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{{#Wiki_filter:November 5, 2012 | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | ||
NUC LEAR REGULATOR Y COMMI SSI ON | |||
RE G IO N I V | |||
1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD | |||
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 | ARL INGTON, TEXAS 76011- 4511 | ||
November 5, 2012 | |||
17265 River Road | EA-12-198 | ||
Killona, LA 70057-0751 | Donna Jacobs, Site Vice President, Operations | ||
Entergy Operations, Inc. | |||
REPORT 05000382/2012008 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION | Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 | ||
17265 River Road | |||
Killona, LA 70057-0751 | |||
On August 2, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem | SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - | ||
Identification and Resolution biennial inspection at | NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION | ||
REPORT 05000382/2012008 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION | |||
Dear Ms. Jacobs: | |||
On August 2, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem | |||
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to | Identification and Resolution biennial inspection at your Waterford Steam Electric Station, | ||
problem identification and resolution and compliance with the | Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results that were discussed on | ||
interviews with personnel. | August 2, 2012, with Keith Nichols, Director of Engineering, and other members of your staff. | ||
After additional in-office inspection, a final telephonic exit meeting was conducted on September | |||
24, 2012 with Keith Nichols, Director of Engineering, and other members of your staff. | |||
Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team concluded that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, were adequate. | This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to | ||
identified problems were entered into the corrective action program at a low threshold. | problem identification and resolution and compliance with the Commissions rules and | ||
Problems were generally prioritized and evaluated commensurate with the safety significance of | regulations and the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved | ||
the problems. | examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and | ||
interviews with personnel. | |||
Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team concluded that the implementation of the | |||
determined to involve a violation of NRC | corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and | ||
resolving problems at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, were adequate. Licensee | |||
identified problems were entered into the corrective action program at a low threshold. | |||
Problems were generally prioritized and evaluated commensurate with the safety significance of | |||
the problems. Corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner | |||
commensurate with their importance to safety and addressed the identified causes of problems. | |||
Lessons learned from industry operating experience were generally reviewed and applied when | |||
appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were effectively used to identify problems and | |||
appropriate actions. Finally, the team determined that the station maintains a safety-conscious | |||
work environment where employees feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of | |||
retaliation. | |||
Five NRC identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this | |||
inspection and are documented in the enclosed report. All five of these findings were | |||
determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating four of the five | |||
disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, | D. Jacobs -2- | ||
violations as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement | |||
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 | Policy. Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low | ||
. | safety significance, is listed in this report. | ||
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be available | One of the findings that the NRC evaluated under the risk significance determination process as | ||
having very low safety significance (Green) did not meet the criteria to be treated as a non-cited | |||
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic | violation. The violation associated with this issue was evaluated in accordance with the NRC | ||
Reading Room). | Enforcement Policy. The current version of this Policy is available on the NRC website at | ||
(http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html). This violation is cited in | |||
the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding it are described in | |||
Ray Kellar, P.E., Chief | detail in the subject inspection report. The violation is being cited in the Notice in accordance | ||
with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy because you failed to restore compliance in a | |||
reasonable period of time after the violation was previously identified as a non-cited violation. | |||
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the | |||
enclosed Notice when preparing your response. This reply should be clearly marked as a | |||
"Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-12-198" and should specifically include a firm commitment as | |||
to when you will establish a design basis to determine the river level at which flood control | |||
measures were to be initiated for closing the water tight doors as required in | |||
Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather and Flooding. If you have additional information that | |||
you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The | |||
NRC review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement | |||
action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. | |||
If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the | |||
date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory | |||
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to: | |||
(1) the Regional Administrator, Region IV; (2) the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States | |||
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and (3) NRC Resident | |||
Inspector Office at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. | |||
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a | |||
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your | |||
disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at | |||
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. | |||
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its | |||
enclosure, and your response will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC | |||
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's | |||
Agency wide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible | |||
from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic | |||
Reading Room). | |||
Sincerely, | |||
/RA/ | |||
Ray Kellar, P.E., Chief | |||
Technical Support Branch | |||
Division of Reactor Safety | |||
D. Jacobs -3- | |||
Enclosures: | Docket No.: 50-382 | ||
2. Inspection Report 05000382/2012008 | License No: NPF-38 | ||
Enclosures: | |||
1. Notice of Violation EA-12-198 | |||
2. Inspection Report 05000382/2012008 | |||
w/Attachments: | |||
1. Supplemental Information | |||
2. Information Request | |||
cc w/enclosures: Electronic Distribution for Waterford 3 | |||
ML12310A497 | ML12310A497 | ||
SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials RLS | |||
TL/SRI:DRP/C RI:DRP/E PE:DRP/C RI:DRS/EB1 ACES BC:DRP/E RSmith DOverland RKumana MYoung HGepford DAllen -e- -e- /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ 10/23/2012 10/23/2012 10/13/2012 10/23/2012 10/26/2012 10/30/12 | Publicly Avail. Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials | ||
BC:DRS/TSB | TL/SRI:DRP/C RI:DRP/E PE:DRP/C RI:DRS/EB1 ACES BC:DRP/E | ||
RSmith DOverland RKumana MYoung HGepford DAllen | |||
-e- -e- /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ | |||
10/23/2012 10/23/2012 10/13/2012 10/23/2012 10/26/2012 10/30/12 | |||
BC:DRS/TSB | |||
Entergy Operations, Inc. | RKellar | ||
/RA/ | |||
11/5/2012 | |||
During an NRC inspection conducted on July 16 | |||
through September 24, 2012, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. | NOTICE OF VIOLATION | ||
Entergy Operations, Inc. Docket No. 50-382 | |||
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 2 License No. NPF-38 | |||
Control, | EA-12-198 | ||
regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, are correctly translated into specifications, procedures, and instructions. | During an NRC inspection conducted on July 16 through September 24, 2012, a violation of | ||
NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the | |||
violation is listed below: | |||
Contrary to the above, from March 10, 2011, to August 2, 2012, the licensee failed to | Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design | ||
establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, were correctly translated into specifications, procedures and instructions. | Control, states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable | ||
basis to determine the river level at which flood control measures were to be initiated for | regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, are correctly | ||
closing the water tight doors as required in Procedure OP-901-521, | translated into specifications, procedures, and instructions. | ||
and Flooding. | Contrary to the above, from March 10, 2011, to August 2, 2012, the licensee failed to | ||
establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design | |||
basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, were correctly translated into specifications, | |||
procedures and instructions. Specifically, the licensee had not established a design | |||
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Entergy Operations is hereby required to submit a | basis to determine the river level at which flood control measures were to be initiated for | ||
written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: | closing the water tight doors as required in Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather | ||
Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, | and Flooding. | ||
reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-12-198" and should | This violation is associated with a Green Significance Determination Process finding. | ||
include for each violation: | Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Entergy Operations is hereby required to submit a | ||
the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. | written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document | ||
received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be | Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, | ||
issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other | Region IV, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this | ||
action as may be proper should not be taken. | Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This | ||
reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-12-198" and should | |||
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear | include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing | ||
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. | the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results | ||
achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the date when full compliance will | |||
be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence if the | |||
correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not | |||
received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be | |||
issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other | |||
action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will | |||
be given to extending the response time. | |||
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with | |||
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear | |||
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. | |||
-1- Enclosure 1 | |||
NRC | Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC | ||
Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the | |||
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not | |||
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made | |||
available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is | |||
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your | |||
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your | |||
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must | |||
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in | |||
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will | |||
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by | |||
10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial | |||
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please | |||
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. | |||
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working | |||
days of receipt. | |||
Dated this 5th day of November, 2012 | |||
-2- Enclosure 1 | |||
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION IV | |||
Docket: 50-382 | |||
License: NPF-38 | |||
Report: 05000382/2012008 | |||
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc. | |||
Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 | |||
Location: 17265 River Road | |||
Killona, LA 70057-0751 | |||
Dates: July 16 through September 24, 2012 | |||
Team Leader: R. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector, Grand Gulf | |||
Inspectors: D. Overland, Resident Inspector, Waterford 3 | |||
R. Kumana, Project Engineer | |||
M. Young, Reactor Inspector | |||
Approved By: Ray Kellar, P.E., Chief | |||
Technical Support Branch | |||
Division of Reactor Safety | |||
-1- Enclosure 2 | |||
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS | |||
IR 05000382/2012008; July 16, 2012 -September 24, 2012; Waterford 3 "Biennial Baseline | |||
Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems." | |||
The team inspection was performed by one senior resident inspector, one resident inspector, | |||
one reactor inspector, and one project engineer. One cited violation and four non-cited | |||
violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this inspection. The | |||
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using | |||
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process". Findings for which the | |||
significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level | |||
after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of | |||
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG 1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," | |||
Revision 4, dated December 2006. | |||
Identification and Resolution of Problems | |||
The team reviewed approximately 350 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations, | |||
root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if | |||
problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action | |||
program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, | |||
self-assessments, audits, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to | |||
the corrective action program. | |||
Based on these reviews, the team concluded that the licensees corrective action program and | |||
its other processes to identify and correct nuclear safety problems were adequate to support | |||
nuclear safety. However, the team noted at times the licensee staff did not always use the | |||
corrective action program for problems that were perceived as minor. The team also noted | |||
several challenges in correcting adverse conditions in a timely manner. Further, the licensee | |||
had several long-standing issues, which had been in the corrective action process for over a | |||
year without resolution. | |||
The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility | |||
and entered applicable items in the corrective action program. However, there was one | |||
example where the licensee failed to enter an information notice into their corrective action | |||
program for evaluation of a condition adverse to quality. The licensee used industry operating | |||
experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations. The licensee | |||
performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as demonstrated by self- | |||
identification of poor corrective action program performance and identification of ineffective | |||
corrective actions. | |||
Finally, the team determined that the station continued to maintain a safety-conscious work | |||
environment. Employees felt free to raise nuclear safety concerns to the attention of | |||
management without fear of retaliation. | |||
-2- Enclosure 2 | |||
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings | |||
Cornerstone: Initiating Events | |||
issue | * Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, | ||
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a failure to follow | |||
Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations. Specifically, the licensee failed | |||
to ensure that control room operators knew the status of equipment at all times. | |||
While interviewing the person responsible for tracking plant deficiencies, the | |||
inspectors discovered that the licensee had two separate governing procedures. | |||
These two instructions had different definitions for categories of plant deficiencies | |||
and different databases for tracking them. The inspectors then interviewed the | |||
on-shift operators in the control room and reviewed both databases. The | |||
inspectors identified several issues, including lack of knowledge by the control | |||
room operators about which procedure to use, failure to track deficiencies in both | |||
databases, and inadequate classification of deficiencies. The inspectors | |||
determined that in March 2010, the licensee changed their process for tracking | |||
deficiencies to be consistent with their fleet reporting process. However, the | |||
licensee did not revise the procedure and did not train all affected personnel on | |||
the new process. As a result, control room operators did not have a complete | |||
and accurate knowledge of all plant deficiencies. This finding was entered into | |||
the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2012- | |||
03732. | |||
The failure to ensure that operators were aware of the status of all plant | |||
equipment was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more | |||
than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the | |||
Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the | |||
likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety | |||
functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee | |||
failed to implement a procedure designed to ensure operators were aware of | |||
deficiencies in the instrumentation, controls, and operation of nuclear plant | |||
systems. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, | |||
Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to | |||
affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection | |||
Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process | |||
(SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety | |||
significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and did not cause the | |||
loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of | |||
the trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in | |||
the human performance area, work practices component, in that the licensee | |||
failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural | |||
compliance, and personnel did not follow procedures [H.4.b] (Section 4OA2.5.d). | |||
* Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, | |||
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, because the licensee failed to | |||
determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality and take | |||
-3- Enclosure 2 | |||
corrective actions to preclude repetition. Specifically, the licensee failed to | |||
assure that the cause of the condition was determined and corrective action | |||
taken to preclude repetition related to a contractors non-compliance with site | |||
procedural requirements. The corrective actions include developing additional | |||
training and provisions to provide additional contractor oversight. This finding | |||
was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03769 and CR-WF3-2012-03772. | |||
The failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality | |||
and take corrective action to preclude repetition was a performance deficiency. | |||
The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it | |||
could lead to more significant consequences; therefore, it is a finding. | |||
Specifically, failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to | |||
quality and take corrective action to prevent recurrence can result in recurrence | |||
of the condition. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, | |||
Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to | |||
affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection | |||
Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process | |||
(SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety | |||
significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss | |||
of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the | |||
trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the | |||
human performance, work practice component, in that the licensee failed to | |||
follow guidance in the root cause evaluation procedure when developing | |||
appropriate corrective actions to prevent repetition [H.4(b)] (Section 4OA2.5.e). | |||
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems | |||
* Green. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, | |||
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a failure to | |||
follow the Operability Determination Process. Specifically, the licensee failed to | |||
determine the operability of the emergency diesel generators immediately upon | |||
discovery without delay and in a controlled manner using the best information | |||
available in response to NRC Information Notice 2010-04. The licensee | |||
completed an evaluation of the information notice that indicated that Waterford 3 | |||
was vulnerable and susceptible to the issue, but the licensee failed to issue a | |||
condition report as required by their procedure. The failure to initiate a condition | |||
report resulted in the licensees failure to perform an operability determination of | |||
the emergency diesel generators as required by, EN-OP-104, Operability | |||
Determination Process, Revision 6. In the evaluation, the licensee considered | |||
the fact that they had an Action Request in their system to add routine | |||
thermography inspections within the voltage regulator cabinets to their | |||
preventative maintenance program as being adequate. The action request was | |||
not completed when the inspection team reviewed the issue. The inspectors | |||
questioned whether there was an operability concern for the emergency diesel | |||
generators. The licensee recognized their failure to perform an operability | |||
determination. They performed a prompt operability determination based on no | |||
-4- Enclosure 2 | |||
observed degradation in performance and declared the emergency diesel | |||
generators operable. In addition, they plan to conduct the thermography | |||
inspections during the next scheduled emergency diesel generator surveillance. | |||
This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as | |||
Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03761. | |||
The failure to promptly perform an operability determination of the emergency | |||
diesel generators in response to NRC Information Notice 2010-04 was a | |||
performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor | |||
because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the | |||
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure | |||
the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating | |||
events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to | |||
promptly determine the operability of the diesel generators after obtaining | |||
information of a potential condition adverse to quality. In accordance with NRC | |||
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of | |||
Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems | |||
Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, | |||
Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at | |||
Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) | |||
because it was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of the | |||
system, it did not represent a loss of system or function, and it was a Technical | |||
Specification system, but did not represent an actual loss of function of a single | |||
train for greater than it allowed outage time. Specifically, the licensee performed | |||
an operability determination in response to the inspectors questions and | |||
determined the emergency diesel generators were operable based on a review of | |||
surveillance data and maintenance records. This finding had a cross-cutting | |||
aspect in the problem identification and resolution area, operating experience | |||
component, in that the licensee failed to systematically collect, evaluate, and | |||
communicate to affected internal stakeholders in a timely manner relevant | |||
internal and external operating experience [P.2.a] (Section 4OA2.5.a). | |||
* Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to take timely corrective action | |||
for a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, from May 2011, through | |||
August 2012, the licensee failed to restore a degraded condition, which included | |||
a corrective action to perform a new design analysis for the emergency | |||
feedwater pump AB after the removal of heat trace circuit 1-8C, despite having a | |||
reasonable amount of time to complete it. Currently, plant operators are required | |||
once per shift to perform temperature verifications of the heat trace to ensure | |||
condensation does not form in the steam supply pipe to the turbine driven pump | |||
and to maintain emergency feedwater pump AB in an operable but degraded | |||
status until the design analysis is complete. This finding was entered into the | |||
licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03754. | |||
The team determined that the failure to complete the corrective action of | |||
performing a new design analysis to determine if emergency feedwater pump AB | |||
-5- Enclosure 2 | |||
required a design modification based on the analysis in a timely manner was a | |||
was | performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor | ||
because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating | |||
The | Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability | ||
of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable | |||
consequences. Specifically, failure to implement this corrective action could | |||
result in reduced reliability of the emergency feedwater pump AB. In accordance | |||
with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial | |||
Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating | |||
Systems Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter | |||
0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings | |||
at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) | |||
because it affected the design or qualification of mitigating systems, structures, | |||
and components; however, the systems, structures, and components maintained | |||
operability. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance | |||
area, resources component, in that the licensee failed to minimize a long- | |||
standing equipment issue adequately to assure nuclear safety [H.2(a)] (Section | |||
4OA2.5.b). | |||
* Green. The team identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to establish measures to assure that | |||
applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis as defined in | |||
10 CFR 50.2 are correctly translated into procedures. Specifically, the licensee | |||
has not determined a basis for the level at which flood control measures are | |||
initiated, two years after receiving a non-cited violation for the same deficiency. | |||
As an interim compensatory measure for a previous violation of inadequate | |||
technical specifications, the licensee modified their flooding procedure to include | |||
an action to start shutting flood control doors at a river level of 24 feet instead of | |||
27 feet. The licensee recognized the need to establish a basis for initiating these | |||
actions at 24 feet, and issued a corrective action to track completion. The | |||
licensee extended the due date several times and had not completed it by the | |||
arrival of the inspection team. The inspection team questioned why the licensee | |||
had not completed the calculation to justify their basis for their compensatory | |||
measures, noting that it had been over two years since the original violation was | |||
identified. The inspectors verified through walk-downs, procedure reviews, and | |||
historical data that the licensees use of 24 feet did not represent an immediate | |||
operability concern, and that the current river level was sufficiently low to allow | |||
time for the licensee to correct the deficiency. This finding was entered into the | |||
licensees corrective action program as condition report CR-WF3-2012-03752. | |||
The failure to complete the corrective action to establish a basis for flood control | |||
measures in a timely manner was a performance deficiency. The performance | |||
deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection | |||
from external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected | |||
the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of | |||
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. | |||
Specifically, the licensee failed to verify through calculations or analysis that the | |||
-6- Enclosure 2 | |||
actions taken to secure flood doors could be completed in time to protect safety- | |||
related equipment from flooding due to a levee failure. In accordance with | |||
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization | |||
of Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems | |||
Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, | |||
accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial | Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at | ||
Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) | |||
Cornerstone. | because it did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function | ||
specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating | |||
event. Specifically, the inspectors confirmed that the licensee could reasonably | |||
ensure the flood control doors could perform their safety function. This finding | |||
had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, resources | |||
the | component in that the licensee failed to maintain long term plant safety by | ||
the licensee failed to | maintenance of design margins and ensuring engineering backlogs low enough | ||
to support safety. [H.2.a] (Section 4OA2.5.c). | |||
B. Licensee-Identified Violations | |||
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been | |||
reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken by the licensee have been entered | |||
into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and associated corrective | |||
action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. | |||
-7- Enclosure 2 | |||
REPORT DETAILS | |||
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA) | |||
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152) | |||
The team based the following conclusions on the sample of corrective action documents | |||
that were initiated in the assessment period, which ranged from May 1, 2010, to the end | |||
of the on-site portion of this inspection on August 2, 2012. | |||
.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The team reviewed approximately 350 corrective action documents, including | |||
associated root cause, apparent cause, and direct cause evaluations, out of | |||
approximately 17,000 corrective action documents that were issued between | |||
May 1, 2010, and August 2, 2012, to determine if problems were being properly | |||
identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for | |||
evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health | |||
reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and | |||
for | metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. | ||
The team evaluated the licensees efforts in establishing the scope of problems | |||
by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessments results, audits, | |||
system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and | |||
preventive maintenance tasks. The team reviewed work requests and attended | |||
the licensees daily Condition Review Group, (which is the management review | |||
committee meeting to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and | |||
significance determination process), as well as observing the interfaces with the | |||
operability assessment and work control processes when applicable. The teams | |||
review included verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and | |||
extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic | |||
implications and previous occurrences. The team assessed the timeliness and | |||
effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for | |||
additional examples of similar problems. The team conducted interviews with | |||
plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist where problems may | |||
be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program. | |||
The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past | |||
NRC-identified violations to ensure that the corrective action addressed the | |||
issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample | |||
of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to ensure that | |||
corrective actions were still appropriate and timely. | |||
The team considered risk insights from both the NRCs and Waterford Steam | |||
Electric Station, Unit 3s risk assessments to focus the sample selection and | |||
plant tours on risk significant systems and components. The team selected the | |||
-8- Enclosure 2 | |||
component cooling water and auxiliary component cooling water systems as risk | |||
significant systems to review. The samples reviewed by the team focused on, | |||
that | but were not limited to, these systems. The team also expanded their review to | ||
include five years of evaluations involving the emergency feedwater system to | |||
determine whether problems were being effectively addressed. The team | |||
conducted a walk-down of these systems to assess whether problems were | |||
identified and entered into the corrective action program. | |||
b. Assessments | |||
1. Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification | |||
The team concluded in most cases that the licensee identified issues and | |||
adverse conditions and entered them into the corrective action program in | |||
accordance with the licensees corrective action program guidance and NRC | |||
requirements. The team determined that the licensee generally was identifying | |||
problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. | |||
The team identified one condition adverse to quality that was not placed in the | |||
corrective action program. The licensee wrote approximately 17,000 condition | |||
reports during the two-year period of review. The team noted that this high rate | |||
of condition report generation is generally a sign of a healthy corrective action | |||
program. The following issues were noted by the team: | |||
* Through the review of NRC information notices over the assessment | |||
period, the team identified that the licensee failed to enter one information | |||
notice applicable to Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3s emergency | |||
diesel generator voltage regulators into their corrective action program. | |||
The team documented this as a Green non-cited violation in | |||
Section 4OA2.5.a of this report. | |||
* The team identified that some main control room deficiencies, although | |||
identified by white identification tags, had not been entered into the | |||
licensees corrective action program. The team documented this as a | |||
Green non-cited violation in Section 4OA2.5.d of this report. | |||
* The licensee self-identified a failure to initiate condition reports that | |||
resulted in missed operability assessments on two occasions when the | |||
emergency feedwater pump AB heat trace fell below the required | |||
temperature per the operating instruction. The team documented this as | |||
a licensee identified violation in Section 4OA7 of this report. | |||
2. Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues | |||
The team concluded that generally the licensee effectively prioritized and | |||
evaluated conditions adverse to quality. The team found that even with the high | |||
number of condition reports initiated on a daily basis, the licensees daily action | |||
review committee pre-screening and the management review committees | |||
-9- Enclosure 2 | |||
effectively assessed each condition adverse to quality. The following are issues | |||
The licensee | the team identified or reviewed during the inspection: | ||
* The licensees extent of condition review for an incorrect preventive | |||
maintenance classification of a limit switch identified additional incorrect | |||
classifications. However, the team identified that the licensee failed to | |||
initiate a separate condition report to document these additional errors | |||
and, therefore, failed to ensure the testing requirements for each of the | |||
newly identified components were met until challenged by the team. This | |||
was documented in Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03557. | |||
* The team identified that the licensee performed an inadequate apparent | |||
cause evaluation of a failure of the security diesel generator. The | |||
evaluation identified one cause as being an incorrect maintenance | |||
classification. When the licensee found the component was properly | |||
classified in its preventative maintenance optimization program, the | |||
licensee did not revise their apparent cause. Instead, they determined | |||
other corrective actions to address security equipment issues. | |||
* The team identified that the apparent cause evaluation for inservice | |||
testing failures of the main feed isolation valves was determined to be | |||
incorrect. The licensee first determined that the failure was the result of | |||
moisture intrusion in the hydraulic fluid. However, additional failures and | |||
a subsequent root cause analysis showed that the failure mechanism | |||
was actually interior varnishing. This was identified by review of external | |||
operating experience that was available, but missed during the initial | |||
apparent cause evaluation. | |||
* The team identified a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion V, that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with | |||
the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The licensee downgraded a Category A | |||
condition report to Category B without obtaining approval of the condition | |||
review group as required by Procedure EN-L1-102, Corrective Action | |||
Program. This was documented in Condition Report CR-WF3-2012- | |||
03325. | |||
* The team reviewed roll up Condition Report CR-WF3-2011-07610, which | |||
identified that the quality of six previous causal analyses was inadequate. | |||
* The team identified that the licensee categorized many conditions | |||
adverse to quality on the diesel fire pump as Category D. Although their | |||
process allowed this, they could have identified and corrected non- | |||
conforming trends in the diesel fire pumps more effectively with a higher | |||
prioritization. This was documented in Condition Report CR-WF3-2012- | |||
03747. | |||
- 10 - Enclosure 2 | |||
The | * The team determined that the licensee categorized a problem with the | ||
steam generator feedwater pump B requiring manual operation as an | |||
Operator Burden when it could have met the definition of an Operator | |||
Workaround, which carried a higher level of prioritization in the licensee | |||
work planning process. | |||
* The team reviewed a licensee failure to frequently and regularly review a | |||
degraded and nonconforming condition associated with the reactor | |||
coolant pump N-9000 stage seals as required by Procedure EN-OP-104, | |||
Operability Determination Process. This is an example of the licensee | |||
not thoroughly evaluating problems, such that the resolutions address | |||
causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. This was documented in | |||
NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2011002 as a Green non-cited | |||
violation. | |||
The team reviewed a number of condition reports that involved operability | |||
reviews to assess the quality, timeliness, and prioritization of operability | |||
assessments. In general, both immediate and prompt operability assessments | |||
reviewed were adequately completed in a timely manner. | |||
3. Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Actions | |||
Overall, the team concluded that the licensee generally developed appropriate | |||
corrective actions to address problems. However, the team identified a number | |||
of corrective actions associated with conditions adverse to quality that were not | |||
completed in a timely manner: | |||
basis | * The team identified that the licensee failed to take timely corrective | ||
actions to correct a design basis analysis for the emergency feedwater | |||
pump AB after the removal of required heat trace on the steam supply | |||
piping. The team documented this as a Green non-cited violation in | |||
Section 4OA2.5.b of this report. | |||
* The team identified that the licensee failed to take timely corrective | |||
actions to establish a basis through analysis for the initiation of flood | |||
control measures at a river level of 24 feet. The team documented this as | |||
a Green cited violation in Section 4OA2.5.c of this report. | |||
* The team identified that the licensee failed to have a GMPO/Director | |||
approve a due date extension on a long-term corrective action from | |||
CR-WF3-2011-00887 (Corrective Action 13), which is not permitted by | |||
Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program. This resulted in a | |||
minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, that is not | |||
subject to enforcement action in accordance with NRCs Enforcement | |||
Policy. The corrective action was to complete an engineering analysis to | |||
determine the scope of modifications needed for the steam driven | |||
- 11 - Enclosure 2 | |||
emergency feedwater turbine steam supply piping. This was documented | |||
in Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03461. | |||
the | * The team identified a failure to complete a corrective action to validate | ||
data for work hours for security personnel. This resulted in a minor | |||
violation of 10 CFR 26.205.e that is not subject to enforcement action in | |||
accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. This was documented in | |||
Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03729. | |||
* The team reviewed a licensee failure to take or perform effective | |||
corrective actions for boric acid leaks for the past seven years. This is an | |||
example of the licensees failure to effectively correct identified boric acid | |||
leaks in a timely manner. This was documented in NRC Inspection | |||
Report 05000382/2010006 as a Green non-cited violation. | |||
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The team examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating | |||
experience, including reviewing the governing procedure and self-assessments. | |||
The team reviewed a sample of 10 condition reports examining operating | |||
experience documents that had been issued during the assessment period to | |||
determine whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notification for | |||
relevance to the facility. The team then examined whether the licensee had | |||
entered those items into their corrective action program and assigned actions to | |||
address the issues. The team reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and | |||
corrective action documents to verify whether the licensee had appropriately | |||
included industry-operating experience. | |||
b. Assessment | |||
Overall, the team determined that the licensee was adequately evaluating | |||
industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, based on reviewing a | |||
sample of 10 condition reports examining industry operating experience. The | |||
licensee entered all but one applicable item in the corrective action program in | |||
accordance with station procedures. The team concluded that the licensee was | |||
evaluating industry operating experience when performing root cause and | |||
apparent cause evaluations. Both internal and external operating experiences | |||
were being incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs. The | |||
following are issues the team identified or reviewed during the inspection: | |||
* The team identified through the review of NRC information notices over | |||
the assessment period that the licensee had failed to enter one | |||
information notice applicable to Waterford 3 emergency diesel generator | |||
voltage regulators into their corrective action program. In response, the | |||
licensee did a complete audit of all NRC information notices issued during | |||
- 12 - Enclosure 2 | |||
the assessment period and found no other discrepancies. The team | |||
documented this as a Green non-cited violation in Section 4OA2.5.a | |||
of this report. | |||
* The team reviewed three examples from this assessment period of the | |||
licensees failure in the use of operating experience, resulting in the | |||
licensee not implementing and institutionalizing operating experience | |||
through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and | |||
training programs. | |||
o The team reviewed a licensee failure to implement a preventative | |||
maintenance activity to replace dry cooling tower process analog | |||
control cards based on internal and industry-wide operating | |||
experience that documented previous failures of process analog | |||
control cards due to age-related degradation after 15 years. This | |||
was documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2011004 as | |||
a Green non-cited violation. | |||
o The team reviewed a licensee failure to identify that varnish | |||
deposits were causing the main feedwater isolation valve to fail its | |||
inservice testing. This resulted from the licensees failure to use | |||
relevant external operating experience to identify that other sites | |||
experienced similar failures of feedwater isolation valves due to | |||
varnish deposits on the interior surfaces. This was documented in | |||
NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2011005 as a Green non-cited | |||
violation. | |||
o The team reviewed a licensee failure to evaluate the internal | |||
condition of the condensate and refueling water storage pool | |||
structures through performance of appropriate preventative | |||
maintenance after previous documented industry-wide operating | |||
experience of concrete degradation due to boric acid. This was | |||
documented in Inspection Report 05000382/2011003 as a Green | |||
non-cited violation. | |||
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The team reviewed a sample size of 22 licensee self-assessments, surveillances, | |||
and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance | |||
trends and effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to | |||
assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated | |||
the use of self- and third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance | |||
department, and the role of the performance improvement group related to | |||
licensee performance. The specific self-assessment documents reviewed are | |||
listed in the Attachment. | |||
- 13 - Enclosure 2 | |||
b. Assessment | |||
The team concluded that the licensee had an effective self-assessment process. | |||
Licensee management was involved with developing tactical self-assessments. | |||
The team determined that self-assessments were self-critical and thorough | |||
enough to identify deficiencies. The following are issues the team reviewed | |||
during the inspection: | |||
* The team reviewed a licensee self-assessment of plant status and | |||
configuration control performed in March 2012. This self-assessment | |||
was an opportunity for the site to identify and address the issues | |||
associated with control room deficiencies documented in | |||
Section 4OA2.5.d of this report, but the assessment did not discuss them. | |||
* The team reviewed the licensees failure to perform an adequate risk | |||
assessment associated with the maintenance window for the turbine | |||
driven emergency feedwater pump. This is an example of the licensees | |||
failure to use independent and self-assessments because the licensee | |||
performed a probabilistic risk assessment model update in April 2009, but | |||
failed to identify an assumption crediting operator actions that were not in | |||
procedures. This was documented in NRC Inspection | |||
Report 05000382/2011007 as a Green non-cited violation. | |||
.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspection team conducted individual interviews with over 30 individuals from | |||
a cross-section of functional organizations: engineering, operations, | |||
maintenance, quality assurance, radiation protection, chemistry, security officers, | |||
and contract personnel. Both supervisory and non-supervisory personnel were | |||
included in these interviews. The team conducted these interviews to assess | |||
whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety- | |||
conscious work environment (SCWE) at Waterford 3. The team also interviewed | |||
the Waterford 3 employee concerns program manager and reviewed the last two | |||
safety culture self-assessment documents. | |||
b. Assessment | |||
Overall, the team concluded that a safety-conscious work environment exists at | |||
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. Employees demonstrated familiarity | |||
with the various avenues available to raise safety concerns. They appeared | |||
comfortable with submitting all nuclear safety issues. | |||
The team noted a potential vulnerability in the licensees safety-conscious work | |||
environment from discussions with plant personnel. There was a perception | |||
among some members of the plant staff that management may use the condition | |||
- 14 - Enclosure 2 | |||
report process to discipline workers when personnel errors were documented in | |||
the condition reports. Additionally, some personnel stated that they did not write | |||
condition reports, but rather they passed the comments along to supervisors who | |||
would enter them into the corrective action program. | |||
Overall, most individuals were familiar with the employee concerns program and | |||
its location on site. There was visibility of the program throughout the site. Many | |||
of the individuals interviewed had knowledge of the employee concerns | |||
manager; however, no one interviewed indicated having direct interactions with | |||
the employee concerns manger during the inspection period. Personnel | |||
understood and were confident in the confidentiality of the program. | |||
Site personnel have received initial and annual refresher training, which provided | |||
instruction on safety-conscious work environment policies. Many of the | |||
individuals interviewed were familiar with this training and with the overall | |||
message in the training. However, not everyone was familiar with the details of | |||
the policy. None of the individuals interviewed cited any examples of | |||
harassment, intimidation, retaliation or discrimination, or any negative reactions | |||
from management when individuals raised nuclear safety concerns. Finally, | |||
individuals indicated that if they were to believe unsafe conditions existed, they | |||
would feel comfortable stopping work without fear of retaliation, even if such | |||
actions would prolong an outage or extend a planned schedule. | |||
.5 Specific Issues Identified During This Inspection | |||
a. Failure to Promptly Determine the Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators | |||
Introduction. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, | |||
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a failure to follow | |||
Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process. Specifically, the licensee | |||
failed to determine the operability of the emergency diesel generators immediately upon | |||
discovery without delay and in a controlled manner using the best information available | |||
in response to NRC Information Notice 2010-04. | |||
Description. The team reviewed the licensees corrective actions taken in response to | |||
an NRC Information Notice. On February 26, 2010, the NRC issued Information | |||
Notice 2010-04, Diesel Generator Voltage Regulation System Component [Failure] Due | |||
to Latent Manufacturing Defect. This information notice describes the failure of a linear | |||
power reactor in an emergency diesel generator voltage regulation system at a plant | |||
where the licensees preventive maintenance program did not address the emergency | |||
diesel generator excitation system magnetic components. | |||
The licensee completed an evaluation of the information notice per Procedure EN- | |||
OE-100, Operating Experience Program, on July 1, 2010. This evaluation indicated | |||
that Waterford 3 was vulnerable and susceptible to the issue, but the licensee failed to | |||
issue a condition report as required by their procedure. The failure to initiate a condition | |||
report resulted in the licensees failure to perform an operability determination of the | |||
- 15 - Enclosure 2 | |||
emergency diesel generators as required by Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability | |||
Determination Process, Revision 6. | |||
In the evaluation, the licensee considered the fact that they had an Action Request in | |||
their system that addressed a similar concern to be an acceptable response to this | |||
information notice. Action Request 079684 was initiated on December 10, 2009, to | |||
address recommendations from an INPO assistance visit in 2007 and it included an | |||
action to add routine thermography inspections within the voltage regulator cabinets to | |||
their preventative maintenance program. The Entergy Nuclear Corporate Operating | |||
Experience group also reviewed this information notice on March 4, 2010. In response, | |||
they issued a specific action through their operating experience database to evaluate the | |||
licensee | information notice to each Entergy site. However, they failed to issue one to | ||
Waterford 3. | |||
The licensee started routing Action Request 079684 for approval, but they stopped on | |||
March 15, 2010. The licensee attributed this to an incomplete turnover by departing | |||
personnel. No other approval actions were taken until April 16, 2012, when the request | |||
was routed to the next person in the approval process. Again, no further action was | |||
taken, and the action request was not completed when the inspection team reviewed the | |||
issue. | |||
The inspectors questioned why there was no condition report generated and why the | |||
action request had not been completed more than two years after issuance. In | |||
particular, the inspectors questioned whether there was an operability concern for the | |||
emergency diesel generators. The licensee recognized their failure to issue a condition | |||
