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10CFR2130DAYWRITTENREPORTNAMEANDADDRESSOFTHEINDIVIDUALINFORMINGTHECOMMISSION:NAME:ADDRESS:RobertC.MecredyVicePresidentNuclearOperationsGroupRochesterGas6.ElectricCorporation89EastAvenueRochester,NewYork14649IDENTXFICATXONOFTHEFACILXTY,THEACTIVITY,ORTHEBASICCOMPONENTSUPPLXEDFORSUCHFACILITYWHICHFAILSTOCOMPLYORCONTA1'NSADEFECT:ThebasiccomponentistheNBFD65NRControlRelay,suppliedbyEatonCorporation,Inc.Thiscomponentwaspurchasedsafety-relatedforuseinvariouslocationsatGinnaStation,andisinstalledinreactorprotectionandsafeguardssystemsforuseascontrollogicrelays.III.IDENTIFICATIONOFTHEFXRMCONSTRUCTINGTHEFACILITYORSUPPLYINGTHEBASICCOMPONENTWHICHFAILSTOCOMPLYORCONTAINSADEFECT!TherelaysweresuppliedtoRochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RG&E)by:EatonCorporationZnc.21SouthStreetDanbury,CT06810XV.NATUREOFTHEDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYANDTHESAFETYHAZARDWHICHISCREATEDORCOULDBECREATEDBYSUCHDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLY:PerRGGETechnicalEvaluation90-145,NBFD65NRrelayswereevaluatedassuitablereplacementsforNBFDXXSrelays.GinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsallowsaminimumvoltageof108.6VDCatthebatteryterminals.AccordingtoaletterfromWestinghousetoRG&E,"MaximumandMinimumDCVoltageandOperatingCurrentsforRelays",datedSeptember13,1993,theNBFD65NRrelaywouldoperateatvoltagesaslowas100volts.Fifteen(15)NBFD6SNRrelaysfailedtoperformpertherequirementsofthepurchasespecificationsduringpre-installationbenchtestingatGinnaStation.Astherelaysweregraduallyenergized,thecontactswouldstarttochatteratapproximately70VDC,andeventuallyfullypickupat125VDC~Theenergizedrelayswouldchatterbelow125VDC,andcompletelydropoutbelow70VDC.PurchasePage2 specificationswere:125VDCNominaloperatingvoltageandaCertificateofCompliancethattherelaysmetallperformancespecifications.Thesespecificationsincludedtestingatdegradedvoltage,whichisdefinedas90volts.ThedeviationwasdetectedbyRG&Eduringtestingpriortoinstallationintoareactorprotectionorsafeguardssystem.Noactualsafetyhazardexisted.Thenatureofthedefectconsistedofamanufacturingdeficiency.Uponinvestigation,byEaton,itwasdeterminedthattherelaycoilhadbeenincorrectlywired.Theinternalcoildesignincludestwocoils,apickupandaholdcoil,whicharedesignedtooperateinseries.Theholdcoilisshortedbyanormallyclosedcontactwhentherelayisde-energized,andinsertedinthecircuitinserieswiththepickupcoilwhentherelayenergizesandopensthecontact.Duetotheincorrectwiring,thecoilsopposedeachotherwhenthecontactopened.Atlowvoltages,thiscausedtherelaytodropoutassoonastheholdcoilwasenergized,resultinginrelaychatterandpreventingasolidpickup.AtGinnaStation,anNBFD65NRcanbeusedforasafety-relatedfunction,suchasContainmentSpray.Forthisapplication,relaysarenormallyde-energized,andenergizetogeneratetheprotectionlogic.Therelayscouldhavecausedcontainmentspraynottofunctionatallowedvoltagelevelsbelow125VDC.Therefore,theuseofthedeficientNBFD65NRrelays,inthethisapplication,couldhavecreatedasubstantialsafetyhazard.THEDATEONWHICHTHEINFORMATIONOPSUCHDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYWASOBTAINED:TheinformationwasobtainedonApril2,1999,duringthepre-installationtestingoftherelays.INTHECASEOPABASICCOMPONENTWHICHCONTAINSADEFECTORFAILSTOCOMPLY,THENUMBERANDLOCATIONOPALLSUCHCOMPONENTSINUSEAT,SUPPLIEDPOR,ORBEINGSUPPLIEDFORGINNASTATION:TherearenumerousNBFD65NRrelaysinsafety-relatedapplicationsinvariouslocationsatGinnaStation.Eatonsupplied50ofthemodelNBFD65NRrelaystoRGSEforinstallationintheGinnaStationreactorprotectionandsafeguardssystemsduringthe1999outage.NoneofthedeficientrelayshadeverbeeninstalledorusedatGinnaStation.Page3 