|
|
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown) |
Line 3: |
Line 3: |
| | issue date = 11/10/2010 | | | issue date = 11/10/2010 |
| | title = IR 05000263-10-007, on 09/13/2010 - 10/01/2010; Monticello Nuclear Generating Station; Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems | | | title = IR 05000263-10-007, on 09/13/2010 - 10/01/2010; Monticello Nuclear Generating Station; Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems |
| | author name = Riemer K R | | | author name = Riemer K |
| | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 | | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| | addressee name = O'Connor T J | | | addressee name = O'Connor T |
| | addressee affiliation = Northern States Power Co | | | addressee affiliation = Northern States Power Co |
| | docket = 05000263 | | | docket = 05000263 |
Line 18: |
Line 18: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter: | | {{#Wiki_filter:ber 10, 2010 |
| [[Issue date::November 10, 2010]]
| |
|
| |
|
| Mr. Timothy Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company, Minnesota 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362-9637
| | ==SUBJECT:== |
| | MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2010007 |
|
| |
|
| SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2010007
| | ==Dear Mr. OConnor:== |
| | On October 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. |
|
| |
|
| ==Dear Mr. O'Connor:==
| | The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 1, 2010, with you and other members of your staff. |
| On October 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 1, 2010, with you and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
| |
|
| |
|
| The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The inspection concluded that your staff was effective at identifying problems and incorporating them into the corrective action program (CAP). In general, issues were appropriately prioritized, evaluated, and corrected; audits and self-assessments were thorough and probing, and operating experience was appropriately screened and disseminated. Your staff was aware of the importance of having a strong safety-conscious work environment and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. The inspectors also observed that actions taken to address a declining trend in Human Performance appeared to be effective. However, your staff was not fully effective in addressing an adverse trend in contractor oversight and in work control and planning, which had begun earlier this year. Although both issues were captured in the CAP program, the underlying causes were not fully understood. This resulted in corrective actions being more reactive, instead of proactive, when responding to related issues. The inspectors were concerned that this adverse trend, if not resolved, would negatively impact the significant number of work activities planned for next year. No violations or findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). | | The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. |
|
| |
|
| ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
| | The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. |
|
| |
|
| Sincerely,/RA/
| | The inspection concluded that your staff was effective at identifying problems and incorporating them into the corrective action program (CAP). In general, issues were appropriately prioritized, evaluated, and corrected; audits and self-assessments were thorough and probing, and operating experience was appropriately screened and disseminated. Your staff was aware of the importance of having a strong safety-conscious work environment and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. The inspectors also observed that actions taken to address a declining trend in Human Performance appeared to be effective. |
| Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
| |
|
| |
|
| Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 | | However, your staff was not fully effective in addressing an adverse trend in contractor oversight and in work control and planning, which had begun earlier this year. Although both issues were captured in the CAP program, the underlying causes were not fully understood. This resulted in corrective actions being more reactive, instead of proactive, when responding to related issues. |
| | |
| | The inspectors were concerned that this adverse trend, if not resolved, would negatively impact the significant number of work activities planned for next year. No violations or findings were identified during this inspection. |
| | |
| | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) |
| | component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). |
| | |
| | Sincerely, |
| | /RA/ |
| | Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 |
|
| |
|
| ===Enclosure:=== | | ===Enclosure:=== |
| Inspection Report 05000263/2010007 | | Inspection Report 05000263/2010007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information |
| | |
| | REGION III== |
| | Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Report No: 05000263/2010007 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Location: Monticello, MN Dates: September 13 - October 1, 2010 Inspectors: N. Shah, Project Engineer - Team Lead D. Sand, Acting Resident Inspector - Monticello C. Scott, Reactor Engineer G. ODwyer, Reactor Engineer M. Phalen, Plant Support Specialist Approved by: Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects |
| | |
| | =SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= |
| | IR 05000263/2010007; 09/13/2010 - 10/01/2010; Monticello Nuclear Generating Station; |
| | |
| | Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems. |
| | |
| | This team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and the resident inspector. |
| | |
| | No violations or findings were identified. |
