Text

IR 05000498-12-005 AND 05000499-12-005; 09/29/2012 - 12/31/2012; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Inservice Inspection and Problem Identification and Resolution
	ML13037A195
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	02/05/2013
From:	Walker W C; NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
To:	Koehl D L; South Texas
	Walker W
References
	IR-12-005
	Download: ML13037A195 (71)
	v • d • e

February 5, 2013

Mr. Dennis Koehl Chief Executive Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Subject: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2012005 AND 05000499/2012005

Dear Mr. Koehl:

On December 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on January 3, 2013, with Mr. D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President, and other members of your staff. The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this inspection. All of these findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. Further, a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Wayne C. Walker, Branch Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000498, 05000499 License Nos.: NPF-76, NPF-80

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000498/2012005 and 05000499/2012005 w/Attachment 1: Supplemental Information w/Attachment 2: Document Request for Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection w/Attachment 3: Inservice Inspection Document Request cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000498/2012005, 05000499/2012005; 09/29/2012 12/31/2012; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Inservice Inspection and Problem Identification and Resolution. The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspections by region-based inspectors. Three Green non-cited violations of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, -CFindings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.55a(g)(4) involving flange leak-off line of Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the applicable edition of Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Contrary to the above, prior to November 1, 2012, the licensee failed to perform the required pressure test of the reactor vessel flange seal leak-off line for both units. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Class 2 requirements for pressure retaining components as provided ding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 12-28600. the reactor vessel flange leak-off line was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Reliability and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Using Manual Chapter Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss-of-coolant accident, and did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function. This issue did not have a cross-cutting aspect associated with it because it is not indicative of current performance (Section 1R08).

Green.

Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of very low safety significance of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33, for the failure to follow procedures that ensured abrasive tools for use on stainless steel systems were not contaminated with carbon steel. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee was not maintaining tools as required by Procedure 0PGP03-ZG-, and Procedure 0PNP01-ZP-instances of tools coded for use on stainless steel or aluminum bronze stored with tools marked for use on carbon steel, rust deposits on tools marked for use on stainless steel, and rust deposits on stainless steel components in the plant. This indicated that carbon steel contaminated tools may have been used on these systems. The licensee took corrective actions to segregate the coded tools and trained tool room attendants to properly store and mark abrasive tools designated for use on stainless steel, and evaluated the systems with indications program as Condition Report 12-28689. Inspectors determined the failure to assure that abrasive tools designated for exclusive use on stainless steel were stored separately from tools used on other materials was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Reliability and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Using Manual Chapter (SDP) for Findings At-significance (Green) because the finding did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss-of-coolant accident, and did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance work practices in that the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance, and personnel did not follow procedures. Specifically, the inspectors observed that although there were requirements to segregate tools, tools were not consistently segregated when returned to the storage locations as required by procedures H.4(b) (Section 1R08).

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification failure to follow work order package instructions requiring the use of Drawing C012-00081--. Seals (Walls & Floors inches of fire retardant sealant material for penetrations in Units 1 and 2. The inspectors noticed that Unit 1 train B safety-related 4160 Vac switchgear room electrical penetration F4476 had gaps around the edge. A design change installed new electrical cables that required the penetration be sealed using work order package 139376, that penetration seal WILL BE IAW the Penetration Seal Permit and detail

Drawing C012-00081-discovered that a portion of the seal was only 4.5 inches. The licensee captured this issue as Condition Report 12-28283. Corrective actions included restoring the seal to 6 inches, performing additional analysis to support a 3-hour fire barrier with just 5 inches, and performing extent of condition inspections. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attributes of Design Control and Procedure Quality, and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions because it resulted in multiple fire penetration seals being declared nonfunctional as a result of being less than the design thickness. The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, to determine that fire protection issues are processed through Appendix February 28, 2005. The inspectors used Appendix F, Attachment 1, to determine that the finding was of very low safety significance because it was a Moderate A fire confinement issue that screened out using Task 1.3.2 questions, since the seals would still have provided a 2-hour fire endurance rating or a 20 minute fire endurance rating without the seal being subject to direct flame impingement. In addition, this finding had human performance cross-cutting aspects associated with work practices because the licensee did not communicate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer checking, commensurate with the risk, such that the work activity was performed safely H.4(a) (Section 4OA2).

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licenseehis violation and associated corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power and remained there until October 10, 2012, when the unit entered coastdown operations in preparation for Refueling Outage 1RE17. Unit 1 commenced Refueling Outage 1RE17 on October 20, 2012. On November 24, 2012, Unit 1 reached normal operating temperature and pressure in preparation for reactor startup, which was achieved on November 26, 2012. The main generator output breaker was closed on November 27, 2012; with 100 percent rated thermal power achieved on November 30, 2012, and essentially remained there for the duration of the inspection period. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power and essentially remained there for the duration of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignments

Main article: IP 71111.04

.1 Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems: November 1, 2012, Unit 1, residual heat removal system train B December 3, 2012, Unit 1, auxiliary feedwater system train C December 4, 2012, Unit 2, component cooling water system train A December 20, 2012, Unit 1, safety injection system train C The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, UFSAR, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of four partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

===.2 Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On October 30, 2012, the inspectors performed a complete system alignment inspection of the Unit 1 residual heat removal system train C to verify the functional capability of the system. The inspectors selected this system because it was considered both safety significant and risk inspectors inspected the system to review mechanical and electrical equipment line ups, electrical power availability, system pressure and temperature indications, as appropriate, component labeling, component lubrication, component and equipment cooling, hangers and supports, operability of support systems, and to ensure that ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with equipment operation. The inspectors reviewed a sample of past and outstanding work orders to determine whether any deficiencies significantly affected the system function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the corrective action program database to ensure that system equipment-alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of one complete system walkdown sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

=

Main article: IP 71111.05

Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas: October 23, 2012, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building engineered safety features switchgear room train B, Fire Zone Z042 October 24, 2012, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building engineered safety features switchgear room train C, Fire Zone Z052 October 24, 2012, Unit 1, fuel handling building, Fire Zone 303 October 27, 2012, Unit 1, mechanical auxiliary building, Fire Zone 147 The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the pdocuments listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were corrective action program. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of four quarterly fire-protection inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

See Section

==4OA2 for a non-cited violation associated with the train B switchgear room fire penetration seal.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

==

Main article: IP 71111.06

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding; reviewed the corrective action program to determine if licensee personnel identified and corrected flooding problems; inspected underground bunkers/manholes to verify the adequacy of sump pumps, level alarm circuits, cable splices subject to submergence, and drainage for bunkers/manholes; and verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes. The inspectors also inspected the areas listed below to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and wall penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

December 5, 2012, Unit 1, isolation valve cubicle These activities constitute completion of one flood protection measures inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

Main article: IP 71111.07

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee programs, verified performance against industry standards, and reviewed critical operating parameters and maintenance records for the Unit 1 component cooling water essential cooling water heat exchangers. The inspectors verified that performance tests were satisfactorily conducted for heat exchangers/heat sinks and reviewed for problems or errors; the licensee utilized the periodic maintenance method outlined in EPRI Report NP 7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines; the licensee properly utilized biofouling controls; he state of cleanliness of their tubes; and the heat exchanger was correctly categorized under 10 CFR 50.65, Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of one heat sink inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

Main article: IP 71111.08

Completion of Sections

.1 through .5, below, constitutes completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.08-05. .1 Inspection Activities Other Than Steam Generator Tube Inspection, Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspections, Boric Acid Corrosion Control (71111.08-02.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed five nondestructive examination activities and reviewed ten nondestructive examination activities that included four types of examinations. The licensee did not identify any relevant indications accepted for continued service during the nondestructive examinations. The inspectors directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD/COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Component Cooling Water 1-CC 1109-RH02/20-CC-1109-WA3-H Visual Examination - VT-2 Reactor Coolant System 12-RC-1125-BB1-FW5 Ultrasonic Testing Main Steam System 30-MS-1001-25B Ultrasonic Testing Chemical and Volume Control System 1-CV-1210-BB2 HFW-0403 Penetrant Testing Main Steam System 30-MS-1003-GA2 26PL1-26PL8 Pipe Lugs Magnetic Particle Testing - Dry Powder The inspectors reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations: SYSTEM WELD/COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Component Cooling Water 1-CC 1109-RH02/20-CC-1109-WA3-H Visual Examination - VT-2 Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrumentation 8, and 10 through 58 Remote Visual Examination Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrumentation 9 Visual Examination Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrumentation 9 Remote Visual Examination Pressurizer System 2R141TRC0078 FW8409 and FW8410 Penetrant Testing Main Steam System 2S131XFW0604 Penetrant Testing Chemical and Volume Control System 1-CV-1210-BB2 HFW-0403 Penetrant Testing SYSTEM WELD/COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Main Steam System 30-MS-1001-GA2-25B Ultrasonic Testing Reactor Coolant System 12-RC-1125-BB1-FW5 Ultrasonic Testing Main Steam System 30-MS-1003-GA2 26PL1-26PL8 Pipe Lugs Magnetic Particle Testing - Dry Powder During the review and observation of each examination, the inspectors verified that activities were performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements and applicable procedures. The inspectors compared any indications identified during previous examinations and verified that licensee personnel evaluated the indications in accordance with the ASME Code and approved procedures. The inspectors also verified the qualifications of all nondestructive examination technicians performing the inspections were current. The inspectors observed one weld on a high point vent for the 1B centrifugal charging pump discharge line in the chemical and volume control system. The inspectors reviewed records for the following welding activities: SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION WELD TYPE Chemical and Volume Control System 1-CV-1210-BB2 HFW-0403 Gas Tungsten Arc Welding The inspectors verified, by review, that the welding procedure specifications and the welder had been properly qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section IX requirements. The inspectors also verified, through observation and record review, that essential variables for the welding process were identified, recorded in the procedure qualification record, and formed the bases for qualification of the welding procedure specifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These actions constitute completion of the requirements for Section 02.01.

b. Findings

Introduction.

Inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10CFR50.55a(g)(4) ressure test of the reactor vessel flange leak-off line of Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the applicable edition of Section XI of the ASME Code.

Description.

inspectors noted that the reactor vessel flange seal leak-off line for each of the units was classified as an ASME Class 2 component. The inspectors identified, through further review and discussion, that the licensee had not performed the required system leakage test of each of the seal leak-off lines as described by the applicable sections of the 2004 Edition of the ASME Code. Specifically, the licensee implemented a methodology that looked for leakage and credited a walkdown of the accessible piping sections of each line during Mode 3 conditions without the line being pressurized. Article IWC-5000, retaining components be pressure tested via a system leakage test per IWC-5220, without the system being filled or pressurized. The licensee is required to comply with the requirements imposed by Section XI of the ASME Code, or request exemption from particular requirements via a relief request. The licensee submitted a relief request to invoke ASME Code Case N-805 to restore compliance with regulatory requirements.

Analysis.

test of the reactor vessel flange leak-off line was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Reliability and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Using Manual At-because the finding did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss-of-coolant accident, and did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function. This issue did not have a cross-cutting aspect associated with it because it is not indicative of current performance (Section 1R08).

Enforcement.

Title 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) requires that components classified as ASME Code Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 meet the requirements set forth in Section XI of the applicable editions of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addenda. Title 10 CFR 50.55(a)(g)(4)(ii) requires that inservice examination of components be conducted during successive 120-month inspection intervals and comply with the requirements of the latest edition and addenda of the Code applicable to the specific interval. ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWC-5221 requires for Class 2 pressure retaining components a system leakage test be performed at the system pressure obtained while the system, or portion of the system, is in service performing its normal operating function. Contrary to the above, prior to November 1, 2012, the licensee failed to perform the required pressure test on the reactor vessel flange seal leak-off line for each of the two units. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 12-28600, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000498/2012005-01 and 05000499/2012005-01, -

.2 Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (71111.08-02.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The licensee did not perform inspections of the vessel upper head penetrations. No inspections were performed because the vessel upper head and its assembly was replaced and inspected in a previous outage. Therefore, the inspectors determined this section of Inspection Procedure 71111.08 is not applicable. These actions constitute completion of the requirements for Section 02.02.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (71111.08-02.03)

a. Inspection Scope

control program for monitoring degradation of those systems that could be adversely affected by boric acid corrosion. The inspectors reviewed the documentation associated Procedure 0PGP03-ZE- The inspectors also reviewed the visual records of the components and equipment. The inspectors verified that the visual inspections emphasized locations where boric acid leaks could cause degradation of safety-significant components. The inspectors also verified that the engineering evaluations for those components where boric acid was identified gave assurance that the ASME Code wall thickness limits were properly maintained. The inspectors confirmed that usually the corrective actions performed for evidence of boric acid leaks were consistent with requirements of the ASME Code. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These actions constitute completion of the requirements for Section 02.03.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (71111.08-02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The licensee did not perform inspections of the steam generator tube inspection analysis. No inspections were performed because the steam generators were replaced and inspected in a previous outage and no inspections were required this outage. Therefore, the inspectors determined this section of Inspection Procedure 71111.08 is not applicable.

These actions constitute completion of the requirements for Section 02.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)

a. Inspection scope

The inspectors reviewed four condition reports which dealt with inservice inspection activities and found the corrective actions for inservice inspection issues were appropriate. From this review, the inspectors concluded that the licensee has an appropriate threshold for entering inservice inspection issues into the corrective action program and has procedures that direct a root cause evaluation when necessary. The licensee also has an effective program for applying industry inservice inspection operating experience. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These actions constitute completion of the requirements of Section 02.05.

b. Findings

Introduction.

Inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33, for the failure to follow procedures that ensured abrasive tools designated for stainless steel weld preparation were stored separately from hand files and wire brushes used on carbon steel.

Description.

During inspection of the tool storage areas in the welding shop; machine shop; and the tool issue room in the radiologically controlled area, inspectors identified that hand files and wire brushes designated for either stainless steel or carbon steel weld preparation and maintenance were not stored separately. The inspectors noted that more than 10 hand files marked for use on stainless steel were rusty and, therefore, most likely had been used on carbon steel. In addition, during system walkdowns, the inspectors identified stainless steel piping and welds with surface rust. This was an indication that the area may have been cleaned with wire brushes that had previously been used on carbon steel. Inspectors were concerned that the failure to separate tools used for stainless steel weld preparation from tools used for carbon steel preparation could result in the contamination of stainless steel welds and piping by carbon steel filings, and affect the material integrity and corrosion resistance of these components. Inspectors reviewed Procedure 0PGP03-ZG-0PNP01-ZP-& sion 6, and concluded that the licensee staff was not consistently following the procedure to ensure the segregation of abrasive tools designated for use on stainless steel from tools used on carbon steel. Step 3.1.3.3.a of Procedure 0PNP01-ZP-0032 statedin contact with materials other than what they were coded for may be used for non-stainless steel and non-aluminum bronze use if the color code is removed or color The licensee reviewed the inspectand wire brushes designated for use only on stainless steel in the various tool rooms was not meeting the requirements established in Procedure 0PGP03-ZG-of Materials and Products By User , and Procedure 0PNP01-ZP- 6. In particular, there was no consistent segregation of files or wire brushes, and there were files designated for use on stainless steel that were rusty and may have been used on carbon steel. The licensee took immediate action to remove the stainless steel designations from tools that were mixed with tools used on carbon steel. Additionally, the licensee planned to conduct additional training with maintenance personnel regarding the requirements for the separation of abrasive tools that are designated for use on stainless steel from those used on other materials. The licensee also reinforced the standards to the tool room attendants to properly store and mark abrasive tools designated for use on stainless steel, and to question the requester of abrasive tools for the end use location so the appropriate tool could be provided. The inspectors walked down various safety-related and important to safety systems, and identified corrosion deposits on stainless steel components that may have been caused by using contaminated stainless steel brushes. The licensee did not have any procedure or approved methodology for cleaning stainless steel surfaces that were contaminated, or suspected to be contaminated, by inappropriate use of tools that had contaminated as Condition Report 12-28689.

Analysis.

Inspectors determined that the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure 0PGP03-ZG-Revision 30, and Procedure 0PNP01-ZP-ls designated for exclusive use on stainless steel were stored separately from tools used on other materials was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Reliability and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and Significant Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss-of-coolant accident, and did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance work practices in that the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance, and personnel did not follow procedures. Specifically, the inspectors observed that although there were requirements to segregate the tools, tools were not consistently segregated when returned to the storage locations as required by procedures H.4(b).

Enforcement.

procedures be established; implemented; and maintained covering the applicable procedures in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Regulatory Guide 1.33, can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. The control of tools used on stainless steel was an activity affecting quality and was implemented by Procedure 0PGP03-ZG-0001, , and Procedure 0PNP01-ZP-0032, Revision 6. Step 3.1.3.3.a required, in part, that tools marked for use only on stainless steel be stored in a designated location, and tools designated for use on stainless steel have the markings removed if used on carbon steel. Contrary to the above, prior to November 1, 2012, the licensee failed to implement written procedures covering requirements in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9.a. Specifically, the licensee failed to accomplish the separation and appropriate designation of tools used on stainless steel, or to ensure tools used to clean stainless steel components had not been contaminated with carbon steel. The licensee took immediate action to separate the abrasive tools and remark them as necessary and provided training to the tool room attendants on the requirements to segregate tools based on use. This issue was -28689. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee. This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000498/2012005-02 the Control of Tools for Use on Stainless Steel.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Main article: IP 71111.11

.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

On December 18, 2012, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the requalification training. The inspectors assessed the following areas: Licensed operator performance The quality of the training provided The modeling and performance of the control room simulator Follow-up actions taken by the licensee for any identified discrepancies These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed-operator requalification program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Cooling Water Systems (MS10)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the mitigating systems performance index - cooling water systems performance indicator for Units 1 and 2 for the period from the fourth quarter 2011 through the third quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-6narrative logs, issue reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of October 2011 through September 2012 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance.

database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constitute completion of two, one per unit, mitigating systems performance index - cooling water system samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.7 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR01)

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.d, Fire Protection Program Implementation, for the failure to follow work order package instructions requiring the use of Drawing C012-00081--. establish the required 6 inches of fire retardant sealant material for penetrations in Units 1 and 2.

Description.

During a fire protection walkdown of the Unit 1 train B safety-related 4160 Vac switchgear room, the inspectors noticed that electrical penetration F4476 had gaps around the edges of the seal. The inspectors questioned the licensee on the history of the penetration and determined that as part of a Unit 1 design change in 1999, the licensee installed new electrical cables that required the original hydrosil fire penetration material to be removed in order for the cables to be routed. Once the new cables were routed, the penetrations were sealed. These activities were accomplished by work order package 139376, which Penetration Seal Permit and detail Drawing C012-00081-called for 6 inches of silicone elastomer 45B to be installed and the drawing required a minimum of 6 inches of silicone elastomer 45B to be installed. During the repair activities to correct the gaps, it was discovered that a portion of the penetration only had 4.5 inches of silicone elastomer 45B. This was less than the required 6 inches and, therefore, the penetration was declared nonfunctional and compensatory measures were put in place until corrective actions could be taken. This penetration separates 4160 Vac safety-related switchgear rooms for trains A and B; train C was not impacted and remained operable the entire time providing a safe shutdown train. The licensee captured this issue as Condition Report 12-28283 and corrective action included an hourly fire watch, restoring the seal to the required minimum of 6 inches, performing additional analysis to be able to support a 3-hour fire barrier with a minimum of 5 inches of silicone elastomer 45B material (but maintaining the design requirement of 6 inches), and performing extent of condition inspections in both Units 1 and 2. These inspections determined that several penetrations had gaps around the circumference, but were within the acceptance criteria of the manufacturer. They also determined that a high number of seals in the sample population were below the required 6 inches, but were greater than 5 inches and determined to be functional but nonconforming. However, Unit 2 penetration W3660 had only 2 inches of silicone elastomer 45B material in a section of the penetration. This penetration was reworked as a result of a design change in 2005 that replaced an inverter and voltage regulation transformer. Work order package 2seal detail drawing C012-00081-Report 12-31930, and declared the penetration nonfunctional. Corrective actions include an hourly fire watch, rework to restore the penetration to the required thickness, and to reevaluate the extent of condition on penetration thickness based on the high number of penetrations that are less than 6 inches. The inspectors view the failure to self check or peer check the thickness of the silicone elastomer 45B material form prior to pouring to be indicative of current performance, since at least one of the seals that was below the required 6 inches was sealed as recently as October 2011.

Analysis.

The inspectors determined that the seals thicknesses being less than the design requirement was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attributes of Design Control and Procedure Quality, and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions because it resulted in multiple fire penetration seals being declared nonfunctional as a result of being less than the design thickness. The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, to determine that fire protection issues are processed through Appendix dated February 28, 2005. The inspectors used Appendix F, Attachment 1, to determine that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a Moderate A fire confinement issue that screened out using Task 1.3.2 questions, since the seals would still have provided a 2-hour fire endurance rating or a 20 minute fire endurance rating without the seal being subject to direct flame impingement. In addition, this finding had human performance cross-cutting aspects associated with work practices because the licensee did not communicate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer checking, commensurate with the risk, such that the work activity was performed safely H.4(a).

Enforcement.

Technical Specification 6.8.1.d states that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the Fire Protection Program implementation. The Fire Protection Program implements and maintains the design requirements for penetrations based on fire confinement as analyzed in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report. The Fire Hazards Analysis Report assumes these fire areas are protected by 3-hour rated fire barriers. Work Authorization Numbers 139376 and 274967 required the use of Drawing C012-00081-F7F, which required a minimum of 6 inches of seal material to be rated for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the above, in 1999 for Unit 1 penetration F4476, and in 2005 for Unit 2 penetration W3660, maintenance personnel failed to correctly follow the work package and implement Drawing C012-00081-F7F, to ensure that 6 inches of silicone elastomer 45B were installed. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and was entered into -28283 and 12-31930, this finding is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000498/2012005-03 and 05000499/2012005-03,

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Main article: IP 71153

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000499/2011-003-000 During the April 2010 and November 2011 refueling outages, Unit 2 transitioned from Mode 4 to Mode 3 without having the required solid state protection system generated turbine trip signals operable. A maintenance work activity installed a jumper in both channels, trains R and S, of the nonclass relays to the turbine trip circuit. The defeated signals from the solid state protection system were the turbine trip from the reactor trip breakers open (P-4), turbine trip from a reactor trip signal (P-16), and the turbine trip from a steam generator HI-HI (P-14). Per Technical Specification 3.3.2, items 5a and 5b, P-4 and P-14 are required in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The jumpers were not removed until after Mode 3 had already been entered, a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.0.4. See Section

4OA7 for the enforcement aspects of this licensee event report.

This licensee event report is closed.

OA5 Other Activities

.1 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/177Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems (NRC Generic Letter 2008- As documented in NRC Inspection Reports 05000498/2010003, 2011002, 2011003, 2012002 and 05000499/2010003, 2011002, 2011003, and 2012002, the inspectors completed activities associated with Temporary Instruction 2515/177. .2 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/187, -Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

flooding walkdown activities were conducted using walkdown methodology endorsed by the NRC. These flooding walkdowns are being performed at all sites in response to a letter from the NRC to licensees, entitled Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai- Inspectors specified in NEI 12-07 Walkdown Guidance document including: Watertight doors Buildings and structures, including building drain system check valves Hatches and panels Manholes and penetrations b. Inspection Documentation The inspectors accompanied the licensee on their walkdown of the: Unit 1 essential cooling water intake structure Unit 1 fuel handling building Unit 1 non-safety related electrical penetrations (manholes) Unit 2 essential cooling water intake structure Unit 2 non-safety related electrical penetrations (manholes) and verified that the licensee confirmed the following flood protection features: Visual inspection of the flood protection feature was performed if the flood protection feature was relevant. External visual inspection for indications of degradation that would prevent its credited function from being performed was performed Critical structure, system, and component dimensions were measured Available physical margin, where applicable, was determined Flood protection feature functionality was determined using either visual observation or by review of other documents The inspectors independently performed their walkdown and verified that the flood protection features were in place for the following areas: Unit 1 safety-related electrical penetrations (manholes) Unit 1 mechanical and electrical auxiliary building flood doors Unit 2 safety-related electrical penetrations (manholes) Unit 2 mechanical and electrical auxiliary building flood doors The inspectors verified that noncompliances with current licensing requirements, and issues identified in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, item 2.g of Enclosure 4, were entered into the licensees corrective action program. In addition, issues identified in response to item 2.g that could challenge risk-ability to mitigate the consequences will be subject to additional NRC evaluation.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/188, -Term Task Force

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensees seismic walkdown activities were conducted using walkdown methodology endorsed by the NRC. These seismic walkdowns are being performed at all sites in response to a letter from the NRC to licensees, entitled ations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-. b. Inspection Documentation The inspectors accompanied the licensee on their seismic walkdowns of spaces and components: Essential cooling water self-cleaning strainer 2A, September 25, 2012; essential cooling water pump room 2A Essential cooling water screen wash pump 2A and FV-6914 solenoid valve, September 25, 2012; essential cooling water 2A room 101 Unit 1, engineered safety features load sequencer cabinet B, September 26, 2012; train A load sequencer room 015C Auxiliary feedwater pump 12, September 27, 2012; train B auxiliary feedwater pump room 006 Qualified data processing system auxiliary process cabinet B1 ZLP678, September 26, 2012; electrical auxiliary building area 015C The inspectors verified that the licensee confirmed that the following seismic features associated with Electrical Distribution Panel DP 001 were free of potential adverse seismic conditions. Anchorage was free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware. Anchorage was free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation. Anchorage was free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors. Anchorage configuration was consistent with plant documentation. Safety system components will not be damaged from impact by nearby equipment or structures. Overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are secure and not likely to collapse onto the equipment. Attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage. The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area. The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area. The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations. The inspectors independently performed their walkdown and verified the following areas: Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building train A channel distribution room, September 27, 2012 Unit 2, fuel handling building main supply fan room, September 27, 2012 Observations made during the walkdown that could not be determined to be acceptable were entered into the licensees corrective action program for evaluation. Additionally, inspectors verified that items that could allow the spent fuel pool to drain down rapidly were added to the seismic walkdown equipment list, and these items were walked down by the licensee.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Exit Meeting Summary On October 25, 2012, the inspectors presented the results of the radiation safety inspections to Mr. G. Powell, Vice President, Generation, and other members of the licensee staff.

The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. On November 1, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results of the review of inservice inspection activities to Mr. D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. On November 16, 2012, the inspectors reexited the inspection for inservice inspection activities with Mr. M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs, and other members of the licensee staff due to a change in the characterization of the issues based on additional information provided. On January 3, 2013, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. The lead inspector obtained the final annual examination results and telephonically exited with Mr. T. Hurley, Operations Training Supervisor for Requalification, on January 7, 2013. The inspector did not review any proprietary information during this inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Technical Specification 3.0.4 requires, in part, that entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability shall only be made when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation for an unlimited period of time, or after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems, or when specifically allowed by the specification. Contrary to the above, in April 2010 and November 2011, Unit 2 transitioned from Mode 4 to Mode 3 without all required equipment being operable, without performing a risk assessment, and when not allowed by the specification. Specifically, the turbine trip signal from the reactor trip breakers, the turbine trip signal from the reactor trip signal, and the turbine trip signal from a steam generator HI-HI level were all inoperable due to a jumper being installed for testing when the plant transitioned from Mode 4 to Mode 3. The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A since the finding was identified after residual heat removal was secured, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 11-27377.

1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Aguilera, Manager, Health Physics

M. Berg, Manager, Design Engineering

C. Bowman, General Manager, Engineering and Regulatory Affairs C, Chappell, Licensing

R. Dunn Jr., Manager, Fuels and Analysis

L. Earls, Consultant, Radiation Protection

R. Engen, Site Engineering Director

T. Frawley, Manager, Operations

J. Hartley, Manager, Mechanical Maintenance

J. Heil, Engineering Programs

G. Hildebrandt, Manager, EP/Plant Protection

T. Hurley, Operations Training Supervisor, Requalification

G. Janak, Manager, Unit 1 Operations

B. Jenewein, Manager, Systems Engineering

D. Koehl, President and CEO/CNO

J. Lovejoy, Manager, I&C Maintenance

A. McGalliard, Manager, Areas for Improvement

J. Mertink, Manager, Training and Knowledge Transfer

B. Migl, Manager, Maintenance Engineering (Acting)

J. Milliff, Manager, Unit 2 Operations

M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

R. Neimann, Site ANII

J. Paul, Supervisor, Licensing

L. Peter, Plant General Manager

J. Pierce, Manager, Operations Training

G. Powell, Vice President, Generation, Units 1 and 2

D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President

M. Ruvalcaba, Manager, Testing and Programs

R. Savage, Engineer, Licensing Staff Specialist

M. Schaefer, Manager, Maintenance

K. Silverthorne, Welding, Engineering Programs

S. Sovizral, Manager, Security Operations

L. Spiess, Lead, Inservice Inspection

M. Tomek, ALARA Supervisor, Health Physics

P. Walker, Engineer, Licensing

D. Wiegand, Fire Protection Engineering

J. Williams, Engineering Programs

C. Younger, Engineering Programs

D. Zink, Supervising Engineering Specialist

Attachment 1

NRC Personnel

J. Dixon, Senior Resident Inspector

K. Kennedy, Director, Division Reactor Projects

B. Tharakan, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000498/2012005-01

05000499/2012005-01 NCV Failure to Perform Pressure Testing of the Reactor Vessel Flange Leak-Off Lines (Section 1R08)

05000498/2012005-02 NCV Failure to Follow Procedure for the Control of Tools for Use on Stainless Steel (Section 1R08)

05000498/2012005-03

05000499/2012005-03 NCV Failure to Maintain Adequate Fire Penetration Seal Material Thickness (Section 4OA2)

Closed

05000499/LER-2011-003-000 LER Unit 2 Plant Mode Change with Turbine Trip Disabled (Section 4OA3) 2515/177 TI Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems (NRC Generic Letter 2008-01) (Section 4OA5) 2515/187 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns (Section 4OA5) 2515/188 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns (Section 4OA5)

Attachment 1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

CONDITION REPORTS 11-16214 12-4756 12-17218 12-27776 12-876 12-5668 12-21068 12-29134 12-3345 12-10603 12-22669 12-30282 12-4216 12-11495 12-24143 12-30464 12-4642

DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION 5R169F20000#1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 26 5N129F05015#1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Safety Injection System 23 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0POP02-AF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater 34 0POP02-CC-0001 Component Cooling Water 46 0POP02-RH-0001 Residual Heat Removal System Operation 59 0POP02-SI-0002 Safety Injection System Initial Lineup 32 0POP02-SI-0004 Safety Injection System Operations 4

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

CONDITION REPORTS 12-28283

FIRE PREPLANS NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0EAB03-FP-0042 Fire Preplan Electrical Auxiliary Building ESF Switchgear Room Train B 3

Attachment 1 NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0EAB03-FP-0052 Fire Preplan Electrical Auxiliary Building ESF Switchgear Room Train C 3

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

CALCULATIONS NUMBER TITLE REVISION

MC 5557 IVC Flooding Analysis 8

MC 6163 Penetration Seals for HELBA and Flooding 0 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

MEG-0101 Penetration Seals 1

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

CALCULATIONS NUMBER TITLE REVISION

MC-6219 Generic Letter 89-13 2 DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION 5R289F05038#1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Cooling Water System 1A 15 5R289F05038#1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Cooling Water System 1B 16 5R289F05038#1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Cooling Water System 1C 17 5R209F05017#1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System 20 5R209F05018#1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System 18 5R209F05019#1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System 17

Attachment 1 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PEP07-EW-0001 Performance Test for Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchangers 6 WORK AUTHORIZATION NUMBERS 417671

Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities

CONDITION REPORTS 11-11600 12-9084 12-22359 12-24356 11-12723 12-13289 12-22360 12-24623 11-13591 12-19417 12-22361 12-25164 11-24973 12-19419 12-22364 12-25242 12-4128 12-21604 12-22428 12-25549 12-4335 12-22347 12-23427 12-28873 12-5163 12-22358 12-23428 12-29104 MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE

Inservice Inspection Plan for South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 and 2 October 8, 2012

WCAP-15988-NP Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for Pressurized Water Reactors 2

WP 515807 Install High Point Vent on

CCP-1B Discharge Line 0 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PEP10-ZA-0004 Ultrasonic Examination 7 0PEP10-ZA-0010 Liquid Penetrant Examination 5 0PEP10-ZA-0017 Magnetic Particle Examination 5 0PEP10-ZA-0023 Visual Examination

VT-2 7 0PEP10-ZA-0024 Visual Examination 4 0PGP03-ZA-0514 Controlled System or Barrier Impairment 7

Attachment 1 NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP03-ZE-0133 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 5 0PGP03-ZF-0001 Fire Protection Program 22 0PGP03-ZF-0018 Fire Protection System Functionality Requirements 15 0PGP03-ZF-0019 Control of Transient Fire Loads and use of Combustible and Flammable Liquids and Gases 9 0PGP03-ZG-0001 Control of Materials and Products By User Groups 30 0PNP01-ZP-0032 Tool and Measuring and Test Equipment Control 6

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

MISCELLANEOUS TITLE DATE Operating Test Results January 7, 2013 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PMP07-DM-0003 Rapid Refueling Rod Holdout Operation 31 0POP03-ZG-0006 Plant Shutdown from 100% to Hot Standby 50 0POP03-ZG-0007 Plant Cooldown 67 0POP03-ZG-0012 Operation with Rods in Rapid Refueling Position 9 0POP05-EO-EO30 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 25 0POP07-RS-0001 Control Rod Exercise 10

Conduct of Operations 12

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

CONDITION REPORTS04-913 11-12309 12-22876 12-29363 04-8283 11-18361 12-23555 12-29878 08-10461 11-31266 12-28052 12-30125 10-2026 12-1044 12-28218 12-30312 11-3196 12-10544 12-28613 12-30461 11-8606 12-21354 12-28962 12-30879 11-8615

Attachment 1 MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE

Maintenance Rule System Scoping Basis Report March 8, 2012

Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes October 17, 2012

System Health Report

Component Cooling Water (CC) Second Quarter 2011

Third Quarter 2012

System Health Report

Essential Cooling Water (EW) First Quarter 2011

Second Quarter 2012

System Health Report

Residual Heat Removal (RH) First Quarter 2011

Third Quarter 2012 5A050GACC01 Component Cooling Water System Risk Significance Basis Document 5 5A050GAEW01 Essential Cooling Water System Risk Significance Basis Document 5 5A050GARRH01 Residual Heat Removal Risk Significance Basis Document 5 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

SEG-0009 Maintenance Rule Basis Document Guideline 1 WORK AUTHORIZATION NUMBERS

397591

442109

442589

452347

423142

442391

452346

455814

434048 442485

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls

CONDITION REPORTS 12-29316 12-30322 12-30944

MISCELLANEOUS TITLE DATE 1RE17 Shutdown Risk Assessment Report October 3, 2012

Attachment 1 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP03-ZA-0091 Configuration Risk Management Program 12 0PGP03-ZG-RMTS Risk-Managed Technical Specification Program 1 0PGP03-ZO-0039 Operations Configuration Management 26 0POP01-ZO-0006 Risk Management Actions (RMAs) 19 0POP02-AE-0004 120 VAC ESF Vital Distribution Power Supplies 48

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations and Functionality Assessments

CONDITION REPORTS 11-3756 12-30688 12-31423 12-31548 12-25979 12-31048 12-31426 12-31930 12-28283 12-31132

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE C012-00052-7F Vendor Technical Information for Installation of Silicone Elastomer Procedure 45B E C012-00399-B7F Southwest Research Institute ASTM E814-83/IEEE 634-1978 Three-Hour Fire Test of Four Penetrations September 9, 1987 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP03-ZE-0027 ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Activities 29 0PGP03-ZE-0082 ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Activity Pressure Testing 0 0PGP03-ZO-0046 RCS Leakage Monitoring 8 0PGP03-ZO-9900 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Program 4 0PGP03-ZO-9900A Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Implementation 1 0PGP03-ZX-0002 Condition Reporting Process 45 0PGP04-ZA-0002 Condition Report Engineering Evaluation 16

Attachment 1 NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0POP01-ZA-0049 Condition Report Operations Evaluation Program 6 0POP01-ZO-0011 Operability, Functionality, and Reportability Guidance 5 0POP05-EO-EO30 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 25 0PTP03-FP-0123 Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Visual Examination 8 0PTP03-FP-0125 Fire Rated Assembly Visual Examination 8 WORK AUTHORIZATION NUMBERS 462588

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

CONDITION REPORTS 11-17459 12-29594 12-31418

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PEP10-ZA-0055 Vacuum Box Testing 0 0PGP03-ZE-0133 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 3 0PGP04-ZA-0002 Condition Report Engineering Evaluation (CREE) 16 0PGP04-ZE-0309 Design Change Package 28 0PGP05-ZA-0002 10

CFR 50.59 Evaluations 16 1TOP02-SI-0101 Drain and Fill Unit 1 RWST 0 WORK AUTHORIZATION NUMBERS

437118 437119

Section 1R19: Post-maintenance Testing

CONDITION REPORTS 12-27493 12-28400 12-31375 12-31418 12-28052 12-28471

Attachment 1 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

Security Instruction 2600 3 0OOI01-OL-0005 Operations Logs

Diesel Generator 15 0PGP03-ZM-0025A Post-Maintenance Testing Implementation 4 0PMP04-DG-0019 Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Injection Pump and Nozzle Assembly Maintenance 23 0PMP05-ZE-0108 Type AR Auxiliary Relay

Maintenance 3 0POP02-SI-0001 Safety Injection System 35 0PSP02-RC-0410 Delta T and T Average ACOT 50 0PSP03-DG-0002 Standby Diesel 12(22) Operability Test 48 0PSP05-RC-0430 Delta T and T Average Loop 3 Set 3 Calibration (T-0430) 47

WCG-0008 Preventing Recurring Equipment Problems (PREP) 6 WORK AUTHORIZATION NUMBERS

431132

437119

459343

464004

431133

458236 459979

Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities

CONDITION REPORTS 12-28000 12-29203 12-30031 12-30720 12-29083 12-29651 12-30689 12-30724 12-29103 12-29984 12-30717 12-30781 12-29134

MISCELLANEOUS TITLE DATE 1RE17 Shutdown Risk Assessment Report October 3, 2012 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PEP02-ZX-0002 Initial Criticality and Low Power Physics Testing 26 0PGP03-ZA-0069 Control of Heavy Loads 23

Attachment 1 NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP03-ZA-0090 Work Process Program 38 0PGP03-ZA-0101 Shutdown Risk Assessment 25 0PGP03-ZA-0135 Outage Scope Change Process 5 0POP03-RC-0100 RCS Vacuum Fill 36 0POP03-ZG-0001 Plant Heatup 58 0POP03-ZG-0003 Secondary Plant Startup 31 0POP03-ZG-0004 Reactor Startup 40 0POP03-ZG-0005 Plant Startup to 100% 77 0POP03-ZG-0006 Plant Shutdown from 100% to Hot Standby 50 0POP03-ZG-0007 Plant Cooldown 67 0POP03-ZG-0008 Power Operations 54 0POP03-ZG-0009 Mid-Loop Operation 58 0POP03-ZG-0010 Refueling Operations 61

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

CONDITION REPORTS08-796 11-21569 12-30282 12-30944 10-5568 12-30196 12-30309

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP03-ZE-0015 Inservice Testing Program 2 0PGP03-ZE-0021 Inservice Testing Program for Valves 19 0PGP03-ZO-0046 RCS Leakage Monitoring 8 0POP07-SI-0004 Safety Injection System Flow Sweeps 6 0PSP03-MS-0002 Main Steam System Cold Shutdown Valve Operability Test 18 0PSP03-RC-0006 Reactor Coolant Inventory 25 0PSP03-SP-0024 Steam Line Isolation Actuation and Response Time Test 13 0PSP11-MS-0001 Main Steam Safety Valve Inservice Test 19

Attachment 1 NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PSP11-XC-0008 LLRT Penetration M-90 Personnel Airlock Door Seals 20 WORK AUTHORIZATION NUMBERS

330565

407361

419750

427083

407360

411390

420842 433269

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

AUDITS,

SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES NUMBER TITLE DATE

MN-12-0-93249 Quality Monitoring Report August 20, 2012

MN-12-0-85412 Quality Monitoring Report January 30, 2012

MN-12-0-92032 Quality Monitoring Report July 17, 2012

MN-11-2-83288 Quality Monitoring Report November 12, 2011

MN-11-2-83691 Quality Monitoring Report May 26, 2011 12-02(RC) Radiological Controls Quality Audit Report March 29, 2012 CONDITION REPORTS 12-00218 12-22787 12-27431 12-28254 12-02268 12-23559 12-28024 12-28307 12-11101 12-23567

MISCELLANEOUS TITLE DATE Radiation Source Inventory and Leak Test September 19, 2012 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP03-ZR-0003 Inventory and Leak Testing of Radioactive Sources 7 0PGP03-ZR-0050 Radiation Protection Program 10 0PGP03-ZR-0051 Radiological Access Controls/Standard 29 0PGP04-ZR-0011 Radiation Protection Key Program 29 0PGP04-ZR-0013 Radiological Survey Program 28

Attachment 1 NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP04-ZR-0015 Radiological Posting and Warning Devices 29 0PRP07-ZR-0010 Radiation Work Permits/Radiological Work ALARA Reviews 30 0PRP07-ZR-0021 RCB Room 003 Entry 4 0PRP11-ZR-0005 Actions for Reactor Power Ascension 3 RADIATION WORK PACKAGES NUMBER TITLE 12-26783-3 1RE17 Rapid Refuel 12-26783-6 1RE17 Work Activities in room 001 12-26783-7 1RE17 Work Activities in room 003 12-26783-10 1RE17 Check Valve Inspections (CV-01, 02, 04, 05) RADIOLOGICAL SURVEYS NUMBER TITLE DATE 52722 Incore Instrumentation Room Unit-1 April 4, 2011 52846 Reactor Cavity Vent Duct Unit-1 April 6, 2011 52722 Incore Instrumentation Room Unit-1 April 29, 2011 54572 Unit-1 Post Reactor Head Power Ascension May 12, 2011 58210 Unit-2 Post Reactor Head Power Ascension November 24, 2011 62501 Primary Sample Room Unit-1 October 22, 2012 62507 Hot Chemistry Lab Unit-2 October 21, 2012 62528 Under Reactor Vessel Unit-1 October 22, 2012 62580 Concentrates Transfer Pump 1B Room October 23, 2012 62583 Boron Analyzer October 23, 2012 62585 Incore Instrumentation Room Unit-1 October 23, 2012

Section 2RS2: Occupational

ALARA Planning and Controls ALARA REVIEW PACKAGES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 11-19683-1 Rapid Refuel Attachment 1 NUMBER DESCRIPTION 11-19683-2 RHR 2B Motor Replacement 11-19683-7 Reactor Head Scratch Repair 12-14001-1 Reactor Vessel Closure Demolition Project AUDITS,

SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES NUMBER TITLE DATE

MN-11-2-81803 Quality Monitoring Report October 6, 2011

MN-11-2-82988 Quality Monitoring Report November 21, 2011

MN-11-2-83561 Quality Monitoring Report November 12, 2011

MN-11-2-94593 Quality Monitoring Report April 30, 2011 12-02(RC) Radiological Controls Quality Audit Report March 29, 2012 CONDITION REPORTS 10-20131 11-26534 11-29235 12-22787 11-23296 11-26589 11-30218 12-23559 11-23316 11-29161 12-11101 12-27431 MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE DATE

2RE14 Refueling Outage ALARA Report December 2, 2010

2RE16 ALARA Review Committee Notes September 27, 2011

2RE15 Refueling Outage ALARA Report March 12, 2012

1RE16 Refueling Outage ALARA Report October 18, 2011

2011

2015 ALARA Five Year Plan October 18, 2010

2011 STP Annual ALARA Report May 21, 2012

Original Reactor Vessel Closure Head Decommissioning Project ALARA Report October 6, 2011

DCP 10-20316-4 Design Change Package for Permanent Scaffold Frames for Supporting Lead Blankets in RCB August 13, 2012

Attachment 1 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP03-ZR-0050 Radiation Protection Program 10 0PGP03-ZR-0052 ALARA Program 13 0PRP07-ZR-0001 ALARA Engineering and Procedure Review 3 0PRP07-ZR-0004 Shielding 18 0PRP07-ZR-0010 Radiation Work Permits/Radiological Work ALARA Reviews 32

STI 32773897 ALARA Planning 4

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

CONDITION REPORTS 11-19073 11-19541 12-404 12-12720 MISCELLANEOUS TITLE DATE Radiation Safety NRC Performance Indicators February 14, 2006 Mitigating System Performance Index [MSPI] Bases Document September 2012 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PGP03-ZR-0044 NRC Performance Indicators 10 0PGP03-ZR-0048 Performance Indicator Program 13 WORK AUTHORIZATION NUMBERS

388590

400910

402233

416940

396589

401129

405479

427243

396590

401760

409851

428983

400046

Attachment 1

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

CONDITION REPORTS 12-28157 12-29543 12-30225 12-30761 12-28283 12-29785 12-30292 12-31329 12-28614 12-29992 12-30483 12-31416 12-28615 12-30047 12-30606 12-31485 12-28617 12-30048 12-30624 12-31930 12-29476 12-30049 12-30664 12-31967 MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE C012-00052-7F Vendor Technical Information for Installation of Silicone Elastomer Procedure 45B

E C012-00081-F7F -Seals (Walls & Floors) July 1, 1994 C012-00399-B7F Southwest Research Institute ASTM E814-83/IEEE 634-1978 Three-Hour Fire Test of Four Penetrations September 9, 1987 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 0PTP03-FP-0123 Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Visual Examination 8 0PTP03-FP-0125 Fire Rated Assembly Visual Examination 8 WORK AUTHORIZATION NUMBERS

139376

317873

459988

460481

254125

390991

460367

460482

274967

416091

460480 460483

Section 4OA3: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

CONDITION REPORTS 11-27377 12-21245

Attachment 1

Section 4OA5: Other Activities Temporary Instruction 2515/187-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding

CONDITION REPORTS 11-4827 12-25811 12-25890 12-26132 12-11655 12-25812 12-25894 12-26142 12-11656 12-25813 12-25898 12-26151 12-11657 12-25814 12-25980 12-26162 12-25603 12-25831 12-25982 12-26168 12-25611 12-25832 12-26004 12-26171 12-25613 12-25833 12-26005 12-26177 12-25696 12-25834 12-26010 12-26182 12-25697 12-25835 12-26028 12-27013 12-25701 12-25859 12-26029 12-27016 12-25753 12-25871 12-26096 12-27571 12-25763 12-25874 12-26099 12-27678 12-25774 12-25876 12-26101 12-27885 12-25797 12-25885 12-26109 12-28278 12-25804 12-25889 12-26116 12-28701 DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION 3E10-0-E-2155 Electrical Class 1E Manhole and Duct Bank Sections 11 3E10-0-E-2156 Electrical Class 1E Manhole Plan Duct Bank Sections 18 3M15-9-C-4210 Concrete Mechanical and Electrical Aux Bldg Isolation - 8 3M15-9-C-4216 Concrete Mechanical and Electrical Aux Bldg Isolation Valve Cubicle Section C 8 FLOODING WALKDOWNS

STP-1-DR-ECW-1

STP-1-MH-SR-1

STP-2-DR-MEAB-1

STP-2-MH-SR-1

STP-1-DR-MEAB-1

STP-1-PEN-ECW-1

STP-2-GEN-BLDGS-1

STP-2-PEN-ECW-1

STP-1-GEN-BLDGS-1

STP-1-PEN-FHB-1

STP-2-MH-NSR-1

STP-2-PEN-FHB-1

STP-1-MH-NSR-1

STP-2-DR-ECW-1

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE

120021 South Texas Project Units 1 and 2 Flood Analysis March 2012

Attachment 1 NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE DCN

CC-54 Qualify a Support for a Pressure Penetration Seal Subjected to 40 feet of Water Head January 15, 1993

NEI 12-07 Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features 0

NOC-AE-12002932 Final Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10

CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident November 26, 2012 Temporary Instruction 2515/188-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3

CONDITION REPORTS 12-26948 12-26988 12-27020 12-27485 12-26950 12-26991 12-27021 12-27486 12-26953 12-26992 12-27022 12-27492 12-26976 12-26993 12-27023 12-27686 MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE DATE

NOC-AE-12002931 Final Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10

CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident November 27, 2012 PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE DATE 25799-000-GPP-GED-00002 Seismic Walkdown Guidance

STP 1&2 Fukushima Response Project September 7, 2012 SEISMIC WALKBYS

STP2-WB-017A

STP2-WB-012C

STP2-WB-010C

STP2-WB-009B

STP2-WB-008A

STP2-WB-006F

STP2-WB-006E

STP2-WB-006A

STP1-WB-014A

STP1-WB-013C

STP1-WB-013B

STP1-WB-010A

STP1-WB-003E

STP1-WB-003D

STP1-WB-002K

STP1-WB-002H

STP1-WB-002G

STP1-WB-002F

STP1-WB-002C

STP1-WB-005B

STP1-WB-004C

Attachment 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS

STP2-WD-SWEL-025

STP2-WD-SWEL-010

STP1-WD-SWEL-038

STP1-WD-SWEL-013

STP2-WD-SWEL-024

STP1-WD-SWEL-077

STP1-WD-SWEL-033

STP1-WD-SWEL-008

STP2-WD-SWEL-019

STP1-WD-SWEL-046

STP1-WD-SWEL-032

STP1-WD-SWEL-002

STP2-WD-SWEL-017

STP1-WD-SWEL-039

STP1-WD-SWEL-031

STP2-WD-SWEL-096

STP2-WD-SWEL-030

STP2-WD-SWEL-014

STP2-WD-SWEL-013

STP2-WD-SWEL-012

STP1-WD-SWEL-053

STP1-WD-SWEL-051

STP1-WD-SWEL-048

STP1-WD-SWEL-047

STP1-WD-SWEL-044

STP1-WD-SWEL-030 STP1-WD-SWEL-029

Section 4OA7: Licensee-Identified Violations

CONDITION REPORTS 11-27377 12-21245

Attachment 2 DOCUMENT REQUET FOR OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION

SAFETY INSPECTION

The following items are requested for the

Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection at South Texas Project

October 22-25, 2012 Integrated Report

2012005 Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.

Inspection areas are Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01), Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls (71124.02), and Performance Indicator Verification (71151) for the Occupational and Public Radiation Safety Cornerstones. Please provide the requested information on or before October 12, 2012. Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below.

For example, all contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.01 should be in a file/folder titled - -

If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the information while writing the report. In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.

The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the entrance meeting. If more than one inspection procedures is to be conducted and the information requests appear to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies.

Enter a note explaining in which file the information can be found. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Louis C. Carson II at (817)200.1221 or Louis.Carson@nrc.gov.

Also, Gilbert Guerra will be assisting on this inspection.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150-0011.

Attachment 2 1. Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)

Date of Last Inspection: October 2011 A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization Staff and Technicians B. Applicable organization charts C. Audits, self assessments, and LERs written since date of last inspection, related to this inspection area D. Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.

1. Radiation Protection Program Description 2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations 3. Personnel Dosimetry Program 4. Posting of Radiological Areas 5. High Radiation Area Controls 6. RCA Access Controls and Radworker Instructions 7. Conduct of Radiological Surveys 8. Radioactive Source Inventory and Control 9. Declared Pregnant Worker Program F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) since date of last inspection, October 2011 a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria can perform word searches. If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since date of last inspection involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety Performance Indicator verification in accordance with

IP 71151) G. List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the inspection period (If the inspection is scheduled during an outage, please also include a list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose estimate for the work activity.) H. List of active radiation work permits I. Radioactive source inventory list Attachment 2 2.

Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls (71124.02)

Date of Last Inspection October 2011 A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for ALARA program personnel B. Applicable organization charts C. Copies of audits, self-assessments, and LERs, written since date of last inspection, focusing on ALARA D. Procedure index for ALARA Program E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.

1. ALARA Program 2. ALARA Committee 3. Radiation Work Permit Preparation F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since date of last inspection, related to the ALARA program.

In addition to ALARA, the summary should also address Radiation Work Permit violations, Electronic Dosimeter Alarms, and RWP Dose Estimates NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria

G.

List of work activities greater than 1 rem, since date of last inspection.

Include original dose estimate and actual dose.

H. Site dose totals and 3-year rolling averages for the past 3 years (based on dose of record) I. Outline of source term reduction strategy J. Please provide the Annual STP ALARA Report for 2011 and the last post Refueling Outage Report (Unit-1)

Attachment 2 From October 15, 2011, to October 26, 2012, reactor inspectors from the Nuclear (NRC) Region IV office will perform the baseline inservice inspection at South Texas Project Unit 2, using NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.08, intensive inspection both for the NRC inspectors and your staff.

In order to minimize the impact to your onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for documents needed for this inspection.

These documents have been divided into two groups.

The first group (Section A of the enclosure), due by September 21, 2012, identifies information to be provided prior to the inspection to ensure that the inspectors are adequately prepared.

The second group (Section B of the enclosure) identifies the information the inspectors will need upon arrival at the site.

It is important that all of these documents are up to date and complete in order to minimize the number of additional documents requested during the preparation and/or the onsite portions of the inspection. We have discussed the schedule for these inspection activities with your staff and understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will be Ms. Robyn Savage of your licensing organization.

Our inspection dates are subject to change based on your updated schedule of outage activities.

If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please contact the lead inspector Jim Drake at (817) 200-1558 (James.Drake@nrc.gov). This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, Control Number 3150-0011.

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number.

Attachment 3 INSERVICE INSPECTION DOCUMENT REQUEST

Inspection Dates: October 15, 2012, through October 26, 2012 (onsite dates)

Inspection Procedures:

Inspectors: James Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector - ISI) Ray Azua, Senior Project Engineer

A. Information Requested for the In-Office Preparation Week

The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic format (ims.certrec.com preferred), in care of James Drake, by September 21, 2012, to facilitate the selection of specific items that will be reviewed during the onsite inspection week.

The inspectors will select specific items from the information requested below and then request from your staff additional documents needed during the onsite inspection week (Section B of this enclosure).

We ask that the specific items selected from the lists be available and ready for review on the first day of inspection.

Please provide requested documentation electronically if possible.

If requested documents are large and only hard copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide subject documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection.

If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the inspector as soon as possible.

A.1 ISI/Welding Programs and Schedule Information a) A detailed schedule (including preliminary dates) of: i)

Nondestructive examinations planned for Class 1 & 2 systems and containment, performed as part of your ASME Section XI, risk informed (if applicable), and augmented inservice inspection programs during the upcoming outage.

