IR 05000348/2006006: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| (3 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Adams|number = ML062650100}} | {{Adams | ||
| number = ML062650100 | |||
| issue date = 09/22/2006 | |||
| title = IR 05000348-06-006, IR 05000364-06-006, on 06/26 - 08/18/2006, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant | |||
| author name = Ogle C | |||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 | |||
| addressee name = Sumner H | |||
| addressee affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc | |||
| docket = 05000348, 05000364 | |||
| license number = NPF-002, NPF-008 | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = IR-06-006 | |||
| document type = Inspection Report, Inspection Report Correspondence, Letter | |||
| page count = 37 | |||
}} | |||
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000348 | year = 2006 | report number = 006 }} | {{IR-Nav| site = 05000348 | year = 2006 | report number = 006 }} | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:ber 22, 2006 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | |||
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2006006 AND 05000364/2006006 | |||
==Dear Mr. Sumner:== | |||
On August 18, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on August 18, 2006, with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of your staff. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final exit was held by telephone with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of your staff on September 19, 2006, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings. | |||
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. | |||
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. | |||
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | |||
Sincerely,/RA/ | Sincerely, | ||
Charles R. Ogle, | /RA/ | ||
Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | ===Enclosure:=== | ||
Inspection Report 05000348/2006006, 05000364/ | Inspection Report 05000348/2006006, 05000364/2006006 w/Attachment-Supplemental Information | ||
REGION II== | |||
Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8 Report Nos.: 05000348/2006006, 05000364/2006006 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. | |||
Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Location: Columbia, AL 36319 Dates: June 26 - August 18, 2006 Inspectors: C. Julian, Team Leader L. Lake, Reactor Inspector R. Lewis, Reactor Inspector R. Hagar, Senior Resident Inspector - Robinson Other personnel: O. Mazzoni, Contractor S. Spiegelman, Contractor Approved by: Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety | |||
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | |||
IR 05000348/2006006, 05000364/2006006; 06/26/2006-08/18/2006; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear | |||
Plant, Units 1 & 2; Component Design Bases Inspection. | |||
This inspection was conducted by a team of three NRC inspectors from the Region II office, one Senior Resident Inspector from another site, and two NRC contract inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, | |||
Revision 3, dated July 2000. | |||
== | ===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings=== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. | |||
===Licensee-Identified Violations=== | |||
None. | |||
-ii- | |||
=REPORT DETAILS= | |||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | |||
Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity {{a|1R21}} | |||
==1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.21}} | |||
===.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process=== | |||
The team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). In general, this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than two or Birnbaum value greater than 1E-6. The components selected were located within the high and low pressure safety injection, component cooling water, service water, and electrical distribution systems. The sample selection included twenty two components, five operator actions, and nine operating experience items. Additionally, the team reviewed five modifications by performing activities identified in IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a. and IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments. | |||
The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modification, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included items such as failed performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance, Maintenance Rule (a)1 status, degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector input , | |||
system health reports, industry operating experience, and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. An overall summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified are included in the following sections of the report. A specific list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report. | |||
=== | ===.2 Results of Detailed Reviews=== | ||
===.2.1 Detailed Component Reviews=== | |||
= | ===.2.1.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
RHR system health reports and corrective actions were reviewed from the past 3 | RHR system health reports and corrective actions were reviewed from the past 3 years to evaluate problems that may have existed for the RHR pump and the actions that were taken to resolve identified problems. Operating experience (OE) history, reported in the health report, was reviewed to determine if problems at other plants were being reviewed and addressed. Surveillance and test results, and associated corrective actions were reviewed to evaluate performance history. A walkdown was performed of the RHR pumps to determine material condition. | ||
Design information was reviewed including functional requirements identified in the Functional System Description (FSD), the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), vendor manual and design drawings to identify the design bases. Pump flow calculations were reviewed for plant cool-down, mid-loop operation and accident conditions and compared to pump capabilities. | |||
The RHR pump calculations, procedures, and test data were reviewed to ensure that appropriate minimum required water level would exist in the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and containment sump under accident conditions to maintain pump net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements specified in vendor manual. The pump was of particular interest because of the low NPSH design margin that was stated by the licensee in the UFSAR. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.2 | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.2 RHR Seal Coolers=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The RHR system health report and corrective action documents were reviewed for | The RHR system health report and corrective action documents were reviewed for the past 2-3 years to determine if any issues were identified for the RHR seal cooler. In addition, the RHR functional design document and the vendor manual were reviewed to assess the design requirements. The system design calculations were reviewed to assure that the design requirements were properly considered. An interview with the system engineer was conducted to determine if any performance or tube plugging problems were known that were not addressed in the above documents. Finally, OE was requested for the past 2-3 years; however, none were found. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
