IR 05000277/2016007
| ML16074A290 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/2016 |
| From: | Halter M K Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| Halter M K | |
| References | |
| Download: ML16074A290 (22) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 March 14, 2016
Mr. Bryan Hanson Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000277/2016007AND 05000278/2016007
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On February 12, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 12, 2016, with Mr. Michael Massaro, Peach Bottom Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC's Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/ Mandy K. Halter, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000277/2016007 and 05000278/2016007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
ML16074A290 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME JAyala/JA DSchroeder/DS MHalter/MH DATE 03/11/2016 03/14/2016 03/14/2016 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket Nos.: 50-277 and 50-278 License Nos.: DPR-44 and DPR-56 Report Nos.: 05000277/2016007 and 05000278/2016007
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Location: Delta, Pennsylvania
Inspection Period: January 25, 2016 through February 12, 2016 Inspectors: J. Ayala, Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
Team Leader K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS
Approved By: Mandy K. Halter, Chief Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
IR 05000277/2016007 and 05000278/2016007; 01/25/16 - 02/12/16; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3; Engineeri ng Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection.
This report covers a two week inspection of the evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by three region based engineering inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5, dated February 2014.
No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (IP 71111.17)
.1 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (27 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed nine safety evaluations to evaluate whether the changes to the facility or procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59 requirements. In addition, the team evaluated whether Exelon had been required to obtain U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval prior to implementing the changes. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting information including calculations, analyses, design change documentation, procedures, the UFSAR, Technical Specifications (TS), and plant drawings to assess the adequacy of the safety evaluations. The team compared the safety evaluations and supporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," Revision 1, as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluations.
The team also reviewed a sample of eighteen 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and applicability determinations for which Exelon had concluded that no safety evaluation was required.
These reviews were performed to assess whether Exelon's threshold for performing safety evaluations was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample included design changes, calculations, procedure changes, and setpoint changes. The screenings and applicability determinations were selected based on the safety significance, risk significance, and complexity of the change to the facility.
In addition, the team compared Exelon's administrative procedures used to control the screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to determine whether those procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The reviewed safety evaluations, screenings, and applicability determinations are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Permanent Plant Modifications (9 samples)
.2.1 Unit 3 High Pressure Service Water Pump Motor Oil Coolers Replacement
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification ECP-14-00317 that replaced the Unit 3 high pressure service water pump (HPSW) motor oil coolers. Based on Peach Bottom Unit 2 HPSW system operating experience, engineering recommended a proactive replacement of the HPSW pump motor oil cooler cooling coils. Engineering determined that corrosion had caused a cooling coil leak on the 2B HPSW pump motor in October 2013 and developed the modification to replace the pre-existing copper cooling coils with upgraded stainless equivalent cooling coils. At the time of the inspection, Exelon had implemented the modification on three of the four Unit 3 HPSW pumps and planned to install the upgraded motor oil cooler in the 3D HPSW pump motor in the Fall 2016.
The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the HPSW system had not been adversely impacted by the modification. The team interviewed engineering staff and reviewed technical evaluations associated with the modification to determine if the HPSW pump motors would function in accordance with the design assumptions. The team reviewed the associated maintenance work orders to determine if Exelon appropriately implemented the modification. The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the HPSW pump motor cooling water supply and return piping and components to independently assess Exelon's configuration control, the operating environment, and the material condition of the associated structures, systems, and components (SSCs). On January 26, 2016, the team observed portions of a prolonged run on the 3B HPSW pump to independently assess pump performance, cooling system integrity, and cooling coil flow. The team reviewed the associated post maintenance test (PMT) results, recent oil sample analyses, system health reports, and recent surveillance test results to verify that the HPSW pumps functioned as designed following the modification. The team also reviewed corrective action issue reports (IRs) to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.2 Emergency Service Water Pipe Replacement
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification ECP-11-00335 that replaced a portion of the 6" emergency service water (ESW) supply piping to the E4 emergency diesel generator (EDG). Exelon replaced the ESW piping to address corrosion and wall thinning concerns. The modification also approved the use of slip-on flanges to aid in the piping
replacement.
