ML11228A032

Crystal River, Unit 3, Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Balance of Plant Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR (TAC ME6527)

ML11228A032
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/11/2011
From:	Franke J A Progress Energy Florida
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
3F0811-02, TAC ME6527
Download: ML11228A032 (59)

Text

Progress Erm Crystal River Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 August 11, 2011 3F0811-02 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 -Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Balance of Plant Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR (TAC No. ME6527)

References:

1.CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 -License Amendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate" (Accession No. ML 112070659)

2. Email from S. Lingam (NRC) to D. Westcott (CR-3) dated, July 25, 2011,"Crystal River, unit 3 -EPU LAR (ME6527)"

Dear Sir:

By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. The proposed license amendment is considered an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). On July 25, 2011, via electronic mail, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) related to turbine generator missile generation, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System, and modification of the emergency feedwater pump recirculation valves needed to support the Balance of Plant Branch acceptance review of the CR-3 EPU License Amendment Request (LAR).Attachment A to this submittal, "Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Balance of Plant Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR," provides the CR-3 formal response to the RAI.In support of the CR-3 EPU acceptance review RAI responses, four enclosures are provided.Enclosure 1, "Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis Report Progress Energy Crystal River 3," Revision 1 (Confidential), provides the CR-3 specific turbine missile generation probability analysis performed for EPU conditions.

Enclosure 2, "Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis Report Progress Energy Crystal River 3," Revision IA (For Public Record), provides a redacted version of the CR-3 specific turbine missile generation probability analysis.

Enclosure 3, "EFW Pump Recirculation Valve Simplified Diagrams (Figures 1 and 2)," provides simplified diagrams of the proposed addition of emergency feedwater (EFW) pump recirculation valves. Enclosure 4, "Summary of Emergency Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve Modification Failure Modes and Effects Analysis," provides a summary of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis prepared for the new EFW pump recirculation valves.I Progress Energy Florida, Inc.Crystal River Nuclear Plant 15760 W. Powerline Street Crystal River, FL 34428 týbý U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 3 3F0811-02 Enclosure 1 contains Siemens Technical Report CT-27438 which includes information that Siemens considers confidential.

Siemens Energy, Inc., as the owner of that confidential information, has executed the affidavit provided in Attachment B and states that the identified proprietary information has been classified as confidential, is customarily held in confidence, and not made available to the public. Siemens requests that the identified confidential information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4).

Enclosure 2 is a for public record copy of Siemens Technical Report CT-27438 with the confidential information redacted.This correspondence contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Dan Westcott, Superintendent, Licensing and Regulatory Programs at (352) 563-4796.Sincer~el, JnA. Fo.Franke Vice President Crystal River Nuclear Plant JAF/gwe Attachments:

A. Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Balance of Plant Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR B. Siemens Affidavit for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure

Enclosures:

1. Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis Report Progress Energy Crystal River 3," Revision 1 (Confidential)

2. Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis Report Progress Energy Crystal River 3," Revision lA (For Public Record)3. EFW Pump Recirculation Valve Simplified Diagrams (Figures 1 and 2)4. Summary of Emergency Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve Modification Failure Modes and Effects Analysis xc: NRR Project Manager Regional Administrator, Region II Senior Resident Inspector State Contact U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 of 3 3F0811-02 STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF CITRUS Jon A. Franke states that he is the Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant for Florida Power Corporation, doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.o~nA. Franke//Vice President Crystal River Nuclear Plant The foregoing document was acknowledged before me this / day of 6 KAI2011, by Jon A. Franke.Signature of Notary Public State of Florida (Print, type, or stamp Commissioned Name of Notary Public)Personally

,/ Produced Known -OR- Identification FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACHMENT A RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT NRC BALANCE OF PLANT BRANCH ACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-02 Page 1 of 8 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT NRC BALANCE OF PLANT BRANCH ACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. The proposed license amendment is considered an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). On July 25, 2011, via electronic mail, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) related to turbine generator missile generation, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System, and modification of the emergency feedwater pump recirculation valves needed to support Balance of Plant Branch acceptance review of the CR-3 EPU License Amendment Request (LAR).NRC Request for Additional Information Our Balance-of-Plant Branch completed an acceptance review of the Crystal River 3 EPU LAR.We found the application unacceptable with opportunity to supplement consistent with the guidelines of LIC-109. This conclusion is based on the following 3 information insufficiencies in the Technical Report associated with the LAR: 1. Section 2.5.1.2.2 of the TR describes that the replacement turbine will have a missile generation probability of 3.5 E-05 based on a 100000 hour inspection interval, which the licensee described as satisfying NRG Guidelines from SRP Section 3.5.1.3. However, the licensee provided no description of the analysis used to determine the missile generation probability.

At a minimum, the licensee must include a description of the methodology, the basis for acceptance of the methodology, and assumptions used in the analysis.2. Section 2.5.4.1 of the TR describes how acceptable pool temperatures of less than 160'F can be achieved at EPU conditions by extending the time after shutdown.

However, the licensee does not describe how these analysis results would be translated into procedures for refueling, consistent with the requirements of Criterion 5 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The applicant must describe the effect of the analysis results on plant operating procedures subject to quality assurance program requirements, such as refueling procedures.

3. In several locations in the LAR, the licensee briefly describes a modification to the minimum flow recirculation control for the emergency feedwater pumps. Improper operation of the modification could cause failure of the pump, and the modification could be configured such that it introduces cross-train dependencies.

The licensee must provide details of the modification necessary to establish that the modification would not adversely affect the independence of the emergency feedwater trains, such as a failure modes and effects analysis, and that the modification would not substantially reduce the reliability of the individual pumps (TMI Action Plan Item II.E. 1.1), consistent with the guidelines of SRP Section 10.4.9.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-02 Page 2 of 8 CR-3 Responses:

1. Section 2.5.1.2.2 of the TR describes that the replacement turbine will have a missile generation probability of 3.5 E-05 based on a 100000 hour inspection interval, which the licensee described as satisfying NRG Guidelines from SRP Section 3.5.1.3.However, the licensee provided no description of the analysis used to determine the missile generation probability.

At a minimum, the licensee must include a description of the methodology, the basis for acceptance of the methodology, and assumptions used in the analysis.An analysis to determine the turbine missile generation probability was performed for EPU conditions.

A description of the methodology used and the analysis results are documented in Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis Report Progress Energy Crystal River 3" (Enclosures 1 and 2) for the Siemens BB281-18m2 low pressure (LP) turbine design. This CR-3 turbine missile probability analysis used the missile analysis methodology provided in Siemens Technical Report CT-27332,"Missile Probability Analysis for the Siemens 13.9 M2 Retrofit Design of Low-Pressure Turbine by Siemens AG" (Reference 2). This methodology has been previously approved by the NRC for the BB281-13.9m2 LP turbine design, which is an advancement over the Westinghouse BB281 model originally used at CR-3, as documented in a letter from Herbert Berkow (NRC) to Stan Dembkoski (SWPC), dated March 30, 2004 (Reference 3). In the associated NRC Safety Evaluation, the NRC staff concluded that the technical report could be applied generically to other designs that are dimensionally different but follow the same missile analysis methodology.

