IR 05000395/1997005: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20149G741
| number = ML20212B893
| issue date = 07/11/1997
| issue date = 10/15/1997
| title = Insp Rept 50-395/97-05 on 970504-0614.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support
| title = Ack Receipt of 970922 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/97-05
| author name =  
| author name = Haag R
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Taylor G
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
| docket = 05000395
| docket = 05000395
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-395-97-05, 50-395-97-5, NUDOCS 9707240043
| document report number = 50-395-97-05, 50-395-97-5, NUDOCS 9710280268
| package number = ML20149G736
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 3
| page count = 24
}}
}}


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October 15;11997  -
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South-Carolina Electric-8. Gas-Company ATTN: - 'Mr.'._ Gary J. Trylor
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L U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
  . Vice Presidena. Nuclear Operations    '
 
' Virgil C. Summer-Nuclear Station
==REGION II==
  'P. 0.: Box 88 Jenkinsville. SC -29065     '
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  -SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT N0. 50-395/97-05
  ' Docket No.: 50 395 License No.: NPF 12 Report No.:. 50 395/97 05 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G)    !
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Facility: V. C. Summer Nuclear Station l
l Location: P. O. Box 88 Jenkinsville, SC 29065 i
Dates:  May 4 June.14, 1997
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  . Inspectors: B. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector T. Farnholtz, Resident Inspector i
M. Ernstes, Rector Inspector (Section 05.1)
P. Harmon, Reactor Inspector (Section 05.1)
P. Hopkins, Project Engineer (Sections 01.1 and H [ partial])      !
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l Approved by: G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects l
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I Enclosure 2 s
u 9707240043 970711        l PDR ADOCK 05000395        i G  PDR  ,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V. C. Summer Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report No. 50 395/97 05 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident ins)ection; in addition, it includes the results of announced inspections ay a regional inspector and a project enginee Operations
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. Intermediate Building operator logs were taken in accordance with I
administrative procedures (Section 01.1).
 
. A Non cited Violation was identified for a failure to follow procedure while performing a test of a CCW pump to restore operability. TMs error resulted in securing cooling flow to an operating CCP. Tk i event was not similar to two previous events in which CCPs operated without CCW. The corrective action for the previous events had not adequately raised operator awareness to ensure that CCW cooling flow is maintained to an operating CCP during CCW pump evolutions (Section 01.2).
 
. The operator aid program was being conducted in accordance with the Operations Administrative Procedure (Section 01.3).
 
. Pre-job briefings conducted by the Operations Shift Supervisor adequately informed maintenance personnel of potential operational risks and concerns associated with spent fuel cooling and feedwater system maintenance (Section 01.4).
 
. A detailed system walkdown found that the safety related chill water system was considered to be able to perform its design function for normal and accident conditions. Observations in the areas of poor housekeeping, poor material condition, minor drawing errors, and a personnel safety condition were made. These concerns were appropriately addressed by the licensee (Section 02.1).
 
. A violation was identified for corrective actions not being effective in preventing a repetition of storage problems. This was the second NRC
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identified repeat of this violation (Section 02.2).
 
. A management observation program of Operations was implemented. This management attention to operations has the potential to enhance operations by identifying inconsistencies and problems, and reinforce good practices (Section 04.1).
 
. Control room operators demonstrated good plant awareness when they identified a malfunctioning pressurizer spray valve (Section 04.2).
 
. The inspectors concluded that the Requalification Training Program was conducted in an effective manner. A strength was identified in the
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direct involvement of Operations in the annual examinations and the critiques of operator performance. Job Performance Measures (JPMs) were
 
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not effective in providing performance feedback. The quality of the JPMs used as test items contributed to this lack of effectiveness. The annual examination provided an appropriate level of challenge to the operators to allow meaningful feedback to both the individuals and the training program. Recent operating history indicated no significant operator performance problems. Operator performance during the simulator scenarios was indicative of an effective training progra The operators exhibited strong command and control, crew discipline, and excellent communications. The requalification program and the annual examination met the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59, "Requalification" (Section 05.1).
 
. The Plant Safety Review Committee meeting observed met Technical Specification quorum requirements and focussed on safety while reviewing agenda items (Section 07.1).
 
. The Management Review Board meetings, to discuss recent plant trips and storage problems, were constructive and focussed management's attention on resolving identified concerns (Section 07.2).
 
Maintenance
. All observed maintenance tasks were conducted in a competent and professional manner. Appropriate tools, equipment, and procedures were ,
used. Proper radiological controls were utilued when required (Section M1.1).
 
. Surveillance activities were conducted satisfactorily and in accordance with applicable procedures (Section M2.1).
 
. Two examples were identified where procedural enhancement had the potential to compensate for the infrequent performance of activities by technicians. In one activity, a breaker charging motor was damaged (Section M4.1).
 
Enaineerina
. The licensee's consequence analysis for a larger than expected Emergency Feedwater (EFW) flow differentials between steam generators concluded that the as found condition of the EFW system would not have produced a condition which was outside of the plant's design basis. The methodology and assumptions used in the analysis were acceptable 1 (Section E2.1).
 
. The modification package to replace the existing sump level probes in the Auxiliary Building with a more reliable level switch was complete and appropriately detailed. Specified post modification testing requirements were acceptable to ensure proper switch operation (Section E2.2).
 