The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and structural integrity of the ESW piping and supports had not been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers, and reviewed evaluations, pipe stress calculations, surveillance and non-destructive examination (NDE) results, and associated maintenance work orders to verify that Exelon appropriately implemented the ESW piping replacement and maintained the ESW piping in accordance with design assumptions. The team also performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the ESW system to ensure that the system configuration was in accordance with design instructions and that ESW piping integrity was maintained. The team also reviewed corrective action IRs and the ESW system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.3 Unit 3 High Pressure Service Water Cross Tie Modification
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification DCP-13-00133 that implemented physical changes to the Unit 3 HPSW cross tie motor-operated valve (MOV MO-3-32-3344) and associated discharge piping. This included replacing the MOV with a normally closed butterfly valve equipped with a motor operator sized to permit stroking of the MOV, when starting a second HPSW pump to deliver HPSW cooling water flow through a second RHR HX, to meet the extended power uprate (EPU) heat removal requirements.
The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases and licensing bases and performance capability of the HPSW system had not been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers, and reviewed calculations, evaluations, PMT results, and associated maintenance work orders to verify that Exelon implemented the modification as designed. The team also performed several walkdowns of the cross tie MOV and associated HPSW discharge piping in the Unit 3 HPSW pump room to ensure that the system configuration was in accordance with design instructions, the HPSW system integrity was maintained, and that important to safety SSCs in the vicinity were not adversely impacted. The team also reviewed corrective action IRs and system health reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.4 Core Spray Torus Pump Suction Isolation Valve MO-2-14-070 Torque Switch Bypass
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed ECR-13-00235 that electrically bypassed the torque switch in motor operated valve (MOV) operator MO-2-14-070. Valve MO-2-14-070 is the Core Spray (CS) torus water filter pump suction isolation valve. The valve is normally closed and performs an active safety function to automatically close, if in the open position, upon initiation of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to provide primary containment isolation by isolating the torus water clean-up from suppression pool inventory. The closure
prevents inadvertent draining of the suppression pool inventory. Exelon implemented the modification to ensure the valve goes closed and eliminate the possibility of the valve stroke stopping in an intermediate position.
The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of the CS system had not been degraded by the modification.
The team interviewed design engineers, and reviewed evaluations, MOV calculations, surveillance results, and associated maintenance work orders to verify that Exelon appropriately implemented the modification in accordance with design assumptions. The team also performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of CS system to independently assess Exelon's configuration control and the material condition of the CS
system. The team also reviewed correctiv e action IRs to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in Section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.5 PB 13-00433, Core Spray In-Vessel Pipe Replacement
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification ECR-13-00433 which replaced piping, supports, and mechanical joint connections inside the reactor vessel for the core spray system. The modification was performed to address degradation identified in welded sections of the piping due to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). The replacement piping and sleeve assemblies were constructed with material that is resistant to IGSCC.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design, licensing bases, and performance capability of the core spray system had been degraded by the modification.
The team reviewed calculations, licensee design documents, and associated maintenance work orders to determine if the changes were appropriately implemented.
The team also reviewed corrective action IRs to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification.
Finally, the team interviewed design engineers to determine if the changes met design and licensing requirements. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in Section 1R17.1 of this report.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.6 PB 13-00132, EPU HPSW Mod - AC Mechanical
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification ECR 13-00132 which installed manual isolation valves on a new section of HPSW piping. This modification, along with several other modifications, was performed to allow for the connection of separate trains of high pressure service water (HPSW), if needed during an event, and thereby improve the flexibility of the HPSW and residual heat removal (RHR) systems to reduce overall risk to the plant. These valves were installed to provide capability to isolate the motor operated cross connect valve for maintenance.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the HPSW or RHR system had been degraded by the modifications. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed the replacement valve design to determine if the changes were consistent with the design and licensing requirements. Additionally, the team reviewed post maintenance test (PMT) results, and associated maintenance work orders to determine if the changes were appropriately implemented and tested, in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements. The team also performed a walkdown of the valves to assess the overall material conditions of the valves, associated piping, and supports following the modification work. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2.7 PB 13-00060, Change RCIC TDH for 3% SV/SRV Tolerance Project
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification ECR 13-00060 which was performed to evaluate the impact of expanding the allowed safety relief valve operating set point tolerance range from (+/-) 1 percent to (+/-) 3 percent on the operation of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. The modification developed a flow model for the RCIC system and evaluated if design flow rates would be available at maximum reactor pressure and minimum system supply pressure. This analysis verified that if the valve did not open until reactor pressure was 103% of the safety relief valve set pressure, adequate flow, as described in the design basis of the RCIC system, would be achieved.