Assumptions used in the CR-3 turbine missile generation probability analysis documented in the CR-3 specific Technical Report CT-27438 are equivalent to those documented in the NRC approved Technical Report CT-27332.A confidential version of the Siemens Technical Report CT-27438 is provided in Enclosure 1 and a for public record copy of the report is provided in Enclosure 2.Maintenance, inspection and testing associated with the turbine rotors and the turbine overspeed control system, including frequencies of these activities, will not change as a result of EPU. CR-3 utilizes a quarterly test frequency for the main turbine governor and throttle valves and an inspection interval on the turbine rotors and blades of every five refueling outages (approximately 10 year interval or < 87,600 operating hours), which is conservative to the manufacturer recommended inspection frequency of 100,000 operating hours. These current testing and inspection frequencies ensure a reasonably low probability of generating turbine missiles.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-02 Page 3 of 8 2. Section 2.5.4.1 of the TR describes how acceptable pool temperatures of less than 160'F can be achieved at EPU conditions by extending the time after shutdown.However, the licensee does not describe how these analysis results would be translated into procedures for refueling, consistent with the requirements of Criterion 5 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The applicant must describe the effect of the analysis results on plant operating procedures subject to quality assurance program requirements, such as refueling procedures.

Consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requirements, the CR-3 spent fuel pool (SFP) steady state temperature of 160'F is currently quantitatively controlled via plant operating procedures by providing appropriate limitations and requirements.

CR-3 procedure controls include;* Operating Daily Surveillance Log provides a maximum SFP temperature acceptance criterion of 120'F;" SFP high temperature alarm setpoint is 140'F;* SFP cooling operation procedure provides steps to operate two SFP cooling pumps in parallel, during refueling and when defueled, to ensure the SFP temperature is maintained

< 160'F;* SFP cooling operation procedure provides a Note that precludes placing the purification demineralizer in service with SFP temperature

> 140'F;" Refueling operation procedures require Reactor Coolant System (RCS)temperature to be < 140'F 'during core offload, shuffles, and reload, which translates to the SFP when RCS is connected to the transfer canal; and* Refueling operation procedures require the reactor to be subcritical for at least 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel to ensure SFP thermal analysis assumptions are maintained.

A Note in this procedure allows fuel to be transferred to the SFP before 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> if an engineering evaluation of the SFP thermal performance is made provided the reactor has been subcritical for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> consistent with the fuel handling accident assumption.

A summary of the bounding analyses is presented in Section 2.5.4.1, "Spent Fuel Pool.Cooling and Cleanup System," of the CR-3 EPU Technical Report (TR) (Reference 1, Attachment 7). The bounding analysis indicates that, with a full core offload after operating at EPU conditions for a full fuel cycle, both trains of SFP cooling capacity is greater than the core decay heat load at 11.24 days (270 hours0.00313 days <br />0.075 hours <br />4.464286e-4 weeks <br />1.02735e-4 months <br />).Potentially affected calculations and associated procedures are identified for EPU implementation and are being tracked for revision via the CR-3 engineering change (EC)process. In accordance with the CR-3 EPU LAR Regulatory Commitment 2 (Reference 1, Attachment 10), procedures subject to quality assurance program requirements, such as refueling operation procedures, will be modified to reflect the analysis results presented in Section 2.5.4.1 of the CR-3 EPU TR prior to exceeding 2609 MWt. Specifically, the refueling operation procedure will be updated to require the reactor to be subcritical for at least 270 hours0.00313 days <br />0.075 hours <br />4.464286e-4 weeks <br />1.02735e-4 months <br /> prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel. Additionally, the current allowance to perform an engineering evaluation which allows fuel to be U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-02 Page 4 of 8 transferred to the SFP before the analysis delay time (270 hours0.00313 days <br />0.075 hours <br />4.464286e-4 weeks <br />1.02735e-4 months <br />) will be maintained for operation at EPU conditions provided the reactor has been subcritical for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.3. In several locations in the LAR, the licensee briefly describes a modification to the minimum flow recirculation control for the emergency feedwater pumps. Improper operation of the modification could cause failure of the pump, and the modification could be configured such that it introduces cross-train dependencies.

The licensee must provide details of the modification necessary to establish that the modification would not adversely affect the independence of the emergency feedwater trains, such as a failure modes and effects analysis, and that the modification would not substantially reduce the reliability of the individual pumps (TMI Action Plan Item II.E.1.1), consistent with the guidelines of SRP Section 10.4.9.As stated in Appendix E, "Major Plant Modifications," of the CR 3 EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachment 7), Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System flow needs to be increased roughly in proportion to decay heat for EPU conditions.

The required EFW pumps can supply the required flow, but are currently prevented from doing so by continuously in-service recirculation flow paths. An upgrade to the EFW pumps recirculation design is being developed in accordance with the CR 3 EC process to support the higher EFW flow requirements to the once-through steam generators (OTSGs) at EPU conditions.

The EFW pump recirculation line modification design considers the probability of pump failure due to improper operation of the new components and ensures cross-train dependencies are not introduced as a result of the modification, thereby maintaining independence of the EFW trains.EFW Pump Recirculation Line Modification Overview As described in Section 2.8.5.2.3, "Loss of Normal Feedwater," and Appendix E of the CR 3 EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachment 7), the most limiting Design Basis Accident (DBA) for EFW System flow is the loss of feedwater (LOFW) event that requires a minimum EFW flow of 660 gallons per minute (gpm) (330 per SG) within 40 seconds.The current minimum required flow of EFW is 550 gpm (275 gpm per SG) within 60 seconds. Therefore, in order to meet the new flow requirements for EPU, the EFW System will be modified by installing new safety-related operated valves in the currently continuously open EFW pump recirculation lines. The recirculation valves will close when flow (as detected by differential pressure switches) to the OTSGs is sufficient to meet or exceed the pump manufacture's minimum recommended flow rates and reopen prior to EFW pump flow demand dropping below the minimum required pump flow rate.The differential pressure switches are provided with a dead band to prevent or minimize excessive cycling of the new recirculation valves. By installing valves in the recirculation lines that automatically close during times of high flow to the OTSGs, the current EFW pumps capacity and head can supply the OTSGs under EPU conditions.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-02 Page 5 of 8 The EFW System consists of two independent, 100% capacity, safety-related trains. The A EFW train consists of a diesel driven pump (EFP-3), flow limiting cavitating venturi, and flow control valves to each OTSG. The B EFW train consists of a turbine driven pump (EFP-2), flow limiting cavitating venturi, and flow control valves to each OTSG.Each of the new recirculation valves will be controlled by three safety-related differential pressure switches that sense flow across the associated cavitating venturi. A "2 out of 3 logic" will be required to open or close the associated safety-related EFW pump recirculation valve. EFW pump recirculation valve simplified piping diagrams are provided in Enclosure 3 showing the new valves in the EFW pump recirculation line and the sensing differential pressure instrumentation.

The differential pressure switches, logic, control and motive power for each recirculation valve will be powered from the same safety-related electrical train as the associated EFW train.A control switch will be added to the control room for each of the new EFW pump recirculation valves. Each switch will have "open" position to allow overriding the automatic operation forcing the valve to the open position.

Control room alarms will also provide indication of the new valves "out of position" when the control switches are overriding the automatic function.

As stated in the proposed CR-3 Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) Bases B 3.7.5, "Emergency Feedwater System" (Reference 1, Attachment 4), the EFW pump low flow instrumentation is required to be capable of closing the associated recirculation line isolation valve in sufficient time to ensure that EFW discharge flow to the OTSGs as assumed during transients and accidents is met.Thus, if an EFW pump recirculation valve control switch is placed in the open position, the associated EFW train would be rendered inoperable and ITS 3.7.5 Actions would apply.EFW Train Independence Enclosure 4 provides a summary of a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)conducted for the EFW pump recirculation valve modification.