RHR Heat Exchangers | ===.2.1.3 . RHR Heat Exchangers=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The RHR health reports, RHR heat exchanger condition reports (CRs) for the past 2- | The RHR health reports, RHR heat exchanger condition reports (CRs) for the past 2-3 years, OEs, Functional System Description, and design calculations, were reviewed to assess the material condition of the heat exchangers and determine any potential problems. Tube plugging limits were reviewed versus the current actual tube plugging conditions. The review of the RHR heat exchangers acceptability for a potential future plant power increase conditions was also reviewed. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.4 | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.4 Charging Pumps=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed charging pump health reports and CRs for the past 2-3 years,industry issues that were contained in the health report, calculations related to minimum and maximum flow requirements and NPSH for the | The inspectors reviewed charging pump health reports and CRs for the past 2-3 years, industry issues that were contained in the health report, calculations related to minimum and maximum flow requirements and NPSH for the piggy-back mode of operation to determine if pump performance meets design requirements. The inspectors reviewed associated surveillance test, vibration and oil sample data to determine material condition. The inspectors conducted a walk down to determine material condition and interviewed the system and design engineer regarding maintenance history, industry experience regarding gas binding issues, including issues related to the volume control tank pressure oscillations associated with gas accumulation in the suction pipe header. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.5 | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.5 Sump and Piping from the Sump to Suction of RHR Pumps=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed records of the last sump inspection for evidence of | The inspectors reviewed records of the last sump inspection for evidence of material condition of the sump and accessible piping, presence of any unacceptable debris, and corrective actions taken. The inspectors reviewed design documents regarding the sump screen sizing, including the analysis of potential binding of downstream valves by material that could pass through the screen. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.6 | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.6 Switchyard Electrical Protection=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
In order to determine conformance with the design drawings and relevant documents,the team reviewed the 230 kilovolt (kV) switchyard and the 500 kV high voltage switchyard installed configuration. The team performed a walk down and held interviews with the cognizant licensee personnel as well as with the cognizant Alabama | In order to determine conformance with the design drawings and relevant documents, the team reviewed the 230 kilovolt (kV) switchyard and the 500 kV high voltage switchyard installed configuration. The team performed a walk down and held interviews with the cognizant licensee personnel as well as with the cognizant Alabama Power Company personnel, who had the overall responsibility for the high voltage switchyard. The team also conducted a review of design documents and a walk down of the low voltage switchyard, which included all the start up transformers, station unit transformers, main generator transformers, and their medium voltage and high voltage connections. To ascertain adequacy of system protection, the team scope included the review of the calculations for protective relaying settings, as well as the related procedures for protective relaying test and surveillance. Particularly, the team review was focused on the primary and secondary protection system for the start up transformers and the 230 kV oil filled cables which feed the 4.16 kV emergency buses and constitute the preferred power supply for the reactor safe shut down systems. The team reviewed the latest available report on the grid stability, to assess whether the two Farley generating units would remain stable under postulated grid upset events, including multiple breaker failure events, as required by commitments in the UFSAR. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.7 | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.7 High Voltage Switchyard Direct Current (DC) System=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
In order to determine conformance with the design drawings and relevant documents,the team reviewed the DC system installed configuration. The team perform a | In order to determine conformance with the design drawings and relevant documents, the team reviewed the DC system installed configuration. The team perform a walk down and held interviews with the cognizant licensee personnel as well as with the cognizant Alabama Power Company personnel, who had the overall responsibility for the high voltage switchyard. The team examined the batteries, chargers, distribution panels, and connections to determine material condition. The team performed a detailed visual inspection of the condition of the battery plates and battery top surfaces to confirm adequacy of material condition and maintenance. The review included review of the surveillance and testing procedures for the switchyard DC system to determine their adequacy. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.8 | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.8 Circuit Breaker DL03 for Service Water Pump 2D=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the installation, preventive, and corrective maintenance | The team reviewed the installation, preventive, and corrective maintenance procedures for the breaker associated with service water pump 2D. These procedures were compared to the vendor manual to verify consistency with vendor recommendations. | ||
The team performed a walk down of the safety related switchgear and observed a breaker rack-in procedure in the field for an identical non-safety related switchgear, to ascertain compliance with licensee procedure for proper breaker engagement in the | The team performed a walk down of the safety related switchgear and observed a breaker rack-in procedure in the field for an identical non-safety related switchgear, to ascertain compliance with licensee procedure for proper breaker engagement in the cubicle. In addition, using system health reports and data compiled by the licensee, the team reviewed the plant-wide operating history for the identical circuit breaker types to assess the failure history and operating experience over the past five years. The team reviewed design drawings of the 4.16 kV breaker control circuit, and breaker interlocks to determine they conform to design requirements. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
| Line 119: | Line 152: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the undervoltage and underfrequency anticipatory trip settings | The team reviewed the undervoltage and underfrequency anticipatory trip settings and surveillance data. The actual settings were compared to requirements contained in the Technical Specifications (TS) and the design calculations. The undervoltage setting was compared to the voltage experienced under all motor start conditions, to ensure that it would not be spuriously activated. It was also compared with the fault conditions imposed on the most restrictive bus configuration, to ascertain that the undervoltage relay of unaffected buses would not be unnecessarily and spuriously activated. | ||
Likewise, the underfrequency setting was compared to system frequency | Likewise, the underfrequency setting was compared to system frequency excursions under abnormal operation, to ensure that it would not result in undesired reactor trips. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.1 0 Containment Sump Isolation Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 8812A=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the | The team reviewed the licensees electrical calculations that determined the minimum and maximum voltage values at the terminals of containment sump isolation valve MOV 8812A. The team reviewed the licensees GL 89-10 MOV sizing calculations and testing to verify that appropriate design basis event conditions and degraded voltage conditions were used as inputs for determining the electric motor operator sizing and for establishing MOV test parameters. The team also reviewed the licensees application of vendor calculation methodology and vendor information in determining the motor operator torque capability, application of stem factors, and operator efficiency factor. | ||
The team reviewed elementary diagrams to confirm that the interlock circuits satisfied functional requirements with adequate redundancy, independence of redundant circuits, and that the circuits included no detectable failure vulnerability with significant consequences. Test results were reviewed to verify that valve performance was being monitored to identify signs of degradation. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. | |||
