IR 07200029/2020001
| ML21005A120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/2021 |
| From: | Anthony Dimitriadis, Jackie Nicholson Decommissioning Branch I |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2020001 | |
| Download: ML21005A120 (13) | |
Text
January 5, 2021
SUBJECT:
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO.
07200029/2020001
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On August 14, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (Peach Bottom) Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) activities. On-site inspections of the welding dry run were performed on March 16-17, 2020, at the Holtec training facility in Camden, New Jersey. Additional inspection activities (in office reviews via remote means) were conducted throughout the period as a consequence of the COVID-19 public health emergency (PHE). The inspectors examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and the conditions of your licenses and the Certificate of Compliance (COC). The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, and a review of procedures and records. The results of this inspection were discussed with Ron DiSabitino, Operations Director and other members of your staff on September 2, 2020, and are documented in the enclosed report.
The report documents one NRC-identified violation of NRC requirements of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV). Because of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the violation as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector office at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station.
In accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
Current NRC regulations and guidance are included on the NRC's Web site at www.nrc.gov; select Radioactive Waste; Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities; then Regulations, Guidance and Communications. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's website at www.nrc.gov; select About NRC, Organizations & Functions; Office of Enforcement; Enforcement documents; then Enforcement Policy (Under 'Related Information'). You may also obtain these documents by contacting the Government Printing Office (GPO) toll-free at 1-866-512-1800. The GPO is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. EST, Monday through Friday (except Federal holidays).
No reply to this letter is required. Please contact John Nicholson at 610-337-5236 if you have any questions regarding this matter.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Docket No: 07200029 License No: DPR-44 DPR-56
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 07200029/2020001
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I==
Inspection Report
Docket No: 072-00029
License Nos:
Report No:
07200029/2020001
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Location:
Delta, PA
Dates:
March 16 - August 14, 2020
Inspectors:
J. Nicholson, Senior Health Physicist
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor HP Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I
M. Davis,
Senior Transportation and Storage Safety Inspector
Inspections and Operations Branch
Division of Fuel Management, NMSS
M. Learn,
Senior Transportation and Storage Safety Inspector
Inspections and Operations Branch
Division of Fuel Management, NMSS
J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector
Division of Reactor Safety, Region I
Approved by:
Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor HP Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I
ii
Enclosure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station NRC Inspection Report No. 07200029/2020001
On August 14, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) competed a period of onsite and remote inspections of Peach Bottoms Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) activities. Onsite inspections were performed on March 16-17, 2020 at Holtecs training facility in Camden, New Jersey to inspect Peach Bottoms pre-operational ISFSI testing.
Additional inspection activities (in office reviews via remote means) were conducted throughout the period as a consequence of the COVID-19 public health emergency (PHE). The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, and a review of procedures and records. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of dry storage of spent fuel at an ISFSI is described in Inspection Manual Chapter 2690, Inspection Program for Dry Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations and for 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71 Transportation Packagings.
List of Violations
A Severity IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV), of 10 CFR 72.48 was identified by the inspectors because Exelon Generation, LLC., (Exelon) did not perform written evaluations which provide the bases for the determination that a change did not require a Certificate of Compliance (CoC)amendment pursuant to paragraph 72.48(c)(2). Specifically, Exelon did not perform a written evaluation to demonstrate that transporting the HI-TRAC VW and MPC on a HI-PORT transporter without redundant drop protection feature on site at the cask handling facility created a possibility for a malfunction with a different result than any previously evaluated in the Holtec Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
REPORT DETAILS
1.0 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
1.1 Background
Owner/Operator Exelon - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), selected Holtec HI-STORM FW Cask System technology to allow spent nuclear fuel assemblies currently stored at PBAPS Units 2 and 3 spent fuel pool (SFP) to be relocated and stored using an ISFSI. The Holtec system is listed in 10 CFR 72.214, List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks, under Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1032 with an effective date of December 17, 2014 and a 20-year term. Holtec updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 4 applies to the Holtec ISFSI system that was placed in service under CoC number 1032.