The FMEA was prepared in accordance with the general guidelines of ANSI/IEEE 352-1987, "IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems." Note that the Number column in Enclosure 4 provides an arbitrary reference number for individual components or group of components and may be referenced by other failures in the matrix for cascading failures (e.g., Enclosure 4, Row 70.2). Note 1 to the Enclosure 4 table is also provided for failure sets which assume varied EFW flows through the cavitating venturi.The FMEA indicates that there are no new potential EFW System failures that could result from human errors, common causes, single-point vulnerabilities, and test and maintenance outages as a result of the EFW pump recirculation valve modification which would prevent the EFW System from performing its intended safety function consistent with the position of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-02 Page 6 of 8 Item II.E. 1.1. As indicated by the FMEA, postulated component failures are bounded by the current failure of a single EFW train and do not prevent the EFW System from performing its intended safety function.Each EFW train is mechanically independent since each train has its own suction line from the emergency feedwater tank (EFT-2), pump, recirculation line back to EFT-2, cavitating venturi, and piping with flow control valves to each OTSG. Although piping cross connections are supplied at the suction piping from EFT-2 and at the discharge lines to the OTSG's, these cross connections are only used for defense in depth and are controlled via ITS Surveillance Requirements (i.e., SR 3.7.5.1) to maintain independence.

ITS SR 3.7.5.1 requires, in part, that each EFW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each water flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct (i.e., accident) position.

The addition of a safety-related recirculation valve on each independent EFW train recirculation line and utilizing the associated cavitating venturi for flow measurement will not impact this mechanical independence.

Each EFW train is electrically independent with all system instrumentation and controls (I&C) and electrical power supplied by independent safety related busses and batteries.

The current electrical and I&C portions of the EFW System are designed and installed in accordance with IEEE 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," which ensures independence with no cross-train dependence.

The new EFW pump recirculation valves, including the control circuits, control room switches, and alarms are also being designed and procured using the same standard (i.e., IEEE 279-1971).

In addition to mechanical and electrical independence, the EFW trains are physically separated.

The A EFW train (EFP-3) is located in its own safety-related building located on the west side of the plant. Also located in this building is all of the auxiliary equipment, including starting air, fire protection, HVAC, cavitating venturi, recirculation line, etc. The B EFW train (EFP-2) and all its auxiliary equipment is located in the Intermediate Building inside the plant. The new recirculation valves and associated differential pressure switches will be installed locally in the associated pump rooms. This ensures that the physical separation of the current EFW System is maintained following completion of the modification.

Based on the conceptual design of the new EFW pump recirculation valves and the results of the associated FMEA, CR 3 has determined that mechanical, electrical, and physical separation and independence of the EFW System will be maintained and that no new common mode failures are created by the modification.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-02 Page 7 of 8 EFW Pump Protection and Reliability The EFW System modification installing new EFW pump recirculation valves is designed to maintain or enhance overall reliability by focusing on long term EFW pump protection.

The current B train EFW pump (EFP-2) has a limitation on the time that it can be operated under normal conditions (approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) due to an undersized recirculation line (1 inch). Because of the undersized line, the minimum manufacture recommended flow rate of 250 gpm for continuous operation of the pump cannot be achieved with flow solely through the minimum flow line. In addition, the undersized line results in very high flow velocities which have resulted in past modification to change materials and increase pipe thickness to compensate for the wear from these high velocities.

The EFW pump recirculation valve modification ensures the pump recirculation line is isolated when flow to the OTSGs is sufficient to meet minimum recommended flow rates and automatically un-isolates prior to EFW pump flow dropping below the minimum required pump flow rate. Adding the automatic recirculation valves will allow the recirculation line to be increased in size from the current 1 inch to a 2 inch line while still maintaining adequate pump margin. The increase in the recirculation line size will improve the recirculation flow rate to support continuous operation of the EFW pump and decrease the flow velocities to normally acceptable rates.The new EFW pump recirculation valves and control logic are designed to ensure pump protection for long term reliability.

Although the safety function position of the valve is closed to ensure the minimum 660 gpm for the LOFW event, the new valves are spring to open and will fail open on a loss of power. In addition the control logic was designed requiring 2 of 3 flow signals to close the valve and no ability to manually close the recirculation is provided in the main control room. This design was chosen to minimize the probability of operating the EFW pump with no flow resulting in possible pump damage. Designing the valves to fail in the open position is considered acceptable based on: The LOFW event analysis for EPU conditions indicates that a required EFW flow of 660 gpm. If an EFW pump recirculation valve fails in the closed position, the EFW pump can still supply the required EFW flow to the OTSGs. However, when flow demand to the OTSGs decreases, pump minimum flow requirements may not be met resulting in possible pump damage and loss of the EFW pump for long term accident mitigation.

The current worst case single failure is a complete loss of an EFW train (e.g., pump fails to start, loss of both control valves, etc). The failure of a new EFW pump recirculation valve on one EFW train is considered a single failure. As a result of one EFW pump recirculation valve failing open, one EFW train could not supply the needed 660 gpm, however, the redundant EFW train would be U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-02 Page 8 of 8 available to supply the required flow to the OTSGs, and the affected EFW pump would be available with a reduced flow to the OTSGs.To ensure the reliability of the new components being installed under this modification, components (e.g., valves, pressure transmitters, etc.) are being designed, fabricated, and procured as safety-related.

In addition to IEEE 279-1971 and IEEE 352-1987, the new components are also being seismically and environmentally qualified as applicable and are being designed to meet or exceed the codes and standards as required by CR-3 current licensing basis, including the following: " IEEE 308-1969, "Criteria for Class lE Electrical Systems,"" IEEE 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and" IEEE 344-1971, "IEEE Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." As described in Section 2.13, "Risk Evaluation," of the CR 3 EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachment 7), CR-3 uses a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model to determine the effect of the EPU modifications on core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF). PSA analyses performed for the EPU indicate that the increased EFW flow assumed in the LOFW analysis is not required to prevent core damage.Therefore, the new EFW pump recirculation valves do not change the PSA success criteria of the EFW System and the new recirculation valves are not included in the PSA model for EPU.CR-3 concludes that since; the new EFW System components are being designed to meet or exceed the current CR-3 codes and standards, the modification is designed with a high emphasis on pump protection and reliability for long term availability, and there is no affect to the CDF or LERF; the modification to the EFW System will not significantly reduce the reliability of the individual EFW pumps to perform their safety function.References 1 .CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 -License Amendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate" (Accession No. ML1 12070659).

2. Siemens Technical Report CT-27332, "Missile Probability Analysis for the Siemens 13.9 M2 Retrofit Design of Low-Pressure Turbine by Siemens AG" Revision 2.3. Letter from Mr. Herbert N. Berkow, (NRC) to Mr. Stan Dembkoski (SWPC) dated March 30, 2004,

Subject:

Final Safety Evaluation Regarding Referencing the Siemens Technical Report No. CT-27332, Revision 2, "Missile Probability Analysis for the Siemens 13.9 M 2 Retrofit Design of Low-Pressure Turbine by Siemens AG" (TAC No. MB7964).

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACHMENT B SIEMENS AFFIDAVIT FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AFFIDAVIT OF WITHHOLDING I, John P. Musone hereby provide this Affidavit and state as follows: 1. I am Assistant Secretary for Siemens Energy, Inc., having its principle offices at 4400 Alafaya Trail, Orlando, Florida 32826 ("Siemens"), and Associate Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for its parent Siemens Corporation.