Provide a status summary of the nondestructive examination inspection activities vs. the required inspection period percentages for this interval by category per ASME Section XI,

IWX-2400.

Do not provide separately if other documentation requested contains this information. ii)

Examinations planned for Alloy 82/182/600 components that are not included in the Section XI scope (If applicable). iii) Examinations planned as part of your boric acid corrosion control program (Mode 3 walkdowns, bolted connection walkdowns, etc.).

Attachment 3 iv) Welding activities that are scheduled to be completed during the upcoming outage (ASME Class 1, 2, or 3 structures, systems, or components). b) A copy of ASME Section XI Code Relief Requests and associated NRC safety evaluations applicable to the examinations identified above. c) A list of nondestructive examination reports (ultrasonic, radiography, magnetic particle, dye penetrant, Visual

VT-1,

VT-2, and

VT-3), which have identified relevant conditions on Code Class 1 & 2 systems since the beginning of the last refueling outage.

This should include the previousSection XI pressure test(s) conducted during start up and any evaluations associated with the results of the pressure tests.

Also, include in the list the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions in the reactor pressure vessel head penetration nozzles that have been accepted for continued service.

The list of nondestructive examination reports should include a brief description of the structures, systems, or components where the relevant condition was identified. d) A list with a brief description (e.g., system, material, pipe size, weld number, and nondestructive examinations performed) of the welds in Code Class 1 and 2 systems which have been fabricated due to component repair/replacement activities since the beginning of the last refueling outage, or are planned to be fabricated this refueling outage. e) If reactor vessel weld examinations required by the ASME Code are scheduled to occur during the upcoming outage, provide a detailed description of the welds to be examined and the extent of the planned examination.

Please also provide reference numbers for applicable procedures that will be used to conduct these examinations. f) Copy of any 10 CFR Part 21 reports applicable to your structures, systems, or components within the scope of Section XI of the ASME Code that have been identified since the beginning of the last refueling outage. g)

A list of any temporary noncode repairs in service (e.g., pinhole leaks). h) Please provide copies of the most recent self-assessments for the inservice inspection, welding, and Alloy 600 programs.

A.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head a)

Per telephone calls with your staff, the NRC understands that there are no scheduled inspections of the reactor vessel head for this outage.

Attachment 3 A.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program a)

Copy of the procedures that govern the scope, equipment and implementation of the inspections required to identify boric acid leakage and the procedures for boric acid leakage/corrosion evaluation. b) Please provide a list of leaks (including Code class of the components) that have been identified since the last refueling outage and associated corrective action documentation.

If during the last cycle, the unit was shutdown, please provide documentation of containment walkdown inspections performed as part of the boric acid corrosion control program. c) Please provide a copy of the most recent self-assessment performed for the boric acid corrosion control program.

A.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections a) Per telephone calls with your staff, the NRC understands that there are no scheduled inspections of the steam generators for this outage. b) Please provide a copy of your steam generator inservice inspection program and plan.

Please include a copy of the operational assessment from last outage and a copy of the following documents as they become available: i) Degradation assessment ii) Condition monitoring assessment c) If you are planning on modifying your Technical Specifications such that they are consistent with Technical Specification Task Force Traveler

TSTF-NRC regarding deviations from the standard technical specifications. d) Copy of steam generator history documentation. e) Identify and quantify any steam generator tube leakage experienced during the previous operating cycle.

Also provide documentation identifying which steam generator was leaking and corrective actions completed or planned for this condition (if applicable). f)

Provide past history of the condition and issues pertaining to the secondary side of the steam generators (including items such as loose parts, fouling, top of tube sheet condition, crud removal amounts, etc.) g) Provide copies of your most recent self-assessments of the steam generator monitoring, loose parts monitoring, and secondary side water chemistry control programs.

Attachment 3 A.5 Additional Information Related to All Inservice Inspection Activities a)

A list with a brief description of inservice inspection, boric acid corrosion control program, and steam generator tube inspection related issues (e.g., condition reports) entered into your corrective action program since the beginning of the last refueling outage for Unit 1.

For example, a list based upon data base searches using key words related to piping or steam generator tube degradation such as: inservice inspection, ASME Code,Section XI, NDE, cracks, wear, thinning, leakage, rust, corrosion, boric acid, or errors in piping/steam generator tube examinations. b)

Please provide names and phone numbers for the following program leads:

Inservice inspection (examination, planning) Containment exams Reactor pressure vessel head exams Snubbers and supports Repair and replacement program

Licensing

Site welding engineer Boric acid corrosion control program

B. Information to be Provided Onsite to the Inspector(s) at the Entrance Meeting (October 15, 2012):

B.1 Inservice Inspection / Welding Programs and Schedule Information a) Updated schedules for inservice inspection/nondestructive examination activities, including planned welding activities and schedule showing contingency repair plans, if available. b) For ASME Code Class 1 and 2 welds selected by the inspector from the lists provided from section A of this enclosure, please provide copies of the following documentation for each subject weld: i) Weld data sheet (traveler) ii) Weld configuration and system location iii) Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for weldment iv) Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for welding procedures v) Applicable weld procedures used to fabricate the welds vi) Copies of procedure qualification records supporting the weld procedures from B.1.b.v Attachment 3 vii) Copies of mechanical test reports identified in the procedure qualification records above viii) Copies of the nonconformance reports for the selected welds (if applicable) ix) Radiographs of the selected welds and access to equipment to allow viewing radiographs (if radiographic testing was performed) x) Copies of the preservice examination records for the selected welds xi) Copies of welder performance qualifications records applicable to the selected welds, including documentation that welder maintained proficiency in the applicable welding processes specified in the weld procedures (at least 6 months prior to the date of subject work) xii) Copies of nondestructive examination personnel qualifications (visual inspection, penetrant testing, ultrasonic testing, radiographic testing), as applicable c) For the inservice inspection related corrective action issues selected by the inspectors from Section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the corrective actions and supporting documentation. d) For the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions on Code Class 1 and 2 systems selected by the inspectors from Section A above, provide a copy of the examination records, examiner qualification records, and associated corrective action documents. e) A copy of (or ready access to) most current revision of the inservice inspection program manual and plan for the current Interval. f) For the nondestructive examinations selected by the inspectors from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the nondestructive examination procedures used to perform the examinations (including calibration and flaw characterization/sizing procedures).

For ultrasonic examination procedures qualified in accordance with ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, provide documentation supporting the procedure qualification (e.g., the EPRI performance demonstration qualification summary sheets).

Also, include qualification documentation of the specific equipment to be used (e.g., ultrasonic unit, cables, and transducers including serial numbers) and nondestructive examination personnel qualification records.

B.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head a) Copy of nondestructive examination reports from the last reactor pressure vessel head examination.

Attachment 3 b) Provide a copy of the updated calculation of effective degradation years for the reactor pressure vessel head susceptibility ranking.

B.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program a) Please provide boric acid walkdown inspection results, an updated list of boric acid leaks identified so far this outage, associated corrective action documentation, and overall status of planned boric acid inspections. b) Please provide any engineering evaluations completed for boric acid leaks identified since the end of the last refueling outage.

Please include a status of corrective actions to repair and/or clean these boric acid leaks.

Please identify specifically which known leaks, if any, have remained in service or will remain in service as active leaks.

B.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections a) No additional information required.

B.5 Codes and Standards a) Ready access to (i.e., copies provided to the inspector(s) for use during the inspection at the onsite inspection location, or room number and location where available): i)

Applicable Editions of the ASME Code (Sections V, IX, and XI) for the inservice inspection program and the repair/replacement program ii)

EPRI and industry standards referenced in the procedures used to perform the steam generator tube eddy current examination

Inspector Contact Information:

James Drake

Ray Azua

Senior Reactor Inspector Senior Project Engineer

817-200-1558

817-200-1445

James.Drake@nrc.gov Ray.Azua@nrc.gov

Mailing Address: US NRC Region IV Attn: James Drake 1600 Lamar Blvd,

Arlington, TX 76011