report and perform an operability determination. They performed a prompt operability | |||
determination based on operating data, work history, and no observed degradation in | |||
performance, and declared the emergency diesel generators operable. In addition, they | |||
plan to conduct the thermography during the next scheduled emergency diesel | |||
generator surveillance. | |||
The licensee initiated CR-WF3-2012-00596 and CR-WF3-2012-03761 to address the | |||
issue. They also initiated CR-HQN-2012-00857 to address the failure of the corporate | |||
organization to include Waterford 3 in their site-specific requests. | |||
Analysis. The failure to promptly perform an operability determination of the emergency | |||
diesel generators in response to NRC Information Notice 2010-04 was a performance | |||
deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated | |||
with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and | |||
affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of | |||
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. | |||
Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly determine the operability of the diesel | |||
generators after obtaining information of a potential condition adverse to quality. In | |||
accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial | |||
Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems | |||
Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, | |||
The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was | |||
- 16 - Enclosure 2 | |||
determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a deficiency | |||
affecting the design or qualification of the system, it did not represent a loss of system or | |||
function, and it was a Technical Specification system but did not represent an actual loss | |||
of function of a single train for greater than it allowed outage time. Specifically, the | |||
licensee performed an operability determination in response to the inspectors questions | |||
and determined the emergency diesel generators were operable based on a review of | |||
surveillance data and maintenance records. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in | |||
the problem identification and resolution area, operating experience component, in that | |||
the licensee failed to systematically collect, evaluate, and communicate to affected | |||
internal stakeholders in a timely manner relevant internal and external operating | |||
experience [P.2.a]. | |||
Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states, in part, that activities | |||
affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or | |||
drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in | |||
accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Licensee Procedure | |||
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 6, Section 5.1 step 13 | |||
required that an operability should be determined immediately upon discovery without | |||
delay and in a controlled manner using the best information available. Contrary to this | |||
requirement, from July 1, 2010, to July 25, 2012, the licensee failed to accomplish an | |||
activity affecting quality prescribed by documented instructions. Specifically, the | |||
licensee failed to determine the operability of the emergency diesel generators as | |||
required by Licensee Procedure EN-OP-104 in response to NRC Information | |||
Notice 2010-04. The licensee immediately determined the operability of the emergency | |||
diesel generators based on operating data and work history, and they established a | |||
reasonable basis for operability. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent | |||
with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy, because it was of very low safety | |||
significance (Green) with no actual or potential safety consequences and was entered | |||
into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03761 | |||
to address recurrence. (NCV 05000382/2012008-01, Failure to Promptly Determine the | |||
Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators) | |||
b. Failure to Take Corrective Action Associated with the Emergency Feedwater Pump AB | |||
Introduction. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, | |||
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to take timely corrective | |||
action for a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to restore a | |||
degraded condition, which included a corrective action to perform a new design analysis | |||
for the emergency feedwater pump AB after the removal of heat trace circuit 1-8C | |||
despite having a reasonable amount of time to complete it. | |||
Description. The team performed an in-depth review of corrective actions associated | |||
with the emergency feedwater system. The turbine driven emergency feedwater pump | |||
AB has steam piping that is maintained at a high temperature with a heat trace to | |||
prevent excessive condensation from developing, which could reduce the reliability of | |||
the pump to perform its design function. The licensee removed heat trace circuit 1-8C | |||
- 17 - Enclosure 2 | |||
from a horizontal section of steam piping because the heat trace was not maintaining the | |||
piping above the required setpoint. In May 2011, the licensee determined that | |||
emergency feedwater pump AB was operable but degraded. A corrective action was | |||
initiated to perform a design analysis using RELAP to determine what modifications | |||
needed to be performed on the system to return the system to a fully operable status. | |||
The team identified that the licensee extended the due date twice for the corrective | |||
action, first from February 23 to June 15, 2012, and then from June 15 until | |||
October 12, 2012. The last extension was approved due to lack of engineering | |||
resources resulting from other activities placed at a higher priority by Waterford 3 | |||
management. The team determined that from May 2011 to August 2012, a corrective | |||
corrective action to | action to perform a design analysis for the long-standing equipment issue of determining | ||
whether or not a plant modification is needed to maintain the system operable had not | |||
been performed in a timely manner. Currently, plant operators are required once per | |||
shift to perform temperature verifications of the heat trace to ensure condensation does | |||
not form in the steam supply pipe to the turbine driven pump and maintain emergency | |||
feedwater pump AB in an operable, but degraded, status until the design analysis is | |||
complete. The licensee has entered the concern into their corrective action program as | |||
Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03754. | |||
Analysis. The team determined that the failure to complete the corrective action of | |||
performing a new design analysis to determine if emergency feedwater pump AB | |||
required a design modification based on the analysis in a timely manner was a | |||
performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it | |||
affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone | |||
objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to | |||
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to implement | |||
this corrective action could result in reduced reliability of the emergency feedwater pump | |||
AB. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial | |||
Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems | |||
Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, | |||
The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was | |||
determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it affected the design | |||
or qualification of mitigating systems, structures, and components; however, the | |||
systems, structures, and components maintained operability. This finding had a cross- | |||
cutting aspect in the human performance area, resources component, in that the | |||
licensee failed to minimize a long-standing equipment issue adequately to assure | |||
nuclear safety [H.2(a)]. | |||
Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, | |||
states, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, | |||
such as failures, malfunction, deficiencies, deviations and non-conformances are | |||
promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, from May 2011 through | |||
August 2012, the licensee failed to assure that measures were established to assure | |||
that a condition adverse to quality was promptly corrected. Specifically, the licensee | |||
failed to take prompt corrective action to restore a degraded condition by not performing | |||
- 18 - Enclosure 2 | |||
a design analysis for emergency feedwater pump AB after heat trace circuit 1-8C was | |||
removed. Consequently, plant operators are required once per shift to perform | |||
temperature verifications of the heat trace to ensure condensation does not form in the | |||
steam supply pipe to the turbine driven pump and maintain emergency feedwater pump | |||
AB in an operable, but degraded, status until the design analysis is complete. This | |||
violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement | |||
Policy because it was of very low safety significance (Green) with no actual or potential | |||
safety consequence and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03754 to address recurrence. (NCV 05000382/2012008-02, Failure to | |||
Take Corrective Action Associated with Emergency Feedwater Pump AB) | |||
c. Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a Basis for Flood Control Measures | |||
Introduction. The team identified a Green cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to establish measures to assure that | |||
applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 are | |||
correctly translated into procedures. Specifically, the licensee has not determined a | |||
basis for the level at which flood control measures are initiated, two years after receiving | |||
a non-cited violation for the same deficiency. | |||
Description. The team reviewed the licensees corrective actions taken in response to a | |||
non-cited violation from 2010 documented as NCV 2010006-02, Non-conservative | |||
Technical Specification 3.7.5 Action Statement. The licensee entered this violation into | |||
their corrective action program under CR-WF3-2010-03232 on May 24, 2010. The | |||
licensee determined that Technical Specification 3.7.5 Flood Protection was not | |||
required to be included in their technical specifications and submitted an amendment to | |||
move it to the Technical Requirements Manual. As an interim compensatory measure, | |||
the licensee modified their Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather and Flooding to | |||
include an action to start shutting flood control doors at a river level of 24 feet instead of | |||
27 feet. | |||
The required actions included verifying that all flood control penetrations below a level of | |||
30 feet were shut within 12 hours before the river was projected to reach 27 feet. There | |||
are seven flood control doors of varying sizes that are required to be shut and two valves | |||
that are required to be locked shut. Five of these doors and both valves are normally | |||
shut during power operations, but may be open during outages. Most of them require | |||
entry into the Radiologically Controlled Area and one requires entry into a locked room | |||
for access. | |||
The licensee recognized the need to establish a basis for initiating these actions at | |||
24 feet, and issued Corrective Action 18 (CA-18) in CR-WF3-2010-03232 on | |||
March 10, 2011, to formally evaluate and document whether 24 feet was an acceptable | |||
river level elevation at which to initiate flood control measures. The CA-18 due date was | |||
extended twice and on February 24, 2012, they determined that the methodology they | |||
intended to use was not acceptable. CA-18 was closed to Corrective Action 23 (CA-23) | |||
which directed the licensee to issue an engineering change using the methodology used | |||
- 19 - Enclosure 2 | |||
in Waterford 3 UFSAR Section 2.4.3.7. The due date for CA-23 was itself extended to | |||
Analysis. | September 30, 2012. | ||
The inspection team questioned why the licensee had not completed the calculation | |||
the | to justify their basis for their compensatory measures, noting that it had been over | ||
two years since the original violation was identified. The licensee initiated | |||
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, | CR-WF3-2012-03752 to address this concern. The inspectors verified through | ||
Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, | walk-downs, procedure reviews, and historical data that the licensees use of 24 feet | ||
significance (Green) because | did not represent an immediate operability concern and that the current river level was | ||
sufficiently low to allow time for the licensee to correct the deficiency. | |||
the | Analysis. The failure to complete the corrective action to establish a basis for flood | ||
control measures in a timely manner was a performance deficiency. The performance | |||
deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection from | |||
external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the | |||
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that | |||
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the | |||
licensee failed to verify through calculations or analysis that the actions taken to secure | |||
flood doors could be completed in time to protect safety-related equipment from flooding | |||
due to a levee failure. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, | |||
Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to affect | |||
the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual | |||
Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings | |||
at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) | |||
because it did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically | |||
designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. Specifically, | |||
the inspectors confirmed that the licensee could reasonably ensure the flood control | |||
doors could perform their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the | |||
human performance area, resources component in that the licensee failed to maintain | |||
long term plant safety by maintenance of design margins and ensuring engineering | |||
backlogs low enough to support safety [H.2.a]. | |||
Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, that measures shall be established to | |||
assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in | |||
10 CFR 50.2, are correctly translated into specifications, procedures and instructions. | |||
Contrary to the above, from March 10, 2011, to August 2, 2012, the licensee failed to | |||
establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design | |||
basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, were correctly translated into specifications, | |||
procedures and instructions. Specifically, the licensee had not established a design | |||
basis to determine the river level at which flood control measures were to be initiated for | |||
closing the water tight doors, as required in Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather | |||
and Flooding. The licensee demonstrated sufficient safety margin based on historical | |||
data and current river levels to provide assurance that this is not an immediate safety | |||
concern. Due to the licensees failure to restore compliance within a reasonable time | |||
- 20 - Enclosure 2 | |||
following previous NCV 05000382/2010006-02, this violation is being cited as a Notice of | |||
Violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is a | |||
violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. A Notice of Violation is attached. | |||
(VIO 05000382/2012008-03, Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a | |||
Basis for Flood Control Measures) | |||
d. Failure to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment Status | |||
Introduction. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, | |||
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a failure to follow | |||
Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to | |||
ensure that control room operators knew the status of equipment at all times. | |||
Description. The team reviewed how the licensee was addressing deficiencies in plant | |||
instrumentation, controls, and equipment that impacted the ability of operators to | |||
properly operate the plant. This included a review of the licensees program to identify, | |||
compensate for, and correct these plant deficiencies and a walk-down of the control | |||
room. | |||
While interviewing the person responsible for tracking plant deficiencies, the inspectors | |||
discovered that the licensee had two separate governing procedures. The licensee used | |||
the Entergy Fleet Administrative Procedure EN-FAP-OP-006, Operator Aggregate | |||
Impact Index Performance Indicator, to track several categories of plant deficiencies in | |||
a standardized spreadsheet. The licensee also had the local departmental Operating | |||
Instruction OI-002-000, Annunciator, Control Room Instrumentation and Workarounds | |||
Status Control. This instruction had different definitions for categories of plant | |||
deficiencies and directed the use of a different database. | |||
The inspectors then interviewed the on shift operators in the control room and reviewed | |||
both databases. The inspectors identified several issues: | |||
* The person responsible for tracking plant deficiencies was only using the fleet | |||
administrative procedure and was unaware of the operating instruction. | |||
* On one shift, the shift technical advisor believed the fleet administrative | |||
procedure was being used and was not aware of the operating instruction, | |||
while the control room supervisor believed the operating instruction was | |||
being used and was not aware of the fleet administrative procedure. | |||
* The database required by the operating instruction had not been maintained | |||
for two years. | |||
* The operating instruction did not have a category for Operator Burdens; | |||
however, the shift crew differentiated between Operator Workarounds and | |||
Operator Burdens. In most cases, they chose the less conservative | |||
designation of Operator Burden. | |||
- 21 - Enclosure 2 | |||
* The fleet administrative procedure was intended for fleet performance | |||
reporting, not plant deficiency control. It does not direct any actions to | |||
address and correct plant deficiencies. | |||
* The operating instruction subcategorizes Workarounds by scheduling of | |||
resources rather than by risk significance or impact to operators. The fleet | |||
administrative procedure does not subcategorize Operator Workarounds or | |||
Operator Burdens, but the licensee carried over this practice to the fleet | |||
administrative procedure spreadsheet. This could lead to improper | |||
prioritization of corrective actions. | |||
* The operating instruction directs identification of plant deficiencies through a | |||
review of work requests, but it does not require a review of condition reports. | |||
* Some plant deficiencies were not entered into either database. | |||
* Operators were using the same tags for Control Room Deficiencies and | |||
informal operator notes. These notes are not controlled by either procedure. | |||
* A list of plant deficiencies was not immediately available to control room | |||
operators. | |||
The inspectors determined that when the fleet administrative procedure was issued in | |||
March 2010, the licensee changed their process for tracking deficiencies. The licensee | |||
Procedure W2.109, Procedure Development, Review & Approval, is safety-related and | |||
requires implementation and maintenance of procedures and departmental instructions. | |||
This procedure prescribes a process for approving and revising procedures and | |||
instructions and conducting necessary training. When the licensee began tracking plant | |||
deficiencies per the fleet administrative procedure, the licensee did not revise the | |||
operating instruction to conform to the new process, and the licensee did not train all | |||
affected personnel on the new process. As a result, the operators did not maintain a | |||
consistent accurate list and were not aware of all plant deficiencies, and therefore were | |||
not aware of the status of all plant equipment. This was not in accordance with | |||
Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Revision 9, Section 5.13 step 1, which | |||
states that the status of plant equipment is known at all times by plant operators. | |||
The licensee initiated CR-WF3-2012-03732 to address the issue. The licensee will | |||
revise the operating instruction to address the process issues and make the intended | |||
changes. | |||
Analysis. The failure to ensure that operators were aware of the status of all plant | |||
equipment was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than | |||
minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating | |||
Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those | |||
events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown | |||
as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a procedure | |||
designed to ensure operators were aware of deficiencies in the instrumentation, controls, | |||
- 22 - Enclosure 2 | |||
and operation of nuclear plant systems. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual | |||
Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the issue was | |||
The | determined to affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC | ||
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process | |||
(SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety | |||
significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation | |||
equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable | |||
shutdown condition. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance | |||
area, work practices component, in that the licensee failed to define and effectively | |||
communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance, and personnel did not | |||
follow procedures [H.4.b]. | |||
Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states, in part, that activities | |||
affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or | |||
drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstance and shall be accomplished in | |||
accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Procedure EN-OP-115, | |||
Conduct of Operations, Revision 9, Section 5.13, step 1, states that the status of plant | |||
equipment is known at all times by plant operators. Contrary to this requirement, from | |||
March 2, 2010, to August 1, 2012, the licensee failed to accomplish an activity affecting | |||
quality in accordance with the documented instructions appropriate to the circumstance. | |||
Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure operators knew the status of plant equipment | |||
at all times in accordance with Licensee Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of | |||
Operations. The licensee has a corrective action to revise their operating instruction for | |||
tracking plant deficiencies, and none of the current plant deficiencies represents an | |||
immediate safety concern. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with | |||
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy, because it was of very low safety significance | |||
(Green) with no actual or potential safety consequences and was entered into the | |||
licensees corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-03732 to address recurrence. | |||
(NCV 05000382/2012008-04, Failure to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment | |||
Status) | |||
e. Failure to Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition | |||
Introduction. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, | |||
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, because the licensee failed to determine | |||
the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality and take corrective actions to | |||
prevent recurrence. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure that the cause of the | |||
condition was determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition associated | |||
with a contractors non-compliance with site procedural requirements. | |||
Description. During refuel outage 16 in 2009, contract instrumentation and control | |||
technicians performed a functional test on a feedwater heater level switch according to | |||
work order instructions. Following restoration, a plant transient occurred because a | |||
valve was out of position (CR-WF3-2009-7420). The licensee determined that the event | |||
constituted a significant condition adverse to quality in accordance with guidance from | |||
Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process. During the valve manipulation, the | |||
- 23 - Enclosure 2 | |||
work instructions called for concurrent verification. However the licensees root cause | |||
analysis determined that the contract workers failed to perform concurrent verification as | |||
required by the procedure (NCV 2011003-04). The contract workers knew the | |||
procedural requirement, but they behaved inappropriately when they chose not to follow | |||
component | the instructions. The licensees root cause analysis did not determine why the contract | ||
workers chose not to follow the procedure. The licensees corrective action to preclude | |||
repetition (CAPR) of this significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) was to release | |||
the contract workers for not following the procedure and prohibit them from future work | |||
at Entergy sites. No actions to preclude repetition that addressed the underlying cause | |||
of the failure to perform concurrent verification were taken. The team identified that | |||
despite guidance provided in Procedure EN-LI-118, Attachment 9.9, Root Cause | |||
Evaluation Process, which states that discipline of individuals is not an appropriate | |||
CAPR, disciplinary action was the only CAPR identified in the root cause for | |||
CR-WF3-2009-07420 performed on January 7, 2010. | |||
The failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality and take | |||
corrective action to preclude repetition had no actual consequences on nuclear plant | |||
safety. However, the failure to determine the cause of the condition adverse to quality | |||
and take corrective action to preclude repetition from an ineffective CAPR has the ability | |||
to lead to more significant safety consequences. The licensee documented this violation | |||
in Condition Reports CR-WF3-2012-03769 and CR-WF3-2012-03772. The corrective | |||
actions include developing additional training and provisions to provide additional | |||
contractor oversight. | |||
Analysis. The failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality | |||
and take corrective action to preclude repetition was a performance deficiency. The | |||
performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could lead to | |||
more significant consequences, therefore it is a finding. Specifically, failure to determine | |||
the cause of a significant condition adverse to qualify and take corrective action to | |||
prevent recurrence can result in recurrence of the condition. In accordance with NRC | |||
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the | |||
issue was determined to affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with | |||
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination | |||
Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety | |||
significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of | |||
mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a | |||
stable shutdown condition. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human | |||
performance, work practice component, in that the licensee failed to follow guidance in | |||
the root cause evaluation procedure when developing appropriate corrective actions to | |||
prevent repetition [H.4(b)]. | |||
Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, | |||
states, in part, in the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall | |||
assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to | |||
preclude repetition. Contrary to this requirement, on January 7, 2010, for a significant | |||
condition adverse to quality, the licensee failed to take measures to assure that the | |||
cause of the condition was determined and corrective actions taken to preclude | |||
- 24 - Enclosure 2 | |||
repetition. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the underlying cause of the failure | |||
of the site contract workers to comply with licensees procedural requirements nor were | |||
corrective actions taken to preclude repetition of the condition. The licensees corrective | |||
actions to address this problem include developing additional training and provisions to | |||
provide additional contractor oversight. This violation is being treated as an NCV, | |||
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy because it was of very low safety | |||
significance (Green) with no actual or potential safety consequence and was entered | |||
into the licensees corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-03769 and | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03772 to address recurrence. (NCV 05000382/2012008-05, Failure to | |||
Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition) | |||
4OA6 Meetings | |||
Exit Meeting Summary | |||
On August 2, 2012, the team presented the inspection results to Keith Nichols, Director of | |||
Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues | |||
presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the | |||
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. | |||
On August 23, 2012, the team exited with the revised characterization of the inspection results | |||
to William McKinney, Acting Director Nuclear Safety and Assurance, and other members of the | |||
licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. | |||
On September 24, 2012, the team exited with the revised characterization of the inspection | |||
results to Keith Nichols, Director of Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff. The | |||
licensee acknowledged the issues presented. | |||
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations | |||
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee | |||
and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meets the criteria of Section VI of the | |||
NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV. | |||
* Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, | |||
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states, in part, that activities affecting quality | |||
shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings and shall be | |||
accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Contrary | |||
to this requirement, on May 10 and May 12, 2011, the licensee failed to accomplish an | |||
activity affecting quality as prescribed by the documented procedure. Specifically, the | |||
licensee failed to perform operability reviews when heat trace circuit 1-8C fell below the | |||
operating instruction temperature on the steam supply piping to the emergency | |||
feedwater pump in accordance with Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination | |||
Process. The team determined that this finding was of very low safety significance | |||
(Green) because it affected the design or qualification of a mitigating system structure | |||
component; however, the system structure component maintained its operability. | |||
- 25 - Enclosure 2 | |||
The emergency feed water pump AB was declared inoperable on May 14, 2011; | |||
however, subsequent evaluation declared the pump operable but degraded. | |||
This was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition | |||
Reports CR-WF3-2011-03599 and CR-WF3-2011-03600. | |||
ATTACHMENTS: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION | |||
INFORMATION REQUEST | |||
- 26 - Enclosure 2 | |||
B. Lanka, Manager, System Engineering Manager | SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION | ||
B. Lindsey, Maintenance Manager | KEY POINTS OF CONTACT | ||
M. Mason, Acting Licensing Manager W. McKinney, Acting Director Nuclear Safety and Assurance K. Nichols, Director of Engineering | Licensee Personnel | ||
R. Porter, Design Engineering Manager | S. Adams, Planning Scheduling and Outage Manger | ||
D. Rieder, Quality Assurance Supervisor | J. Bourgeois, Acting Chemistry Manager | ||
K. Rockwood, Acting Technical Training Supervisor | E. Brauner, Supervision of System Engineering | ||
T. Sanders, Security Superintendant P. Stanton, Design Engineering Supervisor | K. Cook, General Manager, Plant Operations | ||
G. Fey, Emergency Planning Manager | |||
S. Fontenot, Acting Corrective Actions and Assessment Manager | |||
R. Gilmore, Engineering and Components Manager | |||
J. Gumnick, Radiation Protection Manager | |||
D. Jacobs, Site Vice President, Operations | |||
J. Jarrell, Assistant Operations Shift Manager | |||
B. Lanka, Manager, System Engineering Manager | |||
B. Lindsey, Maintenance Manager | |||
M. Mason, Acting Licensing Manager | |||
W. McKinney, Acting Director Nuclear Safety and Assurance | |||
K. Nichols, Director of Engineering | |||
R. Porter, Design Engineering Manager | |||
D. Rieder, Quality Assurance Supervisor | |||
K. Rockwood, Acting Technical Training Supervisor | |||
T. Sanders, Security Superintendant | |||
P. Stanton, Design Engineering Supervisor | |||
NRC Personnel | NRC Personnel | ||
R. Kumana, Project Engineer | |||
R. Smith, Team Leader/Senior Resident Inspector D. Overland, Resident Inspector M. Young, Reactor Inspector | R. Smith, Team Leader/Senior Resident Inspector | ||
D. Overland, Resident Inspector | |||
M. Young, Reactor Inspector | |||
A1-1 Attachment 1 | |||
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED | |||
Opened | |||
05000382/2012008-03 VIO Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a Basis for | |||
Flood Control Measures (Section 4OA2.5.c) | |||
Opened and Closed | |||
Flood Control Measures (Section 4OA2.5.c) | 05000382/2012008-01 NCV Failure to Promptly Determine the Operability of the Emergency | ||
Diesel Generators (Section 4OA2.5.a) | |||
05000382/2012008-02 NCV Failure to Take Corrective Action Associated with Emergency | |||
Feedwater Pump AB (Section 4OA2.5.b) 05000382/2012008-04 NCV Failure to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment Status (Section 4OA2.5.d) 05000382/2012008-05 NCV Failure to Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition (Section 4OA2.5.e) | Feedwater Pump AB (Section 4OA2.5.b) | ||
05000382/2012008-04 NCV Failure to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment Status | |||
(Section 4OA2.5.d) | |||
05000382/2012008-05 NCV Failure to Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude | |||
Repetition (Section 4OA2.5.e) | |||
A1-2 Attachment 1 | |||
21 ME-007-005 Time Delay Relay | LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | ||
Setting Check, Adjustment and Functional Test | PROCEDURES | ||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION | |||
TM-OP-100 Operations Training Manual 16 | EN-LI-104 Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process 8 | ||
EN-TQ-114 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program Description | EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Process 19 | ||
EN-LI-118 Root Cause Evaluation Process 17 | |||
EN-LI-119 Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process 15 | |||
EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process 6 | |||
EN-QV-100 Conduct of Nuclear Oversight 7 | |||
EN-QV-102 Quality Control Inspection Program 1 | |||
EN-QV-108 QA Surveillance Process 9 | |||
EN-MA-101 Fundamentals of Maintenance 10 | |||
OP-901-310 Loss of Train A Safety Bus 308 | |||
OP-903-115 Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator / 21 | |||
Engineering Safety Features Test | |||
ME-007-005 Time Delay Relay Setting Check, Adjustment and 16 | |||
Functional Test | |||
EN-TQ-201 Systematic Approach to Training Process 12 | |||
EN-TQ-201 Systematic Approach to Training Process 13 | |||
TM-OP-100 Operations Training Manual 16 | |||
EN-TQ-114 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program 3 | |||
Description | |||
EN-TQ-126 Inprocessing Training Program 6 | |||
A1-3 Attachment 1 | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION | |||
EN-TQ-126 Inprocessing Training Program 8 | |||
NUMBER TITLE | EN-TQ-107 General Employee Training 7 | ||
EN-EC-100 Guidelines For Implementation Of The Employee | EN-EC-100 Guidelines For Implementation Of The Employee 6 | ||
Concerns Program | Concerns Program | ||
EN-MA-133 Control of Scaffolding 8 | |||
OP-002-007 Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance 18 | |||
EN-IS-102 Confined Space Program 8 | |||
OP-903-046 Emergency Feed Pump Operability Check 309 | |||
EN-NE-G-013 Human Reliability Analysis for PSA Models 1 | |||
OP-009-003 Emergency Feedwater 304 | |||
EN-FAP-OP-006 Operator Aggregate Impact Index Performance Indicator 0 | |||
OI-002-000 Operator Instruction Annunciator, Control Room 304 | |||
Instrumentation and Workarounds Status Control | |||
EN-OP-137 Licensed Operator Candidate Selection Process 2 | |||
EN-LI-125 NRC Cross-Cutting Analysis and Trending 1 | |||
EN-OE-100 Operating Experience Program 14 | |||
EN-LI-118-06 Common Cause Analysis (CCA) 3 | |||
OP-002-007 Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance 18 | |||
OP-903-053 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test 17 | |||
UNT-005-013 Fire Protection Program 12 | |||
EN-FAP-LI-001 Condition Review Group (CRG) 3 | |||
A1-4 Attachment 1 | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION | |||
EN- | EN-FAP-LI-003 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process 8 | ||
EN-HU-103 Human Performance Error Reviews 7 | |||
EN- | EN-HU-106 Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence 0 | ||
EN-PL-202 Personnel Expectations Related to Fatigue Management 0 | |||
EN- | EN-TQ-113 Initial Licensed Operator Training Program Description 7 | ||
OP-100-014 Technical Specification and Technical Requirements 317 | |||
Compliance | |||
OP-901-521 Severe Weather and Flooding 305 | |||
EN-OE-100 Operating Experience Program 14 | |||
EN-FAP-AD-001 Fleet Administrative Procedure (FAP) Process 0 | |||
EN-AD-101-01 NMM Procedure Writer Manual 9 | |||
EN-AD-101 Procedure Process 14 | |||
EN-PL-155 Entergy Nuclear Change Management 4 | |||
W2.109 Procedure Development, Review & Approval 13 | |||
EN-NS-102 Fitness For Duty Program 9 | |||
EN-NS-117 Fitness For Duty Processes 6 | |||
EN-OM-123-02 Working Hour Limits eSOMS Users Guide 1 | |||
EN-OM-123 Fatigue Management Program 4 | |||
EN-PL-202 Personnel Expectations Related to Fatigue Management 0 | |||
EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations 9 | |||
A1-5 Attachment 1 | |||
CALCULATIONS | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION | |||
EC-C97-003 Probabilistic Evaluation of Tornado Missile Strike for 0, Change 1 | |||
Waterford 3 Nuclear Station | |||
EC-M00-004 Thermal-Hydraulic Calculation for the EFW Steam Supply 0 | |||
Valves (MS-401A(B)) and Lines | |||
Calculation No. Flooding Analysis Outside Containment 4 | |||
MNQ3-5 | |||
EC-M99-010 Minimum Flow for DCT Sump Pump 0-2 | |||
134669-G-07 Scour Analysis and Scour Protection Design from a 1 | |||
Hypothetical Levee Break | |||
DRAWINGS | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION | |||
G-153 Feedwater, Condensate & Air Evacuation Systems | |||
G-151 Flow Diagram Main & Extraction Steam System 43 | |||
G-924 HVAC - Water Treatment Bldg. & Fire Pump House 6 | |||
G1370 Fire Protection Turbine Bldg. 2 | |||
OTHER DOCUMENTS | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ | |||
DATE | |||
QS-2012-W3-008 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Category A Condition 1 | |||
Reports initiated during April 2012 | |||
QS-2012-W3-007 QA Follow-up review of EN-QV-126 required issues 1 | |||
initiated January, February, and March 2012 | |||
QS-2011-W3-015 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Category A Condition July 26, 2011 | |||
Reports initiated during September, 2011 | |||
QS-2011-W3-012 QA Follow-up Surveillance of the 2011 Corrective September 12, | |||
Action Program (CAP) Audit 2011 | |||
A1-6 Attachment 1 | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ | |||
DATE | |||
QS-2011-W3-009 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Quality Assurance 1 | |||
Finding CR-WF3-2011-3084 | |||
QS-2011-W3-008 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Category A Condition June 13, 2011 | |||
Reports Initiated During May 2011 | |||
QS-2011-W3-007 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Category A Condition 1 | |||
Reports Initiated During April 2011 | |||
QS-2011-W3-006 QA Follow-up to Category A Condition Reports for 1 | |||
January and February 2011 | |||
LO-WLO-2011- Quality of Causal Analysis Focused Assessment October 13, 2011 | |||
0007 | |||
LO-WLO-2011- Maintenance Training Focused Self-Assessment July 29, 2011 | |||
0053 (I&C, Mechanical, Electrical) | |||
LO-WLO-2011- Quality Assurance Self-Assessment Report December 9, 2011 | |||
0124 | |||
LO-WLO-2012- Snapshot Assessment / Benchmark On: PME May 23, 2012 | |||
0015 Performance | |||
LO-WLO-2012- Snapshot Assessment / Benchmark On: February 6, 2012 | |||
0030 Maintenance - Advanced Qualifications | |||
OE34343- Seismic Monitoring Systems Failed to Actuate September 1, 2011 | |||
20111008 During a Seismic Event | |||
OE35212- Extraction Steam System Carbon Steel Reducer November 3, 2011 | |||
20120211 found Below Design Minimum Wall due to | |||
Unpredicted Flow-Accelerated Corrosion | |||
OE34934- Nuclear Regulatory Commission Red Finding Root December 9, 2011 | |||
20120107 Cause Analysis Results | |||
LO-WLO-2010- Licensed Operator Requal 71111.11 Pre-Inspection March 3, 2011 | |||
00143 Assessment | |||
WLO-2011-00018 Evaluate the Effectiveness of Waterford 3 Shift November 3, 2011 | |||
Manager/STA Training Program | |||
LOR/STAR Examination # WWEX-LOR-11046R/S 2011 | |||
Biennial Written Examination # WEX-LOR-11043R/S | |||
Finding CR-WF3-2011-3084 | Exam Worksheet | ||
A1-7 Attachment 1 | |||
January and February 2011 | |||
OE34343- | |||
During a Seismic Event | |||
OE35212- | |||
Unpredicted Flow-Accelerated Corrosion | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ | |||
DATE | |||
Site Broadcast RCA Drain Limitations February 16, 2012 | |||
Waterford 3 - 2010 Employee Concerns Data | |||
Analysis | |||
Waterford 3 - 2011 Employee Concerns Data | |||
Analysis | |||
FCBT-GET- Entergy Fleet Specific Plant Access Training 17 | |||
NUMBER | PATSS | ||
Analysis | Training Review Group Meeting Minutes June 9, 2010 | ||
Analysis | WLP-TRNC-SATR Focused SAT Review 2 | ||
2nd QTR 2010 Instructor Continuing Training Kickoff | |||
LO-WLO-2010- Waterford 3 Equipment Reliability and Core May 27-29, 2010 | |||
0059 Business Focused Self Assessment | |||
LO-WLO-2010- WF3 IST Program Focused Self Assessment August 20-24, 2010 | |||
0091 | |||
LO-WLO-2011- Snapshot Assessment/Benchmark on: Relief Valve October 26, 2011 | |||
0041 Program | |||
WH-TB-11-5-A2 Evaluation Summary: Evaluation of Downstream June 14, 2011 | |||
Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191 | |||
TB-11-5 Assessment of WCAP-16406-P-A Abrasive Wear March 1, 2011 | |||
Model and Recommendations | |||
WH-TB-10-4-A2 Evaluation Summary: CEDM Upper Pressure August 17, 2010 | |||
Housing Venting | |||
TB-10-4 Potential for Stress Corrosion Cracking in Control April 12, 2010 | |||
Element Drive Mechanism Upper Pressure Housing | |||
SD-EFW Emergency Feedwater 11 | |||
DCP-3506 Auxiliary Steam Test Connection for EFW Pump March 12, 1997 | |||
A/B | |||
A1-8 Attachment 1 | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ | |||
DATE | |||
DCP-3506 Auxiliary Steam Test Connection for EFW Pump July 24, 1998 | |||
NUMBER | A/B | ||
A/B | DCP-3506 Auxiliary Steam Test Connection for EFW Pump February 25, 1999 | ||
A/B | A/B | ||
A/B | DCP-3506 Auxiliary Steam Test Connection for EFW Pump May 26, 1999 | ||
EC 37263 Replacement of MCC DCT Cubicle Compartments 0 | A/B | ||
DC-3526 EFW Heat Trace Reliability Improvements September 3, 1999 | |||
EC 37263 Replacement of MCC DCT Cubicle Compartments 0 | |||
Operability Assistance Tool | |||
111A(B) and CS-117A(B) | STI-WO-275977 CS117A, Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger 0 | ||
Discharge Stop Check Valve Leakage Test | |||
EC 31375 Clarify Safety Function and Leakage Criteria for CS- Draft | |||
111A(B) and CS-117A(B) | |||
W3-DBD-003 Emergency Feedwater System 301 | |||
CRG Report for Tuesday July 31, 2012 | |||
LO-WLO-2010- | CRG Report for Thursday August 2, 2012 | ||
Operational Focus July 31, 2012 | |||
in Security | Operational Focus August 2, 2012 | ||
LO-WLO-2010- Status of the Safety Conscious Work Environment July 6, 2010 | |||
00061 in Security | |||
LO-WLO-2012- Operations Assessment of Plant Status and March 1, 2012 | |||
March 1, 2012 | 006 Configuration Control | ||
A1-9 Attachment 1 | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ | |||
DATE | |||
LPL-EQA-4.2B Environmental Qualification Assessment on Allis- 2 | |||
OP-903-053 V135 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test June 18, 2009 | Chalmers Form Wound Motors Used in the | ||
ER-W3-2002- | Waterford SES Unit No. 3 | ||
NRC IN 2010-04 Diesel Generator Voltage Regulation System February 26, 2010 | |||
W3-DBD-018 Fire Protection 0 | Component Due to Latent Manufacturing Defect | ||
NPF-38 Waterford Operating License | NRC-IN-2010-04- Entergy OE A2 Evaluation Summary July 1, 2010 | ||
W3-DBD-037 Nuclear Island and Building Design - RCB 1 | A2-WF3-0002-001 | ||
Ltr from A H Wern Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Levee Stability Analysis December 7, 1972 | OP-903-053 V134 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test January 9, 2008 | ||
TS 3.7.5 Flood Protection NA W3F1-2011-0018 License Amendment Request to Relocate Technical Specifications to the Technical Requirements | OP-903-053 V135 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test June 18, 2009 | ||
Manual Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 | ER-W3-2002- Diesel Fire Pump Louvers 0 | ||
0429-000 | |||
WSES-FSAR- Updated Final Safety Analysis Report | |||
UNIT-3 | |||
OP-903-053 V136 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test August 25, 2011 | |||
W3-DBD-018 Fire Protection 0 | |||
NPF-38 Waterford Operating License | |||
W3-DBD-037 Nuclear Island and Building Design - RCB 1 | |||
Ltr from A H Wern Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Levee Stability Analysis December 7, 1972 | |||
TS 3.7.5 Flood Protection NA | |||
W3F1-2011-0018 License Amendment Request to Relocate Technical November 21, 2011 | |||
Specifications to the Technical Requirements | |||
Manual Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 | |||
AR079684 Scope Revision to PMID 6718 incorporate EPRI December 12, 2009 | |||
Recommend Pdm | |||
A1-10 Attachment 1 | |||
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ | |||
DATE | |||
NUMBER | Annual Work Hour Review & Fatigue Assessment 2010 | ||
Summary | Summary | ||
Summary | Annual Work Hour Review & Fatigue Assessment 2011 | ||
ODMI LPSI A Gas Accumulation 14 | Summary | ||
Entergy System | ODMI SI MTRP0001 Auto Vent 0 | ||
Policies & | ODMI LPSI A Gas Accumulation 14 | ||
Entergy System Workplace Violence and Weapons 1 | |||
Policies & | |||
Procedures | |||
EN-IS-111 General Industrial Safety Requirements 11 | |||
PS-011-102 Personnel Access Control 308 | |||
PS-011-103 Vehicle Access Control 303 | |||
PS-011-110 Security Owner Controlled Area Vehicle and 010 | |||
Personnel Access Control | |||
Waterford 3 Accreditation Board Report September 2010 | |||
CONDITION REPORTS | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03424 CR-WF3-2012-03461 CR-WF3-2012-03479 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03495 CR-WF3-2012-03557 CR-WF3-2012-03596 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03701 CR-WF3-2012-03729 CR-WF3-2012-03732 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03736 CR-WF3-2012-03744 CR-WF3-2012-03745 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03747 CR-WF3-2012-03752 CR-WF3-2012-03754 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03761 CR-WF3-2012-03657 CR-WF3-2012-03658 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03659 CR-WF3-2012-03660 CR-WF3-2012-03661 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03662 CR-WF3-2012-03663 CR-WF3-2012-03664 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03665 CR-WF3-2012-03666 CR-WF3-2012-03667 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03668 CR-WF3-2012-03669 CR-WF3-2012-03670 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03671 CR-WF3-2012-03672 CR-WF3-2012-03736 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03709 CR-WF3-2012-03710 CR-WF3-2012-03711 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03712 CR-WF3-2012-03713 CR-WF3-2012-03714 | |||
A1-11 Attachment 1 | |||
CONDITION REPORTS | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03715 CR-WF3-2012-03716 CR-WF3-2012-03717 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03718 CR-WF3-2012-03719 CR-WF3-2012-03720 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03721 CR-WF3-2012-03722 CR-WF3-2012-03723 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03724 CR-WF3-2012-03725 CR-WF3-2012-03726 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03727 CR-WF3-2012-03728 CR-WF3-2012-03729 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03730 CR-WF3-2012-03731 CR-WF3-2012-03732 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03733 CR-WF3-2012-03734 CR-WF3-2012-03735 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03736 CR-WF3-2012-03737 CR-WF3-2012-03738 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03739 CR-WF3-2012-03740 CR-WF3-2012-03741 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03742 CR-WF3-2010-03235 CR-WF3-2011-07469 | |||
CR-WF3-2009-07420 CR-WF3-2010-01166 CR-WF3-2010-03660 | |||
CR-WF3-2010-07223 CR-WF3-2010-06219 CR-WF3-2010-02721 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-06832 CR-WF3-2011-00679 CR-WF3-2011-01927 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-03163 CR-WF3-2011-07602 CR-WF3-2011-03636 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-03190 CR-WF3-2011-06205 CR-WF3-2011-04481 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-01356 CR-WF3-2011-07605 CR-WF3-2011-02005 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-07606 CR-WF3-2011-06254 CR-WF3-2011-07610 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-02927 CR-WF3-2011-03084 CR-WF3-2011-00458 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-01737 CR-WF3-2012-01048 CR-WF3-2012-00015 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-00351 CR-WF3-2012-06832 CR-WF3-2012-01419 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03496 CR-WF3-2010-02940 CR-HQN-2006-00605 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-07845 CR-WF3-2011-03522 CR-WF3-2011-03523 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-03525 CR-WF3-2011-03526 CR-WF3-2011-03527 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-08044 CR-WF3-2011-08045 CR-WF3-2011-08046 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-08048 CR-WF3-2011-08049 CR-WF3-2011-08050 | |||
CR-WF3-2010-07466 CR-WF3-2011-00553 CR-WF3-2011-06203 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-07610 CR-WF3-2011-06204 CR-WF3-2011-08150 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-03550 CR-WF3-2011-05841 CR-WF3-2011-07603 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-06852 CR-WF3-2011-03350 CR-WF3-2011-05841 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-06850 CR-WF3-2012-00013 CR-WF3-2012-00021 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-00014 CR-WF3-2012-00818 CR-WF3-2012-01477 | |||
CR-WF3-2007-01955 CR-WF3-2012-00837 CR-WF3-2012-01476 | |||
CR-WF3-2010-06760 CR-WF3-2011-00217 CR-WF3-2010-02278 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-06653 CR-WF3-2012-00024 CR-WF3-2010-01330 | |||
CR-WF3-2010-03660 CR-WF3-2010-03050 CR-WF3-2011-03636 | |||
CR-WF3-2009-00655 CR-WF3-2009-1276 CR-WF3-2008-04000 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-00415 CR-WF3-2011-04935 CR-WF3-2012-00530 | |||
CR-WF3-2000-01334 CR-WF3-2012-01334 CR-WF3-2012-03495 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-00632 CR-WF3-2011-01737 CR-WF3-2010-07223 | |||
CR-WF3-2010-06219 CR-WF3-2011-00458 CR-WF3-2011-00836 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-02902 CR-WF3-2012-03190 CR-WF3-2010-04364 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03736 CR-WF3-2012-03461 CR-WF3-2010-03235 | |||
CR-WF3-2010-03564 CR-WF3-2010-00686 CR-WF3-2010-02857 | |||
CR-WF3-2009-00802 CR-WF3-2010-00341 CR-WF3-2010-02584 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-01576 CR-WF3-2012-01581 CR-WF3-2012-00569 | |||
A1-12 Attachment 1 | |||
CONDITION REPORTS | |||
CR-WF3-2012-02314 CR-WF3-2011-03807 CR-WF3-2012-03424 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-00544 CR-WF3-2011-08043 CR-WF3-2010-04199 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-00934 CR-WF3-2011-08047 CR-WF3-2011-01168 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-04562 CR-WF3-2011-01965 CR-WF3-2011-00987 | |||
CR-WF3-2011-08140 CR-WF3-2011-02546 CR-WF3-2010-05595 | |||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2011-03811 CR-WF3-2012-01044 CR-WF3-1999-00708 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2011-00836 CR-WF3-2011-07603 CR-WF3-2012-00659 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2012-01045 CR-WF3-2011-06573 CR-WF3-2011-06254 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-02672 CR-WF3-2011-06870 CR-WF3-2012-01380 | ||
CR-WF3-2012- | CR-HQN-2010-00503 CR-WF3-2012-00507 CR-WF3-2012-03067 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2011-03524 CR-WF3-2012-00507 CR-WF3-2009-04155 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-02135 CR-WF3-2010-00213 CR-WF3-2010-00036 | ||
CR- | CR-HQN-2012-00857 CR-WF3-2006-03416 CR-WF3-2007-04464 | ||
CR-WF3-2009-02487 CR-WF3-2009-03499 CR-WF3-2009-04155 | |||
CR-WF3-2010-00812 CR-WF3-2010-00890 CR-WF3-2010-02302 | |||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-02721 CR-WF3-2010-02927 CR-WF3-2010-03099 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-03565 CR-WF3-2010-03588 CR-WF3-2010-03595 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-04344 CR-WF3-2010-04352 CR-WF3-2010-04634 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-04641 CR-WF3-2010-04659 CR-WF3-2010-04785 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-05141 CR-WF3-2010-05927 CR-WF3-2010-05929 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-07232 CR-WF3-2010-07276 CR-WF3-2010-07362 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-07552 CR-WF3-2011-00030 CR-WF3-2011-00553 | ||
CR-WF3-2011- | CR-WF3-2011-00786 CR-WF3-2011-01897 CR-WF3-2011-01965 | ||
CR-WF3-2011- | CR-WF3-2011-02546 CR-WF3-2011-03350 CR-WF3-2011-03465 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2011-03618 CR-WF3-2011-04230 CR-WF3-2011-05320 | ||
CR-WF3-2012- | CR-WF3-2011-05779 CR-WF3-2011-05840 CR-WF3-2011-06166 | ||
CR-WF3-2012- | CR-WF3-2011-06303 CR-WF3-2011-06573 CR-WF3-2011-06701 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2011-07443 CR-WF3-2011-07462 CR-WF3-2011-08055 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2011-08060 CR-WF3-2011-08081 CR-WF3-2011-08150 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2012-00315 CR-WF3-2012-00632 CR-WF3-2012-00659 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2012-00772 CR-WF3-2012-00797 CR-WF3-2012-00891 | ||
CR-WF3-2012-01139 CR-WF3-2012-01173 CR-WF3-2012-01503 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-01581 CR-WF3-2012-01605 CR-WF3-2012-01660 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-02046 CR-WF3-2012-02315 CR-WF3-2012-03232 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03479 CR-WF3-2012-03596 CR-WF3-2012-03701 | |||
CR-WF3-2012-03732 CR-WF3-2012-03747 CR-WF3-2012-03752 | |||
CR-WF3-2011- | CR-WF3-2012-03764 CR-WF3-2011-02519 CR-WF3-2012-01956 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2009-02172 CR-WF3-2011-03582 CR-WF3-2012-03325 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2009-05353 CR-WF3-2011-05625 CR-WF3-2012-03729 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-02672 CR-WF3-2011-06203 CR-WF3-2012-03761 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-03232 CR-WF3-2011-07415 CR-ANO-C-2011-00441 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-03809 CR-WF3-2011-08059 CR-WF3-2010-07466 | ||
CR-WF3-2012- | CR-WF3-2010-04638 CR-WF3-2011-08308 CR-WF3-2011-00594 | ||
CR-WF3-2012- | CR-WF3-2010-05046 CR-WF3-2012-00746 CR-WF3-2012-01507 | ||
CR-WF3- | CR-WF3-2010-06531 CR-WF3-2012-01014 | ||
CR-WF3-2012- | A1-13 Attachment 1 | ||
WORK ORDERS | |||
248856 52230980 289449 | |||
275977 196828 262164 | |||
283919 256250 64753 | |||
205779 296253 303342 | |||
296271 305641 52340992 | |||
52356683 52371026 52376231 | |||
52389001 254348 257755 | |||
246482 254493 263585 | |||
286950 261413 279127 | |||
298743 28810 287883 | |||
245561 52382399 52351187 | |||
254203 | |||
A1-14 Attachment 1 | |||
Information Request | |||
June 11, 2012 | |||
Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection - Waterford 3 Nuclear | |||
Generating Station | |||
Inspection Report 2012008 | |||
This inspection will cover the period from May 1, 2010, to June 1, 2012. All requested | |||
information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. To the extent possible, | |||
the requested information should be provided electronically in Adobe PDF or Microsoft Office | |||
format. Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel or a similar sortable format. | |||
A supplemental information request will likely be sent during the week of July 9, 2012. | |||
Please provide the following no later than June 30, 2012: | |||
1. Document Lists | |||
Note: for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the | |||
document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status. Please | |||
include long text descriptions of the issues. | |||
a. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions | |||
adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period | |||
b. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to | |||
quality that were opened or closed during the period | |||
c. Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or | |||
downgraded in priority/significance during the period | |||
d. Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or roll up one or | |||
more smaller issues for the period | |||
e. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or | |||
operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety | |||
system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period | |||
f. Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee | |||
Concerns Program (or equivalent) | |||
g. Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period | |||
h. Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress, but not | |||
complete at the end of the period | |||
2. Full Documents, with Attachments | |||
a. Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period | |||
A2-1 Attachment 2 | |||
b. Quality assurance audits performed during the period | |||
c. | c. All audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action | ||
Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations | |||
d. Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non- | |||
NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO | |||
assessments) | |||
e. Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following: | |||
i. NCVs and Violations issued to Waterford 3 | |||
ii. LERs issued by Waterford 3 | |||
f. Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined | |||
to be applicable to Waterford 3 (for those that were evaluated, but determined | |||
not to be applicable, provide a summary list): | |||
i. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or | |||
evaluated during the period | |||
ii. Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period | |||
iii. Vendor safet | |||
iv. y information letters (or equivalent) issued or evaluated during the period | |||
v. Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for | |||
applicability during the period | |||
g. Corrective action documents generated for the following: | |||
i. Emergency planning drills and tabletop exercises performed during the | |||
period | |||
ii. Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were | |||
evaluated during the period | |||
iii. Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which | |||
were evaluated during the period | |||
iv. Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees | |||
during the period | |||
A2-2 Attachment 2 | |||
3. Logs and Reports | |||
a. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the | |||
period and broken down by functional organization | |||
b. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period | |||
c. Current system health reports or similar information | |||
d. Radiation protection event logs during the period | |||
e. Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information | |||
can be provided by hard copy during first week on site) | |||
f. Employee Concern Program (or equivalent) logs (sensitive information can be | |||
provided by hard copy during first week on site) | |||
g. List of training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator | |||
deficiencies for the period | |||
4. Procedures | |||
a. Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation | |||
procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause | |||
evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement | |||
the corrective action program at Waterford 3 | |||
b. Quality Assurance program procedures | |||
c. Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent) procedures | |||
d. Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety-Conscious Work Environment | |||
5. Other | |||
a. List of risk significant components and systems | |||
b. Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors | |||
A2-3 Attachment 2 | |||
Note: Corrective action documents refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests, | |||
Please note that the NRC is not able to accept | cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to Waterford 3. | ||
electronic documents on thumb drives or other similar digital media. | As it becomes available, but no later than June 30, 2012, this information should be uploaded | ||
on the Certrec IMS website. When these documents have been compiled (and by June 30, | |||
2012), please download these documents onto a CD or DVD and sent it via overnight carrier to: | |||
Richard L. Smith | |||
U.S. NRC Resident Inspector Office | |||
7003 Bald Hill Road | |||
Port Gibson, MS 39150 | |||
Please note that the NRC is not able to accept electronic documents on thumb drives or other | |||
similar digital media. However, CDs and DVDs are acceptable. | |||
A2-4 Attachment 2 | |||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 21:30, 11 November 2019
ML12310A497 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Waterford ![]() |
Issue date: | 11/05/2012 |
From: | Ray Kellar Division of Reactor Safety IV |
To: | Jacobs D Entergy Operations |
References | |
EA-12-198 IR-12-008 | |
Download: ML12310A497 (50) | |
See also: IR 05000382/2012008
Text
UNITED STATES
NUC LEAR REGULATOR Y COMMI SSI ON
RE G IO N I V
1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD
ARL INGTON, TEXAS 76011- 4511
November 5, 2012
Donna Jacobs, Site Vice President, Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70057-0751
SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 -
NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION
REPORT 05000382/2012008 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Ms. Jacobs:
On August 2, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem
Identification and Resolution biennial inspection at your Waterford Steam Electric Station,
Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results that were discussed on
August 2, 2012, with Keith Nichols, Director of Engineering, and other members of your staff.
After additional in-office inspection, a final telephonic exit meeting was conducted on September
24, 2012 with Keith Nichols, Director of Engineering, and other members of your staff.
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to
problem identification and resolution and compliance with the Commissions rules and
regulations and the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved
examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and
interviews with personnel.
Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team concluded that the implementation of the
corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and
resolving problems at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, were adequate. Licensee
identified problems were entered into the corrective action program at a low threshold.
Problems were generally prioritized and evaluated commensurate with the safety significance of
the problems. Corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner
commensurate with their importance to safety and addressed the identified causes of problems.
Lessons learned from industry operating experience were generally reviewed and applied when
appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were effectively used to identify problems and
appropriate actions. Finally, the team determined that the station maintains a safety-conscious
work environment where employees feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of
retaliation.
Five NRC identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this
inspection and are documented in the enclosed report. All five of these findings were
determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating four of the five
D. Jacobs -2-
violations as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement
Policy. Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low
safety significance, is listed in this report.
One of the findings that the NRC evaluated under the risk significance determination process as
having very low safety significance (Green) did not meet the criteria to be treated as a non-cited
violation. The violation associated with this issue was evaluated in accordance with the NRC
Enforcement Policy. The current version of this Policy is available on the NRC website at
(http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html). This violation is cited in
the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding it are described in
detail in the subject inspection report. The violation is being cited in the Notice in accordance
with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy because you failed to restore compliance in a
reasonable period of time after the violation was previously identified as a non-cited violation.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
enclosed Notice when preparing your response. This reply should be clearly marked as a
"Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-12-198" and should specifically include a firm commitment as
to when you will establish a design basis to determine the river level at which flood control
measures were to be initiated for closing the water tight doors as required in
Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather and Flooding. If you have additional information that
you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The
NRC review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement
action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the
date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to:
(1) the Regional Administrator, Region IV; (2) the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and (3) NRC Resident
Inspector Office at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
Agency wide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible
from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic
Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Ray Kellar, P.E., Chief
Technical Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
D. Jacobs -3-
Docket No.: 50-382
License No: NPF-38
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation EA-12-198
2. Inspection Report 05000382/2012008
w/Attachments:
1. Supplemental Information
2. Information Request
cc w/enclosures: Electronic Distribution for Waterford 3
SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials RLS
Publicly Avail. Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials
TL/SRI:DRP/C RI:DRP/E PE:DRP/C RI:DRS/EB1 ACES BC:DRP/E
RSmith DOverland RKumana MYoung HGepford DAllen
-e- -e- /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
10/23/2012 10/23/2012 10/13/2012 10/23/2012 10/26/2012 10/30/12
BC:DRS/TSB
RKellar
/RA/
11/5/2012
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Entergy Operations, Inc. Docket No. 50-382
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 2 License No. NPF-38
During an NRC inspection conducted on July 16 through September 24, 2012, a violation of
NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the
violation is listed below:
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design
Control, states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable
regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, are correctly
translated into specifications, procedures, and instructions.
Contrary to the above, from March 10, 2011, to August 2, 2012, the licensee failed to
establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design
basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, were correctly translated into specifications,
procedures and instructions. Specifically, the licensee had not established a design
basis to determine the river level at which flood control measures were to be initiated for
closing the water tight doors as required in Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather
and Flooding.
This violation is associated with a Green Significance Determination Process finding.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Entergy Operations is hereby required to submit a
written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document
Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator,
Region IV, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this
Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This
reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-12-198" and should
include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing
the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results
achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the date when full compliance will
be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence if the
correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be
issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other
action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will
be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
-1- Enclosure 1
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made
available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by
10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
days of receipt.
Dated this 5th day of November, 2012
-2- Enclosure 1
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket: 50-382
License: NPF-38
Report: 05000382/2012008
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location: 17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70057-0751
Dates: July 16 through September 24, 2012
Team Leader: R. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector, Grand Gulf
Inspectors: D. Overland, Resident Inspector, Waterford 3
R. Kumana, Project Engineer
M. Young, Reactor Inspector
Approved By: Ray Kellar, P.E., Chief
Technical Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
-1- Enclosure 2
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000382/2012008; July 16, 2012 -September 24, 2012; Waterford 3 "Biennial Baseline
Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems."
The team inspection was performed by one senior resident inspector, one resident inspector,
one reactor inspector, and one project engineer. One cited violation and four non-cited
violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this inspection. The
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process". Findings for which the
significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level
after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG 1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The team reviewed approximately 350 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations,
root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if
problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action
program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports,
self-assessments, audits, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to
the corrective action program.
Based on these reviews, the team concluded that the licensees corrective action program and
its other processes to identify and correct nuclear safety problems were adequate to support
nuclear safety. However, the team noted at times the licensee staff did not always use the
corrective action program for problems that were perceived as minor. The team also noted
several challenges in correcting adverse conditions in a timely manner. Further, the licensee
had several long-standing issues, which had been in the corrective action process for over a
year without resolution.
The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility
and entered applicable items in the corrective action program. However, there was one
example where the licensee failed to enter an information notice into their corrective action
program for evaluation of a condition adverse to quality. The licensee used industry operating
experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations. The licensee
performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as demonstrated by self-
identification of poor corrective action program performance and identification of ineffective
corrective actions.
Finally, the team determined that the station continued to maintain a safety-conscious work
environment. Employees felt free to raise nuclear safety concerns to the attention of
management without fear of retaliation.
-2- Enclosure 2
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a failure to follow
Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations. Specifically, the licensee failed
to ensure that control room operators knew the status of equipment at all times.
While interviewing the person responsible for tracking plant deficiencies, the
inspectors discovered that the licensee had two separate governing procedures.
These two instructions had different definitions for categories of plant deficiencies
and different databases for tracking them. The inspectors then interviewed the
on-shift operators in the control room and reviewed both databases. The
inspectors identified several issues, including lack of knowledge by the control
room operators about which procedure to use, failure to track deficiencies in both
databases, and inadequate classification of deficiencies. The inspectors
determined that in March 2010, the licensee changed their process for tracking
deficiencies to be consistent with their fleet reporting process. However, the
licensee did not revise the procedure and did not train all affected personnel on
the new process. As a result, control room operators did not have a complete
and accurate knowledge of all plant deficiencies. This finding was entered into
the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-
03732.
The failure to ensure that operators were aware of the status of all plant
equipment was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more
than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the
Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the
likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety
functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee
failed to implement a procedure designed to ensure operators were aware of
deficiencies in the instrumentation, controls, and operation of nuclear plant
systems. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to
affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection
Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process
(SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety
significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and did not cause the
loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of
the trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in
the human performance area, work practices component, in that the licensee
failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural
compliance, and personnel did not follow procedures H.4.b] (Section 4OA2.5.d).
- Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, because the licensee failed to
determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality and take
-3- Enclosure 2
corrective actions to preclude repetition. Specifically, the licensee failed to
assure that the cause of the condition was determined and corrective action
taken to preclude repetition related to a contractors non-compliance with site
procedural requirements. The corrective actions include developing additional
training and provisions to provide additional contractor oversight. This finding
was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports
CR-WF3-2012-03769 and CR-WF3-2012-03772.
The failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality
and take corrective action to preclude repetition was a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it
could lead to more significant consequences; therefore, it is a finding.
Specifically, failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to
quality and take corrective action to prevent recurrence can result in recurrence
of the condition. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to
affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection
Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process
(SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety
significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss
of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the
trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the
human performance, work practice component, in that the licensee failed to
follow guidance in the root cause evaluation procedure when developing
appropriate corrective actions to prevent repetition H.4(b) (Section 4OA2.5.e).
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a failure to
follow the Operability Determination Process. Specifically, the licensee failed to
determine the operability of the emergency diesel generators immediately upon
discovery without delay and in a controlled manner using the best information
available in response to NRC Information Notice 2010-04. The licensee
completed an evaluation of the information notice that indicated that Waterford 3
was vulnerable and susceptible to the issue, but the licensee failed to issue a
condition report as required by their procedure. The failure to initiate a condition
report resulted in the licensees failure to perform an operability determination of
the emergency diesel generators as required by, EN-OP-104, Operability
Determination Process, Revision 6. In the evaluation, the licensee considered
the fact that they had an Action Request in their system to add routine
thermography inspections within the voltage regulator cabinets to their
preventative maintenance program as being adequate. The action request was
not completed when the inspection team reviewed the issue. The inspectors
questioned whether there was an operability concern for the emergency diesel
generators. The licensee recognized their failure to perform an operability
determination. They performed a prompt operability determination based on no
-4- Enclosure 2
observed degradation in performance and declared the emergency diesel
generators operable. In addition, they plan to conduct the thermography
inspections during the next scheduled emergency diesel generator surveillance.
This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as
Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03761.
The failure to promptly perform an operability determination of the emergency
diesel generators in response to NRC Information Notice 2010-04 was a
performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure
the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating
events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to
promptly determine the operability of the diesel generators after obtaining
information of a potential condition adverse to quality. In accordance with NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of
Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at
Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green)
because it was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of the
system, it did not represent a loss of system or function, and it was a Technical
Specification system, but did not represent an actual loss of function of a single
train for greater than it allowed outage time. Specifically, the licensee performed
an operability determination in response to the inspectors questions and
determined the emergency diesel generators were operable based on a review of
surveillance data and maintenance records. This finding had a cross-cutting
aspect in the problem identification and resolution area, operating experience
component, in that the licensee failed to systematically collect, evaluate, and
communicate to affected internal stakeholders in a timely manner relevant
internal and external operating experience P.2.a] (Section 4OA2.5.a).
- Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to take timely corrective action
for a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, from May 2011, through
August 2012, the licensee failed to restore a degraded condition, which included
a corrective action to perform a new design analysis for the emergency
feedwater pump AB after the removal of heat trace circuit 1-8C, despite having a
reasonable amount of time to complete it. Currently, plant operators are required
once per shift to perform temperature verifications of the heat trace to ensure
condensation does not form in the steam supply pipe to the turbine driven pump
and to maintain emergency feedwater pump AB in an operable but degraded
status until the design analysis is complete. This finding was entered into the
licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03754.
The team determined that the failure to complete the corrective action of
performing a new design analysis to determine if emergency feedwater pump AB
-5- Enclosure 2
required a design modification based on the analysis in a timely manner was a
performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor
because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating
Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability
of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Specifically, failure to implement this corrective action could
result in reduced reliability of the emergency feedwater pump AB. In accordance
with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial
Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating
Systems Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings
at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green)
because it affected the design or qualification of mitigating systems, structures,
and components; however, the systems, structures, and components maintained
operability. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance
area, resources component, in that the licensee failed to minimize a long-
standing equipment issue adequately to assure nuclear safety H.2(a) (Section
4OA2.5.b).
- Green. The team identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to establish measures to assure that
applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis as defined in
10 CFR 50.2 are correctly translated into procedures. Specifically, the licensee
has not determined a basis for the level at which flood control measures are
initiated, two years after receiving a non-cited violation for the same deficiency.
As an interim compensatory measure for a previous violation of inadequate
technical specifications, the licensee modified their flooding procedure to include
an action to start shutting flood control doors at a river level of 24 feet instead of
27 feet. The licensee recognized the need to establish a basis for initiating these
actions at 24 feet, and issued a corrective action to track completion. The
licensee extended the due date several times and had not completed it by the
arrival of the inspection team. The inspection team questioned why the licensee
had not completed the calculation to justify their basis for their compensatory
measures, noting that it had been over two years since the original violation was
identified. The inspectors verified through walk-downs, procedure reviews, and
historical data that the licensees use of 24 feet did not represent an immediate
operability concern, and that the current river level was sufficiently low to allow
time for the licensee to correct the deficiency. This finding was entered into the
licensees corrective action program as condition report CR-WF3-2012-03752.
The failure to complete the corrective action to establish a basis for flood control
measures in a timely manner was a performance deficiency. The performance
deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection
from external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected
the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee failed to verify through calculations or analysis that the
-6- Enclosure 2
actions taken to secure flood doors could be completed in time to protect safety-
related equipment from flooding due to a levee failure. In accordance with
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization
of Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at
Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green)
because it did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function
specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating
event. Specifically, the inspectors confirmed that the licensee could reasonably
ensure the flood control doors could perform their safety function. This finding
had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, resources
component in that the licensee failed to maintain long term plant safety by
maintenance of design margins and ensuring engineering backlogs low enough
to support safety. H.2.a] (Section 4OA2.5.c).
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been
reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken by the licensee have been entered
into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and associated corrective
action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
-7- Enclosure 2
REPORT DETAILS
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)
The team based the following conclusions on the sample of corrective action documents
that were initiated in the assessment period, which ranged from May 1, 2010, to the end
of the on-site portion of this inspection on August 2, 2012.
.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed approximately 350 corrective action documents, including
associated root cause, apparent cause, and direct cause evaluations, out of
approximately 17,000 corrective action documents that were issued between
May 1, 2010, and August 2, 2012, to determine if problems were being properly
identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for
evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health
reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and
metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program.
The team evaluated the licensees efforts in establishing the scope of problems
by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessments results, audits,
system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and
preventive maintenance tasks. The team reviewed work requests and attended
the licensees daily Condition Review Group, (which is the management review
committee meeting to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and
significance determination process), as well as observing the interfaces with the
operability assessment and work control processes when applicable. The teams
review included verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and
extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic
implications and previous occurrences. The team assessed the timeliness and
effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for
additional examples of similar problems. The team conducted interviews with
plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist where problems may
be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program.
The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past
NRC-identified violations to ensure that the corrective action addressed the
issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample
of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to ensure that
corrective actions were still appropriate and timely.
The team considered risk insights from both the NRCs and Waterford Steam
Electric Station, Unit 3s risk assessments to focus the sample selection and
plant tours on risk significant systems and components. The team selected the
-8- Enclosure 2
component cooling water and auxiliary component cooling water systems as risk
significant systems to review. The samples reviewed by the team focused on,
but were not limited to, these systems. The team also expanded their review to
include five years of evaluations involving the emergency feedwater system to
determine whether problems were being effectively addressed. The team
conducted a walk-down of these systems to assess whether problems were
identified and entered into the corrective action program.
b. Assessments
1. Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification
The team concluded in most cases that the licensee identified issues and
adverse conditions and entered them into the corrective action program in
accordance with the licensees corrective action program guidance and NRC
requirements. The team determined that the licensee generally was identifying
problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program.
The team identified one condition adverse to quality that was not placed in the
corrective action program. The licensee wrote approximately 17,000 condition
reports during the two-year period of review. The team noted that this high rate
of condition report generation is generally a sign of a healthy corrective action
program. The following issues were noted by the team:
- Through the review of NRC information notices over the assessment
period, the team identified that the licensee failed to enter one information
notice applicable to Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3s emergency
diesel generator voltage regulators into their corrective action program.
The team documented this as a Green non-cited violation in
Section 4OA2.5.a of this report.
- The team identified that some main control room deficiencies, although
identified by white identification tags, had not been entered into the
licensees corrective action program. The team documented this as a
Green non-cited violation in Section 4OA2.5.d of this report.
- The licensee self-identified a failure to initiate condition reports that
resulted in missed operability assessments on two occasions when the
emergency feedwater pump AB heat trace fell below the required
temperature per the operating instruction. The team documented this as
a licensee identified violation in Section 4OA7 of this report.
2. Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
The team concluded that generally the licensee effectively prioritized and
evaluated conditions adverse to quality. The team found that even with the high
number of condition reports initiated on a daily basis, the licensees daily action
review committee pre-screening and the management review committees
-9- Enclosure 2
effectively assessed each condition adverse to quality. The following are issues
the team identified or reviewed during the inspection:
- The licensees extent of condition review for an incorrect preventive
maintenance classification of a limit switch identified additional incorrect
classifications. However, the team identified that the licensee failed to
initiate a separate condition report to document these additional errors
and, therefore, failed to ensure the testing requirements for each of the
newly identified components were met until challenged by the team. This
was documented in Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03557.
- The team identified that the licensee performed an inadequate apparent
cause evaluation of a failure of the security diesel generator. The
evaluation identified one cause as being an incorrect maintenance
classification. When the licensee found the component was properly
classified in its preventative maintenance optimization program, the
licensee did not revise their apparent cause. Instead, they determined
other corrective actions to address security equipment issues.
- The team identified that the apparent cause evaluation for inservice
testing failures of the main feed isolation valves was determined to be
incorrect. The licensee first determined that the failure was the result of
moisture intrusion in the hydraulic fluid. However, additional failures and
a subsequent root cause analysis showed that the failure mechanism
was actually interior varnishing. This was identified by review of external
operating experience that was available, but missed during the initial
apparent cause evaluation.
- The team identified a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with
the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The licensee downgraded a Category A
condition report to Category B without obtaining approval of the condition
review group as required by Procedure EN-L1-102, Corrective Action
Program. This was documented in Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-
03325.
- The team reviewed roll up Condition Report CR-WF3-2011-07610, which
identified that the quality of six previous causal analyses was inadequate.
- The team identified that the licensee categorized many conditions
adverse to quality on the diesel fire pump as Category D. Although their
process allowed this, they could have identified and corrected non-
conforming trends in the diesel fire pumps more effectively with a higher
prioritization. This was documented in Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-
03747.
- 10 - Enclosure 2
- The team determined that the licensee categorized a problem with the
steam generator feedwater pump B requiring manual operation as an
Operator Burden when it could have met the definition of an Operator
Workaround, which carried a higher level of prioritization in the licensee
work planning process.
- The team reviewed a licensee failure to frequently and regularly review a
degraded and nonconforming condition associated with the reactor
coolant pump N-9000 stage seals as required by Procedure EN-OP-104,
Operability Determination Process. This is an example of the licensee
not thoroughly evaluating problems, such that the resolutions address
causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. This was documented in
NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2011002 as a Green non-cited
violation.
The team reviewed a number of condition reports that involved operability
reviews to assess the quality, timeliness, and prioritization of operability
assessments. In general, both immediate and prompt operability assessments
reviewed were adequately completed in a timely manner.
3. Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
Overall, the team concluded that the licensee generally developed appropriate
corrective actions to address problems. However, the team identified a number
of corrective actions associated with conditions adverse to quality that were not
completed in a timely manner:
- The team identified that the licensee failed to take timely corrective
actions to correct a design basis analysis for the emergency feedwater
pump AB after the removal of required heat trace on the steam supply
piping. The team documented this as a Green non-cited violation in
Section 4OA2.5.b of this report.
- The team identified that the licensee failed to take timely corrective
actions to establish a basis through analysis for the initiation of flood
control measures at a river level of 24 feet. The team documented this as
a Green cited violation in Section 4OA2.5.c of this report.
- The team identified that the licensee failed to have a GMPO/Director
approve a due date extension on a long-term corrective action from
CR-WF3-2011-00887 (Corrective Action 13), which is not permitted by
Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program. This resulted in a
minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, that is not
subject to enforcement action in accordance with NRCs Enforcement
Policy. The corrective action was to complete an engineering analysis to
determine the scope of modifications needed for the steam driven
- 11 - Enclosure 2
emergency feedwater turbine steam supply piping. This was documented
in Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03461.
- The team identified a failure to complete a corrective action to validate
data for work hours for security personnel. This resulted in a minor
violation of 10 CFR 26.205.e that is not subject to enforcement action in
accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. This was documented in
Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03729.
- The team reviewed a licensee failure to take or perform effective
corrective actions for boric acid leaks for the past seven years. This is an
example of the licensees failure to effectively correct identified boric acid
leaks in a timely manner. This was documented in NRC Inspection
Report 05000382/2010006 as a Green non-cited violation.
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The team examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating
experience, including reviewing the governing procedure and self-assessments.
The team reviewed a sample of 10 condition reports examining operating
experience documents that had been issued during the assessment period to
determine whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notification for
relevance to the facility. The team then examined whether the licensee had
entered those items into their corrective action program and assigned actions to
address the issues. The team reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and
corrective action documents to verify whether the licensee had appropriately
included industry-operating experience.
b. Assessment
Overall, the team determined that the licensee was adequately evaluating
industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, based on reviewing a
sample of 10 condition reports examining industry operating experience. The
licensee entered all but one applicable item in the corrective action program in
accordance with station procedures. The team concluded that the licensee was
evaluating industry operating experience when performing root cause and
apparent cause evaluations. Both internal and external operating experiences
were being incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs. The
following are issues the team identified or reviewed during the inspection:
- The team identified through the review of NRC information notices over
the assessment period that the licensee had failed to enter one
information notice applicable to Waterford 3 emergency diesel generator
voltage regulators into their corrective action program. In response, the
licensee did a complete audit of all NRC information notices issued during
- 12 - Enclosure 2
the assessment period and found no other discrepancies. The team
documented this as a Green non-cited violation in Section 4OA2.5.a
of this report.
- The team reviewed three examples from this assessment period of the
licensees failure in the use of operating experience, resulting in the
licensee not implementing and institutionalizing operating experience
through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and
training programs.
o The team reviewed a licensee failure to implement a preventative
maintenance activity to replace dry cooling tower process analog
control cards based on internal and industry-wide operating
experience that documented previous failures of process analog
control cards due to age-related degradation after 15 years. This
was documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2011004 as
a Green non-cited violation.
o The team reviewed a licensee failure to identify that varnish
deposits were causing the main feedwater isolation valve to fail its
inservice testing. This resulted from the licensees failure to use
relevant external operating experience to identify that other sites
experienced similar failures of feedwater isolation valves due to
varnish deposits on the interior surfaces. This was documented in
NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2011005 as a Green non-cited
violation.
o The team reviewed a licensee failure to evaluate the internal
condition of the condensate and refueling water storage pool
structures through performance of appropriate preventative
maintenance after previous documented industry-wide operating
experience of concrete degradation due to boric acid. This was
documented in Inspection Report 05000382/2011003 as a Green
non-cited violation.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample size of 22 licensee self-assessments, surveillances,
and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance
trends and effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to
assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated
the use of self- and third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance
department, and the role of the performance improvement group related to
licensee performance. The specific self-assessment documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment.
- 13 - Enclosure 2
b. Assessment
The team concluded that the licensee had an effective self-assessment process.
Licensee management was involved with developing tactical self-assessments.
The team determined that self-assessments were self-critical and thorough
enough to identify deficiencies. The following are issues the team reviewed
during the inspection:
- The team reviewed a licensee self-assessment of plant status and
configuration control performed in March 2012. This self-assessment
was an opportunity for the site to identify and address the issues
associated with control room deficiencies documented in
Section 4OA2.5.d of this report, but the assessment did not discuss them.
- The team reviewed the licensees failure to perform an adequate risk
assessment associated with the maintenance window for the turbine
driven emergency feedwater pump. This is an example of the licensees
failure to use independent and self-assessments because the licensee
performed a probabilistic risk assessment model update in April 2009, but
failed to identify an assumption crediting operator actions that were not in
procedures. This was documented in NRC Inspection
Report 05000382/2011007 as a Green non-cited violation.
.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspection team conducted individual interviews with over 30 individuals from
a cross-section of functional organizations: engineering, operations,
maintenance, quality assurance, radiation protection, chemistry, security officers,
and contract personnel. Both supervisory and non-supervisory personnel were
included in these interviews. The team conducted these interviews to assess
whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety-
conscious work environment (SCWE) at Waterford 3. The team also interviewed
the Waterford 3 employee concerns program manager and reviewed the last two
safety culture self-assessment documents.
b. Assessment
Overall, the team concluded that a safety-conscious work environment exists at
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. Employees demonstrated familiarity
with the various avenues available to raise safety concerns. They appeared
comfortable with submitting all nuclear safety issues.
The team noted a potential vulnerability in the licensees safety-conscious work
environment from discussions with plant personnel. There was a perception
among some members of the plant staff that management may use the condition
- 14 - Enclosure 2
report process to discipline workers when personnel errors were documented in
the condition reports. Additionally, some personnel stated that they did not write
condition reports, but rather they passed the comments along to supervisors who
would enter them into the corrective action program.
Overall, most individuals were familiar with the employee concerns program and
its location on site. There was visibility of the program throughout the site. Many
of the individuals interviewed had knowledge of the employee concerns
manager; however, no one interviewed indicated having direct interactions with
the employee concerns manger during the inspection period. Personnel
understood and were confident in the confidentiality of the program.
Site personnel have received initial and annual refresher training, which provided
instruction on safety-conscious work environment policies. Many of the
individuals interviewed were familiar with this training and with the overall
message in the training. However, not everyone was familiar with the details of
the policy. None of the individuals interviewed cited any examples of
harassment, intimidation, retaliation or discrimination, or any negative reactions
from management when individuals raised nuclear safety concerns. Finally,
individuals indicated that if they were to believe unsafe conditions existed, they
would feel comfortable stopping work without fear of retaliation, even if such
actions would prolong an outage or extend a planned schedule.
.5 Specific Issues Identified During This Inspection
a. Failure to Promptly Determine the Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators
Introduction. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a failure to follow
Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process. Specifically, the licensee
failed to determine the operability of the emergency diesel generators immediately upon
discovery without delay and in a controlled manner using the best information available
in response to NRC Information Notice 2010-04.
Description. The team reviewed the licensees corrective actions taken in response to
an NRC Information Notice. On February 26, 2010, the NRC issued Information
Notice 2010-04, Diesel Generator Voltage Regulation System Component [Failure] Due
to Latent Manufacturing Defect. This information notice describes the failure of a linear
power reactor in an emergency diesel generator voltage regulation system at a plant
where the licensees preventive maintenance program did not address the emergency
diesel generator excitation system magnetic components.
The licensee completed an evaluation of the information notice per Procedure EN-
OE-100, Operating Experience Program, on July 1, 2010. This evaluation indicated
that Waterford 3 was vulnerable and susceptible to the issue, but the licensee failed to
issue a condition report as required by their procedure. The failure to initiate a condition
report resulted in the licensees failure to perform an operability determination of the
- 15 - Enclosure 2
emergency diesel generators as required by Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability
Determination Process, Revision 6.
In the evaluation, the licensee considered the fact that they had an Action Request in
their system that addressed a similar concern to be an acceptable response to this
information notice. Action Request 079684 was initiated on December 10, 2009, to
address recommendations from an INPO assistance visit in 2007 and it included an
action to add routine thermography inspections within the voltage regulator cabinets to
their preventative maintenance program. The Entergy Nuclear Corporate Operating
Experience group also reviewed this information notice on March 4, 2010. In response,
they issued a specific action through their operating experience database to evaluate the
information notice to each Entergy site. However, they failed to issue one to
Waterford 3.
The licensee started routing Action Request 079684 for approval, but they stopped on
March 15, 2010. The licensee attributed this to an incomplete turnover by departing
personnel. No other approval actions were taken until April 16, 2012, when the request
was routed to the next person in the approval process. Again, no further action was
taken, and the action request was not completed when the inspection team reviewed the
issue.
The inspectors questioned why there was no condition report generated and why the
action request had not been completed more than two years after issuance. In
particular, the inspectors questioned whether there was an operability concern for the
emergency diesel generators. The licensee recognized their failure to issue a condition
report and perform an operability determination. They performed a prompt operability
determination based on operating data, work history, and no observed degradation in
performance, and declared the emergency diesel generators operable. In addition, they
plan to conduct the thermography during the next scheduled emergency diesel
generator surveillance.
The licensee initiated CR-WF3-2012-00596 and CR-WF3-2012-03761 to address the
issue. They also initiated CR-HQN-2012-00857 to address the failure of the corporate
organization to include Waterford 3 in their site-specific requests.
Analysis. The failure to promptly perform an operability determination of the emergency
diesel generators in response to NRC Information Notice 2010-04 was a performance
deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated
with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and
affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly determine the operability of the diesel
generators after obtaining information of a potential condition adverse to quality. In
accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial
Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A,
The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was
- 16 - Enclosure 2
determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a deficiency
affecting the design or qualification of the system, it did not represent a loss of system or
function, and it was a Technical Specification system but did not represent an actual loss
of function of a single train for greater than it allowed outage time. Specifically, the
licensee performed an operability determination in response to the inspectors questions
and determined the emergency diesel generators were operable based on a review of
surveillance data and maintenance records. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in
the problem identification and resolution area, operating experience component, in that
the licensee failed to systematically collect, evaluate, and communicate to affected
internal stakeholders in a timely manner relevant internal and external operating
experience P.2.a].
Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states, in part, that activities
affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or
drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in
accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Licensee Procedure
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 6, Section 5.1 step 13
required that an operability should be determined immediately upon discovery without
delay and in a controlled manner using the best information available. Contrary to this
requirement, from July 1, 2010, to July 25, 2012, the licensee failed to accomplish an
activity affecting quality prescribed by documented instructions. Specifically, the
licensee failed to determine the operability of the emergency diesel generators as
required by Licensee Procedure EN-OP-104 in response to NRC Information
Notice 2010-04. The licensee immediately determined the operability of the emergency
diesel generators based on operating data and work history, and they established a
reasonable basis for operability. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent
with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy, because it was of very low safety
significance (Green) with no actual or potential safety consequences and was entered
into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03761
to address recurrence. (NCV 05000382/2012008-01, Failure to Promptly Determine the
Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators)
b. Failure to Take Corrective Action Associated with the Emergency Feedwater Pump AB
Introduction. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to take timely corrective
action for a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to restore a
degraded condition, which included a corrective action to perform a new design analysis
for the emergency feedwater pump AB after the removal of heat trace circuit 1-8C
despite having a reasonable amount of time to complete it.
Description. The team performed an in-depth review of corrective actions associated
with the emergency feedwater system. The turbine driven emergency feedwater pump
AB has steam piping that is maintained at a high temperature with a heat trace to
prevent excessive condensation from developing, which could reduce the reliability of
the pump to perform its design function. The licensee removed heat trace circuit 1-8C
- 17 - Enclosure 2
from a horizontal section of steam piping because the heat trace was not maintaining the
piping above the required setpoint. In May 2011, the licensee determined that
emergency feedwater pump AB was operable but degraded. A corrective action was
initiated to perform a design analysis using RELAP to determine what modifications
needed to be performed on the system to return the system to a fully operable status.
The team identified that the licensee extended the due date twice for the corrective
action, first from February 23 to June 15, 2012, and then from June 15 until
October 12, 2012. The last extension was approved due to lack of engineering
resources resulting from other activities placed at a higher priority by Waterford 3
management. The team determined that from May 2011 to August 2012, a corrective
action to perform a design analysis for the long-standing equipment issue of determining
whether or not a plant modification is needed to maintain the system operable had not
been performed in a timely manner. Currently, plant operators are required once per
shift to perform temperature verifications of the heat trace to ensure condensation does
not form in the steam supply pipe to the turbine driven pump and maintain emergency
feedwater pump AB in an operable, but degraded, status until the design analysis is
complete. The licensee has entered the concern into their corrective action program as
Condition Report CR-WF3-2012-03754.
Analysis. The team determined that the failure to complete the corrective action of
performing a new design analysis to determine if emergency feedwater pump AB
required a design modification based on the analysis in a timely manner was a
performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it
affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to implement
this corrective action could result in reduced reliability of the emergency feedwater pump
AB. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial
Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A,
The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was
determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it affected the design
or qualification of mitigating systems, structures, and components; however, the
systems, structures, and components maintained operability. This finding had a cross-
cutting aspect in the human performance area, resources component, in that the
licensee failed to minimize a long-standing equipment issue adequately to assure
nuclear safety H.2(a).
Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action,
states, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality,
such as failures, malfunction, deficiencies, deviations and non-conformances are
promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, from May 2011 through
August 2012, the licensee failed to assure that measures were established to assure
that a condition adverse to quality was promptly corrected. Specifically, the licensee
failed to take prompt corrective action to restore a degraded condition by not performing
- 18 - Enclosure 2
a design analysis for emergency feedwater pump AB after heat trace circuit 1-8C was
removed. Consequently, plant operators are required once per shift to perform
temperature verifications of the heat trace to ensure condensation does not form in the
steam supply pipe to the turbine driven pump and maintain emergency feedwater pump
AB in an operable, but degraded, status until the design analysis is complete. This
violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement
Policy because it was of very low safety significance (Green) with no actual or potential
safety consequence and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as
CR-WF3-2012-03754 to address recurrence. (NCV 05000382/2012008-02, Failure to
Take Corrective Action Associated with Emergency Feedwater Pump AB)
c. Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a Basis for Flood Control Measures
Introduction. The team identified a Green cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to establish measures to assure that
applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 are
correctly translated into procedures. Specifically, the licensee has not determined a
basis for the level at which flood control measures are initiated, two years after receiving
a non-cited violation for the same deficiency.
Description. The team reviewed the licensees corrective actions taken in response to a
non-cited violation from 2010 documented as NCV 2010006-02, Non-conservative
Technical Specification 3.7.5 Action Statement. The licensee entered this violation into
their corrective action program under CR-WF3-2010-03232 on May 24, 2010. The
licensee determined that Technical Specification 3.7.5 Flood Protection was not
required to be included in their technical specifications and submitted an amendment to
move it to the Technical Requirements Manual. As an interim compensatory measure,
the licensee modified their Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather and Flooding to
include an action to start shutting flood control doors at a river level of 24 feet instead of
27 feet.
The required actions included verifying that all flood control penetrations below a level of
30 feet were shut within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> before the river was projected to reach 27 feet. There
are seven flood control doors of varying sizes that are required to be shut and two valves
that are required to be locked shut. Five of these doors and both valves are normally
shut during power operations, but may be open during outages. Most of them require
entry into the Radiologically Controlled Area and one requires entry into a locked room
for access.
The licensee recognized the need to establish a basis for initiating these actions at
24 feet, and issued Corrective Action 18 (CA-18) in CR-WF3-2010-03232 on
March 10, 2011, to formally evaluate and document whether 24 feet was an acceptable
river level elevation at which to initiate flood control measures. The CA-18 due date was
extended twice and on February 24, 2012, they determined that the methodology they
intended to use was not acceptable. CA-18 was closed to Corrective Action 23 (CA-23)
which directed the licensee to issue an engineering change using the methodology used
- 19 - Enclosure 2
in Waterford 3 UFSAR Section 2.4.3.7. The due date for CA-23 was itself extended to
September 30, 2012.
The inspection team questioned why the licensee had not completed the calculation
to justify their basis for their compensatory measures, noting that it had been over
two years since the original violation was identified. The licensee initiated
CR-WF3-2012-03752 to address this concern. The inspectors verified through
walk-downs, procedure reviews, and historical data that the licensees use of 24 feet
did not represent an immediate operability concern and that the current river level was
sufficiently low to allow time for the licensee to correct the deficiency.
Analysis. The failure to complete the corrective action to establish a basis for flood
control measures in a timely manner was a performance deficiency. The performance
deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection from
external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the
licensee failed to verify through calculations or analysis that the actions taken to secure
flood doors could be completed in time to protect safety-related equipment from flooding
due to a levee failure. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the issue was determined to affect
the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings
at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green)
because it did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically
designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. Specifically,
the inspectors confirmed that the licensee could reasonably ensure the flood control
doors could perform their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the
human performance area, resources component in that the licensee failed to maintain
long term plant safety by maintenance of design margins and ensuring engineering
backlogs low enough to support safety H.2.a].
Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, that measures shall be established to
assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in
10 CFR 50.2, are correctly translated into specifications, procedures and instructions.
Contrary to the above, from March 10, 2011, to August 2, 2012, the licensee failed to
establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design
basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, were correctly translated into specifications,
procedures and instructions. Specifically, the licensee had not established a design
basis to determine the river level at which flood control measures were to be initiated for
closing the water tight doors, as required in Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather
and Flooding. The licensee demonstrated sufficient safety margin based on historical
data and current river levels to provide assurance that this is not an immediate safety
concern. Due to the licensees failure to restore compliance within a reasonable time
- 20 - Enclosure 2
following previous NCV 05000382/2010006-02, this violation is being cited as a Notice of
Violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is a
violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. A Notice of Violation is attached.
(VIO 05000382/2012008-03, Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a
Basis for Flood Control Measures)
d. Failure to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment Status
Introduction. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a failure to follow
Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to
ensure that control room operators knew the status of equipment at all times.
Description. The team reviewed how the licensee was addressing deficiencies in plant
instrumentation, controls, and equipment that impacted the ability of operators to
properly operate the plant. This included a review of the licensees program to identify,
compensate for, and correct these plant deficiencies and a walk-down of the control
room.
While interviewing the person responsible for tracking plant deficiencies, the inspectors
discovered that the licensee had two separate governing procedures. The licensee used
the Entergy Fleet Administrative Procedure EN-FAP-OP-006, Operator Aggregate
Impact Index Performance Indicator, to track several categories of plant deficiencies in
a standardized spreadsheet. The licensee also had the local departmental Operating
Instruction OI-002-000, Annunciator, Control Room Instrumentation and Workarounds
Status Control. This instruction had different definitions for categories of plant
deficiencies and directed the use of a different database.
The inspectors then interviewed the on shift operators in the control room and reviewed
both databases. The inspectors identified several issues:
- The person responsible for tracking plant deficiencies was only using the fleet
administrative procedure and was unaware of the operating instruction.
- On one shift, the shift technical advisor believed the fleet administrative
procedure was being used and was not aware of the operating instruction,
while the control room supervisor believed the operating instruction was
being used and was not aware of the fleet administrative procedure.
- The database required by the operating instruction had not been maintained
for two years.
- The operating instruction did not have a category for Operator Burdens;
however, the shift crew differentiated between Operator Workarounds and
Operator Burdens. In most cases, they chose the less conservative
designation of Operator Burden.
- 21 - Enclosure 2
- The fleet administrative procedure was intended for fleet performance
reporting, not plant deficiency control. It does not direct any actions to
address and correct plant deficiencies.
- The operating instruction subcategorizes Workarounds by scheduling of
resources rather than by risk significance or impact to operators. The fleet
administrative procedure does not subcategorize Operator Workarounds or
Operator Burdens, but the licensee carried over this practice to the fleet
administrative procedure spreadsheet. This could lead to improper
prioritization of corrective actions.
- The operating instruction directs identification of plant deficiencies through a
review of work requests, but it does not require a review of condition reports.
- Some plant deficiencies were not entered into either database.
- Operators were using the same tags for Control Room Deficiencies and
informal operator notes. These notes are not controlled by either procedure.
- A list of plant deficiencies was not immediately available to control room
operators.
The inspectors determined that when the fleet administrative procedure was issued in
March 2010, the licensee changed their process for tracking deficiencies. The licensee
Procedure W2.109, Procedure Development, Review & Approval, is safety-related and
requires implementation and maintenance of procedures and departmental instructions.
This procedure prescribes a process for approving and revising procedures and
instructions and conducting necessary training. When the licensee began tracking plant
deficiencies per the fleet administrative procedure, the licensee did not revise the
operating instruction to conform to the new process, and the licensee did not train all
affected personnel on the new process. As a result, the operators did not maintain a
consistent accurate list and were not aware of all plant deficiencies, and therefore were
not aware of the status of all plant equipment. This was not in accordance with
Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Revision 9, Section 5.13 step 1, which
states that the status of plant equipment is known at all times by plant operators.
The licensee initiated CR-WF3-2012-03732 to address the issue. The licensee will
revise the operating instruction to address the process issues and make the intended
changes.
Analysis. The failure to ensure that operators were aware of the status of all plant
equipment was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than
minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating
Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those
events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown
as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a procedure
designed to ensure operators were aware of deficiencies in the instrumentation, controls,
- 22 - Enclosure 2
and operation of nuclear plant systems. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the issue was
determined to affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process
(SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety
significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation
equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable
shutdown condition. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance
area, work practices component, in that the licensee failed to define and effectively
communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance, and personnel did not
follow procedures H.4.b].
Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states, in part, that activities
affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or
drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstance and shall be accomplished in
accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Procedure EN-OP-115,
Conduct of Operations, Revision 9, Section 5.13, step 1, states that the status of plant
equipment is known at all times by plant operators. Contrary to this requirement, from
March 2, 2010, to August 1, 2012, the licensee failed to accomplish an activity affecting
quality in accordance with the documented instructions appropriate to the circumstance.
Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure operators knew the status of plant equipment
at all times in accordance with Licensee Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of
Operations. The licensee has a corrective action to revise their operating instruction for
tracking plant deficiencies, and none of the current plant deficiencies represents an
immediate safety concern. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy, because it was of very low safety significance
(Green) with no actual or potential safety consequences and was entered into the
licensees corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-03732 to address recurrence.
(NCV 05000382/2012008-04, Failure to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment
Status)
e. Failure to Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition
Introduction. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, because the licensee failed to determine
the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality and take corrective actions to
prevent recurrence. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure that the cause of the
condition was determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition associated
with a contractors non-compliance with site procedural requirements.
Description. During refuel outage 16 in 2009, contract instrumentation and control
technicians performed a functional test on a feedwater heater level switch according to
work order instructions. Following restoration, a plant transient occurred because a
valve was out of position (CR-WF3-2009-7420). The licensee determined that the event
constituted a significant condition adverse to quality in accordance with guidance from
Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process. During the valve manipulation, the
- 23 - Enclosure 2
work instructions called for concurrent verification. However the licensees root cause
analysis determined that the contract workers failed to perform concurrent verification as
required by the procedure (NCV 2011003-04). The contract workers knew the
procedural requirement, but they behaved inappropriately when they chose not to follow
the instructions. The licensees root cause analysis did not determine why the contract
workers chose not to follow the procedure. The licensees corrective action to preclude
repetition (CAPR) of this significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) was to release
the contract workers for not following the procedure and prohibit them from future work
at Entergy sites. No actions to preclude repetition that addressed the underlying cause
of the failure to perform concurrent verification were taken. The team identified that
despite guidance provided in Procedure EN-LI-118, Attachment 9.9, Root Cause
Evaluation Process, which states that discipline of individuals is not an appropriate
CAPR, disciplinary action was the only CAPR identified in the root cause for
CR-WF3-2009-07420 performed on January 7, 2010.
The failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality and take
corrective action to preclude repetition had no actual consequences on nuclear plant
safety. However, the failure to determine the cause of the condition adverse to quality
and take corrective action to preclude repetition from an ineffective CAPR has the ability
to lead to more significant safety consequences. The licensee documented this violation
in Condition Reports CR-WF3-2012-03769 and CR-WF3-2012-03772. The corrective
actions include developing additional training and provisions to provide additional
contractor oversight.
Analysis. The failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality
and take corrective action to preclude repetition was a performance deficiency. The
performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could lead to
more significant consequences, therefore it is a finding. Specifically, failure to determine
the cause of a significant condition adverse to qualify and take corrective action to
prevent recurrence can result in recurrence of the condition. In accordance with NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the
issue was determined to affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination
Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the issue was determined to have very low safety
significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of
mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a
stable shutdown condition. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human
performance, work practice component, in that the licensee failed to follow guidance in
the root cause evaluation procedure when developing appropriate corrective actions to
prevent repetition H.4(b).
Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action,
states, in part, in the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall
assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to
preclude repetition. Contrary to this requirement, on January 7, 2010, for a significant
condition adverse to quality, the licensee failed to take measures to assure that the
cause of the condition was determined and corrective actions taken to preclude
- 24 - Enclosure 2
repetition. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the underlying cause of the failure
of the site contract workers to comply with licensees procedural requirements nor were
corrective actions taken to preclude repetition of the condition. The licensees corrective
actions to address this problem include developing additional training and provisions to
provide additional contractor oversight. This violation is being treated as an NCV,
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy because it was of very low safety
significance (Green) with no actual or potential safety consequence and was entered
into the licensees corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-03769 and
CR-WF3-2012-03772 to address recurrence. (NCV 05000382/2012008-05, Failure to
Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition)
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On August 2, 2012, the team presented the inspection results to Keith Nichols, Director of
Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues
presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On August 23, 2012, the team exited with the revised characterization of the inspection results
to William McKinney, Acting Director Nuclear Safety and Assurance, and other members of the
licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
On September 24, 2012, the team exited with the revised characterization of the inspection
results to Keith Nichols, Director of Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff. The
licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee
and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meets the criteria of Section VI of the
NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.
- Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states, in part, that activities affecting quality
shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings and shall be
accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Contrary
to this requirement, on May 10 and May 12, 2011, the licensee failed to accomplish an
activity affecting quality as prescribed by the documented procedure. Specifically, the
licensee failed to perform operability reviews when heat trace circuit 1-8C fell below the
operating instruction temperature on the steam supply piping to the emergency
feedwater pump in accordance with Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination
Process. The team determined that this finding was of very low safety significance
(Green) because it affected the design or qualification of a mitigating system structure
component; however, the system structure component maintained its operability.
- 25 - Enclosure 2
The emergency feed water pump AB was declared inoperable on May 14, 2011;
however, subsequent evaluation declared the pump operable but degraded.
This was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition
Reports CR-WF3-2011-03599 and CR-WF3-2011-03600.
ATTACHMENTS: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
INFORMATION REQUEST
- 26 - Enclosure 2
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
S. Adams, Planning Scheduling and Outage Manger
J. Bourgeois, Acting Chemistry Manager
E. Brauner, Supervision of System Engineering
K. Cook, General Manager, Plant Operations
G. Fey, Emergency Planning Manager
S. Fontenot, Acting Corrective Actions and Assessment Manager
R. Gilmore, Engineering and Components Manager
J. Gumnick, Radiation Protection Manager
D. Jacobs, Site Vice President, Operations
J. Jarrell, Assistant Operations Shift Manager
B. Lanka, Manager, System Engineering Manager
B. Lindsey, Maintenance Manager
M. Mason, Acting Licensing Manager
W. McKinney, Acting Director Nuclear Safety and Assurance
K. Nichols, Director of Engineering
R. Porter, Design Engineering Manager
D. Rieder, Quality Assurance Supervisor
K. Rockwood, Acting Technical Training Supervisor
T. Sanders, Security Superintendant
P. Stanton, Design Engineering Supervisor
NRC Personnel
R. Kumana, Project Engineer
R. Smith, Team Leader/Senior Resident Inspector
D. Overland, Resident Inspector
M. Young, Reactor Inspector
A1-1 Attachment 1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000382/2012008-03 VIO Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a Basis for
Flood Control Measures (Section 4OA2.5.c)
Opened and Closed
05000382/2012008-01 NCV Failure to Promptly Determine the Operability of the Emergency
Diesel Generators (Section 4OA2.5.a)05000382/2012008-02 NCV Failure to Take Corrective Action Associated with Emergency
Feedwater Pump AB (Section 4OA2.5.b)05000382/2012008-04 NCV Failure to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment Status
(Section 4OA2.5.d)05000382/2012008-05 NCV Failure to Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude
Repetition (Section 4OA2.5.e)
A1-2 Attachment 1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-LI-104 Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process 8
EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Process 19
EN-LI-118 Root Cause Evaluation Process 17
EN-LI-119 Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process 15
EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process 6
EN-QV-100 Conduct of Nuclear Oversight 7
EN-QV-102 Quality Control Inspection Program 1
EN-QV-108 QA Surveillance Process 9
EN-MA-101 Fundamentals of Maintenance 10
OP-901-310 Loss of Train A Safety Bus 308
OP-903-115 Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator / 21
Engineering Safety Features Test
ME-007-005 Time Delay Relay Setting Check, Adjustment and 16
Functional Test
EN-TQ-201 Systematic Approach to Training Process 12
EN-TQ-201 Systematic Approach to Training Process 13
TM-OP-100 Operations Training Manual 16
EN-TQ-114 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program 3
Description
EN-TQ-126 Inprocessing Training Program 6
A1-3 Attachment 1
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-TQ-126 Inprocessing Training Program 8
EN-TQ-107 General Employee Training 7
EN-EC-100 Guidelines For Implementation Of The Employee 6
Concerns Program
EN-MA-133 Control of Scaffolding 8
OP-002-007 Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance 18
EN-IS-102 Confined Space Program 8
OP-903-046 Emergency Feed Pump Operability Check 309
EN-NE-G-013 Human Reliability Analysis for PSA Models 1
OP-009-003 Emergency Feedwater 304
EN-FAP-OP-006 Operator Aggregate Impact Index Performance Indicator 0
OI-002-000 Operator Instruction Annunciator, Control Room 304
Instrumentation and Workarounds Status Control
EN-OP-137 Licensed Operator Candidate Selection Process 2
EN-LI-125 NRC Cross-Cutting Analysis and Trending 1
EN-OE-100 Operating Experience Program 14
EN-LI-118-06 Common Cause Analysis (CCA) 3
OP-002-007 Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance 18
OP-903-053 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test 17
UNT-005-013 Fire Protection Program 12
EN-FAP-LI-001 Condition Review Group (CRG) 3
A1-4 Attachment 1
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-FAP-LI-003 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process 8
EN-HU-103 Human Performance Error Reviews 7
EN-HU-106 Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence 0
EN-PL-202 Personnel Expectations Related to Fatigue Management 0
EN-TQ-113 Initial Licensed Operator Training Program Description 7
OP-100-014 Technical Specification and Technical Requirements 317
Compliance
OP-901-521 Severe Weather and Flooding 305
EN-OE-100 Operating Experience Program 14
EN-FAP-AD-001 Fleet Administrative Procedure (FAP) Process 0
EN-AD-101-01 NMM Procedure Writer Manual 9
EN-AD-101 Procedure Process 14
EN-PL-155 Entergy Nuclear Change Management 4
W2.109 Procedure Development, Review & Approval 13
EN-NS-102 Fitness For Duty Program 9
EN-NS-117 Fitness For Duty Processes 6
EN-OM-123-02 Working Hour Limits eSOMS Users Guide 1
EN-OM-123 Fatigue Management Program 4
EN-PL-202 Personnel Expectations Related to Fatigue Management 0
EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations 9
A1-5 Attachment 1
CALCULATIONS
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EC-C97-003 Probabilistic Evaluation of Tornado Missile Strike for 0, Change 1
Waterford 3 Nuclear Station
EC-M00-004 Thermal-Hydraulic Calculation for the EFW Steam Supply 0
Valves (MS-401A(B)) and Lines
Calculation No. Flooding Analysis Outside Containment 4
MNQ3-5
EC-M99-010 Minimum Flow for DCT Sump Pump 0-2
134669-G-07 Scour Analysis and Scour Protection Design from a 1
Hypothetical Levee Break
DRAWINGS
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
G-153 Feedwater, Condensate & Air Evacuation Systems
G-151 Flow Diagram Main & Extraction Steam System 43
G-924 HVAC - Water Treatment Bldg. & Fire Pump House 6
G1370 Fire Protection Turbine Bldg. 2
OTHER DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/
DATE
QS-2012-W3-008 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Category A Condition 1
Reports initiated during April 2012
QS-2012-W3-007 QA Follow-up review of EN-QV-126 required issues 1
initiated January, February, and March 2012
QS-2011-W3-015 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Category A Condition July 26, 2011
Reports initiated during September, 2011
QS-2011-W3-012 QA Follow-up Surveillance of the 2011 Corrective September 12,
Action Program (CAP) Audit 2011
A1-6 Attachment 1
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/
DATE
QS-2011-W3-009 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Quality Assurance 1
Finding CR-WF3-2011-3084
QS-2011-W3-008 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Category A Condition June 13, 2011
Reports Initiated During May 2011
QS-2011-W3-007 QA Follow-up Surveillance of Category A Condition 1
Reports Initiated During April 2011
QS-2011-W3-006 QA Follow-up to Category A Condition Reports for 1
January and February 2011
LO-WLO-2011- Quality of Causal Analysis Focused Assessment October 13, 2011
0007
LO-WLO-2011- Maintenance Training Focused Self-Assessment July 29, 2011
0053 (I&C, Mechanical, Electrical)
LO-WLO-2011- Quality Assurance Self-Assessment Report December 9, 2011
0124
LO-WLO-2012- Snapshot Assessment / Benchmark On: PME May 23, 2012
0015 Performance
LO-WLO-2012- Snapshot Assessment / Benchmark On: February 6, 2012
0030 Maintenance - Advanced Qualifications
OE34343- Seismic Monitoring Systems Failed to Actuate September 1, 2011
20111008 During a Seismic Event
OE35212- Extraction Steam System Carbon Steel Reducer November 3, 2011
20120211 found Below Design Minimum Wall due to
Unpredicted Flow-Accelerated Corrosion
OE34934- Nuclear Regulatory Commission Red Finding Root December 9, 2011
20120107 Cause Analysis Results
LO-WLO-2010- Licensed Operator Requal 71111.11 Pre-Inspection March 3, 2011
00143 Assessment
WLO-2011-00018 Evaluate the Effectiveness of Waterford 3 Shift November 3, 2011
Manager/STA Training Program
LOR/STAR Examination # WWEX-LOR-11046R/S 2011
Biennial Written Examination # WEX-LOR-11043R/S
Exam Worksheet
A1-7 Attachment 1
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/
DATE
Site Broadcast RCA Drain Limitations February 16, 2012
Waterford 3 - 2010 Employee Concerns Data
Analysis
Waterford 3 - 2011 Employee Concerns Data
Analysis
FCBT-GET- Entergy Fleet Specific Plant Access Training 17
PATSS
Training Review Group Meeting Minutes June 9, 2010
WLP-TRNC-SATR Focused SAT Review 2
2nd QTR 2010 Instructor Continuing Training Kickoff
LO-WLO-2010- Waterford 3 Equipment Reliability and Core May 27-29, 2010
0059 Business Focused Self Assessment
LO-WLO-2010- WF3 IST Program Focused Self Assessment August 20-24, 2010
0091
LO-WLO-2011- Snapshot Assessment/Benchmark on: Relief Valve October 26, 2011
0041 Program
WH-TB-11-5-A2 Evaluation Summary: Evaluation of Downstream June 14, 2011
Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191
TB-11-5 Assessment of WCAP-16406-P-A Abrasive Wear March 1, 2011
Model and Recommendations
WH-TB-10-4-A2 Evaluation Summary: CEDM Upper Pressure August 17, 2010
Housing Venting
TB-10-4 Potential for Stress Corrosion Cracking in Control April 12, 2010
Element Drive Mechanism Upper Pressure Housing
SD-EFW Emergency Feedwater 11
DCP-3506 Auxiliary Steam Test Connection for EFW Pump March 12, 1997
A/B
A1-8 Attachment 1
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/
DATE
DCP-3506 Auxiliary Steam Test Connection for EFW Pump July 24, 1998
A/B
DCP-3506 Auxiliary Steam Test Connection for EFW Pump February 25, 1999
A/B
DCP-3506 Auxiliary Steam Test Connection for EFW Pump May 26, 1999
A/B
DC-3526 EFW Heat Trace Reliability Improvements September 3, 1999
EC 37263 Replacement of MCC DCT Cubicle Compartments 0
Operability Assistance Tool
STI-WO-275977 CS117A, Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger 0
Discharge Stop Check Valve Leakage Test
EC 31375 Clarify Safety Function and Leakage Criteria for CS- Draft
111A(B) and CS-117A(B)
W3-DBD-003 Emergency Feedwater System 301
CRG Report for Tuesday July 31, 2012
CRG Report for Thursday August 2, 2012
Operational Focus July 31, 2012
Operational Focus August 2, 2012
LO-WLO-2010- Status of the Safety Conscious Work Environment July 6, 2010
00061 in Security
LO-WLO-2012- Operations Assessment of Plant Status and March 1, 2012
006 Configuration Control
A1-9 Attachment 1
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/
DATE
LPL-EQA-4.2B Environmental Qualification Assessment on Allis- 2
Chalmers Form Wound Motors Used in the
Waterford SES Unit No. 3
NRC IN 2010-04 Diesel Generator Voltage Regulation System February 26, 2010
Component Due to Latent Manufacturing Defect
NRC-IN-2010-04- Entergy OE A2 Evaluation Summary July 1, 2010
A2-WF3-0002-001
OP-903-053 V134 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test January 9, 2008
OP-903-053 V135 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test June 18, 2009
ER-W3-2002- Diesel Fire Pump Louvers 0
0429-000
WSES-FSAR- Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
UNIT-3
OP-903-053 V136 Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test August 25, 2011
W3-DBD-018 Fire Protection 0
NPF-38 Waterford Operating License
W3-DBD-037 Nuclear Island and Building Design - RCB 1
Ltr from A H Wern Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Levee Stability Analysis December 7, 1972
TS 3.7.5 Flood Protection NA
W3F1-2011-0018 License Amendment Request to Relocate Technical November 21, 2011
Specifications to the Technical Requirements
Manual Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3
AR079684 Scope Revision to PMID 6718 incorporate EPRI December 12, 2009
Recommend Pdm
A1-10 Attachment 1
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/
DATE
Annual Work Hour Review & Fatigue Assessment 2010
Summary
Annual Work Hour Review & Fatigue Assessment 2011
Summary
ODMI LPSI A Gas Accumulation 14
Entergy System Workplace Violence and Weapons 1
Policies &
Procedures
EN-IS-111 General Industrial Safety Requirements 11
PS-011-102 Personnel Access Control 308
PS-011-103 Vehicle Access Control 303
PS-011-110 Security Owner Controlled Area Vehicle and 010
Personnel Access Control
Waterford 3 Accreditation Board Report September 2010
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-WF3-2012-03424 CR-WF3-2012-03461 CR-WF3-2012-03479
CR-WF3-2012-03495 CR-WF3-2012-03557 CR-WF3-2012-03596
CR-WF3-2012-03701 CR-WF3-2012-03729 CR-WF3-2012-03732
CR-WF3-2012-03736 CR-WF3-2012-03744 CR-WF3-2012-03745
CR-WF3-2012-03747 CR-WF3-2012-03752 CR-WF3-2012-03754
CR-WF3-2012-03761 CR-WF3-2012-03657 CR-WF3-2012-03658
CR-WF3-2012-03659 CR-WF3-2012-03660 CR-WF3-2012-03661
CR-WF3-2012-03662 CR-WF3-2012-03663 CR-WF3-2012-03664
CR-WF3-2012-03665 CR-WF3-2012-03666 CR-WF3-2012-03667
CR-WF3-2012-03668 CR-WF3-2012-03669 CR-WF3-2012-03670
CR-WF3-2012-03671 CR-WF3-2012-03672 CR-WF3-2012-03736
CR-WF3-2012-03709 CR-WF3-2012-03710 CR-WF3-2012-03711
CR-WF3-2012-03712 CR-WF3-2012-03713 CR-WF3-2012-03714
A1-11 Attachment 1
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-WF3-2012-03715 CR-WF3-2012-03716 CR-WF3-2012-03717
CR-WF3-2012-03718 CR-WF3-2012-03719 CR-WF3-2012-03720
CR-WF3-2012-03721 CR-WF3-2012-03722 CR-WF3-2012-03723
CR-WF3-2012-03724 CR-WF3-2012-03725 CR-WF3-2012-03726
CR-WF3-2012-03727 CR-WF3-2012-03728 CR-WF3-2012-03729
CR-WF3-2012-03730 CR-WF3-2012-03731 CR-WF3-2012-03732
CR-WF3-2012-03733 CR-WF3-2012-03734 CR-WF3-2012-03735
CR-WF3-2012-03736 CR-WF3-2012-03737 CR-WF3-2012-03738
CR-WF3-2012-03739 CR-WF3-2012-03740 CR-WF3-2012-03741
CR-WF3-2012-03742 CR-WF3-2010-03235 CR-WF3-2011-07469
CR-WF3-2009-07420 CR-WF3-2010-01166 CR-WF3-2010-03660
CR-WF3-2010-07223 CR-WF3-2010-06219 CR-WF3-2010-02721
CR-WF3-2011-06832 CR-WF3-2011-00679 CR-WF3-2011-01927
CR-WF3-2011-03163 CR-WF3-2011-07602 CR-WF3-2011-03636
CR-WF3-2011-03190 CR-WF3-2011-06205 CR-WF3-2011-04481
CR-WF3-2011-01356 CR-WF3-2011-07605 CR-WF3-2011-02005
CR-WF3-2011-07606 CR-WF3-2011-06254 CR-WF3-2011-07610
CR-WF3-2011-02927 CR-WF3-2011-03084 CR-WF3-2011-00458
CR-WF3-2011-01737 CR-WF3-2012-01048 CR-WF3-2012-00015
CR-WF3-2012-00351 CR-WF3-2012-06832 CR-WF3-2012-01419
CR-WF3-2012-03496 CR-WF3-2010-02940 CR-HQN-2006-00605
CR-WF3-2011-07845 CR-WF3-2011-03522 CR-WF3-2011-03523
CR-WF3-2011-03525 CR-WF3-2011-03526 CR-WF3-2011-03527
CR-WF3-2011-08044 CR-WF3-2011-08045 CR-WF3-2011-08046
CR-WF3-2011-08048 CR-WF3-2011-08049 CR-WF3-2011-08050
CR-WF3-2010-07466 CR-WF3-2011-00553 CR-WF3-2011-06203
CR-WF3-2011-07610 CR-WF3-2011-06204 CR-WF3-2011-08150
CR-WF3-2011-03550 CR-WF3-2011-05841 CR-WF3-2011-07603
CR-WF3-2011-06852 CR-WF3-2011-03350 CR-WF3-2011-05841
CR-WF3-2011-06850 CR-WF3-2012-00013 CR-WF3-2012-00021
CR-WF3-2012-00014 CR-WF3-2012-00818 CR-WF3-2012-01477
CR-WF3-2007-01955 CR-WF3-2012-00837 CR-WF3-2012-01476
CR-WF3-2010-06760 CR-WF3-2011-00217 CR-WF3-2010-02278
CR-WF3-2011-06653 CR-WF3-2012-00024 CR-WF3-2010-01330
CR-WF3-2010-03660 CR-WF3-2010-03050 CR-WF3-2011-03636
CR-WF3-2009-00655 CR-WF3-2009-1276 CR-WF3-2008-04000
CR-WF3-2011-00415 CR-WF3-2011-04935 CR-WF3-2012-00530
CR-WF3-2000-01334 CR-WF3-2012-01334 CR-WF3-2012-03495
CR-WF3-2012-00632 CR-WF3-2011-01737 CR-WF3-2010-07223
CR-WF3-2010-06219 CR-WF3-2011-00458 CR-WF3-2011-00836
CR-WF3-2012-02902 CR-WF3-2012-03190 CR-WF3-2010-04364
CR-WF3-2012-03736 CR-WF3-2012-03461 CR-WF3-2010-03235
CR-WF3-2010-03564 CR-WF3-2010-00686 CR-WF3-2010-02857
CR-WF3-2009-00802 CR-WF3-2010-00341 CR-WF3-2010-02584
CR-WF3-2012-01576 CR-WF3-2012-01581 CR-WF3-2012-00569
A1-12 Attachment 1
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-WF3-2012-02314 CR-WF3-2011-03807 CR-WF3-2012-03424
CR-WF3-2011-00544 CR-WF3-2011-08043 CR-WF3-2010-04199
CR-WF3-2011-00934 CR-WF3-2011-08047 CR-WF3-2011-01168
CR-WF3-2011-04562 CR-WF3-2011-01965 CR-WF3-2011-00987
CR-WF3-2011-08140 CR-WF3-2011-02546 CR-WF3-2010-05595
CR-WF3-2011-03811 CR-WF3-2012-01044 CR-WF3-1999-00708
CR-WF3-2011-00836 CR-WF3-2011-07603 CR-WF3-2012-00659
CR-WF3-2012-01045 CR-WF3-2011-06573 CR-WF3-2011-06254
CR-WF3-2010-02672 CR-WF3-2011-06870 CR-WF3-2012-01380
CR-HQN-2010-00503 CR-WF3-2012-00507 CR-WF3-2012-03067
CR-WF3-2011-03524 CR-WF3-2012-00507 CR-WF3-2009-04155
CR-WF3-2010-02135 CR-WF3-2010-00213 CR-WF3-2010-00036
CR-HQN-2012-00857 CR-WF3-2006-03416 CR-WF3-2007-04464
CR-WF3-2009-02487 CR-WF3-2009-03499 CR-WF3-2009-04155
CR-WF3-2010-00812 CR-WF3-2010-00890 CR-WF3-2010-02302
CR-WF3-2010-02721 CR-WF3-2010-02927 CR-WF3-2010-03099
CR-WF3-2010-03565 CR-WF3-2010-03588 CR-WF3-2010-03595
CR-WF3-2010-04344 CR-WF3-2010-04352 CR-WF3-2010-04634
CR-WF3-2010-04641 CR-WF3-2010-04659 CR-WF3-2010-04785
CR-WF3-2010-05141 CR-WF3-2010-05927 CR-WF3-2010-05929
CR-WF3-2010-07232 CR-WF3-2010-07276 CR-WF3-2010-07362
CR-WF3-2010-07552 CR-WF3-2011-00030 CR-WF3-2011-00553
CR-WF3-2011-00786 CR-WF3-2011-01897 CR-WF3-2011-01965
CR-WF3-2011-02546 CR-WF3-2011-03350 CR-WF3-2011-03465
CR-WF3-2011-03618 CR-WF3-2011-04230 CR-WF3-2011-05320
CR-WF3-2011-05779 CR-WF3-2011-05840 CR-WF3-2011-06166
CR-WF3-2011-06303 CR-WF3-2011-06573 CR-WF3-2011-06701
CR-WF3-2011-07443 CR-WF3-2011-07462 CR-WF3-2011-08055
CR-WF3-2011-08060 CR-WF3-2011-08081 CR-WF3-2011-08150
CR-WF3-2012-00315 CR-WF3-2012-00632 CR-WF3-2012-00659
CR-WF3-2012-00772 CR-WF3-2012-00797 CR-WF3-2012-00891
CR-WF3-2012-01139 CR-WF3-2012-01173 CR-WF3-2012-01503
CR-WF3-2012-01581 CR-WF3-2012-01605 CR-WF3-2012-01660
CR-WF3-2012-02046 CR-WF3-2012-02315 CR-WF3-2012-03232
CR-WF3-2012-03479 CR-WF3-2012-03596 CR-WF3-2012-03701
CR-WF3-2012-03732 CR-WF3-2012-03747 CR-WF3-2012-03752
CR-WF3-2012-03764 CR-WF3-2011-02519 CR-WF3-2012-01956
CR-WF3-2009-02172 CR-WF3-2011-03582 CR-WF3-2012-03325
CR-WF3-2009-05353 CR-WF3-2011-05625 CR-WF3-2012-03729
CR-WF3-2010-02672 CR-WF3-2011-06203 CR-WF3-2012-03761
CR-WF3-2010-03232 CR-WF3-2011-07415 CR-ANO-C-2011-00441
CR-WF3-2010-03809 CR-WF3-2011-08059 CR-WF3-2010-07466
CR-WF3-2010-04638 CR-WF3-2011-08308 CR-WF3-2011-00594
CR-WF3-2010-05046 CR-WF3-2012-00746 CR-WF3-2012-01507
CR-WF3-2010-06531 CR-WF3-2012-01014
A1-13 Attachment 1
WORK ORDERS
248856 52230980 289449
275977 196828 262164
283919 256250 64753
205779 296253 303342
296271 305641 52340992
52356683 52371026 52376231
52389001 254348 257755
246482 254493 263585
286950 261413 279127
298743 28810 287883
245561 52382399 52351187
254203
A1-14 Attachment 1
Information Request
June 11, 2012
Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection - Waterford 3 Nuclear
Generating Station
Inspection Report 2012008
This inspection will cover the period from May 1, 2010, to June 1, 2012. All requested
information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. To the extent possible,
the requested information should be provided electronically in Adobe PDF or Microsoft Office
format. Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel or a similar sortable format.
A supplemental information request will likely be sent during the week of July 9, 2012.
Please provide the following no later than June 30, 2012:
1. Document Lists
Note: for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the
document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status. Please
include long text descriptions of the issues.
a. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions
adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period
b. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to
quality that were opened or closed during the period
c. Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or
downgraded in priority/significance during the period
d. Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or roll up one or
more smaller issues for the period
e. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or
operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety
system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period
f. Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee
Concerns Program (or equivalent)
g. Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period
h. Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress, but not
complete at the end of the period
2. Full Documents, with Attachments
a. Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period
A2-1 Attachment 2
b. Quality assurance audits performed during the period
c. All audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action
Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations
d. Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-
NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO
assessments)
e. Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following:
i. NCVs and Violations issued to Waterford 3
ii. LERs issued by Waterford 3
f. Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined
to be applicable to Waterford 3 (for those that were evaluated, but determined
not to be applicable, provide a summary list):
i. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or
evaluated during the period
ii. Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period
iii. Vendor safet
iv. y information letters (or equivalent) issued or evaluated during the period
v. Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for
applicability during the period
g. Corrective action documents generated for the following:
i. Emergency planning drills and tabletop exercises performed during the
period
ii. Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were
evaluated during the period
iii. Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which
were evaluated during the period
iv. Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees
during the period
A2-2 Attachment 2
3. Logs and Reports
a. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the
period and broken down by functional organization
b. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period
c. Current system health reports or similar information
d. Radiation protection event logs during the period
e. Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information
can be provided by hard copy during first week on site)
f. Employee Concern Program (or equivalent) logs (sensitive information can be
provided by hard copy during first week on site)
g. List of training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator
deficiencies for the period
4. Procedures
a. Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation
procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause
evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement
the corrective action program at Waterford 3
b. Quality Assurance program procedures
c. Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent) procedures
d. Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety-Conscious Work Environment
5. Other
a. List of risk significant components and systems
b. Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors
A2-3 Attachment 2
Note: Corrective action documents refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests,
cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to Waterford 3.
As it becomes available, but no later than June 30, 2012, this information should be uploaded
on the Certrec IMS website. When these documents have been compiled (and by June 30,
2012), please download these documents onto a CD or DVD and sent it via overnight carrier to:
Richard L. Smith
U.S. NRC Resident Inspector Office
7003 Bald Hill Road
Port Gibson, MS 39150
Please note that the NRC is not able to accept electronic documents on thumb drives or other
similar digital media. However, CDs and DVDs are acceptable.
A2-4 Attachment 2