26 Refer- to Section 14.2.12.57.1, which a'ddresse's testing that 2.28 ve" fies adequate communications . coverage and reliability as 2.29 required by Regulatory Guide @ i l . 4, 9 V
m-
'e-
\_ / Amendment 8 Q430.56-2 , Septemcer 1954 f ,
r
- , - e,-- ------,vn -.. p - - , ,r., - - . , - - - . - - - ----~--w,. -,---v- - , -
" ' ~
] ; g. '
r:12 rs8J 07/12/84' 160- . ( )?
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE Q430.56-1 1.11 COMMUNICAll0N SYSTEM TYPE
- 1.13 lifrective Communication Sosand Level-dBA1 1.16 Voico Calibration . PAX Estimated Maximum Ambient Sound 1.17 I }/0[hIDg_ M athir! faging Jack TeIephone Leveis tdBA1 1.18 flain control room Yes (90) Yes (110) Yes (87) 60-65 1.20
. (Control bidg-El 735'-6") 1.21
, Working station where it' 1.23
! may be necessary for plant 1.24
! personnel to communicate 1.25 with tiie main control room 1.26 or emergency shutdown panol 1.27 a rga 1.28 Al tornate stintdown panol Yes (90) Yes (110) 60-65 1.30
( Auxi l ia ry llidg-El 7 % ' -6" ) 1.31 i
I HQl[* 1.33
- Errective communication sound levels are based on using a double ear-cup headset. 1.35 i
i 4
i i
l i
i j Amendment 8 1 of 1 September 1984 1f l-k
= - - - _ - -
n1224106srt81 07/06/84 162 r
BVPS-2 FSAR 3
(O .
TABLE Q430.56-2 1.9 TASK AREAS / COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 1.11 Fire Page Calibration PAX 1.14 Task Area Elev Area Party Jack Telephone 1.15 Control Bldg 707-6 CB-1 Yes Yes Yes 1.17 725-6 CB-2 Yes NA NA 1.18 735-6 CB-3 Yea Yes Yes 1.19 Auxiliary Bldg 710-6 FA-3 Yes Yes Yes 1.21 735-6 PA-3 Yes Yes Yes 1.22 755-6 PA-4 Yes Yes Yes 1.23 773-6 PA-5 Yes Yes Yes 1.24 755-6 P4-6 Yes Yes No 1.25 755-6 PA-7 Yes Yes No 1.26 Service Bldg 730-6 SB-1 Yes Yes Yes 1.28 730-6 SB-2 Yes Yes Yes 1.29 Diesel Generator 730-6 DG-1 Yes Yes Yes 1.31 Bldg 730-6 DG-2 Yes Yes Yes 1.32 O(m,/ Cable Vault and 735-6 CV-1 Spkr only Yes No 1.34 CV-2 1.35 Rod Control Area 735-6 Yws Yes No 755-6 CV-3 Yes Yes Yes 1.36
. 773-6 CV-5 Yes Yes Yes 1.37 Main Steam Valve 773-6 MS-1 Yet ,Yes Yes 1.39 Area 1.40 Safeguards Area 718-6 SG-IN Yes Yes Yes 1.42 718-6 SG-IS Yes Yes Yes 1.43 741-0 SG-IN Yes Yes Yes 1.44 741-0 SG-IS Yes Yes Yes 1.45 Fuel Bldg 752-5 FB-1 Spkr only Yes No 1.47 766-4 FS-1 Yes Yes No 1.48 Reactor Bldg 692-11 RC-1 Yes Yes Yes 1.50 718-6 RC-1 Yes Yes Yes 1.51 738-10 RC-1 Yes Yes Yes 1.52 767-10 RC-1 Yes Yes Yes 1.53 r%
(JI Amendment 8 1 of 1 September 1984
n1224106src8h 07/06/84 162 BVSP-2 FSAR 1.15 TABLE Q430.56-3 1.17 7s
( ,)
TASK AREAS / SOUND LEVELS 1.19 Elev Fire Estimated Maximum 1.22 Task Areas (ft-in) Area Sound Level (dBA) 1.23 Control Bldg 707-6 CB-1 60-65 1.25 725-6 CB-2 60-65 1.26 735-6 CB-3 60-65 1.27 Auxiliary Bldg 710-6 PA-3 80-90 1.29 735-6 PA-3 75-80 1.30 755-6 PA-4 80-85 1.31 773-6 PA-5 80-85 1.32 755-6 PA-6 75-80 1.33 755-6 PA-7 75-80 1.34 Service Bldg 730-6 SB-1 ,
75-80 1.36 730-6 SB-2 75-80 1.37 Diesel Generator 730-6 DG-1 100-105 1.39 Bldg 730-6 DG-2 100-105 1.40 Cable Vault and 735-6 CV-1 75-80 1.42 Rod Control Area 735-6 CV-2 75-80 1.43
(s 755-6 CV-3 70-75 1.44
( ,) 773-6 CV-5 75-80 1.45 Main Steam Valve 773-6 MS-1 100-105 1.47 Area 1.48 Safeguards Area 718-6 SG-1N 95-100 1.51 718-6 SG-15 95-100 1.52 741-0 SG-1N 85-95 1.53 741-0 SG-15 85-95 1.54 Fuel Bldg 752-5 FB-1 85-90 1.58 766-4 FB-1 85-90 1.59 Reactor Bldg 692-11 RC-1 90-05 2.3 718-6 RC-1 100-105 2.4 738-10 RC-1 100-105 2.5 767-10 RC-1 90-95 2.6
['N
\s-)
Amendment 8 1 of 1 September 1984
n1224106sra8g 07/06/84 162 BVPS-2 FSAR
(
V TABLE 0430.56-4 1.8 ,
TASK AREA 5/ EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION 1.10 SOUND LEVELS 1.11 ,
t Elev Fire Page Calibration PAX 1.14 Task Area (ft-in) Area Party Jack
- Telephone 1.15 Control Bldg 707-6 CB-1 90 110 87 1.17 i 725-6 CB-2 90 NA NA 1.18 735-6 CB-3 90 110 87 1.19 Auxiliary Bldg 710-6 PA-3 90 110 87 1.21 '
735-6 PA-3 90 110 87 1.22 755-6 PA-4 90 110 37 1.23 773-6 PA-5 90 110 87 1.24 755-6 PA-6 90 110 NA 1.25 755-6 PA-7 90 110 NA 1.26 Service Bldg 730-6 SB-1 90 110 87 1.28 730-6 SB-2 90 110 37 1.29 Diesel Generator '730-6 DG-1 90 110 87 1.31 Bldg 730-6 DG-2 90 110 87 1.32
(% Cable Vault and 735-6 CV-1 90 110 NA 1.34 x Rod Control Area 735-6 CV-2 90 110 NA 1.35 755-6 CV-3 90 110 87 1.36 773-6 CV-5 90 110 87 1.37 Main Steam Valve 773-6 MS-1 90 110 87 1.39 Area 1.40 Safeguards Area 718-6 SG-1N 90 110 87 1.42 718-6 SG-1S 90 110 87 1.43 741-0 'SG-1N 90 110 87 1.44 741-0 SG-15 90 110 87 1.45
, Fuel Bldg 752-5 FB-1 90 110 NA 1.47 766-4 FB-1 90 110 NA 1.48 Reactor Bldg 692-11 RC-1 90 110 87 1.50 718-6 RC-1 90 110 87 1.51 738-10 RC-1 90 110 87 1.52 767-10 RC-1 90 110 87 1.53 Note: 1.55
- Double ear-cup headset 1.57
-( 'T .
Q ,
Amendment 8 1 of 1 September 1984
n1224106src8s 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR
. f' '} NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 V
Question 430.57 (SRP 9.5.2) 1.13 Discuss the protective measures taken to assure a functionally 1.14 operable onsite and offsite communication system. The discussion 1.16 should include the consideration system. The discussion should 1.17 include the considerations given to component failures, loss of power, the severing of ccmmunication lines or trunks as a result of 1.18 an accident or fire, and any sharing with the Unit 1 communication systems and their power sources (SRP 9.5.2, Part II). 1.19 Response: 1.20
.A fire or accident in a localized area of the plant, individual trunk 1.21 line, or duct line will not substantially impact the capability of 1.22 the integrated communication system to provide effective communication between plant personnel. The integrated communication 1.23 system is comprised of separate and independent systems. Component 1.24 failures in one of these systems will have a limited effect on that system and no effect on other communication systems. 1.25 Localized loss of normal plant power would have limited effect on the 1.26 overall plant communication capabilities due to diesel generator and 1.27 battery backing of the various systems.
,r y
( ,) The page party and calibration jack systems are powered from the 1.28 essential bus, which is backed by the plant onsite, nonsafety-related 1.29 diesel generator. The PAX telephone and fixed radio systems are 1.31 powered from a BVPS-1 48 V de dedicated communication battery / charger system. The microwave radio system is powered from a BVPS-1 48 V de 1.33 dedicated switchyard battery / charger system.
The page party systems for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 are totally separate and 1.34 independent, with a capability to merge or isolate the two systems. 1.35 The PAX telephone system and the radio systems serve BVPS-1 and BVPS- 1.36 2.
A fire or accident in the control building or cable tunnel will have 1.37 a limited effect on the calibration jack system and no effect on the 1.38 page party system. A cold shutdown can be achieved by operator 1.39 action at the alternate shutdown panel in the auxiliary building. A 1.40 cut- off switch located at the alternate shutdown panel will isolate the calibration jack and page party trunk lines to the control 1.41 building from all other plant work stations. Plant work stations 1.43 and task areas are tabulated in Tables Q430.56-1 and Q430.56-2, respectively.
A fire or accident in any other localized plant area that may cause 1.44 the severing of communication lines may impact the capability of 1.45 using the calibration jack and page party systems. The PAX telephone 1.46 g)
(
v Amendment 8 Q430.57-1 September 1984
. . , , - . _, . - _ - . , .- .-m.. . - ,
.. . _ - . _ _ . . _ . . . . . . _ . = _ . . ,._ _ . - _ - -_= - - ... . - . -
I -
n1224106sra8s 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR system would be affected only in that localized plant area where the accident occurred.
The PAX. telephones and hand-held portable radios may be used to 1.47 provide functionally operable onsite and offsite communications while 1.48 achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown.
f i
l i
~
i t
I l
i W
i i-1 i: ;
f c
J l
Amendment S Q430.57-2 September 1984 t
e I
n12241062rtSbg 07/12/84 160 BVPS-2 FSAR
( ] NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9
\s_ / '
Question 430.58 (Section 9.5.2) 1.13 The description of the intraplant and interplant (plant to offsite) 1.14 communication systems is inadequate. Provide a detailed description 1.15 for each communication system listed in Section 9.5.2.2 of the FSAR.
The detailed description shall include an identification and 1.16 description of each system's power source, a description of each 1.17 system's components (headsets, handsets, switchboards, amplifiers, consoles, handheld radios, etc), location of major components (power 1.18 rources, consoles, etc) and interfaces between the various systems (SRP 9.5.2, Parts II and III). 1.19 Response: 1.20 These are the descriptions, in greater detail, of the intraplant and 1.21 interplant (plant-to-offsite) communications systems 1.22 Intraplant Communcations Systems 1.23 The intraplant communications consist of the following systems: page 1.25 party system, calibration jack system, radio system, and private automatic exchange (PAX) telephone system. 1.26
(~~ Page Party System 1.28 O} '
In addition to the information provided in Section 9.5.2.2.1.1, the 1.29 page party system (PPS) consists of amplifiers, handset stations, 1.30 loudspeakers, and special components, such as alarm tone generators, 1.31 merge / isolate cabinets, and various controls. Two communication 1.32 consoles house page party equipment, one located in the main control room and one located in the Shift . Supervisor's office. Control 1.34 ,
switches are provided at these consoles to enable use of the BVPS-2 PPS. In addition, handsets and loudspeakers are located at the 1.35 onsite working stations (refer to the response provided for Question 1.36 430.56, Amendnent 4) and throughout the plant areas of BVPS-2. 1.37 Controls for merging or isolating the BVPS-1 and SVPS-2 page party 1.38 systems are located at the communication console in the main control- 1.39 room, at the auxiliary shutdown panel in BVPS-1, and at the alternate 1.40 shutdown panel (ASP) of BVPS-2.
The PPS is powered from the essential bus panels SD and 6D, which are 1.41 located on the 707 feet-6 inches elevation of the control building. 1.42 The essential bus is fed frem 480 V unit substation 2-5, which is 1.43 ultimately backed by the onsite, nonsafety-related diesel generator. 1.44 Calibration Jack System 1.46 In addition to the description in Section. 9.5.2.2.1.2, the 1.47 calibration jack system is a separately installed system. Jacks are 1.50 m
\
(G Amendment 4 Q430.58-1 December 1983
n1224106srasbg 07/12/84 160 BVPS-2 FSAR
/' T located throughout all areas of the plant and, in particular, are
( ,) . provided on the communication console in the main control room, the 1.51 ESP area of BVPS-2, the Class 1E switchgear area, and the essential 1.52 bus inverter and rectifier area of,BVPS-2.
The major components of the system are heedset/ amplifiers, system 1.53 power supplies (one for each of two channels), phone jacks, and a 1.54 paging interface network.
In' order to facilitate arranging communications on the jack system, a 1.55 tie is provided to the PPS to enable paging via any headset / amplifier 1.57 set connected at any jack location in the system. .
The calibration jack system is powered from the essential bus panel 1.58 2-6D, wnich is Lacked by the onsite nonsafety-related diesel 2.1 generator.
Radio System 2.3 The radio system is shared with BVPS-1 and is described in Section 2.4 9.5.2.2.1.3. An additional remote console is provided at the 2.6 emergency shutdown panel (ESP) area of BVPS-2 at the Emergency 2.7 Response Facility (ERF) and at the Secondary Emergency Response Center approximately 10 miles away from BVPS-2 at South Heights, 2.8 Pennsylvania.
[~') The existing VHF remote consoles are located at the communications 2.9
'\s ,/- console 1 in the main control room, communications console 2 in the 2.10 Shift Supervisor's office, and at the BVPS-1 auxiliary shutdown 2.11 panel.
All of the above' remote consoles are connected to two separate 2.12 control lines. One control line is connected to VHF high band radio 2.13 transmitter / receiver and is the primary radio station for BVPS-1 and 2.14
. BVPS-2. The other control line, selectable by a switch, is connected 2.15 to a VHF low band radio transmitter receiver and is a secondary radio 2.16 system for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2. Both of these bass radios are in the 2.17 radio building. .Each remote console has two speakers so that 2.18 messages can be received from both the primary and secondary base 2.19 stations. The switch selection is identified by lights on the 2.20 console.
The primary radio station can communicate directly with the DLC 2.21 System Centrol Center, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, 2.22 the West Virginia Emergency Services Agency, and the Ohio Disaster 2.23 Service Agency, all of which are within the 10 mile radius of the 2.24
. plant.
The consoles within BVPS-2 are powered from a 120 V ac essential bus 2.25 backed by the onsite, nonsafety-related diesel generator. 2.26 l )
\s_/
Amendment 4 Q430.58-2 December 1933
n1224100srt8bg 07/12/84 160 BVPS-2 FSAR
/~' The radio control circuits at the plant and the radio building are 2.27
(,,)T powered by a 48 V de dedicated communication battery / charger system. 2.28 The batteries are sized to run the system 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> if the ac source is 2.29 lost.
There is a high band base radio transmitter / receiver in the main 2.30 control room. The antenna for this station is on ~the roof of the 2.31 plant. The radio is for emergency use in the event of losing both 2.32 radio transmitter / receiver stations. 2.33 The security radio has a main and a backup repeater station. The 2.36 power for each is an ac to de converter with a battery backup. These 2.37 batteries are sized to run the system 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> if the ac source is lost. Hand-held units key the repeaters, which retransmits all 2.38 messages to give better radio reception in the plant area. 2.39 PAX Telephone System 2.41 The PAX telephone system is described in Section 9.5.2.2.1.4. The 2.43 PAX system is a commercial-type telephone network consisting of an 2.45 onsite switchboard located in the communication area of BVPS-1 that provides telephone service to BVPS-2 dial-type telephone handsets. 2.46 PAX telephones are located at the communication consoles in the main 2.47 control room, at the Shift Supervisor's office, and at the auxiliary 2.48 shutdown panel. PAX phones are also located at the BVPS-2 alternate 2.49
[~}
(,,/
shutdown panel, the ESP, and the essential bus inverter and rectifier area.
2.50 Telephones are located throughout BVPS-2 and associate buildings on 2.51 the site. The primary plant telephone system consists of 100 line, 2.52 rotary type telephone switchboard. This switchboard is powered from 2. 5'4 a 48 V de source.
