IR 05000334/2011005

IR 05000334-11-005, 05000412-11-005, on 10/01/2011-12/31/2011; Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2; Drill Evaluation

ML12032A286
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	02/01/2012
From:	Hunegs G K NRC Region 1
To:	Harden P A FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
Hunegs G K
References
IR-11-005
Download: ML12032A286 (28)

Text

UNITED STATES N UGLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KlNG OF PRUSSlA. PA 19406-1415 February 1, 2012 Mr. Paul Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station P. O. Box 4, Route 168 Shippingport, PA 15077

SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/201 1 005 AND 05000412t201 1005

Dear Mr. Harden:

On December 31 ,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 24,2012, with Mr.Raymond Lieb, Director of Site Operations, and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one (1) self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green).This finding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements.

However, because of its very low safety significance, and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. lf you contest this non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a written response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region l; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the RegionalAdministrator, Region l; and the NRC Resident lnspector at the Beaver Valley Power Station.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,Gordon K. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000334/201 1005; 050004121201 1005 wi

Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Gordon K. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000334/201 1005; 0500041212011005 w/

Attachment:

Supplemental lnformation cc dencl: Distribution via ListServ 2 Distribution w/encl: W. Dean, RA D. Lew, DRA J. Tappert, DRP J. Clifford, DRP C. Miller, DRS P. Wilson, DRS G. Hunegs, DRP T. Tate. DRP S. Barber, DRP A. Dugandzic, DRP N. Lafferty, DRP L. Kern. DRP D. Spindler, DRP, SRI E. Bonney, DRP, Rl P. Garrett, DRP, Resident OA L. Chang, Rl, OEDO RidsN RRPM BeaverValley Resource RidsN rrDorlLpl 1 -1 Resource ROPreports Resource SUNSI Review Complete:

GKH (Reviewer's Initials)MLl20324286 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BMNCH6\+++BEAVER VALLEY\BV INSPECTION REPORTS & EXIT NOTES\BV TNSPEfiON REPORTS 201l\BV IR 2011-005-GKH.DOC(After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it WILL be released to the Public.OFFICIAL RECORD COPY"N' = No copy To receive a copv of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachrnenuenclosure "E" OFFICE mmt RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME DSpindler/GKH for GHunegs/ GKH DATE 01 t31t 12 02101t12 1 U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket Nos. 50-334. 50-412 License Nos. DPR-66, NPF-73 Report Nos. 05000334/201 1005 and 0500041212011005 Licensee:

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)Facility:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:

Shippingport, PA 15Q77 Dates: October 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011 Inspectors:

D. Spindler, Senior Resident Inspector E. Bonney, Resident Inspector D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer Approved by: G. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS suMMARy OF FlNDlNGS...........

.........3 1. REACTOR SAFETY...

....................4 1R01 Adverse Weather protection

.................4 1R04 Equipment Alignment.

..........4 1R05 Fire Protection............

.........

s 1R06 Flood Protection Measures ...................6 1R07 Heat Sink performance...............

..........6 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness.........

..........9 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent work control......

............

g 1R15 operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments..........

.........

10 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ..................

11 1R22 Surveillance Testing ..........11 1EPO Drill Evaluation...........

........12 4. OTHER ACTlVITlES..............

...... 13 4OA1 Performance lndicator Verification

...... 13 4OA2 Problem ldentification and Resolution

..................i4 4OAO Meetings, Including Exit...........

...........17 ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

,,.....,...17 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION...........

........A.1 KEy polNTS OF CONTACT........

......A_1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ....................A-1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED............

.,.....A-2 LtsT oF ACRONYMS..............

..........A-8 Enclosure 3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500033412011005, lR 0500041212011005; 1010112011-1213112011;

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2; Drill Evaluation This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors.

One self'revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified.

The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (lMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects for the findings were determined using IMC 0310, "Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas." Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Emergency

Preparedness e

Green.

A Green, self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)to ensure timely augmentation of response capabilities is available was identified.

Specifically, FENOC failed to fully staff two primary Emergency Response Organization (ERO) positions during an unannounced activation drill. FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2011-04431.

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have an actual safety consequence or the potential for impacting NRC's regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements.

The inspectors determined that the finding was not similar to the examples for minor deficiencies contained in IMC 0612, Appendix E,"Examples of Minor lssues." The finding is more than minor because it affects the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone, The finding is associated with the ERO readiness attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency.

In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix B, Sheet 1, "Failure to Comply" flowchart, the performance deficiency screens to green because it is considered a degraded planning standard function.The cause of this NCV relates to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Practices, in that FENOC personnel did not effectively communicate expectations regarding drill participation and staff did not respond in the required time for ERO positions they had accepted in the call out system H.4(b). (Section 1EP6)

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.1,

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones:

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier lntegrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111,01 - 1 sample).1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the Beaver Valley Power Station's readiness for the onset of seasonal cold temperatures.

The review focused on external storage tanks and associated piping and the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, control room logs, and the corrective action program to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure Beaver Valley personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges.