The team reviewed the analysis to evaluate whether the design inputs and outputs were technically reasonable. Additionally, the team reviewed calculation results to determine whether the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of RCIC system had been degraded by the modification. Specifically, the team evaluated whether the increased reactor pressure adversely affected flowrates when the RCIC pump suction was aligned to the torus. Finally, the team interviewed design engineers to determine the bases for assumptions in the calculations. The 10 CFR 50.59 process applicability determination associated with this EC was also reviewed as described in Section 1R17.1 of this report. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2.8 Add Safety Related Closed Function to RCIC Turbine Trip Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification ECR-13-00094 which added a safety related close function to the normally open Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbine trip throttle valve. The modification was performed to address the potential for a water hammer event identified through external operating experience (OE). The OE described the potential for water hammer during performance of vacuum breaker maintenance while maintaining RCIC operable. The trip throttle valve, which is a spring-to close-valve, must close with a faster stroke time than the vacuum breaker isolation valve in order to minimize the potential for water hammer. The modification was performed to ensure that the trip throttle valve closes before the vacuum breaker isolation valve.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design, licensing bases, and performance capability of the RCIC system had been degraded by the modification.
The team interviewed design engineers, and reviewed evaluations, surveillance results, and associated maintenance work orders to verify that Exelon appropriately, implemented the modification in accordance with design assumptions. The team also performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of RCIC system to independently assess Exelon's configuration control and the material condition of the RCIC system. The team also reviewed corrective action IRs and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in Section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2.9 FLEX Modification - Units 2 and 3 Diesel Fuel Oil Supply
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification ECR-13-0279 which installed piping, valves, and quick-connect coupling onto the auxiliary boiler diesel fuel oil system to support diesel-driven FLEX equipment during FLEX coping strategies. The modification was performed as a result of NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying License with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events."
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design, licensing bases, and performance capability of the EDG system had been degraded by the modification.
The team reviewed the evaluation and associated maintenance work orders to verify that Exelon appropriately implemented the modification in accordance with design assumptions. The team also reviewed corrective action IRs and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in Section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of problems that Exelon had previously identified and entered into the corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions. In addition, the team reviewed corrective action IRs written on issues identified during the inspection to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the
attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
In addition to the samples documented in this report, three additional samples were completed within the scope of this inspection procedure and documented in Section1R17 of Inspection Report 05000277/2015002 and 05000278/2015002 (ML15215A527), dated August 3, 2015. One safety evaluation, PB-2013-002-E, "EPU App R/SBO Mod - CST Standpipe," one modification ECR-12-00155, "Unit 2 EPU HPSW Mod - Electrical Scope," Revision 4, and ECR-13-00135, "Unit 2 EPU HPSW Mod - Mechanical Scope,"
and one screening PB-2014-021-S, "Unit 2 - HPSW Cross-Tie Modification," are documented in the referenced report.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
The team presented the inspection results to Mr. Mike Massaro, Site Vice President, and other members of Exelon's staff at an exit meeting on February 12, 2016. The team returned the proprietary information reviewed during the inspection to the licensee and verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Exelon Personnel
- M. Massaro, Site Vice President
- P. Navin, Plant Manager
- T. Dombach, Electrical Design Engineer
- D. Dullum, Regulatory Assurance Engineer
- D. Knepper, Senior Design Engineer
- J. Mann, Design Engineer
- J. Armstrong, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- J. Phipps, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance Team 5
NRC Personnel
- J. Heinly, Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Smith, Resident Inspector
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
CFR 50.59 Evaluations
- PB 2013-010E, ISFSI Floor Load Analysis and Modifications 50.59 Evaluation, dated 12/10/13
- PB-2013-006E, Control Room Habitability Program Changes due to Construction of an Offsite Power Plant, Revision 0
- PB-2014-002E, Reactor Feedpump Turbine Replacement - Electric/ Instrumentation, Revision 0
- PB-2014-004-E, Allowance of Synthetic Roundslings for NUREG 0612 Heavy Load Lifts 50.59 Evaluation, dated 7/18/14
- PB-2014-005E, Surveillance Interval Change of the 4KV Undervoltage Relays and LOCA LOOP Functional Test, Revision 0
- PB-2015-002E, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 Recirculation MG Replacement-
- Outage Phase, Revision 0
- PB-2015-004E, Test Interval Change to TR 3.5.4 for Containment Spray - Containment High Pressure (Function 5), Revision 0
- PB-2015-007-E, Local Leak Rate Testing Scope Reduction for Residual Heat Removal and Core Spray, Revision 0
- One safety evaluation sample document ed in Section 1R17 of Inspection Report 05000277/2015002 and 05000278/2015002
- 10
- CFR 50.59 Screened-out Evaluations
- PB-2012-068-S, Unit 3 High Pressure Servic
e Water (HPSW) Cross Tie Modification (Mechanical Scope), dated 7/15/15
- PB-2013-001-S, Install NETCO Rack Inserts into the U/2 & U/3 Spent Fuel Racks, dated 1/7/13
- PB-2013-002-S, Installation of CTSB Design in Valve
- MO-2-13-030 Control Logic, Revision 0
- PB-2013-011-S, P2R20 EPU
- MOD-NUMAC Power Range Neutron Monitory System Upgrade, Revision 0
- PB-2013-018-S, ECR
- PB 11-00253 "Addition of Main Steam Safety Valve - Unit 2", Revision 0
- PB-2013-029-S, RHR/CS Room Coolers, RCIC Turbine Lube Oil Cooler, EDG Heat Exchangers Tube Plugging Limit Change, dated 7/11/13
- PB-2013-034-S, RHR Cross-Tie Modification (Unit 2 A/C and Unit 2 B/D Loops) - Mechanical / Structural / I&C, dated 1/23/14
- PB-2013-073-S, HPCI Turbine Inlet Drain HI Level/Instrument Failed Alarm Disable, dated 11/7/13
- PB-2013-075-S,
- MO-2-10-13B, Recommended Margin Improvement Mod, Revision 0
- PB-2014-013-S, PB 2 Cycle 21 Core Reload, Revision 0
- PB-2014-020-S, P3R20 EPU Modification, Technical Specification Setpoint Change, Revision 0
- PB-2014-021-S, Unit 2 - HPSW Cross-Tie Modification, Revision 0#
- PB-2014-026-S, Appendix R HPCI Torus High Level and RCIC CST Low Level Override for Unit 3, Revision 0
- PB-2014-036-S, Hydraulic Analysis for RCIC Pump, Revision 0
- PB-2014-037-S, FLEX Modification - Unit 2 and 3 Diesel Fuel Oil Supply, Revision 0
- PB-2014-090-S, Disabling the Input from
- RV-071E to the Common Bellows Leaking MCR Annunciator, dated 12/22/14
- PB-2015-043-S, Implementation of
- PE-0017 Revision 17, Revision 0 # One screening sample documented in Section 1R17 of Inspection Report 05000277/2015002 and 05000278/2015002.