1.2 Pre-operational Testing of an ISFSI (IP 60854)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated PBAPS performance during NRC observed pre-operational dry run activities that were performed in order to fulfill requirements in the NRC-issued Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1032, Amendment 1, Revision 1 (CoC 1032-1R1).
The inspectors observed PBAPS dry run activities on March 16-17, 2020, at the Holtec facility in Camden, New Jersey. Due to NRC travel restrictions associated with the COVID-19 PHE, subsequent inspections of the remaining three dry runs and the initial dry cask loading campaign were performed via remote means (Skype) on March 30 - April 3, April 24 - 28, and May 14, 26 - 27, 2020.
During the dry run activities, the inspectors observed cask processing activities to determine whether Exelon had developed, implemented, and evaluated preoperational testing activities to safely process the multi-purpose canister (MPC) to be used in storage of spent fuel at the PBAPS site. The inspectors observed MPC activities including blowdown, vacuum drying, helium backfilling, welding, hydrogen monitoring, and non-destructive examinations. The inspectors verified that the vacuum drying system was leak tight and the helium flow path was operable. The inspectors examined the MPC processing equipment and reviewed worker qualification records. The inspectors also observed cask loading and cask movement activities to determine whether Exelon had developed the capability to properly load and move the MPC to be used in storage of spent fuel at PBAPS. The inspectors observed:
- (a) movement of a dummy fuel assembly into the MPC,
- (b) down-ending the HI-TRAC transfer cask/MPC onto the self-propelled motorized transporter (SPMT),
- (c) transportation of the HI-TRAC/MPC to the ISFSI pad,
- (d) upending the HI-TRAC/MPC, stack-up and transfer of the MPC from the HI-TRAC to the HI-STORM at the cask transfer facility (CTF), (e)retrieval of the MPC from the HI-STORM back into the HI-TRAC,
- (f) installation of the HI-STORM lid,
- (g) lifting of the HI-STORM out of the CTF, and
- (h) placement of the HI-STORM on the ISFSI pad.
The inspectors attended select PBAPS pre-job briefings to assess Exelons ability to identify critical steps of the evolution, potential failure scenarios, and human performance tools to prevent errors. The inspectors reviewed the training program and training records of personnel assigned to ISFSI activities. The inspectors reviewed MPC loading, unloading, and processing procedures to determine if they contained commitments and requirements specified in the CoC, technical specifications (TSs),
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and Title 10 of the CFR Part 72. The inspectors also reviewed fuel selection procedures to ensure they appropriately incorporated the requirements in the TSs.
The inspectors reviewed radiation protection procedures and radiation work permits associated with the proposed ISFSI loading campaign. The inspectors also reviewed the radiological controls which would be established during a MPC loading campaign.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action reports associated with preparations for the ISFSI loading campaign to ensure that issues were being properly identified, prioritized, and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1.2 Operation of an ISFSI at Operating Plants (IP 60855)
a. Inspection Scope
From June 1 - 19, 2020, the inspectors observed and evaluated Exelons loading of the first MPC associated with its initial Holtec HI-STORM FW Cask System dry cask campaign. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees planned activities related to long-term operation and monitoring of the ISFSI. The inspectors evaluated compliance with the CoC, TSs, and station procedures.
The inspectors observed fuel assemblies being loaded into the MPC. The inspectors also observed MPC processing operations including installation of the automated welding system, welding, non-destructive weld examinations, blowdowns, vacuum drying, helium backfill, and survey activities. During performance of these activities, the inspectors verified that procedure use, communication, and coordination of ISFSI activities met established Exelon standards and requirements.
The inspectors reviewed PBAPSs program associated with fuel characterization and selection for storage. The inspectors reviewed the first cask fuel selection package to determine if the licensee was loading fuel in accordance with the CoC, TSs, and procedures. Inspectors reviewed a recording made of the fuel assemblies loaded into the first DSC to ensure the loading was in accordance with PBAPSs loading plan.