The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including Beaver Valley's seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions.

Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R04 EquipmentAlionment

.1 Partial Svstem Walkdowns

(71111.04Q - 3 samples)a. lnspection Scope The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:. Unit 1, 'B' Low head safety injection system (LHSI) during 'A' LHSI pump testing on October 18 o Unit 1, 'A' Outside recirculation spray system during 'B' outside recirculation spray pump maintenance on October 25. Unit 1, 1-2 Emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil, air start, and cooling during 1-1 EDG testing on November 9 Enclosure 5 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected.

The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions.

The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.

The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.

The inspectors also reviewed whether licensee staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findinos No findings were identified.

.2 Full Svstgm Walk@wn (71111.04S - 1 sample)a. Inspection

Scope On November 21, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 1 quench spray system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions.

The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hangar and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable.

The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure FENOC appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findinos No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Resident lnspector

Quarterlv Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 5 samples)a. lnspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features.

The inspectors verified that FENOC controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures.

The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition.

The inspectors also verified that Enclosure 6 station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of seryice, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.. Unit 1, Process rack room, CR-04 on October 27. Unit 1, Cable tray mezzanine, CS-1 on October 27 o Unit 1, West cable vault, CV-1, on November 15. Unit 2, Main feed regulating valve room, SB-5, on November 8 o Unit 2, Normal switchgear room, SB-4, on November I b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection

Measures (71111.06 - partial sample).1 Annual Review of Cables Located in Underqround Bunkers/Manholes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an inspection of underground bunkers/manholes subject to flooding that contain cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of risk-significant areas, including manholes 1EMH8A and 1EMH8B, which contain service water and river water cables. lnspectors verified that the cables were not submerged in water, that cables appeared intact, and observed the condition of cable support structures.

The inspectors verified proper sump pump operation and verified level alarm circuits were set in accordance with station procedures to ensure that the cables will not be submerged.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performancs

F1111 1.07A - 1 sample)a. lnspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 'A' primary component cooling water heat exchanger (2CCP-E21A)to determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions.

The inspectors reviewed the design basis for the component and verified FENOC commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13. The inspectors reviewed the results of previous inspections of 2CCP-821A and similar heat exchangers.

The inspectors discussed the results of the most recent inspection with engineering staff. The inspectors verified that FENOC initiated appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies.

The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes plugged within the heat exchanger supports an operable but degraded status of the heat exchanger, limited by river water temperature.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

7 1R1 1 Licensed Operator Requalification Prosram (71111.11 - 2 samples).1 Biennial Review of Ooerator Licensinq Requalification Proqram

a. Inspection Scope

The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9, Supplement 1, Inspection Procedure Attachmenl71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program," Appendix A "Checklist for Evaluating Facility Testing Material," and Appendix B "Suggested Interview Topics." A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspection reports and the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors also reviewed specific events from the licensee's corrective action program which indicated possible training deficiencies, to verify that they had been appropriately addressed.

The senior resident inspector was also consulted for insights regarding licensed operators' performance.

These reviews did not detect any operational events that were indicative of possible training deficiencies.

The operating tests for the week of October 17,2011, were reviewed for quality and performance.

On November 9, 2011, the results of the biennial written exam and the annual operating tests for year 2011 for Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 were reviewed to determine if pass fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9, Supplement 1, and NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix l, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP)." The review verified the following:

For Unit 1. Crew pass rates were greater than 80 percent. (Pass rate was 100 percent.)o lndividual pass rates on the dynamic simulator test were greater than 80 percent, (Pass rate was 100 percent.)r Individual pass rates on the job performance measures of the operating exam were greater than 80 percent. (Pass rate was 100 percent.)r Individual pass rates on the written examination were greater than 80 percent.(There was no biennial written examination this year for Unit 1 operators.)

o More than 75 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the exam, (100 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the operating examination.)

For Unit 2. Crew pass rates were greater than 80 percent. (Pass rate was 100 percent.)Enclosure 8 o lndividual pass rates on the dynamic simulator test were greater than 80 percent.(Pass rate was 93.5 percent,)r Individual pass rates on the job performance measures of the operating exam were greater than 80 percent. (Pass rate was 100 percent.)r Individual pass rates on the written examination were greater than 80 percent. (Pass rate was 100 percent.)o More than 75 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the exam.(93.5 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the operating examination.)

Observations were made of the dynamic simulator exams and job performance measures (JPM) administered during the week of October 17, 2011. These observations included facility evaluations of crew and individual performance during the dynamic simulator exams and individual performance of five JPMs, Written and operating examination material was reviewed to ensure excessive overlap did not exist among examination items.The remediation plans for one crew and nine individual written quiz failures were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial training.Seven operator license re-activations were reviewed to ensure that 10 CFR 55.53 license conditions and applicable program requirements were met.Four operators were interviewed for feedback on their training program and the quality of training received.Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plant control room.A sample of records for requalification training attendance, program feedback, reporting, and medical examinations were reviewed for compliance with license conditions, including NRC regulations.

