IR 05000321/2008003: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 07/31/2008
| issue date = 07/31/2008
| title = IR 05000321-08-003, 05000366-08-003, on 04/01/2008 - 06/30/2008, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Report
| title = IR 05000321-08-003, 05000366-08-003, on 04/01/2008 - 06/30/2008, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Report
| author name = Shaeffer S M
| author name = Shaeffer S
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
| addressee name = Madison D R
| addressee name = Madison D
| addressee affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| addressee affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| docket = 05000321, 05000366
| docket = 05000321, 05000366
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[[Issue date::July 31, 2008]]


Mr. Dennis Vice President - Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
==REGION II==
uly 31, 2008


Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 11028 Hatch Parkway North Baxley, GA 31513
==SUBJECT:==
 
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2008003 AND 05000366/2008003
SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2008003 AND 05000366/2008003


==Dear Mr. Madison:==
==Dear Mr. Madison:==
On June 30, 2008, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 11, 2008, with you and other members of your staff.
On June 30, 2008, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 11, 2008, with you and other members of your staff.


The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
 
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.


Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, licensee-identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs)
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, licensee-identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs)
consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violations and because they are entered into your corrective action program. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.
consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violations and because they are entered into your corrective action program.


SNC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Edwin I.


Sincerely,/RA/
Hatch Nuclear Plant.
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5


===Enclosures:===
SNC  2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Inspection Report 05000321/2008003, 05000366/2008003


===w/Attachment:===
Sincerely,
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: (See page 3)
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5


_________________________ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE /SMS/ OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE CWR /RA/ JBH /via email/ PKN /via email/ SMS /RA/ NAME CRapp JHickey PNiebaum SShaeffer DATE 07/25/2008 07/25/2008 07/25/2008 07/30/2008 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO SNC 3 cc w/encl: Jeffrey T. Gasser Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
===Enclosures:===
 
Inspection Report 05000321/2008003, 05000366/2008003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Electronic Mail Distribution Raymond D. Baker Licensing Manager-Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
 
Electronic Mail Distribution L. Mike Stinson Vice President Fleet Operations Support Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution
 
David H. Jones Vice President Engineering Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
 
Electronic Mail Distribution Moanica Caston Vice President and General Counsel Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
 
Electronic Mail Distribution Steven B. Tipps Hatch Principal Engineer - Licensing Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. K. Rosanski Resident Manager Oglethorpe Power Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Laurence Bergen Oglethorpe Power Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Arthur H. Domby, Esq. Troutman Sanders Electronic Mail Distribution
 
Dr. Carol Couch Director Environmental Protection Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Cynthia Sanders Program Manager Radioactive Materials Program Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution


Jim Sommerville (Acting) Chief Environmental Protection Division Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Steven M. Jackson Senior Engineer - Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Reece McAlister Executive Secretary Georgia Public Service Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Chairman Appling County Commissioners County Courthouse 69 Tippins Street, Suite 201 Baxley, GA 31513 Electronic Mail Distribution SNC 4 Letter to Dennis from Scott M. Shaeffer dated July 31, 2008
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos.: 05000321/2008003, 05000366/2008003 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.


SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2008003 AND 05000366/2008003 Distribution w/encl:
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location: Baxley, Georgia 31513 Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2008 Inspectors: J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector P. Niebaum, Resident Inspector Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
C. Evans, RII L. Slack, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC R. Martin, NRR
 
Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II
 
Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
 
Report Nos.: 05000321/2008003, 05000366/2008003
 
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
 
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant  
 
Location: Baxley, Georgia 31513  
 
Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2008  
 
Inspectors: J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector P. Niebaum, Resident Inspector  
 
Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure  


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000321/2008-003, 05000366/2008-003; 04/01/2008-06/30/2008; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Routine integrated report
IR 05000321/2008-003, 05000366/2008-003; 04/01/2008-06/30/2008; Edwin I. Hatch


The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Routine integrated report The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), Revision 4, dated December 2006.
 
A.


===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
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No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
===Licensee-Identified Violations===


Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. These violations and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.