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!  . The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately evaluated the
:  water hammer issues associated with the condensate system and the deaerator (Section E8.1).
 
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[  Plant'Suooort l  . Postings at locked doors between the radiation controlled area and the
;  . Intermediate Building were satisfactory (Section R1.1).
 
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.  . A pre-job briefing to discuss personnel safety and radiological issues i  prior to a planned reactor building entry was well conducted and >
j-  effective. NO concerns were identified (Section R1.2).
 
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  . Security activities observed during the conduct of tours and observation i  . of plant activities were acceptable (Section S1.1).


A        ;
==Dear Mr. Taylor:==
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LThank you for your followup response of September 22, 1997, to our Notice of Violation, issued on' July 11._1997, concerning activities conducted at your  ,
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V.- C. Summer facility. The response addresses the corrective actions being taken..to prevent recurrence of-failure to meet' storage requirements. We have-evaluated-your response.and-found that it meets the requirements of..
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10 CFR 2.201. We . vill examine the, implementation of your corrective actions during future inspections.-
We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.


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;  Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant was operating at approximately 100 percent reactor power. On May 30, power was reduced to approximately 85 percent to perform repairs on the C main feedwater pum). The plant returned to full power on June 2 and remained at that level for t1e remainder of the inspection perio I. Doerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)    l Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of
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l operations was professional and safety conscious. Specific events and l noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections belo The inspectors accompanied an Intermediate Building operator performing Technical Specification (TS) required rounds. During the tour, the operator was thorough in verifying and recording the required equipment parameter .2 Loss of Comoonent Coolina Water System Flow To An Operatina Charaina Pumo 1 Insoection Scope (71707)
The ins)ectors reviewed the circumstances associated with an operator ,
error tlat occurred while performing a Component Cooling Water (CCW) I pump tes Observations and Findinas    l On May 7, at 2:06 a.m., during the performance of Surveillance Test i Procedure (STP) STP 222.002, " Component Cooling Pump Test," Revision 2, to determine operability of the B CCW pump, the A train CCW Jump was i secured while supplying cooling water to the A Centrifugal Clarging Pump (CCP) gear and oil cooler. The A CCP ran without cooling for about 57 seconds Mfore this condition was recognized by the operator and action taken to restore CCW flow. Temperature checks of the pump were performed and found to be satisfactor The STP required the B CCW pump to be started in both slow and fast speed to establish pump operability. The STP provided the overall 3rocedural guidance while referencing the specific System Operating
  )rocedure (S0P) S0P-118 " Component Cooling Water," Revision 13, to achieve pump starts, stops, speed changes, and necessary system realignments to conduct the test. The portion of the test that required the B CCW pump to be started in slow speed was completed satisfactoril The operator then proceeded to conduct the fast speed portion of the
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;  test. This part of the test was more complex since it was necessary to
:  perform system realignments to accommodate the increased pump flows due.
 
[  to fast speed operation. Step 6.2.6 of STP-222.002 referenced the
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operator to shift the B CCW pump to fast speed in accordance-with SOP'
L  118. Section IV.E " Shifting Train B To Fast Speed In.The Inactive Loop." While performing the referenced section of the S0P the operator misinterpreted a step and secured the A CCW pump by placing the pump switch in the "After-Stop" position. On the next page of the procedure a note discussed the status of the A CCP and the necessity.to transfer the inservice CCP. At this step in the procedure the operator recognized that CCW cooling to the A CCP was secured and had been supplied by the A CCW pum The licensee assembled a root cause evaluation team to review this event, determine.the root causes, and recommend corrective action. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and concluded that the team had identified the causes of the event. The operator performing the test had not followed the CCW system S0P while performing the ,
section of the'S0P to realign the system for fast speed operation. This was attributed to misunderstanding the intent of two ste)s in Section
  .IV.E of S0P 118. The operator failed to recognize that le was securing CCW cooling to an operating CCP. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's recommended corrective actions which -included procedural enhancements and concluded that they addressed the causes of this even The failure to follow the procedure for maintaining CCW cooling flow to an operating CCP is identified as a violation. This non-repetitive licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50 395/97005 0 The inspectors also reviewed this event in comparison to two previous events that resultad in CCPs operating without CCW cooling. In the two previous events a CCP was started without CCW cooling. "n this event cooling water was secured to an operating CCP. The inspectors concluded after reviewing the two previous events that these were not similar to the recent violation. The inspectors, however, concluded that the corrective action for the previous events had not adequately raised operator awareness to ensure that CCW cooling flow is maintained to an operating CCP during CCW pump evolution c. - Conclusion A Non cited Violation was identified for a failure to follow procedure while performing a test of a CCW pump to restore operability. This error resulted in securing cooling flow to an operating CCP. This event was not similar to two previous events in which CCPs operated without CCW. The corrective action for the previous events had not adequately raised operator awareness to ensure' that CCW cooling flow is maintained to an operating CCP during CCW' pump evolution .
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01.3 Review of Ooerator Aids a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the conduct of the Operator Aids program which is controlled by Operations Administrative Procedure (0AP), 0AP 105.1,
" Control of Operator Aids," Revision 2. The inspectors also sampled several operator aids and verified that they conformed with their operator aid reques b. Observations and Findinas The licensee has defined an operator aid as a label or other device affixed to a control panel, component, or other structure that enhances the ability of 0)erations Department and Test Unit personnel to perform their duties. T1e inspectors' review of the sample of operator aids found they were all in conformance with their respective operator aid requests. The inspectors found that the operator aids appeared technically correct, were appropriately justified and located in the correct areas. The description on each operator aid was as described in the operator aid request and they were identified correctly as operator aid Conclusions The operator aid program was being conducted in accordance with the OA .4 Pre Job Briefinas a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed pre job briefings by the Operations Shift Supervisor (SS).
 