Proficiency watch records for Unit 2 operators were also reviewed for the third quarter 2011.b. Findinos No findings were identified.

.2 Quarterlv

Review of Licensed Operator Req ualification Testinq and Trainino (7 1111 . 1 1 Q- 1 sample)a. Inspection Scooe The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on October 6,2011, which included a fire in the 1DF switchgear, loss of an emergency diesel, and a loss of primary containment.

The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

The inspectors assessed the clarity Enclosure I and effectiveness of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor.

The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the technical specification action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems.b. Findinqs No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance

Effectiveness (71111.12-3 samples)a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on SSC performance and reliability.

The inspectors reviewed system health reports, corrective action program documents, maintenance work orders, and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that FENOC was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2)performance criteria established by FENOC staff was reasonable.

As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that FENOC staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries.

r Unit 2, Fire protection early warning panel failures on December 15,2011. Unit 1 and 2, Maintenance rule program Periodic Assessment Review of September 2009 through February 2011 o Unit 1 and 2, 8A Manhole sump pump failures on December 12,2011 b. Findinss No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance

Risk Assessments and Emerqent Work kntrol (71111

.13 - 5 samples)a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that FENOC performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones.

As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that FENOC personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(aX4)and that the assessments were accurate and complete.

When FENOC performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results Enclosure 10 of the assessment with the station's probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment.

The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.o Unit 2, 'B' System station service transformer (SSST) tap changer emergent repair on October 8 o Unit 2, Rescheduled maintenance on'A'SSST on October 13 o Unit 2, Emergent maintenance on service water system 2SWP-P21A, B, C seal water and motor cooling water strainer (2SWS-STRM48)on October 29 r Unit 1 and 2, Risk assessment for emergent work on 2-2 EDG on October 5. Unit 1 and 2, Risk assessment for emergent work on the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) EDG during the week of December 12 b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R15 Operabilitv

Determinations and Functionalitv Assessments (71111

.15 - 5 samples)a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:. Unit 1, Containment electrical penetration test gauges reading zero, CR 11-96117 on October 17 o Unit 2, A Service water supply header to 2-1 EDG through-wall leak, CR 2011-02562 on October 3 o Unit 2, Pinhole leak in fire protection piping DV-1FP-s, CR 2011-02362 on October 3 and 4 o Unit 2, 'B' Service water pump strainer packing failure, CR 2011-04562 on October 29 r Unit 2, 'A' Component cooling water heat exchanger, CR 2011-02159 on November 4 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred.

The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and UFSAR to FENOC's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable.Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by FENOC. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

11 b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R19 Pgst-Maintenance

&stinq (71111

.19 - 7 samples)a. lnsoection

Scope The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability.

The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved.

The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.

r Unit 1, Containment isolation valve, TV-1DA-1008, repair on October 11. Unit 1, 1-1 EDG air start system solenoid operated valve replacement on November 9. Unit 1,1-2 Battery bus supply breaker replacement on November 23 o Unit 2,2-2 EDG cylinder head test valve replacement on October 5. Unit 2, 'A' Component cooling water pump shaft and outboard bearing repair on October 14 o Unit 2, Steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump steam supply header valve repair on December 9 o Unit 2,'C'steam supply isolation to the steam driven AFW PUMP [2MSS-SOV105C]

solenoid operator replacement on December 16 b, Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance

Testinq (71111.22 - 6 samples)a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied technical specifications, the UFSAR, and licensee procedure requirements.

The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied.

Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions.

The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests: Enclosure 12 o Unit 1, l 03T-36

.1 , 1-1 EDG monthly test on October 1 1 o Unit 1, l 05T-6.24, Reactor coolant system inventory

balance on October 14-18, (RCS leak rate)r Unit 1, lOST-30,1A, Auxiliary river water pump test on October 21 (in-service test)o Unit 2,2MSP-24.02-1, Loop 1 Narrow range steam generator water level channel I test on October 13 o Unit 2,2MSP-21.24-1, Loop 'B' Steamline pressure protection channel lV calibration, on November 4 o Unit 1 and 2,1l2OST-33.31, Fire brigade equipment test on November 26 b.. Findinqs No findings were identified.

Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparedness 1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 2 samples).1 Emerqencv Preparedness Drill Observation a. lnspection Scooq The inspectors evaluated the conduct of routine FENOC emergency drill on October 6 and unannounced activation drill on October 25 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities.

The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator, technical support center, and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures.

The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified by FENOC staff in order to evaluate FENOC's critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program.b. Findinos lntroduction:

A Green, self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)to ensure timely augmentation of response capabilities is available was identified.

Specifically, FENOC failed to fully staff two primary Emergency Response Organization (ERO) positions during an unannounced activation drill.Description:

On October 25, Beaver Valley Power Station failed an Emergency Response off-hours, unannounced activation drill. At 041 1, a simulated Alert was initiated by the control room as a site wide activation with all ERO responders required to report to assigned positions.