2.1.11 Piggyback Motor Operated Valves MOV 8706A/B | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the | The team reviewed the licensees electrical calculations that determined the minimum and maximum voltage values at the terminals of piggyback MOVs 8706A and B. The team reviewed the licensees Generic Letter 89-10 MOV sizing calculations and testing to verify that appropriate design basis event conditions and degraded voltage conditions were used as inputs for determining the electric motor operator sizing and for establishing MOV test parameters. The team also reviewed the licensees application of vendor calculation methodology and vendor information in determining the motor operator torque capability, application of stem factors and operator efficiency factor. | ||
The team reviewed elementary diagrams to confirm that the interlock circuits satisfied functional requirements with adequate redundancy, independence of redundant circuits, and that the circuits included no detectable failure vulnerability with significant consequences. Test results were reviewed to verify that valve performance was being monitored to identify signs of degradation. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. 2.1.12 Circuit Breaker for Charging Pump 1B | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
2.1.12 Circuit Breaker for Charging Pump 1B | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the preventive, and corrective maintenance procedures for | The team reviewed the preventive, and corrective maintenance procedures for the breaker associated with Charging Pump 1B. These procedures were compared to the vendor manual to verify consistency with vendor recommendations. The team performed a walk down of the safety related switchgear to determine material condition. | ||
The team reviewed system health reports and performance data compiled by | The team reviewed system health reports and performance data compiled by the licensee, to assess the failure history and operating experience for this equipment over the past five years. The team reviewed drawings of the 4.16 kV breaker control circuit, and breaker interlocks to ascertain that the design basis functions would be fulfilled. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
| Line 149: | Line 190: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
This component group included the component cooling water pumps and | This component group included the component cooling water pumps and their associated pump motor, and 4.16 kV power supply path. The team reviewed the UFSAR, TS and their bases, and the CCW functional system description to identify and verify consistency of design requirements related to flow, developed head, and NPSH. | ||
SNC 7 Design calculations, performance test (PT) procedures, and past test results were reviewed to verify that the CCW pump design and licensing performance requirements were met. Maintenance work orders (WOs), in-service testing (IST) reports, condition report corrective actions, and design change history were reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins or performance. | |||
The team reviewed design drawings reflecting the motor power supply path, and then walked down that path to ensure that no unsatisfactory conditions existed to possibly affect power applied to the motor terminals for pump operation. The team also reviewed the licensees calculations that established the device settings for protection of the motor, to verify that premature trips would be precluded under design basis conditions, without unduly compromising motor protection. Motor control logic diagrams were compared against design basis documents to ensure all safety functions were properly incorporated. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.1 4 CCW Surge Tank and Level Instrumentation=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team performed a field walk down to verify that the installed configuration | The team performed a field walk down to verify that the installed configuration will support system function under accident conditions, and that it was consistent with plant drawings and design basis documents. The impact of security modifications on equipment function and accessibility were reviewed. Equipment environmental and seismic protections were evaluated against supporting documentation. Calibration and testing of level transmitters was reviewed against vendor supporting documentation and plant calculations to ensure consistency and accuracy of level indication. In performing this evaluation, the team sampled a small portion of the licensees measurement and test equipment program, including handling of lost and out-of-specification equipment. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.1 5 CCW Heat Exchanger=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed system piping diagrams and performed independent valve | The team reviewed system piping diagrams and performed independent valve position verifications to ensure that system alignment is consistent with design assumptions and will support its design basis function under accident conditions. Work Orders, Performance Tests, CR corrective actions, and design change history were reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins or performance. | ||
Manufacturers data and vendor manuals were reviewed against maintenance and testing practices to ensure conformance to manufacturers requirements. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.1 6 CCW Relief Valves=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed system piping diagrams and performed walk downs to ensure | The team reviewed system piping diagrams and performed walk downs to ensure that the installed configuration is consistent with design documents. Walk downs also reviewed conditions and equipment protection measures to determine material conditions. The team reviewed the licensees CR corrective actions to identify performance problems. These valves are not currently included in the in-service testing program so no past set point testing data was available. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.1 7 CCW RHR Pump Seal Cooler Pressure Control Valve=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed design differences between the two units that led to the need for | The team reviewed design differences between the two units that led to the need for an air operated pressure control valve only on Unit 1 CCW flow line to the residual heat removal pump seal cooler. Engineering drawings and system specifications were reviewed to ensure that installed configuration is consistent with design documentation. | ||
Machinery history, condition reports, design change history and system health reports were reviewed to assess the potential for component degradation and impact on design margins or performance. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.1 8 CCW Pump Discharge Check Valves=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the design, installed orientation, and the | The team reviewed the design, installed orientation, and the licensees actions to monitor the material conditions of the CCW pump discharge check valves. This included periodic in-service flow and back leakage testing to demonstrate full open and closure capability, and leak tightness. Maintenance history, CR corrective actions, test results, foreign material exclusion controls, and design changes were reviewed to assess the potential for material degradation and the licensees capability to identify degradation. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.1 9 CCW Heat Exchanger Service Water (SW) Outlet Flow Control Valves=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the circumstances of a recent failure of the outlet flow control | The team reviewed the circumstances of a recent failure of the outlet flow control valve associated with the A heat exchanger against past maintenance and CR history. Past test results, and design changes were reviewed to assess the potential for material degradation. A walk down observation of the components was conducted to determine current material conditions. Discussions relating the maintenance history and the consideration of a future actuator change out were conducted to assess licensee plans for these components. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.2 0 Service Water System Piping Integrity=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed design drawings, UFSAR descriptions, structural | The team reviewed design drawings, UFSAR descriptions, structural integrity evaluations, and operability determinations related to the structural integrity of the service water system to verify design requirements are appropriately implemented and maintained. The team reviewed the Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program and associated radiographic and ultrasonic examination results, condition reports and corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed records of completed inservice inspections, system health reports, and design change history to assess service water failure history and degradation of service water system piping. The inspectors verified that potential degradation is monitored or prevented and that component replacement is consistent with original design requirements. The team also reviewed a design change package on the installation of dye injection ports to verify ASME Section XI repair/replacements requirements. The team conducted a walkdown of the service water system including the service water intake structure, diesel generator building, and the auxiliary building to assess the material condition of the pressure retaining boundary. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.2 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Indication=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the design of the RWST level instrumentation and the logic | The team reviewed the design of the RWST level instrumentation and the logic circuits for automatic switch-over from the injection path to the recirculation flow path for the safety injection system, initiated by low-low RWST level. The team also reviewed the basis and determination of the instrumentation setpoints. This included a review to confirm that the valve interlock circuits satisfied functional requirements with adequate redundancy and independence of redundant circuits. The team also reviewed tank and installation drawings, instrument scaling and uncertainty calculations, and interfaces with mechanical calculations, to determine the adequacy of the existing setpoints, including allowance for vortexing or other process effects. The team reviewed calibration procedures for the instrument loops to confirm that the range, scaling, accuracy and setpoints were consistent with the design and licensing bases, including consistency with the assumptions in the uncertainty calculations. The team reviewed the past three calibration and logic test results for both units to confirm an adequate performance history, and to confirm that instrument performance degradation would be identified. | ||
The team visually inspected the level transmitter configurations for both units, to assess observable material condition, vulnerability to hazards, separation of redundant channels, and the potential for environmental effects on instrument reliability and performance. The team also observed the operator use of the RWST level instrumentation and alarms during a small-break LOCA scenario performed by the licensee on the plant simulator. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified..2.1. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.2.1.2 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Bearing Temperatures=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed the setpoints used by operators to decide to trip reactor | The team reviewed the setpoints used by operators to decide to trip reactor coolant pumps due to high pump motor bearing temperatures, to verify that those setpoints are consistent with engineering calculations and associated vendor manuals. The team also reviewed the past three calibration and logic test results for both units to confirm an adequate performance history, and to confirm that instrument performance degradation would be identified. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.3 Review of Low Margin Operator Actions=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of selected risk-significant, time-critical operator actions. Where possible, margins were determined by the review of the assumed design basis and UFSAR response times and performance times documented by job performance measure results within operator time-critical task verification tests. For the selected operator actions, the team observed operator performance during simulator drills. The team also performed walk throughs | The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of selected risk-significant, time-critical operator actions. Where possible, margins were determined by the review of the assumed design basis and UFSAR response times and performance times documented by job performance measure results within operator time-critical task verification tests. For the selected operator actions, the team observed operator performance during simulator drills. The team also performed walk throughs of applicable steps in associated abnormal and emergency procedures, and other operations procedures with an appropriate plant operator to assess operator knowledge level, adequacy of procedures, availability of special equipment when required, and the conditions under which the procedures would be performed. The following operator actions were reviewed: | ||
*Place standby component cooling water into service | * Respond to a loss of residual heat removal capability | ||
*Place standby charging pump into seal injection service | * Trip reactor coolant pumps upon loss of seal cooling | ||
*Transition from low-pressure safety injection to low-pressure recirculation | * Place standby component cooling water into service | ||
* Place standby charging pump into seal injection service | |||
* Transition from low-pressure safety injection to low-pressure recirculation | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified.. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.4 Review of Industry Operating Experience=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at | The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at domestic and foreign nuclear facilities for applicability at Farley. The team performed an independent applicability review, and issues that appeared to be applicable to Farley were selected for a detailed review. The issues reviewed by the team included: | ||
associated with the safety analyses performed for Condition II events, are applicable to Farley, and make recommendations with regard to any needed corrective actions | * AI 2005200399, and Rev. 1, Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter, NSAL-05-3, Centrifugal Charging Pump Runout During Safety Injection | ||
*NSAL-04-7, Containment Sump Line Fluid Inventory | * AI 2005201136, Determine if the concerns discussed in RIS 2005-29 (Anticipated Transients That Could Develop into More Serious Events)associated with the safety analyses performed for Condition II events, are applicable to Farley, and make recommendations with regard to any needed corrective actions SNC 12 | ||
*Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3430, Response to Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals, 2/15/06*Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3443, Review of Internal Flood Design Deficiencies, Letter C062210001, 7/6/2006*Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3413 Response to Gas Intrusion in Safety Systems, 9/12/05 | * Documentation of Engineering Judgement DOEJ-SS- 2006200334-001 Evaluation of CPS Part 21 Report, Version 1 | ||
* NL-04-2397, 10CFR21 Evaluation 04-008, Westinghouse NSAL-04-7, Containment Sump Line Fluid Inventory | |||
* NL-06-0315, 10CFR21 Evaluation 06-004, Consolidated Power Supply Pipe | |||
* NSAL-04-7, Containment Sump Line Fluid Inventory | |||
* Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3430, Response to Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals, 2/15/06 | |||
* Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3443, Review of Internal Flood Design Deficiencies, Letter C062210001, 7/6/2006 | |||
* Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3413 Response to Gas Intrusion in Safety Systems, 9/12/05 | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified.. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.5 Review of Permanent Plant Modifications=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The team reviewed modifications related to the selected risk significant components | The team reviewed modifications related to the selected risk significant components in detail to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the components have not been degraded through modifications. The team reviewed the modification package, implementation procedures, 50.59 evaluation, calculations, post-modification testing results, and corrective action documents where applicable. The team reviewed the modifications in accordance with IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a and IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments. | ||
*DCP2979928201/DCR 97-2-9282, Inservice Test Plan Service Water | |||
The following modifications were reviewed: | |||
* DCP2979928201/DCR 97-2-9282, Inservice Test Plan Service Water Dye Injection Points | |||
* DCP203999601/DCR-03-2-9996, Tornado Missile Protection to the Man-Way Shell and Cover of the Condensate Storage Tank, Unit 2 | |||
* DCP103999501/DCR-03-1-9995, Tornado Missile Protection to the Man-Way Shell and Cover of the Condensate Storage Tank, Unit 1 | |||
* DCP-96-0-9012, Plastocor of First 12" of CCW HX Tubes and Tubesheets | |||
* DCP-00-1-9565, CCW Surge Tank Level Transmitter Replacement | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
==OTHER ACTIVITIES== | |||
{{a|4OA6}} | |||
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit== | |||
On August 18, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Randy Johnson and the other members of the licensees staff who acknowledged the findings. | |||
The inspectors noted that proprietary information was examined during the inspection but none is included in this inspection report. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final exit was held by telephone with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of the licensees staff on September 19, 2006, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings. | |||
ATTACHMENT: | |||
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= | =SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= | ||
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== | |||
===Licensee personnel=== | |||
: [[contact::R. Bayne]], Performance Analysis Supervisor | |||
: [[contact::S. Berryhill]], Plant Support | |||
: [[contact::L. Branning]], APCO, Substation Supervisor (Eufaula Office) | |||
: [[contact::S. Chestnut]], Engineering Support Manager | |||
: [[contact::J. Cox]], Senior Engineer | |||
: [[contact::G. Dykes]], Plant Support | |||
: [[contact::C. Gallardo]], Electrical Engineer | |||
: [[contact::S. Gates]], Plant Support | |||
: [[contact::J. Guilford]], APCO, Southeast Division Transmission Specialist | |||
: [[contact::C. Hanks]], M&TE Coordinator | |||
: [[contact::P. Harlos]], Health Physics Manager | |||
: [[contact::J. Hunter]], Farley Operations | |||
: [[contact::R. Johnson]], Plant General Manager | |||
: [[contact::R. Lyon]], Corporate Electrical Engineer | |||
: [[contact::D. McKinney]], Corporate Licensing Manager | |||
: [[contact::C. McLean]], FNP Training | |||
: [[contact::C. Medlock]], Senior Engineer | |||
: [[contact::B. Moore]], Maintenance Manager | |||
: [[contact::K. Moore]], FNP Electrical Systems Supervisor | |||
: [[contact::W. Oldfield]], Quality Assurance Supervisor | |||
: [[contact::J. Seay]], SNC Licensing | |||
: [[contact::S. Soper]], Engineering Supervisor | |||
: [[contact::A. Spence]], APCO, Engineer, Technical Services | |||
: [[contact::N. Tarrant]], FNP Performance Analysis | |||
: [[contact::W. VanLandingham]], FNP Shift Manager/Training Coordinator | |||
: [[contact::R. Wells]], Operations Manager | |||
: [[contact::T. Youngblood]], Assistant General Manager - Plant Support | |||
===NRC personnel=== | |||
: [[contact::J. Baptist]], Resident Inspector | |||
: [[contact::T. Hoeg]], Division of Reactor Safety, Acting Branch Chief | |||
: [[contact::C. Patterson]], Senior Resident Inspector | |||
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 12:11, 22 December 2019
| ML062650100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/2006 |
| From: | Ogle C NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-06-006 | |
| Download: ML062650100 (37) | |
Text
ber 22, 2006
SUBJECT:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2006006 AND 05000364/2006006
Dear Mr. Sumner:
On August 18, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on August 18, 2006, with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of your staff. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final exit was held by telephone with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of your staff on September 19, 2006, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000348/2006006, 05000364/2006006 w/Attachment-Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8 Report Nos.: 05000348/2006006, 05000364/2006006 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Location: Columbia, AL 36319 Dates: June 26 - August 18, 2006 Inspectors: C. Julian, Team Leader L. Lake, Reactor Inspector R. Lewis, Reactor Inspector R. Hagar, Senior Resident Inspector - Robinson Other personnel: O. Mazzoni, Contractor S. Spiegelman, Contractor Approved by: Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000348/2006006, 05000364/2006006; 06/26/2006-08/18/2006; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 & 2; Component Design Bases Inspection.
This inspection was conducted by a team of three NRC inspectors from the Region II office, one Senior Resident Inspector from another site, and two NRC contract inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
-ii-
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection
.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process
The team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). In general, this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than two or Birnbaum value greater than 1E-6. The components selected were located within the high and low pressure safety injection, component cooling water, service water, and electrical distribution systems. The sample selection included twenty two components, five operator actions, and nine operating experience items. Additionally, the team reviewed five modifications by performing activities identified in IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a. and IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments.
The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modification, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included items such as failed performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance, Maintenance Rule (a)1 status, degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector input ,
system health reports, industry operating experience, and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. An overall summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified are included in the following sections of the report. A specific list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report.
.2 Results of Detailed Reviews
.2.1 Detailed Component Reviews
.2.1.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps
a. Inspection Scope
RHR system health reports and corrective actions were reviewed from the past 3 years to evaluate problems that may have existed for the RHR pump and the actions that were taken to resolve identified problems. Operating experience (OE) history, reported in the health report, was reviewed to determine if problems at other plants were being reviewed and addressed. Surveillance and test results, and associated corrective actions were reviewed to evaluate performance history. A walkdown was performed of the RHR pumps to determine material condition.
Design information was reviewed including functional requirements identified in the Functional System Description (FSD), the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), vendor manual and design drawings to identify the design bases. Pump flow calculations were reviewed for plant cool-down, mid-loop operation and accident conditions and compared to pump capabilities.