The 48 V de source is obtained from a 120 V ac to 48 V de converter. 3.2 The converter supplies 43 V de operating pcwer to the switchboard and 3.3 current to keep 48 V battery bank fully charged. The battery bank 3.5 operates in parallel with the converter and maintains full power to the switchboard for a minimum of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in the event of a converter 3.6 failure or a less of ac power to the converter. The converter is 3.8 connected to the vital ac bus. The converter is sized to provide 3.9 full power to the switchboard and simultaneously recharge the battery 3.10 from fully discharged to fully charged within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This power 3.11 system is shared with BVPS-1 telephone switchboard, which has an indentical 100 line telephone switchboard. 3.12 The BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 switchboards are interconnected so that 3.13 incoming and outgoing calls can be completed even with a failure of 3.14 either switchboard. All of the commen switchboard equipment for 3.15 BVPS-2, such as ringers, dial tone, etc, are provided with standby 3.16 units. The telephone lines frem the BVPS-2 switchboard to various 3.17 parts of the plant are fed radially and are in separate conduits. 3.18
,/ T
! /
V Amendment 4 Q430.58-3 December 1933
n1224106sra8bg 07/12/84 160 BVPS-2 FSAR l The loss of a cable within the plant would not affect more than six 3.19 telephones. Most of.the telephone cables only serve two or three 3.20 telephones. The 20 trunk lines to the switchboard leaves the plant 3.21 in 2 separate cables in separate underground duct runs. These trunks 3.23 tie to a 1,000 line switch at the ERF. The loss of one cable would 3.24 only reduce the number of trunk lines to the plant. The trunk lines 3.25 tie to. the DLC telephone system and to the local and long distance Bell Telephone system network. 3.26 There is an independent telephone system between the BVPS-2 main 3.27 control room and the containmer.t building. Telephones on this system 3.29 are located in the main control room, containment building, personnel 3.30
, hatch, and emergency air lock. The system is powered from the 3.31 essential ac bus. If the telephone handset is lifted at any one of 3.32 the four locations, it automatically rings at the other two 3.33 locations.
Direct telephone lines from the ERF switchboard to key plant 3.34 personnel in the administration building have been established. This 3.36 is in . addition to a 120 line solid-state telephone switchboard dedicated to the administration building. This switchboard is 3.38 connected via trunk circuits to the ERF 1,000 line switchboard, which in turn connects to all the DLC communication systems and the Bell 3.39 Telephone system network. The 1,000 line switchboard at the ERF has 3.41 redundant equipment. The ERF switchboard is connected to the DLC 3.42 network and the Bell system with a large number of trunks. 3.43 V The. administration building switchboard is powered by 48 V de from an ac to de converter operating in~ parallel with a 4S V battery system.
3.44 3.45 The 48 V' battery can operate the system for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in the event of 3.46 an ac power failure. 3.47 A direct telephone system is provided between the ERF and the main 3.48 j- control room. These lines are established for emergency use. 3.49 Personnel in the ERF can access one of six lines to the control room. 3.50 In the' control room, two of these lines appear -on the operator's 3.51 desk, two on the Shif t Supervisor's desk, and two in the computer 3.52
-room. Lifting the handset at either end will automatically ring the 3.53 respective line at the other end. This system is powered from the 3.55 essential bus at the ERF end and from the vital bus at the BVP& 3.56 end. ,
. A direct telephene line is connected to the DLC system control center 3.57 frcm the BVPS-2 control room. This line is powered by dry cell 4.1 batteries and has a separate signaling system.
Plant-to-Offsite Communications Systems 4.3 1
Information regarding plant-to-offsite ccmmunications systems is 4.4 described in the Emergency Preparedness Plan and has been 4.5 successfully. . reviewed in accordance with SRP 13.3 SRP 9.5.2 4.7 Amendment 8 430.58-4 September 1984
n1224106sra8bg 07/12/84 160 BVPS-2 FSAR
/~'s. indicates that the emergency preparedness licensing branch should
( _) review plant-to-offsite communications as part of their 4.8 responsibility under SRP 13.3. No acceptance criteria or review 4.9 procedures applicable to plant-to-offsite communications systems are provided in SRP 9.5.2 and conclusions presented in the " Evaluation 4.10 Findings" .section of SRP 9.5.2 pertain only to the areas of review 4.11 already performed under SRP 13.3.
The plant-to-offsite communications consist of the following separate 4.12 and diverse systems: commercial telephone land-line system, plant- 4.15 to-offsite. radio system, microwave system, system operator telephone l 4.17 system, and PAX telephone system. I Commercial Telephone Land-Line System 4.19 Selected locations in the plant are provided with commercial 4.21 telephone company voice circuits and telephone handsets. Components 4.25 of this system are the handsets and their cabling system throughout the plant. The main control room, Shift Supervisor's office, plant 4.26 offices, and security office are also served by the Bell Telephone 4.27
. system. The Bell system cables are in separate manholes and are 4.28 independent of the DLC telephone system. The talk circuit and ringer 4.30 power for single lines is from the Bell system's central office. 4.31 Power for lights and ringer on key set telephones is from the BVPS-2 4.32 essential bus.
. [N Plant-to-Offsite Radio System 4.34 The main components of the system are described in Section 4.35 9.5.2.2.2.2.
-This radio system is powered from the 48 V de dedicated communication 4.37 battery / charger system. 4.38 Microwave System 4.40 The microwave system is a shared facility with BVPS-1. It is 4.42
-comprised of microwave radios (located at the switchyard relay house) 4.44 and their affiliated circuits.
The microwave radios are powered from a BVPS-1 48 V de dedicated 4.45 ,
switchyard battery / charger system. 4.46 System Operator Telephone System 4.43 The system operator telephone is located on the communication console 4.49 in the main control room. It is a direct link, via hardwire and 4.52 microwave radio, to the DLC dispatcher. It'is separated from all 4.53 other telephone systems and powered by two dedicated No. 6 dry cells. 4.54 Amendment 8 430.58-5 September 1984 a(S
n1224106erc8v 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR jy NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.10 V
Question 430.59 (SRP 9.5.2) 1.14 In Section 9.5.2.2.1.2 of the FSAR, you state that during emergency 1.15 or accident conditions the calibration jack "... system can be used as 1.16 an . alternate means to relay messages between different areas of the plant." Decribe how the relaying or messages using the calibration 1.17 jack system will be accomplished for those areas specified in Request 1.18 430.57 above. The description should include the maximum number of 1.19 plant personnel needed to relay the messages, the procedures, if any, 1.20 that will be used in setting-up and using the relay, and assurances that adequate station personnel will be onsite in the event that the 1.21 relay system must be used (SRP 9.5.2, Part II).
Response: 1.22 The calibration jack system is an installed network of phone jacks 1.23 and cabling with power supplies provided across the voice circuits. 1.24 Two voice circuits are available at each jack station. 1.25 Headset / amplifier units can be connected to the network at any jack 1.26 location,- enabling communications to take place between two or more 1.27 jack station locations.
In the event of an emergency, the jack system could be called upon as 1.28
(}
(_ ,/-
an additional or alternate means of communicating between preselected 1.29 locations in the plant. For example, if a fire situation occurred in 1.30 a plant building, a convenient jack station at the fire brigade 1.31 staging area could be designated, and an individual dispatched to the location to establish a direct communication link to the main control 1.32 room or emergency shutdown panel area. It is not envisioned that 1.34 this would be the primary means of communication, but could be used 1.35 in addition to or in place of page party, radio, or telephone.
Section 9.5.2.2.1'.2, which states that during emergency or accident 1.36 conditions the calibration jack " ... system can be used as an 1.37 alternate means to relay messages between different areas of the plant," has been revised to, ". . . system can be used as an alternate 1.38
- means of communications 'between two or more areas of the plant."
SFP 9.5.2 is devoted to the design of communications systems and 1.39 provides no criteria for such items as staffing.
f'~s 1 e
\ ,/ Amendment 8 Q430.59-1 September 1984 g , n-, - - , , -y,, ~
n1224100sre8tj 07/07/84 38 BVPS-2 FSAR f' j . NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 V
Question 430.60 (SRP 9.5.2) 1.13 In Section 9.5.2.4 of the FSAR you state that in-service inspection 1.14 tests, preventative maintenance, and operability checks are performed 1.15 periodically to prove the availability of the communication systems.
Provide the frequency for these tests (SRP 9.5.2, Parts II and III). 1.16 Response: 1.17 i
All . communications systems are inspected and tested (and adjusted if 1.18 required) prior to completion of installation to ensure proper 1.19 coverage and audibility. The systems described above are of 1.20 conventional design and their performance has been proven successful at other operating plants. 1.21 The BVPS Emergency ' Preparedness Plan (EPP) includes implementing 1.22 procedures which prescribe the required frequency for periodic 1.23 testing of communication systems at BVPS-2. Communication systems 1.24 are tested based on their frequency of use and importance to the site responses outlined in the EPP. Since the intra-plant communication 1.26
, systems (i.e., page party system, calibration jack system, radio system, and private automatic exchange telephone-PAX system) are used 1.27 on a daily basis, periodic testing is not required. Damaged or 1.28 O broken equipment is repaired by the appropriate maintenance
() organization. To ensure muimum audibility, the page party system is 1.29 tested every 4 months. All plant to off-site communication systems 1.30 in use on a daily basis (i.e., commercial telephone land line system and system operator telephone system) are not required to be 1.31 periodically tested. The DLC radio system is tested annually in 1.32 accordance with the provisions of the FCC license. The radio 1.33 communication links between the control room, the three risk counties, and the Per.nsylvania State Police are tested weekly. The 1.35 microwave system is monitored continuously at all terminals for alarm conditions. !!anthly checks are accomplished on microwave terminals 1.36 and all terminals are inspected on a 2-year schedule by DLC substations and shops personnel. 1.37 The Emergency Communication System (i.e., States Hotline, Nuclear 1.38 Regulatory Commission ENS Hotline, Nuclear Regulatory Commission HPN 1.39 Hotline, and the Department of Environmental Resources / Bureau of Radiation Protection Hotline) are tested on a monthly basis in 1.40 accordance with EPP Implementing Procedures.
() Amendment 8 Q430.6C-1 September 19S4
n1224106src8r 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
' /~'N . NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9
- (
. Question 430.61 (Section 9.5.3) 1.13 Identify the vital areas and hazardous areas where emergency lighting 1.14 is needed for safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of 1.15 personnel in the event of an accident. Tabulate the lighting system 1.16 provided in your design to accommodate those areas so identified.
Include the degree of compliance to Standard Review Plan 9.5.1 1.17 regarding emergency lighting requirements in the event of a fire 1.18 (SRP 9.5'.3, Parts I and II).
Response: 1.19 Normal ac lighting is used throughout the plant. Backup de lighting 1.21 is used for illumination of all personnel exits. Backup de lighting 1.22 <
f is used in conjunction with backup ac lighting in areas from which safe shutdown operations may be controlled. 1.23 These safe-shutdown areas are: 1.24
- 1. Main control room, 1.26
- 2. Emergency shutdown panel area, 1.27 I/"'% 3. Class 1E switchgear areas, 1.28
~b 4. Essential bus inverter and rectifier area, and 1.29
, 5. Alternate shutdown panel area. 1.30 Additional backup' lighting in the form of sealed beam lamps powered 1.32 by _ individual, 8-hour- rated battery packs is provided in the 1.33
. following areas:
- 1. Perscnnel exits throughcut the plant, and 1.35
- 2. Safe' shutdown control areas. 1.36 i
These individual sealed beam / battery pack un.ts provide 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of 1.38 acceptable illumination for personnel evacuation and firefighting 1.39
. activities in the event that a fire has interrupted the circuit integrity of the backup de and backup ac lighting systems. 1.40 The lighting system is, therefore, summarized as follows: 1.41 O Amendment 8 Q430.61-1 September 1984 f
- , . . -.,---w-,---,-,,-,-n-r- ,----,--_-,--,-,.-,-,---,.-,5-~,. .-n,
n1224106src8r 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR i
/~'N Individual Sealed 1.46
(,,) Normal Backup Beam / Battery Backup 1.47 AC DC Pack Units AC 1.48 Safe shutdown X X X X 1.50 control areas 1.51 Personnel er.its X X X 1,55 throughout X X X 1.56 the plant 1.57 Balance of X 2.3 plant 2.4 This design is in full compliance with Standard Review Plan 9.5.1. 2.9 The following table depicts the safe shutdown control (work) stations 2.10 and the two types of emergency lighting that are available in these 2.11 areas to provide for safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident: 2.12 Backup AC with Individually Sealed 2.16 Onsite Nonsafety Beam /8 hr Rated , 2.17 Area / Elevation / Fire Area Diesel Generator Battery Pack Units 2.18
[~ ) Main Control Room 2.20 V 735-6 CB-3 X X 2.21 Emergency Shutdown 2.25 Panel Area 2.26 707-6 CB-1 X X 2.27 Alternate Shutdown 2.31 Panel Area 2.32 755-6 ASP X X 2.33 In addition to the two power sources indicated above, the backup ac 2.38 has the ability to automatically transfer to the 2-hour rated backup 2.39 de station batteries, providing for a third energency power source.
All access and egress paths to the safe shutdown control (work) 2.40 stations haye individually sealed beam /S-hr rated battery pack units, 2.41 providing the necessary emergency illumination to/from these stations.
All remaining Category I (nuclear safety-related) task areas, and 2.42 access and egress paths thereto, are serviced with portable lighting 2.43 system (s) that consist of 8-hr rated battery pack units and are readily accessible to main control room personnel. Refer to the 2.45 response provided for Question 430.65, Amendmen: 5. for illuminatien
\j Amendment 8 Q430.61-2 September 1934
In1224106sra8r 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
't i
+' l levels provided and Table Q430.61-1, Amendment 8, for listing of task 2.46 l i- areas. '
?
}.
4 4
t:
I s
1 li T 1 l
j-i i' l:
- i. ;
i i.
i.
t
- k. ' ?
i t
t
- - r t
- i
(
l.-
[ 'c 1-t i: ,
- '. b: -I ;
li .
't
- a l
i
. i
~
t t
l' ;
l l:
t
!. Amendment 8 . Q430.61-3 September 1984 l !
I-
!' i 6
[ -.
l-
!. }
[
i
t n1224106sra8f 07/06/84 162 BVPS-2 FSAR v}.
('~ TABLE Q430.61-1 TASK AREAS REQUIRING EMERGENCY PORTABLE LIGHTINC SYSTEMS 1.8 1.10 Building / Area 1.13 Nuclear Safety-Related Elevation Fire Area 1.14 Building / Area (ft-in) Identification 1.15 Control Bldg 707-6 CB-1 1.17 725-6 CB-2 1.18 735-6 CB-3 1.19 Auxiliary Bldg 710-6 PA-3 1.21 735-6 PA-3 1.22 755-6 PA-4 1.23 773-6 PA-5 1.24 755-6 PA-6 1.25 755-6 PA-7 1.26 Service Bldg 730-6 SB-1 1.28 730-6 SB-2 1.29 Diesel Generator Bldg 730-6 DG-1 1.31 730-6 DG-2 1.32 Cable Vault and Rod 735-6 CV-1 1.34
[~)')
(_ Control Area 735-6 CV-2 1.35 755-6 CV-3 1.36 773-6 CV-4 1.37 773-6 CV-5 1.38 Main Steam Valve Area 773-6 MS-1 1.40 Safeguards Area 718-6 SG-1N 1.42 718-6 SG-1S 1.43 741-0 SG-1N 1.44 741-0 SG-15 1.45
, Fuel Bldg 752-5 FB-1 1.47 766-4 FB-1 1.48 Reactor Bldg 692-11 RC-1 1.50 718-6 RC-1 1.51 738-10 RC-1 1.52 767-10 RC-1 1.53 i
Amendment 8 1 of 1 September 1984
n1224105sra8p 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9
('%,')} ,
Question 430.62 (Section 9.5.3) 1.13 Expand the lighting section of the FSAR to include a discussion of 1.14 how lighting will be provided for those areas listed in Questions 1.15 430.57 and 430.62 above and illuminated by the emergency DC lighting system only, in the event of a loss of offsite ac power (in excess of 1.16 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />), or provide the rationale why lighting is not required in 1.17 these areas. Include in your discussion what, if any, other areas 1.id would require lighting during an extended loss of ac power, and how 1.19 it would be provided (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II).
Response: 1.20 Since both the backup ac and backup de lighting subsystems are 1.21 ultimately backed by the onsite nonsafety diesel generator, the areas 1.22 served by these subsystems will receive backup lighting of an extended duration. The diesel generator has a minimum 7-day onsite 1.23 fuel oil storage capacity.