Two primary ERO positions that augment on-shift personnel, Radiation Technician and Field Monitoring Driver, were not fully staffed within the required 60 minute activation per the Emergency Preparedness Plan, Section 5, Table 5.1, Minimum On-Shift Staffing Requirements.

Four of the ten required Radiation Technician positions were not fully staffed until 69 minutes from drill declaration, and one of two required Field Monitoring Driver positions was not filled until 71 minutes after drill declaration.

These positions are filled by personnel not required to carry pagers. All Enclosure 13 personnel were initially contacted via pager, followed by calls to home phones and/or cell phones. The automated callout system continues to contact personnel until all ERO positions are acknowledged by a callfrom the responder committing to report to the station within the required time.The licensee conducted a root cause analysis of the failed activation drill. Several changes were made to the ERO automated call-out system that contacts ERO responders.

More phone lines were dedicated to calling Radiation Technicians.

The number of Radiation Technicians contacted for ERO positions required to respond to the site was increased from 10 to 20 personnel.

The automated callout system now contacts personnel via home phone, cell phone, and pager, when positions remain unfilled after the initial call-out system transmission.

A text message is also sent out with the initial page to cell phones.Analvsis:

The failure to fully staff the Radiation Technician positions and Field Monitoring Driver position within the required time is considered a performance deficiency.

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have an actual safety consequence or the potential for impacting NRC's regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements.

The inspectors determined that the finding was not similar to the examples for minor deficiencies contained in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor lssues." The finding is more than minor because it affects the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone.

The finding is associated with the ERO readiness attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency.

ln accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix B, Sheet 1, "Failure to Comply" flowchart, the performance deficiency screens to green because it is considered a degraded planning standard function.The cause of this NCV relates to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Practices, in that FENOC personnel did not etfectively communicate expectations regarding drill participation and staff did not respond in the required time for ERO positions they had accepted in the automated callout system tH.4(b)1.Enforcement:

10 CFR 50.sa(q) requires that FENOC follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which comply with the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(bX2), to ensure timely augmentation of response capabilities is available.

Contrary to the above, FENOC failed to filltwo primary ERO positions required by the Emergency Preparedness Plan during an off-hours, unannounced, activation drill. Because this deficiency is considered to be of very low safety significance (Green), and was entered into the corrective action program (CR 2011-04431), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000334, 41212011005-01, Unannounced Emergency Response Organization Activation Drill Failure)4.

4OA1 Performance

lndicator Verification (71 151).1 Mitiqatinq Svstems Performance Index (4 samples)Enclosure a.14 Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed FENOC's submittal of the Mitigating Systems Performance Index for the following systems for the period of October 1, 2010 through September 30, 2011: o Unit 1 Emergency AC Power System. Unit 2 Emergency AC Power System. Unit 1 High Pressure Injection System. Unit 2 High Pressure Injection System To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02,"Regulatory Assessment Performance lndicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors also reviewed operator narrative logs, condition reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.

Findinos No findings were identified.

Problem ldentification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples)Routine Review of Problem ldentification and Resolution Activitigs Inspection Scope As required by Inspection Procedure71152, "Problem ldentification and Resolution," the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that FENOC entered issues into the corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the corrective action program and periodically attended management review board condition report screenings.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Annual Sample: Review of the Operator Workaround Prooram Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the existing operator workarounds, operator burdens, existing operator aids and disabled alarms, and open main control room deficiencies to identify any effect on emergency operating procedure operator actions, and any impact on possible initiating events and mitigating systems. The b.4c.42.1 a.b.,2 Enclosure

.3 b.a.15 inspectors

evaluated whether station personnel had identified, assessed, and reviewed operator workarounds as specified in FENOC procedure NOBP-OP-OO12, "Operator Work-Arounds, Burdens, and Control Room Deficiencies." The inspectors reviewed FENOC's process to identify, prioritize and resolve main control room distractions to minimize operator burdens. The inspectors reviewed the system used to track these operator workarounds and recent self assessments of the program.The inspectors also toured the control room and discussed the current operator workarounds with the operators to ensure the items were being addressed on a schedule consistent with their relative safety significance.

Findinos and Observations No findings were identified.

Annual Sample: Deqradino Trend in Operations Procedure Content and Usaqe Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an in-depth review of FENOC's corrective actions associated with the full apparent cause for condition report CR 10-82360 and limited apparent cause for condition report CR 11-88214 regarding Operations procedure usage and content during the third and fourth quarters of 2Q10.The inspectors assessed FENOC's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of FENOC's corrective actions to determine whether FENOC was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with the procedure usage by operations department personnel.

Findinqs and Observations No findings were identified.

FENOC's cause analyses identified that errors in procedures was a significant contributor to errors made by operations personnel.

A significant backlog of procedural changes exists on site, and prior to the CR 10-82360, prioritization of procedure changes was not effectively managed. Operators were identifying procedure issues in the corrective action program, but procedure corrections were not being addressed in a timely manner commensurate with the frequency and safety importance of the procedure usage. FENOC is now actively managing the document change request list with a backlog reduction plan that includes weekly updates to management.