The inspectors observed radiation protection surveys and job coverage for the cask loading workers. The inspectors reviewed survey data maps and radiological records from the first MPC loading to determine if radiation survey levels measured were within limits specified by the TSs and consistent with values specified in the FSAR.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action reports and the associated follow-up actions that were generated since PBAPSs dry run demonstrations to ensure that issues were entered into the corrective action program, prioritized, and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1.3 Review of 10 CFR 72.212
- (b) Evaluations (IP 60856)
a. Inspection Scope
PBAPS selected the Holtec International HI-STORM FW Cask System for the storage of spent fuel at the onsite expanded ISFSI. The HI-STORM FW casks augment the TN-68 casks already in service at the original ISFSI, which began operation in calendar year 2000.
The review of the HI-STORM FW Cask System was based on NRC-issued Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1032, Amendment 1, Revision 1 (CoC 1032-1R1) and its associated Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and HI-STORM FW Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Revision 4. The review of the Part 50 facility site-specific parameters utilized the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and other applicable plant-specific design and licensing basis information.
The inspectors evaluated Exelons compliance with the requirements outlined in 10 CFR 72.212. The inspectors examined the licensees written evaluations to determine if they were in accordance with 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5) and evaluated the conditions set forth in the CoC to determine if conditions had been met prior to use and if the radiological requirements of 72.104 were met. The inspectors examined applicable reactor site parameters, such as fire and explosions, tornadoes, wind-generated missile impacts, seismic qualifications, lightning, flooding and temperature, to determine if they had been evaluated for acceptability with bounding values specified in the FSAR and the NRC SER. The inspectors also examined 50.59 evaluations related to the construction and operation of the ISFSI and plant interfaces to determine if they were performed and to determine if changes to certain facility design bases and UFSAR commitments required NRC approval. The reactor emergency plan, quality assurance program, training program, and radiation protection program were reviewed to determine if there was a decrease in effectiveness and if changes made required prior NRC approval.
b. Findings
Introduction
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.48 because the licensee did not perform written evaluations which provide the bases for the determination that the change did not require a Certificate of Compliance (CoC)amendment pursuant to paragraph 72.48(c)(2). Specifically, the licensee performed changes that required a written evaluation with one of the changes requiring NRC review and approval in accordance with 72.48(c)(2)(6).
Description The inspectors evaluated engineering change (EC) number (No.) 618376 and assessed screening No. PB-2017-7248-009-S, Revision 1, as required by 10 CFR 72.48 associated with several of the design changes to expand the PBAPS ISFSI.
The inspectors noted that the Holtec FSAR addressed the environmental phenomena loads, design criteria and accident condition in sections 1.2.1.3.b, 2.2.3.e and 12.2.6.2, respectively. Section 1.2.1.3 of the Holtec FSAR states, in part, that the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask provide protection of the multiple purpose canister (MPC) against extreme environmental phenomena loads, such as tornado-borne missiles, during short term operations (e.g., on-site handling of a loaded HI-TRAC VW transfer cask).
Section 2.2.3 of the Holtec FSAR states, in part, the kinematic stability of the HI-STORM FW overpack, and continued integrity of the MPC confinement boundary, within the storage overpack or HI-TRAC VW transfer cask, must be demonstrated under impact from potential tornado-generated missiles in conjunction with the wind loadings.
Section 12.2.6.2 of the Holtec FSAR states, in part, that it is not credible that a potential large tornado missile and/or wind could tip-over the loaded HI-TRAC VW transfer cask while being handled in the vertical orientation because it shall be attached to a lifting device designed in accordance with the requirements specified in the FSAR, section 2.3.3. Section 2.3.3 describes the equipment for redundant drop protection features at a handling facility outside the reactor structure.
The inspectors identified that the Holtec FSAR describing accident conditions for a tornado analysis was different than the configuration used at the PBAPS ISFSI and affected a design function, which constituted a change. Specifically, PBAPS transports the HI-TRAC VW and MPC on a transporter called the HI-PORT with no redundant drop protection feature outside the reactor structure. The inspectors reviewed the guidance provided in the licensees Manual LS-AA-114-1000, 72.48 Resource Manual, Revision 1 and Regulatory Guide (RG) 3.72, Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 72.48, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, which endorsed Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, Appendix B for the industry guidance to determine if the screening required an evaluation and required prior NRC review and approval before implementing the change.
