ML111300570

IR 05000397-11-002; 01/01/2011 - 03/26/2011; Columbia Generating Station, Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Postmaintenance Testing, Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML111300570
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	05/10/2011
From:	Webb Patricia Walker NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
To:	Reddemann M Energy Northwest
References
IR-11-002
Download: ML111300570 (33)

See also: IR 05000397/2011002

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGI ON I V

612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400

ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125

May 10, 2011

Mr. M.E. Reddemann

Chief Executive Officer

Energy Northwest

P.O. Box 968, Mail Drop 1023

Richland, WA 99352-0968

Subject: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

NUMBER 05000397/2011002

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On March 26, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection

at your Columbia Generating Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the

inspection findings, which were discussed on March 31, 2011, with yourself, and other members

of your staff.

The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one Severity Level IV

violation of NRC requirements occurred. The NRC has also identified one NRC identified issue

that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety

significance (Green). The NRC has determined that a violation is associated with this issue.

However, because of the very low safety significance and because they were entered into your

corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as noncited violations, consistent

with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance of the noncited violation, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the

NRC Resident Inspector at the facility. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect

assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date

of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator,

Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility.

Energy Northwest -2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one for cases where a response is not

required, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not

include any personal, privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the

Public without redaction.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Wayne C. Walker, Chief

Project Branch A

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-397

License: NPF-21

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2011002

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc: Distribution via ListServ for Columbia Generating Station

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket: 05000397

License: NPF-21

Report: 05000397/2011002

Licensee: Energy Northwest

Facility: Columbia Generating Station

Location: Richland, WA

Dates: January 1, 2011 through March 26, 2011

Inspectors: R. Cohen, Senior Resident Inspector

M. Hayes, Resident Inspector

B. Larson, Senior Operations Engineer

D. Strickland, Operations Engineer

Approved By: W. Walker, Chief, Project Branch A

Division of Reactor Projects

-1- Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000397/2011002; 01/01/2011 - 03/26/2011; Columbia Generating Station, Integrated

Resident and Regional Report; Postmaintenance Testing, Identification and Resolution of

Problems

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced

baseline inspections by region-based inspectors. One Green noncited violation of significance

and one Severity Level IV violation were identified. The significance of most findings is

indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

Significance Determination Process. The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection

Manual Chapter 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the

significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level

after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of

commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50

Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the

licensees failure to consider the impact of preconditioning on the emergency

core cooling systems during maintenance. Specifically, licensee personnel failed

to consider the impact of scheduling keep fill pump maintenance prior to

technical specification required surveillance testing. Licensee personnel

reviewed three years worth of data on the emergency core cooling systems to

ensure there was no degrading performance trend. This issue was placed in the

licensees corrective action program as Action Request/Condition

Report 236880.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the

equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective

of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using

Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - "Initial Screening and

Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined that this performance

deficiency was of very low safety significance because this finding was confirmed

to not result in a loss of operability for the emergency core cooling systems. The

inspectors identified a cross-cutting issue in the area of human performance,

work practices, because the licensee failed to effectively communicate

expectations regarding procedural compliance H.4.b] (Section 1R19).

Cornerstone: Miscellaneous

• Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV violation of 10

CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the failure of the licensee to make a non-emergency

-2- Enclosure

event notification to the NRC. Specifically, on December 20, 2010, the licensee

failed to report the low pressure core spray minimum flow valve failing to open on

pump start, rendering the low pressure core spray system incapable of

performing its specified safety function during testing. The licensee made Event

Notification 46604 on February 8, 2011, to report the identified condition. As a

corrective action the licensee has informed all current shift managers, and plans

to train future senior reactor operators, of the expectation to evaluate low

pressure core spray system failures as a failure of a single train system to

complete a safety function. This violation has been placed in the licensees

corrective action program as Action Request/Condition Report 236879.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because the NRC relies on

licensees to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified

in the regulations in order to perform its regulatory function. The inspectors

determined that this finding was not appropriate to evaluate using the

Significance Determination Process due to the finding only affecting the NRCs

ability to perform its regulatory oversight function. As a result, this finding was

evaluated for traditional enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement

Policy. This finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation in

accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated

September 30, 2010. The inspectors determined that assigning a cross-cutting

aspect was not applicable to this finding due to the finding being screened

exclusively using the traditional enforcement process (Section 4OA2).