The RHR pump calculations, procedures, and test data were reviewed to ensure that appropriate minimum required water level would exist in the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and containment sump under accident conditions to maintain pump net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements specified in vendor manual. The pump was of particular interest because of the low NPSH design margin that was stated by the licensee in the UFSAR.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.2 RHR Seal Coolers
a. Inspection Scope
The RHR system health report and corrective action documents were reviewed for the past 2-3 years to determine if any issues were identified for the RHR seal cooler. In addition, the RHR functional design document and the vendor manual were reviewed to assess the design requirements. The system design calculations were reviewed to assure that the design requirements were properly considered. An interview with the system engineer was conducted to determine if any performance or tube plugging problems were known that were not addressed in the above documents. Finally, OE was requested for the past 2-3 years; however, none were found.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.3 . RHR Heat Exchangers
a. Inspection Scope
The RHR health reports, RHR heat exchanger condition reports (CRs) for the past 2-3 years, OEs, Functional System Description, and design calculations, were reviewed to assess the material condition of the heat exchangers and determine any potential problems. Tube plugging limits were reviewed versus the current actual tube plugging conditions. The review of the RHR heat exchangers acceptability for a potential future plant power increase conditions was also reviewed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.4 Charging Pumps
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed charging pump health reports and CRs for the past 2-3 years, industry issues that were contained in the health report, calculations related to minimum and maximum flow requirements and NPSH for the piggy-back mode of operation to determine if pump performance meets design requirements. The inspectors reviewed associated surveillance test, vibration and oil sample data to determine material condition. The inspectors conducted a walk down to determine material condition and interviewed the system and design engineer regarding maintenance history, industry experience regarding gas binding issues, including issues related to the volume control tank pressure oscillations associated with gas accumulation in the suction pipe header.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.5 Sump and Piping from the Sump to Suction of RHR Pumps
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed records of the last sump inspection for evidence of material condition of the sump and accessible piping, presence of any unacceptable debris, and corrective actions taken. The inspectors reviewed design documents regarding the sump screen sizing, including the analysis of potential binding of downstream valves by material that could pass through the screen.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.6 Switchyard Electrical Protection
a. Inspection Scope
In order to determine conformance with the design drawings and relevant documents, the team reviewed the 230 kilovolt (kV) switchyard and the 500 kV high voltage switchyard installed configuration. The team performed a walk down and held interviews with the cognizant licensee personnel as well as with the cognizant Alabama Power Company personnel, who had the overall responsibility for the high voltage switchyard. The team also conducted a review of design documents and a walk down of the low voltage switchyard, which included all the start up transformers, station unit transformers, main generator transformers, and their medium voltage and high voltage connections. To ascertain adequacy of system protection, the team scope included the review of the calculations for protective relaying settings, as well as the related procedures for protective relaying test and surveillance. Particularly, the team review was focused on the primary and secondary protection system for the start up transformers and the 230 kV oil filled cables which feed the 4.16 kV emergency buses and constitute the preferred power supply for the reactor safe shut down systems. The team reviewed the latest available report on the grid stability, to assess whether the two Farley generating units would remain stable under postulated grid upset events, including multiple breaker failure events, as required by commitments in the UFSAR.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.7 High Voltage Switchyard Direct Current (DC) System
a. Inspection Scope
In order to determine conformance with the design drawings and relevant documents, the team reviewed the DC system installed configuration. The team perform a walk down and held interviews with the cognizant licensee personnel as well as with the cognizant Alabama Power Company personnel, who had the overall responsibility for the high voltage switchyard. The team examined the batteries, chargers, distribution panels, and connections to determine material condition. The team performed a detailed visual inspection of the condition of the battery plates and battery top surfaces to confirm adequacy of material condition and maintenance. The review included review of the surveillance and testing procedures for the switchyard DC system to determine their adequacy.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.8 Circuit Breaker DL03 for Service Water Pump 2D
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the installation, preventive, and corrective maintenance procedures for the breaker associated with service water pump 2D. These procedures were compared to the vendor manual to verify consistency with vendor recommendations.
The team performed a walk down of the safety related switchgear and observed a breaker rack-in procedure in the field for an identical non-safety related switchgear, to ascertain compliance with licensee procedure for proper breaker engagement in the cubicle. In addition, using system health reports and data compiled by the licensee, the team reviewed the plant-wide operating history for the identical circuit breaker types to assess the failure history and operating experience over the past five years. The team reviewed design drawings of the 4.16 kV breaker control circuit, and breaker interlocks to determine they conform to design requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.9 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1A Anticipatory Trips
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the undervoltage and underfrequency anticipatory trip settings and surveillance data. The actual settings were compared to requirements contained in the Technical Specifications (TS) and the design calculations. The undervoltage setting was compared to the voltage experienced under all motor start conditions, to ensure that it would not be spuriously activated. It was also compared with the fault conditions imposed on the most restrictive bus configuration, to ascertain that the undervoltage relay of unaffected buses would not be unnecessarily and spuriously activated.
Likewise, the underfrequency setting was compared to system frequency excursions under abnormal operation, to ensure that it would not result in undesired reactor trips.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 0 Containment Sump Isolation Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 8812A
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees electrical calculations that determined the minimum and maximum voltage values at the terminals of containment sump isolation valve MOV 8812A. The team reviewed the licensees GL 89-10 MOV sizing calculations and testing to verify that appropriate design basis event conditions and degraded voltage conditions were used as inputs for determining the electric motor operator sizing and for establishing MOV test parameters. The team also reviewed the licensees application of vendor calculation methodology and vendor information in determining the motor operator torque capability, application of stem factors, and operator efficiency factor.