Human performance was not recognized as a significant contributor in the analysis and corrective actions.CR 11 -88214 assessed the human performance aspect of the errors that occurred in 2010. A decline in procedure adherence was identified in the analysis.

The corrective actions directed management to reinforce standards to operations regarding the importance of procedural compliance.

Operations human performance has started to decfine in the Clearance/Tagging Program, NOP-OP-1001, implementation, as evidenced by CR 2011-04088, "lnadvertent de-energization of MCC-2-14," b.Enclosure

.4 16 CR 2011-01798 "Locking device not properly installed" and CR 2011- 02791"lncorrect

clearance posting causes trip of 'C' chiller" in the fourth quarter af 2011. While not adversely affecting safety related equipment, human performance by Operations has not exhibited a high level of attention to detail to FENOC clearance program procedures, which are general field references.

There has been an improvement in step-by-step procedure usage by Operations personnel in the fourth quarter of 2011.Annual Sample: Radiation Protection and Chemistrv Safetv Conscious Work Environment 2010/201 1 Survev Results Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an in-depth review of FENOC's corrective actions associated with the full apparent cause for condition reports CR-10-83224 and 10-83492 regarding multiple negative responses in the 2010 Radiation Protection and Chemistry department safety conscious work environment (SCWE) survey.The inspectors assessed FENOC's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of FENOC's corrective actions to determine whether FENOC was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with the negative responses identified in the SCWE survey. The inspectors reviewed the 2011 and 2010 SCWE survey results for the site.Interviews were conducted by inspectors to assess employees'willingness to raise safety concerns onsite. Condition reports generated by Radiation Protection and Chemistry personnelwere reviewed by inspectors.

lnspectors also performed observations of site personnel response to issues discovered in the field, Findinqs and Observations No findings were identified.

FENOC identified several communication issues between Radiation Protection and Chemistry management and staff that is a potential driver of the negative responses in the annual SCWE survey. Based on inspector interviews and discussions with Radiation Protection and Chemistry personnel, the staff is aware of various means of raising safety concerns on site. The employee concerns program is consistently used throughout the year by FENOC employees.

2011 Chemistry SCWE survey results improved from the 2010 results. Radiation Protection SCWE survey results remained unchanged.

Inspectors reviewed a sampling of condition reports to determine if Radiation Protection and Chemistry personnel were identifying issues through the corrective action process. Condition reports denote if the issue is identified by an individual, supervisor, oversight or is self-revealing.

Based on a random sampling of thirty{hree condition reports generated in the past three months by the Radiation Protection group, over half were identified by individuals.

Twenty-two condition reports generated by Chemistry personnel in the last three months were reviewed, with approximately 65% of issues identified by individuals.

The inspectors determined that, combined with the inspectors'daily review of condition reports, issues are being raised by individuals on site.a.b.Enclosure 17 40A6 Meetinqs.

lncludinq Exit.1 LicensedOperatorRequalification On October 21,2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results of 1R1 1 to Chris Hynes, Training manager and other members of the FENOC staff at an exit meeting, The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report..2 Quarterlv Inspection Report Exit On January 24,2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr, Raymond Lieb, Director of Site Operations, and other members of the FENOC staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.ATTACHMENT:

=SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION=

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensse Personnel D. Auditori S. Baker D. Batina R. Boyle G. Cramer T. Cunningham

K. Deberry P. Eisenmann R. Ernfield L Forbes J. Gallagher D. Gyms P. Harden D. Haser D. Huff C. Hynes S. Kubis R. Lieb M. Manoleras K. Martin J. Matsko O. McElligott

E. McFarland C. McFeaters J. Miller D. Murray W. Rudolph B. Sepelak D. Salera Other Personnel L. Ryan Supervisor, Instrumentation

and Contro, Manager, Radiation

Protection

Coordinator, Employee Concerns Program Supervisor, Engineering

Manager, Emergency

Planning Technician, Instrumentation

and Control Engineer, Mechanical

Fleet Exam Developer Simulator

Operations

Tester Fleet Exam Developer Coordinator, Maintenance

Rule Program Engineer, Fire Protection

Site Vice President U2 Operations

Superintendent

Director, Maintenance

Manager Training Engineer, Electrical

Director, Site Operations

Director, Engineering

Supervisor

Continuing

Training Supervisor, Electrical

Engineering

Simulator

Software Engineer Supervisor

Initial Training Manager, Operations

Site Fire Marshall Director, Performance

lmprovement

Operations

Training Superintendent

Supervisor, Regulatory

Compliance

Manager, Chemistry Inspector, Pennsylvania

Department

of Radiation

Protection

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened/Closed

05000334, 4121201 1 005-01 NCV Unannounced

Emergency

Response Organization

Activation

Drill Failure Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

lOST-45.1

1, Cold Weather Protection Verification, Rev. 20 2OST-45.11, Cold Weather Protection Verification, Rev. 19

