ML16155A159

Watts Bar Public Meeting Summary

ML16155A159
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	06/03/2016
From:	Alan Blamey NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B6
To:	James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority
References
Download: ML16155A159 (29)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 June 3, 2016 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3D-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

FOR WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, DOCKET NO. 50-390 and 50-391

Dear Mr. Shea:

This refers to the meeting conducted at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Office on May 24, 2016. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the NRC staff on the current status and progress of the actions taken to improve the chilled work environment in the Operations Department at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN).

As of March 23, 2016, the NRC issued a Chilled Work Environment Letter (CEL) to Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in an effort to ensure a clear understanding of the scope of concerns related to the chilled work environment in the Operations Department. According to TVA, the work environment in the WBN Operations Department was inconsistent with TVA core values.

Therefore, TVA has taken immediate actions following receipt of the CEL which included Chief Nuclear Officer communication to the TVA fleet acknowledging ownership of the issue; Watts Bar Site Vice President met with the site staff to reinforce safety culture, ownership and the roles and responsibilities of the licensed reactor operators; conducted independent observations of the Watts Bar Control Room and Outage Control Center; and began a Root Cause Analysis. Based on the Causal Analysis performed, the following root causes have been determined: 1) Senior leaders failed to recognize potential impacts on the work environment associated with initiatives to drive improvements in overall station performance; and 2) A failure by management to communicate the rationale and bases for some personnel actions that were taken which led to an atmosphere of fear by some workers.

TVAs corrective actions include, but are not limited to, perform periodic safety conscious work environment (SCWE) observations and trends; establish and communicate a vision for a strong and healthy SCWE, implement a Watts Bar Shift Manager mentoring program; revise the adverse employment action procedure, including establishment of an executive review board.

TVA reemphasized their commitment to core values and behaviors emphasizing safety over competing goals, employees feeling free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation, and ensuring management will respond in a timely and effective manner. Corrective actions have been taken to prevent recurrence, and actions taken to address the safety conscious work environment at WBN will continue to be monitored for effectiveness by TVA.

J. Shea 2 In closing the NRC acknowledged the management ownership of the Operations Department SCWE issue, the importance of completing CEL actions, and sustained improving work environment. The NRC noted the importance for all TVA employees to continue using the corrective action program, the Employees Concerns Program, and other available avenues to raise concerns. The NRC also noted that no serious safety violations or instances involving significant plant safety issues associated with the work environment were identified; however, the NRC will continue to assess TVAs actions to improve the Operations Department SCWE.

A list of attendees and a copy of the presentation handout are enclosed.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this meeting, please contact me at (404) 997-4415.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Alan Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-390, 50-391 License No.: NPF-90, NPG-96

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

2. TVA Meeting Slides cc: distribution via ListServ

_________________________ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE CRS2 AJB3 NAME C. Smith-Standberry A. Blamey DATE 6/3/2016 6/3/2016 6/ /2016 6/ /2016 6/ /2016 6/ /2016 6/ /2016 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO J. Shea 3 Letter to Joseph W. Shea from Alan Blamey dated June 3, 2016

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

FOR WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, DOCKET NO. 50-390 and 50-391 Distribution:

S. Price, RII L. Gibson, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMWattsBar Resource

NRC ATTENDEES C. Haney, Regional Administrator, Region II L. Wert, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II L. Dudes, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II L. Jarriel, Agency Allegations Advisor, NRC Headquarters M. Frankie, Acting Deputy Division Director, DRP, RII A. Blamey, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 6, DRP, RII J. Nadel, Senior Resident Inspector, Watts Bar Unit 1, DRP, RII M. Franovich, Division Director, DRP, RII C. Kontz, Senior Project Engineer, Branch 6, DRP, RII J. Baptist, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 8, DRP, RII N. Coovert, Senior Construction Inspector, Construction Inspection, Branch 3, DCI, RII A. Echavarria, Senior Investigator, OI, RII M. Checkle, Senior Allegations Coordinator, EICS, RII S. Mendez, Allegations Coordinator, EICS, RII C. Smith-Standberry, Project Engineer, Branch 6, DRP, RII S. Rose, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5, DRP, RII J. Ledford, Public Affairs Officer, PA, RII E. Michel, RII E. Lea, Regional Governmental Liason Officer, RII S. Morrow, RES TVA ATTENDEES M. Balduzzi, Senior Vice President Operations, TVA P. Simmons, Site Vice President, Watts Bar J. Shea, Vice President Regulatory Affairs, TVA S. Connors, Plant Manager, Watts Bar E. Henderson, TVA B. Dungan, Rotational Development, Watts Bar I. Hagins-Dyer, Senior Manager, Employee Concerns Program, TVA G. Arent, Director, Watts Bar Licensing C. Edmondson, TVA J. Calle, TVA S. Fiedler, TVA C. Chandler, TVA OTHER ATTENDEES S. Barczak, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy D. Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists D. Flessner, Chattanooga Times-Free Press D. Shurberg, Human Performance Analysis Corp.