| | |
| | Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was good. Issues were effectively identified, evaluated and corrected. Nuclear Oversight (NOS) audits and department self-assessments were generally critical and identified issues that were captured in the (CAP). Operating Experience (OE) was well communicated and appropriately evaluated. A strong safety culture was evident, based on interviews with licensee staff and a review of the types of issues captured in the CAP and Employee Concerns Program (ECP). |
|
| |
|
| ===w/Attachment:===
| | The inspectors observed that the evaluation of OE in Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) had improved since the 2008 PI&R inspection. Specifically, ACEs now discussed whether the failure to properly evaluate previously identified OE was a potential precursor of the event. |
| Supplemental Information
| |
|
| |
|
| cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServe
| | The licensee took proactive efforts to address a declining trend in the Security Department Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). The inspectors received positive feedback during interviews with Security officers, and noted an increasing trend in the number of issues identified by the Security force. |
|
| |
|
| U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Report No: 05000263/2010007 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Location: Monticello, MN Dates: September 13 - October 1, 2010 Inspectors: N. Shah, Project Engineer - Team Lead D. Sand, Acting Resident Inspector - Monticello C. Scott, Reactor Engineer G. O'Dwyer, Reactor Engineer M. Phalen, Plant Support Specialist
| | The licensees actions to address the previous cross-cutting issues in Human Performance and a potential cross-cutting issue in Issue Evaluation appeared good. The corrective actions appeared appropriate and the inspectors noted improving performance over the last six months in these areas. |
|
| |
|
| Approved by: Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
| | However, the inspectors noted that the licensee had recurring problems with managing the CAP backlog and with ensuring that items identified during management observations were captured in the CAP. The inspectors also identified some examples where licensee staff had changed due dates for subtasks without referencing the source CAP report. |
|
| |
|
| =SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
| | The inspectors identified that CAP implementing procedures did not provide good guidance regarding how to evaluate critical and non-critical component failures. Specifically, some component failures, which could reasonably be considered critical, (i.e., had significant consequences) could be classified as non-critical using the current guidance. |
| IR 05000263/2010007; 09/13/2010 - 10/01/2010; Monticello Nuclear Generating Station; Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems. This team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and the resident inspector. No violations or findings were identified. Identification and Resolution of Problems
| |
|
| |
|
| Overall, the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was good. Issues were effectively identified, evaluated and corrected. Nuclear Oversight (NOS) audits and department self-assessments were generally critical and identified issues that were captured in the (CAP). Operating Experience (OE) was well communicated and appropriately evaluated. A strong safety culture was evident, based on interviews with licensee staff and a review of the types of issues captured in the CAP and Employee Concerns Program (ECP). The inspectors observed that the evaluation of OE in Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) had improved since the 2008 PI&R inspection. Specifically, ACEs now discussed whether the failure to properly evaluate previously identified OE was a potential precursor of the event. The licensee took proactive efforts to address a declining trend in the Security Department Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). The inspectors received positive feedback during interviews with Security officers, and noted an increasing trend in the number of issues identified by the Security force. The licensee's actions to address the previous cross-cutting issues in Human Performance and a potential cross-cutting issue in Issue Evaluation appeared good. The corrective actions appeared appropriate and the inspectors noted improving performance over the last six months in these areas. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee had recurring problems with managing the CAP backlog and with ensuring that items identified during management observations were captured in the CAP. The inspectors also identified some examples where licensee staff had changed due dates for subtasks without referencing the source CAP report. The inspectors identified that CAP implementing procedures did not provide good guidance regarding how to evaluate "critical" and "non-critical" component failures. Specifically, some component failures, which could reasonably be considered "critical," (i.e., had significant consequences) could be classified as "non-critical" using the current guidance. The inspectors observed that there were continuing issues related to work planning and execution and with contractor control. Although both problems were captured in the CAP, the underlying causes were not yet fully understood, resulting in most of the corrective actions being reactive rather than proactive. For example, it was unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were the same issues that were affecting the contractor performance. In addition, as previously stated, some issues identified through management observations associated with these topics may not be captured in the CAP.
| | The inspectors observed that there were continuing issues related to work planning and execution and with contractor control. Although both problems were captured in the CAP, the underlying causes were not yet fully understood, resulting in most of the corrective actions being reactive rather than proactive. For example, it was unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were the same issues that were affecting the contractor performance. In addition, as previously stated, some issues identified through management observations associated with these topics may not be captured in the CAP. |
|
| |
|
| Although the station continued to evaluate the issue, it remained an area of concern given the significant outage work planned for the next year. | | Although the station continued to evaluate the issue, it remained an area of concern given the significant outage work planned for the next year. |
|
| |
|
| ===A. NRC-Identified=== | | ===NRC-Identified=== |
| and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified. | | and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified. |
|
| |
|
| ===B. Licensee-Identified Violations=== | | ===Licensee-Identified Violations=== |
|
| |
|
| No violations of significance were identified. | | No violations of significance were identified. |
Line 71: |
Line 91: |
| The activities documented in sections | | The activities documented in sections |
|
| |
|
| ===.1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of PI&R as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152.=== | | ===.1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of=== |
| | |
| | PI&R as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152. |
|
| |
|
| ===.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness=== | | ===.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness=== |
|
| |
|
| ====a. Inspection Scope==== | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP implementing procedures and attended CAP program meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel. | | The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP implementing procedures and attended CAP program meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel. |
|
| |
|
| The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensee's CAP since the last NRC PI&R inspection in November 2008. The issues selected were appropriately varied across the NRC cornerstones, and were identified through routine daily plant activities, licensee audits and self-assessments, industry operating experience reports, and NRC inspection activities. The inspectors also reviewed a selection of apparent, common and root cause evaluations for more significant CAP items. The inspectors performed a more extensive review of the licensee's efforts to address ongoing issues with human performance and issue evaluation. This review consisted primarily of a five year search of related issues identified in the CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensee's corrective actions. | | The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensees CAP since the last NRC PI&R inspection in November 2008. The issues selected were appropriately varied across the NRC cornerstones, and were identified through routine daily plant activities, licensee audits and self-assessments, industry operating experience reports, and NRC inspection activities. The inspectors also reviewed a selection of apparent, common and root cause evaluations for more significant CAP items. |
|
| |
|
| During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee staff's actions were in compliance with the facility's CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements.
| | The inspectors performed a more extensive review of the licensees efforts to address ongoing issues with human performance and issue evaluation. This review consisted primarily of a five year search of related issues identified in the CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensees corrective actions. |
|
| |
|
| Specifically, whether licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the station's CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings. | | During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee staffs actions were in compliance with the facilitys CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. |
| | |
| | Specifically, whether licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the stations CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings. |
|
| |
|
| All documents reviewed during this inspection were listed in the Attachment to this report. | | All documents reviewed during this inspection were listed in the Attachment to this report. |
|
| |
|
| b. Assessment | | b. Assessment |
| : (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification The licensee's implementation of the CAP was generally good. Workers were encouraged to identify issues and were familiar with the various avenues available (NRC, CAP, etc). This was evident by the large number of CAP items generated annually, which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A shared computerized database was used for creating individual reports and for subsequent management of the processes of issue evaluation and response. This included determining the issue's significance, addressing such matters as regulatory compliance and reporting, and assigning any actions deemed necessary or appropriate. | | : (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification The licensees implementation of the CAP was generally good. Workers were encouraged to identify issues and were familiar with the various avenues available (NRC, CAP, etc). This was evident by the large number of CAP items generated annually, which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A shared computerized database was used for creating individual reports and for subsequent management of the processes of issue evaluation and response. This included determining the issues significance, addressing such matters as regulatory compliance and reporting, and assigning any actions deemed necessary or appropriate. |