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

-3- Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The plant began the inspection period at 100 percent power. The plant remained at 100 percent

power for the remainder of the inspection period except for planned power reductions to support

maintenance and testing.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and

Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the adverse weather procedures for seasonal

extremes (e.g., extreme high temperatures, extreme low temperatures, or hurricane

season preparations). The inspectors verified that weather-related equipment

deficiencies identified during the previous year were corrected prior to the onset of

seasonal extremes, and evaluated the implementation of the adverse weather

preparation procedures and compensatory measures for the affected conditions before

the onset of, and during, the adverse weather conditions.

During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant-specific design features and the

procedures used by plant personnel to mitigate or respond to adverse weather

conditions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the FSAR and performance

requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were

appropriate as specified by plant-specific procedures. Specific documents reviewed

during this inspection are listed in the attachment. The inspectors also reviewed

corrective action program items to verify that plant personnel were identifying adverse

weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their corrective action

program in accordance with station corrective action procedures. The inspectors

reviews focused specifically on the following plant systems:

• February 25, 2011, diesel generator rooms, service water pump houses and

circulating water pump houses due to extreme low temperatures being

forecasted for the day

These activities constitute completion of one readiness for seasonal adverse weather

sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

-4- Enclosure

1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant

systems:

• January 5, 2011, residual heat removal system C

• February 14, 2011, diesel generator 1

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the

reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted

to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore,

potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,

system diagrams, FSAR, technical specification requirements, administrative technical

specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing

work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could

have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The

inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system

components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The

inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating

parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The

inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment

alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of

mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with

the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this

inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of two partial system walkdown samples as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability,

accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant

plant areas:

-5- Enclosure

• January 6, 2011, fire area RC-4, division 1 switch gear room

• January 10, 2011, fire area R-8/1, low pressure core spray pump room

• January 12, 2011, fire area R-1/1, reactor building 522 elevation northwest

quadrant

• February 14, 2011, fire area DG-2, division 1 diesel generator room

• February 16, 2011, fire area R-5, residual heat removal pump 2A room

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire

protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within

the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained

passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented

adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire

protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensees fire plan.

The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk

as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later

additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a

plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using

the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and

extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that

fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was

within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to

be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified

during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program.

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of five quarterly fire-protection inspection samples

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

.1 Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

On February 14, 2011, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the

plants simulator to verify that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were

identifying and documenting crew performance problems, and training was being

conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the

following areas:

-6- Enclosure

• Licensed operator performance

• Crews clarity and formality of communications

• Crews ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction

• Crews prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms

• Crews correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures

• Control board manipulations

• Oversight and direction from supervisors

• Crews ability to identify and implement appropriate technical specification

actions and emergency plan actions and notifications

The inspectors compared the crews performance in these areas to preestablished

operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements.

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed-operator requalification

program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Biennial Inspection (71111.11B)

The licensed operator requalification program involves two training cycles that are

conducted over a 2-year period. In the first cycle, the annual cycle, the operators are

administered an operating test consisting of job performance measures and simulator

scenarios. In the second part of the training cycle, the biennial cycle, operators are

administered an operating test and a comprehensive written examination.

a. Inspection Scope

To assess the performance effectiveness of the licensed operator requalification

program, the inspectors conducted personnel interviews, reviewed both the operating

tests and written examinations, and observed ongoing operating test activities.

The inspectors interviewed four licensee personnel, consisting of instructors and training

management, to determine their understanding of the policies and practices for

administering requalification examinations. The inspectors also reviewed operator

performance on the written exams and operating tests. These reviews included

observations of portions of the operating tests by the inspectors. The operating tests

-7- Enclosure

observed included six job performance measures and three scenarios that were used in

the current biennial requalification cycle. These observations allowed the inspectors to

assess the licensee's effectiveness in conducting the operating test to ensure operator

mastery of the training program content. The inspectors also reviewed medical records

of six licensed operators for conformance to license conditions and the licensees

system for tracking qualifications and records of license reactivation for two operators.

The results of these examinations were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of the

licensees appraisal of operator performance and to determine if feedback of

performance analyses into the requalification training program was being accomplished.

The inspectors interviewed members of the training department and reviewed six

Licensee Event Reports to assess the responsiveness of the licensed operator

requalification program to incorporate the lessons learned from plant events. In addition,

the inspectors reviewed examination security measures, a sample of simulator

performance test records (transient and steady-state tests, malfunction tests, and

scenario-based tests), simulator fidelity and existing logs of simulator deficiencies.

Examination results were assessed to determine if they were consistent with the

guidance contained in NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for

Power Reactors," Revision 9, Supplement 1, and NRC Manual Chapter 0609,

Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination

Process."