Enclosure 1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Chilled Work Environment Response May 24, 2016 Enclosure 3

Agenda

• Opening Remarks

• Chilled Work Environment Letter

• Response

• Causal Analysis

• Corrective Actions

• Summary Balduzzi Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 2

Opening Remarks Michael Balduzzi, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Balduzzi Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 3

Chilled Work Environment Letter

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issues Chilled Work Environment Letter (CWEL) to Watts Bar (WBN) on March 23, 2016

• Key points in CWEL A chilled work environment exists in Operations Department No serious safety violations or significant plant safety issues were identified Concerns existed regarding impact of chilled work environment on plant operations

• NRC issued CWEL to ensure clear understanding of the scope of concerns Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 4

TVA Response

• TVA is committed to:

Core values and behaviors that emphasize safety over competing goals Ensuring that employees feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation Ensuring management will respond in a timely and effective manner

• TVA acknowledged that the WBN Operations Department work environment was inconsistent with TVA core values Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 5

TVA Response

• Evaluations performed by TVA prior to receipt of CWEL Employee Concerns Investigation Reports, NEC-16-00127 Watts Bar Special Review Team Report, Revision 1

• Comprehensive action plan initiated prior to receipt of CWEL Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations met with senior reactor operators and above Site Vice President met with first-line supervisors and above Roles and responsibilities reinforced for Main Control Room (MCR) and Outage Control Center (OCC)

Key organizational changes implemented Site plan implemented to improve and focus site communications Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 6

TVA Response

• Immediate actions following receipt of the CWEL TVAs Chief Nuclear Officer communicated to the nuclear fleet regarding:

Issuance of CWEL TVA ownership of chilled work environment causes TVA implemented independent observations of the MCR and OCC WBN initiated a Root Cause Analysis Site Vice President conducted all-hands meetings that reinforced:

Safety is paramount Senior leadership teams ownership of chilled work environment causes and commitment to resolve Roles and responsibilities of licensed operators Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 7

CWEL Required Actions

• Conduct an assessment of Watts Bar climate

• Address the root causes of the chilled work environment

• Take steps to ensure WBN staff members are willing to openly participate in the process Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 8

CWEL Focus Areas Assessed

• A chilled work environment exists within the WBN Operations Department due to perceptions of retaliation

• A perception of:

An emphasis of production over safety An undue influence by management on MCR operators

• Management oversight and effectiveness of the corrective action and employee concerns programs Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 9

Causal Analysis Overview

• Independent team established

• Root causes determined Senior leaders failed to recognize potential impacts on the work environment associated with initiatives to drive improvements in overall station performance A failure by management to communicate the rationale and bases for some personnel actions taken led to an atmosphere of fear by some workers Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 10

Causal Analysis Contributing Causes

• Weaknesses in Operations

• Established processes for oversight and management for setting and monitoring of station nuclear safety consistently reinforcing high culture were less than effective standards of performance

• Lack of confidence in the Corrective

• Weaknesses in senior leadership Action Program (CAP) by some behaviors associated with managing Operations Department personnel a healthy interface between the OCC and the MCR

• Inconsistent implementation of the Adverse Employment Action procedure Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 11

Causal Analysis Extent

• Extent of Condition Chilled work environment confined to Operations Department Indications of work environment challenges in other departments

• Extent of Cause Extended to WBN station as a whole Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 12

Causal Analysis ECP Effectiveness

• Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Effectiveness Effective in achieving the goals outlined RIS-2005-18, Guidance For Establishing And Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment Procedures provide an effective path for individuals to feel free to raise issues Reporting of the ECP staff is independent of the line organization and management Key elements of the ECP have been evaluated and found effective Browns Ferry Confirmatory Order response effective with 2 gaps identified

• Industry Self Assessment of ECP Program Effectiveness August 2016 Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 13

Causal Analysis CAP Effectiveness

• Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness Lack of confidence in the CAP by some Operations Department personnel has contributed to a reluctance by some Operators to document issues and concerns Causal Analysis Lack of feedback provided to the Operations CAP initiators