The team reviewed elementary diagrams to confirm that the interlock circuits satisfied functional requirements with adequate redundancy, independence of redundant circuits, and that the circuits included no detectable failure vulnerability with significant consequences. Test results were reviewed to verify that valve performance was being monitored to identify signs of degradation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2.1.11 Piggyback Motor Operated Valves MOV 8706A/B
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees electrical calculations that determined the minimum and maximum voltage values at the terminals of piggyback MOVs 8706A and B. The team reviewed the licensees Generic Letter 89-10 MOV sizing calculations and testing to verify that appropriate design basis event conditions and degraded voltage conditions were used as inputs for determining the electric motor operator sizing and for establishing MOV test parameters. The team also reviewed the licensees application of vendor calculation methodology and vendor information in determining the motor operator torque capability, application of stem factors and operator efficiency factor.
The team reviewed elementary diagrams to confirm that the interlock circuits satisfied functional requirements with adequate redundancy, independence of redundant circuits, and that the circuits included no detectable failure vulnerability with significant consequences. Test results were reviewed to verify that valve performance was being monitored to identify signs of degradation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2.1.12 Circuit Breaker for Charging Pump 1B
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the preventive, and corrective maintenance procedures for the breaker associated with Charging Pump 1B. These procedures were compared to the vendor manual to verify consistency with vendor recommendations. The team performed a walk down of the safety related switchgear to determine material condition.
The team reviewed system health reports and performance data compiled by the licensee, to assess the failure history and operating experience for this equipment over the past five years. The team reviewed drawings of the 4.16 kV breaker control circuit, and breaker interlocks to ascertain that the design basis functions would be fulfilled.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 3 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pumps/Motors/Circuit Breakers
a. Inspection Scope
This component group included the component cooling water pumps and their associated pump motor, and 4.16 kV power supply path. The team reviewed the UFSAR, TS and their bases, and the CCW functional system description to identify and verify consistency of design requirements related to flow, developed head, and NPSH.
SNC 7 Design calculations, performance test (PT) procedures, and past test results were reviewed to verify that the CCW pump design and licensing performance requirements were met. Maintenance work orders (WOs), in-service testing (IST) reports, condition report corrective actions, and design change history were reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins or performance.
The team reviewed design drawings reflecting the motor power supply path, and then walked down that path to ensure that no unsatisfactory conditions existed to possibly affect power applied to the motor terminals for pump operation. The team also reviewed the licensees calculations that established the device settings for protection of the motor, to verify that premature trips would be precluded under design basis conditions, without unduly compromising motor protection. Motor control logic diagrams were compared against design basis documents to ensure all safety functions were properly incorporated.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 4 CCW Surge Tank and Level Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed a field walk down to verify that the installed configuration will support system function under accident conditions, and that it was consistent with plant drawings and design basis documents. The impact of security modifications on equipment function and accessibility were reviewed. Equipment environmental and seismic protections were evaluated against supporting documentation. Calibration and testing of level transmitters was reviewed against vendor supporting documentation and plant calculations to ensure consistency and accuracy of level indication. In performing this evaluation, the team sampled a small portion of the licensees measurement and test equipment program, including handling of lost and out-of-specification equipment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 5 CCW Heat Exchanger
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed system piping diagrams and performed independent valve position verifications to ensure that system alignment is consistent with design assumptions and will support its design basis function under accident conditions. Work Orders, Performance Tests, CR corrective actions, and design change history were reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins or performance.
Manufacturers data and vendor manuals were reviewed against maintenance and testing practices to ensure conformance to manufacturers requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 6 CCW Relief Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed system piping diagrams and performed walk downs to ensure that the installed configuration is consistent with design documents. Walk downs also reviewed conditions and equipment protection measures to determine material conditions. The team reviewed the licensees CR corrective actions to identify performance problems. These valves are not currently included in the in-service testing program so no past set point testing data was available.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 7 CCW RHR Pump Seal Cooler Pressure Control Valve
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed design differences between the two units that led to the need for an air operated pressure control valve only on Unit 1 CCW flow line to the residual heat removal pump seal cooler. Engineering drawings and system specifications were reviewed to ensure that installed configuration is consistent with design documentation.
Machinery history, condition reports, design change history and system health reports were reviewed to assess the potential for component degradation and impact on design margins or performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 8 CCW Pump Discharge Check Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design, installed orientation, and the licensees actions to monitor the material conditions of the CCW pump discharge check valves. This included periodic in-service flow and back leakage testing to demonstrate full open and closure capability, and leak tightness. Maintenance history, CR corrective actions, test results, foreign material exclusion controls, and design changes were reviewed to assess the potential for material degradation and the licensees capability to identify degradation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 9 CCW Heat Exchanger Service Water (SW) Outlet Flow Control Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the circumstances of a recent failure of the outlet flow control valve associated with the A heat exchanger against past maintenance and CR history. Past test results, and design changes were reviewed to assess the potential for material degradation. A walk down observation of the components was conducted to determine current material conditions. Discussions relating the maintenance history and the consideration of a future actuator change out were conducted to assess licensee plans for these components.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.2 0 Service Water System Piping Integrity
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed design drawings, UFSAR descriptions, structural integrity evaluations, and operability determinations related to the structural integrity of the service water system to verify design requirements are appropriately implemented and maintained. The team reviewed the Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program and associated radiographic and ultrasonic examination results, condition reports and corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed records of completed inservice inspections, system health reports, and design change history to assess service water failure history and degradation of service water system piping. The inspectors verified that potential degradation is monitored or prevented and that component replacement is consistent with original design requirements. The team also reviewed a design change package on the installation of dye injection ports to verify ASME Section XI repair/replacements requirements. The team conducted a walkdown of the service water system including the service water intake structure, diesel generator building, and the auxiliary building to assess the material condition of the pressure retaining boundary.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.2 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Indication
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design of the RWST level instrumentation and the logic circuits for automatic switch-over from the injection path to the recirculation flow path for the safety injection system, initiated by low-low RWST level. The team also reviewed the basis and determination of the instrumentation setpoints. This included a review to confirm that the valve interlock circuits satisfied functional requirements with adequate redundancy and independence of redundant circuits. The team also reviewed tank and installation drawings, instrument scaling and uncertainty calculations, and interfaces with mechanical calculations, to determine the adequacy of the existing setpoints, including allowance for vortexing or other process effects. The team reviewed calibration procedures for the instrument loops to confirm that the range, scaling, accuracy and setpoints were consistent with the design and licensing bases, including consistency with the assumptions in the uncertainty calculations. The team reviewed the past three calibration and logic test results for both units to confirm an adequate performance history, and to confirm that instrument performance degradation would be identified.
The team visually inspected the level transmitter configurations for both units, to assess observable material condition, vulnerability to hazards, separation of redundant channels, and the potential for environmental effects on instrument reliability and performance. The team also observed the operator use of the RWST level instrumentation and alarms during a small-break LOCA scenario performed by the licensee on the plant simulator.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.2 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Bearing Temperatures
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the setpoints used by operators to decide to trip reactor coolant pumps due to high pump motor bearing temperatures, to verify that those setpoints are consistent with engineering calculations and associated vendor manuals. The team also reviewed the past three calibration and logic test results for both units to confirm an adequate performance history, and to confirm that instrument performance degradation would be identified.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Review of Low Margin Operator Actions
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of selected risk-significant, time-critical operator actions. Where possible, margins were determined by the review of the assumed design basis and UFSAR response times and performance times documented by job performance measure results within operator time-critical task verification tests. For the selected operator actions, the team observed operator performance during simulator drills. The team also performed walk throughs of applicable steps in associated abnormal and emergency procedures, and other operations procedures with an appropriate plant operator to assess operator knowledge level, adequacy of procedures, availability of special equipment when required, and the conditions under which the procedures would be performed. The following operator actions were reviewed:
- Respond to a loss of residual heat removal capability
- Trip reactor coolant pumps upon loss of seal cooling
- Place standby component cooling water into service
- Place standby charging pump into seal injection service
- Transition from low-pressure safety injection to low-pressure recirculation
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Review of Industry Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at domestic and foreign nuclear facilities for applicability at Farley. The team performed an independent applicability review, and issues that appeared to be applicable to Farley were selected for a detailed review. The issues reviewed by the team included:
- AI 2005200399, and Rev. 1, Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter, NSAL-05-3, Centrifugal Charging Pump Runout During Safety Injection
- AI 2005201136, Determine if the concerns discussed in RIS 2005-29 (Anticipated Transients That Could Develop into More Serious Events)associated with the safety analyses performed for Condition II events, are applicable to Farley, and make recommendations with regard to any needed corrective actions SNC 12
- Documentation of Engineering Judgement DOEJ-SS- 2006200334-001 Evaluation of CPS Part 21 Report, Version 1
- NL-04-2397, 10CFR21 Evaluation 04-008, Westinghouse NSAL-04-7, Containment Sump Line Fluid Inventory
- NL-06-0315, 10CFR21 Evaluation 06-004, Consolidated Power Supply Pipe
- NSAL-04-7, Containment Sump Line Fluid Inventory
- Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3430, Response to Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals, 2/15/06
- Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3443, Review of Internal Flood Design Deficiencies, Letter C062210001, 7/6/2006
- Operating Experience Review Evaluation, Screening Index 3413 Response to Gas Intrusion in Safety Systems, 9/12/05
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Review of Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modifications related to the selected risk significant components in detail to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the components have not been degraded through modifications. The team reviewed the modification package, implementation procedures, 50.59 evaluation, calculations, post-modification testing results, and corrective action documents where applicable. The team reviewed the modifications in accordance with IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a and IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments.
The following modifications were reviewed:
- DCP2979928201/DCR 97-2-9282, Inservice Test Plan Service Water Dye Injection Points
- DCP203999601/DCR-03-2-9996, Tornado Missile Protection to the Man-Way Shell and Cover of the Condensate Storage Tank, Unit 2
- DCP103999501/DCR-03-1-9995, Tornado Missile Protection to the Man-Way Shell and Cover of the Condensate Storage Tank, Unit 1
- DCP-00-1-9565, CCW Surge Tank Level Transmitter Replacement
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On August 18, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Randy Johnson and the other members of the licensees staff who acknowledged the findings.
The inspectors noted that proprietary information was examined during the inspection but none is included in this inspection report. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final exit was held by telephone with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of the licensees staff on September 19, 2006, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- R. Bayne, Performance Analysis Supervisor
- S. Berryhill, Plant Support
- L. Branning, APCO, Substation Supervisor (Eufaula Office)
- S. Chestnut, Engineering Support Manager
- J. Cox, Senior Engineer
- G. Dykes, Plant Support
- C. Gallardo, Electrical Engineer
- S. Gates, Plant Support
- J. Guilford, APCO, Southeast Division Transmission Specialist
- P. Harlos, Health Physics Manager
- J. Hunter, Farley Operations
- R. Johnson, Plant General Manager
- R. Lyon, Corporate Electrical Engineer
- D. McKinney, Corporate Licensing Manager
- C. Medlock, Senior Engineer
- B. Moore, Maintenance Manager
- W. Oldfield, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- S. Soper, Engineering Supervisor
- A. Spence, APCO, Engineer, Technical Services
- N. Tarrant, FNP Performance Analysis
- W. VanLandingham, FNP Shift Manager/Training Coordinator
- R. Wells, Operations Manager
- T. Youngblood, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
NRC personnel
- J. Baptist, Resident Inspector
- T. Hoeg, Division of Reactor Safety, Acting Branch Chief
- C. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector