IR 05000400/2022010
| ML22161A979 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/2022 |
| From: | James Baptist Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Maza K Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2022010 | |
| Download: ML22161A979 (17) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2022010
Dear Ms. Maza:
On April 29, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.
June 13, 2022 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Br 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000400 License No. NPF-63
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000400
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-010-0035
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
New Hill, NC.
Inspection Dates:
April 03-April 29, 2022
Inspectors:
T. Fanelli, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Schwieg, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Zudans, Contractor
Approved By:
James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Br 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Valves Anomalous Behavior Not Identified in Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000400/2022010-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.21N.02 The inspectors identified a GREEN finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify potential degradation to a containment isolation valve in the corrective action program (CAP).
Not Addressing Containment Isolation Valve Closure Requirements in Design Documents Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000400/2022010-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.02 The NRC identified a GREEN finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B,
Criterion III for the licensees failure to address containment isolation valve closure requirements to prevent leakage.
Failure to correct nonconformance's with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000400/2022010-03 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.02 The inspectors identified a GREEN finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to correct nonconformance with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii).
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)
The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from [enter dates].
- (1) URI 05000400/2021010-01, Treatment of Class 1E interfaces and interlocks with the Turbine Trip System Design
71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)
The inspectors:
a determined whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases Specific Guidance b.
determined whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis functions c.
determined whether testing of the sampled POVs is adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions d.
evaluate maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible)
(1)1CT-102 MOV Containment Sump to CS Pump "B" Isolation Valve (CIV)
(2)1MS-82 AOV Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) for MS Header "B" (CIV)
(3)1AF-19 HOV AFWP "1A" Pressure Control Valve (4)1CC-167 MOV CCW From RHR Heat Exchanger "B" Outlet Isolation Valve (5)1CT-50 MOV Containment Spray Pump "A" Discharge to Nozzles Isolation Valve (CIV)
(6)1BD-30 AOV SG "B" Blowdown Isolation Valve (CIV)
(7)1SI-4 MOV Boron Injection Tank (BIT) Outlet Isolation Valve (CIV)
(8)1MS-62 HOV MS Line "C" PORV (CIV)
(9)1CS-11 AOV Letdown Isolation (CIV)
INSPECTION RESULTS
Valves Anomalous Behavior Not Identified in Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000400/2022010-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.21N.02 The inspectors identified a GREEN finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify potential degradation to a containment isolation valve in the corrective action program (CAP).
Description:
On 5/3/2021, after a valve packing replacement, Work Order (WO) 20380548 performed a post maintenance diagnostic test for Air Operated Valve (AOV) 1BD-30, Steam Generator "B" Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve (CIV). The test showed high and uneven friction anomalies indicating an issue with the valve. In addition, the diagnostic test identified a potential binding anomaly at the beginning of the closing stroke (the CIV safety function). The binding anomaly prevented a continuous and smooth closure of the valve. A qualified AOV engineer evaluated the test on 5/13/2021 and noted that the margin had been reduced significantly due to the high friction but remained acceptable. No further investigations into these anomalies were performed. No Corrective Action or Work Request (WR) was initiated until WR 20223816 was issued 4/7/2022. Procedure TMM-134, "Post Test Evaluation of AOV Diagnostic Test Data," Rev. 3, requires initiation of WR as needed to correct anomalies.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the nonconformance into the CAP and identified a second corrective action deficiency with anomalies associated with valve 1CS-231 in Action Request (AR) 02423878
Corrective Action References: NCR 2423818 and AR 02423878
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to identify anomalous behavior that could degrade the safety function of containment isolation valve performance in the corrective action program was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the anomalous behavior was on the beginning of the closure stoke and could worsen, thus degrading the valve effectiveness to perform its safety function to close and isolate containment.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance GREEN because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, but the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. The licensee failed to identify anomalous valve behavior completely and in a timely manner in accordance with evaluation procedure TMM-134.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, that Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, since 5/3/2021, deviant valve diagnostic anomalies were not promptly identified in CAP to be corrected.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Not Addressing Containment Isolation Valve Closure Requirements in Design Documents Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000400/2022010-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.02 The NRC identified a GREEN finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III for the licensees failure to address containment isolation valve closure requirements to prevent leakage.