• Perform Self-Assessment to determine CAP Effectiveness and Confidence in CAP December 2016 Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 14

Key Actions to Prevent Recurrence

• Establish and communicate a vision for a strong and healthy safety conscious work environment, focusing on results of the root cause and initiatives

• Define roles and responsibilities for key influencers

• Perform safety conscious work environment observations and trend monthly

• Conduct periodic reviews of CWEL response and effectiveness of root cause actions Connors Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 15

Additional Corrective Actions

• Implement a WBN and independent oversight observation plan focused on shift manager and unit supervisor leadership behaviors

• Implement WBN Operations Shift Manager Mentoring Program

• Implement an OCC pre-job briefing sheet for inclusion in the Outage Oversight Plan and in unplanned/forced outage oversight governance

• Revise the adverse employment action procedure, including establishing an Executive Review Board (ERB)

• Revise Nuclear Safety Review Board guidance to include interviews of Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP)

Connors Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 16

Additional Corrective Actions

• Revise NSCMP procedure to ensure departmental representatives provide specific safety conscious work environment insights

• Revise the Employee Concern Program (ECP) procedure to ensure additional oversight and pulsing surveys during periods of high organizational stress

• Provide a method for the Shift Manager to communicate the status of CAP to MCR operators on a per shift basis Connors Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 17

Effectiveness Measures

• Achieve and sustain a healthy safety conscious work environment Open forums with site leadership to receive feedback NSCMP meetings ECP intakes and pulse surveys Employee surveys Anonymous Condition Reports MCR and OCC observations NRC allegations

• Oversight by Corporate and WBN senior leadership to ensure a healthy safety conscious work environment exists Conduct observations that changes are visible and effective Ensure actions taken in 30-day response and root cause are successfully completed Connors Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 18

Summary

• The work environment in the WBN Operations Department was inconsistent with TVA core values.

• TVA is committed to:

Core values and behaviors emphasize safety over competing goals Employees feeling free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation Ensuring management will respond in a timely and effective manner

• The WBN senior leadership team owns the chilled work environment causes and is actively working to resolve.

• Actions taken to address the safety conscious work environment at WBN will be monitored for effectiveness.

Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 19

Closing Remarks Michael Balduzzi, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 20

Questions?

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 June 3, 2016 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3D-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

FOR WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, DOCKET NO. 50-390 and 50-391

Dear Mr. Shea:

This refers to the meeting conducted at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Office on May 24, 2016. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the NRC staff on the current status and progress of the actions taken to improve the chilled work environment in the Operations Department at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN).

As of March 23, 2016, the NRC issued a Chilled Work Environment Letter (CEL) to Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in an effort to ensure a clear understanding of the scope of concerns related to the chilled work environment in the Operations Department. According to TVA, the work environment in the WBN Operations Department was inconsistent with TVA core values.

Therefore, TVA has taken immediate actions following receipt of the CEL which included Chief Nuclear Officer communication to the TVA fleet acknowledging ownership of the issue; Watts Bar Site Vice President met with the site staff to reinforce safety culture, ownership and the roles and responsibilities of the licensed reactor operators; conducted independent observations of the Watts Bar Control Room and Outage Control Center; and began a Root Cause Analysis. Based on the Causal Analysis performed, the following root causes have been determined: 1) Senior leaders failed to recognize potential impacts on the work environment associated with initiatives to drive improvements in overall station performance; and 2) A failure by management to communicate the rationale and bases for some personnel actions that were taken which led to an atmosphere of fear by some workers.

TVAs corrective actions include, but are not limited to, perform periodic safety conscious work environment (SCWE) observations and trends; establish and communicate a vision for a strong and healthy SCWE, implement a Watts Bar Shift Manager mentoring program; revise the adverse employment action procedure, including establishment of an executive review board.

TVA reemphasized their commitment to core values and behaviors emphasizing safety over competing goals, employees feeling free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation, and ensuring management will respond in a timely and effective manner. Corrective actions have been taken to prevent recurrence, and actions taken to address the safety conscious work environment at WBN will continue to be monitored for effectiveness by TVA.

J. Shea 2 In closing the NRC acknowledged the management ownership of the Operations Department SCWE issue, the importance of completing CEL actions, and sustained improving work environment. The NRC noted the importance for all TVA employees to continue using the corrective action program, the Employees Concerns Program, and other available avenues to raise concerns. The NRC also noted that no serious safety violations or instances involving significant plant safety issues associated with the work environment were identified; however, the NRC will continue to assess TVAs actions to improve the Operations Department SCWE.