The areas served are: 1.24
- 1. Safe shutdown control areas; backup ac and backup de, and 1.26
(N
(,). 2. Personnel exits backup de; no other areas of the plant 1.27 require backup lighting, regardless of duration.
A complete loss of ac power (offsite and onsite) is not postulated 1.29 s
for BVPS-2, and would not be in our design basis, for it encompass s 1.30 a " double failure" criterion precept.
- However, as described in the responses provided for Questiens 430.61 1.31 and 430.65, Amendment 8, the following de-based lighting systems 1.32 would be available for this supposition:
- 1. DC lighting, powered by S-hr rated battery pack units, for 1.3%
safe shutdown control stations and access and egress paths 1.35 thereto.
-2. DC lighting, .peuered by 2-hr rated station batteries, for 1.36 safe shutdown control stations.
- 3. Portable lighting units -> 1.37 for infrequent task areas and access and egress routes 1.38 thereto.
1 O
1 k) s Amendment 8 .
Q430.62-1 September 1934
-h - , ----.,.,.,#-#. , . - - , . , , . - - - . . _ _ . - - . - - - -,--w---. --w- < - m, . - - +-- ,.
n1224106sra8q 07/07/84 54
, BVP3-2 FSAR
- NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.11 Question.430.63 (Section 9.5.3) 1.15 Sections 8.3.1 and 9.5.3 of the FSAR do not indicate how during 1.16 accident and transient conditions the backup ac lighting system is 1.17 connected to its power source. Identify whether the connection is 1.18 manual or automatic (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II).
Response: 1.19 The connection is automatic. The backup ac lighting subsystem is 1.21 L
connected to a single non-Class 1E, 480V unit substation through a non-Class 1E, 480V MCC and 480-120/240V dry-type transformers. In 1.23 the event of a loss of normal ac power, this 480V unit substation is automatically loaded onto the onsite, nonsafety diesel generator 1.24 (Section 8.3.1.1.1).
Refer to the responses provided for Questions 430.66, 430.67, and 1.25 430.68, Amendment 8, for additional clarification en lighting system 1.26 power sources.
- O ,
i f
i i
f I
Amendment 8 Q430.63-; September 1984
n1224106sra8o 06/28/84 43gs BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 O
- -t)
Question 430.64 (Section 9.5.3) 1.13
. Provide a discussion on the protective measures taken to assure a 1.14 functionally operable lighting system, including considerations given 1.15 to component failures, loss of ac power, and the severing of lighting
- cables as a result of an accident or fire (SRP 9.53, Parts I and II). 1.16 Response: 1.17 The- lamp in sealed beam / battery pack units will not normally be 1.18 illuminated and will be activated by a loss of normal ac power. 1.19 These units will receive the necessary power to trickle charge the 1.20 battery packs and provide indication of available normal ac power 1.21 from local normal ac lighting circuits. A sealed beam / battery pack 1.22 unit will, therefore, be activated by the loss of normal ac lighting power in the area serviced by the unit, whatever the origin of 1.23 failure (component failure, severing of cables, etc). Individual 1.24 power supplies assure that the failure of any one component will not affect the balance of the units.
The latter system will not be lost as a result of an accident or fire 1.25 since the sealed beam units are self-contained and do not require 1.26 external cabling, with the exception of trickle charging.
i m
f f
t
n1224100srt8n. 07/12/84 ,
160 BVPS-2 FSAR m
NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 N,_)j .
-Question 430.65 (Section 9.5.3) 1.13 You state in Section 9.5.3.1 of the FSAR that the lighting systems 1.14 provide adequate = illumination in all access areas and in all areas 1.15 required for control of safety-related equipment. This statement is 1.16 too general. . The staff has determined that a minimum of 10 foot- 1.17 candles at the work station is required to adequately control, monitor, and/or maintain safety-related equipment during accident and 1.18 transient conditions. For those safe ty-related areas listed in 1.19 Requests 430.51 and 430.62, above, and illuminated by the ac and de lighting systems only, verify that the minimum of 10 foot-candles at 1.21 the work station is being met. Modify your design as necessary 1.22 (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II).
Response: 1.23 All backup emergency lighting subsystems in those areas required for 1.24
.the control of safe shutdown operations has been designated to 1.25 provide a minimum of 10 foot-candles at the safe shutdown work 1.26 stations addressed. Calculations verifying this attribute have been 1.27 performed and completed.
As identified in the response to Question 430.61, Amendment 8, all 1.28
.f~'T. safe shutdown control stations shall have an illuminated level of 1.29 x/ 10 foot-candles average maintained within the task-seeing areas of these work stations, with power provided from both the ensite 1.31 nonsafety-related diesel generator and local battery pack units.
In addition, as further identified in Question 430.61, all access and 1.32 egress paths to safe shutdown control stations shall have an 1.33 illumination of 1/2 foot-candle average maintained as thesq paths are '
determined to be minimum activity and low hazard environments in 1.34 accordance with Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) guidelines.
These paths'will have their lighting powered from both the onsite, 1.35 nonsafety-related diesel generator and local battery pack units. 1.36 Task areas in the plant (where activities for equipment maintenance 1.37 or repair may be required) and access and egress paths thereto, may 1.38
.be illuminated by portable battery powered lighting, readily accessible to operations persennel. Portable lighting facilitates 1.40 tasks for personnel by providing direct lighting at a proper and adjustable angle on the equipment, minimizing surface shadows which 1.41 ceuld hinder maintenance or repair.
Amendment S Q430.65-1 September 1934 i
I
. .- - - . - , _ _ . -- ,...-...-..r . . _ _ , , _m.__. --_,,r -
. , , . . , ,.- , ,_ ....p _ - ,..,_ _. ,, ,w _,_,m _ _ _ - .--
n1224106sra8k 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FFAR
= t9 NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 U -
Question 430.66 (SRP 9.5.3) 1.13 Section 9.5.3.2 of the FSAR descrDes the emergency lighting system 1.14 which is composed of three subsystems. They are 125 V de, 1.15 480-120/240 V ac, and either hour battery lighting systems. A number 1.16 of areas in the plant are served by one or more of these systems.
All these systems are classified non-Class 1E and receive power from 1.17 non-Class 1E sources, i.e., non-Class 1E station batteries for the de 1.18 lighting and the non-Class IE emergency diesel generator for the ac lighting. Assuming _a failure or nonavailability of any or all of 1.19 these systems following a seismic event, it is possible that portions 1.20 of the plant, particularly the control room, may be without sufficient lighting or without lighting for an extended period of 1.21 time during this. design basis event. This is unacceptable. It is 1.23 our position that adequate lighting be provided to all vital, hazardous,-and safety-related areas needed for the safe shutdown of 1.24 the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident. Modify your design to provide this necessary lighting 1,25 (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II). 1.26 Response: 1.27 The_ BVPS-2 design provides four lighting subsystems for the safe 1.28 (4'. shutdown control areas. Three of the subsystems can be energized 1.29 from onsite backup power supplies: backup ac, backup de, and sealed beam / battery pack units. In addition, the backup ac and backup de 1.31 subsystems are capable of an indefinite period of operation in the event of loss of normal power. 1.33
, The -acceptance-criteria of SRP 9.5.3 (Part II) states: 1.34 "There are no general design criteria or regulatory guides that 1.36 directly apply to the safety related performance requirements for 1.37 the lighting system. The Power Systems Branch (PSB) will use the 1.38
~
following criteria to= access the systems design capability ...(2) The emergenecy lighting system (s) is acceptable 1.39 if the integrated design of the systen(s) will provide adequate emergency -station lighting in all areas, from onsite power 1.40 sources, required for.firefighting, control and maintenance of safety related equipment, and access routes to and from these 1.41 areas, "
The_ BVPS-2 design meets these criteria with one 8-hour duration 1.46 subsystem and two long-term duration subsystems. The coexistence. of 1.47 these subsystems in the safe shutdown control areas provides a very high degree of reliability.
The' postulation of the unavailablity of non-Class 1E systems due to a 1.48 g- seismic event must include the conclusion that the operability of 1.49 Amendment 4 Q430.66-1 December 1983
n1224106src8k 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR
/ 1 plant lighting fixtures cannot be verified, regardless of power (j supply. Lighting fixtures qualified for operation during and after a 1.50 seismic event are not available.
Because lighting systems cannot be considered Class 1E, an isolation 1.51 device would be required in a power circuit from a Class 1E bus. Any 1.53 non-Class IE equipment on the load side of the isolation device could, therefor e, not be verified as operable during a seismic event 1.54 (i.e., distribution panels, wiring, conduit run through non-seismic areas, etc.).
Additionally, since BVPS-2 has the option of supplying nonsafety- 1.55 related loads from a nonsafety-related diesel generator, it was 1.56 determined that the backup lighting subsystems should be supplied from there. This design eliminates any unnecessary risk to the 1.57 Class 1E power systems which would be presented by connecting the backup lighting system to a safety related bus. 1.58 Personnel evacuation routes are serviced by the 8-hour sealed 2.1 beam / battery pack units and the backup de subsystem. The sealed 2.2 beam / battery pack units will provide lighting for firefighting and evacuation in the event of damage to the backup de lighting subsystem 2.3 (e.g., fire damage to supply cables). The backup de subsystem will 2.5 provide.long-term duration lighting in the event of a loss of normal power for any reason.
/9 The backup lighting system at BVPS-2 will provide acceptable and 2.6
(_) reliable lighting to meet the illumination needs in safe shutdown 2.7 control areas and personnel evacuation routes and meets the requirements given in SRP 9.5.3.
The BVPS-2 lighting system is designed to provide' adequate and 2.8 reliable lighting at all plant locations needed to accomplish a safe 2.9 reactor shutdown, and to prcmote personnel safety and aid evacuation, if required. for the unlikely failures cited in Question 430.66 such 2.10 as an accident, fire, or seismic event.
Specific system design attributes and goals (illumination sufficiency 2.11 and duration for all design basis events) at vital plant areas are 2.12 attained by a combination of diverse and highest grade, quality lighting components and distribution systems, including: 2.13
- 1. Normal ac lighting, powered via unit station transformers, 2.15
- 2. Emergency ac lighting, powered from motor centrol centers 2.16 backed by an onsite nonsafety-related diesel generator,
- 3. Dc lighting, powered by 8-hr battery packs, automatically 2.17 energi:ed upon loss of normal ac power, and
- 4. Backup de lighting, powered by onsite station batteries. 2.18 h\.j Amendment 8 Q430.66-2 September 1984
. . . = . _ . - . . .-
n1224106sra8k 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR
['~ '
These. lighting systens in total, conform to the Illuminating 2.20 Engineering Society (IES) recommendations for industrial facilities. 2.21
- In particular,. control room provisions are as follows: 2.22 4
Lighting Provision Condition 2.26
. Normal ac lighting All normal plant operations 2.28
. De station-backed Loss of offsite power 2.32 and onsite nonsafety- 2.33 related diesel-backed 2.34 lighting 2.35
. 8-hr battery packs, Loss of all power, all design 2.38 seismically supported, basis events 2.39 9 self-contained 2.40 Since the - dc lighting system is powered via self-contained battery 2.45
- packs, which are seismically supported in all Category I buildings 2.46 and. do not require external cabling with the exception of a trickle charge, there is no concern over the loss of lighting due to a fire 2.47 !
or accidents involving cabling of the de lighting system.
The - dc lighting system is also discussed in Section 1.4 of the Fire 2.48
- - Protection Evaluation Report (FPER). As discussed in the FPER, 2.49 sealed beam, battery-powered portable hand lighting units are also 4 O- provided for emergency use.
h 1
f 9
i A
i k-s Amendment 8 Q430.66-3 September 1984 Y r'T'W V- Y =
'-*+eY ys-n- yt-+-r--mye* mew,-gi- yK+-*->Nggwya-ya-irw e+-t wemm P e-- *'Nwot' **- ---*-wm--------+w+*-mywt*--w-s + 1 W --
n1224106srt8tg 07/09/84 162 BVPS-2 FSAR
/m '
r (v;- NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.67 (SRP 9.5.3) 1.13 In Section 9.5.3.2.3 of the FSAR you state that tne backup ac 1.14 lighting system is continuously energized and upon loss of offsite 1.16 power receives its power from the nonsafety-related diesel generator.
You also state in Section 9.5.3.5 that the system will be tested when 1.17 the onsite non-safety diesel generator is tested under load. 1.18 Describe the procedures of how the lighting system test will be 1.19 performed and the frequency of the test (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II). 1.20 Response: 1.21 The backup ac lighting subsystem receives power from the onsite 1.22 nonsafety-related diesel generator through a 4,160 V to 480 V to 1.24 120 V/240 V distribution system. I There are no transfer devices associated with the backup ac lighting. 1.25 Since this is the same lighting system used under normal conditions' 1.26
, (except for the power source), periodic testing is not necessary to 1.27 verify its operability.
Periodic testing of the nonsafety-related diesel generator will 1.28 7-s, ensure its operability and verify functional performance of the 1.29
( i diesel generator as well as supporting equipment. Testing will be 1.30
\- / identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures that specify the frequency of testing. In determining the frequency, 1.32 the following factors will be considered:
- 1. Testing frequency required for safety-related diesel 1.34 generators (at least once per month),
- 2. Operating history of the diesel generator and success of 1.35 pr'evious tests, and
- 3. The importance of plant functions which are supperted b; the 1.36 diesel generator.
F
[%
-- Amendment 8 Q430.67-1 September 1984
N n1224106sra8as 07/03/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR 1
./V NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.10 4
- Question 430.74 (Sections 3.2, 9.5.4 through 9.5.8) 1.13 The FSAR-text and Table 3.2-1 indicate that the components and piping 1.14 systems for the diesel generator auxiliaries (fuel oil system, 1.15 cooling . water, lubrication, air starting, and intake' and combustion system) that are mounted on the auxiliary skids are designed seismic 1.16 Category I and are ASME Section III Class 3 quality to the extent 1.17
! possible. ' The engine mounted components and piping and certain other 1.18 components listed in the various sections of 9.5 and Table 3.2-1 are 1.19
. designed and manufactured to DEMA standards and/or manufacturer's 1.20 standards and are seismic Category I. This is not in accordance with 1.21 Regulatory Guide 1.26 which requires the entire diesel generator auxiliary systems.be designed to ASME Section III Class 3 or Quality 1.22 '
Group C. You also' state that the figures in Section 9.5 show where 1.23 quality group classification changes are. The figures do not provide 1.24 this information. Provide the following: (a) the industry standards 1.25 that were used in the design, manufacture, and inspection of the engine mounted piping and components, (b) show on the appropriate 1.26 P&ID's where the Quality Group Classification changes from Quality 1.27 Group C, and where the Seismic Category I portions of the system are
. located. Sections 9.5.4 through 9.5.8 and Table 3.2-1 define certain 1.28 pumps, filters, strainers, . valves, and subsystems in the diesel 1.29 generator. auxiliary systems as. Quality Group D or not applicable with 1.30
'L(N regard to' Quality Group Classification. It is our position that. all 1.31 1
components and piping in the. diesel generator auxiliary systems be
, designed to Seismic Category I ASME Section_III Class 3 requirements. 1.32 Comply with this position or justify noncompliance (SRP 9.5.4 through 1.33 9.5.8, Part III).
Response: 1.34.
g.
Regulatory Guide 1.26 does not cover the diesel generator or its 1.35 12 auxiliary. systems except for the " cooling water ... systems ... that 1.36
.are designed for functioning of ... diesels ..." (paragraph C.2.b). 1.37 1 Refer to revised Regulatory Guide 1.26, Table 1.8-1, Amendment 8, 1.38
. -which ' addresses the use of non-ASME III components in the diesel 1.40
+
generator cooling-water system. ;
l Regulatory Guideil.26 also states (in Section B): 1.41 l I
"Other. systems' not covered by this guide such as ... diesel 1.43 engine and its generators.~and auxiliary support. systems ... 1.44 should be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality 1.45 standards commensurate with the safety function to be performed. ~
Evaluation to establish the quality group classification of these 1.46 other systems should include consideration of the guidance 1.47 provided in regulatory positions:C.1 and C.2 of this guide." 1.48 s
l O(g i Amendment 8 .Q430.74-1 September 1984 i
+
e'- mr- *-=--Wg- ,e==*=nr 7r am-s e- *;e+W-a+ ++-4--***--nt-Ww --e-WW sa-wetw'e'++ $e -aw - wr ee w e v -ee-t w 1r,,m,e-e--e-----ev- t - a nu t eew=wy-mw.y-= -r--r wg vy -y etw w-
n1224106srt8cs 07/03/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR j) - BVPS-2 has followed this guidance. The diesel generators and those 1.51
\s,/ portions of diesel auxiliary systems which have a safety function 1.52 have been ' designed, fabricated, erected, and tested under the vendor's Quality Assurance Program, which meets the requirements of 1.53 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. As stated in the FSAR, these components are 1.54 classified Safety Class 3 and, to the extent possible, are built to 1.55 the rules of ASME III, Class 3. Certain components, considered by 1.56 the vendor to be part of the engine (as distinguished from auxiliary 1.57 support systems) were built to th Refer 1.58 to revised Table 3.2-1, Amendment,$g manufacturer's which identifies safety standards. Class 3 equipment that was not built to ASME III rules. Refer to revised 2.2 Figures 9.5-7 through 9.5-12, Amendment 8, which identify ASME and non-ASME piping. The non-ASME Safety Class 3 components are high 2.4 quality, proven by experience, and were fully controlled by the 2.5 vendor's QA program. Similar equipment has been accepted by the NRC 2.6 for other nuclear power plant applications. 2.7 In addition, in Regulatory Guide 1.26 the phrase " standards 2.8 commensurate with the safety function to be performed," acknowledges 2.9 that not all components associated with the diesel need to be 2.10 classified as safety-related. Nonsafety-related components have been 2.11 identified in Sections 9.5.4 through 9.5.8. Figure 9.5-11 has been 2.12 revised, adding a note that all components shown are Safety Class 3. 2.13 Figures 9.5-7 through 9.5-10 and Figu.e 9.5-12 show the boundaries 2.14 between Safety Class 3 and nonsafety-related portions of the systems. 2.15 Safety-related equipment is designated on the figures by the use of
~
2.16 an asterisk as the first character of the equipment number (e.g., the 2.17
(,,
(~')N starting air tanks have the equipment numbers *TK21A&B and *TK22A&B). 2.18 All piping connected to Safety class 3 equipment is classified as 2.19 Safety Class 3 except where the figures show a boundary. 2.20 s- / Amendment 8 Q430.74-2 September 1984
,. pp y ,y., v-y-=..,ye
. -.s ,,.--.-,m, .g- _.p.. -
__p. , , , . , , ,,, .y,-,_,.gn_,,,m, p~,.g,..,*p--v.yy w+,.w--.q-m -9,,, 959_-p., ._,,p.,--._g m, 77 -
n1224106sra8ar- 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR O,, TABLE 1.8-1 (Cont)
' % ./
organic and inorganic species il 2-inch charcoal bed depth is 1.14 provided; 99 percent if 4 or more inches of charcoal bed depth is 1.15 provided) since these represent more realistic values. 1.16 RG No. 1.26, Rev. 3 1.20 FSAR Reference'Section 3.2.2 1.22 QUALITY . GROUP CLASSIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS FOR WATER , STEAM , AND 1.24 RADIOACTIVE-WASTE-CONTAINING COMPONENTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1.25 (FEBRUARY 1976)
Quality group classificatiens and standards for water , steam , and 1.27
. radioactive-waste-containing corr.ponents of Beaver Valley Power 1.28 Station -- Unit 2 meet" the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.26 with the 1.29 following alternatives:
- 1. The safety class terminology. of- ANSI N18.2 and 1.32 ANSI'18.2a-1975 is used instead of z the quality group terminology. Thus, the terms Safety Class 1, Safety 1.33 Class,2., Safety Class 3, and Non-nuclear Safety.(NNS) Class 1.34 are used instead of Quality! Groups A, B, C, and D, respectively, and are consistent with present nuclear 1.35 industry practice.
- 2. Parggraph NB-7153 of the ASliE-Section III Code requires that 1.36 b the.re be no valves between a code safety. valve and its 1.37 relief point unless .special interlocks prevent shutoff without other protection capacity. Therefore, as an 1.38 alternative to Paragraphs C.1.e and C.2.c, a single safety valve designed, manufactured, and tested in accordance with 1.39 ASME III, Division 1 is considered acceptable'as the boundary between the reactor coolant pressure boundary and. a lower 1.40 safety [classorNNSclassline.
~
. 3. Portions of the emergency diesel generator coeling water 1.41 system, considered by the vendor to be parts of' the engine 1.42 (as -distinguished from auxiliary support ~ systems), were built to the manufacturer's standards rather than ASME III. 1.43 These, are identified in Table-3.2-1 and Section 9.5.5. The 1.45 componencs used are of high quality, proven by experience, and wer:e" designed, fabricated, erected, and tested under the 1 46
. vendor's. Quality Assurance Program which meets the require- l'.47 ments of J0 CFR 50,, Appendix B. Similar equipment has been l'.49 accepted by. the NRC for other nuclear power plant applications. 1.50 1
- s
.! \ :
( ,/ , , ,
Amendment 8 11'ef"80' ' September 1984 N
i r - 6 f.* -. f., ,
m y - _,...-y-- -- - --T, , - - , ,
.,-vy
n1224106src8ar 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
[~ , TABLE 1.8-1 (Cont)
V RG No. 1.27, Rev. 2 1.54 FSAR Reference Sections 2.4.11.6, 9.2.5 1.56 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (JANUARY 1976) 1.58 The ultimate heat sink for Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 2 2.1 follows the guidance of this regulatory guide.
RG No. 1.28, Rev. 2 2.5 FSAR Reference Sections 17.1.2, 17.2 2.7 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION) 2.8 (FEBRUARY 1979)
This regulatory guide does not apply to the Beaver Valley Power 2.10 Station - Unit 2 (BVPS-2) Quality Assurance Program since it is 2.12 applicable to construction permit applicants docketed after October 2.13 1979. BVPS-2, docketed October 20, 1972, meets the requirements of 2.14 Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 with the BVPS-2 Design and Construction 2.15 Quality Assurance Program submitted and approved through Appendix A 2.16 of the BVPS-2 PSAR. Regulatory Guide 1.28 does not apply to the 2.17 BVPS-2 Quality Assurance Program for plant operations since it is applicable only to the plant design and construction phase. 2.18
~/ ) RG No. 1.29, Rev. 3 2.22
(/ FSAR Reference Section 3.2.1 2.24 SEISMIC DESIGN CLASSIFICATION (SEPTEMBER 1978) 2.25 The seismic design classification of structures, systems, and 2.27 components at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 follows the guidance 2.29 of Regulatory Guide 1.29 with the following clarifications: 2.30 Each compor.ent which is required to mitigate the consequences of 2.36 an accident, as defined in ANSI N18.2, shall be classified 2.37 Seismic Category I. In addition, all components classified as 2.38 Safety Class 1, 2, or 3 shall be designated Seismic Categc.y I. 2.39 Seismic Category I components, structures, and systems shall be 2.40 designed to remain functional in the event of the safe shutdown 2.41 earthquake (SSE). All Seismic Category I components are designed 2.42 and constructed to Quality Assurance (QA) Category I 2.43 requirements.
Portions of structures, systems, or components whose continued 2.44 function after an SSE are not required, but whose failure could 2.45 reduce the functioning of other safety-related structures, 2.46 systems, or components shall be designated Seismic Category II.
These structures, systems, or components shall either be 2.47 seismically designed, located to preclude interactions, further 2.48 (D
N/l .
Amendment 8 12 of 80 September 1984
n1224106sra8ar 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
/~' TABLE 1.8-1 (Cont)
O).
restrained, structurally upgraded, or proven incapable of affecting safety.
Seismic Category I design requirements shall extend to the first 2.49 seismic restraint beyond the seismic boundary and shall include 2.50 the interface portion of the boundary itself (that is, for piping 2.51 systems, the isolation valve at a boundary between seismic Category I and nonssismic portions shall be designated Seismic 2.52 Category I. The piping up to and including the first seismic 2.54 restraint beyond the valve shall be designed to Seismic 2.55 i
O
\-
% ~ Amendment 8 12a of 80 September 1984 1
y ,-- - -
- m. - __,.,_,.,,___-_____.my. , , , - - - - - ,,,,...-_,,,,_.,,.-,..v.,,,,,,,,...,-.m,,,.-,,-.-..m.., - - . _ , , .
p _.-
[ g ('Thg\
n1224 (N 'aq 07/10/84 12T BVPS-2
(")%-
t b'
-\ /-
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Safety code or Missile ' Flood I t em/ Mark No . " " Loca t ion "' Class Standard ' Protect ion "' Prot ec t i on " . *
- Remarks I
Instrumentation and controls 'MV.SB.SA,Y. NA " " "' PS PAG, PBG 1.15 required to perform a safety CB CS 1.16 function 1.17
) Service Water System (Section 9.21) 1.24 Service water system piping 1.26 and valves: 1.27 4
Between and including CS, CV 2 ASME III PS PBG 1.29 contatnment isolation' 1.30 valves 1.31 Outside containment IS,SA FB DG, 3 ASME III PS PAG, PBG 1.34 AB.CB,Y,CS, 1.35 and CV 1.36 4
Inside containment CS 3 ASME III PS PAG, PBG 1.38 Service water pump and motor / IS 3 ASME III PS PBG 1.42
. 25WS*P21A,B.C Class 1E 1.4J 1.44
- Service water pump seal water IS 3 ASME III PS PBG 1.48
, strainer /STRM 47 and 48 Class 1E 1.49 Instrumentation and controls- CS,CV.IS,SB, NA " " "* PS PAG, PSG 1.52
) function 1.54 Emergency Diesel Generator, 1.57 Supporting Systems (Section 9.5)
- 1.58 Air starting system 1.60 Tanks / DG 3 ASME III PS PAG l2.3 2EGA*TK21A,8 2.4 2EGA*TK22A.B 2.5 Shutdown air tank l2.6
2.10 check valve up to and 2.11 j including the air 2.12 4
start solenold valves, 2.13 I
and up to the air 2.14 i start valves 2.15 4
l Amendinen t B 8 of 24 September 1984
.I l
. _ . - . .. . . . . . .~ - .m . . . . , _ . . . -
.... ._4.
s nt224- l
%aq 07/10/84 167 ~
4 BVPS-2 1
4 T ABLE 3.2-1 -(Cont )
4
} Safety . Code or Missile Flood
- - I tem / Mark No . " ' ' L oca t i on "
- Class Standard Prot ect ion "' . Prot ec t ion " . *
- ___ Remarks 4;.
.. Atr start valves, air DG 3 Nfr's PS PAG 2.18 t j start distributors. Std 2.19 and piping and valves 2.20 1 downstream of air 2.21 J
start valves, air , ' 2.22 I
- start solenold valves. 2.23
- and stxatdown solenoid 2.24 j
valve 2.25 j, l
1 i I i e
j .
I.
l i i i
l .
i l
e I
4 i
f i -
i E
i i
i i ;
- f. i i
r i
i Amendment 8 8a of 24 September 1984 i
t
nt224 q 07/10/24 123 EVPS-2 TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
]
Safety Code or -Mtsstle Flood Item / Mark No . " * ' Loca t ion "' Class Standard Pro t ec t i on *" Protection ".** Remarks Air Intake and Exhaust System 2.33 Air intake and exhaust DG 3 ASME III PS PAG 2.35 piping outboard of 2.36 turt>o charger 2.37 Air intake fliter/ DG 3 Mfr*s PS PAG 2.40 2EDG*FLTAtB std l2.41
, 2EDG*FLTA?A 2.42 Air intake silencer / DG 3 Mfr*s PS PAG 2.50 2EDG*SIL2A and B std 2.51 2EDG*SILIA and B 2.52 Turbo charger and DG 3 Mfr*s PS PAG engine-mounted air std l2.55 intake and exhaust l2.56 2.57 piping 2.58 Exhaust sliencer/ DG 3 Mfr*s PS PAG 2[DG*SIL3A and 3B std l3.2 i
13.3 Cooling Water System 3.6
- Jacket water expansion DG 3 ASME III .PS PAG 3.8 tank 2EGS*TK-1A&B. 3.9 j intercooler water heat 3.10 1 exchanger 2EGS* E2 t A&B.
3.11 Jacket water heat 3.12
- - exchanger 2EGS* E22A&B, .
3.13 Jacket water keep-warm 3.14 heater 2EGS*E23A&B. 3.15 Jacket water keep-warm 3.16 pump 2FGS*P23A88 3.17 Engine-driven Jacket DG 3 Mfr's PS PAG 3.20 water pump 2EGS*P22A&B, std 3.21 engine-driven inter-3.22 cooler water pump 3.23 2EGS*P2tA&B 3.24 1'
l Cooling water ptptng and DG 3 ASME III PS PAG 3.27 1
valves from jacket water 3.28 expansion tank to diesel 3.29 i generator 3.30 l
Amendment 8 9 of 24 September 1984 ,
l i
~~%
n1224 hq 07/10/04 s- / 123 (
EVPS-2 ('/
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Safety Code or Missile . Flood I t em/ Mark No . " " Loca t ion "' Class Standard Protec t ion "' Protec t ion " . *' Remarks Engine-mounted cooling DG 3 ASME III/ PS PAG 3.33 water piping and valves Mfr's 3.34 std 3.35 tubrication System 3.39 Lube ott heat exchanger .DG 3 ASME III PS PA'G 2ECO*E21A&B, stratners 3.40 3.41 2 EGO *STR22A&B 3.42 Engine driven lube oil DG 3 Mfe's PS PAG pump 2 EGO *P2tA&B, 3.45 std 3.46 strainers 2 EGO *STRtA&B, 3.47 keep warm and prelube 3.48 pump 2 EGO *P24A&B 3.49 Keep warm beater DG 3 ASME III PS PAG 2 ego *E24A&B, stratners 3.52 3.53 2 EGO'STR23A&B. 3.54 i
fliters 2 EGO *FLT21A&B 3.55 Rocker arm lubrication DG~ 3 Mfr's PS PAG 3.58 system std 3.59 Fuel Oil Supply System 4.3 Fuel oil piping of diesel DG 3 generator from oil storage ASME III PS PBG, PAG. l 4.5 4.6 tank to diesel
, 4.7 Diesel fuel oli storaDe DG 3 ASME III PS PBG 4.10 tanks /2EGF*TK21A and B 4.11 i
Diesel fuel transfer pumps DG 3 ASME III PS PBG, PAG with motor / Class 1E l 4.14 2EGF*P2tA,B.C.and D 4.15 4.16 Strainers 2ECF*STR39, 40 DG 3 ASME III PS PAG 41 & 42 4.19 4.20 Diesel fuel oil day tanks / DG 3 ASME III PS PAG 4.23 2EGF*TV22A and B 4.24 Motor driven fuel oil DG 3 ASME III PS PAG 4.27 pump 2EGF*P22A&B 4.28 Engine driven fuel oil DG 3 Mfr's PS PAG 4.31 i pump 2EGF*P23A&B Std 4.32 1
4 Amendment 8 of 24
( September 1984 1
T nt224 sq 07/10/34 152 .
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) j Safety Code or Misstle. Flood Item / Mark No..ao Loca t ion Class Standard Protect ion "' Protection ".** . Remarks Fuel oil filters. DG 3 Mfr's PS PAG 4.35 j accumutator tank. std 4.36 engine mounted piping 4.37 i and valves 4.38
) Instru:nentat 1on and controls DG, CB NA " " "
PS PSG. PAG 4.42
- for fuel oil, lube oil, atr.
and cooling water supply 84.43 4.44 systems required to perform a safety functton 4.45 4.40
'h w
grw3 r u i
~ fab" W
- l ss l
1 NJ V io L
i 1
P-i 1
i i
1 i i
1 Amendment 8
] i
/o~(9 of 24 September 1934
,- m .n
(-
nt224 3rl 10/05/83 16t %
/t- BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Safety Code or Missile Flood Item / Mark No . " " L oca t ion "' Class Standard Pro tect ion "' Pro t ec t i on " . " Remarks J
Prleary Plant Component Cooling 9.6 j Water System (Section 9.2.2) 9.7 i
Piping and Valves: 9.9 Inside containment CS 3 ASME III PS PAG, PBG 9.11 Class 1E 9.12 Outsido containment AB.FB.CV 3 ASME III PS PAG, PBG 9.15 2
Class 1E 9.tG 1
Retween and including CV. CS 2 ASME III PS PBG 9.19 l containment isolation Class 1E"" 9.20 valves 9.21 Primary component cooling AB 3 ASME III PS PAG '
9.24
, water surge tanks / 9.25 1 2CCP'TK2tA and B 9.26
. Primary component cooling AB 3 ASME III PS PAG 9.29 l water pumps with motora/ Class 1E 9.30
{ 2CCP'P2fA B.C. and D 9.31
- Primary component cooling AB 3 ASME III PS PBG 9.35 water heat exchangers 9.36 Instrumentation and controls CS.AB,CB FB NA " " "' PS- PAG, PBG 9.39 required to perform a safety 9.40
- function 9.41 i
Boron Recovery System (Section 9.3.4) 9.44 4
1 DeGasifier steam heater / AB 3 ASME III NR " " PBG 9.46
] 2BRS'E2tA and B 9.47 1~
Degastfter recovery owchanger/ AB 3 ASME III NR " " PAG 9.50 j 2BRS*24A 8 1 and 2 9.51 I Piping and isolation valves AB 3 ASME III NR " " PAG. PBG 9.54 3 to maintain OA Category I Class 1E 9.55 d
pressure boundary. 9.5G 4
.i Amerwheen t 10 of 24 (OEober 198D s a
s
~;.
. DOCUMENT .
. PAGE~ .
PULLED ANO. w==
NO.OF PAGES D pas!ILLEG31 CF D MAD COPf FnID M. PDR c14n -
3 3_
D MTTER COP (REQUESTED ON =
f'AsttotAnstenu HAD COPt Fli.ED M. PDR 014R D ' LWD ON AMR10RI CNt> No 99O'79.*a
,. l n1224106sra8ak 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
('~') NRC Lette e: September 19, 1983 1.9 V'
Question 430.75 (Section 9.5.4) 1.13 In Section 9.5.4.3 you state that diesel fuel oil is available from 1.14 local distribution sources. In Table 9.5-2 you identify the sources 1.15 where diesel quality fuel oil will be available and the distances required to be travelled from the source to the plant. Discuss how 1.18 fuel oil will be delivered onsite under extremely unfavorable environmental conditions.
Response: 1.20 Fuel oil can be delivered onsite by truck under unfavorable 1.21 environmental conditions. The five major oil distributors, all 1.22 within 40 miles of the site, provide a number of alternative distribution routes. Under extremely unfavorable environmental 1.23 conditions, delivery of fuel oil by truck can be accomplished in less than 1 day. Environmental conditions considered are those having 1.25 potential for affecting a large area for a prolonged period of time, 1.26 such as floods or snowstorms. Flooding is not a concern because 1.27 g water levelsyhigh enough to cover all roads into the planga ,
/ Ar= not Road maintenance in the affected 1.30 I area is sufficient to ensure that any snow accumulation which could prevent fuel oil delivery is removed from major roads within a day. 1.31
\_
l Probable, nta>dw flood
)
i r
km ,) Amendment 8 Q430.75-1 September 1984 l'
w
'n1224106src8bs 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
./h. NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 V
Question 430.77.(Sections 9.5.4,'9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7, and 9.5.8) 1.13 ;
You state in the FSAR that protection from high and moderate energy 1.14 pipe breaks is provided for the emergency diesel generators. 1.15 Section 3.6, Table 3.6B-1,-identifies the emergency diesel generator 1.16 '
. air start and combustion air and exhaust systems as high energy 1.17 systems, but does not provide any analysis for these systens. In 1.18 Ladditioni Table 3.6B-2 only identifies portions of the emergency
-diesel engine fuelJ oil and air start systems as essential systems 1.19 needed for shutdown; all emergency . diesel engine- systems are necessary.for shutdown. This is unacceptable. Identify all high and 1.21 moderate energy lines and systems that will be installed in the 6 diesel. generator room. Discuss the measures that will be taken in 1.22 the design of the diesel. generator facility to protect the safety
. related . -systems, piping, and components from the effects of high and 1.23 moderate energy line failure to assure availability of the diesel 1.24 generators when needed. Update Table 3.6B-2 as necessary. Refer to 1.26
- Question 430.106 for additional concerns on high energy line bteaks with regard to the air start system (SRPs 9.5.4 - 9.5.8, Parts II and 1.28
- III).
Response:' 1.29
. ,O - a. . Refer to revised Table 3.6D-2, Amendment 3, which identifies all 1.31
' \s./ diesel engine systems.
b'.1 Refer to revised Sections 3.6B.1.3 and 3.1.1.3, Amendment 4, for 1.32 l criteria used in evaluating high and- moderate energy piping 1.34 failures, that is, application of single failure, application of loss of offsite power, etc. 1.35 Under the criteria contained in the revised sections, since an 1.37 immediate plant shutdown-is not required- as a result of any 1.38 postulated piping failures in diesel generator systems, the
' damage due to any postulated piping failure must be limited to 1.39 prevent a total loss of safe shutdown function without postulation of concurrent LOOP or single active failure. 1.40 Protection from pipe break propagation in emergency diesel 1.41
- generator-support systems is provided by locating the redundant 1.42
- . diesel' and associated support systems in separate cubicles / rooms (see Sections'3.6B.1.2.1.1 and 3.6B.1.2.1.2). A break in any of 1.44 l
, the high or moderate energy diesel systems installed in one of the diesel generator rooms will not affect the redundant diesel 1.45 l and associated systems located in the other diesel generator
. room.
b.2' Refer 'to revised Table 3.68-1, Amendment 8. which deleted the 1.47 combustion air and exhaust systems since these systems are not 1.48 knendment 8 Q430.77-1 September 1984 l
.a _ _ , _ . - . - , . _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ..- _ _._ _ ._
n1224106srs8ba 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
}v normally pressurized nor normally operating during normal plant conditions (see BTP ASB 3-1, Appendix A). 1.49 At a meeting _
on March 6, 1984, the 1.51 NRC requested additional information on the ability of the emergency 1.52 diesel generator systems to remain operable considering simultaneous occurrence of a high energy piping failure, loss of offsite power, 1.53 and a single failure. BVPS-2 has been designed and evaluated 1.54 according to the -direction provided in SRP 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, as supplemented by BTPs ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1. These SRPs and 1.56 supplemental BTPs specifically define the criteria, coincident assumptions, and postulated failures to be used in high energy pipe 1.57 I failure evaluations. Based on these regulatory documents, 1.58 simultaneous occurrence of a piping failure, a loss of offsite power, and a single failure of the redundant diesel generator need not be 2.1 considered in the evaluation of piping failures in the diesel generator cubicles. The specific evaluation is described as follows: 2.3
- 1. A high energy pipe failure in the diesel generator piping 2.5 must be postulated to occur during normal plant conditions, 2.6 in accordance with BTP ASB 3-1, item B.3.a. Normal plant 2.7 conditions are defined as conditions during reactor startup, operation at power, hot standby, or reactor cooldown to cold 2.8 shutdown, in accordance with App,endix A of BTP ASB 3-1.
Section 15.0.1.1 classifies these events as Condition I 2.9 Normal Operation and Operational Transients. A loss of 2.10 O offsite power, requiring diesel generator operation, is not U classified as a normal plant event. Rather, it is 2.11
. considered in Section 15.0.1.2 as a Condition II event, Faults of Moderate Frequency (see SRP 15.2.6, Loss of 2.12 Nonemergency AC Power to' the Station Auxiliaries).
Therefore, if the plant is already in a loss of offsite 2.13 power condition and requiring diesel' generator operation, a coincident high energy. pipe failure need not be postulated. 2.14
- 2. When piping failures are postulated during normal plant 2.15 operation, BTP ASB 3-1 item B.3.b requires that an evaluation be made to determine whether the direct effects 2.16 of the pipe failure is a trip of the turbine generator or reactor. protection system. If either of these occur, a loss- 2.18 of offsite power must then be assumed coincident with the pipe failure, in accordance with item B.3.b(1) of the same 2.19 g regulatory documerrt. BVPS-2 has performed this evaluation 2.20 process for the specific pipe failures affecting the diesel generators. None of these failures will result in direct 2.21 consequences cat' sing a turbine generator trip or reactor protection system actuation. Therefore, if a piping failure 2.23 occurs, a coincident loss of offsite power need not be assumed and operation of the diesel generators is not 2.24 necessary for this event.
O Amendment 8 Q430.77-2 September 1984
n1224106sra8ba 07/07/84 54 4
BVPS-2 FSAR
- 3. Protection has been provided in the BVPS-2 design such that 2.25 a piping failure can only affect one of the two redundant 2.26 diesel generators reijardless of which condition the plant is in.
i s
i i
j t
i; i
k i t
1 t
i 4
1 1 .
i
- 1 r
I i
t 4 ,
l I i
1 I
{- Amendment 8 Q430.77-3 September 1984 4
l l i i
i_____..
~ _ . , _ . , _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _
'n1224106src8bc 07/06/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR r%
( ) ,
TABLE 3.6B-1 1.10 HIGH-ENERGY PIPING SYSTEMS 1.12 Location 1.15 FSAR Inside Outside 1.16 System Section Containment Containment 1.17 Auxiliary steam 10.4.10 X 1.19 Blowdown - steam generator 10.4.8 X X 1.21 Boron recovery 9.3.4.6 X 1.36 Charging and volume control 9.3.4 X X 1.38 Condensate - aux condensate 10.4.10 X 1.40 Condensate - chemical treatment 10.3.5 X 1.42 Condensate - demineralizer 10.4.6 X 1.44 Condensate - main condensate 10.4.7 X 1.46 Condensate - makeup, drawoff, 1.48
. s_-
(' ) transfer, storage 10.4.7 X 1.49 Electrohydraulic control 10.2 X 1.55 system - turbine generator 1.56 Extraction steam 10.3 X 1.58 Feedwater - chemical treatment 10.3.5 X 2.1 Feedwater - auxiliary feedwater 10.4.9 X 2.3 Feedwater - main 10.4.7 X X 2.5 d
Primary plant gas supply 9.5.9 X X 2.7 Gland steam 10.4.3 X 2.9 Hydrogen control (post-DBA) 6.2.5 X 2.11 Heater drains - high-pressure 10.4.7 X 2.13 Heater drains - low-pressure 10.4.7 X 2.15
!!ain steam 10.3 X X 2.17 I \ Reactor coolant 5.2 X 2.19
- N,,Y Amendment 6 1 of 2 April 1984
n1224106sra8be 07/06/84 163 p~s BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.6B-1 (Cont)
Location FSAR Inside outside System Section Containment Containment Residual heat removal 5.4.7 X 2.21 Steam drains 10.3 X 2.23 Steam generator water cleanup 10.4.8 X 2.25 Safety injection 6.3 X X 2.27 Steam vents 10.3 X 2.29 Drains (aerated & hydrogenated) 9.3.3 X X 2.31 Sampling system (radioactive) 9.3.2 X X 2.33 Hot water heating 10.4.10 2.35 Emergency diesel - air start 9.5.6 X 2.37 Turbine plant sampling 2.39
( 9.3.2 X i
4 1
1 t
l
- l. l t ;
j Amendment 8 2 of 2 September 1984 i
- , - -v= ,-- - ,n- ,, ,.w,n,--,e-w_,n.,,n-,-ew,,,,--,w- -v._------- -,,,--.m.-.g..,_--n ,,-,,n_,,- .--,,---,,.enn, nee-
n1224106sra8al 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9
\~.)
Question-430.78 (Section 9.5.4) 1.13 Discuss the precautionary measures that will be taken to assure the 1.14 quality and reliability of the fuel oil supply for emergency diesel 1.15 generator operation. Include the type of fuel oil, impurity and 1.16 quality limitations as well as diesel index number or its equivalent, cloud point, entrained moisture, sulfur, particulates, and other 1.17 deleterious insoluble substances, procedure for testing newly 1.18 delivered fuel, periodic sampling and testing of onsite fuel oil (including interval between tests), interval of time between periodic 1.19 removal 'o f condensate from fuel tanks, and periodic system inspection. In your discussion include reference to industry (or 1.20 other) standards which will be followed to assure a reliable fuel oil 1.21 supply to the emergency generators (SRP 9.5.4, Parts II and III).
Response: 1.26 Precautionary measures taken to assure the quality and reliability of 1.27 the fuel oil supply include periodic sampling and analyses of the 1.28 fuel oil and the removal of accumulated water from storage tanks if necessary.
The following is a description of some of the fuel oil 1.29 characteristics and their limiting values:
N>
- 1. Type of fuel oil - No. 2 Fuel Oil, 1.31
- 2. Impurity level - less than 2 mg of insolubles per 100 m1, 1.32
- 3. Diesel index number - Cetane number greater than 40, 1.33
- 4. Cloud point.- specified at 40'F, 1.34l
- 5. Water and sediment - less than .05% by volume, 1.35
- 6. Sulfur content - less than 0.5% by weight, 1.36
- 7. Carbon residue on 10% bottoms - 0.35% by weight maximum, 1.37
- 8. Ash - less than 0.01% by weight, and 1.38
- 9. The fuel oil meets the requirements of ASTM D975-77. 1.39 Testing of newly-delivered fuel oil includes taking a sample with a 1.41 bacon bomb near the bottom of the supply truck and performing 1.42 analyses for kinematic viscosity, cloud point, water and sediment, and 90 percent distillation temperature. This is performed within 2 1.43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> and ccmpleted before ,the fuel oil supply truck is unloaded.
g Shortly after unloading, and within 2 weeks, the samples will be 1.44 i
Amendment 8 Q430.73-1 September 1984
L n1224106sra8a1 07/10/84 163 i BVPS-2 FSAR analyzed for flash point, carbon residue on 10 percent distillation 1.45
- l,jg residue, percent ash, viscosity, percent sulfur, copper strip )
, corrosion, and cetane number.
l -
J Periodic sampling of the fuel oil day tank is performed at least 1.46 quarterly. Sampling is done in accordance with ASTM D270-1975 and to 1.47 '
determine viscosity, percent water, and sediment.
h Condensate is removed from the day tanks every 31 days following each 1.48 I operation of the diesel where the period of operation is longer than 1.49 i 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
i i
i I
+
4 t
i a
l Amend.T.ent 4 Q430.78-2 December 1933 1
i I
i
n1224106er28:m 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.79 (Section 9.5.4) 1.13 Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of a diesel 1.14 generator for a prolonged period that would require replenishment of 1.15 fuel oil without interrupting operation of the diesel generator.
What provision will be made in the design of the fuel oil storage 1.16 fill systems to minimize the creation of turbulence of the sediment 1.17 in the bottom of the storage tank? Stirring of this sediment during 1.18 addition of new fuel has the potential of causing the overall quality of the fuel to become unacceptable and could potentially lead to the 1.19 degradation or failure of the diesel generator (SRP 9.5.4, Parts I, 1.20 II, and III).
Response: 1.21 Revised Section 9.5.4, Amendment 4, discusses design features which 1.22 minimize stirring of sediment. Additionally, should stirred sediment 1.23 be a problem, it would not affect diesel operation. As shown on 1.24 Figure 9.5-7, strainers will prevent significant amounts of sediment from being transferred to the day tank while a duplex filter protects 1.25 the engine from particles transferred from the day tank.
Alarms are provided for high differential pressure on the strainers. 1.26 In the event a strainer is seriously restricting flow, a low level in 1.27 hb the day tank will cause the backup transfer pump (with its own 1.28 strainer) to start. Restriction of the duplex filter will result in 1.29 an alarm, which would allow the valving in of the clean filter element,ito replace the clogged one while the engine continues 1.31 running.
/3 h Amendment 8 Q430.79-1 September 1984
n1224106src8st. 07/02/84 164 BVPS-2 FSAR
-n NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9
(}
Question 430.82 (Section 9.5.4) 1.12 Figure 9.5-7 of the FSAR shows a fuel oil accumulator tank on the 1.13 diesel engine fuel oil system. The accumulator tank is located on 1.14 the engine . skid and is connected in parallel with the fuel oil headers. Provide a description of the tank and its purpose 1.15 (SRP 9.5.4, Part III).
Response 1.16 Refer to revised Section 9.5.4, Amendment 4, for the description of 1.17 the fuel oil accumulator tank. 1.18 Also refer to revised Figure 9.5-7, Amendment 8. The line leading 1.20 from the accumulator tank to the pressurized return header is a 1/4 inch line, which is connected to the top of the accumulator tank. 1.21 The purpose of this line is to purge air from the accumulator. The 1.23 fuel flow through the line is a small fraction of the fuel flow to the diesel engine and will have an insignificant effect on the 1.24 operation of the system.
Fuel is supplied to the injection pumps, via the fuel inlet header, 1.25 from the engine-driven fuel oil pump. The injection pumps are cam- 1.26 g driven reciprocating pumps, which deliver the required amount of fuel
'- (controlled by the governor) to the injection nozzles. Priming of 1.28 the injection pumps is accomplished by pressurized fuel flowing from the inlet header and filling the injection pump's cylinder, with 1.29
. excess fuel flowing to the pressurized return header. This return 1.30 header is pressurized to assure that the injection pump is fully primed. A spring-loaded check valve is used in the discharge of this 1.31 return header to maintain pressure during operation, and to prevent 1.32 the header and injection pump from emptying when the engine is stopped.
