IR 05000400/2018003

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000400/2018003

ML18306A942
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	10/26/2018
From:	David Hardage NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4
To:	Hamilton T Duke Energy Progress
References
IR 2018003
Download: ML18306A942 (16)

Text

UNITED STATES October 26, 2018

SUBJECT:

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2018003

Dear Ms. Hamilton:

On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. On October 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.

The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

David H. Hardage, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63 Enclosure: IR 05000400/2018003 cc: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting a quarterly integrated inspection at Shearon Harris, Unit 1 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Implement Adequate Periodic Exercising of Turbine Trip Solenoid Operated Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green P.5 - Operating 71152 - Annual Systems FIN 05000400/2018003-01 Experience Follow-Up of Closed Selected Issues A self-revealing Green finding was identified for the licensees failure to establish and implement adequate preventive maintenance (PM) for exercising the turbine electro-hydraulic auto-stop trip (AST) solenoid operated valves (SOVs) in accordance with procedure AD-EG-ALL-1202, Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration. As a result of the failure to exercise the SOVs at the weekly vendor recommended frequency, three of the four SOVs experienced mechanical binding (sticking) which rendered the turbine emergency trip system incapable of tripping the main turbine within the time response requirements of Technical Specifications.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue number Title Report Status Section LER 05000400/2018-003-00 Turbine Control System 71153 Closed Auto-Stop Trip Solenoid Operated Valves Response Times Impacted

PLANT STATUS

The unit operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Impending Severe Weather

The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for Hurricane Florence on September 11-16, 2018.

External Flooding (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding on August 8, 2018.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) B emergency diesel generator (EDG) and B emergency service water (ESW) while A train EDG and ESW was out of service for preventive maintenance on July 17, 2018

(2) B residual heat removal (RHR) while A RHR was out of service for valve preventive maintenance on July 24, 2018

(3) A and B motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps while the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump was out of service for control panel repairs on August 8, 2018

(4) TDAFW pump while the A MDAFW pump was out of service for limitorque valve calibrations on August 21, 2018

71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) B EDG room (fire zones 1-D-1-DGB-RM, 1-D-1-DGB-ER, and 1-D-1-DGB-ASU) on July 17, 2018

(2) A and B RHR pump and heat exchanger rooms (fire zones 1-A-1-PA, 1-A-1-PB, 1-A-34-RHXA, and 1-A-34-RHXB) on July 18, 2018

(3) ESW intake screening structure (fire zone 5-S-BAL) on August 8, 2018

(4) Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) elevation 236 mechanical penetration rooms (fire zone 1-A-3-MP) on August 21, 2018

(5) Fuel handling building spent fuel pool pumps and heat exchangers room (fire zones 5-F-2-FPC, 5-F-2-FPV1, and 5-F-2-FPV2) on August 22, 2018

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the ESW intake and screening structure on September 7, 2018.

71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification

The inspectors observed and evaluated an operator training scenario involving a complete station blackout event on July 12, 2018.

Operator Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance during the period of greatest plant impact from Hurricane Florence on September 15, 2018.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Main turbine trip solenoid operated valve failures during testing on June 29, 2018

Quality Control (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance issue:

(1) Replace degraded slinger ring on C component cooling water (CCW) pump motor inboard bearing on August 29, 2018

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Elevated (Green) risk during troubleshooting of emergent failure of solenoid operated valves for main turbine trip system on July 3, 2018

(2) Elevated (Green) risk during planned unavailability of the A EDG and A ESW for preventive maintenance on July 17, 2018

(3) Elevated (Green) risk during planned unavailability of the A RHR pump for preventive maintenance on July 24, 2018

(4) Elevated (Green) risk during planned unavailability of the TDAFW pump for emergent maintenance on August 6, 2018

(5) Elevated (Green) risk during planned unavailability of the B EDG for preventive maintenance on September 5-6, 2018

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Main turbine trip capability following mechanical binding identified with auto stop trip solenoid operated valves (Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 02216160) on July 3, 2018

(2) Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) after operators stopped a surveillance before inadvertently causing both trains of ECCS to become inoperable (NCR 02221295) on July 27, 2018

(3) Local TDAFW pump control panel degraded status indication lights (NCR 02222054) on August 1, 2018

(4) Missing or degraded air tight seals for RAB emergency exhaust pressure boundary doors (NCRs 02226108, 02226140, and 02226191) on August 22, 2018

(5) CCW cooling water isolated to RCS primary sample cooler due to cooler leakage and valve operational problems (NCRs 02226836 and 02228599) on September 4, 2018

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

The inspectors evaluated the following permanent and temporary modifications:

(1) Engineering Change (EC) 412436, Temporarily defeat alarms for turbine vibration probe issues on September 6, 2018

(2) EC 413572/413592, Replace B EDG 1C-SB starting air compressor aftercooler fan motor on September 24, 2018

71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Technical Procedure Testing (OPT)-1509, Turbine Trip Tests Quarterly Interval Modes 1 and 2, following troubleshooting to repair mechanical binding of main turbine trip solenoid operated valves on July 3, 2018

(2) Operations Surveillance Test (OST)-1013, 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4-5-6, following preventive maintenance on the A EDG on July 17, 2018

(3) Operating Procedure (OP)-137, Auxiliary Feedwater System, following replacement of failed indicating lights and sockets on the TDAFW control panel on August 6, 2018

(4) OST-1077, Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Operability Test Quarterly Interval Mode 4-5-6, and OST-1211, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-SA Operability Test Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, following calibration of A MDAFW discharge flow control valve 1AF-19 on August 21, 2018

(5) OST-1216, Component Cooling Water System Operability (A-SA and B-SB Pumps in Service) Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4, following scheduled inboard motor bearing replacement on August 24, 2018

(6) OST-1073, 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4-5-6, following preventive maintenance on the B EDG on September 6, 2018

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine

(1) OPT-1509, Turbine Trip Tests Quarterly Interval Modes 1 and 2, on July 10, 2018

(2) Maintenance Surveillance Test (MST)-I0080, Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure (P-0402) Calibration, on August 9, 2018

(3) Engineering Surveillance Test (EST)-400, Engineered Safety Feature Air Filtration Testing (for A RAB emergency ventilation exhaust system), on August 23, 2018

In-service (1 Sample)

(1) OST-1008, 1A-SA Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3, on July 24, 2018

Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection (1 Sample)

(1) OST-1026, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation, Computer Calculation, Daily Interval, Modes 1-4, on August 16, 2018

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Drill/Training Evolution

The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill involving a complete station blackout event on July 12,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below for the period from July 1, 2017, through June 30, 2018.

(1) MS06: emergency AC power system on August 29, 2018

(2) MS07: high pressure injection system on September 7, 2018

(3) MS09: residual heat removal system on August 29, 2018

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Sluggish Turbine Control System Auto-Stop solenoid operated valve response (NCR 02216793)

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Licensee Event Reports

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event report which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:

(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000400/2018-003-00, Turbine Control System Auto-Stop Trip Solenoid Operated Valves Response Times Impacted

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation

71152 - Annual Follow-Up of

Selected Issues Sluggish Turbine Control System Auto-Stop Solenoid Operated Valve Response (NCR 02216793)

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of NCR 02216793, initiated on July 3, 2018, regarding the discovery of mechanical binding in three of the four turbine electro-hydraulic AST SOVs. The inspectors chose this sample because the degraded SOV condition rendered both turbine trip AST channels non-functional and resulted in the system being incapable of depressurizing the AST header needed to trip the main turbine.

As appropriate, the inspectors verified the following attributes during review of the licensees corrective actions for the issue:

• Complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;

• Consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;

• Evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;

• Classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with safety significance;

• Identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the problem; and,

• Completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

The licensee completed a formal root cause evaluation to address the circumstances associated with this event. The inspectors determined that the licensees evaluation and corrective actions developed as a result of the event were reasonably commensurate with the safety significance of the event. A Green self-revealing Finding (05000400/2018003-01),which is detailed in this report, was identified by the inspectors to address the performance deficiency associated with the event.

Failure to Implement Adequate Preventive Maintenance of Turbine Trip Solenoid Operated Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green Finding P.5 - Operating

==71152 - Annual Systems05000400/2018003-01 Experience Follow-Up of

==

Closed Selected Issues A self-revealing Green finding was identified for the licensees failure to establish and implement adequate PM for exercising the turbine electro-hydraulic AST SOVs in accordance with procedure AD-EG-ALL-1202, Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration. As a result of the failure to exercise the SOVs at the weekly vendor recommended frequency, three of the four SOVs experienced mechanical binding (sticking)which rendered the turbine emergency trip system incapable of tripping the main turbine within the time response requirements of the Technical Specifications.

Description:

During the April 2018 refueling outage, the licensee implemented a new digital turbine control system (TCS) that included an upgraded turbine emergency trip system. The upgraded trip system uses four hydraulic SOVs, in two separate parallel banks (upper and lower), to depressurize the turbine electro-hydraulic fluid in the turbine AST header.