b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed pre job briefings by the Operations SS for Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV) and Spent Fuel Cooling (SFC) valve maintenance. Both tasks involved higher than normal risk to the plan The FWIV maintenance involved replacement of the pilot air pressure regulator on the C FWIV. The potential existed for FWIV closure and a plant trip. The SFC valve maintenance involved the repacking of an unisolable valve from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The valve repacking was performed on the backsea If the backseat did not seal, the potential existed for an eight to ten thousand gallon leak from the SFP into the Auxiliary Buildin Both briefings with the involved maintenance personnel covered preparations for the jobs, expected communications, parameters to monitor, personnel safety, and the potential hazards. The inspectors concluded that the briefings adequately prepared the personnel involved for the risks and concerns associated with these tasks. Prior to
 
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repacking the SFC valve, the inspectors verified that should the
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backseat of the valve not prevent the valve from leaking, the SFP water
;  level would not drop below the TS minimu c. Conclusion
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Pre job briefings conducted by the Operations SS adequately informed .
maintenance personnel of potential operational risks and concern '
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown a. Insoection Scope (71707)
i The inspectors conducted a detailed ESF system walkdown of the  j safety related chilled water system. This walkdown was conducted using l the guidance provided in Inspection Procedure 7170 ;
b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors conducted a detailed system walkdown of the chilled water system to assess the general condition of system com)onents including l labeling, to verify that system valve msitions matc1 the system  '
drawings and SOP, and to assess plant lousekeeping in the area of system components. The following procedure and system piping and instrumentation drawings were used during the performance of this walkdown:
  . S0P 501 "HVAC Chilled Water System," Revision 1 .
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  . Drawing D 302 841, " System Flow Diagram, Chilled Water Pump and l Chiller Area," Revision 2 '
  * Drawing D 302 842, " System Flow Diagram, Chilled Water to 4 Cooling Coils A," Revision 1 . Drawing D 302 843, " System Flow Diagram, Chilled Water to Cooling Coils B," Revision 1 The inspectors considered that the chilled water system was able to perform its design function for both normal and accident conditions. No misaligned valves were identified and component labeling was adequat The inservice air handling units appeared to be functioning properly and chilled water temperatures throughout the system were as expected for the prevailing condition Poor housekeeping was identified in areas that were not frequently traveled. Identified items included foreign material in cable trays, significant amounts of debris in some areas, and unauthorized construction material. Also, two minor drawing errors were identified on drawing D 302 84 _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ .  - _ _ _ _ _
 
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)  .In addition, several. examples of poor material condition were observed, i A number of chilled water system valves were observed to have a large  !
:  ' amount of corrosion on the bonnets and handwheels. A number of valves had minor packing leaks. Several inoperable light fixtures and some -
damaged pipe insulation were also noted. One personnel safety issue was observed involving a safety chain not being installed on a ladde ,
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:  These concerns were communicated to the licensee for their resolutio i L  The inspectors also reviewed the applicable sections of the FSAR and  i identified no discrepancie ~
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I Conclusions-i
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A detailed = system walkdown found that the safety related chill water l~  system was considered to be able to perform its design function for
!  normal and accident conditions. Poor housekeeping,. poor material
!  condition, minor drawing errors, and a personnel safety condition were
;. observed. These concerns were appropriately addressed by the license .2 Failure To Follow Storace Area Reauest Evaluation 1 Insoection Scope (71707)
 
1  In conjunction with an ESF system walkdown, the inspectors reviewed L  overall plant housekeeping and storage.
 
i Observations and Findinas
 
i  Station Administrative Procedure (SAP), SAP-142, " Station Housekeeping
!  Program," Revision 11, Section 6.11, provides the requirements for the
!  designation of storage areas in the plant. Engineering services i  wrsonnel are responsible for reviewing all Designated Storage and
. iousekeeping Area Request (DSHARs) for areas inside the Protected Area to ensure that no design critaria are compromised. This review  ,
}  includes, as a minimum, an evaiuation of combustible loading, structural '
floor loading, electrical loading and anti falldown (seismic  )
interaction). - As required by the procedure, an engineering analysis had
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!  been performed, attached to the storage request, and had appropriately
}  identified limitations due to potential fire loading and seismic
;  interactions. SAP 142 also requires that the storage area request  j
;  originator ensure that all provisions, recommendations, or limitations
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identified in the engineering review are complied with in the storage are On June 4, during a tour of the Control Building 482 foot level, the inspectors inspected a permanent equipment storage area adjacent to safety related equipment. The storage area contained charcoal change out carts (hoppers) on rollers and hoses used to replace charcoal in the ventilation equipment installed on that level. The inspectors reviewed the DSHAR and the associated engineering review that was attached to the wall in the storage area. The inspectors found that the !
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material was not being stored in accordance with the posted storage limitation The engineering review identified a concern with the flammability of the flexible hoses used with the change out equipment. The review recommended that the hoses be removed and stored in a non-safety /non-seismic structure or location in order to maintain area combustible loading at a minimum. There was no automatic fire suppression capability in that area of the control building where the cart and hoses were being stored. The engineering review also recommended that the equipment be secured to the building wall by the installation of pad eye (s) and cabling to prevent these items from moving around during a potential seismic event. The engineering review designated an adjacent area where the equipment should be stored. The inspectors found that the engineering recommendations identified in the engineering review were not being implemented. The hoses were not stored in a separate location and the change-out equipment was not in the location designated in the storage request and not secured to the building wal This failure to follow station storage requirements is the second repeat (third occurrence) identified by the inspectors. Previous violations of storage requirements were identified on July 15, 1996, and on December 11, 199 In both the previous violations, the licensee failed to follow the engineering evaluation attached to the storage reques Previous corrective actions including personnel counseling, verification of storage requests, and procedural changes did not prevent recurrenc This is identified as Violation 50 395/97005 0 c. Conclusions A violation was identified for corrective actions not being effective in preventing a repetition of storage problems. This was the second NRC identified repeat of this violatio Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Control Room Manaaement Observations  l a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed an Operations observation progra I b. Observations and Findinas On May 19, plant management began an eight week around the clock operations observation program. Independent observers witnessed operational activities in the control room and in the plant to give feedback on the conduct of plant operations. The program was implemented, in part, as a response to recent o  The observations were being compiled in a log book.perational The inspectorsproblem concluded that this management attention to plant operations has the
 
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potential to enhance performance by identifying inconsistencies and problems, and reinforcing good practice c. Conclusions A management observation program of operations was implemented. This l management attention to operations has the potential to enhance operations by identifying inconsistencies and problems, and reinforcing good practices.
 
04.2 Pressurizer Soray Valve a. Inspection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the identification of a partially stuck open pressurizer spray valv b. Observations and Findinas On May 31, operators observed on the main control board unusual indications of control group heater amps with the RCS pressure steady and normal. A review of plant computer data indicated that the pressurizer spray valve off the A RCS loop, PCV 444D RC, was open with a closed demand signa An evaluation of plant computer data for the spray valves indicated that PCV 4440 RC was partially open. The valve apparently failed to fully close after receiving a close demand signal. A subsequent Reactor Building (RB) entry and troubleshooting by the licensee identified that the spray valve was in fact partially open due to a problem with the valve's air control system. A volume booster in the air control system was replaced, and the valve was returned to a fully functional statu The inspectors concluded that this observation by control room operators demonstrated plant awareness and attention to changing plant condition c. Conclusions Control room operators' demonstrated good plant awareness when they identified a malfunctioning pressurizer spray valve.
 
05 Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Licensed Operator Reaualification Proaram Evaluation -(71001)
a. Inspection Scoce During the week of May 5 through 8. Region based inspectors used the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71001 to assess the Licensed Operator Requalification Program. The inspectors witnessed the administration of week 2 of the 5 week examination process. The Operating shift crew examined during the inspection was D Shift, with a total of seven Senior
 
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Reactor Operators, and four Reactor Operators. The inspectors observed simulator examination scenarios, plant and simulator walk through l examinations in the form of Job Performance Measures (JPMs), and l reviewed the 50 question written examination. In addition, the l inspectors reviewed the administrative controls the licensee used to
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ensure the Requalification Program met the requirements in 10 CFR 55.59. l b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors evaluated th written examination and concluded the 50 question test was challenging and comprehensive. The examination was
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an open reference examination, using test items sufficiently complex to meet the guidance of NUREG 1021, " Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Attachment 3. " Examination Sample Plan,"
and Appendix B. " Written Exam Guidelines." The Requalification written examination bank contained approximately 800 items, which satisfied the guidance in NUREG 102 The licensee has taken an exception to the guidance of NUREG 1021 and no longer administers a static simulator examination. The inspectors determined that plant and control systems typically evaluated in this section of the examination were appropriately sampled on the written examinatio The dynamic simulator operating examinations were appropriately discriminating. The scenarios presented challenges to the operating crews that allowed a valid assessment of the crews and individual Dominant accident sequences identified from the facility's Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) were incorporated into the operating test Faults and events were related to a degree that allowed a logical, reasoned approach by the operating crews in determining the nature of the faults and accidents. During the simulator scenarios the operators were observed to maintain good situational command and control. Three part communications were used, throughout the exercises, in accordance with station procedure The JPMs were adequate to ensure that a safety critical task could be performed. However, several JPMs were not sufficiently complex to provide a reasonable degree of confidence that the candidate was demonstrating a mastery of the requalification training material or of the functional positio For example, JPM 036B was a simulator JPM in which the operator is required to respond to a continuous rod withdrawal event. The initiating cue provided by the evaluator arompted the operator to " respond to rod motion." After placing t1e Rod Control Bank Selector to MANUAL, (which did not stop the withdrawal), the operator was expected to trip the reactor. This was the only action required to successfully complete the JPM. Other JPMs required a single, simple step response from the o>erators. Although any training program requires demonstrating tlat all required tasks be mastered, whether simple or comalex, the testing process should be predisposed toward those items w11ch provide meaningful feedback. A simple, single action task will seldom provide any significant data for determining areas in


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Sincerely
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Original- signed by Robert C. Haag Robert C. Haag. Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
which retraining is needed or where training programs should be modified. Test items that r e too easy or fundamental such that ;
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individuals with performan c problems could answer them correctly are not sufficiently discrimbatir.g and should be used with discretio i l
Dock'et No. 50-395
The inspectors discussed this issue with both Training Management and Operations Management. The total population of JPMs in the licensee's l examination bank was approximately 150 test items, which satisfied the guidance in NUREG 102 The requalification examination was administered as planned, with a minimum of changes in content or schedule. This reflected effective planning and strong experience levels by the training staff. The training staff involved in the examination used appro)riate performance standards in grading and evaluating the operators. T1e staff conducted critiques immediately after each dynamic simulator exercise. The critiques were effective in identifying errors or problems, and assigning the proper corrective actions. The threshold for providing corrective feedback was appropriately conservative. Operations
. License No. NPF-12 cc: R.'J. White
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, Nuclear Coordinator. Mail Code 802 S.C. Public' Service; Author P,y    1
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  : Virgil-C. Summer Nuclear Station    1 P. O. Box 88 Jenkinsville.'SC 29065 u
management actively participated in both the dynamic simulator evaluation and in the critique of the crew and individuals. The involvement of Operations in the training pmcess was especially useful during the >ost scenario assessments. Thr e erations managers provided direct feed)ack to Training regarding wha >erations expected in matters of crew and individual behavior, munications, and procedural adherence. This aspect of the Requalifit on program is considered a strengt Crew and individual feedback was provided n the form of completed critique sheets for each of the dynamic simulator exercises. The sheets were presented to each student at the completion of the examination week, prior to returning to shift. The inspectors interviewed one SR0 and one R0 regarding the feedback provided. Both felt the feedback was detailed enough to allow an accurate assessment of their performanc c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the Requalification Training Program was conducted in an effective manner. A strength was identified in the direct involvement of Operations in the annual examinations and the critiques of operator  JPMs were not effective in providing performance feedback. performance.The quality of the JPMs used as test ite contributed to this lack of effectiveness. The annual examination provided an appropriate level of challenge to the operators to allow meaningful feedback to both the individuals and the training progra Recent operating history indicated no significant operator performance problems. Operator performance during the simulator scenarios was indicative of an effective training program. The operators exhibited strong command and control, crew discipline, and excellent communications. The requalification program and the annual examination met the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59, "Requalification."
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07 Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) Meetina a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors attended a PSRC meeting to assess the effectiveness of ,
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b. Observations and Findinas On June 10, the inspectors attended a PSRC meeting during which several SAP changes were discussed. These changes were reviewed by the PSRC with all questions and concerns being fully addressed. The PSRC voted to approve each change. No concerns were identifie In addition, the PSRC members were briefed on an Emergency Feedwater (EFW) consecuence analysis which was performed following greater than expecttd EFh flow differentials noted after the April 22 reactor tri Details of this analysis are described in Section E c. Conclusions The PSRC meating observed met TS quorum requirements and focussed on safety while reviewing agenda item .2 Manaaement Review Board (MRB) Meetinas a. Inspection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors observed MRB meetings on May 9 and June 1 b. Observations and Findinas On May 9, the ins)ectors attended a MRB meeting which was held to review the plant trips tlat occurred in April and the operating crew's performance during the trips and subsequent restarts. The MRB also discussed problems that were seen in the plant that needed resolution including feedwater pump speed controls and feedwater system performance, potential waterhammer problems, EFW status, and the electro hydraulic system 0 ring failur The June 13 MRB meeting was held to review continued problems with equipment storage in the plant. The meeting covered the recent storage issue (see Section 02.2), the current program to designate storage areas, and proposed ways to enhance the progra Both HRB meetings were chaired by the Vice President, Nuclear Operations. The meetings were attended by plant general managers and other department managers. The inspectors considered the discussions to be constructive, open, and focussed on resolving outstanding concern . _ . __ . . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
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1SCE&G  2-cc: Continued J; B..Knotts. Jr.. Esq. .
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l l    11 The meetings resulted in establishing action items to resolve the identified concerns.
    ,
  'Winston and Strawn'
'1400 L-Street. tN Washington.-D. C. '20005-3502 Chairman Fairfield County Council P. O. Box 60-Winnsboro.-SC 29180 Virgil _R. Autry. Director-Radioactive Waste Management Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management-S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control u 2600 Bull Street Columbia. SC 29201 R. M. Fowlkes. Manager Operations (Mail Code 303)
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station P. O. Box 88-Jenkinsville. SC 29065-April Rice. Manager Nuclear Licensing & Operating Experience (Mail Code 830)
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station P. O. Box 88-Jenkinsville. SC 29065 Distribution:
A.' Johnson, NRR fL Gibbs. RII P. Fillion. RII R. Aiello, RII.


.
.
c. Conclusions
W. Stansberry. RII D.' Jones. RII^
. The MRB meetings,.to discuss recent plant trips and storage problems, i were constructive and focussed management's attention on resolving
PUBLIC
. identified concern Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
0 (Closed) Temocrary Instruction (TI) 2515/86: Inspection of licensee's actions taken to implement Generic Letter No. 81 21. " Natural Circulation Cooldown." The licensee's training program to implement Generic Letter (GL) 81 21 was reviewed in NRC Inspection Report (IR) N /87032 and found to be acceptable. Inspectors' reviews of licensee procedures for natural circulation cooldown and operator interviews on the use of these procedures were documented in NRC IR No /88003 and 50 395/8802 Following the licensee's resolution of several procedural deficiencies identified during the inspection, the-licensee's procedures were considered satisfactory. Based on the results of these previous inspections, TI 2515/86 is closed.
 