The inspectors completed one inspection sample of the biennial licensed operator

requalification program.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk-

significant systems:

• February 22, 2011, TSP-TURB-G001, "Turbine Overspeed Protection Valve

Disassembly and Inspection"

• March 2, 2011, Action Request/Condition Report 234859, CRD-HCU-1843

scram outlet valve leaks by"

• March 2, 2011, Review of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation

The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has

resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and

-8- Enclosure

independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition

problems in terms of the following:

• Implementing appropriate work practices

• Identifying and addressing common cause failures

• Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)

• Characterizing system reliability issues for performance

• Charging unavailability for performance

• Trending key parameters for condition monitoring

• Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or -(a)(2)

• Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and

components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance

through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as

requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective

actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described

in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,

and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance

effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate

significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are

listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of three quarterly maintenance effectiveness

samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk

for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-

related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were

performed prior to removing equipment for work:

-9- Enclosure

• February 3, 2011, Action Request 233580, "500 KV Relay Set 1 Spurious Trip

Tone Signals"

• March 1, 2011, Yellow risk due to I&C testing and removal of the 500 KV north

bus from service

• March 7, 2011, Yellow risk due to stator cooling water pump maintenance

The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to

the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified

that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel

performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly

assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance

work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk

analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the

risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements

and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk

analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific

documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of three maintenance risk assessments and

emergent work control inspection samples as defined in Inspection

Procedure 71111.13-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issues:

• January 5, 2011, Action Request/Condition Report 231738, Diesel Generator 2

Breaker Closing Spring will not Discharge

• January 25, 2011, Action Request/Condition Report 232917, Post Seal Cracks

discovered on HPCS-B1-DG3

• February 1, 2011, Action Request/Condition Report 233290, "Emergency Siren

D-2 is Not Communicating"

• February 24, 2011, Action Request/Condition Report 234537, "Circuit Breaker

Case is Cracked"

- 10 - Enclosure

• February 28, 2011, Action Request/Condition Report 234766, DMA-FN-31

Electrical Phase Imbalance Noted at Motor Starter

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance

of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical

adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that technical specification operability was

properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no

unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and

design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and FSAR to the

licensee personnels evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were

operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the

inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and

were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance

with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors

also reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was

identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of five operability evaluations inspection samples

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-04

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

To verify that the safety functions of important safety systems were not degraded, the

inspectors reviewed the temporary modification identified as Temporary Modification

TMR-11-008, "Crack in Weld Down Stream of BS-V-52A"

The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification and the associated safety-

evaluation screening against the system design bases documentation, including the

FSAR and the technical specifications, and verified that the modification did not

adversely affect the system operability/availability. The inspectors also verified that the

installation and restoration were consistent with the modification documents and that

configuration control was adequate. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the

temporary modification was identified on control room drawings, appropriate tags were

placed on the affected equipment, and licensee personnel evaluated the combined

effects on mitigating systems and the integrity of radiological barriers.

These activities constitute completion of one sample for temporary plant modifications as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18-05.

- 11 - Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following postmaintenance activities to verify that

procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional

capability:

• January 3, 2011, WO 01126278, E-CB-8/3, "Detailed Inspection of MOC Switch"

• February 3, 2011, Work Order 01192825, LPCS-P-2 - Replace Pump Power

Frame

• February 28, 2011, Work Order 01195224, " DG3 DMA-Fan-31 Post Maintenance

Testing

• March 3, 2011, Work Order 01169668, Replace FPC-M-P/1A

• March 10, 2011, Work Request 02000086, "SCW-P-2 Postmaintenance Testing"

• March 21, 2011, Work Request 29086232, "SEIS-RSA-1 Amber and Red Lights

Will Not Reset"

The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or

component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the

following:

• The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was

adequate for the maintenance performed

• Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test

instrumentation was appropriate

The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the FSAR, 10

CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic

communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment

met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed

corrective action documents associated with postmaintenance tests to determine

whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action

program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their

importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in

the attachment.

- 12 - Enclosure

These activities constitute completion of six postmaintenance testing inspection samples

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05.

b. Findings

Introduction: The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix

B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to consider the

impact of preconditioning on the emergency core cooling systems during keep fill pump

maintenance in the work management process.

