ML16281A270
| ML16281A270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley, Hatch, Calvert Cliffs, Davis Besse, Browns Ferry, Oconee, Mcguire, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Hope Creek, Three Mile Island, Seabrook, Turkey Point, River Bend, Callaway, South Texas, San Onofre, Fort Calhoun, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/2016 |
| From: | Bolt T AZZ Nuclear Logistics |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML16281A270 (10) | |
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0912212016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Pagel Part 21 (PAR) Event# J 51923 Rep Org: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC. Notification Date I Time: 05/12/2016 19:23 (EDT)
Supplier: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC. Event Date I Time: 05/10/2016 (CDT)
Last Modification: 09/22/2016 Region: 4 Docket#:
City: FORT WORTH Agreement State: Yes County: License #:
State: TX NRC Notified by: TRACY BOLT Notifications: ART BURRITT R1DO HQ Ops Officer: VINCE KLCO JAMIE HI;::ISSERER R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY ERIC DUNCAN R3DO 10 CFR Section: VIVIAN CAMPBELL R4DO 21.21(d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL PART 21 - INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF MASTERPACT BREAKER FAIL TO CLOSE The following information was a licensee received facsimile; "Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply.
"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.
"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21 (d}(4):
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118
"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"Masterpact NT and NW style circuit breakers.
-The failure of the breaker being ready to electrically close after being subjected to an 'Anti-Pump condition'. £/CJ
. L~~
0912212016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 Note: The specific application where the failures have occurred is when the breaker is being utilized as a starter for closing into an inductive load like a fan motor.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
AZ.ZI Nuclear Logistics Fort Worth, Texas 76118
"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.
"PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load.
"NLI inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the plant. NLI was only able to repeat the failure to close when performing an 'anti-pump' test. The failure to close was intermittent, but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shunt trip assemblies.
"Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NWOS breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be the root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure.
When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger, it will 'rock' up in the rear, catching on the top of. the mechanism plate. Once the close voltage is removed, and the plunger retracts, the latch. may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the plunger, the breaker will not close.
"PSEG performed extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"This revised notification is being submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing, at the request of River Bend, was performed. This additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the original issue of this letter in February 2016.
"The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that time to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only l::leen reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope Creek and River Bend Station. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted. The two affected plants were knowledgeable of the condition.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations In this part.
"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers.
0912212016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page3 "PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style River Bend - Issue identified for NT style Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated.
Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified.
"(vii) The corrective action which bas been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 will be revised, as the proposed solution will not reliably solve the problem for all postulated events. Upon completion of the revised technical bulletin, it will be re-submitted to the plants which have been supplied the Masterpact breakers from NLI.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"NLI is currently working with the OEM of the circuit breaker to determine the permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event after the breaker is subjected to an Anti-Pump condition.
"Advice for plants with breakers currently installed: Evaluate the applications where the breakers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition; where the close coil will be energized for an extended period of time.
"The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism.
"Please contact NU with any questions or comments.
Sincerely, Tracy Bolt Director of Quality Assurance"
- UPDATE ON 5/13/16 AT 1153 EDT FROM TRACY BOLT TO BETHANY CECERE***
"Added 4 additional plants that were inadvertently left off the list.
"Browns Ferry - This iss1,1e has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Wolf Creek - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Seabrook - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated."
Notified R1 DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Campbell), and Part 21 Group via email.
- UPDATE AT 1612 EDT ON 7/13/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA***
0912212016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page4 The following information was received via facsimile:
Additional information in attachment has been updated since the original report provided on 5/13/2016.
Additional facility identified as impacted:
St. Lucie - Issue identified For additional information contact:
Tracy Bolt Director of Quality Assurance AZZ/NU Nuclear Logistics 7410 Pebble Drive Fort Worth, Texas 76118 Notified the R1 DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Rich), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).
- UPDATE AT 1907 EDT ON 9/22/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA***
"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.
"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers:
"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style River Bend - Issue identified for NT style Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie - This issue has been identified.
Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Hatch - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
- KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU). This issue has not been identified.
Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Wolf Creek This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Seabrook This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
"NU originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations.* However, since new information has been recently identified, NU TB-12-007 has been revised. The solution for this potential problem is to replace the XF (shunt close assembly) with the XFCOM shunt close assembly.
"The part numbers are:
847323 (100-130VAC/DC) 847324 (200-240VAC/DC)
Additional details regarding the replacement device are contained in the NU technical bulletin TB-12-007."
Notified the R1 DO (Krohn), R2DO (Blarney), R3DO (Jeffers), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21 Reactor group (via
0912212016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page5 email).
09/22/2016 18:04 (FAX) P.0011005 IJJ:Azz NL I' Date: 9/22/2016 To:
FAX (301) 816-5151 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 From:
Tracy Bolt Director of Quality Assurance AZZJNLI Nuclear Logistics 7410 Pebble Drive.
Fort Worth, Texas 76118 Total pages including this page: .....;:5;;...._._
Subject:
Report of IOCFR Part 21 condition Masterpact Breaker Fail to Close
Reference:
Part 21 Report No: P21-02152016, Rev. 3 Event/Accession Number: ML16139A832 NUCl.EAR LOGISTICS INC. www.azz.com 74*10 Pebble Drive
- Fort Worth, Texas 76"1'!8
- 800.448.4124 Phone
- 8'17.590.0484 Fax
09/22/2016 18:04 (f141.) P.002/005 hAZZ NL I' Date: September 22, 2016 To: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Fax 301-816~5151 From: Tracy Bolt AZZ I NLI Director of Quality Assurance Part 21 Report No: P21-02152016, Rev. 3 Update - Reference NRC Notification Event Number: 51923
Subject:
Notification of 10CFR Part 21 condition, Masterpact Breaker Fail to Close Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (d) (3) (ii), AZZINLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply.
On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.
The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21 (d) (4).
(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance Nuclear Logistics, Inc 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 (ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect, Masterpact NT and NW style Electrically/Remotely operated circuit breakers.
A potential issue of failure to reclose following a command to open electrically has been identified. The failure to reclose electrically/remotely may occur when a close signal of greater than 200mS is applied while the breaker is charging the closing springs and/or a breaker open signal from the shunt trip is received while the close circuit is still energized.
Note: The closing springs electrically charge automatically each time after the breaker closes.
This identified condition is not applicable to manual only circuit breakers.
Page 1of4 NUCLEAR LOGISTICS INC. www.azz:.com*
7410 Pebble Drive
- Fort Worth, Texas 76118
- 800.446.4124 Phone
- 8*17.590.0484 Fax
09/22/2016 18:05 P.003/005 (in") Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
AZZ [ Nuclear Logistics Fort Worth, Texas 76118 (iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
Possible "failure to close" condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW stylet that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to "anti~pwnp" conditions during nonnal operation or are having the close command maintained for greater than 200mS while the closing springs are being charged, have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.
Testing by Schneider Electric confinned that the condition may exist if the breaker has a standing close signal during the few seconds of charging the closing springs following an electrical command to close.
PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close command, and the breakers failed to close.
NL! inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the-plant. NLI was only.able to repeat the failure to close when performing an **anti-pump" test. The failure to close was intermittent. but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shWlt trip assemblies.
Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NW08 breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be one root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure.
When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger; it will "rock" up in the rear1 catching on the top of the mechanism plate. Once *the close voltage is removed~ and the plunger retracts, the latch may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the plunger, the breaker will not close.
PSEG perfonned extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close.
The anti-pump condition is present when the close signal remains present after closing and during the time that the breaker receives a command to open electrically.
Page 2 of4
09/22/2016 18:05 P.0041005 Possible scenarios for the circuit breaker to be more susceptible to the condition:
- The closing circuit is continually energized during charge and or open operations.
- Anti~Pump condition is present.
- The breaker receives a command to open electrically before or at the same time the close command is initiated.
- A remote closing action by an operator that may hold the close signal for a duration longer than 200 mS which would extend into the charging cycle.
- A logic scheme that would have a component controlling the close circuit that would apply the voltage to the close coil for a duration longer than 200mS which would extend into the charging cycle.
(v) Tbe date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
Revision 2 of this notification was submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing by the request ruverbend was perfonned. The additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the original issue of this letter in February 2016.
The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that ti.me to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only been reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope CreekJ River Bend Station and St. Lucie. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted.
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or falls to comply, the number and location of tbesc components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or* more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
- Plantswhichhave been SUDO.rledthe Mastemact crrcutt. hreakers.
Plant Name Notes PSEG Hope Creek Issue Identified for NW stvle River Bend Issue identified for NT style Callaway This issue has not been identified however. the notential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie This issue has been identified.
Turkey Point This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley This issue has not been identified however, the notential should be evaJuated.
Davis Besse This issue has not been identified however; the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island This issue has not been identified however, the ootential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs This issue has not been identified however. the notential should be evaluated.
Hatch This issue has not been identified however, the notential should be evaluated.
Page 3of4
0912212016 18:06 (FAX) P.0051005 STP This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNPUlchin This issue has not been identified however, the ootential should be evaluated.
kHNPKori This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee This issue h~ not been identified however, the ootential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire Non-safetv (not sunnlied by NLI). This issue has not been identified.
Browns FeTTJ1 This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Fort Calhoun This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Wo((Creek This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Seabrook This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
(vii) The corrective action which has been, fl being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time thflt has been or will be taken to complete the action.
NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations.
However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 has been revised. The sQlution for this potential problem is to replace the XF (shunt close assembly) with the XFCOM shunt close assembly.
- The part numbers are:
847323 (100-130VAC/DC)
S4 7324 (200-240VAC/DC)
Additional details regarding the replacement device are contained in the NLI technical bulletin TB~ 12-007.
(viii) Any. advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility; activity, or basic component that has been, ls being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
The permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event has been identified
_above.
- Advice for plants with breakers currently installed:
Evaluate the applications where the br~ers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition or where the close coil will be energized for greater than 200mS while the closing springs are being charged.
The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism.
- zz;~oMmoonun~.
Trocy'-45; .'.
Director of QUality Assurance Page 4of4