,
,
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments
Q1stribution continued: See page 3
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a. Inspection Scope (62707)
'
The inspectors reviewed or observed all or portions of the following work activities:
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* Maintenance Work Request (MWR) 9710453, A Chiller Surging / Restore Proper Operatio * Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet (PMTS) P0210557, Lubricate C
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Charging / Safety Injection (SI) Pump Moto * PMTS P0210454, Quantify Leakage from Mechanical Seals on the C 3 Charging /SI Pum * PMTS P0210474, Perform Operational Check, Electrical Inspection, and Cleaning on the C Charging /SI Breaker.


j e MWR 9710605, Install Mounting Bracket for Level Switch ILS0196 * MWR 9709254, XVG 06661-SF Replace Body to Bonnet Gasket and
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Packing.
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SCE&G-    .3 Distribution: Continued NRC Resident inspector-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Route 1. Box 64 Jenkinsville. -SC 29065      r
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, oFklCIALRECORDCOPY DecMNT NAME: G:\ sum 9705A.RES
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. NWR 9710844, Replacement of C Feedwater Isolation Valve '
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_ (XVG01611C) Pilot Air Pressure Regulato * MWR 9700139, Agastat Relay Calibration / Replacement XSW1DA1 b. Observations and Findinas The observed maintenance on the C chiller was performed in accordance l with established procedures using acceptable work practice The preventive maintenance associated with the C charging /SI pump seals I'
was accomplished using the proper tools and equipment. Demineralized water was used to clean the residual boric acid crystals from the seal areas. Proper Health Physics (HP) procedures were utilized during the i performance of this tas l The mounting bracket installation for level switch ILS01966 was performed in accordance with Hodification Review Form (HRF) 34428. The existing level switch was replaced with a switch of a different desig This required the installation of a different type of mounting bracke Level switch ILS01966 was located in a radiologically contaminated are This required HP assistance and the use of appropriate personnel contamination protectio The FWIV air pressure regulator replacement and the Spent Fuel Cooling (SFC) system valve repacking were performed in accordance with the procedures using acceptable work practices. These two tasks were especially noteworthy because they both posed higher than normal plant ris c. Conclusions All observed raaintenance tasks were conducted in a competent and professional manner. Appropriate tools, equipment, and procedures were !
used. Proper radiological controls were utilized when require M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment H2.1 S_urveillance Observation a. Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors reviewed or observed all or portions of the following surveillance tests:
. STP 121.00, " Main Steam Valve Operability Test," Revision 1 * STP-170.010 " Fire Switch Functional Yest for XFN0064B and XFN0065B, B Trai,, RBCUs," Revision 2.
 
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* STP-125.002, " Diesel Generator Operability Test," Revision 1 .
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. STP 120.004, " Emergency Feedwater Valve Operability Test,"
Revision 1 . STP 124.001, " Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup," Revision * STP-102.001, " Source Range Analog Channel Operational Test, N 31, N 32 N 33," Revision . STP 345.037, " Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test - Train A," Revision 1 b. Observations and Findinas As part of the STP 345.037 review, the inspectors verified that the licensee had revised the procedure to include complete verification of the P 4 circuitry (see NRC IR No. 50 395/97001).
 
During observation of the surveillance tests, the inspectors observed good planning, communications and procedural adherenc c. Conclusions Surveillance activities were conducted satisfactorily and in accordance with applicable procedure M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 Pgrformance of Breaker Testina a. Inspection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed the performance of Electrical Maintenance Procedure (EMP). EMP 405.013. "7.2 kV Circuit Breaker 500 Operation Maintenance," Revision 10, on the A train breaker for the C charging /SI pump and STP 506.009, " Reactor Trip Breaker Testing," Revision 1 b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that the technicians performing EMP 405.013 did not understand how to properly connect a Multi Amp SST-2 timer to measure the breaker's as found open and close times. The technicians contacted their supervisor for additional guidance, and the proper connections were established to provide the required data. A procedure change was initiated to clarify the use of the Multi-Amp timer. A similar problem was also identified during the performance of STP-506.00 In a later section of procedure EMP-405.013, the technicians manually charged the charging springs using a ratchet handle. The ratchet handle i was not removed when it was no longer required. When the charging motor was energized later in the procedure, the charging motor was damaged and had to be replaced. The ratchet was used in the clockwise direction l
 