2. This statement is under 10 C.F.R. 2.390 and NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-11.3. 10 C.F.R. 2.390(a)(4) provides for nondisclosure of information provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that constitutes "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 4. 10 C.F.R. 2.390(b)(1)(ii) and (iii) provide for submission of an Affidavit as the mechanism by which such nondisclosure is affected, and specifies that the Affidavit

--A. Identifies the document or part sought to be withheld;B. Identifies the official position of the person making the affidavit; C. Declares the basis for proposing the information be withheld, encompassing considerations set forth in Sec. 2.390(a);D. Includes a specific statement of the harm that would result if the information sought to be withheld is disclosed to the public; and E. Indicates the location(s) in the document of all information sought to be withheld;F. Contain a full statement of the reason for claiming the information should be withheld from public disclosure.

Such statement shall address with specificity the consideration listed in paragraph (b)(4) of this section.

5. Following the Overview, this Affidavit tracks the affidavit organization and requirements of 10 C.F.R. 2.390.Overview 6. Siemens contracted with Progress Energy Florida, (PEF) to design, fabricate, deliver and install BB281-18m 2 turbine improvements to PEF's Crystal River #3 Nuclear Power Plant in Crystal River Florida. In preparation of the design of the BB281-18m 2 turbine, Siemens performed a Missile Probability Analysis and documented this analysis in Missile Probability Analysis Report CT-27438 Revision 1 dated 8/25/2008 (the "MPAR").7. PEF has requested Siemens permission to provide the MPAR to the NRC.Siemens is amenable to provide a redacted version of the MPAR titled Missile Probability Analysis Report CT-27438 Revision 1A dated 8/05/2011 (the "R-MPAR").

8. The MPAR contains highly sensitive and confidential design information which embodies Siemens' state-of-the-art design and analysis parameters for Siemens turbine rotors.9. Public disclosure of the MPAR would (i) provide a windfall shortcut for Siemens competitors to obtain Siemens' rotor design and analysis parameters and thereby replicate Siemens components, and (ii) allow Siemens competitors to glean the capabilities and limits of Siemens' technology.

This confidential information is invaluable when competing and akin to having the opposing team's playbook before and during the big game.Document or Part Sought to be Withheld 10. Siemens specific confidential rotor design and parameters and calculation results contained within the MPAR prepared by Siemens pertaining to the BB281-18m 2 turbine improvements at PEF's Crystal River #3 Nuclear Power Plant.2 Official Position of Person Making the Affidavit 11. The person making this Affidavit is John P. Musone, Assistant Secretary for Siemens Energy, Inc., having its principle offices at 4400 Alafaya Trail, Orlando, Florida 32826 ("Siemens"), and Associate Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for its parent Siemens Corporation.

Basis for the Information to be Withheld 12. The basis for the information to be withheld, is Section 2.390(a)(4)

-"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged and confidential." The person to provide the information is Siemens via PEF. The trade secret information is the specific rotor design parameters and calculation results contained within the MPAR prepared by Siemens pertaining to the BB281-18m 2 turbine improvements at PEF's Crystal River #3 Nuclear Power Plant that is confidential and proprietary to Siemens and only provided to PEF under strict terms of confidentiality.

Specific Statement of Harm Due to Public Disclosure

13. The general public has no defined interest in the specific confidential rotor design parameters and calculation results contained within the MPAR and would not undergo any harm due to its nondisclosure.

The general public presumably is not interested in replicating Siemens components.

The specific confidential rotor design parameters and calculation results contained within the MPAR provide no newsworthy or publicly-relevant information regarding the Crystal River Nuclear Plant. A false argument could be made that Siemens' competitors are "the public" and that they would be harmed because they would then not obtain a windfall shortcut to replicate Siemens components and glean Siemens capabilities.

Locations in the Document of Information to be Withheld 14. The portions of the R-MPAR identified in brackets that illustrate confidential rotor design parameters and calculation results (e.g. rotor disk temperatures, rotor disk stresses, fracture toughness and yield strength information, rotor disk crack initiation probability(s), simulation results) for the Crystal River #3 BB281-18m 2 turbine has been withheld.3 Full Statement of Reason for Claiming the Information Should be Withheld 15. Through its own innovation, substantial investment in research and development and by virtue of its long established experience as a world renowned going-concern in the power generation industry, Siemens successfully developed the turbine design embodied BB281-18m 2 turbine delivered to PEF. Siemens prepared the MPAR which in turn discloses the design parameters and calculation results (e.g. rotor disk temperatures, rotor disk stresses, fracture toughness and yield strength information, rotor disk crack initiation probability(s) and simulation results) from which Siemens' turbine is designed and manufactured.

Public disclosure of the MPAR would (i) provide a windfall shortcut for Siemens competitors to obtain Siemens' rotor design parameters and thereby replicate Siemens components, and (ii) allow Siemens competitors to glean the capabilities and limits of Siemens' technology.

This confidential information is invaluable when competing and akin to having the opposing team's playbook before and during the big game.16. Siemens' specific turbine design information as embodied in the MPAR is valuable, confidential and proprietary business assets of Siemens and constitute trade secrets.They derive independent economic value from not being generally known and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from their disclosure or use. It is Siemens' understanding that the specific turbine design information as embodied in the MPAR is customarily held in confidence throughout the industry and is not made publicly available.

17. Siemens has adopted reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of its trade secrets; to-wit: securing their business offices and facilities with private fences and borders restricting access via key pads requiring individual access codes, locking main building doors, locking file cabinets, password-protecting computer files, using automated e-mail encryption, and locking portable computers.

Siemens also shreds confidential documents that are no longer in use.4

18. In addition, Siemens requires its employees with access to Siemens trade secrets, to execute confidentiality agreements agreeing to maintain the confidentiality of the trade secrets. Further, Siemens employees are required to complete instruction modules covering, inter alia, protection of corporate confidential information and the importance of maintaining the secrecy of Siemens' trade secrets. Siemens' employees are also required to participate in routine security programs and checks directed by company security officers to ensure that the security measures are being followed.19. Siemens further requires that, prior to any provision of Siemens confidential information to a third party, Siemens's management must authorize such disclosure and the third party must first execute a confidentiality agreement agreeing to maintain Siemens's confidential information in confidence.

Siemens included a confidentiality provision in its contract with PEF.20. For the foregoing reasons, Siemens' specific turbine design information as embodied in the MPAR comprise its confidential, proprietary and trade secret information.

The general public has no defined interest in this design information and would not undergo any harm due to its nondisclosure.

On the other hand, public disclosure of this design information would (i) provide a windfall shortcut for Siemens competitors to obtain Siemens' rotor design parameters and thereby replicate Siemens components, and (ii) allow Siemens competitors to glean the capabilities and limits of Siemens' technology.

It is therefore respectfully requested that portions of Siemens MPAR remain in confidence.

Ai0 SIGNED UNDER THE PAINS AND PENALTIES OF PERJURY THIS 1 0 DAY OF August, 2011.J0)~ P. Musone Assistant Secretary; Siemens Energy, Inc.Associate Chief Intellectual Property Counsel; Siemens Corporation 5

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ENCLOSURE 3 EFW PUMP RECIRCULATION VALVE SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAMS (FIGURES 1 AND 2)

Figure 1 Simplified Diagram of EFP-3 Recirculation Valve FS1,2, 3 Opens on low flow of<350 gpm EFV- 4 6 -F Auto Open Note: Drawing omits some valves, contacts, relays and instruments for simplicity and clarity.Differential pressure switches use nominal numbers subject to inst uncertainty.

I ef SAR Fig 10-031 DPDP-5D BRKR-1 1 Figure 2 Simplified Diagram of EFP-2 Recirculation Valve 1" To EFT-2 EE~Ifi 1V" m= * =II I FS1 FS I M1? FS2 M~351gpMIj

ý 350 g~1 ~350 gmj FS2 FS3 FS3> 350 g FS1,2, 3 Opens on low flow of< 250 gpm I F-8 0 EFP-2 Recirc Valve L~1 I F-2FO 10 Auto Open I EFP-I ef SAR Fig 10-03 Note: Drawing omits some valves, contacts, relays and instruments for simplicity and clarity.Differential pressure switches use nominal numbers subject to inst uncertainty.

DPDP-5B BRKR-5 2 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ENCLOSURE 4

SUMMARY

OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP RECIRCULATION VALVE MODIFICATION FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 1 of 37 Summary of Emergency Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve Modification Failure Modes and Effects Analysis z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects (D Including Provision-Dependent Failures 1.1 EFV-1 79 Fail OPEN Electrical or Ability of one train Annunciator alarm EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no mechanical failure of EFW to mitigate triggered by valve available in the longer be able to perform its an accident would out of position.

event of complete design functions.

The affected be reduced. Actual position vs. failure of affected trains flow would be demanded pump. approximately 75% of design.position.

100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.1.2.1 EFV-1 79 Fail CLOSED Electrical or Immediate Annunciator alarm EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no During periods of low flow mechanical failure, damage to EFP-3 triggered by valve available and longer be able to perform its one train of EFW could be'<250 GPM out of position.

running during the design functions.

removed from service.through pump.' Actual position vs. event of complete EFV-179 being in the demanded failure of affected closed position will only be position.

pump. a detriment during periods of low to no demand. This occurs late or outside of accident conditions with exception to LOCA.1.2.2 EFV-1 79 Fail CLOSED Electrical or Accelerated wear / Annunciator alarm EFW Train B The affected train would no mechanical failure, damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available in the longer be credited to perform its'>250 GPM <300 out of position.

event of complete design functions.

GPM through Actual position vs. failure of affected pump., demanded pump.position.1.2.3 EFV-179 Fail CLOSED Electrical or No damage to Annunciator alarm EFW Train B n/a mechanical failure. EFP-2 '>300 GPM triggered by valve available.

through pump.' out of position.Actual position vs.demanded position.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 2 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other 1 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including Provision-Dependent Failures 1.3.1 EFV-1 79 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or Immediate Annunciator alarm EFW Train B During periods of low flow one mechanical failure damage to EFP-3 triggered by valve available and train of EFW could be removed'<250 GPM out of position.

running during the from service. EFV-179 being in through pump.' Actual position vs. event of complete the closed position will only be a demanded failure of affected detriment during periods of low to position. (includes pump. no demand. This occurs late or Mid position) outside of accident conditions.

1.3.2 EFV-1 79 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or Accelerated wear / Annunciator alarm EFW Train B The affected train would no mechanical failure damage to EFP-3 triggered by valve available in the longer be credited to perform its'>250 GPM <300 out of position.

event of complete design functions.

GPM through Actual position vs. failure of affected pump., demanded pump.position. (includes Mid position)1.3.3 EFV-1 79 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or No damage to Annunciator alarm EFW Train B n/a mechanical failure EFP-2 >300 GPM triggered by valve available.

through pump.' out of position.Actual position vs.demanded position. (includes Mid position)1.6 EFV-1 79 Loss of control Electrical failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through Circuit power Close of EFV-179 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi design functions.

The affected EFV-1 79 Opens train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.1.7 EFV-1 79 Loss of Motive Electrical failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through power Close of EFV-179 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi pFwer 7desegn functions.

The affected EFV-1 79 Opens train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100%/ design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 3 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including Provision-Dependent Failures 10.1 EFV-180 Fail OPEN Electrical or Ability of one train Annunciator alarm EFW Train A One train (1 of 2) of EFW could mechanical failure of EFW to mitigate triggered by valve available and be removed from service.an accident would out of position, running during the be reduced. Actual position vs. event of complete demanded failure of affected position.

pump.10.2.1 EFV-1 80 Fail CLOSED Electrical or Immediate Annunciator alarm EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no mechanical failure. damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available in the longer be able to perform its'<100 GPM out of position.

event of complete design functions.

through pump.' Actual position vs. failure of affected demanded pump.position.10.2.2 EFV-180 Fail CLOSED Electrical or Accelerated wear / Annunciator alarm EFW Train A The affected train would no mechanical failure, damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available in the longer be credited to perform its'>100 GPM <250 out of position.

event of complete design functions after >3 hr.GPM through Actual position vs. failure of affected pump., demanded pump.position.102.3 EFV-180 Fail CLOSED Electrical or No damage to Annunciator alarm EFW Train A n/a mechanical failure. EFP-2 >250 GPM triggered by valve available.

through pump.' out of position.Actual position vs.demanded position.10.3.1 EFV-180 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or Immediate Annunciator alarm EFW Train A During periods of low flow one mechanical failure damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available and train of EFW could be removed'<100 GPM out of position.

running during the from service. EFV-180 being in through pump.' Actual position vs. event of complete the closed position will only be a demanded failure of affected detriment during periods of low to position. (includes pump. no demand. This occurs late or Mid position) outside of accident conditions.

(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 4 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects (D Including ProvisionDependent Failures 103.2 EFV-180 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or Accelerated wear / Annunciator alarm EFW Train A The affected train would no mechanical failure damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available in the longer be credited to perform its'>100 GPM <250 out of position.

event of complete design functions after >3 hr.GPM through Actual position vs. failure of affected pump., demanded pump.position. (includes Mid position)10.3.3 EFV-180 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or No damage to Annunciator alarm EFW Train A n/a mechanical failure EFP-2 '>250 GPM triggered by valve available through pump.' out of position.Actual position vs.demanded position. (includes Mid position)10.6 EFV-180 Loss of control Electrical failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through Circuit power Close of EFV-180 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi design functions.

The affected 20XB energized train s flow would be EFV-180 Opens approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with Yhe failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.10.7 EFV-180 Loss of Motive Electrical failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through power Close of EFV-180 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi design functions.

The affected 20XB energized train s flow would be EFV-180 Opens approximately 75% of design.10 design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.20.1 EFV-23 Fail OPEN Mechanical failure N/A Surveillance Valve line up. Valves normal position is open Manual valve (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 5 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C 3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including Provision-Dependent Failures 20.2.1 EFV-23 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure Immediate High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could be damage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service prior to'<100 GPM running during the operators being able to take through pump.' event of complete compensatory measures.failure of affected pump.20.2.2 EFV-23 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure Accelerated wear / High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could be damage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service if'>100 GPM <250 running during the undiscovered for an GPM through event of complete indeterminate time greater than 3 pump., failure of affected hr. Time periods greater than 3 hr pump. increase wear and pump degradation.

20.2.3 EFV-23 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure No damage to High recirculation EFW Train A None.EFP-2 '>250 GPM line pressure available and through pump.' running during the event of complete failure of affected pump.20.3.1 EFV-23 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure Immediate High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could be damage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service prior to'<100 GPM running during the operators being able to take through pump' event of complete compensatory measures.failure of affected pump.20.3.2 EFV-23 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure Accelerated wear / High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could be damage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service if 5>100 GPM <250 running during the undiscovered for an GPM through event of complete indeterminate time greater than 3 pump., failure of affected hr. Time periods greater than 3 hr pump. increase wear and pump degradation.