As stated, in part, in LS-AA-114-1000, any change that adversely affects a Holtec FSAR described design function, a method of performing or controlling design functions, or evaluation that demonstrates that the intended design function will be accomplished, is screened in as a written evaluation to provide the bases for the determination that the change, test, or experiment does not require a license amendment pursuant to paragraph (c)(2). Furthermore, the following is an example of a change that the industry guidance document consider adverse and must be screened in to an evaluation:
- (1) any change that alters a design basis limit for fission product barrier positively or negatively is considered adverse and must be screened in;
- (2) if the effect of a change is such that existing safety analyses would no longer be bounding and therefore UFSAR safety analyses must be re-run to demonstrate that all required safety functions and design requirements are met, the change is considered to be adverse and must be screened in (B4.2.1, Screening for Adverse Effects).
Based on the above guidance documents, the inspectors noted that the licensee stopped at a screening and did not perform a full evaluation. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.48 because Exelon did not perform written evaluations which provide the bases for the determination that a change did not require a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) amendment pursuant to paragraph 72.48(c)(2).
Specifically, Exelon did not address the applicable criteria identified in 10 CFR 72.48(c)(2) because the change was adverse and the protection against natural phenomena and environmental conditions were established as a part of the design requirements for general licensees. Therefore, the inspectors noted that criterion
- (vi) of 10 CFR 72.48(c)(2) requires, in part, that a general licensee shall request that the certificate holder obtain a CoC amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 72.244, prior to implementing a proposed change if the change would create a possibility for a malfunction with a different result than any previously evaluated in the FSAR. The inspectors assessed that the change increased the likelihood of a malfunction previously thought to be incredible since accident analysis states that it is not credible that a large tornado missile could tip-over the loaded HI-TRAC VW transfer cask while being handled in the vertical orientation due to redundant drop protection feature.
Analysis
In accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy and Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, ISFSIs are not subject to the Significance Determination Process and are not subject to the Reactor Oversight Process, therefore, violations identified at ISFSIs are assessed using traditional enforcement. Traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
The inspectors assessed the significance of the violation using the NRC Enforcement Policy and Enforcement Manual. The inspectors determined that the violation had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory oversight function because the licensee did not receive prior NRC approval for changes in licensed activities. The inspectors determined that the violation was more than minor because the licensee did not seek prior NRC review and approval. The inspectors characterized the violation as a Severity Level IV violation because the licensee implemented an administrative control to preclude any possibility of an unwanted system interaction by limiting the movement of the HI-PORT if adverse weather is expected.
The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program under IR 04352694.
Because the violation was of low safety significance and was entered into Exelons CAP, the issue was not repetitive or willful, this is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
Enforcement
10 CFR 72.48(d)(1) requires, in part, that the licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility or spent fuel storage cask design, of changes in procedures, and tests and experiments made pursuant to paragraph
- (c) of this section. These records must include a written evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not require a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) amendment pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
10 CFR 72.48(c)(2)(vi) requires, in part, that a general licensee shall request that the certificate holder obtain a CoC amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 72.244, prior to implementing a proposed change if the change would create a possibility for a malfunction with a different result than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.