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instead of the counter clockwise direction as recommended in the 7.2 kV Magna Blast circuit breaker technical manual. The technicians also manually charged the springs with the breaker control mwer connecte No personnel were injured during this event, but the c1arging motor was damaged and required replacemen The inspectors reviewed the training records for the electrical technicians involved in the breaker maintenance and found they had received training in 1993. The training staff used the a) proved )
procedures and the circuit breaker technical manual as a 3 asis for the q training program for the 7.2 kV breakers. The training facilities were considered to be adequat c. Conclusions Two examples were identified where procedural enhancement had the potential to compensate for the infrequent performance of activities by !
technicians. In one activity, a breaker charging motor was damage III. Enaineering  j i
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 EFW Flow Balance a. Inspection Scooe (37551. 92903)
      :
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's consecuence analysis which was performed because of larger than expected EFv flow differentials between Steam Generators (SGs) following the manual reactor trip on April 2 b. Observations and Findinas An Unresolved Item (URI) was owned in NRC IR Ho. 50 395/97003 (URI 50-395/97003 05) concerning a higler than expected differential EFW flow between each of the SGs following a manual reactor trip. Part of this URI involved a review of the consequences of the observed system conditions to determine if the design basis assumptions were me The licensee performed an EFW consequence analysis to address the question. The analysis included three system performance evaluations:
  . Maximum flow to a faulted S . Automatic isolation of emergency feed to the faulted S * Minimum flow to the intact SG The results of these evaluations indicated that the system's function to limit the maximum EFW flow to less than or equal to 1000 gallons per minute (gpm) to a faulted SG may not have been met. The automatic isolation and the minimum flow evaluations showed that they would have
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been met with the EFW system in the as found condition. As a result of these evaluations, the licensee performed a consequence analysis to
 
address the impact of EFW flow exceeding 1000 gpm to the faulted S The licensee determined that the inability to limit EFW flow to less
 
than or equal to 1000 gpm to the faulted SG potentially impacts two design basis analysis:
. RB pressure and temperature analysis for steam line break
. RB flood analysis
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The analysis showed that the resulting pressure and temperature conditions inside the RB would be within the bounds of current analyses.
 
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Also, the resulting RB flood level would have been acceptable for current plant equipment to ensure accident mitigation, establish safe l- shutdown co titions, and perform post accident monitoring functions.
 
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The inspectort, reviewed the licensee's methodology and assumptions used j
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in the analysis. The EFW system hydraulic model was a normalized
; version of the same model that was originally used for the system
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analysis. The specific post trip system conditions were analyzed. The 3 assumptions used were reasonable and provided an acceptable level of confidence in the results. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's ,
. conclusion that the as found condition of the EFW system would not have !
i produced a condition which was outside of the plant's design basis.
 
i The URI (50 395/97003 05) will remain open pending review of the licensee's root cause evaluation to determine the cause of the
{ out of specification valve stop adjustment Conclusions
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l The licensee's consequence analysis for larger than expected EFW flow I i~
differentials between SGs following a manual reactor trip concluded that l
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the as found condition of the EFW system would not have produced a condition which was outside of the plant's design basis. The inspectors i determined that the methodology and assumptions used in the analysis !
were acceptabl I E2.2 Modification to Replace Leak Detection System Switches  j
, InsDection Scope (37551)    I l
l The inspectors reviewed the MRF 34428 Jackage and sup)orting i documentation. The purpose of this MR was to make t1e Auxiliary
; Building leak detection system more reliabl ;
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      ' Observations and Findinas    l
 
The licensee initiated a modification to replace the existing Magnetrol
; capacitance probes in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room sumps, i
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the waste evaporator room sumps, and the alarm drains in the Auxiliary Building. A more reliable Magnetrol flood level switch was designated as a replacement instrumen The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screening review which was completed in sup) ort of this modification. The screening review indicated that t11s activity did represent a change to the facility as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or the Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER). Because of this, a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was completed. All questions on the safety evaluation were answered N0 and appropriate justification was included. The FSAR was identified as requiring revision to change the description of the level sensing devices. No change to the FPER was require Appropriately detailed instructions were provided to the Instrumentation
& Control (I&C) technicians, the civil maintenance technicians, and the electrical maintenance technicians to complete the required tasks. The replacement switches required that a different bracket be fabric ited and installed in the various sumps. Drawings and measurements were govided to modify the existing brackets to accommodate the replacement switche The replacement switches did not require a 120 volt AC power su) ply as did the original probes. The instructions addressed removing t11s power supply. The replacement switches were designated as seismically qualified and seismically mounted as were the original probe Post modification testing requirements were specified in the HRF package. A functional test was specified following installation. This required plugging the drain in each sump or temporarily disabling the sump pump, and filling the sumps with water until the switch actuate The acceptance criteria for the post modification functional testing was specific and included the appropriate alarm function ,
 
c. Conclusions The modification package to replace the existing sump level probes in I the Auxiliary Building with a more reliable level switch was complete I and appropriately detailed. Specified post modification testing requirements were acceptable to ensure proper switch operatio E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities (37551)
E7.1 Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments I A recent discovery of a licensee o)erating their facility in a manner l contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special l focused review that compared plant practices, procedures and/or l parameters to the UFSAR description. While performing the inspections l discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the FSAR that related to the areas inspected. No discrepancies were identifie .- . _ ~
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (IFI) 50 395/97003 02: Licensee I corrective action to prevent DA transients. This item adaressed the licensee's evaluation and proposed corrective actions for water hammer / pressure transients that occurred in the condensate system and Deaerator (DA) during the plant restarts following the plant trips in A)ril 1997. The engineering evaluation concluded that the transients in t1e DA were caused by the injection of relatively cool condensate water (75 100 Fahrenheit (F)) into a relatively hot DA (approximately 330 1 F), causing' flashing of the condensate, immediate pressure and temperature depression in the DA heater section, bulk boiling and flashing of the storage tank water, and generally high stress loads on l the DA. The licensee's evaluation of these events recommended revision of SOPS and operator training to minimize occurrences of this type of event. The procedure revisions will include a review of the need to maintain a hot DA during plant restart conditions. The stringent feedwater temperature requirements for the model D 3 SGs have been relaxed since the SGs were replaced. A recommendation was also made for a comprehensive inspection of the interior of the DA during the next refueling outage. The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately evaluated the water hammer issues associated with the condensate system and the D IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of tours and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be acceptabl During an ESF system walkdown the inspectors observed postings at locked doors between the radiation controlled area and the Intermediate Building. All postings were found to be satisfactor R1.2 Pre-Job Briefina for RB Entry a. Insoection Scope (71750)
The inspectors attended a pre job briefing conducted in preparation for a planned RB entr b. Observations and Findinas On June 2, the inspectors attended a pre-job briefing prior to the licensee performing a RB entry to isolate air to a RCS spray valve. The purpose of the briefing was to ensure that all involved individuals were familiar with their s)ecific responsibilities and the expected conditions in the wor ( area. Attendees included the shift engineer, maintenance perscanel, and HP personnel. The heat stress conditions and
 