Depressurizing the AST header shuts the main turbine throttle valves which isolates steam to the main turbine.

On June 29, 2018, with the unit operating at full power, the licensee conducted the first turbine trip surveillance test since reaching full power operation with the new TCS installed.

The previous successful trip test was conducted May 10, 2018, at 16 percent power during startup from the refueling outage. As part of this testing, each SOV is exercised one at a time to prevent actuating an actual turbine trip. During the testing, the first AST SOV did not complete its trip/closure cycling within 10 seconds. The TCS software-driven testing program auto-aborted as designed, preventing further testing of the other three SOVs. After further troubleshooting between July 2 and July 3, 2018, it was identified that three of the four AST SOVs were experiencing mechanical binding (sticking).

The cause of the SOV sticking was determined to be the result of elevated environmental temperature conditions that allowed oxidation (varnishing film buildup) of the stagnant electro-hydraulic fluid within the moving internal parts of the SOVs. The vendor who supplied the TCS modification was aware of the potential for this phenomenon and had recommended weekly exercising of the SOVs to ensure this varnishing would not buildup to the extent of impeding valve operation. Licensee engineering personnel responsible for developing the TCS design modification were also aware of this phenomenon and recognized that the new SOVs would be located in a similar high temperature environment where the vulnerability was known to exist. In addition to the vendor supplied information, the TCS modification documentation referenced operating experience from other nuclear facilities using the same SOVs in high temperature environments that had experienced similar sticking. These facilities were successful in preventing the sticking by implementing weekly valve exercising PMs.

The TCS modification had originally prescribed a weekly PM program for exercising the SOVs in accordance with the vendor recommendations, however, during the process of establishing the PM in accordance with AD-EG-ALL-1202, Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration, the weekly frequency was changed to monthly. This change was implemented without an adequate understanding of the critical nature of the common mode failure mechanism of the SOVs or an adequate technical justification for deviating from the vendor recommended PM frequency. In addition, due to weaknesses in implementing an effective post-modification PM bridging strategy under AD-EG-ALL-1202, the first monthly PM frequency was not implemented on the scheduled date resulting in 50 days elapsing since the previous SOV exercising.

The licensee determined that as a result of the degraded condition of the three SOVs, the AST hydraulic header would not have depressurized and the automatic turbine trip actuation function would have been unable to actuate within its allowable design response time (i.e.,

2.5 seconds assumed for a steam generator hi-hi level turbine trip actuation). After further evaluation of the TCS circuitry and software program, the licensee determined that upon receipt of any turbine trip signal, the TCS generates an additional, although delayed (by ~6.5 seconds), demand signal that would energize the unaffected turbine over-speed protection system SOVs. This would have resulted in closure of the turbine governor valves, effectively tripping the turbine by isolating steam flow. The licensee determined that the turbine remained capable of being tripped based on this delayed demand signal.

Corrective Actions: The licensees immediate corrective actions included repeated cycling of the SOVs to remove the oxidized hydraulic fluid film buildup from the valve internals to restore their functionality. Subsequently, weekly periodic testing, as recommended by the vendor, was implemented to ensure continued SOV reliability.

Corrective Action Reference: NCR 02216793

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to implement an adequate PM schedule for periodically exercising the AST SOVs in accordance with procedure AD-EG-ALL-1202, Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration, was a performance deficiency (PD).

Screening: The inspectors determined the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the failure to establish an adequate AST SOV PM frequency consistent with the vendor weekly exercising recommendation, allowed internal mechanical binding in the SOVs which rendered the AST turbine trip system non-functional.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, SDP for Findings at-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding was screened by Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, under Section C, Reactivity Control Systems. The inspectors determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required since both channels of the turbine AST system were affected and the system was rendered incapable of depressurizing the AST hydraulic header needed to generate an automatic main turbine and reactor trip. A detailed risk evaluation of the PD was performed by a Region II Senior Reactor Analyst in accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix A. The turbine trip function was not explicitly modelled in the NRC Harris Simplified Plant Analysis Risk model or the licensees Harris Probabilistic Risk Assessment model, therefore a bounding hand calculation was used to assess system and equipment failures required to lead to core damage given a turbine trip failure. A separate fault tree was created to model the turbine trip function, including operator actions to close the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and trip the reactor given a turbine trip failure. The major analysis assumptions included: a twenty-four-day exposure period, a turbine trip frequency of 1.72E-1/year determined from industry transient data, SOV failure probability from SPAR data, and MSIV closure and reactor trip operator action human error probability determined using the NRC SPAR-H methodology. The result of the bounding analysis was an increase in the core damage frequency due to the PD of <1E-6/year, a Green finding of very low safety significance. The short exposure period and the amount of equipment required to fail before the onset of core damage mitigated the risk.

Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the operating experience component of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area (P.5), because the organization failed to systematically and effectively collect, evaluate, and implement relevant internal and external operating experience regarding the proper frequency for exercising the turbine trip SOVs in order to ensure their reliable operation.

Enforcement:

The inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements with this finding because the equipment associated with the failure to implement adequate PM was not safety-related.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 17, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Ms. Tanya Hamilton, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather

AP-300, Severe Weather Response, Rev. 33

Reactivity Manipulation Plan (for potential downpower for Hurricane Florence)

GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby (Mode 1 to Mode 3),

Rev. 86

AOP-028, Grid Instability, Rev. 37

APP-ALB-022, Main Control Board, Rev. 90

OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution, Rev. 161

OST-1024, On-Site Power Distribution Verification Weekly Interval Modes 1-6, Rev. 17

Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

UFSAR Section 2.4, Hydrologic Engineering

UFSAR Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design

HNP-13-031, Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report

AP-300 Severe Weather Response, Rev. 32

EPT-811, HNP Dam/Dike/Retaining Wall Monitoring Procedure, Rev. 15

NCRs 02043878, 02044553, 02088614, 02110320, 02119214

NCR 02226389, Responsibilities unclear in AP-300 for rainfall monitoring

NCR 02231701, Gravel needs to be added to the crest of the main and auxiliary dams

Section 71111.04: Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown

OP-155, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System, Rev. 88

OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution, Rev. 161

OP-111, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 62

OP-137, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 45

DBD-114, Auxiliary Feedwater System

CPL-2165-S-0544, Simplified Flow Diagram, Feedwater System, Rev. 46

Section 71111.05: Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Quarterly Inspection

FPP-001, Fire Protection Program Manual, Rev. 43

FPP-013, Fire Protection - Minimum Requirements, Mitigating Actions and Surveillance

Requirements, Rev. 98

AD-EG-ALL-1520, Transient Combustible Control, Rev. 11

AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 13

CSD-HNP-PFP-DGB, Diesel Generator Building Pre-Fire Plan, Rev. 1

CSD-HNP-PFP-RAB-190-216, Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevations 190 and 216 Pre-Fire Plan,

Rev. 1

CSD-HNP-PFP-RAB-236, Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 236 Pre-Fire Plan, Rev. 2

CSD-HNP-PFP-SEC, Out Building Pre-Fire Plan, Rev. 2

CSD-HNP-PFP-FHB, Fuel Handling Building Pre-Fire Plan, Rev. 1

Section 71111.06: Flood Protection Measures

Internal Flooding

UFSAR Section 2.4.10, Flooding Protection Requirements

UFSAR Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design

Calculation PRA-F-E-0011, ESW Intake Structure and Screening Structure Internal Flooding

Analysis, Rev. 2

Section 71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator

Performance

Operator Requalification

AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 13

AOP-10, Feedwater Malfunctions, Rev. 40

AOP-22, Loss of Service Water, Rev. 38

AOP-25, Loss of One Emergency AC Bus (6.9kV) or One Emergency DC Bus (125V), Rev. 42

EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 11

AD-TQ-ALL-0420, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation, Rev. 12

Operator Performance

AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 13

AP-002, Plant Conduct of Operations, Rev. 72

AD-NF-ALL-0201, Reactivity Manipulation Plan, Rev. 1 (for potential reactor downpower during

Hurricane Florence)

OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Rev. 113

AP-300, Severe Weather Response, Rev. 33

AOP-028, Grid Instability, Rev. 37

GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby (Mode 1 to Mode 3),

Rev. 86

Section 71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power

Plants, dated July 10, 1991

NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear

Power Plants, Rev. 4A

Regulatory Guide 1.160, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,

Rev. 3

AD-EG-ALL-1210, Maintenance Rule Program, Rev. 1

Quality Control Review

AD-EG-ALL-1103, Procurement Engineering Products, Rev. 3

AD-EG-ALL-1107, Quality Classifications, Rev. 4

WO 20228830, Replace C CCW motor inboard bearing HSG slinger ring

CM-M0020, Westinghouse Lifeline D Motors, Frame 6808-S Disassembly and Maintenance,

Rev. 19

NCRs 02062740, 02175444, 02179578, and 02225970

Section 71111.13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

AD-WC-ALL-0200, On-Line Work Management, Rev. 13

AD-WC-ALL-0410 Work Activity Integrated Risk Management, Rev. 7

AD-WC-ALL-0430, Outage Risk Review, Rev. 4

AD-NF-ALL-0501, Electronic Risk Assessment Tool (ERAT), Rev. 1

AD-OP-ALL-1000 Conduct of Operations, Rev. 13

AD-OP-ALL-0201, Protected Equipment, Rev. 4

OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 113

WCM-001, On-Line Maintenance Risk Management, Rev. 28

NCR 02222054, Metal base of bulb stuck in TDAFW control panel light socket

WP 20272156, Metal base of light bulb stuck in light socket

Section 71111.15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

AD-OP-ALL-0105, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Rev. 4

ODP Reference Guide, Rev. 5

AD-OP-ALL-0202, Aggregate Operator Impact Assessment, Rev. 2

MST-I0080, Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure (P-0402) Calibration, Revs. 22

and 23

MST-I0081, Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure (P-0403) Calibration, Revs. 22

and 23

NCR 02221316, MST-I0080/I0081 Dual Train Inoperability

WO 20112154, MST-I0080, Test wide range pressure, P-0402, 7200 portions

OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution, Rev. 160

OST-1023, Off-site Power Availability, Rev. 33

Drawing PD-5165-BC-0001, AC Power Distribution System

WO 20277097, Inspect/repair CCW primary sample panel cooler leaks

Section 71111.18: Plant Modifications

NEI 96-07, Guidelines for 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.187,

Rev. 1

Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for Implementation of 10CFR50.59, dated November 2000

AD-EG-ALL-1103, Procurement Engineering Products, Rev. 3

AD-EG-ALL-1110, Design Review Requirements, Rev. 5

AD-EG-ALL-1130, Activation of Engineering Changes, Rev. 2

AD-EG-ALL-1132, Preparation and Control of Design Change Engineering Changes, Rev. 11

AD-EG-ALL-1155, Post Modification Testing, Rev. 4

AD-LS-ALL-0008, 10 CFR 50.59 Review Process, Rev. 0

AR 02212822, Install EC 412436

WO 20253518, Implement temporary modification EC 412436

DBD-201, Emergency Diesel Generator System, Rev. 18

AR 02230414, Damage to B EDG 1C-SB starting air compressor motor fan

WO 20280685, Implement replacement fan for B EDG 1C-SB starting air compressor motor

Section 71111.19: Post Maintenance Testing

PLP-400, Post Maintenance Testing, Rev. 64

WO 20264805, Troubleshoot main turbine trip solenoid operated valve failure to open

WO 20228830, Replace inboard motor bearing slinger ring on C CCW pump

WO 20099066, A MDAFW valve AF-19 limitorque calibration

WOs 13497017, 20107035, 20160852, 20160853, 20085396, 20242339, 20174065, and

20109082, for preventive maintenance on the B EDG

Section 71111.22: Surveillance Testing

Routine

NCR 02221316, MST-I0080/I0081 Dual Train Inoperability

WO 20112154, MST-I0080, Test wide range pressure, P-0402, 7200 portions

Section 71114.06: Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution

AD-TQ-ALL-0420, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation, Rev. 13

AD-EP-ALL-0803, Evaluation and Critique of Drills and Exercises, Rev. 4

EP-EAL, Emergency Action Levels, Rev. 17

PLP-201, Emergency Plan, Rev. 69

PEP-110, Emergency Classification and Protective Action Requirements, Rev. 28

PEP-230, Control Room Operations, Rev. 30

AOP-10, Feedwater Malfunctions, Rev. 40

AOP-22, Loss of Service Water, Rev. 38

AOP-25 Loss of One Emergency AC Bus (6.9kV) or One Emergency DC Bus (125V), Rev. 42

EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 11

Section 71151: Performance Indicator Verification

NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline

AD-LS-ALL-0004, NRC Performance Indicators and Monthly Operating Report, Rev. 2

Calculation HNP-F/PSA-0068, NRC Mitigating System Performance Index Basis Document for

Harris Nuclear Plant, Rev. 9

Section 71152: Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 18

AD-PI-ALL-0104, Prompt Investigation Response Team, Rev. 4

AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation, Rev. 4

AD-PI-ALL-0103, Quick Cause Evaluation, Rev. 4

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