ML20153D071

Supplemental Response to NRC 871217 Notice of Violation & Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties Re Enforcement Action EA-87-142 in Insp Repts 50-348/87-30 & 50-364/87-30

ML20153D071
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	05/05/1988
From:	Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
EA-87-142, NUDOCS 8805090054
Download: ML20153D071 (11)

Text

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Allbama Power Company

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600 North 16th Stre<st Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 352910400

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Telephone 205 250-1835 m

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u R. P. Mcdonald Alabama Power Sentor Vice President o

the soahem eutre sntem May 5, 1988 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 h

Director,.0ffice of Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Vashington. D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Jopph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Inspections of May 11-22, June 1-5 and June 11-July 10, 1987 RE:

Supplemental Response to Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties Regarding Enforcement Action 87-142 On December 17, 1987 Alabama Power Company responded to the NRC Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (NOV), dated November

3. 1987, relating to the,Jaseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (E!.87-142). The NRC reported additional findings, asserted to relate to EA 87-142, in an Inspection Report issued by letter dated February 4, 1988.

In that letter, the NRC requested that Alabama Power Company "provide [its]

corrective actions for these additional examples in a supplemental i

response" to the NOV. As requested, Alabama Power Company describes below the corrective actions taken with respect to these items.

PROCUREMENT OF COMMERCIAL GRADE COMPONENTS FOR EQ APPLICATIONS (50-348, 364/87-30-01)

General In the February 4, 1988 Inspection Report, six examples of conditions considered to reflect adversely on Alabama Pover Company's procurement process were noted. Four of these items were self-identified by Alabama Power Company. As requested, corrective measures related to those findings are described below. Some of these actions are included in our December 17, 1987 response.

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s On June 4, 1987, prior to completion of the vendor inspection audit on which the November 3, 1987 NOV vas based, plant procedures were revised to require written evaluation and approval of code C parts prior-to their use in safety related functions. This action was an interim measure until a dedication program was approved.

Procedures were revised on November 13, 1987 requiring engineering ceview of Code C parts prior to installation in safety related components.

If the commercial grade part does not perform a safety function, a basis for acceptance is provided.

Procedures have also been revised to incorporate a parts dedication program which provides clear guidance for procurement and dedication of commercial grade items (except for parts procured as Code D) for use in performance of safety related functicas.

As noted in Alabama Power Company's December 17, 1987 response, Alabama Power Company intends to continue actively working with the NRC and industry committees in an effort to improve the process for dedication of commercial grade items for use in the performance of safety related functions.

Alabama Power Company vill further revise its procedures as follows:

1.

EQ components and parts that perform a safety function vill be procured as safety related or they vill be procured as non-safety related and dedicated.

If the parts serve no safety related function and are not required to function to satisfy the environmental qualification of the component, they may be purchased as non-safety related.

2.

Procurement procedures vill be revised to require that items that are procured as non-safety related for dedication for safety related use in EQ applications vill undergo an engineering review to determine that the items are the same as the items included in the original qualification test (s) or that any deviations which could affect the quellfication status have been satisfactorily addressed.

3.

Procurement procedures vill be revised as necessary to allow the dedication of Code D (non-safety related) items to be used in safety related functions. This dedication, including a commitment of Alabama Power Company to accept 10CFR21 reporting responsibility, may be a formal dedication plan or it may be a documented engineering reviev showing the adequacy of the part.

The second paragraph on page 11 of the Inspection Report states in part, "Review of the quality implementing procedure FNP-0-AP-9, Revision 12, I

revealed that measures had not been established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements are met, and design bases are preserved during the procurement and use of 0A Review Code C (Non-safety-Related) and QA reviev

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., 2 Director, Office of Enforcement May 5, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 Code D (Non-safety-Related) items in E0 applications." Alabama Power Company does not agree with the portion of this conclusion regarding Code D items.

FNP-0-AP-9, paragraph 9.2.1, states that Code D assemblies, parts or materials and services vill be assigned QA requirements per the criteria contained in paragraph 9.2.1.1.

Specifically, this paragraph states that design, code, or license requirements shall be included in the procurement documents. This ensures that the design bases are preserved during the procurement of Code D items, including items in E0 applications.

Detailed Discussion of NRC Identified Examples EXAMPLE 1:

"P.O. No. OP-1481 (OA Review Code D) vas issued for the procurement of States type ZVM terminal blocks. The controlling procedure for this procurement was FNP-0-AP-9, revision 12 (Issue Date September 2, 1986).

This procedure defined Code D as a non-safety-related procurement of an item where current license requirements are applicable to the part, or special vendor documentation and verification of vendor's OA program is deemed necessary.

The requirements of 10 CFR 21 vere not imposed on this purchase order.

teceptance of the items by the licensee was by receipt inspection with a Jertificate of Conformance that noted the terminal blocks had been manufactured using vendor's standard QA/0C procedures for Class 1E terminal blocks.

However, specific supplemental documentation, such as material certificates or reports of tests, was not requested in the l

purchase order nor vere they provided by the vendor.d Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that specific supplemental documentation vas not requested in the purchase order nor was it provided by the vendor.

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Evaluation of Violation i

Although specific supplemental documentation was not requested nor received in the subject purchase order, subsequent evaluation by the vendor (Multi-amp letter dated May 3, 1988) has demonstrated that the l

States type ZVM terminal blocks procured Code D vere of the same design, materials and manufacturing processes as those tested (Wyle l

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!aboratories Test Report NE044354-1 dated March 8, 1979). Therefore Alabama Power Company concludeF the subject terminal blocks are i

l acceptable for safety related E0 applications. The States type ZVM l

terminal blocks were procured Code D under the States Quality Assurance l

Program, Revision 3, that had been approved by Alabama Power Company prior to procurement.

Receiot inspection was done by Alabama Power Company as required by FNP-0-AP-20, which is the same procedure used to document receipt inspection for safety related items. This procedure ensures proper inspection of the items as well as verification that the documentation required by the procurement documer.ts has been received.

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 In addition, the traceability of the Code D items of this purchase order was maintained per FNP-0-AP-21.

These steps, combined with the knowledge of Alabama Pover Company that it had previously had Vyle Laboratories perform the necessary E0 testing on this type terminal block, adequately constituted the dedication of the terminal blocks for safety related E0 applications.

Further, these steps are equivalent to a dedication of the items under a formal plan. No additional action for 10CFR21 compliance is deemed necessary.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved No further action required.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations Procurement procedures vill be revised as necessary to allow the dedication of Code D (non-safety related) items to be used in safety related functions. This de61 cation, including a commitment of Alabama Power Company to accept 10CFR21 reporting responsibility, may be a formal dedication plan or it may be a documented engineering review showing the adequacy of the part.

Date of Full Compliance Applicable Farley Nuclear Plant procedures vill be revised by June 2, 1988.

EXAMPLE 2:

"The reactive inspection the week of September 14-18, 1987, for follovup of licensee identified unqualified taped splices revealed the use of commercially procured tapes for E0 applications.

Purchase Order No. B4541 (OA Review Code C) was issued on September 30, 1986 for procurement of miscellaneous electrical supplies including Okonite T-95 insulating tape and No. 35 overlay tape. An engineering determination of the items critical attributes, ability to function in the intended safety-related application, and the acceptance parameters for verification of those critical attributes were never performed by the licensee. An assessment of the impact on E0 status pursuant to receipt of Okonite's letter to Mr.

Robert Culp, dated November 11, 1986 [ sic], was never performed. This letter gave a qualified shelf life for T-95 tape as 18 months, and for No.

35 tape as 24 months. The controlling procedure for this procurement FNP-0-AP-9, revision 12, did not establish requirements for dedication of commercially procured items prior to use in E0 applications."

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S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page.5 Admission or Denial Alabana Power Company, admits that requirements for dedication of commercially procured items prior to use in EQ applications were not established.

Evaluation of Violation Inadequate pro:edural guidance resulted in inadequate documentation of the suitability of these commercial grade items prior to their installation in safety related components. To confirm previous verbal informs. tion, a letter was obtained from The Okonite Company on June 11, 1987 stating that Okonite T-95 and Okonite #35 tapes are commercial materials manufactured under a commercial QC Program. The tapes have been qualified for use in a nuclear environment (see Report NORN-3 Rev.

2, 2/16/84).

Stock material is run and distributed to varehouses.

These stock tapes are the same quality as vould be.provided if identified for nuclear plant use and traceability requirements imposed in the procurement documents.

In addition, a shelf life program was implemented in 1986.

An inspection of tape removed as a result of the V-t'epe splice tape replacement program was performed and the tape was in good condition.

On this basis, the use of these tapes is accoptable and hence no significant safety issue is involved.

Corrective Actior. Taken and Resulta Achieved No further action required.

Evaluations affirmed that the tapes are acceptable.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations EQ components and parts that perform a safety function vill be procured as safety related or they vill be procured as non-safety related and dedicated.

If the parts serve no safety related function and are not required to function to satisfy the environmental qualification of the component, they may be purchased as non-safety related.

Date of Full Compliance Applicable Tarley Nuclear Plant procedures vere revised on November 13, 1987. Okonite tape has been procured as safety related since September 23, 1987.

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i Director, Office of Enforcement May 5, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 6 EXAMPLE 3:

"Installation of unqualified limit switch and torque switches in motor operated valves discovered during valkdown in response to IEN 86-03.

(Procured Code C)."

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that the installed limit switch and torque switches were procured without environmental qualification supporting documentation.

Evaluation of Violation Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in an inadequate evaluation of the suitability of commercial grade parts prior to their installation in safety related components. An investigation was initiated which determined that the non-metallic portions of the torque switch and limit switches installed had a whitish-gray color and appeared to be identical to the qualified replacement parts.

According to Limitorque, whitish-gray is the sas.e color material they utilize for Code A, safety related, environmentally qualified applications.

Code C items, however, are normally red in color.

Frem this review, it was determined that the limit switch and torque switches vould have performed their intended function and hence no significant safety issue was involved. Therefore, the extent of the deficiency is limited to a lack of documentation supporting environmental qualification.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved The torque switch and limit switches vere replaced with parts procured as Code A.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid,Further Violations E0 components and parts that perform a safety function vill be procured as safety related or they vill be procured as non-safety related and dedicated.

If the parts serve no safety related function and are not required to function to satisfy the environmental qualification of the component, they may be purchased as non-safety related.

Date of Full Compliance Applicable Farley Nuclear Plant procedures were revised on November 13, 1987.

Replacement of all subject components was completed on November 25, 1987.

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i EXAMPLE 4t.

"Installation of Raychem Breakout kits in NANCO Limit Switches for Chico Seal (Procured Code D vithout supporting documentation)."-

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company denies that the Raychem breakout kits were procured without supporting documentation. Alabama Power Company admits that the reporting requirements of 10CFR Part 21 vere not addressed.

Reason for Denial

,J Alabama Power Company purchased the material for Class lE use inside containment in accordance with 0A Requirements for Safety Related Commodities. Raychem provided the requested documentation as well as a Certificate of Compliance. The Certificate of Compliance certf.fied that the material was equivaler t to that tested by test reports EDR-5015, EDP-5009, and Vyle Report 58442-3.

Even though the purchase order stated that the material was classified as Code D, safety grade documentation requirements were specified and the vendor supplied proper documentation for safety related or EQ use of the material.

This material is therefore acceptable for its installed application.

While all documentation supporting safety grade material was supplied by the vendor, the requirements of 10CFR Part 21 vere not imposed on this purchase order. Alabama Power Company did, however, handle receipt inspection and issuance per FNP-0-AP-21, which provides the necessary traceability to meet 10CFR Part 21.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved No further action required.

Corrective Action Taken to Avoid Future Violations Procurement procedures vill be revised as necessary to allow the dedication of Code D (non-safety related) items to be used in safety related functions. This dedication, including a commitment of Alabama Power Company to accept 10CFR Part 21 reporting responsibility, may be a formal dedication plan or it may be a documented engineering review shoving the adequacy of the part.

Date of Full Compliance Applicable Farley Nuclear Plant procedures vill be revised by June 2, 1908.

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Dir'ector, Office of' Enforcement May 5,' 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 8 w

e EXAMPLE 5:

."Installation of. G.E. O rings in penetrations (Procured Code C, r.ot upgraded for EQ applicable)."

Admission or Denial Vhile Alabama Power Company admits that the G.3. O rings were procured Code C, we deny that upgrading for EQ applicability is required since the 0 ring does not affect the environmental qualification of the module.

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Evaluation of Violation Inadenua procedural gaidance resulted in an inadegaate evaluation of the suittoility of commercial grade parts prior to installation in safety related components. This issue vas reviewed and it was

~~termined that the material was purchased for use inside Containment on the Electrical Penetration Assemblies supplied by General Electric vnder P.O. FNP-241. The subject 0 rings are metallic and serve to seal individual penetration modules for containment leakage aiderations. These parts are commercial quality items whose iformance is demonstrated by periodic Local Leak Rate Testing of each penetration. General Electric supplied a Product Quality Certification for these parts certifying that the items were supplied in accordance l

vith applicable codes and specifications.

From this review it was determined that the seals vould have performed their intended function and hence no significant safety issue was involved.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved No further corrective action necessary.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations Components and parts that perform a safety function vill be procured as safety related or they vill be procured as non-safety related and dedicated.

Date of Full Compliance Applicable Farley Nuclear Plant procedures were revised on November 13, 1987.

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EXAlfP1Ji 6:

"Installation of metal 0 rings in Conax Penetration (Procured Code C)."

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company denien that the violation occurred as described above.

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Reason for Denial The subject containment penetrations were manufactured by General Electric. The General Electric penetrations contain General Electric and/or Conax modules. No metallic 0 rings have been installed on Conax modules; however, Alabama Power Company admits that General Electric 0 rings were procured as Code C and installed on four blank plugs supplied by General Electric. Refer to Example 5, Evaluation of Violation, regarding commercially supplied 0 rings by General Electric.

Action Takren to Reinforce Continued Compliance Refer to Example 5, above.

UPGRADING E0 EQUIPMENT DURING PROCUREMENT (50-348, 364/87-30-02)

General In the February 4, 1988 Report the NRC Staff describes an alleged deficiency (concerning upgrading of equipment) related to the procurement of certain limit switches as an additional example of a previously cited violation.

Detailed Discussion of NRC Identified Examplo EXAMPLE:

"An example of failure to upgrade during procurement is the purchase of Snap-Lock limit switches.

P.O. No. OP-1164 (OA Review Code A) van issued for the procurement of environmentally qualified Snap-Lock limit switches on September 8, 1986. The switches were procured as safety-related equipment, and the provisions of 10 CFR 21 vere imposed on the purchase order, however, the P.O. specified that the Certificate of Compliance should certify. compliance with ACHE-Cleveland Development Report llo.

OTR/105 Revision 4, dated January 8, 1984. This report establishes m

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Director, Office of Enforcement May 5, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 10 environmental qualification (EQ) to NUREG-0588 Category II.

Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49(1) the equipment was not upgraded to 10 CFR 50.49 and reasons to the contrary for not doing so vere never documented. The controlling procedure for procurement activities, FNP-0-AP-9, revision 12, did not establish requirements for procurement of upgraded items. This failure of the liceauce procurement program to establish measures that ensure upgrade of equipment in accordance with requirements of 10CFR50.49(1) is identified as a violation..."

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that replacement equipment, as interpreted by the NRC, was not upgraded to 10CFR50.49 or "sound reasons to the contrary" documented.

Evaluation of Violation On January 11, 1984, a meeting with NaC staff in Bethesda, Maryland was held to discuss Alabama Power Company position on maintaining equipment qualification.

On February 29, 1984, Alabama Power Company documented, via letter to the NRC, minutes of the January 11, 1984 meeting in which Alabama Power Company's position on procurement of replacement equipment was described.

Specifically, Alabama Power Company stated that it vould procure "identical components" as replacements unlesc identical components cannot be obtained. On December 13, 1984, NRC issued an SER specifically referencing the February 29, 1984 Alabama Power Company letter and concluding that Alabama Power Company's EQ program is in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.49.

As shown above, Alabama Power Company informed the NRC through a meeting and by letter of its intended actions on maintaining qualification of equipment; specifically, replacement equipment.

It was Alabama Power Company's understanding that the NRC SER documented that Alabama Power Company's EQ program, including Alabama Power Company's interpretation of replacement equipment, was in compliance with 10CFR50.49 requirements.

During an EQ inspection conducted during the period of September 14-18, 1987, a concern was identified that the requirements of 10CFR50.49(1) were not being properly implemented. To resolve ongoing NRC concerns, Alabama Power Company revised procedures on Novemer 16. 1987 to require that replacement equipment be upgraded to 10CFR50.49 or "sound reasons to the contrary" be documented.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved All E0 components replaced since February 1983 have been reviewed.

It has been determined that all items vere qualified to 10CFR50.49 requirements or "sound reasons to the contrary" have been documented.

In addition, a review of store-room inventories was conducted to determine the level of qualification of all E0 components in inventory.

Any components not qualified to 10CFR50.49 vere removed from the EQ t

inventory.

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o Director, Office of Enforcement May 5, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 11 Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations on November 16, 1987, Alabama Power Company revised procedures requiring replacement equipment to be upgraded to 10CFR50.49 or "sound reasons to the contrary" be documented.

Date of Full Compliance Review of storeroom inventories and repla,ement EQ equipment including the disposition of the results of this reviev was completed on May 2, 1988.

CONCLUSION Alabama Power Company believes that the actions described above fully respond to the conditions identified in the original NOV and to the conditions identified above, many of which vere in fact identified through Alabama Power Company's efforts.

In addition, as noted, each of the examples referenced by the NRC in the February 4, 1988 Inspection Report have been evaluated and found to be acceptable for use in EQ applications.

Thus, none of these findings represent conditions of adverce safety significance.

In view of the above, Alabama Power Company maintains that the positions taken in the December 17, 1987 response to the NOV remain valid and we reassert those here.

If you have any questions, plesse advise.

Respectfully submitted, AJAy^

POV.R COKPANY

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R. P. Mcdonald RPN/JARedst-D1V8.21 cci Mr. L. B. Long Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. V. H. Bradford i

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