ML19340E470

Final Deficiency Rept SD-413/414/80-08:originally Reported on 800617,re Inadequate Min Flow Through Centrifugal Charging Pump.Util Will Implement Westinghouse Interim Mod 2 Transmitted on 800714

ML19340E470
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	01/07/1981
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8101140600
Download: ML19340E470 (2)

Text

1 eP DUKE POWER COMPANY Powen Duit.oixo 400 Souris Csicacii Sinzer, CuAnt.orre. N. C. cea4:

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II  ?

101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 -

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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 i ~

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• s Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.55e, please find attached the final response to nif.icant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/80-08.

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William O. Parker, Jr.

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Office-of Inspection and Enforcement Catawba Nuclear Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' Washington, D. C. 20555 -

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Report Number: 50-413/414/80-08 Report Date: January 2, 1981 Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Identification of Deficiency: Inadequate minimum . flow through the centrifugal charging pumps.

Descriotion of Deficiency:

On 6-17-80, Mr. W. H. Bradley and Mr. R. E. Miller advised Mr. J. K. Rausch of the NRC, of a potential design deficiency due to inadequate centrifugal charging pump minimum flow. Duke Power Company has performed a specific analysis for the Catawba Plant, per Westinghouse letter NS-TMA-2245 dated Nay 8, 1980, to victor Stello, which indicates that inadequate minimum flow will exist for the centrifugal charging pumps following a secondary side high energy line rupture if isolation of the' minimum path is allowed to occur.

Without adequate minimum flow, damage to one or both centrifugal charging pumps will occur.

Analysis of Safety implication:

Westinghouse has evaluated the impact of the recommended operating procedure modifications considering various secondary system ruptures and loss of coolant accidents which initiate safety injection and are sensitive to centrifugal charging pump (CCP) flow delivery. Feedline and steamline rupture analyses show that reduced safety injection flow due to normally open miniflow iselation valves have an insignificant ef fect on the plant transient response. L0cA analysis shows negligible effect on peak clad temperature (PCT). if CCP miniflow is manually isolated at the RCP trip setpoint. Also, analysis shows only slight increases in PCT if CCP miniflow is not isolated until 10 minutes.

Corrective Action:

f Based on the safety evaluation above, Duke Power Company has chosen to implement as permanent corrective action the modification which Westinghouse refers to as

" Interim Modification 11," in- the above referenced correspondence whict was transmitted to the NRC on July 17, 1980 by W. O. Parker.

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