Description: On February 3, 2011, the inspectors identified that the work schedule for

the keep fill pump maintenance performed on December 20, 2010, could have resulted

in the unacceptable preconditioning of the low pressure core spray system. The

licensee was scheduled to start the low pressure core spray pump to perform

Surveillance Procedure SOP-LPCS-SP, LPCS Suppression Pool Mixing, to support

keep fill pump maintenance on the low pressure core spray system. During low

pressure core spray pump start, the minimum flow valve strokes open to protect the

pump from damage. The low pressure core spray minimum flow valve is scoped into the

licensees inservice testing program; which requires the licensee to test the valve in an

as-found condition without preconditioning of the valve prior to inservice testing.

Preconditioning, as defined in the licensees inservice testing program, is the

manipulation of the physical condition of a component before technical specification

surveillance testing. Unacceptable preconditioning is further defined to be

preconditioning that alters one or more attributes of components which results in

acceptable test results. The licensees definition of unacceptable preconditioning goes

on to further state that any activity performed prior to an inservice test which results in

acceptable test results, but may have adversely affected the ability to monitor the

component for degradation. Once the keep fill pump maintenance was completed, the

licensee was scheduled to complete the required technical specification surveillance test

on the low pressure core spray system. This technical specification surveillance test is

used to test the time the low pressure core spray minimum flow valve takes to stroke

from fully closed to fully open, among other attributes of the low pressure core spray

system. This test is performed to ensure the low pressure core spray system can meet

its specified design function, and to detect a degrading performance trend before

operability is challenged.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees technical position on preconditioning within its

inservice testing program plan to determine what the licensee had defined to be

unacceptable preconditioning. The inspectors identified that one of the examples of

unacceptable preconditioning listed in the licensees inservice testing program was the

exercising of a motor-operated valve other than for test configurations or normal system

operation prior to a surveillance test on the valve. The inspectors also reviewed NRC

Inspection Manual Chapter 9900, "Maintenance-Preconditioning of Structures, Systems,

and Components Before Determining Operability." The inspectors noted that

preconditioning could mask the actual as-found condition of components and possibly

result in an inability to verify the operability of components. The inspectors also noted in

the NRC technical guidance, that the scheduling of apparently unrelated activities could

- 13 - Enclosure

result in unacceptable preconditioning. The inspectors determined that the scheduling of

the keep fill pump maintenance, which requires the starting of the low pressure core

spray system and the cycling of the minimum flow valve, prior to technical specification

surveillance testing constituted unacceptable preconditioning by the licensee.

The inspectors reviewed keep fill pump maintenance scheduling records for the previous

three years and noted the following additional occurrences of unacceptable

preconditioning on emergency core cooling systems:

• 4/22/2008 high pressure core spray system started for keep fill pump maintenance.

4/25/2008 high pressure core spray system started for technical specification

surveillance testing.

• 7/14/2008 high pressure core spray system started for keep fill pump maintenance.

7/18/2008 high pressure core spray system started for technical specification

surveillance testing.

• 10/7/2008 high pressure core spray system started for keep fill pump maintenance.

10/8/2008 high pressure core spray system started for technical specification

surveillance testing.

• 11/23/2009 low pressure core spray system started for keep fill pump maintenance.

11/27/2009 low pressure core spray system started for technical specification

surveillance testing.

• 5/17/2010 high pressure core spray system started for keep fill pump maintenance.

5/19/2010 high pressure core spray system started for technical specification

surveillance testing.

• 8/11/2010 high pressure core spray system started for keep fill pump maintenance.

8/14/2010 high pressure core spray system started for technical specification

surveillance testing.

• 9/8/2010 high pressure core spray system started for keep fill pump maintenance.

9/8/2010 high pressure core spray system started for technical specification

surveillance testing.

• 2/2/2011 residual heat removal system, train C, started for keep fill pump

maintenance.

2/3/2011 residual heat removal system, train C, started for technical specification

surveillance testing.

The inspectors determined, through interviews with the licensees staff, the licensee did

not have clear guidance on how to avoid preconditioning of components during the

scheduling of work or how to resolve issues of preconditioning when identified.

Analysis: The failure to consider preconditioning during the work scheduling process is

a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it

- 14 - Enclosure

affects the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events.

Specifically, the improper scheduling of maintenance and surveillance activities could

mask a degraded condition such that systems would be unable to perform their intended

safety function when called upon. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04,

Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors

determined this performance deficiency was of very low safety significance because the

finding was confirmed to not result in a loss of operability for the emergency core cooling

systems. During interviews with plant personnel the inspectors identified a cross-cutting

issue in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee failed to

effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance. In that, the

licensee failed to give clear guidance to work week managers in preparing work

schedules H.4.b].

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures,

and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by

documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstance and shall be

accomplished in accordance with those procedures. Contrary to this, from 2008 through

2010, the licensee failed to ensure aspects of preconditioning are considered during

scheduling of work as specified in Procedure 1.3.68, Work Management Process. This

caused the licensee to fail to realize the scheduling of emergency core cooling systems

keep fill pump maintenance prior to quarterly scheduled surveillance testing constituted

unacceptable preconditioning. This violation was identified on February 3, 2011.

Because this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance and was

entered into the licensees corrective action program as Action Request/Condition

Report 236880, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with

Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000397/2011002-01, Failure to

Ensure Unacceptable Preconditioning is Considered During the Work Management

Process.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the FSAR, procedure requirements, and technical

specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below demonstrated that the

systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their

intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to

verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the

following:

• Preconditioning

• Evaluation of testing impact on the plant

• Acceptance criteria

- 15 - Enclosure

• Test equipment

• Procedures

• Jumper/lifted lead controls

• Test data

• Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability

• Test equipment removal

• Restoration of plant systems

• Fulfillment of ASME Code requirements

• Updating of performance indicator data

• Engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested systems,

structures, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct

• Reference setting data

• Annunciators and alarms setpoints

The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any

needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.

• January 5, 2011, Work Order 01194716, OSP-RHR/IST-Q704, RHR Loop C

Operability Test

• January 5, 2011, OSP-RHR-M103, "Fill Verification RHR-C System"

• January 24, 2011, Work Order 01194381, ISP-RFW-Q401, "Feedwater/Turbine

Trip Reactor Level 8 Channel Functional Test

• February 2, 2011, ISP-MS-Q935, "Division 2 Channel D Isolation Actuation on

Reactor Level 2 - CFT/CC"

• February 7, 2011, Work Order 01194835, ISP-RCIC-Q903, RCIC Isolation on

RCIC Steam Supply Flow High DIV 2 - CFT/CC

• February 8, 2011, Work Order 01194837, "RCIC Isolation on RCIC Steam Supply

Flow High Division 1 - Channel Functional Tests and Channel Calibration"

• February 22, 2011, Work Order 01193731, "Control Rod Settle Time Test"

- 16 - Enclosure

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of seven surveillance testing inspection samples

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

Training Observations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on January

11, 2011, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew.

This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data

regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification

and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the

postevolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note

any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crews performance and ensure that the

licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action

program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and

other documents listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection

Procedure 71114.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Data Submission Issue

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the

licensee for the fourth Quarter 2010 performance indicators for any obvious

inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual

Chapter 0608, Performance Indicator Program.

- 17 - Enclosure

This review was performed as part of the inspectors normal plant status activities and,

as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical

hours performance indicator for the period from the first quarter 2010 through the fourth

quarter 2010. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported

during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI

Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, event

reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2010 through

December 2010, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also

reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been

identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator

and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment

to this report.

These activities constitute completion of one unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours

sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams with

complications performance indicator for the period from the first quarter 2010 through

the fourth quarter 2010. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data

reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in

NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue

reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January

2010 through December 2010, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The

inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any

problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or

transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are

described in the attachment to this report.

- 18 - Enclosure

These activities constitute completion of one unplanned scrams with complications

sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned power changes per 7000

critical hours performance indicator for the period from the first quarter 2010 through the

fourth quarter 2010. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data

reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in

NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue

reports, maintenance rule records, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports

for the period of January 2010 through December 2010, to validate the accuracy of the

submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to

determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data

collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents

reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of one unplanned transients per 7000 critical

hours sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical

Protection

.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of

this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities

and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees

corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being

given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and

addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate

identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety

- 19 - Enclosure

significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications,

common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and

previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness

of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action program

because of the inspectors observations are included in the attached list of documents

reviewed.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute

any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an

integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in

Section 1 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific

human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of

items entered into the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors

accomplished this through review of the stations daily corrective action documents.

The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status

monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

During a review of items entered in the licensees corrective action program, the

inspectors recognized a corrective action item documenting the low pressure core spray

systems minimum flow valve losing position indication during surveillance testing. The

inspectors were concerned that the issue was reportable to the NRC and that the

licensee had failed to do so.

These activities constitute completion of one in-depth selected issue follow-up inspection

sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.

- 20 - Enclosure

b. Findings

Introduction: The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV violation of Title 10 CFR

50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the failure of the licensee to make a non-emergency event

notification to the NRC. Specifically, the licensee failed to report the low pressure core

spray minimum flow valve failing to open on December 20, 2010, rendering the low

pressure core spray system incapable of performing its specified safety function, during

testing.

Description: On December 20, 2010, while performing Surveillance Procedure SOP-

LPCS-SP, LPCS Suppression Pool Mixing, in support of scheduled maintenance, the

low pressure core spray minimum flow valve failed to open as expected. The low

pressure core spray minimum flow valve is a motor-operated valve which is required to

open when the low pressure core spray system is started. This is done to establish a

flow path from the suppression pool, back to the suppression pool until a flow path can

be established to the reactor vessel to prevent overheating and damage to the low

pressure core spray pump and motor. The low pressure core spray system was

subsequently declared inoperable and an investigation team was assembled to

determine the cause of the failure. The investigation team determined that two of the

three fuses associated with the low pressure core spray motor starter showed internal

melting and discoloration while the third fuse did not. The licensee replaced all three

fuses and performed testing on the low pressure core spray motor starter and returned

the low pressure core spray system to an operable status.

The inspectors questioned the licensee on whether the low pressure core spray system

was capable of performing its specified safety function, at the time of discovery, when

the minimum flow valve failed to open. The inspectors referred to NUREG-1022, Event

Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 73, Revision 2, and noted the following under

Section 3.2.7, Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety

Function:

• The intent of these criteria is to capture those events when there would have

been a failure of a safety system to properly complete a safety function.

• These criteria cover an event or condition where structures, components, or

trains of a safety system could have failed to perform their intended function

because of: [] equipment failures.

• The event must be reported regardless of whether or not an alternate safety

system could have been used to perform the safety function.

• There are a limited number of single train systems that perform safety functions.

For such systems, loss of the single train would prevent the fulfillment of the

safety function of that system and, therefore, is reportable.

The inspectors presented their questions to the licensee on December 29, 2010. The

licensee prepared a position paper that summarized the low pressure core spray system

was not a single train system for reporting purposes, but that it was a redundant system

- 21 - Enclosure

to both the residual heat removal system and the high pressure core spray system.

Therefore, the reporting requirement would not be met due to the previously mentioned

systems being able to provide the appropriate safety function. The licensee position

paper was presented to the inspectors on January 6, 2011. The inspectors reviewed the

FSAR and consulted with NRC regional, headquarters, and training staff to determine

the treatment of the low pressure core spray system for reporting purposes. After

review, the inspectors determined the low pressure core spray system was a single train

system and the failure of the minimum flow valve to open was a reportable condition.

The licensee submitted Event Notification 46604 to the Headquarters Operations Officer

on February 8, 2011.

Analysis: The failure to report a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a

systems safety function is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor

because the NRC relies on licensees to identify and report conditions or events meeting

the criteria specified in the regulations in order to perform its regulatory function. Using

Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, the inspectors determined that this performance

deficiency was not appropriate to evaluate using the NRCs Significance Determination

Process due to the finding only affecting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory

oversight function. As a result, this performance deficiency was evaluated for traditional

enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This performance

deficiency was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section

6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated September 30, 2010. The inspectors

determined that assigning a cross-cutting aspect was not applicable to this performance

deficiency due to the performance deficiency being screened exclusively using the

traditional enforcement process.

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) requires, in part, that licensees shall notify

the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of an event or condition that at the time of

discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are

needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Contrary to this requirement, on

December 20, 2010, the licensee failed to report to the NRC a condition that could have,

at the time of discovery, prevented the low pressure core spray system from fulfilling its

safety function. This violation was identified on December 28, 2010. The licensee made

Event Notification 46604 on February 8, 2011. As a corrective action the licensee has

informed all current shift managers, and plans to train future senior reactor operators, of

the expectation to evaluate low pressure core spray system failures as a failure of a

single train system to complete a safety function. There was no actual or potential

safety consequences associated with this violation. Because this violation was placed

into the licensees corrective action program as Action Request/Condition

Report 236879, compliance was restored within a reasonable amount of time, the

violation was not repetitive, or willful, this Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a

noncited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy: NCV

05000397/2011002, Failure to Make Required Event Notification.

- 22 - Enclosure

.4 Assessment of Licensee Improvement Efforts

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issue:

• March 2, 2011, Action Request/Condition Report 222076, Pride and

Performance Completion Sample - Equipment Reliability, items 12 and 30

The inspectors determined that the licensee has effectively identified systems and

components necessary to control reactor power, reactor pressure and reactor level and

have accurately assessed the reliability of such systems and components.

These activities constitute completion of one in-depth problem identification and

resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000397/2010-002-00: LPCS Minimum Flow

Valve Failed to Open Due to Premature Fuse Failure at the Solder Joint

This LER documented a failure of the low pressure core spray minimum flow valve to

open during surveillance testing, rendering the low pressure core spray system

inoperable and unable to perform its specified safety function. See Section 4OA5 of

NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2011002 for a discussion of an NRC identified

violation associated with this event. The inspectors completed a review of this LER and

did not identify any other violations of regulatory requirements or findings associated

with this event. This LER is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 NRC TI 2515/177, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay

Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems (NRC Generic Letter 2008-01)"

As documented in Section 1R22 of Inspection Report 05000397/2010005 and 1R22 of

Inspection Report 05000397/2011002, the inspectors confirmed the acceptability of the

described actions for the residual heat removal system and the high pressure core spray

system. This inspection effort counts towards the completion of TI 2515/177 which will

be closed in a later inspection report.

- 23 - Enclosure

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors debriefed Messrs. John Bekhazi, Plant General Manager, James Moon, Training

Manager, and other members of the staff on December 2, 2010. A telephonic exit of the results

of the licensed operator requalification program inspection was conducted on March 1, 2011,

between Messrs. Brian Larson, Lead Inspector, and Kevin Smart, Operations Training

Supervisor. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

On March 31, 2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Mark Reddemann,

Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged

the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during

the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

- 24 - Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

B. Sawatzke, Chief Nuclear Officer

B. MacKissock, Plant General Manager

C. King, Assistant, Plant General Manager

D. Brown, Operations Manager

S. Wood, Organizational Effectiveness Manager

D. Swank, Engineering General Manager

D. Mand, Design Engineering Manager

J. Bekhazi, Maintenance Manager

D. Gregoire, Acting Regulatory Affairs Manager

K. Christianson, Acting Licensing Supervisor

R. Garcia, Licensing Engineer

L. Williams, Licensing Engineer

P. Taylor, Operations Training Manager

K. Smart, Operations Training Supervisor

R. Hayden, Operations Training Specialist

NRC Personnel

R. Cohen, Resident Inspector

M. Hayes, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None.

Opened and Closed

05000397/2011002-01 NCV Failure to Ensure Unacceptable Preconditioning is Considered

During the Work Management Process (Section 1R19)05000397/2011002-02 NCV Failure to Make Required Event Notification (Section 4OA2)

Closed

05000397/2010-002-00 LER LPCS Minimum Flow Valve Failed to Open Due to Premature

Fuse Failure at the Solder Joint (Section 4OA3)

Discussed

None.

A-1 Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1RO1: Adverse Weather Protection

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

SOP-COLDWEATHER-OPS Cold Weather Operations 16

Section 1RO4: Equipment Alignment

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

SOP-DG1-STBY Emergency Diesel Generator (Div 1) Standby Lineup 14

Section 1RO5: Fire Protection

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

FSAR Columbia Generating Station Final Safety Analysis Report, 60

Appendix F

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

Licensed Operator Requalifications Training LR002021 0

TDI-08 Licensed Operator Requalification Program 7

TDI-12 Shift Technical Advisor/Incident Advisor Program 2

AR/CR Licensee Medical Status Not Consistent with RIV Database

00230147

LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS

397-10001 Failure of a Secondary Containment Isolation Valve to Fully Close

397-09005 Manual Reactor Scram due to Main Turbine DEH Control System Fluid Leak

397-09004 6.9 kV Non-Segregated Electrical Bus Failure

397-09003-1 Manual Reactor Scram due to a Fire Stemming from a Turbine Lube Oil leak

A-2 Attachment

397-09002-1 Manual Reactor Scram due to Loss of Hydrogen Pressure in the Main

Generator

397-09001-1 Reactor Scram due to Turbine Control System Trip Header Depressurization

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

TSP-TURB-G001 Turbine Overspeed Protection Valve Disassembly and April 19, 2007

Inspection

Drawing M502 Flow Diagram Main & Exhaust Steam System 35

Drawing M959 Flow Diagram Electro-Hydraulic Fluid System 15

ABN-DEH-LEAK DEH-System-Leak 2

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

AR 233580233580 500 KV Relay Set 1 Spurious Trip Tone Signals February 3,

2011

Energy Northwest Impact Statement, BPA Communication February 3,

Equipment 2011

WO 2000583 Investigate Spurious Tone 1 and Tone 2 Signals on 500 KV 0

Relay Set 1

ABN- Main Generator Trouble 9

GENERATOR

02000086-01 SCW-P-2 Replace power frame with rebuilt one February 28,

2011

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

ESP-B1DG3- 12 Month Battery Inspection of 125 VDC HPCS-B1-DG3 6

A101

A-3 Attachment

AR/CR 234537 Circuit breaker Case is Cracked February 24,

2011

AR/CR 234766 DMA-FN-31 Electrical Phase Imbalance Noted at Motor February 28,

Starter 2011

ACTION REQUEST/CONDITION REPORTS

232917 218082 228525 218980

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

TMR-11-008 Crack in Weld Down Stream of BS-V-52A March 1,

2011

Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

Action Request DMA-FN-31 Electrical Phase Imbalance Noted at Motor February 25,

234765 Starter 2011

Action Request DMA-FN-31 Phase Imbalance February 25,

234766 2011

Work Order DG3 Monthly Operability Testing February 25,

01195224 2011

OSP-FPC/IST- Fuel Pool Cooling System Operability Surveillance 24

Q701

18.1.22 FPC-P-1A IST Preservice Test 1

Work Request SCW-P-2 Postmaintenance Testing March 10,

02000086 2011

Work Request SEIS-RSA-1 Amber and Red Lights Will Not Reset March 21,

29086232 2011

Work Order SP HP Support Replace Power Frame LPCS-P-2 December

0119282503 20, 2010

Work Order OSP-LPCS/IST-Q702 Operability Testing December

0119266501 20, 2010

SWP-PRO-01 Description and Use of procedures and Instructions 16

A-4 Attachment

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

Inservice Testing Program Plan Third Ten-Year Inspection 2011

Interval

Action Request Energy Northwest Condition Evaluation

234072

1.3.68 Work Management Process 22

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

ISP-RFW-Q401 Feedwater/Turbine Trip reactor level 8 Channel Functional 11

Test

ISP-MS-Q935 Division 2 Channel D Isolation Actuation on Reactor Level 8

2-CFT/CC

ISP-RCIC-Q903 RCIC Isolation on RCIC Steam Supply Flow High DIV 2 - 15

CFT/CC

RCIC Isolation on RCIC Steam Supply Flow High Division 1 17

- Channel Functional Test and Channel Calibration

PPM 8.2.449 Control Rod Settle Time Test 3

ACTION REQUEST/CONDITION REPORTS

01194620 01193731

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE DATE

Columbia Generating Station 2011 ERO Team D Training January 11,

Drill 2011

A-5 Attachment

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline 6

Operator Logs

Energy Northwest and NRC Performance Indicator Data

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

ACTION REQUEST/CONDITION REPORTS

00233155 00233160 00233181 00233182 00233184

00233209 00233210 00233227 00233228 00233260

00232626 00233275 00233276 00233278 00233266

00233267 00233290 00233452 00233457 00233456

00233462 00233463 00233368 00233580 00233588

00233642 00233644 00233646 00233647 00233648

00233668 00233670 00233679 00233682 00233691

00233692 00233913 00233915 00233883 00233887

00233913 00233915 00233580 00233588 00233589

00233592 00233594 00233609 00233614 00233634

00233637 00233642 00233644 00233646 00233647

00233648 00233649 00233650 00233652 00233653

00231848 00231907 00231905 00231908 00231661

00231662 00231665 00231677 00231680 00231684

00231738 00231778 00231798 00231805 00231810

00231813 00231848 00231852 00234219 00234221

00234265 00234268 00234269 00234271 00233986

00233989 00234167 00234169 00234187 00234190

00234191 00234051 00234052 00234072 00234077

00234081 00234082 00234101 00234102 00234103

00234119 00234120 00234122 00234123 00234134

00234135 00234136 00234137 00234140 00234141

00234146 00234765 00234535 00234537 00234538

00234580 00234380 00234381 00234383 00234384

00234407 00234409 00234443 00234444 00234445

A-6 Attachment

00234446 00235404 00235405 00235522 00235523

00235525 00235526 00236261 00236264 00236265

00236306 00236307 00236311 00235994 00235996

00235997 00236022 00236023 00236024 00235660

00235661 00235640 00235654 00236339 00236340

00236343 00236453 00236454 00236455 00236473

00236474 00236488 00236489 00236500 00236501

00236502

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

AR/CR 222076 Pride and Performance Completion Sample - Equipment March 2,

Reliability, items 12, 30 2011

Section 4OA3: Event Follow-Up

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

LER 2010-002-00 LPCS Minimum Flow Valve Failed to Open Due to February 18,

Premature Fuse Failure at the Solder Joint 2011

A-7 Attachment