'- Amendment 8 Q430.82-1 September 1984
n1224106sra8bi 07/13/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR I
,, NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 j
\s-Question 430.83 (Section 9.5.4) 1.13 I 'Section 9.5.4.3 states that the day tank is within a sump of 1.14 sufficient capacity to hold the entire contents of the day tank. 1.15 Figure 9.5-7 of the FSAR shows a p'.atform underneath the day tanks: 1.16 l it is assumed that this is the sump. No description is provided for 1.17 the day tank sump drainage system. Describe the operation of the day 1.18 tank drainage system and the procedures that will be used when in operation to prevent an oil spill and resulting fire hazard in the 1.20 diesel generator area (SRP 9.5.4, Part III). 1.21 Response: 1.22 Refer to revised Section 9.5.4, Amendment 4. 1.23 l The- fuel oil day tank is located within a diked area. Within this 1.25 l diked area is a sump, which gravity-drains to a waste oil separator located east of the diesel generator building (Figure 9.3-20).
The 1.27 drain piping is extra heavy cast iron (ASTM A74) soil pipe with hub
- and spigot caulked joints, and is encased in concrete within the 1.28 l diesel generator building. The sump within the diked area has a 1.29 level switch with a set-point that would alert the operator when there is an abnormal condition. In addition, fuel oil leakage will 1.31 be visually evident during testing that is performed monthly.
\
Immediate action will be taken to determine the root cause of any 1.32
'N leakage and appropriate corrective action will be taken. 1.33 The waste oil separator is located and designed such that no backflow 1.34 could occur between the separator and.the building sumps. High level ,1.36 in the separator is alarmed, regging the operator to manually I
- activate the waste ' oil separator transfer pump. The transfer pump 1.38 l transfers wastes to a truck for proper disposal. Should the level 1.39 increase substantially prior to transfer to the truck, an overflow ,
connection on the separator would transfer the excess waste oil to 11.40 manhole #number 14 and then to the sewage treatment facility. "
The design of the diesel generator ftk$ oil transfer and drainage ',1. 41 "
l systems meets the guidance of BTP CHEB 9.5-1, " Guideline for Fire l1.42 Protection for Nuclear Power Plants. l l
l l
A
} Amendment 8 Q430.83-1 September 1984
{
L.)
! i l
l
i n1224106cr:8:3 07/10/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 l
Question 430.90 (Section 9.5.5) 1.12 You state in Section 9.5.5.2 that the diesel engine cooling water is 1.13 treated as appropriate to minimize corrosion. Provide additional 1.14 details of your proposed diesel engine cooling water system chemical treatment with regard to precluding organic fouling and discuss how 1.16 your proposed treatment complies with the engine manufacturer's recommendations (SRP 9.5.5, Parts I and III). 1.17 Response: 1.18 Makeup for the diesel engine cooling water system is provided from 1.19 the demineralized water system which will minimize organic fouling. 1.20 Water purity and chemistry will be maintained in compliance with the 1.21 manufacturer's recommendations.
The diesel engine cooling water system is a closed loop water system 1.22 with both its initial and makeup water supplied from the 1.23 demineralized water system. Provisions for chemical treatment of the 1.24 closed loop are provided to prevent against organic fouling. This 1.25 treatment consists of the addition of an inhibitor chemical (a 7- mixture of Nitrite and boron) which is maintained in the water by the 1.26 l ) BVPS chemistry departmer t. The BVPS chemistry manual specifies that 1.27 the emergency diesel generator coolant water is sampled quarterly for pH, conductivity, Nitrite, and boron. This inspection monitors for 1.29 the correct inhibitor concentration and verifies that the pH is maintained within the 8.5 to 9.5 range specified by the manufacturer. 1.30 The service water side of the jacket coolant water heat exchanger 1.31 also has the capability for chemical treatment to prevent fouling and 1.32 corrosion. However, use of this treatment system will probably not 1.33 be necessary unless the diesel generator is laid up for an extended 1.34 period of time, since the system will normally be flushed out once a month during the diesel generator operational test. Need for such a 1.36 chemical treatment would be determined by a rise in jacket coolant water temperatures, which are monitored and logged in the monthly 1.37 diesel generator test. ,
)
Amendment 8 September 1984
~_-
Q430.90-1
- . ~-- . _ - . . . = - - . - _ _ . - - - - - _ _ - _ - . _ _ _ . -
4 n1224106srt8:n 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR l l
NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 j Question 430.92 (Section 9.5.5) 1.13 The diesel generators are required to start automatically on loss of 1.14
) all offsite power and in the event of a LOCA. The diesel generator 1.15 sets should be capable of operation at less than full load for 4
extended periods without degradation of performance er reliability. 1.16 Should a LOCA occur with availability of offsite power, discuss the 1.17 design provisions and other parameters that have been considered in 1.18 the selection of the diesel generators to enable them to run unloaded
- (on standby) for extended periods without degradation of engine 1.19 performance or reliability. Expand your FSAR to include and 1.20 explicitly define the capability of your design with regard to this requirement (SRP 8.3.1, Parts II and III SRP 9.5.5, Part III). 1.21 Response
- 1.22 During a LOCA, the diesel generators would 3not run unloaded for 1.23 extended periods of time. The diesel generators would start 1.24 automatically and would be shut' down by the operator once the
- availability of offsite power is verified. The diesel generators 1.26 would then be available to start automatically should offsite power be lost.
' / Manufacturer's recommendations that are to be followed for no load or 1.27
\ light load running conditions are discussed in the response provided 1.28 for Question 430.25, Amendment '4.
i 4 .
4 3
l.
i Amendment 8 Q430.92-1 September 1984 4
4 1
,,r e - - - -n-,-~.,-w,-m,wn *,_mm,-,,-- ---w..-.w..e-.n-,.,, ,--ammn.g ,,-en-,,n .a.-,~,,-a - - ,,, m e g y- m - c e m , aven, - ,--,-ng
i n1224106src8x 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR lA) v NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.103 (Section 9.5.6.2) 1.13 You -state in Section 9.5.6.2 that the diesel generator air start 1.14 systems for both safety-related emergency diesel generators are 1.15 connected by a nonsafety-related cross-connect with proper isolation valves provided. It is further stated that cross-connect will be 1.16 used to start the failed diesel using the other diesel's starting air receivers. Inadequate information is provided to evaluate this 1.18 aspect of the system design. Provide the following for the 1.19 safety-related diesels only:
- 1. State the conditions under which this portion of the air 1.21 start system will be used.
- 2. Describe the procedures, administrative controls, and 1.22 o limiting conditions of operation that will govern the use of this cross-connect during the above stated conditions. 1.23
- 3. In light of Question 430.102, show that the requirements of 1.24 430.102(b) are met for this operating condition assuming 1.25 that the failed engine controls that will be used to preclude the depletion of the control air below the minimum 1.26 required for 7 day operation (SRP 9.5.6, Part III).
g\
, (V Response: 1.28 l
The air start system becomes safety-related at the inlet check valves 1.29 to the safety-related starting air receivers. The cross-connect 1.30 occurs on the nonsafety-related side of the class break and cannot utilize stored air from any start system. Since the air compressor 1.32 motors are power by their associated diesel generator, (with loss of effsite ac power) the compressors associated with an operating diesel 1.33 generator can be used to charge the air receivers of the other diesel generator through the air system cross-connect. In no way can use of 1.35 the cross-connect allow any of the two diesel generator systems' air receivers to be depleted through the cross-connect. 1.36 The isolation valves called out in the diesel generator cross-connect 1.37 system will be administratively controlled under the BVPS operating 1.38 manual procedure governing lockout. This procedure controls the use 1.39 of padlocks or locking devices on operating equipment. A log of 1.40 padlock *d equipment is maintained by the shift supervisor. Keys for 1.41 such equipment are only issued through the concurrence of the !!uclear Shif t Operating Foreman or !!uclear Shif t Supervisor. 1.42 l
\
O Amendment 8 ,
Q430.103-1 September 1984 l
n1224106sre8bb 07/06/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.105 (Section 9.5.6) 1.13 Section 3.6 of the FSAR defines the air starting system of your plant 1.14 as a high energy system. A high energy line pipe break in the air 1.15 starting system of one diesel generator, plus any single active failure in any auxiliary system of the other diesel generator will 1.16 result in loss of all onsite ac power. This is unacceptable. 1.17 Provide the following information: 1.18
- 1. Assuming a pipe break at any location in the high energy 1.20 portion of the air start system, demonstrate that no damage from the resulting pipe whip, jet impingement, or missiles 1.21 (air receivers, or engine mounted air tanks) will occur on either of the two diesel generators or their auxiliary 1.22 systems.
- 2. Section 9.5.6.2 states that the air receivers, valves, and 1.23 piping to the engine are designed in accordance with ASME 1.24 Section III Class 3 (Quality Group C) requirements. This is 1.25 partially acceptable. We require the entire air starting 1.26 system from the compressor discharge up to and including all engine mounted air start piping, valves and components be 1.27 designed to Seismic Category I, ASME Section III Class 3
.(./
O (Quality Group C) requirements. Show that you comply with 1.29 this position (SRP 9.5.6, Parts II and III).
Response: 1.31
- 1. Refer to the response provided for Question 430.77, 1.33 Amendment 8, and revised Section 9.5.6, Amendment 4, for discussion of t,he effect of loss of air pressure on an 1.34 operating diesel generator.
- 2. Refer to revised Section 9.5.6, Amendment 4, and the '1.35 response to Question 430.74, Amendment 8.
i
.) Amendment 8 .
Q430.105-1 September 1984
n1224106srt8y 06/28/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR v-
.(\,_/
m) .
NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.108 (Section 9.5.7) 1.13 For the diesel engine lubrication system in Section 9.5.7 provide the 1.14 following 'information s (1) define the temperature differentials, flow 1.16
-rate, and heat removal rate of the interface cooling system external to- the engine and verify that these are in accordance with 1.17 recommendations of the engine manufacturer;-(2) discuss the measures that will be taken to maintain the required quality of the oil, 1.18 including the inspect, ion, frequency of inspection, and replacement when oil quality is degraded; and (3) describe the capability for 1.19 detection and control of system leakage and the frequency it will be 1.21 checked (SRP 9.5.7, Parts II and III).
Response: 1.22
- 1. Refer to revised Section 9.5.7 and Table 9.5-3, Amendment 4, and 1.24 the response provided for Question 430.95, Amendment 7. 1.25
- 2. Through the Preventive Maintenance Program, emergency diesel 1.26 generator lube oil will be sampled and tested annually. Samples 1.28 will be sent for a complete spectrographic analysis, and results of this analysis will be evaluated to determine if the oil change 1.30 frequency recommended by the emergency diesel generator vendor should be modified.
.( )
- 3. Possible leakage of lube oil into the diesel generator cooling '1.31 water can be detected by any of the following checks. During a 1.33 monthly operations surveillance test (OST), the cooling water sight glass level and the lube oil level are checked both before 1.34 and during operation. Through this check, oil leakage can be 1.35 detected in the cooling water or suspected by a decrease in lube .
oil level with a corresponding increase in cooling water level. 1.36 Also, unusually high cooling water temperatures noted during the 1.37 OST would indicate possible cooling water contamination. The 1.39 lube oil level dipstick is checked and logged every shift. A 1.40 decrease noted in this reading will indicate lube oil leakage, which could be into the cooling water. In addition to the 1.41 previous methods, the BVPS chemistry manual specifies that the emergency dienel generator coolant water should be sampled once 1.42 per month. If lube oil leakage is discovered in the cooling 1.43 water, or suspected of existing, immediate action will be taken j; to ' locate the root cause of the leakage in accordance with the 1.44 i appropriate station procedures.
i 4
-- Amendment 8 Q430.108-1 September 1984
n1224106crs8z 07/07/84 54
,BVPS-2 FSAR
'~'t NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9
~Y
- Question 430.109 (Section 9.5.7) 1.13 What measures have been taken to prevent entry of deleterious 1.14 materials into the engine lubrication oil system due to operator 1.15 error .during recharging of luhticating oil or normal operation (SRP ,
9.5.7, Parts II and III).
Response: 1.16 i
Prior to use, all lube oil for the emergency diesel generators is 1.17 sampled by the Station Chemistry Department in accordance with 1.18 existing procedures and tests. The addition of lubricant into the 1.19 emergency diesel generator lube oil system is performed in accordance with a site approved procedure. This procedure addresses two 1.21 i-alternate methods of adding lubricant to the system. Method Number 1 1.22 (less preferred) utilizes a 4-inch gravity fill gonnection which is marked " Lube Oil Fill Connection." Unless oil is being added, this 1.24 connection remains capped, thus preventing the entry of deleterious materials. Method Number 2 (more preferred) . utilizes the d ia tAsej e. l .25 side of the prelube/ filter circulating pump. This pump discharges to 1.26 the lube oil filters and strainers, thus preventing the entry of deleterious materials into the lube oil. system. Oil is stored in 1.28 closed, sealed drums until used.
T
- 5. .
, N s
s 6
I i Amendment 8 September 1984 Q430.109-1 s
t *\
A i
a
-c y g- - - - +-q~, e-dw<- w-+me--*-*-#"W'- ww-w' ' + - - 9M' 9' *~-*F"*"-"""--"N* C"'*-C""* T'""" '* * * "
1 n1224106src8:3 07/07/84 38 BVPS-2 FSAR
,I 1 NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 a
Question 430.113 (Section 9.5.7) 1.13 An emergency diesel generator unit in a nuclear power plant is 1.14 normally in the ready standby mode unless there is a loss of offsite 1.15 power, an accident, or the diesel generator is under test. Long 1.16 periods on standby have a tendency to drain or nearly empty the engine lube oil piping system. On an emergency start of the engine 1.17 as much as 5 to 14 or more seconds may elapse from the start of cranking until full lube oil pressure is attained even though full 1.18 engine speed is generally reached in about five seconds. With an 1.19 essentially dry engine, the momentary lack of lubrication at the various moving parts may damage bearing surfaces producing incipient 1.20 or actual component failure with resultant equipment unavailability.
The emergency condition o f. readiness requires this equipment to 1.21
-attain full rated speed and enable automatic sequencing of electric 1.22 load within ten seconds. For this reason, and to improve upon the 1.23 availability of this equipment on demand, it is necessary to establish as quickly as possible an oil film in the wearing parts of 1.24 the diesel engine. Lubricating oil is normally delivered to the 1.25 engine wearing parts by one or more engine driven pump (s). During 1.26 the starting cycle the pump (s) accelerates slowly with the engine and may . not supply the required quantity of lubricating oil where needed 1.27
(~')
(_,/
fast enough. To remedy this condition for the rocker arm assembly 1.28 lubrication system, as a minimum, an electrically driven lubricating 1.29 oil pump, powered from a reliable de power supply, should be installed in the rocker arm lube oil system to operate in parallel 1.30 with the engine driven rocker arm lube pump. The electric driven 1.31
- prelube pump should operate only during the engine cranking cycle or until satisfactory lube oil pressure is established in the engine 1.32 rocker arm lube distribution header. The installation of this 1.33 prelube pump should be coordinated with the respective engine manufacturer.
Confirm your compliance with the above requirement or provide your 1.34 justification for not installing an electric prelube oil pump (SRP 1.35 9.5.7, Parts II and III).
Response: 1.36 The BVPS-2 emergency diesel generator units are specifically designed 1.37 with nuclear standby service in mind. The units have a 1.38 K4ap-u.mmt ud probe. pump that operate:;
continuously, maintaining the engine in s prelubri:ated condition for' 1.39 emergency starts with the exception of r.e rocker arms. The rocker 1.40 arm has its own lube oil system consisttr.: of an engine-driven pump and an electric rocker arm prelube :;rp. i:th regard to dry 1.41 emergency starts, the vendor technical m2...al states that the system
,-, is properly lubricated and ready for e ergency starts if, (A) the 1.42 I
V Amendment S Q430.113 . September 1984
4 n122410Ssra8ss 01/07/t , 38
^ 'EV?D-2 FSAR J' ,
4 O
l engine has been operated in.the past'Weeki or (B) the rocker arm 1 prelube oil pump has'been run for at.least 5 minutes but no more than 1.43
, 30 minutes in the past week.
The operating < manual will recuire the;tlectric, rocker arm prelube 1.44
, pump to be operated. for at least 5 minuEes (but .no more' than 30 1.45 t
minutes)~once a week unless the engin'e hat been operated within the pre;rious week. This ;will ensure that. the system is properly 1.47
.lubricat,ed and ready for emergency starts.
~
,t Daily opedation of the electric rocker arm prelube pump, as discussed 1.48 in .SRP 9,5.7, would be excessive lubricatipn for the BVPS-2 diesel 1.49
, generators.when' compared to the manufacturer's recommendations.
i -
.~
' % k' ,
e
.( ,
r e
p 4 #
+
w
\
d e %
/
, m
- l J
Amendment 8 'Q430.li3-2 September 1984
.g ,
/ j- ,
, . ~ , ---,sw.-,-%.e h 7--- tee we -ro ---'e--- 7" *=*#** " * ' + * ' ' ' * * " - * * * * * ' " ' " * " " * * " " ~ " " " ' " " ' " ' ' " * " ' * ' ' ~ " " * " " " -
- n1224106src8cb 07/07/84 38 BVPS-2 FSAR
/O NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.115 (Section 9.5.7) 1.13 In Section 9.5.4 you state that diesel fuel oil is available frcm 1.14 local distribution sources, but yeu have not discussed the 1.15 availability of lube oil. Identify the sources where diesel quality 1.16 lube oil will be available and the distances required to be travelled from the source (s) to the plant. Also discuss how the lube oil will 1.18 he delivered onsite under extremely unfavorable environmental conditions (SRP 9.5.7, Parts II and III). 1.19 Response: 1.20 Diesel lube oil will be stored at the site in quantities for one 1.21 complete change of one diese.1 engine. In addition, lube oil can be 1.22 obtained from Cleveland, Ohio (a 2-hour drive) which has a minimum of 5,000-gallons of Mobilguard 312 on hand at all times. The total 1.24 capacity of -the sump is 1,400 gallons. The normal time involved in 1.25 obtaining this oil is 5 days, and the lube oil can be expedited in an emergency. There is sufficient onsite storage which precludes the 1.26 need to consider unfavorable environmental conditions. As stated in 1.27 the response provided for Question 430.114, the 1,400 gallons stored onsite are adeqcate to supply both diesel engines, assuming excessive 1.28 consumption rates, for greater than 7 days starting with sump level O
V at the low alarm point. 1.29 O
V Amendment 8 Q430.115-1 September 1984
n1224106sra8tu 07/03/84 164 BVPS-2 FSAR f'~' NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.10 Question 430.120 (SRP 9.5.7) 1.13 Section 9.5.7 and Figure 9.5-11 do not give an adequate 1.14 representation of the lube oil system. Very few valves and pipe 1.16 sizes are shown. For example, a number of lines from the lube oil 1.17 heat exchanger, oil filter, and oil strainers lead directly back to the lube oil sump, leading to the conclusion that the engine may not 1.19 be adequately lubricated due to the oil being diverted to the sump. 1.21 Provide a detailad description (including instrumentation) of the 1.22 lube oil flow paths, as well as a more detailed P&ID of the lube oil 1.24 system showing pipe sizes, valves, and instrument locations (SRP 9.5.7, Part III).
' Response: 1.25 Refer to revised Figure 9.5-11, Amendment 8. The lines leading 1.27 directly back to the sump are 3/8 inch vent lines. The flow through 1.28 these lines will have an insignificant effect on the operation of the system. 1.29 f%
O
[ .
,, Amendment 8 Q430.120-1 September 1984
n1224106sr:8;h 07/07/84 38 BVPS-2 FSAR
/ ^g
~
NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 b
Question 430.123 (Section 9.5.8) 1.13 Discuss the provisions made in your design of the diesel engine 1.14 combustion air intake and exhaust system to prevent possible 1.15 clogging, during standby and in operation, from abnormal climatic conditions (heavy rain, freezing rain, dust storms, ice and snow 1.16 drifts, and snow) that could prevent operation of the diesel generator on demand (SRP 9.5.8, Parts II and III). 1.17 Response: 1.18 Abnormal climatic conditions to be considered at BVPS-2 would include 1.19 heavy rain, freezing rain, ice and snow drifts, and snow. Heavy 1.21 rain, freezing rain, and snow cannot impair the functioning of diesel intakes and exhausts because of the downward facing openings of the 1.22 labyrinths which are designed to protect the exhausts and intakes from tornado missiles. Drifting snow cannot restrict intakes due to 1.24 their elevation, which is greater than 25 ft. above the ground (refer to Figure 3.8-43). Blo:kage of diesel exhausts by drifting snow is 1.26 prevented by the location and configuration of the concrete hoods (refer to-Figure 3.8-43). Since each hood has two downward facing 1.28 openings, one on the north side of the center supporting pedestal and one on the south side of the pedestal, blowing snow from the north or 1.29
(}
(_,/
south will not significantly drift at least one opening on each 1.30 diesel exhaust because of shielding by the pedestals and/or the adjacent diesel exhaust hood. Snow blown from the east or west will 1.31 not drift significantly because the north opening of the "B" diesel exhaust and the south opening of the "A" diesel exhaust permit 1.32 blowing snou to freely pass under the overhanging openings. In 1.33 addition, the area of the openings (over 50 ft 2 ) far exceeds the area of the exhaust pipe (less than 8 ftz) and would permit significant 1.34 screen blockage before diesel performance would be impacted. Snow 1.35 depth can reach 51 inches average at the diesel exhausts and still maintain the 8 fta total opening area, assuming the exhaust flow does 1.36 not blow or melt nearby snow (which it certainly would).
k ,)
m Amendment S Q430.123-1 September 1984 i
n1224106srt8m 07/07/84 04 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter September 19, 1983 1.9 question 430.127 (Sections 8.3, 9.5.6, 9.5.7, and 9.5.8) 1.13 4
Diesel generators for nuclear power plants should be capable of 1.14 4
operating at maximum rated output under various service conditions. 1.15 For no load and light load operations, the diesel generator may not 1.16 be capable of operating for extended periods of time under extreme 1.17 service conditions or weather disturbances without serious degradation of the engine performance. This would result in the 1.18 inability of the diesel engine to accept full load or fail to perform on demand. Provide the following: 1.19
- 1. The environmental service conditions for which your diesel 1.21 generator is designed to delive.r rated load including the 1.22 following: 1.23 Service Conditions 1.25
- a. Ambient air intake temperature range 'F, and 1.27 9
- b. Humidity, max - percent. 1.28
- 2. Assurance' that the diesel generator can provide full rated 1.30
,_ , load under the following weather disturbances:
- a. A tornado pressure transient causing an atmospheric 1.32 pressure reduction'of 3 psi in 1.5 seconds followed by a rise to normal pressure in 1.5 seconds. 1.33
- b. A low pressure storm such as a hurricane resulting in 1.34 ambient pressure of not less than 26 inches Hg for a minimum duration of two (2) hours followed by a 1.35
. pressure of no less than 26 to 27 inches Hg for an
!. extended period of time (approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />). 1.36 1
- 3. In light of recent- weather conditions (subzero 1.41 temperatures), discuss the effects low ambient temperature will have on engine standby and operation and effect on its 1.42 output particularly at no load and light load operation.
Will air preheating be required to maintain engine 1.43
. performance? Provide curve or table that shows performance 1.44 versus ambient temperature for your diesel generator at E -normal rated load, light load, and no load conditions. Also' 1.46 provide assurance that the engine jacket water and lube oil preheat systems have the capacity to maintain the diesel 1.47 engine at manufacturer's recommended standby temperatures with minimum expected ambient cenditions. If the engine 1.48 jacket water and lube oil preheat systems capacity is not sufficient to do the above, discuss how tr.:s equipment will 1.49 Amendment 4 Q430.127-; December 1983 1
I u__
n122410$ set 8m 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
( ,
be maintained at ready standby status with minimum ambient
- temperature.
- 4. Provide the manufacturer's design data for ambient pressure 1.50 vs engine derating.
- 5. Discuss the effects that any other service and weather 1.51 conditions will have on engine operation and output, i.e.,
dust storm, air restriction, etc. (SRP 8.3.1, Parts II and 1.54 III, SRP o.55, Part III; SRP 9.5.7, Parts II and III; SRP 9.5.8, Parts II and III). 1.55 Response: 1.57 The emergency diesel generator engines are designed to operate with 1.58 an ambient building temperature of +10 F to +122*F and a combustion 2.1 air intake tempature of -20*F to +104 F. The engine is also 2.2 unaffected by humidity and can operate from 0 to 100 percent humidity.
The diesel engine manufacturer has reviewed the engine design 2.7 relative to a tornado pressure reduction of 3 psi and the hurricane 2.8 pressures. The diesel engine manufacturer has indicated that no 2.9 deleterious effect will take place for these events due to their ,
short event durations. 2.10
-m
- The diesel engine manufacturer indicated that regardless of 2.11
'/ temperature, safe and reliable performance of the engine is assured 2.12 when operation of the engine is in accordance with the operation and maintenance instructions described in the response to Question 2.13 430.25 Amendment 3. The manufacturer has stated that the 2.14 probab1_ity that extreme cold air temperatures could affect the ability of the diesel engine to start was considered in the responses 2.16 to NRC questions relating to another nuclear plant. The effects of 2.17 air temperature in combination with other engine parameters were considered in the manufacturer's analysis in response to those NRC 2.18 questions. The manufacturer's conclusion was that no air preheating 2.19 is required when combustion air temperatures are above -20 F.
The jacket water and lube oil preheat systems have been designed by 2.20 the diesel engine manufacturer to maintain the engine at temperatures 2.21 required by the diesel engine manufacturer to enhance first-start capability. The jacket water and oil preheat systems have been 2.22 designed predicated on a room temperature of +10*F.
The diesel generators and associated auxiliary systems are located in 2.23 heated cubicles. As described in Section 9.4.6 and Table 9.4-9, 2.24 heating is provided by multiple electric unit heaters. The size and 2.25 number of unit heaters required was determined without taking credit for the diesel's jacket water heater and lube oil preheater. 2.27 Therefore, adequate building temperatures could be maintained with 2.28 s one unit heater out of service when the heat released by the diesel 2.29 l
Amendment 8 Q430.127-2 September 1984 A
n1224106sraGm 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR in the standby mode is available.
O The only credible event which 2.30 '
would cause loss of all the heaters is a loss of the power supply.
In that event the diesel would start and the heaters would not be 2.31 required because of the heat released from the diesels under load. 2.32 The engine manufacturer's criteria do not require derating for any 2.33 ambient pressure expected at the site.
Refer to Figure 430.127-1, based on vendor-supplied drawing. Also 2.35 refer to the response provided for Question 430.123, Amendment 4.
)
s_
1 6 9
n1224106sra8ba 07/09/84 162 BVPS-2 FSAR
('^
NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.10
+
Question 430.128 (Section 8.3, SRPs 9.4.5 and 9.5.8) l'14 In Section 8.3 of the FSAR you state that in the event of a loss of 1.15 offsite power (LOOP), the diesel generator room ventilation system 1.16 must be manually reconnected to the bus. The diesel generator room 1.18 ventilation system provides cooling to the diesel generator and its 1.19 auxiliary fequipment during diesel generator operation. Failure to 1.20 restore the ventilation system to operating condition within a reasonable amount of time will result in diesel generator roon 1.21 temperatures exceeding the 120 F design ambient temperature specified 1.22 in Section 9.5.4 of the FSAR. Provide the following: 1.23
- 1. The means that are provided to the control room operator 1.30 that tell him the ventilation system needs to be manually 1.31 connected to the bus in the event of LOOP.
- 2. How and from where will manual reconnection be performed? 1.32
- 3. The- time period that will be required to manually reconnect 1.33 the ventilation system to the bus. This should include all 1.35 travel time. The time interval between diesel generator 1.36 start-up and operator recognition that the diesel room 1.38 ventilation system has to be turned-on as a result of the room temperature alarm, procedures, or other indication, and 1.39
/)
(_, other contingencies or actions that the operator must take 1.41 as a result of the accident.
- 4. A room temperature versus time profile for the worst case 1.42 outside ambient air temperature conditions for the following 1.43 events: -
- a. Diesel generator started, ventilation system 1.45 automatically reenergized.
- b. Diesel generator started, ventilation system manually 1.46 reenergized in the time sp.:ified in item 3 above. 1.47
- c. Diesel generator started, ventilation system not 1.48 energized.
- 5. Assuming that the diesel room ventilation system is not 1.50 reenergized for whatever reason, verify that the diesel 1.51 generator and its associated equipment (electrical and mechanical) is qualified to operate in the maximum rocm 1.52 temperature environment specified in 4(c) above and will be 1.53
, able to operate in this environment for' a minimum of seven days of diesel generator operation. 1.54 Amendment 4 430.128-1 December 1983 t-
, - . , - , .-- ~ , - - , , , . . - . - . - . _ , - . - - , - - - - - , ~ ~ , - , - - . - . - . , . . , - - - . - - . . - - -
. n1224106sra8ba 07/09/84 162 BVPS-2 FSAR
- 6. If the diesel generator and its associated equipment 1.55
. (,, (]/ (electrical and mechanical) cannot operate in the maximum 1.56 room temperature environment of 4(c) above, state the maximum allowable room temperature in which the diesel 1.57
, generator and its associated equipment can operate, and 1.58 provide a list of diesel generator components whose environmental operating' temperatures are less than the 2.1 maximum room temperature specified in 4(c) above and their 2.2 operating temperatures. Discuss how the listed diesel 2.3 generator components will be upgraded to qualify and operate 2.4 in the maximum environmental room temperature or will be protected during these conditions, so that the diesel 2.5 generator can perform its design safety function, or provide 2.6
. assurance to the staff that the ventilation system will be reenergized prior to reaching the maximum environmental room 2.7 temperature so that the diesel generator and the above 2.8 listed equipment can perform its design safety function, (SRP 8.3.1, Parts II and III; SRP 9.4.5, Part III, and SRP 2.9 9.5.8, Parts II and III)
Response: 2.11
- Refer to Section 9.4.6.3, which states that " Operation of the primary 2.12 and secondary supply fans, normal exhaust fans, and associated 2.13 motorized dampers is maintained during loss of normal station power 2.14 by automatic connection to the emergency buses."
< - (_,/
In addition, the diesel generator secondary supply fan (2HVD*271A) 2.15 will be added to Table 8.3-3 in a future amendment.
4 I
. , . . - - Amendment 8 430.128-2 September 1984
- Og o
---,)-- .-., - ,-, ,,_.., - . - , - - - , , , - - - - . ,,r,_ -,--.------reee-'-- 'rw vww yy - - ---ry
n1224106srt8tp 07/02/84 164 BVPS-2 FSAR
-7 NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 Question 430.129 (Section 9.5.8) 1.12 In the FSAR you state the primary fire protection system for the 1.13 diesel generator building is a CO 2 system. The CO 2 is a nonsafety 1.15 related system and is not qualified for seismic events. The system 1.16
-is seismically supported. Show that spurious actuation of the CO2 1 17
' fire protection system will not affect diesel generator availability and operability (SRP 9.5.8, Parts II and III). 1.18 Response: 1.19 As stated in the esponse to Question 280.3, Amendment 3, a review of 1.20 spurious actuation of CO2systems has been completed. That response 1.22 described changes required to the ventilation system identified in the review. No other unacceptable effects were identified in the 1.24 review.
Postulated effects of spurious actuation of the CO2 systems include 1.25 dilution of the diesel combustion air and thermal transients in the 1.26 diesel generator cubicles. The effects of dilution of combustion air 1.27 resulting from spurious actuation of the CO 2 systems are less severe 1.28 than the effect of a fire in one diesel generator cubicle which were 1.29 addressed in the response to Question 430.124, Amendment 7. The 1.30 7 -effects of thermal transients are addressed as follows:
(j s
1.31
~
Discharge of the CO 2 systems is postulated to be a single shot resulting from a spurious actuation signal. The CO2 nozzle discharge 1.33 is directed away from essential equipment. This discharge will cause 1.34 a rapid drop in air temperature. Due to the heat capacity of the 1.35 building structure and equipment in the building, as well as heat 1.36 sources in-the building, the air temperature will return to near normal.in minutes-(refer to typical test data, Chemetron 1975). 1.38 The cooling of the air in the building is caused by the air mixing 1.39 with the CO 2 discharge, which causes thermal equilibrium to be 1.40 reached almost immediately. Cooling of equipment will then occur as 1.41 thermal equilibrium between the equipment and the air /CO2 mixture is 1.42 approached through natural convection heat transfer. Because the 1.43 mass of the air /CO2 mixture is only a small fraction of the mass of the equipment and structures in the diesel generator building, the 1.44 change in temperatore for the equipment and structures will only be a 1.45 fraction of the temperature change in the air. Electrical equipment 1.47 enclosed in cabinets will be partially insulated by those enclosures and will therefore experience less temperature change. L.48 Due to the low probability of spurious CO discharge 2 and the short ;L.49 duration of the event should it occur, no significant effects are 1.50 expected.
O Amendment 8 Q430.129-1 September 1984
L' n1224106sra8ap 07/02/84 164 BVPS-2 FSAR t
Reference for Q430.129: 1.51 Chemetron 1975. Letter to R. E. Heilman, Stone & Webster Engineering 1.53
, Corporation,, from H. V. Williamson, Chemetron Gases Group Research 1.54 Center, February 6, 1975. ,1.55 if d
1 i
i 4
t 1
i
(
l' l
Amendment 8 Q430.129-2 September 1984 y.,._._,,-7-.. _ , . ,_ . , . - . - . . . . , , _ _ , _ . . , _ . . . . _ , _ . . , . , , _ _ _ . .,_m..,_L-m,.__,,_,_,~,___. , , , _ , . _ _ , - . , , . _ , . _ - , , ,
n1224106srt0tc 07/09/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR l
[ NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 D]
Question 430.134 (Section 10.2) 1.13 In Sections 10.2.2.3 and 10.2.3.5 you discuss inservice inspection 1.14 and exercising of the main steam turbine stop and control and 1.15 reheater stop and intercept valves. You do not discuss the inservice 1.17 ,
inspection, testing and exercising of the extraction steam valves.
Provide a detail description of: 1) the extraction steam valves, and 1.18
- 2) your inservice inspection and testing program for these valves. 1.19 Also , provide the time interval between periodic valve exercising to 1.20 assure the extraction steam valves will close on turbine trip 1.21 (SRP 10.2, Part III).
Response: 1.22 Refer to Section 10.4.11 and revised Section 10.2.2.1, Amendment 4, 1.23 for the description of the extraction line nonreturn valves. 1.24 The extraction steam valves are not safety-related and are not an 1.25 ASME Section XI examination requirement. As such, they are not 1.26 inspected or tested within the plant's in-service inspection program l (ASME Section XI). However, these valves will be operationally 1.27 tested prior to any startup. The E7PS operating manual chapter on 1.28 the extraction steam system start-up requires all extraction steam nonreturn valves to have been tested during start-up within 1 week. 1.29
() This requirement is met in the start-up procedure by visually noting the stroking of the valves in a test latch-unlatch sequence during 1.30 1.31 the turbine start-up.
boa . 6
I n1224106sra8ad 06/28/84 163 f
BVPS-2 FSAR O. NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.10
,( f .
Question 430.136 (Sections 10.2.2.3 and 10.2.3.5) 1.14 In Sections. 10.2.2.3 and 10.2.3.5 of the FSAR, you discuss the in- 1.15
!: service inspection (ISI) program for the main turbine stop, control 1.16 and combined. intercept and intermediate stop valves, and the turbine 1.17 overspeed protection system.
- 1. In the description of the ISI for the valves, you state the 1.19 following: "The valves are partially closed and then 1.20 reopened during this procedure [ weekly valve exercising]" 1.21 and "after this initial inspection program [ valve dismantlement and visual inspection] is completed, 1.22 inspection of all valves at least once every 36 to 39 months is . suggested." This is not in accordance with the ISI 1.24 criteria in Section II of SRP 10.2 tnd the Westinghouse Test 1.25 Instructions (I.L. 1250-4093 B) which require complete closure of the valves and visual inspection every 36 to 39 1.26 months. Comply with this position. 1.27
- 2. In the description of the ISI for the turbine overspeed 1.28 protection system, you state "... overspeed trip tests are 1.29 performed periodically...." Define periodically (SRP 10.2, 1.30 Parts II and III).
(
Q Response: 1.33 Refer to revised Sections 10.2.2.3, Amendment 4, and 10.2.3.5, 1.34 Amendment 2 and the response to Question 251.2, Amendment 3. l1.35 DLC is not currently following the Westinghouse Test Instructions 1.36 (I.L. 1250-4093 B) which were referenced in the question. The 11.38 applicable information for BVPS-2 is contained in Westinghouse Instruction Manual 1250-C874, Volume 1. Thus, in accordance with 1.41 this manual, DLC is following the recommendations of I.L. 1250- 1.42 4700.06 rather than I.L. 1250-4093 B. DLC will conform to SRP 1.43
, Section 10.2 concerning valve maintenance and overspeed protection. 1. g .
A complete turbine overspeed trip test (actual turbine trip) will be 1.45 conducted during refueling outages unless previously conducted as a 1.46 post-maintenance test of the turbine. The special test provision 1.47 discussed in Section 10.2.0.3 will be used on a monthly basis to check the mechanical and backup electrical overspeed trips. 1.48 G
.h. Amendment 8-' '430.136-1 September 1984
n1224106sre8bd 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
- [~'S NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.10
\vl Question 430.138-(Section 10.3.1) 1.14.
You state in Section 10.3.1 of the FSAR that the main steam system is 1.15 designed in accordance with Issue No. 1 of -NUREG-0138, and that 1.16 credit is being taken for all valves downstream of the main steam 1.17 isolation valve (MSIV) to limit blowdown of a second steam generator 1.18 in the event of a steam line break upstream of the MSIV. In order to 1.19 confirm. satisfactory performance following such a steam line break, you provided a tabulation (Table 10.3-1) in the FSAR of all flow 1.20 paths that branch off the main steam lines between the MSIVs and the 1.21 turbine stop valves. For each flow path originating at the main 1.22 steam lines, the following information was provided: 1.23 a) System identification, 1.29 b) Maximum steam flow in pounds per hour, 1.30 c) Type of shut-off valve (s), 1.31 d) Size of valve (s), 1.32 e) Quality of the valve (s), 1.33 f) Design code of the valve (s), 1.34
(-]/
\~~
g) Closure time of the valve (s), and 1.35 h) Actuation mechanism of the valve (s) (such as, solenoid- 1.36 operated, motor-operated, and air-operated diaphram' valves). 1.37 Sufficient descriptive information was not provided in the FSAR to 1.39 confirm satisfactory performance following such a steam line break. 1.40 Provide the following: 1.41 a) In the event of the postulate,d accident, termination of 1.43 steam flow from all- systems identified in Table 10.3-1, 1.44 except those that can be used for mitigation of the accident, is required to bring the reactor to a safe cold 1.45 shutdown. For these systems describe what design features 1.46 have been incorporated to assure closure of the steam shut- 1.47 off valve (s). Describe what operator actions (if any) are 1.48 required.
b)- If the systems that can be used for mitigation of the 1.49 accident are not available or a decisior. is made to use 1.50 other means to shut down the reactor, describe how these systems are secured to assure positive steam shut-off. 1.52 Describe what operator actions (if any) are required. 1.53 6
\ .
Amendment 8 430.138-1 September 1984
n1224106sra8bd 07/07/84 54 BVPS-2 FSAR
/~~s c) Show that failure to isolate or secure these systems will 1.54
( _,) not result in a blowdown of more than one steam generator. 1.55 If any of the requested information is presently included in the FSAR 1.57 text, provide only the references where the information may be found 1.58 (SRP 10.3, Parts II and III).
Response: 2.1 Closure of steam shutoff valves is not required for any of the branch 2.2 lines off the main steam lines. 2.3 Reheat steam flow to the tube side of the reheater will cease when 2.4 flow from the high pressure turbine exhaust to the shell side of the 2.5 reheater is terminated by a turbine trip. 2.6 Turbine bypass steam flow to the main condenser is automatically 2.7 controlled. Following a loss of offsite power (LOOP), the centrol 2.8 valves will close. If offsite power remains available, the valves 2.9 will modulate to control the cooldown of the reactor (Section 7.7). 2.10 The flow from all the remaining branch lines in combination is so 2.11 small that it will have an insignificant effect compared to the 2.12 effect of the postulated double-ended rupture of main steam line. 2.13 This flow is less than the flow which would pass through a main steam 2.14
/% safety valve or power-operated relief valve. Therefore, postulation 2.15
- 5. _) of failure of a safety or relief valve as the single failure is more restrictive than postulation of an MSIV failure. 2.16 As stated in Section 15.1.5.2, the most restrictive single failure is 2.17 assumed to occur in the safety injection system for the analysis of a 2.18 main steam line break.
A k, Amendment 8 430.138-2 September 1984
.- . . _ _ . _ . , _ - - . , _. _ . _ . _ ~ _ . -_.
n1224106sra8te 06/28/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR
,' s NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 (v)
Question 430.141 (Section 10.4.1) 1.13 In Section 10.4.1.4 you have discussed tests, initial field 1.14 inspection, and inservice inspection but not the frequency of 1.15 inservice inspection of the main condenser. Provide this information 1.16 in the FSAR (SRP 10.4.1, Part III).
Response: 1.17 The main condenser is not included in the ASME Section XI Inservice 1.18 Inspection Program. The condenser is scheduled for inspection based 1.19 on plant chemistry conditions, results of fouling analysis, and trends in operating parameters. These inspections are normally 1.21 scheduled during refuelipg outages but may occur more frequently based on changes in the operating conditions mentioned above. The 1.23 condenser is inspected as outlined in Section 10.4.1.4.
Additionally, differential pressure and other plant parameters which 1.24 monitor condenser operation are monitored daily during plant 1.25 operation.
O V
O .
n1224106sra8af 07/07/84 38 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 h(N, Question 430.144 (Section 10.4.4.4) 1.13 In Section 10.4.4.4 you have discussed tests and initial field 1.14 inspection, inspections at refueling, and in-service inspection but 1.15 not the frequency of in-service testing and inspection of the turbine bypass system. Provide this information in the FSAR (SRP 10.4.4, 1.16 Part I).
Response: 1.17 The turbine bypass system (TBS) is not included in the ASME 1.18 Section XI In-service Inspection Program. During preoperational 1.19 testing to Regulatory Guide 1.68, the TBS control valves and controls will be inspected and tested as described in Section 14.2.12. The 1.21 TBS piping is inspected and tested in accordance with Paragraphs 136 and 137 of ANSI B31.1.
79 V
l l
l l
' - O l [\s,) Amendment 8 Q430.144-1 September 1984 l
l I
i
, , , _. , - _ . - . - _ , _ _ _ , . . . - . .. , _ , . _ , , . _ _ . . . . ~ _ _ . . , _ . - - _ _ _ _ - . . _ - . . . - . . , _ _ _ _
n1224106sra8bj 07/13/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR
,, NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.9 I \
-\-v/ Question 430.146 (Sections 10.3.2 and 10.4.4.3) 1.13 In Sections 10.3.2 and 10.4.4.3 of the FSAR you state that turbine 1.14 bypass system interlocks are provided to prevent spurious opening of 1.15 the turbine bypass valves. In Section 10.4.4.5 you state that 1.16 interlock selector switches are provided in the main control room, but no description is provided. Provide a detailed description of 1.18 the turbine bypass system interlocks, including interlock selector switches and their purpose (SRP 10.4.4, Part III). 1.19 Resptase: 1.20
-Steam dump system interlocks are provided to prevent spurious opening 1.21 of the steam dump valves. These interlocks are as follows: 1.22
- 1. High condenser pressure or insufficient condenser circulating 1.24 water flow (C-9) blocks the signals which supply air to the 1.25 individual dump valves.
- 2. ' Low-low reactor coolant system average temperature (P-12) blocks 1.26 the signals which supply air to the individual dump valves. 1.27 Redundant interlock selector switches for manual bypass of thisl 1.28 interlock are provided to . allow a planned, controlled plant 1.29 cooldown but apply only to the cooldown condenser dump valves. A 1.31
/ }- low-low reactor coolant system temperature signal always blocks (V the signals which supply air to those condenser dump valves that 1.32 j
are not cooldown interlock cannot bedump valves (this function of the low-low T ,Y 1.34 bypassed).
- 3. On a reactor trip, upon actuation of load-loss permissive C-7A or 1.35 upon selection of steam header pressure control, air can be 1.36 supplied to half of the condenser dump valves (the half containing the cooldown condenser dump valves), and air to the 1.37 remaining half remains blocked; upon actuation of load-loss permissive C-7B while the steam dump control mode is in the T 1.38 mode, air can be supplied to the remaining half. aN
- 4. Reactor trip (P-4) . blocks the signals which allow air to be 1.39 supplied to half of the condenser dump valves (the half that does 1.40 not contain the ecoldown dump valves).
- 5. Each of the four banks of condenser dump valves is tripped open 1.41 by a temperature error signal from comparison of the auctioneered 1.42 Taoo Ta 4 with (reactor Ta q (load rejection) or of the auctioneered Tag with 1.43 -
trip). The valves are tripped open one bank 1.44 atN. time. For a load rejection, either 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 banks 1.45 can be tripped open, depending on the temperature. error signal generated by the load rejection. For a reactor trip, either 0, 1.47 I
[
5V
]/ Amendment 8 Q430.146-1 September 1984 l
I
. . _ . _ _ _ _ _ .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.__m_. _ _ . _ _ . . . . _
- n1224106sra8bj. 07/13/84 363 BVPS-2 FSAR I
1,- or 2 banks can be tripped open, depending on the temperature ;
error signal generated. i O-% 6. The condenser. dump valves are modulated sequentially, one bank at 1.48 7 a time. The second bank does not begin to modulate open until 1.49 "
the first bank has received a signal to modulate fully open, the third bank does not begin to modulate open until the first and 1.50 second banks have received signals to modulate fully open, etc. 1.51 The sequence for modulating the valves closed is the reverse of 1.52 Lthe opening sequence (i.e., the last bank to open is the first 1.53 bank to close, etc). . The first bank to modulate open is also the 1.54 bank that is tripped open first.
The interlocks are also presented in the Functional Logic Diagrams 1.56 for BVPS-2 (Westinghouse drawing #108D993) on Sheet 10. 1.57 i
. Also-refer to revised Section 10.4.4.5, Amendment 8, for descriptions '1.58 l of the turbine bypass interlocks and interlock selector switches and 2.1 their purposes.
c
.-p
\
l 1
l i
l
)
l
-f\z Amendment 8 Q430.146-2 September 1984
_\
L
n1224106sra8bk 07/13/84 163 BVPS-2 FSAR 4
pressure is relieved co the atmosphere through the atmospheric dump 1.10 valves and through the main steam safety valves (Section 10.3). 1.11 10.4.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 1.14 During the Initial Startup Test Program, the turbine bypass control 1.15 valves and TBS controls are inspected and tested in accordance with 1.18 Section 14.2.12.
The TBS piping is inspected and tested in accordance with 1.21 Paragraphs 136 and 137 of A!1SI B31.1.
10.4.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements 1.24 A steam dump control mode selector switch and redundant interlock 11.25 selector switches are provided in the main control room. Loss of 1.28 condenser vacuum and circulating water pump interlocks are provided for the turbine bypass control valves.
The following control switches are provided in the main control room 1.29 for operation of the TBS: steam bypass control mode selector switch 1.30 (reset-Tgi -steam pressure), steam bypass interlock selector switches 1.31 (off/ reset on-defeat Tg ), and selector switches (loop 21 T g 1.33 defeated, loop 22 T defeated, loop 23 Tm defeated). 7 l1.34 Manual / Auto oh stations for the atmospheric steam dump valves are 1.35 s
provided in the main control room and at the emergency shutdown panel 1.36 (ESP). A pushbutton at the ESP will trcnsfer control from the main 1.37 control room to the ESP. A manual reset at the relay will transfer 1.38 control from the ESP back to the main control roon. If their 1.39 respective steam line pressures are not high, the atmospheric steam dump valves can be modulated automatically or manually from either 1.40 the main control room or from the ESP.
Manual stations for two of the atmospheric steam dump valves are 1.41 provided at the alternate shutdown panel (ASP). A pushbutton on the 1.42 ASP will transfer control from the main control room or the ESP to the ASP. A manual reset at the relay on the ASP will transfer 1.43 control back to either the main control room or to the ESP. The 1.44 atmospheric steam dump valves can be modulated manually from the ASP provided the transfer pushbutton on the ASP has been depressed. 1.45 Annunciation ir provided in the main control room when control is at 1.46 the ESP or at the ASP. These conditions are also monitored by the 1.47 BVPS-2 computer. Red (open) and green (closed) indicating lights are 1.48 provided at the main control board, at the ESP, and at the ASP to indicate where the control is at. 1.49 A manual loading station for the atmospheric residual heat release 1.50 valve is provided in the main control room and at the ESP. A 1.52 pushbutton at the ESP will transfer control from the main control room to the ESP, and a manual reset at the relay on the ESP will 1.53 Amendment 8 10.4-11 September 1984