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the radiological controls were discussed in detail. The inspectors considered the briefing to be effective and well conducte c. Conclusions A pre job briefing to discuss personnel safety and radiological issues prior to a planned RB entry was well conducted and effective. No concerns were identifie S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed security activities including compensatory measures during the conduct of plant tours and plant activities and found them acceptabl Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on June 19, 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie _
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee      l l
F. Bacon. Manager, Chemistry Services    i
 
L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics S. Byrne, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations R. Clary, Manager, Quality Systems
      !
M. Fowlkes, Manager, Operations S. Furstenberg, Manager, Maintenance Services D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services  l G. Moffatt, Manager, Design Engineering    !
K. Nettles, General Manager, Strategic Planning and Development  l H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services A. Rice, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience G. Taylor, Vice President, Nuclear Operations R. Waselus, Manager, Systems and Component Engineering R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority B. Williams, General Manager, Engineering Services G. Williams, Associate Manager, Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71001: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup Plant Operations IP 92903: Followup Engineering ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50 395/97005 01 NCV Securing of CCW to an operating charging pump (Section 01.2).


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50 395/97005-02 VIO Failure to implement effective corrective action for '
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i equipment storage violations (Section 02.2).
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I Closed 50 395/97005 01 NCV Securing of CCW to an operating charging pump (Section 01.2).
 
l 50 395/97003-02 IFI Licensee corrective action to prevent DA transients (Section E8.1).
 
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Discussed 50 395/97003 05 URI Evaluation of high EFW system differential flow rates (Section E2.1).
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Revision as of 16:51, 21 January 2021

Ack Receipt of 970922 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/97-05
ML20212B893
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 10/15/1997
From: Haag R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Gabe Taylor
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
References
50-395-97-05, 50-395-97-5, NUDOCS 9710280268
Download: ML20212B893 (3)
v • d • e


Text

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October 15;11997 -

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South-Carolina Electric-8. Gas-Company ATTN: - 'Mr.'._ Gary J. Trylor

,

. Vice Presidena. Nuclear Operations '

' Virgil C. Summer-Nuclear Station

'P. 0.: Box 88 Jenkinsville. SC -29065 '

-SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT N0. 50-395/97-05

Dear Mr. Taylor:

LThank you for your followup response of September 22, 1997, to our Notice of Violation, issued on' July 11._1997, concerning activities conducted at your ,

V.- C. Summer facility. The response addresses the corrective actions being taken..to prevent recurrence of-failure to meet' storage requirements. We have-evaluated-your response.and-found that it meets the requirements of..

10 CFR 2.201. We . vill examine the, implementation of your corrective actions during future inspections.-

We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

'

Sincerely

.

Original- signed by Robert C. Haag Robert C. Haag. Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

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Dock'et No. 50-395

. License No. NPF-12 cc: R.'J. White

, Nuclear Coordinator. Mail Code 802 S.C. Public' Service; Author P,y 1

Virgil-C. Summer Nuclear Station 1 P. O. Box 88 Jenkinsville.'SC 29065 u

~

.cc: continued: See page 2 DR 5,5 h - o

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1SCE&G 2-cc: Continued J; B..Knotts. Jr.. Esq. .

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'Winston and Strawn'

'1400 L-Street. tN Washington.-D. C. '20005-3502 Chairman Fairfield County Council P. O. Box 60-Winnsboro.-SC 29180 Virgil _R. Autry. Director-Radioactive Waste Management Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management-S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control u 2600 Bull Street Columbia. SC 29201 R. M. Fowlkes. Manager Operations (Mail Code 303)

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station P. O. Box 88-Jenkinsville. SC 29065-April Rice. Manager Nuclear Licensing & Operating Experience (Mail Code 830)

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station P. O. Box 88-Jenkinsville. SC 29065 Distribution:

A.' Johnson, NRR fL Gibbs. RII P. Fillion. RII R. Aiello, RII.

.

W. Stansberry. RII D.' Jones. RII^

PUBLIC

,

Q1stribution continued: See page 3

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SCE&G- .3 Distribution: Continued NRC Resident inspector-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Route 1. Box 64 Jenkinsville. -SC 29065 r

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, oFklCIALRECORDCOPY DecMNT NAME: G:\ sum 9705A.RES

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