(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 6 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C 3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects 0 Including Provision-Dependent Failures 20.3.3 EFV-23 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure No damage to High recirculation EFW Train A None.EFP-2 '>250 GPM line pressure available and through pump.' running during the event of complete failure of affected pump.30.1 EFV-34 Fail OPEN Mechanical failure EF-6-PI indicates Surveillance EFV-5 prevents Insignificant to no pump Check valve higher than back flow through performance margin degradation normal pressure EFP-2 during the sole operation of EFP-1 30.2.1 EFV-34 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure Immediate High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could be damage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service prior to'<100 GPM running during the operators being able to take through pump' event of complete compensatory measures.failure of affected pump.30.2.2 EFV-34 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure Accelerated wear / High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could be damage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service if'>100 GPM <250 running during the undiscovered for an GPM through event of complete indeterminate time greater than 3 pump.- failure of affected hr. Time periods greater than 3 hr pump. increase wear and pump degradation.

30.2.3 EFV-34 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure No damage to High recirculation EFW Train A None.EFP-2 '>250 line pressure available and GPM through running during the pump.- event of complete failure of affected pump.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 7 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C 3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including Provision"- Dependent Failures 30.3.1 EFV-34 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure Immediate High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could be damage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service prior to I<100 GPM running during the operators being able to take through pump' event of complete compensatory measures.failure of affected pump.30.3.2 EFV-34 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure Accelerated wear / High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could be damage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service if>100 GPM <250 running during the *undiscovered for an GPM through event of complete indeterminate time greater than 3 pump., failure of affected hr. Time periods greater than 3 hr pump. increase wear and pump degradation.

30.3.3 EFV-34 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure No damage to High recirculation EFW Train A None.EFP-2 '>250 GPM line pressure available and through pump.' running during the event of complete failure of affected pump.40.0.a EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FSI(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-64-FS1 9-10 40.1 .a EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS 1(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2 permanently in Contact place 9-10 40.2.a EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded FS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available Contact 3EF-64-FS1 2-3 (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 8 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C 3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects e Including ProvisionDependent Failures 40.3.a EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded FS1 (LO) of 2 close signals available Contact permanently in after Hi flow 2-3 40.0.b EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS1(Hi) Loss of available 2/2 Contact 3EF-66-FS1 9-10 40.1.b EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS1(Hi) of 2 close signals available 1/2 permanently in Contact place 9-10 40.2.b EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available 2/2 Contact 3EF-66-FS1 2-3 40.3.b EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS1 (LO) of 2close signals available 2/2 Contact permanently in 2-3 place after Hi flow 40.0.c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-64-FS1 9-10 40.1 .c EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degraded FS1(Hi) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2 permanently in Open Logic Contact place 3EF-64-9-10 S1 energized (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 9 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other r-3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including Provision Dependent Failures 40.2.c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-64-FS1 2-3 40.3.c EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degraded FS1 (LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2 Contact in place w/250 Open Logic 2-3 gpm flow 41.0.a EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-64-FS1 9-10 41.1.a EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2 permanently in Contact place 9-10 41.2.a EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded FS2(LO) Loss of seal to available Contact 3EF-64-FS1 2-3 41.3.a EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded FS2(LO) of 2 close signals available Contact permanently in after Hi flow 2-3 41.0.b EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS2(Hi) Loss of available 2/2 Contact 3EF-66-FS 1 9-10 41.1.b EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available 1/2 permanently in Contact place al 9-10 (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 10 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including ProvisionDependent Failures 41.2.b EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS2(LO) Loss of seal to available 2/2 Contact 3EF-66-FS1 2-3 41.3.b EF Close Electrical failure Degirade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS2(LO) of 2 close signals available 1/2 for after HI flow Contact permanently in 2-3 place after Hi flow 41.0.c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-64-FS2 9-10 41.1 .c EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degraded FS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2 permanently in Open Logic Contact place 3EF-64-9-10 S2 energized 41.2.c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Logic degrade from 2/3 to Contact 3EF-64-FS2 2/2 2-3 41.3.c EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degraded FS2(LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2 Contact in place w/250 Open Logic 2-3 gpm flow 42.0.a EF Open Electrical failure Degrade logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS3(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-64-FS1 9-10 42.1 .a EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS3(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2 permanently in Contact place 9-10 (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 11 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C 3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects-Including Provision-Dependent Failures 42.2.a EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded FS4(LO) Loss of seal to available Contact 3EF-64-FS1 2-3 42.3.a EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded FS3(LO) of 2 close signals available Contact permanently in after Hi flow 2-3 42.0.b EF Open Electrical failure Degrade logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS3(Hi) Loss of available 2/2 Contact 3EF-66-FS1 9-10 42.1 .b EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS3(Hi) of 2 close signals available 1/2 permanently in Contact place al 9-10 42.2.b EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS4(LO) Loss of sealto available 1/2 after HIflow Contact 3EF-66-FS1 2-3 42.3.b EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 to FS3(LO) of 2 close signals available 1/2 for after HI flow Contact permanently in 2-3 place after Hi flow 42.0.c EF Open Electrical failure Degrade logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EF-64-FS3(Hi)

Contact FS3(Hi) Loss of available Contact 3EF-64-FS3 9-10 9-10 42.1 .c EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degraded FS3(Hi) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; go change to 2/2 permanently in Open Logic Contact place 3EF-64-9-10 S3 energized (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 12 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C SLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects (1 Including Provision-Dependent Failures 42.2.c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 FS3(LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-64-FS3 2-3 42.3.c EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degraded FS3(LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2 Contact in place w/250 Open Logic 2-3 gpm flow 43.0 SS/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A No Manual Open For all flows through 179-SV Manual Open available capability from ControlRoom cavitating venturi Contact 3-4 capability 43.1 SS/EFV- Close Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through 179-SV Close of EFV-1 79 available longer be able to perform its itating venturi Contact 3-4 20XB energized design functions.

The affected EFV-179 Opens train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.1 00% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.44.0 33o/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through 179 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturi c-d position.44.1 33o/EFV- Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through 179 Contact 2EFV-179 available c-d energized cavitating venturi 44.2 33o/EFV- Open Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through 179 Contact for valve position.

Operator available Indication cavitating venturi a-b Validation 44.3 33o/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through 179 Contact for valve position.

Operator available Indication cavitating venturi a-b Validation 45.0 33c/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through 179 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturi a-b position.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 13 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects C Including Provision-Dependent Failures 45.1 33c/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through 179 Contact valve out of available a-b position.

cavitating venturi 45.2 33c/EFV- Open Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through 179 Contact for valve position.

Operator available Indication cavitating venturi a-b Validation 45.3 33c/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through 179 Contact for valve position.

