ML19326E210

Significant Deficiency Rept Re Centrifugal Charging Pump Operation Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture, Initially Reported 800617.Inadequate Min Flow May Result in Degraded Pump Performance.Westinghouse Reviewing Problem

ML19326E210
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	07/17/1980
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:
References
SD-413-414-80, SD-413-414-80-0, NUDOCS 8007280501
Download: ML19326E210 (2)

Text

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,3 DUKE POWER COM PANY Powen Dt;ttntyo 422 Sourn Citt acu STREET, CHARI.OTTE, N. C. 282 C wtu1 AM O. PA R M C A, s f%, July 17, 1980

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Unit; I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.55e, please find attached 31;;nificant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/S0-GS.

Very truly yours, G -v l .6 ,L E e William O. Parker, Jr. , p[

RWO:scs Attachment cc: Director G. F. Ma::well Office of Inspection and Enforcement NRC - Catawba Nuclear Station 30/'l s

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80072so5b/

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DUKF '.'0WER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 & 2

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Repcet Number: SD-413/414/80-08 Report Date: July 17, 1980 Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2

Reference:

Westinghouse letter NS-TMA-2245, May 8, 1980, from T. M. Anderson to V. Stello (copy attached)

Description of Deficiency:

On June 17, 1930, Mr. W. H. Bradley and Mr. R. E. Miller advised Mr. J. K. Rausch of the NRC of the following deficiency.

See referenced Westinghouse letter NS-TMA-2245. Duke Power Company has performed a specific analysis for Catawba which indicates that the potential does exist for inadequate minimum flow with consequential damage to one or both centrifugal charging pumps following a secondary side high energy line rupture.

Analysis of Safety Implications:

Inadequate minimum flow through the centrifugal charging pumps may result in degraded performance or loss of function of one or both pumps. This in turn may adversely impact long-term recovery operations for the initiating event and is not permitted by design criteria.

Corrective Action:

Westinghouse is currently studying this problem to determine an appropriate permanent solution. Westinghouse has recommended two possible interim solutions to the problem as described in the referenced letter NS-TMA-2245. Duke Power Company is awaiting confirmed analytical results supporting acceptability of those solutions with regard to impact on consequences of various accidents which initiate safety injection and are sensitive to centrifugal charging pump flow delivery. A permanent solution to the problem will be implemented upon Westinghouse completion of their study of alternatives. If a permanent solution has not been reached prior to fuel loading then an interim solution will be implemented. A follow-up report will be provided prior to fuel loading.

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]@ 9000g g g \ D p % 1.3 NS-TMA-2245 Mr. V. Stello, O rec +'

Office of Inspece. n and Enforcement U. S. !!uclear Regula: ry Cccaission 1717 H Street .

• Washington, D. C. 2055S

Subject:

Centrifugal Charging Puma Cperation Folicwing Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture

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Dear Mr. Stallo:

This letter is to confirm the telephone conversatien of May 8,1980 between Westinghouse anc tr. Ed Blackwccc of Divisicn of Reactor 0;eraticns Ins:sc:icn, Office of Ins:cc:icn and Enforcement, regarcing notificaticn made pursuant to Title 10 CFR ?ar: 21. -

A review of the '<lestinghouse Safety Injecticn (S!) Termination Criteria

1. following a sec:ncary side hign energy line ruo:ure (feedline cr s:eamline rupture .at high ini:ial pcwer leveis) nas revealed a Octential for conse-

• quential c27 age cf one or more centrifugai :narging purcs (CC?s) cefere the SI tarmina:icn cri:eria are satisfied anc CCP operaticn termina:ec.

Such consecuan:121 camage may acversely imcact icng-term recovery caeraticns for the initiating even; and is not permittac by design criteria. This concern exists f:r plants wnich utilize One CCFs as Emergency C:re Ccoling System (ECCS) ;;mos, wnere ne CC?s are au::~.atically startec, anc wnere the CCP ninifl:w iscia:ica valves are auc:matically isolatec ucen safety injection initiation. A :acnment A identifies :lants :c:entially subjec :: :nis concerr. A su=ary of he concern anc rec:=encations follow.

Following a secondary side high energy line ructure and associated reactor trip, Reac:cr Ccclan System (RCS) pressure anc tercerature initially decrease.

Safety injecti:n is ac uated and the CCFs s: art to increase RCS invent ry.

Reactor C: clan: Sysum cressure and tem:erature subsecuena y increase cue to the loss of sa::ncarf inventary, s:eamline 2nd feedline isolatien, RCS inventory adcition anc reactor core cecav neat generaticn. The accident scenario may vary witn rupture si:e and s:ecific plant cesign, but it will

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develop inia a its neatup transien: with acccm:anying increase in RCS pressure.

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As RCS pressure increases, the pressuri:er scwcr-operated relief valves (PORVs) are designed to l imi t'"' PO7'@i Mj /'9DY'~TW""*"" "~

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valves are normally availableb '" .

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