Section 1R04: Equipment

Alisnment Procedures

1OM-11.3.D.1, Safety Injection System Startup Checklist, Revision 1 1OM-13.3.C, Power Supply and Control Switch List, Revision 6 1OM-13.3.8.1, Valve List-1QS, Revision 14 Maintenance OrdersiWork Orders

200316403

200367561

200165958

200295271

200295271

200375189 Drawinqs 8700-RM-0053A, Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel and Air System, Revision 32 8700-RM-0430-001, Piping and Instrument Diagram River Water System, Revision 31

RM-041 3-002, Revision 1 2

RM-0411-001, Piping and lnstrument Diagram Safety Injection System, Revision 24

RM-0413-001

Miscellaneous

Unit 1 System Health report 2011-3, dated 11115111

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures

l

PFP-SRVB-725, Cable Tray Mezzanine Prefire Plan, Revision 0 lPFP-SRVB-713, Process Rack Room Prefire Plan, Revision 0 l

PFP-SFGB-735, West Cable Vault Prefire Paln, Revision 2 2PFP-SRVB-780, Main Feed Reg Valve Room, Revision 0 2PFP-SRVB-760, Normal Switchgear Room Prefire Plan, Revision 0 l12ADM-1900, Fire Protection Program, Revision 25 Miscellaneous wo

200248579 Beaver Valley Unit 1 Appendix R Update, Revision 21 Condition Reports 09-64328 09-60931 2011-00336

2011-05012

2011-00410

2011-01016

Section 1R06: Flood Protection

Measures Miscellaneous Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients, dated May 7,2QQ7 wo

200328616 Attachment ll2Ml-7s-Manhole-1E, Inspection of Manholes for Water Induced Damage, Revision 7

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Miscellaneous

EPRI-NP-7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines, December 1991 Root Cause Analysis Report, "Eddy Current Results of 2CCP-E21A," dated October 19,2011 BETA Laboratory Services ComponenVMaterialTest Report, "Heat Exchanger

2CCP-E214 Tube Load Test," dated October 22.2011 Condition Reports 2011-01747

2011-02159

2011-04840

2011-94662

Work Orders

200459261

200459273

200413546

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification

Proqram Miscellaneous Beaver Valley Power Station 2011 Blue Team Mini Drill October 6, 2011 controller book 2011 Unit 2 Sample Plan Written Exam ARE1 1U2C3E2 Written Exam ARE1 1 U2C3E3 Scenario 2DRLS-FS-S.

.006 Scenario 2DRLS-E-2.007

JPM 2AD-026 JPM 2CR.154 JPM 2CR-570 JPM 2CR-589 JPM 2PL-054 JPM 2PL-072

BVBP-TR-0008, Licensed Operator Requalification Exam Development and Administration

NOP-TR-1010, Licensed Operator Requalification Exam Development

12-ADM-1351, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program 112-ADM-1357, Conduct of Simulator Training Lesson Plan 201 1U1C3D3-Low Power Ops with Malfunctions Lesson Plan 201 1U2C3D3-Low Power Ops with Malfunctions Lesson Plan IOA Practice and Shift Manager Requests Simulator Work Requests

SWR-6505, Add Bypass Feed Reg Valve Oscillation Per CR 11-92603-05

SWR 6434, MFP Suction Pressure Trip 2CNM-PS1 18A/B Incorrect

SWR 6445,

ECP 10-0082 Remove Automatic Anti-Motoring Trip Function

SWR 6500,

ECP 10-0082 Restore Turbine Anti-Motoring Trip

SWR 6467, 2RCS-PCV455C

Indication Remains On With Loss of Dc Bus 2

SWR 6506, Transient Review

4110111 NR Level Trip CR 11-92603-05

SWR 6512, Heater Drain Check Valves 2HDH-695 & 696 Not Allowing Flow

SWR 6514, Plant MUG Sync Shrink/Swell Transient Comparison

SWR 6515, Plant Transient

2SWS.P21A

Trip SWS Header Pressure Response Attachment Simulator Tests

SQT-6.1, Steady State Drift Test - Full Power (2010 and 201 1)SGT-6.2, Steady State Drift Test - Interim Power (2010 and 2011)SQT-6.3, Steady State Drift Test - Low Power (2010 and 2011)SQT-14.1 .5.2.1.01, Reactor Plant Heatup from CSD to HSB (2010)SQT-1 4.1.5.2.1.03, Plant Startup from Zero Power to Full Power (2011)SQT-14.1 .5.2.6.45, OST 2.24.2 Motor-Driven Aux Feed Pump 2FWE.P23A

Test (2011)SQT- 1 4.1 .5.5.2.02, 2

FWS-P2 1 A Shea red Shaft (201 1 )SQT-5.1, Reactor Trip Test (2011)SQT-5.8, DBA Loss of Coolant Accident Transient Test (2010 and 2011)

Section 1Rl2: Maintenance

Effectiveness

Procedures

1BW 1.33.07, Flood Seals Visual Inspection, Revision 5

NOP-LP-2018, Quality Control Inspections of Maintenance and Modification Activities, Revision 7

NOP-ER-3004, FENOC Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 1 Condition Reports 11-91853 10-72119 06-04144 09-69171 10-69762 10-70075 10-73441 10-73646 10-76283 10-76947 10-77375 10-77719 10-86127 11-88256 11-88624 11-91282 11-91773 11-94715 2011-04101

Work Orders/Notifications

200338750

200338751

200399885

200399375

200400348

200218584

200403250

200415001

200437337

200448590

200446176

200479350

600480437

600438206

600585364

600589042

600590241

600604445

600613749

600618520

600649594

Section 1Rl3: Maintenance

Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Procedures

1l2ADM-2035, Risk Program, Revision 4

NOP-WM-0001, Work Management Process, Revision 7

NOP-WM-2001, Work Management Scheduling/AssessmenVSeasonal Readiness Processes, Revision 12 Condition Reports 2011-04562

2011-02655

2011-02710

2011-02958

2011-03005

Miscellaneous

BV Unit 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 1, dated

1015111 BV Unit 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 1, dated

12112111 BV Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 2, dated

1015111 BV Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, revision 3, dated

1017111 BV Unit 2 Operator Logs, dated

1018111 BV Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 2, dated

10124111 BV Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 1, dated

12112111 BV Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 2, dated

12112111 Attachment

BV Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 3, dated

12114111 BV Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 4, dated

12115111 BV Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary, Revision 5, dated

12116111 Section 1 R1 5: Operabilitv Determinations and Functionalitv Assessments

Procedures

BOP-UT-11-313, NDE Characterization of Flow,

9129111

NOBP-OP-1009, Prompt Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment Preparation Guide, Revision 4 1B\f[1 1.47.2, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, Revision 9 1 B\ff1 .47 .4, Containment Electrical Penetrations Type 'B' Leak Test, Revision 14

BOP-UT-1 1-327, UT Erosion/Corrosion Examination Report, dated

10126111 Condition Reports 2011-02562

2011-04404

Drawinqs L24334, Electrical Penetration Details and Assemblies, Revision 3 Drawing 10080-RC-45E

Miscellaneous

UT Erosion/Corrosion Examination, dated

912911 1 AWS/ANSI 56.8-1 994, Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements wo

200480681 BVPS Unit 2 Logs, dated

10129111 Section 1 Rl 9: Post-Maintenance Testino Procedures

2CMP-75-SOV-11, Replacement of ASCO Solenoid Operated Valves, Revision 10 205T-36.2, Emergency Diesel Generator

[2EGS.EG2-2], Revision 62 2OST-15.1, Primary Component Cooling Water Pump I2CCP-P21AI

test, Revision 46 lMSP-36.704-1, No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator air start solenoid valve [SOV-1EE-101]

replacement, Revision 0 l0ST-36.1, Diesel Generator No. 1 Monthly Test, Revision 53 lOMG-36.4.AG, Diesel Generator No, 1 Startup and Shutdown, Revision 16 1OM-36.4.AM, Diesel Generator No, 1 Fast Start, Revision 3

NOP-WM-1005, Work Management Order Testing Process, Revision 3

BVBP-SITE-0053, Post Maintenance Test Requirements, Revision 5 2OST-24.4, Steam Driver Auxiliary Feed Pump l2FWE.Pz2l Quarterly Test, Revision 69 Condition Reports 2011-03080

2011-02989

2011-02613

2011-05608

2011-02406

2011-05033

2011-05072

2011-05034

2011-05151

2011-05857

09-58615 2011-05088

Maintenance OrdersMork Orders

200402334

200477583

200441945

200468900

600717668

204438659

200436535

200438668

200481956 Attachment Section 1 R22: Surveillance Testinq Procedures

2MSP-21.24-1, 2MSS-P486

Loop B Steamline Pressure Protection Channel lV calibration, Revision 10 2MSP-21.24-1, 2MSS-P486

Loop B Steamline Pressure Protection Channel lV calibration, Revision 14 l0ST-6.2A, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance, Revision 20 lOST-30.1A, [1WR-P-9A]

Auxiliary River Water Pump Test, Revision 40 l 05T-36.1 , Diesel Generator No. 1 Monthly Test, Revision 53 1/2OST-33.31, Fire Protection System Operating Surveillance Test, Revision 15 Work Orders

200374579

200435914

200435015

200455637 Condition Reports 2011-03292

2011-03965

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

Procedures

1/2-ADM-1111, Rev. 4, 'NRC EPP Performance lndicator Instructions" 1 /2-ADM-1 1 1 1 .F01, Rev. 3, "Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators Classifications/Notifications/PARS"

EPP-I-1a/b, Rev. 14, "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions;" Il2-EPP-l-z, Rev. 35, "Unusual Event" 1l2-EPP-l-3, Rev. 33, "Alert" 112-EPP-!-4, Rev. 33, "Site Area Emergency" and 1lz-EPP-l-s, Rev. 34, "General Emergency" Other Blue Team mini-drill timeline Drill Rosters, dated 1Q125111 Condition Reports 2011-03110

