IR 05000336/2010010

IR 05000336-10-010, 05000423-10-010, on Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection

ML103560111
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	12/22/2010
From:	Doerflein L Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Heacock D Dominion Resources
References
FOIA/PA-2011-0115 IR-10-010
Download: ML103560111 (23)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSION W

REGION I

475 ALLENDALE ROAD

SUBJECT:

MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION RE PORT 05000336/20 1 00 1 0 AN D 0500 0423 1201 00 1 0

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On November 18, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Millstone Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on November 18, 2010, with Mr. A. J. Jordan, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

ln conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS), ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/readino-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, f,

\-

crYo^^,*"^^, b: h*r,/l Lawrence T. Doerflein. Chie; Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-336: 50-423 License Nos.: DPR-65, NPF-49 Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 0500033612010010 and 0500042312010010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc Wencl. Distribution via ListServ

December 22.2010 Mr. David Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 SUBJECT: M]LLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION RE PO RT 05000336/20 1 00 1 0 AN D 0500 0423I 201 001 0 Dear M

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 05000336/2010010, 0500042312010010;1110112010 - 1111812010; Millstone Power Station,

Units 2 and 3; Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection.

This report covers a two week on-site inspection period of the evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by three region based engineering inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4. dated December 2006.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFEW

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier lntegrity

1R17 Evaluations of Chanqes. Tests. or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications

(tP 71111.17)

.1 Evaluations of Chanqes. Tests, or Experiments (34 samples)

a. lnsoection Scope The team reviewed nine safety evaluations to determine whether the changes to the facility or procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. In addition, the team evaluated whether Dominion had been required to obtain NRC approval prior to implementing the changes. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting information including calculations, analyses, design change documentation, procedures, the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications (TS), and plant drawings to assess the adequacy of the safety evaluations. The team compared the safety evaluations and supporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEl) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187 , "Guidance for lmplementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluations The team also reviewed a sample of twenty five 10 CFR 50.59 screenings for which Dominion had concluded that no safety evaluation was required. These reviews were performed to assess whether Dominion's threshold for performing safety evaluations was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample included design changes, calculations, and procedure changes.

The team reviewed the safety evaluations that Dominion had performed and approved during the time period covered by this inspection (i.e., since the last modifications inspection) not previously reviewed by NRC inspectors. The screenings were selected based on the safety significance, risk significance, and complexity of the change to the facility.

ln addition, the team compared Dominion's administrative procedures used to controlthe screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to determine whether those procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The reviewed safety evaluations and screenings are listed in the Attachment.

Findinss No findings were identified.

.2.1 Charqinq Pump'A' and'C' RotatinqAssemblv

Replacement

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a modification (M3-07001) that replaced the 'A' and 'C' charging pump rotating assemblies at Unit 3. The 'B' charging pump had previously failed while in-service, and this modification upgraded the pump shaft with an improved material (lnconel 625). Additional shaft design changes were made as part of the modification to reduce shaft stress.

The team conducted the review to ensure that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the charging system had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed Dominion's implementation of the modification, which included a review of the adequacy of the post-modification test results. The team interviewed the engineering staff regarding the design, installation, and testing of the new rotating assemblies to assess the adequacy of the modification. The team reviewed various documents to verify that the installation was accomplished in accordance with design assumptions and determine if the performance of the charging pumps was acceptable. The team also confirmed that surveillance tests, operational procedures, and drawings had been appropriately updated to reflect the modification. The team reviewed condition reports (CR) and completed surveillance test results to determine if reliability or performance issues resulted from the modification. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.2 Evaluation of Stem Thrust Requirements for 3RHS*MV8701B/8702A

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a Unit 3 calculation (Report 1824 - Part 39) that was revised to increase the open and close running load limits from 2500 to 5000 pounds on motor-operated valves (MOV) 3RHS*MV8701818702A. The MOVs are residual heat removal system containment isolation valves.

The team conducted the review to ensure that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the MOVs had not been adversely affected by the calculation revision. The team reviewed various documents to ensure the valves were operated in accordance with design assumptions and instructions. The team reviewed CRs to determine if reliability or performance issues existed with the valves. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this calculation was also reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinss No findings were identified.

.2.3 Replacement of Charqinq Pump Pulsation Dampeners

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a modification (M2-07002) that replaced the nitrogen filled bladder type pulsation dampeners with liquid filled pulsation dampeners in the discharge piping of the three positive displacement charging pumps at Unit 2. The bladder type dampeners were replaced due to the potential for bladder failure, which could cause gas binding in the charging system.

The team conducted the review to ensure that the design bases, licensing bases, and the performance capability of the charging system had not been adversely affected by the modification. The team reviewed Dominion's installation work orders, which included a review of the adequacy of the post-modification test results. The team interviewed the engineering staff regarding the design, installation, and testing of the new pulsation dampeners to assess the adequacy of the modification. The team walked down the accessible portions of the new equipment to assess the material condition of the system, and to ensure the pulsation dampeners were installed in accordance with design assumptions and instructions. The team also confirmed that surveillance tests, operational procedures, and drawings had been appropriately updated to reflect the design change. The team reviewed CRs and completed surveillance test results to determine if reliability or performance issues resulted from the modification. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Findinss No findings were identified.

.2.4 Net Positive Suction Head Available to 3QSS*P3A.B

lnspection Scope The team reviewed a Unit 3 calculation, P(R)-1062, that was revised to incorporate proposed changes to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) maximum water temperature and to correct the design input for the quench spray (QS) system flow to address a flow assumption deficiency identified in CR-07-06330. The calculation revision documented the net positive suction head (NPSH) available and the associated margin to NPSH required for the QS pumps in support of increasing the maximum RWST temperature to 85 degrees Fahrenheit ("F) (stretch power uprate).

The team conducted the review to ensure that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the QS system had not been adversely affected by the revision to the calculation. The team reviewed the design of the QS system to assess the adequacy of the calculation. The team walked down the accessible portions of the QS system to evaluate the material condition. The team also confirmed that related documents and procedures were updated as necessary to reflect the revision. The team reviewed CRs to determine if reliability or performance issues existed with the QS pumps. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this calculation was also reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.5 Reactor Plant Component Coolino Svstem Surqe Tank Sizing Calculation

lnspection Scope The team reviewed a Unit 3 calculation, P(R)-71 1, which was revised to update the reactor plant component cooling water (CCW) surge tank volume based on items such as thermal expansion and contraction, and volume lost due to moderate energy line breaks. The calculation revision also updated the range of CCW system temperature to address the maximum temperature derived in the stretch power uprate of 155"F.

The team conducted the review to ensure that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the CCW system had not been adversely affected by the revision to the calculation. The team reviewed the design of the CCW system to assess the adequacy of the calculation. The team walked down the accessible portions of the CCW system to evaluate the material condition. The team also confirmed that related documents and procedures were updated as necessary to reflect the revision. The team reviewed CRs to determine if reliability or performance issues existed with the CCW pumps. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this calcufation was also reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Findinos No findings were identified.

.2.6 Over-Power Delta Temperature/Over-Temperature Delta Temperature Electronic Filter

Inspection Scope The team reviewed an over-power delta temperature/over-temperature delta temperature (OPDT/OTDT) modification (DM3-00-0189-07) at Unit 3 in which the OPDT rate/lag cards were replaced and reconfigured for the hot leg temperature (TnoJ signal.

The Tsol temperature signal from each reactor coolant system (RCS) hot leg is used to generate the auctioneered high vessel average temperature (T"us) and delta temperature protection and control signals. The modification was performed because Unit 3 observed short duration temperature measurement variations from each of three locally mounted temperature sensors due to fluid stratification within the RCS hot legs.

The team's review was performed to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the OPDT/OTDT trips had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed setpoint calculations and technical evaluations to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions. Modified components were reviewed to ensure that the modification conformed to the design specifications. Design assumptions were reviewed to evaluate whether they were technically appropriate and consistent with the UFSAR. The team also verified selected drawings, calculations, instrument calibration sheets, and procedures were properly updated based on the new system configuration. The team reviewed the post-modification testing, instrument calibration data sheets, and surveillance testing to verify the results indicated the system would function in accordance with design requirements.

The team reviewed CRs associated with the system to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and corrected. Additionally, the team conducted interviews with engineering staff to verify the affected components functioned in accordance with the design requirements, and to determine if the modification corrected the previously identified problem. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinos No findings were identified

.2.7 Pressurizer Level Control Prooram

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a Unit 3 modification (DM3-00-0298-07) that changed the pressurizer level program as a function of RCS auctioneered high vesselT"un. The function of the pressurizer level control system is to maintain the pressurizer water level at or near its programmed level as a function of T"un. The pressurizer level program provides an approximate constant mass inventory in the RCS so that the chemical and volume control system charging rate remains relatively constant during load changes.

The modification was performed because there was a change in RCS normal plant operating conditions resulting from the stretch power uprate that caused an increase in shrink and/or swell within the pressurizer during normal plant operations. To accommodate this increased shrink and/or swell, the pressurizer level program as a function of RCS T"un was revised to provide a wider level control band for the no-load to full load range of RCS T"un temperatures.

The team's review was performed to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the pressurizer level control program had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed instrument scaling calculations and technical evaluations to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions.

Instrument calibration requirements and design assumptions were reviewed to evaluate whether they were technically appropriate and consistent with the UFSAR. The team also verified that selected drawings, instrument calibration sheets, and procedures were properly updated based on the new system configuration. The team reviewed the post-modification and surveillance test results to verify proper operation of the system.

Finally, the team reviewed CRs associated with the system to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and corrected. The documents reviewed are listed in the

.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.8 Inadequate Circuit lsolation of Service Water Pump Discharqe Motor-Operated Valves

3SWP-MOV102A and 3SWP"MOV102C Inspection Scope The team reviewed a Unit 3 modification (DM3-00-0190-08) that removed the control function from the fire transfer switch panel for the train 'A' service water (SW) pump discharge MOVs 3SWP*MOV102A and 3SWP*MOV102C close circuits. Remote control functions for these MOVs were originally needed for post-fire safe shutdown when evacuation of the main control room was required due to a fire. The modification was performed because it was identified that the close circuits associated with these two MOVs passed through the control room area and did not have the required isolation capability. Fire damage to the close circuitry could disable operation of the MOVs from the fire transfer switch panel or it could cause spurious operation of the MOVs. The modification hard-wired the MOV close signals within the control circuits of their respective SW pumps, which eliminated the need to manually close the valves from the fire transfer switch panel. The team's review was performed to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the close function of MOVs 3SWP*MOV102A and 3SWP*MOV102C had not been degraded by the modification.

Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report.

The team assessed if the modification was consistent with requirements in the design and licensing bases. The team reviewed technical evaluations to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions. Elementary wiring diagrams were reviewed to ensure that the modification conformed to the design specifications. The team also verified that selected drawings and procedures were properly updated based on the new equipment configuration. The team reviewed the post-modification and surveillance test results to verify proper operation of the modified MOV circuits. The team reviewed CRs associated with the equipment to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and corrected. The team performed a walkdown of the accessible components of the system (i.e., selector switches and valve position indicators on the fire transfer switch panel) to identify any abnormal conditions.

Additionally, the team conducted interviews with engineering staff to verify affected systems and/or components functioned in accordance with the design assumptions, and to verify the modification corrected the previously identified problem. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.9 Power-Ooerated Relief Valve 2-RC-404 Resistance Temperature Detector Relocation

and Setpoint Chanqe a. lnspection Scope The team reviewed a Unit 2 modification (DM2-03-0128-08) that relocated resistance temperature detector (RTD) TE-114 downstream of power operated relief valve (PORV)2-RC-404. The function of TE-114 is to provide indication and high temperature annunciation of 2-RC-404 discharge temperature. The modification was performed because the existing location of RTD fE-114 resulted in high temperature readings due to conduction heat transfer between RTD TE-114 and its associated PORV.

Specifically, it was a challenge to operators to discern between PORV leakage and conduction heat transfer in the prior configuration. The relocation of the RTD downstream of the PORV also allowed the original annunciator setpoint of 165"F to be restored and provided operations with a more accurate determination of PORV leakage.

The team's review was performed to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the PORV leakage temperature monitoring configuration had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed technical evaluations to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions. Instrument calibration requirements were reviewed to verify that the configuration met the manufacturer's specifications. Design assumptions were reviewed to evaluate whether they were technically appropriate and consistent with the UFSAR. Instrumentation setpoints and scaling were reviewed to ensure design limits were not exceeded. The team verified that selected drawings, instrument calibration sheets, and procedures were properly updated based on the new system configuration; and reviewed the post-modification testing to verify proper operation of the new configuration. The team reviewed CRs associated with the equipment or system to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and corrected. The team conducted interviews with engineering staff to verify the modified RTD functioned in accordance with the design assumptions, and to verify the modification corrected the previously identified problem. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.10 Vital Inverters Replacement

a.

lnspection Scope The team reviewed a modification (M3-06004) that replaced the existing Unit 3 vital inverters, manual bypass switches, and regulation transformers with new equipment.

The 120 Vac vital bus system is designed to supply control and instrument power to plant equipment that is credited in the design bases accident analysis. The vital inverters, regulating transformers, and manual bypass switches are designed to meet this design function by supplying safety-related, regulated, 120 Vac power to the vital instrumentation loads. The modification was performed because the system was in Maintenance Rule (aX1) status due to frequent functional failures. The existing inverters and their associated equipment were becoming unreliable, and many of the components within the inverters were obsolete.

The team's review was performed to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the new vital inverter system had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed calculations and technical evaluations, and interviewed engineering staff, to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions. Power requirements were reviewed to verify that the equipment met the manufacturer's specifications and did not adversely affect other support systems.

Replacement components and materials were reviewed to ensure that the modification conformed to the design specifications. Design assumptions were reviewed to evaluate whether they were technically appropriate and consistent with the UFSAR. Supporting electrical calculations and analyses for the loading and sizing requirements were reviewed to ensure design limits were not exceeded. The team also verified that selected drawings, calculations, and procedures were properly updated based on the new equipment configuration. The team reviewed the post-modification and surveillance test results to verify proper operation of the new vital inverter system. The team reviewed CRs associated with the system to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and corrected. The team performed a walkdown of the accessible components of the system to identify any abnormal conditions and to verify proper operation of the system while in-service. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17

.1 of this

report. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Findinss No findings were identified.

.2.11 Removal

of Check Valve 2-CS-26 lnternals and Relocation of TS-2542

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a Unit 2 modification (DM2-00-0152-07) that removed the internal components of check valve 2-CS-26 and also relocated and replaced an existing temperature switch (TS-2542) assembly (i.e., thermostat, capillary tube, sensing bulb) in the associated piping with a new assembly. The check valve was located in the I

minimum flow return line to the RWST. lt had a passive safety function as a pressure boundary and a design function to prevent back flow from the RWST to the high and low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and the containment spray (CS)system. Dominion implemented this modification after determining that a failure of this valve to open could result in insufficient minimum recirculation flow and a loss of ECCS and CS pumps during certain postulated scenarios. Additionally, the back flow protection that this valve provides was redundant. Relocation of TS-2542 and its sensing bulb was to improve the effectiveness of the electric heat tracing circuit.

The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the ECCS and CS systems had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the documentation supporting Dominion's evaluation that determined it was acceptable to remove the check valve's internals to assess its adequacy. The team reviewed Dominion's maintenance activities and post-modification testing results to verify proper setpoint and calibration of the temperature switch. The team verified calculations, drawings, procedures, and design bases documents were updated to reflect the modification. The team also interviewed engineering staff and conducted a walkdown of the RWST tank area and the 2-CS-26 valve to identify any abnormal conditions and determine if the material condition was acceptable. The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed,as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b.

Findinss No findings were identified.

.2.12 EDG Operatinq Time with 24,000 Gallons of Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a Unit 2 calculation (DM2-00-0042-07) that was revised to determine the length of time that the emergency diesel generators (EDG) could operate at the continuous rated load of 2750 kW utilizing a maximum of 24,000 gallons of fuel, which was the amount of fuel required to be stored in the diesel fuel oil supply tanks as per the Unit 2 TSs. The modification was implemented to calculate any changes to engine fuel oil consumption rates or run times due to the use of ultra low sulfur diesel fuel.

The team assessed whether the modification was consistent with assumptions in the design and licensing bases. The team reviewed the associated revision and discussed the calculation with the responsible design engineer to verify the assumptions were appropriate. The team conducted a walkdown of the EDG enclosures to assess material condition. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.13 Addition of lnstrumentation Pulsation

Dampeners

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a Unit 3 modification (DM3-00-1598-96) that upgraded the material of instrumentation line pressure pulsation dampeners (snubbers). The snubbers provide pressure dampening and filtering to prevent damage to associated pressure gauges or transmitters. The modification was performed as a revision to add a commercial grade, seismically rugged, non-environmentally qualified item for purchase and dedicated use.

This item was an upgrade to previous snubber installations in various pressure indicator sensing lines where gauges/instruments have required frequent replacement and extended out-of-service time due to excessive wear caused by pressure pulsations.

The review was performed to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the pressure-sensing instrumentation had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed technical evaluations to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions. The modification requirements and procurement receipt documentation were reviewed to verify the components met the manufacturer's specifications, material codes, non-magnetic requirements, and dimensions. The team conducted interviews with engineering staff to verify that the affected pressure instrumentation functioned in accordance with the design assumptions and to verify that the modification corrected the previously identified problem. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.14 Service Water Pump

Strainer Backwash Pipino to Alternate Bav - Operatinq Procedure

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a revision to the Unit 2 system operating procedure OP 2326D, "Service Water Pump Strainer Backwash Piping to Alternate Bay." The purpose of this procedure modification was to 1) reconfigure the SW pump strainer backwash piping from its normal discharge path to an alternate discharge path, to be used during concurrent SW bay draining, cleaning or other maintenance; and 2) to add a compensatory operator action during the alternate discharge piping tie-in activity.

The team's review was performed to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the service water system had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed system operating procedures, related maintenance activities, and surveillance and post maintenance test results to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions. The team conducted interviews with engineering staff to verify the intent and adequacy of the modification, and to verify that modification corrected the previously identified problem. The team performed a walkdown of the Unit 2 intake structure and accessible components of the system to identify any abnormal conditions and to verify proper operation of the equipment while in-service. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4c.42 ldentification and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of CRs associated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plant modification issues to determine whether Dominion was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas, and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. In addition, the team reviewed CRs written on issues identified during the inspection to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action system.

The CRs reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

4046 Meetinqs. includinq Exit The team presented the inspection results to Mr. A. J. Jordan, Site Vice President, and other members of Dominion's staff at an exit meeting on November 18, 2010. The team returned the proprietary information reviewed during the inspection and verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Dominion Personnel

D. Bajumpaa, Design Engineer

B. Burnham, Senior Engineer

T. Cleary, Licensing Engineer

K. Cyr, Senior Engineer

W. Faye, Design Engineer

N. Jaycox, Sr. Mechanical Project Engineer

D. MacNeill, Design Engineering Supervisor

D. Robinson, Senior Engineer

J. Roddy, Project Engineer

R. Ryan, Procurement Engineering Technical Specialist

L. Salyards, Licensing Engineer

R. Sterner, Senior Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

None.