Contrary to the above, as of May 27, 2020, Exelon did not include a written evaluation that provided the bases for the determination that the change does not require a CoC amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48(c)(2) and implemented a change that would create a possibility for a malfunction with a different result than any previously evaluated in the FSAR without prior NRC review and approval. Specifically, Exelon did not perform a written evaluation to demonstrate that transporting the HI-TRAC VW and MPC on a HI-PORT transporter with no redundant drop-protection feature on site at its cask handling facility outside the reactor structure created a possibility for a malfunction with a different result than any previously evaluated in the Holtec FSAR. Because this violation was of low safety significance and was entered into Exelons CAP, the issue was not repetitive or willful, this is being treated as a Severity Level IV, Non-Cited Violation (NCV),consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
2.0 Exit Meeting
On September 2, 2020, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Ron DiSabitino, Operations Director, and other Exelon personnel who acknowledged the inspection results. No proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
R. DiSabitino
Operations Director
A. Stathes
Dry Cask Storage Project Manager
P. Gregory
Dry Cask Storage Program Manager
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1.1 Review of 10 CFR 72.212 (b) Evaluations
CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Screenings/Evaluations
618371
618374
618375
618375
618376
618377
Calculations
CoC 2601006A-001; HI-PORT Test Results; Revision 0
DOC-104-209-117; MPC Lift Cleats Test Records; Revision 0
DOC-104-729-121; Lift Links, Brackets Test Results; Revision1
DOC-104-759-127; Lift Yoke Test Results; Revision 0
DOC-2601-012; Mating Device Test Results; Revision 0
HI-0004; Peach Bottom ISFSI Expansion - HI-STORM FW Site Dose Calculation; Revision 000
HI-2135647; Structural Qualification of 415 KIP VCT Revision 000
HI-2135677; Evaluation of Effects of Tracked VCT Fire on HI-STORM FS System; Revision 000
HI-2177674; Thermal Evaluation of HI-STORM FW System Placed in a CTF at Peach Bottom;
Revision 1
HI-2177675; Evaluation of Effect of Combined HI-PORT and VCT Fire on HI-TRAC VW for
Peach Bottom; Revision 1
HI-2177738; Seismic Stability of HI-TRAC on HI-PORT; Revision 000
HI-2177767; Seismic Structural Analysis of the CTF at Peach Bottom; Revision 000
HI-2177817; Stability Assessment of HI-TRAC in SFP and on Refueling Floor at Peach Bottom;
Revision 000
HI-2177829; VCT Seismic Stability Analysis for PBAPS; Revision 000
HI-2188482; Evaluation of the Structural Integrity of the SFP Wall Liner Impacted by a Loaded
HI-TRAC VW; Revision 000
HI-2188652; HI-TRAC Tipover Analysis Under Explosion Event for Peach Bottom; Revision 000
PS-1120; Purchase Specification for the Vertical Cask Transporter; Revision 9
PS-1208; PB ISFSI Expansion - Rock Run Creek Bridge Structural Capacity; Revision 000
PS-1210; Buried Commodities Evaluation; Revision 000
PS-1213; Seismic Soil Liquefaction of Haul Path; Revision 000
PS-1223; PB ISFSI Expansion - ISFSI Fire Radiant Heat and Explosion Overpressure Analysis;
Revision 0
PS-1227; RB El 234' Floor Evaluation for DCS Equipment Loading for HI-STORM; Revision
Calculations (Contd)
PS-1228; RB Floor Evaluation for HI-STORM FW-XL System 000
PS-1228; RB Floor Evaluation for HI-STORM FW-XL System; Revision
PS-1232; Lateral Displacement of Suspended HI-TRAC Cask in Spent Fuel Pool; Revision 000
VCT DOC PKG - 2601 PB #1734 Test Results
Miscellaneous
CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report for the HI-STORM FW XL MPC Storage System; Revision 0
50.54(q) Program Evaluation / Assessment Review; EP-AA-1007 Addendum 3; Revision 9
OU-AA-630, Dry Cask Storage Program Implementation; Revision 11
PBAPS ISFSI Fire Hazards Analysis for the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System; Revision 0
TN-68 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report; Revision 18
Procedures
EP-AA-1007; Emergency Action Levels for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; Revision 9
LS-AA-114; Exelon 72.48 Review Process; Revision 3
OU-PB-630-206; Radiation Protection Requirements for Holtec HI-STORM FW / MPC Loading
and Transport Operations; dated March 3, 2020
RP-AA-305; Holtec HI-TRAC Radiation Survey; Revision 3
RP-AA-306; Holtec HI-STORM Radiation Survey; Revision 1
RP-AA-307; Holtec ISFSI Radiation Survey; Revision 2
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Corrective Action Program
Certificate of Compliance
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
EC
Engineering Change
Exelon
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Final Safety Analysis Report
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Multi-Purpose Canister
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Public Health Emergency
Safety Evaluation Report
SPMT
Self-Propelled Motorized Transporter
TS
Technical Specifications