IR 05000400/2022002
| ML22217A006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/2022 |
| From: | Matthew Fannon NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Haaf T Duke Energy Progress |
| References | |
| IR 2022002 | |
| Download: ML22217A006 (16) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2022002
Dear Mr. Haaf:
On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant. On July 20, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
Licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance are documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant.
August 5, 2022 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Matthew S. Fannon, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000400 License No. NPF-63
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000400
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-002-0019
Licensee:
Duke Energy Progress, LLC
Facility:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant
Location:
New Hill, NC 27562
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2022 to June 30, 2022
Inspectors:
C. Smith, Resident Inspector
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Matthew S. Fannon, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report section: 71152
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On April 29, 2022, a manual reactor trip occurred due to degrading main turbine condenser vacuum as a result of the trip of the operating main condenser vacuum pump. The unit was restarted on April 30, 2022, and was returned to rated thermal power on May 1, 2022. The unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures on May 19, 2022.
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather involving a tornado warning on May 23, 2022.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)
'A' emergency service water (ESW) system while 'B' ESW was out of service for room cooling exhaust fan damper preventive maintenance on April 6, 2022 (2)
'A' essential services chilled water (ESCW) system while 'B' ESCW was out of service for preventive maintenance on May 3, 2022 (3)
'A' component cooling water (CCW) pump and 'B' motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump while 'B' CCW pump was out of service for preventive maintenance on May 11, 2022
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the containment spray system on April 19 and May 19, 2022.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)
'A' and 'B' ESW pump rooms and intake structure (fire zones 12-I-ESWPA, 12-I-ESWPA-BAL, 12-I-ESWPB, 12-I-ESWPB-BAL, and 12-I-ESW-BAL) on April 6, 2022
- (2) Fuel oil transfer pump rooms A, B, 2A, and 2B in the diesel fuel oil storage building (fire zones 1-O-PA, 1-O-PB, and 5-O-BAL) on April 19, 2022
- (3) Reactor auxiliary building (RAB) 236' elevation mechanical penetration room (fire zone 1-A-3-MP) on April 26, 2022
- (4) RAB 216' elevation service water and safety injection pipe tunnels (fire zone 1-A-2-PT) on April 27, 2022
- (5) RAB 286' elevation switchgear ventilation rooms 'A' and 'B' and cable spreading rooms 'A' and 'B' (fire zones 1-A-5-HVA, 1-A-5-HVB, 1-A-CSRA, and 1-A-CSRB) on May 16, 2022
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on June 14, 2022.
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1)
'A' train containment fan cooler units AH-2 and AH-3 heat exchangers and associated service water valves (2)
'B' CCW heat exchanger and associated valves
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the following activities:
Reactor restart on May 1, 2022, following manual reactor trip on degraded condenser vacuum on April 29, 2022
Control rod power mismatch speed control circuitry card replacement on May 5, 2022
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator scenario for an operator requalification annual examination on May 18, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Momentary isolation of reactor coolant pump seal injection flow during 'B' charging and safety injection pump (CSIP) testing (non-conformance report [NCR] 02426708)on May 2, 2022
- (2) Sample pump tripped for waste monitor tank discharge radiation monitor RM-3541 (NCR 02423298) on April 10, 2022
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated (green) risk during scheduled 'B' ESW pump room ventilation damper maintenance on April 6, 2022
- (2) Elevated (green) risk during startup from a reactor trip on April 30, 2022
- (3) Elevated (green) risk during scheduled 'B' ESCW chiller maintenance on May 3-4, 2022
- (4) Elevated (green) risk during scheduled 'B' CCW pump maintenance on May 11, 2022
- (5) Elevated (green) risk during scheduled testing of 'A' train solid state protection system on May 17, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Alternate mini-flow recirculation valve (1CS-745) failed code criteria (NCR 02420744)on April 18, 2022
- (2) Through-wall leakage in 'B' ESW cooling return piping from 'B' emergency diesel generator room fan cooler (NCR 02425852) on May 2, 2022 (3)
'B' ESCW chiller refrigerant found low during post-maintenance testing following unrelated maintenance (NCR 02426074) on May 3, 2022
- (4) Degraded insulation on 'B' phase line side of bus bars feeding the 6.9 kilovolt breaker 1B-5 from unit auxiliary transformer 1B (NCR 02420406) on May 23, 2022
===02425557) on June 1, 2022
- (6) Potential leakage through steam outlet valve (1MS-70) to turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (NCR 02430227) on June 22, 2022
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Permanent modification engineering change (EC) 414532, RAB 261' Elevation Fire Detection System Upgrade
- (2) Permanent modification EC 419063, Refurbishment of Siemens RLN 480-volt Circuit Breakers
- (3) Permanent modification EC 420418, Upgrade ESW Drain and Pressure Connection Instrument Lines to CSIP Coolers
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
- (1) Operations periodic test (OPT)-1512, Essential Chilled Water Turbopak Units Quarterly Inspection/Checks Modes 1-6, following replacement of hot gas bypass valve and refrigerant addition to 'B' ESCW chiller on May 3-4, 2022
- (2) Operating procedure (OP)-145, Component Cooling Water (CCW), following preventative maintenance of 1B CCW pump on May 11, 2022
- (3) OP-111, Residual Heat Removal System, following breaker replacement of 'A' RHR Pump on May 18, 2022
- (4) OP-139, Service Water System, Section 8.1, Swapping ESW Suctions or Auxiliary Reservoir Makeup Using ESW System, following restoration of 'A' ESW booster pump for motor breaker replacement activities on May 24, 2022
- (5) Maintenance surveillance test (MST)-I0018, Main Steam/Feedwater Flow Loop 2 (F-048/F-0487) Channel Calibration, following replacement of circuit cards in the associated reactor protection system cabinet on June 20, 2022
- (6) OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution, Section 8.37, Restoration of the Auto Transfer Switch for MCC 1D23, following dedicated shutdown diesel generator maintenance on June 22, 2022
- (7) OP-139, Service Water System, Section 5.2, Supplying ESW Headers with an ESW Pump, to start 'B' ESW pump, following motor maintenance on June 29, 2022
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) OPT-1530, Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval Modes: All, on April 6, 2022
- (2) OST-1054, Permissives P-6 and P-10 Verification Quarterly Interval Modes 3-6, on April 30, 2022
- (3) OST-1045, ESFAS Train B Slave Relay Test 18-Month Interval Modes 1-4, on June 2, 2022
- (4) OST-1017, Pressurizer PORV Block Valve Full Stroke Test Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4, on June 10, 2022
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) OST-1191, Steam Generator PORV and Block Valve Operability Test, on June 6, 2022
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Inspectors observed an off-hours emergency response organization activation and site report-in emergency drill involving a reactor auxiliary building fire followed by a loss-of-offsite power and anticipated transient without scram event on June 16,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) RAB elevation 261' sprinkler header isolation valve found not tripped on December 21, 2021 (NCR 02410358)
(2)
'A' ESCW chiller pre-rotation vanes found out of position on January 10, 2022 (NCR
02411360) 71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in equipment and human performance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000400/2022-001-00, Essential Services Chilled Water Chiller Inoperable Due to Pre-Rotation Vane Actuator Control Arm Position, (ADAMS Accession No.
ML22070A034). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under inspection Results Section 71152A. This LER is closed.
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a manual reactor trip due to degrading condenser vacuum and licensees performance on April 29,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152A This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: License Condition F, Fire Protection, requires in part, Duke Energy Progress, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. FPP-013 was established as part of the provisions of the approved fire protection program. Procedure FPP-013, provides instructions for implementing compensatory measures in the event that both fire detection and suppression are non-functional. FPP-013 requires a continuous fire watch in high-risk areas when both the pre-action or multicycle sprinkler system (fire suppression) and fire detection are nonfunctional.
Contrary to the above, from December 22, 2021, to December 29, 2021, the licensee failed to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a continuous fire watch when both fire detection and suppression systems were nonfunctional. In particular, the licensee was performing a modification on the fire detection system associated with the 261' elevation of the reactor auxiliary building, and detection for this area was nonfunctional during this implementation of the modification. On December 22, 2021, the licensee used a provision in FPP-013 which allows the suspension of firewatch rounds provided the sprinkler header in the area is wetted. However, 1FP-2538 was not properly manipulated and the header was not wetted. This resulted in both fire suppression and detection being nonfunctional when firewatch rounds were suspended from December 22 to 29, 2021.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors determined that this issue was associated with the Fixed Fire Protection Systems category because the fire watches were posted as a compensatory measure for a fixed fire protection system outage. The inspectors determined that the finding could not be assigned a low degradation rating and the deficiency (degraded fix suppression capability and no fire watch assign to mitigate risk as required by their fire protection program) adversely affected the ability of the system to protect equipment important to safe shutdown. Since Harris does have an approved fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) available to screen the issue, in accordance with Step 1.5, a regional senior reactor analyst (SRA) reviewed their fire PRA and risk assessment for acceptability. The licensees risk assessment determined risk was well below 1E-6.
The SRA completed a modified phase II assessment using IMC 0609, Appendix F, and the NRCs Shearon Harris Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model. The SRA assumed a duration factor of 7 days for the period of time the fixed suppression was isolated and there was no fire watch assigned as a compensatory measure. Using the fire initiation frequencies and conditional core damage probability (CCDP) in the SPAR model for a reactor auxiliary building fire, the SRAs results were comparable with the licensees. Therefore, questions 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 were both answered yes, and the finding was screened to very low safety significance (Green).
Corrective Action References: NCR 02410358 Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152A This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Shearon Harris Technical Specification 3.7.13, Essential Services Chilled Water System, requires two ESCW systems to be operable in Modes 1 through 4, and if one ESCW system is inoperable, it shall be returned to an operable condition within seven days or the unit shall be shut down and be in Mode 3 (hot standby) within the next six hours and in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, from December 27, 2021, to January 10, 2022, while operating in Mode 1, the licensee failed to follow the action requirements of TS 3.7.13, in that, following seven days of inoperability associated with the A ESCW system due to an unknown mispositioned pre-rotation vane (PRV) associated with the chiller compressor, the licensee failed to be in hot standby within the following six hours or restore the A ESCW to an operable condition. Specifically, during A' ESCW chiller maintenance in August 2021, maintenance personnel failed to properly install a threaded cap screw fastener that holds the chiller compressor PRV control linkage arm to the vane actuator assembly. The cap screw eventually loosened, causing control linkage slippage and mispositioning of the PRV on December 27, 2021, which led to reduced chiller cooling capacity below its design basis accident requirement and inability of the chiller to restart automatically during certain design basis accident events. The mispositioned PRV was later identified by the licensee on January 10, 2022, and subsequently corrected. This issue is associated with LER 05000400/2022-001-00, Essential Services Chilled Water Chiller Inoperable Due to Pre-Rotation Vane Actuator Control Arm Position.
Significance/Severity: Green. The violation involved the A ESCW chiller being incapable of providing its design basis cooling capacity under accident conditions and inability to restart automatically during certain design basis events. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was screened utilizing Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, under Section A, Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality, and it was determined that the performance deficiency required a detailed risk evaluation because the degraded condition represented a loss of PRA function of one train of a multi-train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time. A detailed risk evaluation of the performance deficiency was performed by a Region II SRA in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A. The exposure period was from the date of the maintenance to the date repairs were completed and the chiller restored to an operable status (14 days). In order to bound this condition, the SRA conservatively assumed the A ESCW chiller would fail to start and fail to run for its mission time over this 14-day exposure period and chiller supported equipment would also fail. Using SAPHIRE 8 Version 8.2.6 and Harris SPAR Model Version 8.55, dated February 28, 2017, the SRA set CHW-CHL-FR-1A and CHW-CHL-FS-1A (A ESCW chiller fails to run and fails to start) to True. The dominant accident sequence was a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident with a failure of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps and Failure of Secondary Side Reactor Coolant System Cooldown. The change in plant risk for this conservative bounding analysis was 1.09 E-7 per year. The SRA also evaluated the period described in the LER where both trains were inoperable for one day due to maintenance on the 1B chiller. The SRA set CHW-CHL-FR-1A, CHW-CHL-FS-1A, CHW-CHL-FR-1B and CHW-CHL-FS-1B (A and B ESCW chillers fail to run and fail to start) to TRUE for one day. Change in plant risk was determined to be 5.96 E-8. Therefore, the total change in plant risk was less than 1 E-6 and the finding corresponds to a finding of very low safety significance (Green).