=REPORT DETAILS=
=REPORT DETAILS=
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==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity  
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
 
{{a|1R01}}
{{a|1R01}}
==1R01 Adverse Weather==
==1R01 Adverse Weather==


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====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R04}}
{{a|1R04}}
==1R04 Equipment Alignment==
==1R04 Equipment Alignment==


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
Partial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems when the opposite trains were removed from service. The inspectors checked system valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Partial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems when the opposite trains were removed from service. The inspectors checked system valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
* Unit 2 'A' train of the Standby Liquid Control System (SBLC)
* Unit 2 A train of the Standby Liquid Control System (SBLC)
* Unit 1C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) while the Unit 1A EDG was out of service for preventive maintenance
* Unit 1C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) while the Unit 1A EDG was out of service for preventive maintenance
* Unit 2A EDG while the Unit 1B EDG was out of service for preventative maintenance.
* Unit 2A EDG while the Unit 1B EDG was out of service for preventative maintenance.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R05}}
{{a|1R05}}
==1R05 Fire Protection==
==1R05 Fire Protection==


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====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R11}}
{{a|1R11}}
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification==
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification==


Line 150: Line 115:


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R12}}
 
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
51R12 Maintenance Effectiveness


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed the following two samples associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)
The inspectors reviewed the following two samples associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)
: (1) or (a)
: (1) or (a)
: (2) classification. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated CRs, Maintenance Work Orders (MWO), and the licensee's procedures for implementing the Maintenance Rule to determine if equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
: (2) classification. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated CRs, Maintenance Work Orders (MWO), and the licensees procedures for implementing the Maintenance Rule to determine if equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
* Unit 1 Division 1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) flow Restricting Orifice Replacement
* Unit 1 Division 1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) flow Restricting Orifice Replacement
* 1B EDG Reliability Outage
* 1B EDG Reliability Outage


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R13}}
{{a|1R13}}
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation==
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation==


Line 175: Line 138:


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R15}}
{{a|1R15}}
==1R15 Operability Evaluations==
==1R15 Operability Evaluations==


Line 188: Line 150:


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R18}}
{{a|1R18}}
==1R18 Plant Modifications==
==1R18 Plant Modifications==


Line 199: Line 160:


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R19}}
==1R19 Post Maintenance Testing==


71R19 Post Maintenance Testing
====a. Inspection Scope====
For the following five post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements.


====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors also reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
For the following five post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements. The inspectors also reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
* 2A SBLC System Pump and Accumulator Cleaning & Precharge Check
* 2A SBLC System Pump and Accumulator Cleaning & Precharge Check
* 2P41F316D Motor operator and limit switches replacement
* 2P41F316D Motor operator and limit switches replacement
Line 212: Line 174:


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R20}}
{{a|1R20}}
==1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities==
==1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities==


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On May 3, Unit 2 was shutdown for a planned outage for safety relief valve repairs. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's outage plan, monitored shutdown activities, licensee control of outage activities, and monitored the activities listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
On May 3, Unit 2 was shutdown for a planned outage for safety relief valve repairs. The inspectors reviewed the licensees outage plan, monitored shutdown activities, licensee control of outage activities, and monitored the activities listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
* Reactor Coolant System cooldown following shutdown to verify the cooldown rate did not exceed TS limits
* Reactor Coolant System cooldown following shutdown to verify the cooldown rate did not exceed TS limits
* Two clearances to verify implementation of the clearance process and the associated equipment was properly configured to support the function of the clearance
* Two clearances to verify implementation of the clearance process and the associated equipment was properly configured to support the function of the clearance
Line 226: Line 187:


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R22}}
==1R22 Surveillance Testing==


81R22 Surveillance Testing
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following seven surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.


====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following seven surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.


Surveillance Tests
Surveillance Tests
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===.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items===
===.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items===


As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensee's computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.


9.2 Annual Sample
===.2 Annual Sample===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following two CRs to verify the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensee's corrective action program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following two CRs to verify the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensees corrective action program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
 
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
* CR 2006112331, Response to 10 CFR 50.59 NCV 05000321, 366/2007002-01
* CR 2006112331, Response to 10 CFR 50.59 NCV 05000321, 366/2007002-01
* CR 2008103563, Failure of the #2 Turbine By-pass valve due to galling
* CR 2008103563, Failure of the #2 Turbine By-pass valve due to galling
Line 270: Line 234:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's Corrective Action Program and associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but 10also considered the results of inspector daily CR screening, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the six month period of January 2008 through June 2008 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated with operability determinations which occurred during the period. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensee's two latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensee's trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensee's corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program and associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of inspector daily CR screening, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the six month period of January 2008 through June 2008 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated with operability determinations which occurred during the period. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees two latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.


Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Line 276: Line 240:
====b. Findings and Observations====
====b. Findings and Observations====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.
 
{{a|4OA3}}
{{a|4OA3}}
==4OA3 Event Follow-up==
==4OA3 Event Follow-up==


===.1 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-008 Reactor Scram on Low Water Level Due to Partial Loss of Condensate System===
===.1 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-008 Reactor Scram on Low Water Level Due to Partial===


On August 7, 2007, a loss of the 2A and 2B Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps resulted in degraded feedflow which ultimately caused a reactor scram on low water level. The cause of the scram was an inadvertent actuation of the 2D 4160 volt switchgear when a technician bumped the actuation arm of a over-current relay while installing a protective cover. This condition was documented in CR 2007107492. No findings of significance were identified.
Loss of Condensate System On August 7, 2007, a loss of the 2A and 2B Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps resulted in degraded feedflow which ultimately caused a reactor scram on low water level. The cause of the scram was an inadvertent actuation of the 2D 4160 volt switchgear when a technician bumped the actuation arm of a over-current relay while installing a protective cover. This condition was documented in CR 2007107492. No findings of significance were identified.


===.2 (Closed) LER 05000366/2008-001-000 and 001 Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half Coupling in RHRSW System===
===.2 (Closed) LER 05000366/2008-001-000 and 001 Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half===


On February 18, 2008, a crack was identified at a weld on a 3/4 inch vent line of the RHRSW system. The cause of the crack was flow induced vibration resulting in a high cycle fatigue failure of the weld. This condition was documented in CR 2008102081.
Coupling in RHRSW System On February 18, 2008, a crack was identified at a weld on a 3/4 inch vent line of the RHRSW system. The cause of the crack was flow induced vibration resulting in a high cycle fatigue failure of the weld. This condition was documented in CR 2008102081.


See Section
See Section 4OA7 for the disposition of this issue.
{{a|4OA7}}
==4OA7 for the disposition of this issue.==


===.3 (Closed) LER 05000321/2007-001 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Component Failures===
===.3 (Closed) LER 05000321/2007-001 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable===


On February 7, 2007, the HPCI minimum flow control valve position indicating lights were discovered extinguished. The cause was a degraded resistor and blown control power fuse. This condition was documented in CR 2008101308. On February 8, 2008 The HPCI turbine steam supply valve failed to open on demand. The cause was a failed motor on the motor operated valve. This condition was documented in CR 2008101351. No findings of significance were identified.
Due to Component Failures On February 7, 2007, the HPCI minimum flow control valve position indicating lights were discovered extinguished. The cause was a degraded resistor and blown control power fuse. This condition was documented in CR 2008101308. On February 8, 2008 The HPCI turbine steam supply valve failed to open on demand. The cause was a failed motor on the motor operated valve. This condition was documented in CR 2008101351.


114OA5 Other Activities
No findings of significance were identified.
 
{{a|4OA5}}
==4OA5 Other Activities==


===.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities===
===.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
 
These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


===.2 LER 05000366/2007-004 Leak in Reactor Pressure Boundary Due to Failure of a Socket Weld This LER was reviewed and closed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000321,===
===.2 LER 05000366/2007-004 Leak in Reactor Pressure Boundary Due to Failure of a Socket===


366/2008002, but was misidentified as LER 05000366/2007-003.
Weld This LER was reviewed and closed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000321,      366/2008002, but was misidentified as LER 05000366/2007-003.


===.3 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-005 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Water Intrusion Into the Oil System===
===.3 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-005 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable===


This LER was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000366/2008-006.
Due to Water Intrusion Into the Oil System      This LER was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000366/2008-006.


===.4 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-007 HPCI System Inoperable due to Clogged Valve Causing Water Intrusion Into the Oil System===
===.4 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-007 HPCI System Inoperable due to Clogged Valve===


This LER was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000366/2008-006.
Causing Water Intrusion Into the Oil System      This LER was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000366/2008-006.


===.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000366/2008-002, Residual Heat Removal Service Water Vent Valve Failure===
===.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000366/2008-002, Residual Heat Removal Service Water===


The residents reviewed CR 2008102081 which was generated to address a leak at the weld on the branch piping to 2E11FV001 Vent Valve on the "B" loop of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW). See Section
Vent Valve Failure The residents reviewed CR 2008102081 which was generated to address a leak at the weld on the branch piping to 2E11FV001 Vent Valve on the B loop of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW). See Section 4OA7 for the disposition of this issue.
{{a|4OA7}}
==4OA7 for the disposition of this issue.==


{{a|4OA6}}
{{a|4OA6}}
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The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.
The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.
* 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requires in part that measures shall be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of material, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems and components. Contrary to this, on May 16, 2008, the licensee determined that a plant modification recently installed on the Unit 1 Reactor Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system did not meet the design objective of achieving rated flow of 8000 gallons per minute (gpm) with 2 RHRSW pumps operating. Additionally, on May 28, 2008, it was identified that the same plant modification installed on the Unit 2 RHRSW system did not meet the same design objective. Prior to the modification, the RHRSW system achieved a flowrate of 8600 gpm with 2 RHRSW pumps operating. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program under CR 2008105696. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in inoperability of the Unit 1 RHRSW system because river temperature did not exceed 94F.
* 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control states, in part, that the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculation methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not adequately evaluate, or use other means to demonstrate, that the RHRSW flow control valves operating in the normal flow regimes would not cause cavitations and subsequent vibration such that the RHRSW piping would remain functional. As a result, a flow induced vibration high cycle fatigue failure occurred at a welded connection for a vent valve. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program under CR 2008102081. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of system safety function of the Unit 2 RHRSW system.


12* 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requires in part that measures shall be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of material, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems and components. Contrary to this, on May 16, 2008, the licensee determined that a plant modification recently installed on the Unit 1 Reactor Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system did not meet the design objective of achieving rated flow of 8000 gallons per minute (gpm) with 2 RHRSW pumps operating. Additionally, on May 28, 2008, it was identified that the same plant modification installed on the Unit 2 RHRSW system did not meet the same design objective. Prior to the modification, the RHRSW system achieved a flowrate of 8600 gpm with 2 RHRSW pumps operating. This issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program under CR 2008105696. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in inoperability of the Unit 1 RHRSW system because river temperature did not exceed 94F.
ATTACHMENT:  
* 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control states, in part, that the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculation methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not adequately evaluate, or use other means to demonstrate, that the RHRSW flow control valves operating in the normal flow regimes would not cause cavitations and subsequent vibration such that the RHRSW piping would remain functional. As a result, a flow induced vibration high cycle fatigue failure occurred at a welded connection for a vent valve. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program under CR 2008102081. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of system safety function of the Unit 2 RHRSW system.
 
ATTACHMENT:


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
Line 344: Line 307:


===Licensee personnel===
===Licensee personnel===
: [[contact::G. Johnson]], Site Engineering Manager  
: [[contact::G. Johnson]], Site Engineering Manager
: [[contact::J. Dixon]], Health Physics Manager  
: [[contact::J. Dixon]], Health Physics Manager
: [[contact::S. Bargeron]], Plant Manager  
: [[contact::S. Bargeron]], Plant Manager
: [[contact::B. Goodwin]], Design Manager G Brinson, Operations Manager  
: [[contact::B. Goodwin]], Design Manager
: [[contact::J. Lewis]], Site Support Manager  
G Brinson, Operations Manager
: [[contact::D. Madison]], Hatch Vice President  
: [[contact::J. Lewis]], Site Support Manager
: [[contact::S. Soper]], Engineering Support Manager  
: [[contact::D. Madison]], Hatch Vice President
: [[contact::J. Thompson]], Nuclear Security Manager  
: [[contact::S. Soper]], Engineering Support Manager
: [[contact::R. Varnadore]], Maintenance Manager  
: [[contact::J. Thompson]], Nuclear Security Manager
: [[contact::R. Varnadore]], Maintenance Manager


==LIST OF ITEMS==
==LIST OF ITEMS==
Line 358: Line 322:


===Closed===
===Closed===
: [[Closes LER::05000366/LER-2007-008]]  LER Reactor Scram on Low Water Level due to Partial Loss of Condensate System (Section 4OA3.1)
: 05000366/2007-008             LER   Reactor Scram on Low Water Level due to Partial Loss of Condensate System (Section 4OA3.1)
: [[Closes LER::05000366/LER-2008-001]]-000 LER Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half Coupling in RHRSW System (Section 4OA3.2)
: 05000366/2008-001-000         LER   Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half Coupling in RHRSW System (Section 4OA3.2)
: [[Closes LER::05000366/LER-2008-001]]-001 LER Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half Coupling in RHRSW System (Section 4OA3.2)
: 05000366/2008-001-001         LER   Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half Coupling in RHRSW System (Section 4OA3.2)
: [[Closes LER::05000321/LER-2007-001]]  LER High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable due to Component Failures (Section 4OA3.3)
: 05000321/2007-001             LER   High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable due to Component Failures (Section 4OA3.3)
: [[Closes LER::05000366/LER-2007-005]]  LER High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Water Intrusion Into the Oil System (Section 4OA5.3)
: 05000366/2007-005             LER   High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Water Intrusion Into the Oil System (Section 4OA5.3)
: [[Closes LER::05000366/LER-2007-007]]  LER HPCI System Inoperable due to Clogged Valve Causing Water Intrusion Into the Oil System (Section 4OA5.4)  
: 05000366/2007-007             LER   HPCI System Inoperable due to Clogged Valve Causing Water Intrusion Into the Oil System (Section 4OA5.4)
: 05000366/2008-002 URI Residual Heat Removal Service Water Vent Valve Failure (Section 4OA5.5)  
: 05000366/2008-002             URI   Residual Heat Removal Service Water Vent Valve Failure (Section 4OA5.5)


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==Section 1R01: Adverse Weather==
: DI-OPS-87-0408, Actions for GENCOMM Alerts 34AB-S11-001-0, Operation with Degraded System Voltage Licensee response to Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact of Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power CRs:
: 2008100374,
: 2008100148
: 2
==Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment==
: 34SO-C41-003-2, Standby Liquid Control System, 31EO-EOP-011-2, RCA RPV Control
(ATWS) Flow Chart, 34SO-R43-001-1, Diesel Generator Standby AC System,
: 34SO-R43-001-2, Diesel Generator Standby AC System Drawings: H-26009, H-11631, H-21074, H21033
: CRs:
: 2008105046,
: 2007111139, 2007104657
==Section 1R05: Fire Protection==
: Drawings: A-43965 sheets 030, 032, 039, 041, 047, and 050 Procedures:
: DI-FPX-02-0693, Fire Fighting Equipment Inspection 42SV-FPX-023-0, Fire Hose Hydrostatic Testing
==Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness==
: 40AC-ENG-020-0, Maintenance Rule (10
: CFR 50.65) Implementation and Compliance
: 90AC-OAM-022-0, Scheduling Maintenance 51GM-MNT-033-0, Torque of Pressure Boundary Applications
: 2PM-R43-015-0, Diesel Generator Turbocharger and Heat Exchanger Inspection
: NMP-DP-001, Operational Risk Awareness CRs:
: 2008106733,
: 2008106906 DCP:
: 1080654701 MWOs:
: 1080654713,
: 1062104401
: Drawings: S50638 Other:
: High Risk Planning Worksheet for replacement of RO 1E11D004A
==Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation==
: NMP-DP-001, Operational Risk Awareness
: AG-OAM-02-0701, Work Scheduling Principles
==Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations==
: 34SO-Z41-001-1, Control Room Ventilation System Main Control Room logs CRs:
: 2008104783,
: 2008104981,
: 2008102487,
: 2008100209,
: 2008106670 Drawings: H-16249, H-26094, S-25140
: Certificates of Analysis for the 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2C EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tanks for cetane OD 2-08-06 Rev. 0
: OO 02-0508S Letter dated April 13, 1994 titled Diesel Generator Rotor Block Dowel Pins
==Section 1R18: Plant Modifications==
: CRs:
: 2008105696 Design Change Package
: 1080654701 for the Unit 1 RHRSW system
: Procedure:
: NMP-ES-022, DCP Site Approval Implementation and Closure
==Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing==
: MWOs:
: 2071021401,
: 2072073101,
: 2080667801,
: 2081111801,
: 1071052501 34SV-C41-001-2, Standby Liquid Control Pump Monthly Test,
: 95IT-OTM-001-0, Maintenance Work Order Functional Test Guideline 
: 334SV-SUV-016-2, Cold Shutdown Valve Operability 34SV-SUV-008-2, Primary Containment Isolation Valve Operability 52GM-MEL-006-0, Sealing Entrances Into Safety Related Devices 52PM-MEL-013-0, Installation and Maintenance of ASCO/AVCO Solenoid Valves 42IT-TET-012-2S, Plant Service Water and RHR Service Water Piping Inspection 51GM-MNT-048-0, Bolted Bonnet Swing Check Valve Maintenance
: 2SV-SUV-040-2, Check Valve Internal Inspection 52SV-SUV-002-0, Mechanical Snubber Visual Inspection 52SV-SUV-001-0, Hydraulic Snubber Visual Inspection and Functional Test U2 MCR logs Quality Control Inspection Point Assignment Sheet for MWO 107052501
==Section 1R20: Refueling and Outage Activities==
: 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown
: 34-GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup 34AB-C71-001-2 Reactor Scram Procedure Clearances:
: 2-DT-08-2E11-00020, 2-OP-08-2P41-00016
==Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing==
: CRs:
: 2008104879,
: 2008105147,
: 2008104563,
: 2008105049 34SO-E51-001-2 RCIC System Restoration 31GO-INS-001-0, Pump and Valve Inservice Testing (IST) 34SO-G11-009-2, Drywell and Reactor Building Sump Systems
: IST Program Component Basis Information for the Unit 2 MSIV U2 MCR logs


==Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems==
: CRs:
: 2006112331,
: 2008103563 Action Item:
: 2007200459,
: 2007200460,
: 2007200461,
: 2007200462,
: 2007200463,
: 2008202451,
: 2008202452, 2008202454-461, 2008202463-496 MWO:
: 1080601401
: NMP-AD-010, 10CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations Apparent Cause Determination Grading Sheets Monthly CAP Performance Indicators Key Performance Indicators Trend Evaluation File Corrective Action Program Performance Indicators
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 03:14, 22 December 2019

IR 05000321-08-003, 05000366-08-003, on 04/01/2008 - 06/30/2008, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Report
ML082130421
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/2008
From: Scott Shaeffer
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To: Madison D
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-08-003
Download: ML082130421 (19)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

uly 31, 2008

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2008003 AND 05000366/2008003

Dear Mr. Madison:

On June 30, 2008, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 11, 2008, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, licensee-identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs)

consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violations and because they are entered into your corrective action program.

If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Edwin I.

Hatch Nuclear Plant.

SNC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000321/2008003, 05000366/2008003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos.: 05000321/2008003, 05000366/2008003 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location: Baxley, Georgia 31513 Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2008 Inspectors: J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector P. Niebaum, Resident Inspector Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2008-003, 05000366/2008-003; 04/01/2008-06/30/2008; Edwin I. Hatch

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Routine integrated report The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), Revision 4, dated December 2006.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) and remained at 100% RTP through the end of the reporting period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at or near 100% RTP. A planned reactor shutdown occurred on May 3, 2008, to replace three safety relief pilot valves. Unit 2 was returned to service on May 11, 2008, and remained at or near 100% for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather

a. Inspection Scope

Summer Readiness of AC Power Systems. The inspectors performed a review of licensee seasonal readiness of the two following systems. The inspectors verified guidance is in place to respond to off-site power reliability issues, assess the risk of maintenance activities given off-site power reliability issues and communication protocols are in place to exchange information which could impact off-site power reliability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Off-Site Power
  • Alternate AC Power

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems when the opposite trains were removed from service. The inspectors checked system valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Unit 2A EDG while the Unit 1B EDG was out of service for preventative maintenance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Area Tours. The inspectors toured the following five risk significant plant areas to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment, verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed and that transient combustibles were properly controlled. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings H-11846 and H-11847 to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, was in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Units 1 and 2 East & West Switchgear Rooms CB 130'
  • Units 1 and 2 Main Control Room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Quarterly Observation. The inspectors observed the performance of licensee simulator scenario LT-SG-50618-02, which included a Moisture Separator/Reheater drain line break, loss of condenser vacuum, high turbine building radiation, reactor scram, Main Steam Isolation Valve closure, HPCI logic failure and RCIC flow oscillations in automatic control. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two samples associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)

(1) or (a)
(2) classification. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated CRs, Maintenance Work Orders (MWO), and the licensees procedures for implementing the Maintenance Rule to determine if equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
  • 1B EDG Reliability Outage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors assessed whether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.

  • April 5 through April 11, Switchyard Switching/Line maintenance, MCC 1R24S002 Inspection, Unit 2 A Standby Gas Treatment preventive maintenance
  • April 19 through April 25, B Main Control room HVAC outage, 2D Plant Service Water Pump outage, Unit 2 ATTS 2B21N695B replacement
  • May 24 through May 30, Unit 2 B Control Rod Drive (CRD) pump repair, Unit 2 1E11F068B repair, Switchyard Offernan Line 175459 repair
  • June 7 through June 13, 2A EDG preventive maintenance, 2A Core Spray Pump/Valve surveillance, 1B EDG aligned to Unit 2

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the Technical Specification (TS) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Main Control Room Environmental Control System Damper movement
  • 2D RHRSW pump casing corrosion
  • EDG fuel oil storage tanks lower than expected cetane levels
  • 2C RHR pump seal leak

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following plant modification to ensure that safety functions of important safety systems have not been affected. Also, the inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components have not been degraded through modifications.

The inspectors verified that any modifications performed during increased risk-significant configurations did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • DCP 1080654701 RHRSW Flow Control Valve/Restricting Orifice Modifications

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the following five post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements.

The inspectors also reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • 2A SBLC System Pump and Accumulator Cleaning & Precharge Check
  • 2P41F316D Motor operator and limit switches replacement
  • 2B31F020 Reactor Water Sample Isolation Valve Solenoid replacement

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

On May 3, Unit 2 was shutdown for a planned outage for safety relief valve repairs. The inspectors reviewed the licensees outage plan, monitored shutdown activities, licensee control of outage activities, and monitored the activities listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Two clearances to verify implementation of the clearance process and the associated equipment was properly configured to support the function of the clearance
  • Drywell closeout and inspection prior to startup
  • TS and licensee procedures to verify mode change requirements were met
  • Plant startup, heatup, and power ascension
  • Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to outage activities

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following seven surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Surveillance Tests

  • 34SV-SUV-019-2, Drywelll Floor-Drain Leakage Surveillance Checks In-Service Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.

.2 Annual Sample

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following two CRs to verify the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensees corrective action program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • CR 2008103563, Failure of the #2 Turbine By-pass valve due to galling

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

CR 2006112331 was generated to address NCV 05000321, 366/2007002-01, a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments. The licensee had proceduralized manual actions without an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. A door, C-69 located between the Main Control Room (MCR) and MCR Annex was left open and resulted in a condition prohibited by TS. The licensee performed a root cause determination and developed several action items to address this NCV. The inspectors reviewed the root cause determination and the actions items. The root cause was comprehensive, included in the evaluation was the human performance weakness of a poor evaluation and an organizational weakness of not challenging the evaluation results by multiple parties. The corrective actions were adequate.

CR 2008103563 was generated to address the failure of the #2 Turbine By-pass valve following the Spring 2008 refueling outage. The licensee has recently implemented changes to the root cause evaluation process. These changes resulted in a very detailed and thorough root cause product. The root cause provided distinctions between symptoms of the failure, galling of the valve stem and root causes, a software error which facilitated rapid cycling of the valve in conjunction with other degraded components. The corrective actions totaled 31 items and ranged from component hardware, procedures, training and process improvements. Additionally 3 items were added as a result of management and department reviews. The corrective actions are adequate.

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program and associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of inspector daily CR screening, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the six month period of January 2008 through June 2008 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated with operability determinations which occurred during the period. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees two latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-008 Reactor Scram on Low Water Level Due to Partial

Loss of Condensate System On August 7, 2007, a loss of the 2A and 2B Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps resulted in degraded feedflow which ultimately caused a reactor scram on low water level. The cause of the scram was an inadvertent actuation of the 2D 4160 volt switchgear when a technician bumped the actuation arm of a over-current relay while installing a protective cover. This condition was documented in CR 2007107492. No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000366/2008-001-000 and 001 Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half

Coupling in RHRSW System On February 18, 2008, a crack was identified at a weld on a 3/4 inch vent line of the RHRSW system. The cause of the crack was flow induced vibration resulting in a high cycle fatigue failure of the weld. This condition was documented in CR 2008102081.

See Section 4OA7 for the disposition of this issue.

.3 (Closed) LER 05000321/2007-001 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable

Due to Component Failures On February 7, 2007, the HPCI minimum flow control valve position indicating lights were discovered extinguished. The cause was a degraded resistor and blown control power fuse. This condition was documented in CR 2008101308. On February 8, 2008 The HPCI turbine steam supply valve failed to open on demand. The cause was a failed motor on the motor operated valve. This condition was documented in CR 2008101351.

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 LER 05000366/2007-004 Leak in Reactor Pressure Boundary Due to Failure of a Socket

Weld This LER was reviewed and closed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2008002, but was misidentified as LER 05000366/2007-003.

.3 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-005 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable

Due to Water Intrusion Into the Oil System This LER was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000366/2008-006.

.4 (Closed) LER 05000366/2007-007 HPCI System Inoperable due to Clogged Valve

Causing Water Intrusion Into the Oil System This LER was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000366/2008-006.

.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000366/2008-002, Residual Heat Removal Service Water

Vent Valve Failure The residents reviewed CR 2008102081 which was generated to address a leak at the weld on the branch piping to 2E11FV001 Vent Valve on the B loop of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW). See Section 4OA7 for the disposition of this issue.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On July 11, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Dennis Madison and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the observations. The inspectors confirmed proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.

  • 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requires in part that measures shall be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of material, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems and components. Contrary to this, on May 16, 2008, the licensee determined that a plant modification recently installed on the Unit 1 Reactor Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system did not meet the design objective of achieving rated flow of 8000 gallons per minute (gpm) with 2 RHRSW pumps operating. Additionally, on May 28, 2008, it was identified that the same plant modification installed on the Unit 2 RHRSW system did not meet the same design objective. Prior to the modification, the RHRSW system achieved a flowrate of 8600 gpm with 2 RHRSW pumps operating. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program under CR 2008105696. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in inoperability of the Unit 1 RHRSW system because river temperature did not exceed 94F.
  • 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control states, in part, that the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculation methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not adequately evaluate, or use other means to demonstrate, that the RHRSW flow control valves operating in the normal flow regimes would not cause cavitations and subsequent vibration such that the RHRSW piping would remain functional. As a result, a flow induced vibration high cycle fatigue failure occurred at a welded connection for a vent valve. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program under CR 2008102081. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of system safety function of the Unit 2 RHRSW system.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

G. Johnson, Site Engineering Manager
J. Dixon, Health Physics Manager
S. Bargeron, Plant Manager
B. Goodwin, Design Manager

G Brinson, Operations Manager

J. Lewis, Site Support Manager
D. Madison, Hatch Vice President
S. Soper, Engineering Support Manager
J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager
R. Varnadore, Maintenance Manager

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED AND CLOSED

Closed

05000366/2007-008 LER Reactor Scram on Low Water Level due to Partial Loss of Condensate System (Section 4OA3.1)
05000366/2008-001-000 LER Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half Coupling in RHRSW System (Section 4OA3.2)
05000366/2008-001-001 LER Leak in Vent Pipe to Process half Coupling in RHRSW System (Section 4OA3.2)
05000321/2007-001 LER High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable due to Component Failures (Section 4OA3.3)
05000366/2007-005 LER High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Water Intrusion Into the Oil System (Section 4OA5.3)
05000366/2007-007 LER HPCI System Inoperable due to Clogged Valve Causing Water Intrusion Into the Oil System (Section 4OA5.4)
05000366/2008-002 URI Residual Heat Removal Service Water Vent Valve Failure (Section 4OA5.5)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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