ML092680569

09/02/09 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Between NRC Staff and NPPD, Related to a Clarification for Certain Responses to Requests for Additional Information, for Cooper Nuclear Station License Renewal

ML092680569
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	10/08/2009
From:	Tam Tran License Renewal Projects Branch 1
To:	Minahan S Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
tran t, NRR/DLR/RPB1, 415-3617
References
Download: ML092680569 (11)

Text

October 8, 2009 LICENSEE: Nebraska Public Power District

FACILITY: Cooper Nuclear Station Power Plant

SUMMARY

OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON SEPTEMBER 2, 2009, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF AND NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, RELATED TO A CLARIFICATION FOR CERTAIN RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, FOR COOPER NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff and representatives of Nebraska Public Power District held a telephone conference call on September 2, 2009, to discuss clarifications for certain responses to requests for additional information for Cooper Nuclear Station license renewal. Enclosure 1 provides a listing of the participants and Enclosure 2 contains a brief description of the conference call.

The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

/RA/ Tam Tran, Project Manager Projects Branch 1 Division of License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-298

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/encls: See next page

ML092680569 OFFICE LA:DLR PM:RPB1:DLR PM:RPB1:DLR BC:RPB1:DLR PM:RPB1:DLR NAME S. Figueroa T. Tran B. Brady B. Pham T. Tran (Signature) DATE 10/01/09 10/01/09 10/05/09 10/06/09 10/08/09 Memorandum to Nebraska Public Power District from Tam Tran dated October 8, 2009

SUMMARY

OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON SEPTEMBER 2, 2009, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF AND NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, RELATED TO A CLARIFICATION FOR CERTAIN RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, FOR COOPER NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL DISTRIBUTION

HARD COPY: DLR RF E-MAIL: PUBLIC RidsNrrDlr Resource RidsNrrDlrRpb1 Resource RidsNrrDlrRpb2 Resource RidsNrrDlrRer1 Resource RidsNrrDlrRer2 Resource RidsNrrDlrRerb Resource RidsNrrDlrRpob Resource RidsNrrDciCvib Resource RidsNrrDciCpnb Resource RidsNrrDciCsgb Resource RidsNrrDraAfpb Resource RidsNrrDraApla Resource RidsNrrDeEmcb Resource RidsNrrDeEeeb Resource RidsNrrDssSrxb Resource RidsNrrDssSbpb Resource RidsNrrDssScvb Resource RidsOgcMailCenter Resource ------------- T. Tran G. Miller (RIV) E. Sayoc G. Pick (RIV) B. Brady F. Lyon I. Couret D. Roth (OGC) A. Jones (OGC) N. Taylor (RIV) E. Collins (RIV) C. Casto (RIV)

B. Maier (RIV) V. Dricks (RIV) D. Chamberlain (RIV) A. Vegel (RIV) W. Walker (RIV)

ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL COOPER NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION September 2, 2009 PARTICIPANTS AFFILIATIONS Tam Tran U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) S. Min NRC F. Farzam NRC Bill Victor, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)

Jim Loynes NPPD Ken Thomas NPPD Dave Lach Entergy Alan Cox Entergy Reza Ahrabli Entergy Jacque Lingenfelter Entergy

ENCLOSURE 2 COOPER NUCLEAR STATION POWER PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION (Brief description of the conference call)

A. Scoping and Screening of Structure

Regarding RAI 2.4-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17 which was issued to the applicant on July 14, 2009 (ML091880476) and responded by the applicant on August 13, 2009 (ML092400412), the staff asked for further clarification on the appropriateness and adequacy of the scoping and screening of relevant structures and components for aging management review. The staff requested the following clarifications and associated available documentation:

RAI 2.4-1 In the applicant's RAI response (ML092400412), the base plate and anchors are in scope. Why is the rest of the crane not in scope?

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

The jib crane and its associated trolley located in the reactor building are used to move control rod drives when maintenance is required during an outage. The crane does not lift loads over safety-related equipment. It is built of a pipe column seismically anchored to the operating floor. The crane cannot break loose and damage any safety-related equipment on any of the different levels below it during an earthquake. Thus, its failure could not prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii) of 10 CFR 54.4.

RAI 2.4-2 Is sliding support plate only used for torus? Is it included in A.1.1.36, "Structures Monitoring Program"?

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

Sliding supports are used for torus support only. For license renewal, the aging management program (AMP) credited for these supports, is the ISI-IWF Program as indicated in LRA Table 3.5.2-1 (Reactor Building and Primary Containment), line item "Torus external supports (saddles, columns)".

RAI 2.4-3 In the applicant's RAI response, the intake structure crane is addressed in LRA Section 2.4.2, "Water Control Structures." It is nonsafety-related, and located away from safety-related systems and components when not in use." Could its failure affect any safety system when in use?

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

The intake structure crane, when in use, generally travels over nonsafety-related SSCs. However, if needed, it can also travel over safety-related components (i.e., service water pumps) using a safe load path established through engineering evaluation. The intake structure crane lifts the service water pump and motor parts out of individual hatches above the service water pump room when maintenance is required. Removal through the hatches follows a safe load path which prevents one pump being lifted above another. Procedural controls prevent lifting service water pump or motor parts where a load drop could result in damage to the other service water pumps or other safety-related equipment. Safety-related service water pumps are housed in seismic class I structure within the intake structure. As a Class I structure, the structure is designed to withstand impact of the crane in case of potential failure of the crane. Thus, its failure could not prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii) of 10 CFR 54.4.

RAI 2.4-4 Why are the trash racks are not in scope. Wouldn't their failure affect the function of the in scope traveling screens and have cascading effect on function of the safety-related system and components (i.e., service water system)? Your response does not say that. Please explain.

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

The trash racks, nonsafety-related components, are installed about 10 feet in front of traveling screens toward the Missouri River. They protect the traveling screens from debris larger than 3 inches. Traveling screens are in scope due to their potential for structural interaction and not for system function. Although, catastrophic failure of the trash racks is not anticipated, their failure would not have a cascading effect on providing adequate water supply to the service water pumps. Thus, in the remote chance of total failure of the trash racks, their failure could not prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii) of 10 CFR 54.4.

RAI 2.4-5 In the applicant's RAI response, the gate is not subject to aging management review because it is an active component. Is the gate a hinged door similar to a fire door? By comparing its function to a fire door (which is in scope), the gate seems should also be included in scope. Please explain.

The gate is not a hinged door. It is rather a guillotine type door which slides into grooves integral to the guide wall, and is removed or set in place by a barge crane. For scoping and screening purpose, its function can be compared to that of a fire damper. Its position has to be changed to perform its intended function, thus it is not subject to aging management review (STAMR). However, its frame assembly is within the scope of license renewal and STAMR. This is consistent with the treatment of fire dampers.

RAI 2.4-7 In the applicant's RAI response, rip-rap is provided as a secondary measure to minimize erosion in the area of the foundation, which is not a required safety function. Please elaborate as to why it is secondary measure and what is the primary measure.

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

As described in CNS USAR Section XII-2.2.7.1, a ten foot deep concrete skirt, plus sheet piling down to bedrock, is installed along the river face as an integral part of the bottom slab. Rip-rap is placed in front of the intake structure along the floor of the forebay and along the adjoining banks to supplement the skirt and sheet piling in providing scour protection. Thus, the concrete skirt and the sheet piling down to bedrock provide the primary scour protection.

RAI 2.4-9 LRA Section A.1.1.36 does not include "beams, columns, floor slabs, and interior walls." Please explain.

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

LRA Section A.1.1.36 identifies the enhancements and lists those items that are not specifically identified in the established Structures Monitoring Program (SMP). Beams, columns, floor slabs, and interior walls are already specified in the SMP, thus they are not listed in the enhancement in LRA Section A.1.1.36.

RAI 2.4-10 In the applicant's RAI response, the roofing membrane is nonsafety-related and it does not have any intended function. Its failure could cause degradation of decking and water leak in the room and on equipment below. So, please explain why the roof membrane shouldn't be in scope.

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

Roofing materials provide protection of equipment from the elements to protect the utility investment in equipment contained within plant structures.

During the operating experience review for the CNS license renewal project, several occurrences of leaking roof membrane were identified, none of which affected the operability of equipment relied on to accomplish any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii) of 10 CFR 54.4. This operating experience provides additional confirmation that a leaking roof will not prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii) of 10 CFR 54.4.

Therefore, roofing materials do not perform an intended function identified in 10 CFR 54.4 (a) and are not in the scope of license renewal and subject to aging management review.

RAI 2.4-11 In the applicant's RAI response, "other subcomponents, specifically hoists and associated hardware, are supported by the structural components included under crane rails and girders. These subcomponents do not support a license renewal intended function identified in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(l), (a)(2), or (a)(3)." However, Table 2.2-3 shows hoists as in scope within line item "cranes, Trolleys, Monorails and Hoists." Please explain.

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

The RAI response will be restated. The response to RAI should be clarified to read as follows: "As indicated in LRA Table 2.2-3, cranes, trolleys, monorails and hoists are evaluated as structural components or commodities of the structure in which they are located. Accordingly, the turbine building crane and its subcomponents (including bridge, trolley, hoists, hardware, rails and girders), which are in the scope of the LRA and subject to AMR license renewal, are evaluated in Section 2.4.3, "Turbine Building, Process Facilities and Yard Structures,." And are included within the LRA Table 2.4

-3 Steel and Other Metals line item "Crane rails and girders In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)(i), hoists are not listed in LRA Table 2.4-3 Steel and Other Metals line item "Crane rails and girders" as subject to aging management review because they perform their function with moving parts. The associated bolting is evaluated as a bulk commodity in Section 2.4.4, "Bulk Commodities,"

and is included in LRA Table 2.4-4 Bolted connections line item "Structural bolting." Other subcomponents, specifically hoists and associated hardware, are supported by the structural components included under crane rails and girders. These subcomponents do not support a license renewal intended function identified in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3)If associated structural crane rails, girders, and bolting perform their intended functions, the hoists will not be a hazard to nearby equipment. RAI 2.4-16 According to CNS USAR, the optimum water chemistry gas generator (OWCGG) building is a Class II structure which seems should be in scope of license renewal. Please explain.

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

As indicated in CNS USAR Section XII-2.1, the Class II structural design criteria apply to structures, equipment, and components which are important to reactor operation, but are not essential for preventing an accident which would endanger the public health and safety, and are not required for the mitigation of the consequences of these accidents. Accordingly, OWCGG is categorized as Class II, and its failure would not prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii) of 10 CFR 54.4.

RAI 2.4-17 In your response you say missile shielding for high energy line break (HELB), is included within the LRA Table 2.4-4 line item "Missile shields." However, according to table 2.0-1, the intended function for "HELB barrier" is "EN" and for "missile barrier" is MB. Please explain.

The applicant provided the following clarifications:

Table 2.0-1 provides the list of individual intended functions and their abbreviations referenced in tables 2.4-X and 3.5-X. As shown in table 2.0-1, the intended function for "HELB barrier" is EN and for "missile barrier" is MB. Missile shields perform both of these functions. In Tables 2.4-4 and 3.5-4, concrete missile shields are listed only with MB intended function while steel missile shields are listed with intended functions EN and MB. Listing the EN function for steel missile shields is appropriate since steel structures are used for HELB barriers.

Cooper Nuclear Station cc: Mr. Ronald D. Asche President and Chief Executive Officer Nebraska Public Power District 1414 15th Street Columbus, NE 68601 Mr. Gene Mace Nuclear Asset Manager Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 98 Brownville, NE 68321 Mr. John C. McClure Vice President and General Counsel Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 499 Columbus, NE 68602-0499 Mr. David Van Der Kamp Licensing Manager Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 98 Brownville, NE 68321

Mr. Michael J. Linder, Director Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality P.O. Box 98922 Lincoln, NE 68509-8922

Chairman Nemaha County Board of Commissioners Nemaha County Courthouse 1824 N Street Auburn, NE 68305 Ms. Julia Schmitt, Manager Radiation Control Program Nebraska Health & Human Services R&L Public Health Assurance 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, NE 68509-5007 Deputy Director for Policy Missouri Department of Natural Resources P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0176 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 218 Brownville, NE 68321 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4125

Director, Missouri State Emergency Management Agency P.O. Box 116 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0116

Chief, Radiation and Asbestos Control Section Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of Air and Radiation 1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310 Topeka, KS 66612-1366 Ms. Melanie Rasmussen Radiation Control Program Director Bureau of Radiological Health Iowa Department of Public Health Lucas State Office Building, 5th Floor 321 East 12th Street Des Moines, IA 50319 Mr. Keith G. Henke, Planner Division of Community and Public Health Office of Emergency Coordination 930 Wildwood Drive P.O. Box 570 Jefferson City, MO 65102

Cooper Nuclear Station cc: Mr. Art Zaremba, Director of Nuclear Safety Assurance Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 98 Brownville, NE 68321 Mr. John F. McCann, Director Licensing, Entergy Nuclear Northeast Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601-1813 Mr. Mike Boyce Cooper Strategic Initiatives Manager Cooper Nuclear Station 72676 - 648A Avenue Brownville, NE 68321 Mr. Dave Bremer License Renewal Project Manager Cooper Nuclear Station 72676 - 648A Avenue Brownville, NE 68321

Mr. Bill Victor License Renewal Project Licensing Lead Cooper Nuclear Station 72676 - 648A Avenue Brownville, NE 68321

Mr. Jim Loynes License Renewal Project Engineer Cooper Nuclear Station 72676 - 648A Avenue Brownville, NE 68321 Mr. Garry Young License Renewal Manager Entergy Nuclear 1448 S.R. 333, N-GSB-45 Russellville, AR 72802

Mr. Alan Cox License Renewal Technical Manager Entergy Nuclear 1448 S.R. 333, N-GSB-45 Russellville, AR 72802 Mr. Dave Lach LRP Entergy Project Manager Entergy Nuclear 1448 S.R. 333, N-GSB-45 Russellville, AR 72802 Mr. Stewart B. Minahan Vice President Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer Cooper Nuclear Station 72676 - 648A Avenue Brownville, NE 68321