A list of attendees and a copy of the presentation handout are enclosed.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this meeting, please contact me at (404) 997-4415.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Alan Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-390, 50-391 License No.: NPF-90, NPG-96

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

2. TVA Meeting Slides cc: distribution via ListServ

_________________________ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE CRS2 AJB3 NAME C. Smith-Standberry A. Blamey DATE 6/3/2016 6/3/2016 6/ /2016 6/ /2016 6/ /2016 6/ /2016 6/ /2016 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO J. Shea 3 Letter to Joseph W. Shea from Alan Blamey dated June 3, 2016

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

FOR WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, DOCKET NO. 50-390 and 50-391 Distribution:

S. Price, RII L. Gibson, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMWattsBar Resource

NRC ATTENDEES C. Haney, Regional Administrator, Region II L. Wert, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II L. Dudes, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II L. Jarriel, Agency Allegations Advisor, NRC Headquarters M. Frankie, Acting Deputy Division Director, DRP, RII A. Blamey, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 6, DRP, RII J. Nadel, Senior Resident Inspector, Watts Bar Unit 1, DRP, RII M. Franovich, Division Director, DRP, RII C. Kontz, Senior Project Engineer, Branch 6, DRP, RII J. Baptist, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 8, DRP, RII N. Coovert, Senior Construction Inspector, Construction Inspection, Branch 3, DCI, RII A. Echavarria, Senior Investigator, OI, RII M. Checkle, Senior Allegations Coordinator, EICS, RII S. Mendez, Allegations Coordinator, EICS, RII C. Smith-Standberry, Project Engineer, Branch 6, DRP, RII S. Rose, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5, DRP, RII J. Ledford, Public Affairs Officer, PA, RII E. Michel, RII E. Lea, Regional Governmental Liason Officer, RII S. Morrow, RES TVA ATTENDEES M. Balduzzi, Senior Vice President Operations, TVA P. Simmons, Site Vice President, Watts Bar J. Shea, Vice President Regulatory Affairs, TVA S. Connors, Plant Manager, Watts Bar E. Henderson, TVA B. Dungan, Rotational Development, Watts Bar I. Hagins-Dyer, Senior Manager, Employee Concerns Program, TVA G. Arent, Director, Watts Bar Licensing C. Edmondson, TVA J. Calle, TVA S. Fiedler, TVA C. Chandler, TVA OTHER ATTENDEES S. Barczak, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy D. Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists D. Flessner, Chattanooga Times-Free Press D. Shurberg, Human Performance Analysis Corp.

Enclosure 1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Chilled Work Environment Response May 24, 2016 Enclosure 3

Agenda

• Opening Remarks

• Chilled Work Environment Letter

• Response

• Causal Analysis

• Corrective Actions

• Summary Balduzzi Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 2

Opening Remarks Michael Balduzzi, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Balduzzi Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 3

Chilled Work Environment Letter

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issues Chilled Work Environment Letter (CWEL) to Watts Bar (WBN) on March 23, 2016

• Key points in CWEL A chilled work environment exists in Operations Department No serious safety violations or significant plant safety issues were identified Concerns existed regarding impact of chilled work environment on plant operations

• NRC issued CWEL to ensure clear understanding of the scope of concerns Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 4

TVA Response

• TVA is committed to:

Core values and behaviors that emphasize safety over competing goals Ensuring that employees feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation Ensuring management will respond in a timely and effective manner

• TVA acknowledged that the WBN Operations Department work environment was inconsistent with TVA core values Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 5

TVA Response

• Evaluations performed by TVA prior to receipt of CWEL Employee Concerns Investigation Reports, NEC-16-00127 Watts Bar Special Review Team Report, Revision 1

• Comprehensive action plan initiated prior to receipt of CWEL Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations met with senior reactor operators and above Site Vice President met with first-line supervisors and above Roles and responsibilities reinforced for Main Control Room (MCR) and Outage Control Center (OCC)

Key organizational changes implemented Site plan implemented to improve and focus site communications Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 6

TVA Response

• Immediate actions following receipt of the CWEL TVAs Chief Nuclear Officer communicated to the nuclear fleet regarding:

Issuance of CWEL TVA ownership of chilled work environment causes TVA implemented independent observations of the MCR and OCC WBN initiated a Root Cause Analysis Site Vice President conducted all-hands meetings that reinforced:

Safety is paramount Senior leadership teams ownership of chilled work environment causes and commitment to resolve Roles and responsibilities of licensed operators Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 7

CWEL Required Actions

• Conduct an assessment of Watts Bar climate

• Address the root causes of the chilled work environment

• Take steps to ensure WBN staff members are willing to openly participate in the process Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 8

CWEL Focus Areas Assessed

• A chilled work environment exists within the WBN Operations Department due to perceptions of retaliation

• A perception of:

An emphasis of production over safety An undue influence by management on MCR operators

• Management oversight and effectiveness of the corrective action and employee concerns programs Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 9

Causal Analysis Overview

• Independent team established

• Root causes determined Senior leaders failed to recognize potential impacts on the work environment associated with initiatives to drive improvements in overall station performance A failure by management to communicate the rationale and bases for some personnel actions taken led to an atmosphere of fear by some workers Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 10

Causal Analysis Contributing Causes

• Weaknesses in Operations

• Established processes for oversight and management for setting and monitoring of station nuclear safety consistently reinforcing high culture were less than effective standards of performance

• Lack of confidence in the Corrective

• Weaknesses in senior leadership Action Program (CAP) by some behaviors associated with managing Operations Department personnel a healthy interface between the OCC and the MCR

• Inconsistent implementation of the Adverse Employment Action procedure Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 11

Causal Analysis Extent

• Extent of Condition Chilled work environment confined to Operations Department Indications of work environment challenges in other departments

• Extent of Cause Extended to WBN station as a whole Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 12

Causal Analysis ECP Effectiveness

• Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Effectiveness Effective in achieving the goals outlined RIS-2005-18, Guidance For Establishing And Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment Procedures provide an effective path for individuals to feel free to raise issues Reporting of the ECP staff is independent of the line organization and management Key elements of the ECP have been evaluated and found effective Browns Ferry Confirmatory Order response effective with 2 gaps identified

• Industry Self Assessment of ECP Program Effectiveness August 2016 Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 13

Causal Analysis CAP Effectiveness

• Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness Lack of confidence in the CAP by some Operations Department personnel has contributed to a reluctance by some Operators to document issues and concerns Causal Analysis Lack of feedback provided to the Operations CAP initiators

• Perform Self-Assessment to determine CAP Effectiveness and Confidence in CAP December 2016 Shea Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 14

Key Actions to Prevent Recurrence

• Establish and communicate a vision for a strong and healthy safety conscious work environment, focusing on results of the root cause and initiatives

• Define roles and responsibilities for key influencers

• Perform safety conscious work environment observations and trend monthly

• Conduct periodic reviews of CWEL response and effectiveness of root cause actions Connors Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 15

Additional Corrective Actions

• Implement a WBN and independent oversight observation plan focused on shift manager and unit supervisor leadership behaviors

• Implement WBN Operations Shift Manager Mentoring Program

• Implement an OCC pre-job briefing sheet for inclusion in the Outage Oversight Plan and in unplanned/forced outage oversight governance

• Revise the adverse employment action procedure, including establishing an Executive Review Board (ERB)

• Revise Nuclear Safety Review Board guidance to include interviews of Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP)

Connors Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 16

Additional Corrective Actions

• Revise NSCMP procedure to ensure departmental representatives provide specific safety conscious work environment insights

• Revise the Employee Concern Program (ECP) procedure to ensure additional oversight and pulsing surveys during periods of high organizational stress

• Provide a method for the Shift Manager to communicate the status of CAP to MCR operators on a per shift basis Connors Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 17

Effectiveness Measures

• Achieve and sustain a healthy safety conscious work environment Open forums with site leadership to receive feedback NSCMP meetings ECP intakes and pulse surveys Employee surveys Anonymous Condition Reports MCR and OCC observations NRC allegations

• Oversight by Corporate and WBN senior leadership to ensure a healthy safety conscious work environment exists Conduct observations that changes are visible and effective Ensure actions taken in 30-day response and root cause are successfully completed Connors Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 18

Summary

• The work environment in the WBN Operations Department was inconsistent with TVA core values.

• TVA is committed to:

Core values and behaviors emphasize safety over competing goals Employees feeling free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation Ensuring management will respond in a timely and effective manner

• The WBN senior leadership team owns the chilled work environment causes and is actively working to resolve.

• Actions taken to address the safety conscious work environment at WBN will be monitored for effectiveness.

Simmons Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 19

Closing Remarks Michael Balduzzi, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l 20

Questions?