Corrective Action References: NCR
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On July 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Thomas Haaf and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calibration
Records
Summer Readiness
2/14/2021
Procedures
AP-300
Severe Weather Response
Rev. 37
Service Water System
Rev. 141
Procedures
Essential Services Chilled Water System
Rev. 84
CSD-HNP-PFP-
RAB-190-216
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevations 190 and 216 Pre-Fire
Plan
Rev. 1
CSD-HNP-PFP-
RAB-236
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 236 Pre-Fire Plan
Rev. 2
CSD-HNP-PFP-
RAB-286
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 286 Pre-Fire Plan
Rev. 1
Fire Plans
CSD-HNP-PFP-
SEC
Out Building Pre-Fire Plan
Rev. 8
AD-EG-ALL-1520
Transient Combustible Control
Rev. 14
AD-OP-ALL-0207
Fire Brigade Administrative Controls
Rev. 4
Fire Protection Program Manual
Rev. 45
Fire Emergency
Rev. 47
Fire Protection - Minimum Requirements, Mitigating Actions,
and Surveillance Requirements
Revs. 111
and 112
Procedures
OMM-001
Operations Administrative Requirements
Rev. 124
Miscellaneous
Reactivity
Manipulation Plan
H1C24 Loss of Condenser Vacuum Startup
Rev. 0
AD-OP-ALL-1000
Conduct of Operations
Rev. 19
Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control
Rev. 26
Secondary Steam Leak/Efficiency Loss
Rev. 8
Steam Generator Tube Leak
Rev. 0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Rev. 15
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Rev. 7
GP-004
Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2)
Rev. 68
GP-005
Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1)
Rev. 115
Procedures
Component Cooling Water
Rev. 80
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
RM-3541 WMT discharge sample pump tripping
04/10/2022
Procedures
AD-EG-ALL-1210
Rev. 3
AD-NF-ALL-0501
Electronic Risk Assessment Tool (ERAT)
Rev. 6
AD-WC-ALL-
200
On-Line Risk Management
Rev. 20
Procedures
AD-WC-ALL-
0410
Work Activity Integrated Risk Management
Rev. 12
Corrective Action
Documents
1CS-745 failed code criteria in open direction
03/21/2022
Procedures
AD-OP-ALL-0105
Rev. 6
AD-EG-ALL-1110
Design Review Requirements
Rev. 10
AD-EG-ALL-1132
Preparation and Control of Design Change Engineering
Changes
Rev. 20
Procedures
AD-EG-ALL-1133
Preparation and Control of Design Equivalent Change
Engineering Changes
Rev. 16
Work Orders
Replacement of B CSIP pump cooler ESW drain and
pressure connection lines
4/25/2022
Procedures
PLP-400
Post Maintenance Testing
Rev. 64
20384613
Replace motor breaker for 'A' ESW booster pump
5/24/2022
Replace circuit boards associated with reactor protection
system steam flow/feedwater flow channel IV
06/20/2022
Work Orders
Replace 'B' ESCW chiller hot gas bypass valve
5/3/2022
Procedures
OPT-1530
Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator Operability Test
Monthly Interval Modes: All
Rev. 010
AD-EP-ALL-0101
Emergency Classification
Rev. 3
AD-EP-ALL-0105
Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center
Rev. 8
AD-EP-HNP-
0105
Rev. 3
CSD-EP-HNP-
0101-01
EAL Technical Basis Document
Rev. 3
CSD-EP-HNP-
0101-02
EAL Wallchart
Rev. 2
Procedures
Duke Energy Common Emergency Plan
Rev. 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71151
Procedures
AD-PI-ALL-0700
Performance Indicators
Rev. 5
RAB 261 sprinkler header isolation valve found not tripped
2/29/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Unavailability exceeded on NFPA-805 monitoring PMG
01/26/2022
AD-PI-ALL-0100
Corrective Action Program
Rev. 26 and
Rev. 27
Procedures
AD-PI-ALL-0106
Cause Investigation Checklists
Rev. 7
AD-PI-ALL-0200
Performance Trending
Rev. 11
AD-PI-ALL-0300
Self-Assessment and Benchmark Programs
Rev. 5
Procedures
AD-PI-ALL-1000
Conduct of Performance Improvement
Rev. 10
Control Room Operator Logs
4/29/2022
Miscellaneous
CFR 50.72 NRC Notification of Manual Reactor Trip and
Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation
4/29/2022
Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum
Rev. 32
GP-006
Normal Plant Shutdown From Power Operation to Hot
Standby (Mode 1 to Mode 3)
Rev. 97
OMM-004
Post Trip/Safeguards Actuation Review
Rev. 43
Procedures
Main Condenser Air Removal System
Rev. 47