Description:
FSAR, Section 6.2.4.2.3, Valve Operability, states, in part, that, The valve types utilized for containment isolation service are designs which provide rapid closure and near zero leakage. Therefore, essentially no leakage is anticipated through the containment isolation valves when in closed position. The licensing basis for the plant exempted approximately 36 CIV from 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, testing requirements, based on the application of a water seal for 30 days after a design basis event. However, these valves were not exempted from the rapid closure and near zero leakage requirement. The licensee program did not ensure that the valve seat stresses necessary for near zero leakage were determined and met. In addition, test control documents and subsequent corrective action documents that identified degradation on the disc and seat did not evaluate for leakage degradation. The documents specified that the valves did not need to meet any leak rate requirements because of their exemption from 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, testing requirements. The inspectors identified that the degradation could affect the valve leakage.
The valves evaluated in the inspection sample included the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) output containment isolation valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4, Containment Sump valve 1CT-102, and Blowdown isolation valve 1BD-30. A site extent of condition is being performed to determine how many CIVs were affected by this issue. The inspectors noted that not ensuring that near zero leakage requirements were addressed in the valve program allowed degradation affecting leakage requirements to go unaddressed.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into the CAP and is performing an extent of condition.
Corrective Action References: AR 2425558
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to ensure that the near zero leakage requirements for CIVs continued to be met was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The containment isolation function of these valves was not ensured in design control and test control documents for their associated design basis events leading to the failure to address potential degradation affecting their safety functions.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance GREEN because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, but the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, states, in part, that Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Contrary to the above, since 4/28/2000, the site failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for containment isolation valves to which this appendix applies were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, design documents for valve capability did not address the containment isolation valve function.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to correct nonconformance's with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000400/2022010-03 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.02 The inspectors identified a GREEN finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to correct nonconformance with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii).
Description:
Differential pressure testing results for 1SI-3 and1SI-4 showed signs of degradation and instability of valve factor performance, which could affect their safety injection function and their near zero leakage design requirement for CIVs. The tests demonstrated that the valves were not in conformance with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) and this nonconformance was not recognized following these tests. The degradation was recognized and placed in the in the CAP as part of the Motor Operated Valve (MOV) testing program in 2006. It was identified that seat lapping has not been successful in achieving low VFC [Valve Factor Close] & VFO [Valve Factor Open]. Consideration needs to be given to replacing the valve. AR# 193559 is tracking the resolution of this issue. Instead of tracking the resolution of the issue, these valves were incorrectly classified as JOG Class A (based on these tests),not requiring further testing. This was contrary to the site MOV program given the identified degradation. The valves have not been retested under differential pressure since 2006. In this case, the licensee found MOVs that do not have a stable VF and are not consistent with the 95% approach used by the approved MOV program and Joint owners Group (JOG) data used for MOV program.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this into the CAP and is performing an extent of condition with other valves of the same type.
Corrective Action References: AR 2425557
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to correct nonconformance's with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The identified degradation could lead to affect the effectiveness of the Safety Injection system to perform its safety functions as well as their CIV functions. These valves were identified to be used in approximately 39 procedures associated with the safe operation of the plant.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance GREEN because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, but the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, that Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformance's are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, since 5/3/2006, the site failed to correct valve factor degradation in Safety Injection Valves that prevented them from meeting 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii).