Operator available Indication cavitating venturi a-b Validation 50.0 3EF-64-FS1 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal 50.1 3EF-64-FS1 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Deenergize Close of I close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 50.2 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available 3EF-64-FS 1 cavitating venturi 50.3 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 50.4 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 signal cavitating venturi 50.5 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure De raded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 50.6 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 10 signal cavitating venturi (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 14 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects-Including Provision Dependent Failures 50.7 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi 10 permanently in place 50.8 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 50.9 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 50.10 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 50.11 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 51.0 3EF-64-FS2 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal 51.1 3EF-64-FS2 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Deenergize of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 51.2 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available cavitating venturi 3EF-64-FS1 51.3 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 51.4 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 signal cavitating venturi (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 15 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other c Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including Provision-Dependent Failures 51.5 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 51.6 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi 10 signal 51.7 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi 10 permanently in place 51.8 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 51.9 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 51.10 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 51.11 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 52.0 3EF-64-FS2 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal 52.1 3EF-64-FS2 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Deenergize of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 52.2 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available 3EF-64-FS1 cavitating venturi (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 16 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects g Including ProvisionDependent Failures 52.3 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 52.4 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 signal cavitating venturi 52.5 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 52.6 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 10 signal cavitating venturi 52.7 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi 10 permanently in place 52.8 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 52.9 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 52-10 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 52-11 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 53.0 20XB Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A No Manual Open For all flows through Manual Open available capability from Control Room cavitating venturi capability (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 17 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects 0 Including Provision-Dependent Failures 53.1 20XB Fails to Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2 train would no For all flows through Deenergize Close of EFV-179 available longer be able to perform its 20XB energized design functions.

The affected cavitating venturi EFV-179 Opens train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.53.2 20XB Open Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through Contact 5-6 Close of EFV-179 available longer be able to perform its EFV-179 Opens design functions.

The affected cavitating venturi train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary onl early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.53.4 20XB Close Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A No Manual Open For all flows through Contact 5-6 Manual Open available capability from Controi Room cavitating venturi capability 53.5 20XB Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 Initiation signal available cavitating venturi 53.6 20XB Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 2EFV-179 available energized cavitating venturi 54.0 20XA Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through valve out of available venturi position.

cavitating 54.1 20XA Fails to Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Deenergize when valve closes available cavitating venturi 2EFV-1 79 energized 54.2 20XA Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 valve out of available cavitating venturi position.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 18 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C 3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects e"Including Provision=Dependent Failures 54.3 20XA Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 when valve closes available 2EFV-179 cavitating venturi energized 54.4 20XA Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 9- valve out of available 10 position.

cavitating venturi 54.6 20XA Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 9- 2EFV-179 available 10 energized cavitating venturi 55.0 2EFV-1 79 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through available cavitating venturi 55.1 2EFV-179 Fails to Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Deenergize 2EFV-179 available energized cavitating venturi 55.2 2EFV-179 Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-5 available cavitating venturi 55.3 2EFV-179 Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-5 2EFV-179 available energized cavitating venturi EFV-179- Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Valve remains in Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through SV Open position available longer be able to perform its 56.0. design functions.

The affected cavitating venturi train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 19 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects o"Including Provision-Dependent Failures 56.1 EFV-1 79- Fails to Electrical Failure Valve remains in Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through SV Deenergize Closed Position available longer be able to perform its design functions.

The affected cavitating venturi train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with The failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.DPDP-1 D Blown Fuse Electrical Failure Loss of Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2 train would no For all flows through control/motive available longer be able to perform its ting venturi 57.0 power for design functions.

The affected cavita train s flow would be EFV-179 approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.58.0 2EFV-179/A Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Nuisance Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarms degraded For all flows through available cavitating venturi 58.1 2EFV-179/A Fails to Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarms degraded For all flows through Deenergize available cavitating venturi 58.2 2EFV-179/A Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarms degraded For all flows through Contact available cavitating venturi 1-5 58.3 2EFV-1 79/A Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarms degraded For all flows through available Contact cavitating venturi 1-5 60.1 EF-62-FS1, Fails High Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 or FS3 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F081 1-02 Enclosure 4 Page 20 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other E3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects o-Including Provision I Dependent zFailures 60.2 EF-62-FS1, Fails Low Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 or FS3 closed)60.3 EF-62-FS1, Fails Constant Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 or FS3 closed)61.1 EF-62-FS1, Fails High Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 or FS3 open)61.2 EF-62-FS1, Fails Low Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 or FS3 open)61.3 EF-62-FS1, Fails Constant Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 or FS3 open)62.1 EF-62-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 pressure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) boundary -Low EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3 (EFV-1 80 closed)(Fails High)62.2 EF-62-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 pressure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) boundary -High EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3 (EFV-1 80 closed)(Fails Low)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 21 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects o- Including Provision-Dependent Failures 63.1 EF-62-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 pressure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 of 3) boundary -Low EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3 (EFV-1 80 open)(Fails High)63.2 EF-62-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 pressure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 of 3) boundary -High EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3 (EFV-1 80 open)(Fails Low)64.1 EF-64-FS1, Fails High Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-1 79 or FS3 closed)64.2 EF-64-FS1, Fails Low Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 or FS3 closed)64.3 EF-64-FS1, Fails Constant Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-1 79 or FS3 closed)65.1 EF-64-FS1, Fails High Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-179 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 out EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 of 3) or FS3 open)65.2 EF-64-FS1, Fails Low Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-1 79 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 out EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 of 3) or FS3 open)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 22 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects g Including Provision-Dependent Failures 65.3 EF-64-FS1, Fails Constant Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-179 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 out EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 of 3) or FS3 open)66.1 EF-64-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 pressure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) boundary -Low EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3 (EFV-1 79 closed)(Fails High)66.2 EF-64-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: High Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 pressure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow (Any 1 of 3) boundary -High EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3 (EFV-179 open)(Fails Low)67.1 EF-64-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 pressure component close EFV-179 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 of 3) boundary -Low EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3 (EFV-179 open)(Fails High)67.2 EF-64-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow Setpoint FS2, FS3 pressure component close EFV-179 actuated with High Flow (Any 1 of 3) boundary -High EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3 (EFV-179 open)(Fails Low)70.1 EFV-139 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F08 11-02 Enclosure 4 Page 23 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C 3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including ProvisionDependent Failures 70.2 EFV-1 39 Fail Closed Operational Mis- EFV-180 opens. Periodic Test EFW Train A Will not auto-close EFV-1 80 High Side root valve of EF-position or available Cascades into 10.2 62-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Affects EF Red Light Setpoint actuated with Low FS1, FS2,& FS3. Indication for EFV- Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 180 closed)70.3 EFV-1 39 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO.Mode:

High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)71.1 EFV-139 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)71.2 EFV-139 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A Will not auto-close EFV-1 80 High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 10.1 62-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)71.3 EFV-139 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)72.1 EFV-140 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 24 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including ProvisionDependent Failures 72.2 EFV-140 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A Will not auto-open EFV-1 80 Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 10.2 62-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)72.3 EFV-140 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)73.1 EFV-140 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)73.2 EFV-140 Fail Closed Operational Mis- EFV-1 80 closes. Periodic Test EFW Train A Will not auto-open EFV-1 80 Low Side root valve of EF-position or Affects EF available Cascades into 10.2 62-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure FS1, FS2,& FS3. Green Light Setpoint actuated with High Indication for EFV- Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 180 open)73.3 EFV-140 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train A None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)74.1 EFV-181 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 25 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other ,.: Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects-Including ProvisionDependent Failures 74.2 EFV-181 Fail Closed Operational Mis- EFV-1 79 opens. Periodic Test EFW Train B Will not auto-close EFV-1 80 High Side root valve of EF-position or Affects EF available Cascades into 10.1 64-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure FS1, FS2,& FS3. Red Light Setpoint actuated with Low Indication for EFV- Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 179 closed)74.3 EFV-1 81 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)75.1 EFV-1 81 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 open)75.2 EFV-181 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B Will not auto-close EFV-1 79 High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 1.1 64-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset.(EFV-179 open)75.3 EFV-181 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset.(EFV-179 open)76.1 EFV-182 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 26 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects CD Including ProvisionDependent Failures 76.2 EFV-182 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B Will not auto-open EFV-179 Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 1.2 64-FO.Mode:

High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)76.3 EFV-1 82 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: High Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with Low Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)77.1 EFV-182 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 open)77.2 EFV-1 82 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B Will not auto-open EFV-1 79 Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 1.2 64-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 open)77.3 EFV-182 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF Periodic Test EFW Train B None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: Low Flow Mechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with High Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 open)140.Oa EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-62-FS1 9-10 140.1 a EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1 (Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2 permanently in Contact place 9-10 (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 27 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C SLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects o"Including Provision Dependent Failures 140.2a EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded FS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available Contact 3EF-62-FS1 2-3 140.3a EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded FS1 (LO) of 2 close signals available Contact permanently in after Hi flow 2-3 140.Ob EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1 (Hi) Loss of 3EF-B2- available to 2/2 Contact 9- FS1 10 140.1 b EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded FS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available Contact 2-3 3EF-62-FS1 140.2b EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1 (Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2 Contact 9- permanently in 10 place 140.3b EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded FS1 (LO) of 2 close signals available Contact 2-3 permanently in after Hi flow 140.0c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1 (Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-62-FS1 9-10 140.1 c EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Close Logic degraded FS1 (Hi) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; go change to 2/2 permanently in Open Logic Contact place 3EF-62-9-10 S1 energized (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 28 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects Including Provision-Dependent Failures 140.2c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-62-FS1 2-3 140.3c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS 1 (LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-62-FS1 2-3 141.Oa EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-62-FS1 9-10 141 .la EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2 permanently in Contact place 9-10 141.2a EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded FS2(LO) Loss of seal o available Contact 3EF-62-FS1 2-3 141.3a EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded FS2(LO) of 2 close signals available Contact permanently in after Hi flow 2-3 141.Ob EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 9-10 3EF-62-FS1 141.1b EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded FS2(LO) Loss of seal to available Contact 2-3 3EF-62-FS1 (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 29 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects o"Including Provision=Dependent Failures 141.2b EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2 Contact 9- permanently in 10 place 141.3b EF Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded FS2(LO) of 2 close signals available Contact 2-3 permanently in after Hi flow 141.0c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-62-FS1 9-10 141.1 c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS2(LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Logic degrade from 2/3 to Contact 3EF-62-FS2 2/2 2-3 141.2c EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS1(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-62-FS 1 9-10 141.3c EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Close Logic degraded FS2(LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2 Contact in place w/250 Open Logic 2-3 gpm flow 142.0a EF Open Electrical failure Degrade logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS3(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2 Contact 9-10 3EF-62-FS1 142.1 a EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS3(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2 Contact 9- permanently in 10 place (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 30 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Cr=!Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects" Including Provision-Dependent Failures 142.2a EF Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 FS3(LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Contact 3EF-62-FS3 2-3 142.3a EF Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Close Logic degraded FS3(LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2 Contact in place w/250 Open Logic 2-3 gpm flow 143.0 SS/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B No Manual Open For all flows through 180-SV Manual Open available capability from Control Room cavitating venturi Contact 3-4 capability 143.1 SS/EFV- Close Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through 180-SV Close of EFV-1 80 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi Contact 3-4 design functions.

The affected 20XB energized train s flow would be EFV-180 Opens approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with The failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.144.0 33o/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through 180 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturi c-d position.144.1 33o/EFV- Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through 180 Contact available cavitating venturi c-d 2EFV-180 energized 144.2 33o/EFV- Open Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through 180 Contact for valve position.

Operator Validation available Indication cavitating venturi a-b 144.3a 33o/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through 180 Contact for valve position.

Operator Validation available Indication cavitating venturi a-b 145.0 33c/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through 180 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturi a-b position.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 31 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects ( Including Provision-Dependent Failures 145.1 33c/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through 180 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturi a-b position.145.2 33c/EFV- Open Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through 180 Contact for valve position.

Operator Validation available Indication cavitating venturi a-b 145.3 33c/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through 180 Contact for valve position.

Operator Validation available Indication cavitating venturi a-b 150.0 3EF-62-FS1 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal 150.1 a 3EF-62-FS1 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Deenergize Close of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 150.2 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available cavitating venturi 3EF-62-FS1 150.3 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 150.4 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal 150.5 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 150.6 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi 10 signal (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 32 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects" Including Provision-Dependent Failures 150.7 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi 10 permanently in place 150.8 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 150.9 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 150.10 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 150.11 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test' EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 151.0 3EF-62-FS2 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal 151.1 3EF-62-FS2 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Deenergize of close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 151.2 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available cavitating venturi 3EF-62-FS1 151.3 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 1-2 of 2close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 151.4 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 33 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other r_3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects CD Including Provision" Dependent Failures 151.5 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 151.6 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi 10 signal 151.7 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi 10 permanently in place 151.8 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 151.9 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train B & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 Iogic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 151.10 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 151.11 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 152.0 3EF-62-FS2 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal 152.1 3EF-62-FS2 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Deenergize of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 152.2 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available cavitating venturi 3EF-62-FS1 (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 34 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects C- Including ProvisionDependent Failures 152.3 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 152.4 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi signal 152.5 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi permanently in place 152.6 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi 10 signal 152.7 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows through Contact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi 10 permanently in place 152.8 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 152.9 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 152-10 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturi close signal 152-11 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturi signals permanently in place 153.0 20XB Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B No Manual Open For all flows through Manual Open available capability from Control Room cavitating venturi capability (1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 35 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects (D Including Provision=Dependent Failures 153.1 20XB Fails to Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through Deenergize Close of EFV-1 80 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi design functions.

The affected 20XB energized train s flow would be EFV-180 Opens approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.153.2 20XB Open Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through Contact 5-6 Close of EFV-1 80 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi design functions.

The affected EFV-1 80 Opens train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with The failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.153.4 20XB Close Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B No Manual Open For all flows through Contact 5-6 Manual Open available capability from Control Room cavitating venturi capability 153.5 20XB Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 Initiation signal available cavitating venturi 153.6 20XB Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-2 2EFV-180 available cavitating venturi energized 154.0 20XA Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through valve out of available cavitating venturi position.154.1 20XA Fails to Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Deenergize when valve closes available cavitating venturi 2EFV-180 energized 154.2 20XA Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 valve out of available cavitating venturi position.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 36 of 37 Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other C Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects o Including Provision-Dependent Failures 154.3 20XA Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 5-6 when valve closes available cavitating venturi 2EFV-180 energized 154.4 20XA Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 9- valve out of available cavitating venturi 10 position.154.6 20XA Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 9- available cavitating venturi 10 2EFV-180 energized 155.0 2EFV-180 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through available cavitating venturi 155.1 2EFV-180 Fails to Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Deenergize 2EFV-180 available cavitating venturi energized 155.2 2EFV-180 Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-5 available cavitating venturi 155.3 2EFV-180 Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through Contact 1-5 2EFV-180 available cavitating venturi energized 156.0 EFV-180-SV Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Valve remains in Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through Open position available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi design functions.

The affected train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0811-02 Enclosure 4 Page 37 of 37 z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects CrIncluding Provision-Dependent Failures 156.1 EFV-180-SV Fails to Electrical Failure Valve remains in Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through Deenergize Closed Position available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi design functions.

The affected train s flow would be a pproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.157.0 DPDP-5B Blown Fuse Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through Close of EFV-1 80 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturi design functions.

The affected EFV-180 Opens train s flow would be approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typically necessary only early in accidents.

The train with the failure will regain the ability to fully mitigate later in the accident scenario.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing