ML15014A061

Notification of Potential Part 21 Re Failure of Sbm Type Switches

ML15014A061
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom, Watts Bar, Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	01/08/2015
From:	Bolt T AZZ Incorporated
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
50726
Download: ML15014A061 (6)

Text

0110812015 Paop I 010/05U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com isnkif Onerazions Center Event Report Pnoop I Part 21 (PAR) Event # 50726 Rep Org: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS INC. Notification Date / Time: 01/08/2015 18:42 (EST)

Supplier: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS INC. Event Date / Time: 01/08/2015 (CST)

Last Modification: 01/08/2015 Region: 4 Docket #:

City: FORT WORTH Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: TX NRC Notified by: TRACY BOLT Notifications: DON JACKSON RI DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF ROTTON MICHAEL F. KING R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY GREG PICK R4DO 10 CFR Section: PART 21 GROUP EMAIL 21.21 (d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE POTENTIAL FAILURE OF SBM TYPE SWITCHES The following is a summary of information that was provided by the reporting organization via facsimile:

"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (b), AZZ - NLI [AZZ - Nuclear Logistics Inc.] has provided written notification to the affected licensees of the potential failure of GEH SBM type switches manufactured (by GEH) [General Electric -

Hitachi] in the period from January 2012 to December 2014.

"This condition has been reported in GEH document SC 14-19 (dated Dec. 11, 2014) in which GEH notified their affected licensees of the potential failure of SBM type switches, manufactured and shipped January 2012 through December 2014, due to incorrect installation of a conical spring. AZZ - NLI procured and dedicated commercial grade SBM type switches, manufactured during this time-frame, and subsequently provided to: Exelon - Peach Bottom; OPPD - Fort Calhoun; TVA- Watts Bar; KHNP [Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power].

"On the basis of our evaluation, it is determined that AZZ - NLI does not have sufficient information to determine if the subject condition would, or has, created a Substantial Safety Hazard or would have created a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications.

"Therefore, purchasers are being advised to perform a visual inspection of the switches at the earliest opportunity to determine if the condition exists.

"The following information is provided per 10CFR 21.21(d) (4). Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance, AZZ - Nuclear Logistics Inc., 7410 Pebble Drive, Ft. Worth, TX 76118"

0110812015 17:39 fAX) P.001/005 AZZ I NLI 7410 Pebble Drive Fort Wodh, Texas 76118 PH (817) 284-0077

(~?Azz NUCLEAR Fax (817)590-0484 Fax NRC Operations Center From Tracy Bolt - Director of Quality Assurance Fax: 301-816-6151 Pagesi 5 Phone: 301-816-5100 Date 8 January2015 NO: NRC Operations Center M.=

o Urfent 0 For Review 13 Please Comment [ PNeeme Reply 03 Pleai Recycle AZZINLI Contact email: tracybolt~azz.com

0110812015 17:40 1FA) P.0021005 GAZZ NUCL~EAR January 08, 2015 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Report No: P21-01072015. Report of potential failure of GE Hitachi (GEH) SBM type Switches per 10CFR Part 21 Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (b), AZZINLI has provided written notification to the affected licensees of the potential failure of GEH SBM type switches manufactured (by GEH) in the period from January 2012 to December 2014.

This condition has been reported in GEH document SC 14-19 (dated Dec. 11, 2014) in which GEH notified their affected licensees of the potential failure of SBM type switches, manufactured and shipped January 2012 through December 2014, due to incorrect installation of a conical spring (see Figure 1). AZZINLI procured and dedicated commercial grade SBM type switches, manufactured during this time-frame, and subsequently provided to:

• Exelon - Peach Bottom

• OPPD - Fort Calhoun

• TVA- Watts Bar

" KHNP On the basis of our evaluation, it is determined that AZZINLI does not have sufficient information to determine if the subject condition would, or has, created a Substantial Safety Hazard or would have created a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications.

Therefore, purchasers are being advised to perform a visual inspection of the switches at the earliest opportunity to determine if the condition exists.

The following information is provided per 10CFR 21.21 (d) (4).

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance AZZ I Nuclear Logistics Inc.

7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 AZZ Nuclear I NLI 7410 Pebble Drive I Fort Worth, TX 76118 I Phone: 800.448.4124 I Fax: 817.590.0484 I azznuclear.com/nli

0110812015 17:40 P.0031005 Page 2 of 4 (ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The specific part which has the potential failure:

GEH SBM type switches provided in a variety of configurations used for low voltage DC switching applications. GEH has attributed the root cause of this spring orientation condition to a change in sub-supplier for the contact carrier assembly.

This change in sub-supplier occurred in 2011 and GEH received shipment of switches with the change in sub supplier no earlier than January 2012.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Commercial grade GEH SBM type switches procured from December 2012 through May 2014 and dedicated for Safety Related use by AZZ I NLI.

(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

The cause of the failure was incorrect installation of a conical spring, which subsequently shifted and resulted in the switch failure. GEH determined that SBM switches shipped in the period from January 2012 to December 2014 may have the subject condition.

AZZINLI does not have sufficient information to determine if the subject condition would, or has, created a Substantial Safety Hazard or would have created a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications.

The GEH notification (document Sc 14-19) was not provided to AZZINLI, since AZZINLI does not procure SBM type switches from GEH as a basic component.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

On December 23, 2014, AZZINLI was initially notified of the GEH documentation regarding the potential failure of SMB type switches via email from an affected licensee in receipt of the GEH documentation.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or falls to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

01/0812015 17:40 P.0041005 Page 3 of 4 NL[ has supplied the same GEH SBM type switches, shipped by GEH from January 2012 through December 2014, to OPPD - Fort Calhoun, TVA - Watts Bar, Exelon -

Peach Bottom and KHNP.

The following switch serial numbers are listed for inspection:

Licensee \ Plant Quantity Serial Number Name KHNP 2 39246-005-00001, 39246-005-00002 OPPD- 9 40447-001-00001, 40447-001-00002,40447-001-Fort Calhoun 00003, 40447-001-00004, 40447-001-00005, 40447-002-00002, 40447-002-00003, 52257-001-00001, 52257-001-00002 Exelon - 10 58122-002-00002, 58122-001-00001, 58122-001-Peach Bottom 00002, 58122-001-00003, 58122-004-00001, 58122-004-00002, 58122-004-00003, 58122-004-00004, 58122-003-00001, 59062-001-00001 TVA-Watts Bar 2 50773-001-00002, 50773-001-00003 (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

Action Responsible Orgnization Status Document issue via NCR AZZ I NLI Quality Assurance Complete Review GEH failure analysis AZZ I NLI Quality Assurance Comrlete Identify extent of condition AZZ I NLI Quality Assurance Complete Place existing stock on hold AZZ I NLI Quality Assurance Complete Evaluate and revise as necessary AZZ I NLI Engineering Pending AZZ I NLI SBM switch Verification Plan(s)

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

NLI recommends that all identified GEH SBM type switches be inspected at the next available interval (as determined by the plant) to verify the spring orientation.

Licensees may request further guidance from AZZJNLI regarding inspection methodology.

0110812015 17:41 P.0051005 Page 4 of 4 Eith 4aaeI Figure 1 jj tIUMW Contacts nq Conical Spring Orientation Please contact me with any questions or comments.

Director of Quality Assurance