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On April 29, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Kim Maza and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
14.SI-0017 DBR
Mechanical Analysis and Calculation for Gate Valve 1SI-4
Bit Outlet Isolation (CIV)
04/28/2021
CC-0009
Mechanical Analysis and Calculation for Gate Valve 1CC-
167 RHR Heat Exchanger B Isolation
CC-0009
JOG MOV EVALUATION REPORT 1CC-167 (HNP-1)
CT-0049
Mechanical Analysis and Calculation for Gate valve 1CT-50
Containment Spray Pump Discharge (CIV)
DC-129
Weak Link and Seismic Analysis Report for Velan Valve 12
Inch Class 150 Carbon Steel Bolted Bonnet Motor Operated
Gate Valve
EQDP-0311
Main Steam PORV Operator
HNP-15-0073
GL 89-10 MOVs 1CC-147 & 1CC-167 are Undersized
10/20/2015
HNP-APPJ
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program
HNP-C-EQ-1196
Weak Link Analysis of Westinghouse Valves 1S1-3 and
2/14/2001
HNP-C/EO-1203
Weak Link Analysis of Velan Valves 1CC-147 and 1CC-167
HNP-IST-004
HNP IST Program Plan - 4th Interval
HNP-M/MECH-
23
Determination of MOV Rate of Loading Factors
HNP-M/MECH-
28
AOV System Level Calculations for Steam Generator
Blowdown Valves (1BD-1, 1BD-11, 1BD-20,1BD-30, 1BD-
39, 1BD-49)
Calculations
TMM-134
Analysis of Category 1(2) AOV Diagnostic Data, Sliding
Stem Valve with Spring/Diaphragm Actuator Spring to
Close Configuration, 1BD-30
05/03/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 193559-05
1SI-2 and 1SI-4 Increase Valve Factor /Margin after Seat
lap
08/31/2006
1364-003059
IN CS 150 lb MO Gate Valve ASME CL 3 12-GM32SB
1364-099223 SHT
1-2
PORV EHO Assembly Drawing
1364-4383 SO1
Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valves Details
71111.21N.02
Drawings
1364-4384
Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valves Details
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
5-S-0542
SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM MAIN STEAM SYSTEM
UNIT 1
5-S-0550
SFD CONT SPRAY SYSTEM UNIT 1
CAR 2166 B-401
Unit No.1 Control Wiring Diagram
CAR 2166-B-060
Miscellaneous Electrical Details & Notes Sheet 42
CAR-2165 G-
0050
Flow Diagram Containment Spray System Unit 1
CF1L-2165
Simplified Flow Diagram Component Cooling Water
System, Sheet 2
CPL-2165-S-1324
Simplified Flow Diagram RHR System Unit 1
Wedge, Valve, Gate, 12 inch, Velan, MH/FS
Obsolete MS PORV EHO Replacement
Mod Test Plan, AD-EG-ALL-1155, Attachment 3
Engineering
Changes
ESR 99-00009
RF-09, MOV Modifications for HHSI, Cont. Spray and HHSI
2/02/1999
AOV Setup Datasheet
2/15/2022
Analysis of Category 2 & 3 AOV Diagnostic Data
04/19/2015
1SI-4 DP Test 4-
2-06
Rising Stem Dynamic Test Analysis
04/12/2006
1SI-4 DP Test 5-
4-06
Rising Stem Dynamic Test Analysis
05/04/2006
PTE_2015_04_05
MOV POST-TEST DATA REVIEW WORKSHEET
04/05/2015
PTE_2021_04_15
MOV POST-TEST DATA REVIEW WORKSHEET
04/25/2021
9500335
Document Review of Pressure-Locking Scenario for
Containment
04/04/1995
9600054
Valve Press Lock/Thermal Bind Evaluations Reqd by 95-07
2/11/1996
CT-0054
MECHANICAL ANALYSIS AND CALCULATION FOR
GATE VALVE 1CT-102 CONTAINMENT SUMP TO
CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP
E5-0001
ANALYSIS OF MOTOR OUTPUT TORQUE FOR AC
MOTOR OPERATED VALVES
Engineering
Evaluations
HNP-M-Mech-
21
DETERMINATION OF MOV VALVE FACTORS
R6
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
HNP-M/MECH-
21
AOV COMPONENT LEVEL CALCULATION FOR MAIN
STEAM ISOLATION VALVES (MSIVS)
HNP-M/MECH-
250
DESIGN BASIS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE REPORT
FOR MOV'S IN THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM
HNP-M/MECH-
252
DESIGN BASIS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE REPORT
FOR MOV'S IN THE LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION &
RHR SYSTEM
OST-1072
05/13/2021
OST-1865
CVCS/SI System Operability Cold Shutdown/Refueling
Interval Mode 4-5-6 Or Defueled
08/13/2021
RH-0017
JOG MOV EVALUATION REPORT 1RH-063
741918
50.59 Screening for EC 95206
99-1264
50.59 Screening for ESR 99-00009
AOQG OUT-TUR
Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Auxiliary Operator Outside and
Turbine Building Qualification Guide
CAR-SH-M-056
Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valve
Piping Stress Analysis
DBD-1000-V01
Harris Nuclear Plant Environmental Qualification Design
Basis Document
Chemical & Volume Control System Boron Thermal
Regeneration System Boron Recycle System
Safety Injection System
Containment Spray System
Containment Isolation System
Steam Generator, Main Steam, Extraction Steam, Steam
Dump and Auxiliary Steam System
Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator
Blowdown System Steam Generator Chemical Addition
System
Component Cooling Water System
EPRI TR-103237
- R1 - T1
EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Program
Miscellaneous
MA26430
Detailed Complete Functional Acceptance Test Procedure,
PORV Modulating Actuator MD26420, EC 95206
F
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
VM-FBG
ACTUATORS, HYDRAMOTOR
AD-EG-ALL-1415
Motor Operated Valve Performance Prediction, Actuator
Settings and Diagnostic Test Data
AD-EG-ALL-1431
Operated Valve Scope and Characterization
AD-EG-ALL-1432
Air Operated Valve Design Basis Review
AD-EG-ALL-1433
Air Operated Valve Testing Requirements
CM-M0186
Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Operator
Fill and Bleed
LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
ISI-801
Inservice Testing of Valves
ISI-802
Inservice Testing of Pressure Relief Devices
Main Steam, Extraction Steam and Steam Dump Systems
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
OST-1046
Main Steam Isolation Valve with Remote Position Indication
Operability Test Quarterly Interval Mode 3 to 5
OST-1068
Containment Isolation Valve Remote Position Indication
Test Two Year Interval Modes 5, 6
OST-1077
Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Operability Test Quarterly
Interval Mode 4-5-6
OST-1087
MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS FULL
FLOW TEST QUARTERLY INTERVAL
MODE 1
OST-1104
Containment Isolation Inservice Inspection Valve Test
Quarterly Interval Modes 1-6
OST-1118
Containment Spray Operability Train A Quarterly Interval
Modes 1-4
OST-1129
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM ISI VALVE TEST
QUARTERLY INTERVAL MODES 5 AND 6
OST-1191
Steam Generator PORV and Block Valve Operability Test
Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4
OST-1316
Component Cooling Water System Operability (Pump 1C-
SAB In Service) Quarterly Interval Modes1-4
Procedures
OST-1803
CONTAINMENT SUMP VISUAL INSPECTION 18 MONTH
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
INTERVAL MODE 5
OST-1839
Component Cooling Water Valve Remote Position
Indication Test Two Year Interval Modes 1-6
PD-EG-ALL-1430
Air Operated Valve Program
PLP-112
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM
PLP-400
Post Maintenance Testing
PM-I0054
Air Operated Valve Diagnostic Testing
TE-EG-ALL-1413
MOV Design Database Control, Calculation and Diagnostic
Test Instruction Development and Data Evaluation/Trending
2038486-05
MOV 1CT-50 Post Test Data Review Worksheet
05/16/2012
13321262-01
MOV 1CT-50 Post Test Data Review Worksheet
04/24/2015
13321262-06
Perform MOV PVT and PM -M0014 for 1CT-50
04/10/2015
13352259
M, 1AF-19:002, Hydromotor Actuator Long Term Reliability
04/03/2014
13352259
I, PIC-I058, Replace Hydromotor Actuator 1AF-19
04/04/2014
13366092-07
lCS-11, As Left Diagnostic Testing
04/23/2015
13484301-03
DUKE Nuclear MOV Program MOV Post-Test Data Review
Worksheet, 1CC-167
01/30/2017
13484301-03
MNT-NGGC-00 10,1CC-167, As Left Diagnostic Test
01/30/2017
20374172-01
1MS-62, Steam Leak Through Leakoff Line
2/31/2019
20380548
I, FT, PM-I0054, 1BD-30:006, As-Left AOV Diagnostic Test
05/20/2021
20394523-01
I, 1SI-4:002, MOV PVT AND PM-M0014
4/25/2021
Work Orders
2197059-03
DUKE Nuclear MOV Program MOV Post-Test Data Review
Worksheet, 1CC-167
06/17/2014