VT~rIl THECORRECTIVEACTIONWHICHHASBEENIISBEINGgORWILLBETAKEN)THENAMEOFTHEINDIVIDUALORORGANIZATIONRESPONSIBLEFORTHEACTION;ANDTHELENGTHOFTIMETHATHASBEENORWILLBETAKENTOCOMPLETETHEACTION:AfterthedeviationwasdiscoveredbyRG&E,therelayswerereturnedtoEatonforevaluationandrootcauseanalysis.AnRG&EQAEngineerwaspresentduringtherootcauseinvestigation.Atthefactorytherelaysweretestedandpassedthebenchtest,butthesoundoftherelayschattering'asnotdetectedbecausefactorynoisemaskedthechatteringsound.Uponfurtherinvestigation,itwasdiscoveredthatoneofthetworelaycoilswaswiredbackwardsonalltherelaysinquestion.Accordingtothevendor,thecoilwindingproblemwasisolatedtotheRG&Eorderonly.Thedeficientrelaycoilswerereplacedandtherelayswereretestedusingenhancedtestprocedureswhichincludedcheckingforrelaychatter.Theincorrectwiringwasattributedtoinsufficienttrainingandsubsequentpoorworkmanshipofanewemployee.Inadequatefactorytestingfailedtodetectthechatteringrelays.AccordingtoEaton,theirtrainingprogramhasbeenrevisedandtheworklocationhasbeenenhancedwithvisualaidstoensuretherelaysarecorrectlyconstructedandtested.RG&EhascurrentlyimposedaSourceSurveillancerequirementonEaton,andwillconsidertheneedtoincludeSourceSurveillanceand/ortoperformreceipttestingofrelayspurchasedfromEatonasaconditionofacceptanceforfutureorders.ANYADVICERELATEDTOTHEDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYABOUTTHEFACILITY,ACTIVITY,ORBASICCOMPONENTTHATHASBEEN,ISBEING,ORWILLBEGIVENTOPURCHASERSORLICENSEES:Performanceofreceiptinspectiontestingofrelaysand/orperformanceofasourcesurveillanceofthevendor'stestingpracticesmaybeappropriate.Page4 | 10CFR2130DAYWRITTENREPORTNAMEANDADDRESSOFTHEINDIVIDUALINFORMINGTHECOMMISSION:NAME:ADDRESS:RobertC.MecredyVicePresidentNuclearOperationsGroupRochesterGas6.ElectricCorporation89EastAvenueRochester,NewYork14649IDENTXFICATXONOFTHEFACILXTY,THEACTIVITY,ORTHEBASICCOMPONENTSUPPLXEDFORSUCHFACILITYWHICHFAILSTOCOMPLYORCONTA1'NSADEFECT:ThebasiccomponentistheNBFD65NRControlRelay,suppliedbyEatonCorporation,Inc.Thiscomponentwaspurchasedsafety-relatedforuseinvariouslocationsatGinnaStation,andisinstalledinreactorprotectionandsafeguardssystemsforuseascontrollogicrelays.III.IDENTIFICATIONOFTHEFXRMCONSTRUCTINGTHEFACILITYORSUPPLYINGTHEBASICCOMPONENTWHICHFAILSTOCOMPLYORCONTAINSADEFECT!TherelaysweresuppliedtoRochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RG&E)by:EatonCorporationZnc.21SouthStreetDanbury,CT06810XV.NATUREOFTHEDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYANDTHESAFETYHAZARDWHICHISCREATEDORCOULDBECREATEDBYSUCHDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLY:PerRGGETechnicalEvaluation90-145,NBFD65NRrelayswereevaluatedassuitablereplacementsforNBFDXXSrelays.GinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsallowsaminimumvoltageof108.6VDCatthebatteryterminals.AccordingtoaletterfromWestinghousetoRG&E,"MaximumandMinimumDCVoltageandOperatingCurrentsforRelays",datedSeptember13,1993,theNBFD65NRrelaywouldoperateatvoltagesaslowas100volts.Fifteen(15)NBFD6SNRrelaysfailedtoperformpertherequirementsofthepurchasespecificationsduringpre-installationbenchtestingatGinnaStation.Astherelaysweregraduallyenergized,thecontactswouldstarttochatteratapproximately70VDC,andeventuallyfullypickupat125VDC~Theenergizedrelayswouldchatterbelow125VDC,andcompletelydropoutbelow70VDC.PurchasePage2 specificationswere:125VDCNominaloperatingvoltageandaCertificateofCompliancethattherelaysmetallperformancespecifications.Thesespecificationsincludedtestingatdegradedvoltage,whichisdefinedas90volts.ThedeviationwasdetectedbyRG&Eduringtestingpriortoinstallationintoareactorprotectionorsafeguardssystem.Noactualsafetyhazardexisted.Thenatureofthedefectconsistedofamanufacturingdeficiency.Uponinvestigation,byEaton,itwasdeterminedthattherelaycoilhadbeenincorrectlywired.Theinternalcoildesignincludestwocoils,apickupandaholdcoil,whicharedesignedtooperateinseries.Theholdcoilisshortedbyanormallyclosedcontactwhentherelayisde-energized,andinsertedinthecircuitinserieswiththepickupcoilwhentherelayenergizesandopensthecontact.Duetotheincorrectwiring,thecoilsopposedeachotherwhenthecontactopened.Atlowvoltages,thiscausedtherelaytodropoutassoonastheholdcoilwasenergized,resultinginrelaychatterandpreventingasolidpickup.AtGinnaStation,anNBFD65NRcanbeusedforasafety-relatedfunction,suchasContainmentSpray.Forthisapplication,relaysarenormallyde-energized,andenergizetogeneratetheprotectionlogic.Therelayscouldhavecausedcontainmentspraynottofunctionatallowedvoltagelevelsbelow125VDC.Therefore,theuseofthedeficientNBFD65NRrelays,inthethisapplication,couldhavecreatedasubstantialsafetyhazard.THEDATEONWHICHTHEINFORMATIONOPSUCHDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYWASOBTAINED:TheinformationwasobtainedonApril2,1999,duringthepre-installationtestingoftherelays.INTHECASEOPABASICCOMPONENTWHICHCONTAINSADEFECTORFAILSTOCOMPLY,THENUMBERANDLOCATIONOPALLSUCHCOMPONENTSINUSEAT,SUPPLIEDPOR,ORBEINGSUPPLIEDFORGINNASTATION:TherearenumerousNBFD65NRrelaysinsafety-relatedapplicationsinvariouslocationsatGinnaStation.Eatonsupplied50ofthemodelNBFD65NRrelaystoRGSEforinstallationintheGinnaStationreactorprotectionandsafeguardssystemsduringthe1999outage.NoneofthedeficientrelayshadeverbeeninstalledorusedatGinnaStation.Page3 VT~rIl THECORRECTIVEACTIONWHICHHASBEENIISBEINGgORWILLBETAKEN)THENAMEOFTHEINDIVIDUALORORGANIZATIONRESPONSIBLEFORTHEACTION;ANDTHELENGTHOFTIMETHATHASBEENORWILLBETAKENTOCOMPLETETHEACTION:AfterthedeviationwasdiscoveredbyRG&E,therelayswerereturnedtoEatonforevaluationandrootcauseanalysis.AnRG&EQAEngineerwaspresentduringtherootcauseinvestigation.Atthefactorytherelaysweretestedandpassedthebenchtest,butthesoundoftherelayschattering'asnotdetectedbecausefactorynoisemaskedthechatteringsound.Uponfurtherinvestigation,itwasdiscoveredthatoneofthetworelaycoilswaswiredbackwardsonalltherelaysinquestion.Accordingtothevendor,thecoilwindingproblemwasisolatedtotheRG&Eorderonly.Thedeficientrelaycoilswerereplacedandtherelayswereretestedusingenhancedtestprocedureswhichincludedcheckingforrelaychatter.Theincorrectwiringwasattributedtoinsufficienttrainingandsubsequentpoorworkmanshipofanewemployee.Inadequatefactorytestingfailedtodetectthechatteringrelays.AccordingtoEaton,theirtrainingprogramhasbeenrevisedandtheworklocationhasbeenenhancedwithvisualaidstoensuretherelaysarecorrectlyconstructedandtested.RG&EhascurrentlyimposedaSourceSurveillancerequirementonEaton,andwillconsidertheneedtoincludeSourceSurveillanceand/ortoperformreceipttestingofrelayspurchasedfromEatonasaconditionofacceptanceforfutureorders.ANYADVICERELATEDTOTHEDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYABOUTTHEFACILITY,ACTIVITY,ORBASICCOMPONENTTHATHASBEEN,ISBEING,ORWILLBEGIVENTOPURCHASERSORLICENSEES:Performanceofreceiptinspectiontestingofrelaysand/orperformanceofasourcesurveillanceofthevendor'stestingpracticesmaybeappropriate.Page4 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Revision as of 13:03, 18 May 2018
ML17265A676 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Ginna ![]() |
Issue date: | 06/16/1999 |
From: | MECREDY R C EATON CORP., ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
To: | VISSING G S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
References | |
REF-PT21-99 NUDOCS 9906220033 | |
Download: ML17265A676 (8) | |
Text
REGULARLYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTICOSYSTEM(RIDE)ACCESSIONNBR:990622'0033DOC.DATE:99/06/16NOTARIZED:NODOCKETIFACIL:>0-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterG05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONMECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFXLIATIONVISSING,G.S.RecordsManagementBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
SUBJECT:
Part21reptredefectsSnoncomplicanse,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii),whichrecpxires"WrittennotificationtoNRConidentificationofdefectorfailuretocomply."RelayswerereturnedtoEatonforevaluation6rootcauseanalysis.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE19TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:Part21Rept(50DKT)NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).E05000244GRECIPXENTIDCODE/NAMELPD1-INTNAL:FILECENTER01DRNARD,RGN1'GN3COPIESLTTRENCL.'11-1111111.1RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEVISSING,G.NRR/DRIP/REXBRES/DET/EIBRGN2RGN4COPIESLTTRENCL1111111111EXTERNAL:INPORECORDCTRNRCPDR1111NOACSILVER,ENUDOCSFULLTXT1111DM'EUINIgIIIhimNOTETOALLMRIDSMRECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR14ENCL14 4NDROCHESTERGASAh/DEIECTRICCORPORATION~89FASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,N.Y1dbf90001ARFACODE716Sf6-27D0ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresidentNuciearoperationsJune16,1999U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.20555
Subject:
10CFRPart2130DayReportR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244
DearMr.Vissing:
Theattached10CFR21reportissubmittedinaccordancewith10CFRPart21,ReportingofDefectsandNoncompliance,Section21(d)(3)(ii),whichrequires"WrittennotificationtotheNRContheidentificationofadefectorafailuretocomply".Veryrulyyours,AttachmentRobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStopSC2)ProjectDirectorateI-1DivisionofReactorProjects-I/IIOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20S5SRegionalAdministrator,RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector990622003$9906ibPDRADQCK05000244sPDR
10CFR2130DAYWRITTENREPORTNAMEANDADDRESSOFTHEINDIVIDUALINFORMINGTHECOMMISSION:NAME:ADDRESS:RobertC.MecredyVicePresidentNuclearOperationsGroupRochesterGas6.ElectricCorporation89EastAvenueRochester,NewYork14649IDENTXFICATXONOFTHEFACILXTY,THEACTIVITY,ORTHEBASICCOMPONENTSUPPLXEDFORSUCHFACILITYWHICHFAILSTOCOMPLYORCONTA1'NSADEFECT:ThebasiccomponentistheNBFD65NRControlRelay,suppliedbyEatonCorporation,Inc.Thiscomponentwaspurchasedsafety-relatedforuseinvariouslocationsatGinnaStation,andisinstalledinreactorprotectionandsafeguardssystemsforuseascontrollogicrelays.III.IDENTIFICATIONOFTHEFXRMCONSTRUCTINGTHEFACILITYORSUPPLYINGTHEBASICCOMPONENTWHICHFAILSTOCOMPLYORCONTAINSADEFECT!TherelaysweresuppliedtoRochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RG&E)by:EatonCorporationZnc.21SouthStreetDanbury,CT06810XV.NATUREOFTHEDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYANDTHESAFETYHAZARDWHICHISCREATEDORCOULDBECREATEDBYSUCHDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLY:PerRGGETechnicalEvaluation90-145,NBFD65NRrelayswereevaluatedassuitablereplacementsforNBFDXXSrelays.GinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsallowsaminimumvoltageof108.6VDCatthebatteryterminals.AccordingtoaletterfromWestinghousetoRG&E,"MaximumandMinimumDCVoltageandOperatingCurrentsforRelays",datedSeptember13,1993,theNBFD65NRrelaywouldoperateatvoltagesaslowas100volts.Fifteen(15)NBFD6SNRrelaysfailedtoperformpertherequirementsofthepurchasespecificationsduringpre-installationbenchtestingatGinnaStation.Astherelaysweregraduallyenergized,thecontactswouldstarttochatteratapproximately70VDC,andeventuallyfullypickupat125VDC~Theenergizedrelayswouldchatterbelow125VDC,andcompletelydropoutbelow70VDC.PurchasePage2 specificationswere:125VDCNominaloperatingvoltageandaCertificateofCompliancethattherelaysmetallperformancespecifications.Thesespecificationsincludedtestingatdegradedvoltage,whichisdefinedas90volts.ThedeviationwasdetectedbyRG&Eduringtestingpriortoinstallationintoareactorprotectionorsafeguardssystem.Noactualsafetyhazardexisted.Thenatureofthedefectconsistedofamanufacturingdeficiency.Uponinvestigation,byEaton,itwasdeterminedthattherelaycoilhadbeenincorrectlywired.Theinternalcoildesignincludestwocoils,apickupandaholdcoil,whicharedesignedtooperateinseries.Theholdcoilisshortedbyanormallyclosedcontactwhentherelayisde-energized,andinsertedinthecircuitinserieswiththepickupcoilwhentherelayenergizesandopensthecontact.Duetotheincorrectwiring,thecoilsopposedeachotherwhenthecontactopened.Atlowvoltages,thiscausedtherelaytodropoutassoonastheholdcoilwasenergized,resultinginrelaychatterandpreventingasolidpickup.AtGinnaStation,anNBFD65NRcanbeusedforasafety-relatedfunction,suchasContainmentSpray.Forthisapplication,relaysarenormallyde-energized,andenergizetogeneratetheprotectionlogic.Therelayscouldhavecausedcontainmentspraynottofunctionatallowedvoltagelevelsbelow125VDC.Therefore,theuseofthedeficientNBFD65NRrelays,inthethisapplication,couldhavecreatedasubstantialsafetyhazard.THEDATEONWHICHTHEINFORMATIONOPSUCHDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYWASOBTAINED:TheinformationwasobtainedonApril2,1999,duringthepre-installationtestingoftherelays.INTHECASEOPABASICCOMPONENTWHICHCONTAINSADEFECTORFAILSTOCOMPLY,THENUMBERANDLOCATIONOPALLSUCHCOMPONENTSINUSEAT,SUPPLIEDPOR,ORBEINGSUPPLIEDFORGINNASTATION:TherearenumerousNBFD65NRrelaysinsafety-relatedapplicationsinvariouslocationsatGinnaStation.Eatonsupplied50ofthemodelNBFD65NRrelaystoRGSEforinstallationintheGinnaStationreactorprotectionandsafeguardssystemsduringthe1999outage.NoneofthedeficientrelayshadeverbeeninstalledorusedatGinnaStation.Page3 VT~rIl THECORRECTIVEACTIONWHICHHASBEENIISBEINGgORWILLBETAKEN)THENAMEOFTHEINDIVIDUALORORGANIZATIONRESPONSIBLEFORTHEACTION;ANDTHELENGTHOFTIMETHATHASBEENORWILLBETAKENTOCOMPLETETHEACTION:AfterthedeviationwasdiscoveredbyRG&E,therelayswerereturnedtoEatonforevaluationandrootcauseanalysis.AnRG&EQAEngineerwaspresentduringtherootcauseinvestigation.Atthefactorytherelaysweretestedandpassedthebenchtest,butthesoundoftherelayschattering'asnotdetectedbecausefactorynoisemaskedthechatteringsound.Uponfurtherinvestigation,itwasdiscoveredthatoneofthetworelaycoilswaswiredbackwardsonalltherelaysinquestion.Accordingtothevendor,thecoilwindingproblemwasisolatedtotheRG&Eorderonly.Thedeficientrelaycoilswerereplacedandtherelayswereretestedusingenhancedtestprocedureswhichincludedcheckingforrelaychatter.Theincorrectwiringwasattributedtoinsufficienttrainingandsubsequentpoorworkmanshipofanewemployee.Inadequatefactorytestingfailedtodetectthechatteringrelays.AccordingtoEaton,theirtrainingprogramhasbeenrevisedandtheworklocationhasbeenenhancedwithvisualaidstoensuretherelaysarecorrectlyconstructedandtested.RG&EhascurrentlyimposedaSourceSurveillancerequirementonEaton,andwillconsidertheneedtoincludeSourceSurveillanceand/ortoperformreceipttestingofrelayspurchasedfromEatonasaconditionofacceptanceforfutureorders.ANYADVICERELATEDTOTHEDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYABOUTTHEFACILITY,ACTIVITY,ORBASICCOMPONENTTHATHASBEEN,ISBEING,ORWILLBEGIVENTOPURCHASERSORLICENSEES:Performanceofreceiptinspectiontestingofrelaysand/orperformanceofasourcesurveillanceofthevendor'stestingpracticesmaybeappropriate.Page4
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