2011-03150

201 1,03163 2011-03170

2011-03115

2011-04300

2011-04525

2011-04452

2011-04616

2011-04361

2011-04431

2011-04408

2011-04406

2011-04407

Section 4OA1 : Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

NOBP-LP-4012, NRC Performance Indicators, Revision 3 Condition Reports 10-84733 10-86428 10-86553 10-86618 10-86652 10-87284 10-87341 2011-01795

2011-02316

'11-88069

11-90570 11-91377 11-92231 11-92235 11-92470 11-94172 11-94784 1

1-95145 11-96222 11-97251 11-97306 11-98014 11-98162 Attachment

Miscellaneous

NOBP-LP-4012-23, MSPI Emergency

AC Power Systems Beaver Valley Unit #1, Revision 0, Monthly forms dated September

2010 through September

2011

NOBP-LP-4012-24, MSPI High Pressure Injection Valley Unit #1, Revision 0, Monthly forms dated September

2010 through September

2011

NOBP-LP-4A12-28, MSPI Emergency

AC Power Systems Beaver Valley Unit #2, Revision 1, Monthly forms dated September

2010 through September

2011

NOBP-LP-4012-29, MSPI High Pressure Injection Valley Unit #2, Revision 0, Monthly forms dated September

2010 through September

2011

Section 4OA2: Problem ldentification

and Resolution

Procedures

NOP-OP-1002, Conduct of Operations, Revision 5

NOP-OP-1001, Clearanceffagging Program, Revision 1 5

NOP-OP-1014, Plant Status Control, Revision 1 1l2OM-48.3.D, Administrative Control of Valves and Equipment, Revision 6

NOBP-OP-0012, Operator Work-Arounds, Burdens and Control Room Deficiencies, Revision Condition Reports 2011-00001

2011-00363

2011-00368

2011-01065

2011-01410

2011-01618

2011-01818

2011-01847

2011-04382

2011-01814

2011-04846

2011-04849

2011-01701

2011-01408

2011-01730

2011-00797

2011-04058

2011-03725

2011-03172

2011-04473

2011-00292

2011-00313

2011-00319

2011-00654

2011-01653

2011-01616

2011-01690

2011-01746

2011-02204

201

1-01504 201

1-01910 2U1-41692 2011-02801

2011-03902

2011-00430

2011-02791

10-85773 10-87312 10-78090 10-82360 10-83224 10-83492 10-83797 10-87005 Work Order/Notifications

200016861

200016927

200017002

200017903

200394803

200394804

200394805

200402644

200430019

200434874

200435497

200442124

200452191

200454933

200456660

200456916

200462230

200464681

200466792

200468740

200474932

200476985

200468900

600711841

600073429

600214790

600420576

600499191

600556279

600573445

600641058

600662735

600680257

600691406

600696104

600696146

600711542

600711545

600711634

600714412 Miscellaneous Beaver Valley SCWE Survey Results for August 2011 lP-SA-11-033, Integrated Performance Assessment and Trending, Operations,2010

2011-01344

2011-01347

2011-01875

2011-02793

2011-02527

2011-02888

201

1-03696 201

1-02598 2011-00214

2011-00289

201

1-00914 201

1-01336 2011-01910

2011-02203

2011-03182

2011-04359

2011-01798

2011-00316

11-88214 10-85927 11-91225 1

1-91368

200292766

200316431

200412988

200415221

200446751

200448745

200456917

200457477

200472575

200473734

600055485

600065430

600542194

600542196

600676512

600677547

600703356

600703496 Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC Alternating

Current ADAMS Agency-wide

Documents

Access and Management

System ADM Administrative

Procedure BCO Basis for Continued

Operations

BVPS Beaver Valley Power Station

CAP Corrective

Action Program

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CR Condition

Report(s)EDG Emergency

Diesel Generator FA Functionality

Assessments

FENOC First Energy Nuclear Operating

Company

HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection

IEEE Institute

of Electrical

and Electronics

Engineers IMC Inspection

Manual Chapter INPO Institute

of Nuclear Power Operations

IOD lmmediate

Operability

Determination

lP Inspection

Procedure lsl Inservice

Inspection

JPM Job Performance

Measures

KV Kilovolt

LCO Limiting Conditions

for Operations

LER Licensee Event Report

LHSI Low Head Safety Injection MR Maintenance

Rule MSP Maintenance

Surveillance

Package NCV Non-cited

Violation

NEI Nuclear Energy lnstitute

NRC Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

OD Operability

Determinations

OST Operations

Surveillance

Test pCi/g Picocuries

per Gram PARS Publicly Available

Records Pl Performance

lndicator Pl&R Problem ldentification

and Resolution

POD Prompt Operability

Determination

PMT Post Maintenance

Testing

RCS Reactor Coolant System

RPS Reactor Programs System SDP Significance

Determination

Process

SSC Structure, System, or Component

TS Technical

Specification

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI Unresolved

ltem Attachment