- Modifications
- ECR-13-00060, Change RCIC TDH for 3% SV/SRV Tolerance Project, Revision 0
- ECR-13-00352, Peach Bottom Unit 2 Cycle 21 Core Reload Design, Revision 1
- ECR-13-00433, Core Spray In-Vessel Pipe Replacement, Revision 0
- ECR-13-00094, Add Safety Related Closed Function to RCIC Turbine Trip Valves, Revision 0
- ECR-13-00235,
- MO-2-14-070-OP Recommended Margin Improvement Mod, Revision 0
- ECP-14-00317, Replacement of HPSW Pump Motor Oil Coolers, Revision 1 # One modification sample documented in Section 1R17 of Inspection Report 05000277/2015002 and 05000278/2015002
- Assessments
- 02446530, Peach Bottom 2015 Inspection of Mods and 50.59 Reviews Focused Area Self-Assessment, dated 9/16/15
Calculations
& Analysis 32-1, Piping Stress Analysis for HPSW Pumps Discharge in Pump Structure Building, Revision 1 32-1H, Design of HPSW Supports in Pump Structure for Stress Calc 32-1, Revision 6
- 33-33, Piping Stress Analysis for ESW Loops A and B in Cardox Room and Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Rooms, Revision 4 33-33C, Evaluation of Pipe Supports for Emerge ncy Service Water (ESW) Supply to Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Coolers - (Supports 33HB-S3 to S6, S16 to S27B, S29, and
- S30), Revision 1B A-585-VC-7, Design/Seismic Report Maximum Torque Calculations & Weak Link Analysis for
- 14-IN.
- CL 300 Tricentric Valves, Revision 0
- PEAM-EPU-29, T0400 Containment System Response, Revision 2
- PM-0436, Determination of Minimum Acceptable Wall Thickness to Support the Applied Mechanical Loads for Systems 30, 32, 33, 34, 44 & 48 Piping, Revision 6D
- GL 89-10 and Summarize the Maximum Design Basis Differential Pressure, Revision 19
- PM-0824, Develop an Equation to Extrapolate, from Actual Data, the Maximum Anticipated Bearing Oil Temperature on the HPSW Pump Motors, Revision 2
- PM-1042, Determination of Diesel Operability with Cross-Flow, Revision 4
- PM-1079, High Pressure Service Water System - Orifice Sizing, Revision 1
- PS-0965, Evaluation of Structural Adequacy of RB Floors at Pool Cask Area, Cask Laydown Area and Cask Unloading Area, Revision 2A
- PS-1080, Peach Bottom Free Standing Cask in SFP Seismic Response and Potential Impact Load Evaluation, Revision 0
- PS-1093, ISFSI Cask Displacement on Refuel Floor on Low Friction Plates, Revision 0
- Corrective Action Issue Reports
- 00647808
- 297948
- 01330242
- 01502676
- 01510515
- 01538819
- 01548575
- 01554318
- 01556052
- 01561476
- 01561560
- 01561752
- 01594731
- 01611658
- 01642297
- 01642299
- 01642301
- 01642307
- 01669516
- 01672022
- 01673523
- 02394823
- 02403035
- 2450488
- 2470575
- 2559488
- 2559493
- 02561982
- 02617213
- 2617856
- 02618210*
- 2618250*
- 2618278*
- 2618892
- 01134292
- 00872125
- 02624080
- 02624124*
- 2624310*
- 00477724
- 00478007
- 2625303*
- 2624970*
- Generated as result of this inspection
- Design & Licensing Bases
- NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1 Philadelphia Electric Company Letter to USNRC, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13,
"Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," dated 1/29/90 Philadelphia Electric Company Letter to USNRC, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," Implementation of Actions dated 6/1/92 P-S-02, Emergency Service Water System Design Baseline Document, Revision 12
- P-S-03, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Design Baseline Document, Revision 23
- P-S-04, High Pressure Service Water System Design Baseline Document, Revision 12 P-S-31, Automatic Depressurization System Design Baseline Document, Revision 4 P-T-01, Structural Design Baseline Document, Revision 9
- T04333, PBLR NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Activities, dated 7/29/13
Drawings
- 6280-M-309, Sht. 1 and 2, Condensate and Refueling Water Storage and Transfer Systems, Revisions 65 and 61 6280-M-311, Sht. 7, Condensate Filter/Demineralizer System, Revision 55
- 280-M-315, Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water Systems, Revision 55
- 280-M-356, Sht. 2, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Part A, Revision 76
- 280-M-359, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Revision 50 6280-M-361, Sht. 1, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 85 6280-M-362, Sht. 1, Core Spray Cooling System, Revision 64
- GB-32-MI-201-1, 32GB-14" from HP Service Water Pumps to 32GB-18" ISI Isometric, Revision 1
- HB-33-MI-201-6, Emergency Service Water for Diesel Generator ISI Isometric, Revision 1
- ISO-3-32-14, Unit 3 Piping Isometric Service Water, Revision 0
- PD-25, Typical Penetration Seal Detail Link Seals, Revision 0
- PS-818, Penetration Seal Locations Controlled Barriers - Room No. 818 Diesel Generator Building, Revision 0
- Evaluations
- A0151006-02, Re-Adjust Frequency of PM, dated 2/24/04 A17455897-05, Fuel Line Removal Technical Evaluation, dated 2/6/13 A1862458-01, PM Frequency Change Evaluation, dated 12/1/14
- A1899859-56, Conflicting ECRs Evaluation, dated 9/29/15
- ME-0299, Required TDH of RCIC Pump - 600 gpm Supply at Max RVP Pressure, Revision 1
- PBAPS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 25
- PLM 001N9043, PBAPS Units 2 & 3, Extended Power Uprate, PCR E35 R0 Suppression Pool Temperature - T0406 SBO NPSH Re-Analysis, dated 10/1/14
- PM-1085, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Cont rol Room Habitability Analysis for the Off-site Chemicals Stored at Calpine Site, Revision 1
- Hydrostatic Tests, In-Service Tests, and Non-Destruction Examinations
- C0245791-03, Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 3/20/13
- C0245791-03, Magnetic Particle Examination, performed 4/10/13
- C0245791-04, Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 4/18/13
- C0245791-07,
- C0245791-07,
- VT-3 Examination NDE Report for Component Supports, Attachments and Interiors of Reactor Vessels (33HB-S3 and 33HB-S17), performed 4/18/13
- C0245791-11, Final
- VT-2 Inspection, performed 4/18/13
- C0245791-12, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination (ISO-2-33-102), performed 4/16/13
- C0245791-32, Magnetic Particle Examination, performed 4/17/13
- C0245794-06, Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 4/19/13
- C0245794-14, Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 4/15/13
Miscellaneous
- ANSI/ANS 56.2, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems after a LOCA, dated 1984 ANSI/ANS-56.8, Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements, dated 2002
- DGC-127-C-1025, Penetration Seal Data, dated 7/12/06 Instructions for 8500 HP Condensing Steam Turbines Driving Reactor Feedwater Pumps, dated March 2015 Letter from GE Hitachi to PBAPS, Description of Removal of RPS Alarms for Standard
- DSS-CD
- Design by GEH, dated 05/29/13 M-00300, Specification For Piping Materials, Instrument Piping Standards and Valve Classifications for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 and 3, Revision 18
- MO-2-14-070 as Found Torque Switch Trip Testing, dated June 5, 2012
- MO-2-14-070 as Left after Torque Switch Bypass Mod Testing, dated June 23, 2014
- MO-3-32-3344 DP Test Flow A - B Loop, performed 10/20/15
- MO-3-32-3344 DP Test Flow B - A Loop, performed 10/20/15
- NEI 99-03, Control Room Habitability Assessment Guidance, dated June 2001 Peach Bottom Technical Specifications
- PLOR-1404H, EPU Implementation Licensed Operator Requal Training, Revision 0
- PLOT-5032, High Pressure Service Water System Initial License Training, Revision 4
- Regulatory Guide 1.196, Control Room Habitability At Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors, dated May 2003 Regulatory Guide 1.78, Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room during a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release, Revision 0 and Revision 1 Safety Evaluation by NRR Related to Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 Amendment
- 264 and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 Amendment 268 Stock Code 116 83156, Inventory Parts Catalog Report (FS Model Fire Seal), dated 1/27/16 Wire Rope News & Sling Technology, August 2002
Operating Experience
- AR 00640371-08, PBAPS Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-25, Supplement 1, dated 9/13/07 NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-25, Supplement 1, Clarification of NRC Guidelines for Control of Heavy Loads, dated 5/29/07
- NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36, July 1980
- NUREG-1774, A Survey of Crane Operating Experience at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants from 1968 through 2002 (NUREG-1774), July 2003
Procedures
- AO 32.2-3, High Pressure Service Water Injection into the Reactor Vessel, Revision 5
- AO 32.4-3, High Pressure Service Water Injection into the Torus, Revision 2
- CC-AA-102, Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening, Revision 28
- CC-AA-103, Configuration Change Control for Permanent Physical Plant Changes, Revision 27
- CC-AA-103-1001, Configuration Change Control Guidance, Revision 5
- CC-AA-107, Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria, Revision 9
- CC-AA-107-1001, Post Modification Acceptance Testing, Revision 5
- COL 32.1.A-3, High Pressure Service Water System, Revision 15
- LS-AA-104, Exelon 50.59 Review Process, Revision 10
- LS-AA-104-1000, Exelon 50.59 Resource Manual, Revision 9
- MA-AA-716-012, Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 20
- MA-AA-716-021, Rigging and Handling Heavy Loads, Revision 6
- MA-AA-716-021-1000, Guideline for Rigging and Handling Heavy Loads, Revision 10
- MA-AA-716-021-1010, Certification of Portable Hoists, Slings and Associated Rigging Hardware, Revision 1
- OP-AA-102-106, Operator Response Time Program, Revision 3
- OP-AA-108-103, Locked Equipment Program, Revision 2
- RT-O-032-310-3, High Pressure Service Water Oil Cooler Heat Transfer Capability Test, Revision 12
- SE-11.1, Operating Station Blackout Line during a Loop Event, Revision 8
- SE-17, Main Control Room Atmosphere Non-Radioactive Contamination, Revision 3
- SF-210, Preparation for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Campaign, Revision 19
- SF-221, Spent Fuel Casks
- TN-68 Loading and Transport Operations, Revision 15
- SF-290, Spent Fuel Cask Transport and Unloading Operations, Revision 9
- SO 32.1.A-3, High Pressure Service Water System Startup and Normal Operations, Revision 18
- SO 52A.1.B, Diesel Generator Operations, Revision 53
- T-205-3, Initiation of Containment Sprays using HPSW, Revision 5
- T2063, Placing the RHR Heat Exchanger Cross Tie(s) In Service, Revision 0 T-231-3, HPSW Injection into the Torus, Revision 9 T-245-3, HPSW Injection into the RPV, Revision 8
- Surveillance, Functional, and Modifications Acceptance Tests
- RT-O-013-240-2, RCIC Overspeed Trip Test Using AUX Steam, Revision 2
- RT-O-032-301-3, High Pressure Service Water Oil Cooler Heat Transfer Capability Test, performed 6/12/12, 7/5/12, 7/3/13, 6/17/14, 7/15/14, 6/8/15, & 7/15/15
- ST-O-013-301-2, RCIC Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-service Test, Performed 11/4/15
- ST-O-013-301-3, RCIC Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-service Test, Performed 10/21/15
- ST-O-013-302-2, RCIC Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-service Comprehensive Test, Performed 1/24/15
- ST-O-013-302-3, RCIC Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-service Comprehensive Test, Revision 6
- ST-O-032-301-3, HPSW Pump, Valve and Flow Functional and Inservice Test, performed
- 1/12/16
- ST-O-032-350-3, HPSW Valve Alignment Verification, performed 11/9/15 & 1/7/16
- ST-O-032-635-3, HPSW System Pressure Test Examination, performed 3/14/15
- ST-O-052-214-2, E4 Diesel Generator Slow Start Full Load and IST Test, performed 1/16/16
- ST-O-052-704-2, E4 Diesel Generator 24 Hour Endurance Test, performed 12/22/13
- ST-O-054-751-2, E13 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays and LOCA LOOP Functional, Revision 22
- ST-O-054-751-3, E13 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays and LOCA LOOP Functional, Revision 25
- ST-O-054-752-2, E22 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays and LOCA LOOP Functional Test and E22 and E224 Alternative Shutdown Control Functional Test, Revision 26
- ST-O-054-752-3, E23 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays and LOCA Loop Functional Test and E23 and E234 Alternative Shutdown Control Functional Test, Revision 27
- ST-O-054-753-2, E32 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays and LOCA LOOP Functional, Revision 24
- ST-O-054-753-3, E33 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays and LOCA LOOP Functional, Revision 24
- ST-O-054-754-2, E42 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays and LOCA LOOP Functional Test and E42 and E424 Alternative Shutdown Control Functional Test, Revision 23
- ST-O-054-754-3, E43 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays and LOCA LOOP Functional Test and E43 and E434 Alternative Shutdown Control Functional Test, Revision 25
- System Health Reports, Walkdown Reports, & Trending
- Common Unit Emergency Diesels System Health Report, Q4-2015
- Common Unit ESW System Health Report, Q3-2015 DNA History Plot (D HPSW Pump Motor Bearing Temperatures), dated 1/12/16 SPID
- 252193, 3AP042 Inboard Motor Bearing Condition Report, dated 1/19/16
- SPID 69910, 3BP042 Inboard Motor Bearing Condition Report, dated 1/19/16
- SPID 69911, 3BP042 Outboard Motor Bearing Condition Report, dated 1/18/16
- SPID 69912, 3DP042 Inboard Motor Bearing Condition Report, dated 1/19/16 SPID 69913, 3DP042 Outboard Motor Bearing Condition Report, dated 1/20/16 SPID 69920, 3CP042 Inboard Motor Bearing Condition Report, dated 1/19/16
- SPID 69922, 3CP042 Outboard Motor Bearing Condition Report, dated 1/19/16
- SPID 70659, 3AP042 Outboard Motor Bearing Condition Report, dated 1/19/16
- Unit 3 High Pressure Service Water System Health Report, Q4-2015
- Vendor Manuals, Standards, and Specifications 6280-E8-14, Vertical Induction Motors, Revision 0
- 280-M11-49, Installation & Maintenance of Series 1130 Deep Set Direct Coupled Vertical Turbine Pumps & Series 1110 Shallow Set (HPSW), Revision 5 A-585-VC-9, Instruction Manual for 14" Class 300 Tricentric Butterfly Valve, Revision 3
- ASME B30.9-2003, Slings - Safety Standard for Cableways, Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings, issued 1/15/03 ASME B30.9-2010, Slings - Safety Standard for Cableways, Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings, issued 1/18/11 ASME B30.9-2014, Slings - Safety Standard for Cableways, Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings, issued 2/6/15 M-300, Specification for Piping Materials, Instrument Piping Standards and Valve Classifications for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3, Revision 18 Specification
- NE-00004, Specification for Torquing of Flange Bolts for Limerick Generating Station and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Revision 3 Specification
- NE-00332 Attachment 1, Nuclear Service Butterfly Valve Data Sheet Motor Operated Valve, Revision 1 Specification
- NE-057, As-Built Reconciliation Program Requirements for Safety-Related Piping and Pipe Supports for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3, Revision 0 Thunderline Corporation Link-Seal Pipe to Wall Penetration Seals Specification, Revision 0
Work Orders
- A0151006 A1982191
- C0245791
- C0245793
- C0245794
- C0253976
- C0255978
- C0255984
- C0256242
- R0039916
- R0040330
- R0040671 R0040850 R1157879 R1231312
- R1237556
- R1240128
- R1241453 R1241544 R1242166 R1246508
- R1270696
- R1270749
- R1271472 R1273515 R1278597 R1280125
- R1289209
- R1314572
LIST OF ACRONYMS
EPU Extended Power Uprate
ESW Emergency Service Water
Exelon Exelon Nuclear
TS Technical Specification