|
| |
|
| In reviewing licensee management observations conducted between June and October 2010, the inspectors found several examples of items that were apparently not captured in the CAP. Most of the examples were concerned with industrial safety or work planning issues that should have been captured in the CAP. In one example, a worker observing an industrial safety concern stated that because the worker had not met a management expectation, vice a procedural requirement, the issue wasn't going to be documented in the CAP. The licensee documented the inspectors' concern as CAP item 1251890. The licensee was also good at identifying and resolving trends. The inspectors noted a large number of trends identified through the "binning" of issues or via the quarterly department roll-up meeting (DRUM) reports. During the November 2008, PI&R review, the inspectors identified that the licensee's trending program was somewhat limited in that it did not always identify trends with issues affecting the same functional area, but having dissimilar aspects. Subsequently, the licensee initiated an effort to assign cross-cutting criteria (analogous to NRC criteria)to apparent and root cause evaluations, which were then trended. Although the inspectors considered this a positive effor t, it was too early to determine its overall effectiveness. | | In reviewing licensee management observations conducted between June and October 2010, the inspectors found several examples of items that were apparently not captured in the CAP. Most of the examples were concerned with industrial safety or work planning issues that should have been captured in the CAP. In one example, a worker observing an industrial safety concern stated that because the worker had not met a management expectation, vice a procedural requirement, the issue wasnt going to be documented in the CAP. The licensee documented the inspectors concern as CAP item 1251890. |
| | |
| | The licensee was also good at identifying and resolving trends. The inspectors noted a large number of trends identified through the binning of issues or via the quarterly department roll-up meeting (DRUM) reports. |
| | |
| | During the November 2008, PI&R review, the inspectors identified that the licensees trending program was somewhat limited in that it did not always identify trends with issues affecting the same functional area, but having dissimilar aspects. Subsequently, the licensee initiated an effort to assign cross-cutting criteria (analogous to NRC criteria)to apparent and root cause evaluations, which were then trended. Although the inspectors considered this a positive effort, it was too early to determine its overall effectiveness. |
|
| |
|
| Findings No findings were identified. | | Findings No findings were identified. |
Line 100: |
Line 128: |
| Additionally, licensee management did not always address issues with ACE quality that were identified during the evaluation grading process. The inspectors noted that subsequent ACEs now addressed whether OE was properly used prior to the event and that ACE quality issues were communicated to the originating departments. | | Additionally, licensee management did not always address issues with ACE quality that were identified during the evaluation grading process. The inspectors noted that subsequent ACEs now addressed whether OE was properly used prior to the event and that ACE quality issues were communicated to the originating departments. |
|
| |
|
| Station Procedure FP-E-SE-02, "Component Classification," was used by licensee staff to distinguish between a "critical" and "non-critical" component failure. | | Station Procedure FP-E-SE-02, Component Classification, was used by licensee staff to distinguish between a critical and non-critical component failure. The procedure was written specifically to address equipment reliability, but was referenced in the CAP for use during cause evaluations. Although the stated guidance was adequate for equipment reliability considerations, it was not appropriate for CAP evaluations. |
| | |
| | For example, this procedure specifically defines any component failure that results in a significant radiological release as a non-critical component failure. From a CAP perspective, any component failure resulting in significant radiological consequences would be critical. The inspectors were concerned that this procedure may result in some component failures being treated as less significant under the CAP, then appropriate. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250116 to review this issue. |
| | |
| | Since 2006, the licensee has experienced numerous issues in human performance. |
|
| |
|
| The procedure was written specifically to address equipment reliability, but was referenced in the CAP for use during cause evaluations. Although the stated guidance was adequate for 5 Enclosure equipment reliability considerations, it was not appropriate for CAP evaluations. For example, this procedure specifically defines any component failure that results in a significant radiological release as a "non-critical" component failure. From a CAP perspective, any component failure resulting in significant radiological consequences would be "critical." The inspectors were concerned that this procedure may result in some component failures being treated as less significant under the CAP, then appropriate. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250116 to review this issue. Since 2006, the licensee has experienced numerous issues in human performance.
| | Initially, these issues were primarily of low significance (i.e., did not result in an NRC finding). However, the issues continued through 2008, with the significance of the findings increasing, until an adverse trend in human performance had become evident. |
|
| |
|
| Initially, these issues were primarily of lo w significance (i.e., did not result in an NRC finding). However, the issues continued through 2008, with the significance of the findings increasing, until an adverse trend in human performance had become evident.
| | The licensees early efforts to address this trend were largely ineffective, as the licensee originally believed that the human performance issues were limited to specific behaviors or work groups, instead of a more widespread concern involving fundamental human behaviors. Subsequently, the licensee identified that the issues were principally due to a lack of resources and an inappropriate tolerance for risk among workers. Several corrective actions were initiated, including additional training to site workers on configuration control and risk management. The inspectors noted that performance had improved among site workers in the past six months. |
|
| |
|
| The licensee's early efforts to address this trend were largely ineffective, as the licensee originally believed that the human performance issues were limited to specific behaviors or work groups, instead of a more widespread concern involving fundamental human behaviors. Subsequently, the licensee identified that the issues were principally due to a lack of resources and an inappropriate tolerance for risk among workers. Several corrective actions were initiated, including additional training to site workers on configuration control and risk management. The inspectors noted that performance had improved among site workers in the past six months. However, the licensee was still dealing with an adverse trend in contractor human performance, primarily related to oversight and work planning and execution. Although this issue was captured in the CAP (items 1249158 and 1247197), the underlying causes are not yet fully understood, and many of the corrective actions, to date, have been more reactive than proactive. For example, it is unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were also affecting the contractor performance. To date, the majority of the issues have been of low significance (i.e., not resulting in an NRC finding); however, the overall trend was similar to the previous issue with site human performance.
| | However, the licensee was still dealing with an adverse trend in contractor human performance, primarily related to oversight and work planning and execution. |
| | |
| | Although this issue was captured in the CAP (items 1249158 and 1247197), the underlying causes are not yet fully understood, and many of the corrective actions, to date, have been more reactive than proactive. For example, it is unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were also affecting the contractor performance. To date, the majority of the issues have been of low significance (i.e., not resulting in an NRC finding); however, the overall trend was similar to the previous issue with site human performance. |
|
| |
|
| Findings | | Findings |
Line 114: |
Line 148: |
|
| |
|
| =====Description:===== | | =====Description:===== |
| As part of the review of the ACE for an adverse trend in double disc gate valve (DDGV) local leak rate testing (LLRT) performance documented in CAP 1202466, the inspectors noted that the ACE had determined that the valves' performance degradation did not prevent the valves from performing their safety function. The ACE only addressed the valves' safety function of providing containment isolation. The inspectors questioned if the safety function of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) steam supply valves to close after detection of a HELB should have been considered. The licensee responded that the ACE did not need to consider the effect of the valves' increased leakage on the HELB analyses because any leakage would not impact the alternate shutdown path. The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and acceptance criteria of the HELB calculations for HPCI, RCIC and RWCU line breaks and identified potential inconsistencies between the calculations' assumptions with Technical Specifications' and UFSAR allowed values for valve closure times, incorporation of delay actuations, and isolation initiation signals. The licensee entered the NRC concerns with these 6 Enclosure potential inconsistencies into the CAP by initiating CAP 01252363 on October 1, 2010. The licensee stated that the calculations were appropriate and provided the inspectors | | As part of the review of the ACE for an adverse trend in double disc gate valve (DDGV) local leak rate testing (LLRT) performance documented in CAP 1202466, the inspectors noted that the ACE had determined that the valves performance degradation did not prevent the valves from performing their safety function. The ACE only addressed the valves safety function of providing containment isolation. The inspectors questioned if the safety function of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI),reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) steam supply valves to close after detection of a HELB should have been considered. The licensee responded that the ACE did not need to consider the effect of the valves increased leakage on the HELB analyses because any leakage would not impact the alternate shutdown path. The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and acceptance criteria of the HELB calculations for HPCI, RCIC and RWCU line breaks and identified potential inconsistencies between the calculations assumptions with Technical Specifications and UFSAR allowed values for valve closure times, incorporation of delay actuations, and isolation initiation signals. The licensee entered the NRC concerns with these potential inconsistencies into the CAP by initiating CAP 01252363 on October 1, 2010. |
|
| |
|
| with some original licensing documents for the HELB analyses; however, additional questions remained. This issue will be tracked as URI 05000263/201007-01 pending further NRC review of the licensee responses and the HELB analyses and determination of the original and current licensing bases. | | The licensee stated that the calculations were appropriate and provided the inspectors with some original licensing documents for the HELB analyses; however, additional questions remained. This issue will be tracked as URI 05000263/201007-01 pending further NRC review of the licensee responses and the HELB analyses and determination of the original and current licensing bases. |
| : (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented, commensurate with their safety significance. Those corrective actions addressing selected NRC documented violations were also generally effective and timely. | | : (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented, commensurate with their safety significance. Those corrective actions addressing selected NRC documented violations were also generally effective and timely. |
|
| |
|
Line 125: |
Line 159: |
| The inspectors identified several examples where the revised due dates for subtasks were inconsistent with the parent CAP. Although none of the identified examples were highly significant, the inspectors were concerned that the practice may result in other changes having a greater operational impact. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250089 to evaluate this issue. | | The inspectors identified several examples where the revised due dates for subtasks were inconsistent with the parent CAP. Although none of the identified examples were highly significant, the inspectors were concerned that the practice may result in other changes having a greater operational impact. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250089 to evaluate this issue. |
|
| |
|
| The station has a recurring problem with managing the backlog. A recent licensee initiative to redefine the items tracked in the backlog has reduced the numbers, but didn't necessarily address the issue. The licensee currently tracks only Corrective Actions, Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence, and operability issues. Other items, that used to be part of the backlog, were instead tracked as CAP action items. However, the inspectors noted that there was no formal effort to determine whether the CAP action items were being addressed in a timely fashion (i.e., no performance indicator similar to the formal backlog indicator). Since these action items were corrective actions (albeit of lower significance), the inspectors were concerned that some may not get implemented. Complicating the issue was an apparent mixed message from station management, who expressed the view that the backlog numbers weren't important so long as items were being properly managed. Since this issue was already captured in the CAP, the inspectors' observations were included as part of the ongoing licensee evaluation. | | The station has a recurring problem with managing the backlog. A recent licensee initiative to redefine the items tracked in the backlog has reduced the numbers, but didnt necessarily address the issue. The licensee currently tracks only Corrective Actions, Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence, and operability issues. Other items, that used to be part of the backlog, were instead tracked as CAP action items. However, the inspectors noted that there was no formal effort to determine whether the CAP action items were being addressed in a timely fashion (i.e., no performance indicator similar to the formal backlog indicator). Since these action items were corrective actions (albeit of lower significance), the inspectors were concerned that some may not get implemented. |
| | |
| | Complicating the issue was an apparent mixed message from station management, who expressed the view that the backlog numbers werent important so long as items were being properly managed. Since this issue was already captured in the CAP, the inspectors observations were included as part of the ongoing licensee evaluation. |
|
| |
|
| Findings No findings were identified. | | Findings No findings were identified. |
Line 132: |
Line 168: |
|
| |
|
| ====a. Inspection Scope==== | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the facility's OE program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed implementing OE program procedures, attended CAP meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors' review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively 7 Enclosure integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensee's program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented. | | The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the facilitys OE program. |
| | |
| | Specifically, the inspectors reviewed implementing OE program procedures, attended CAP meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensees program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented. |
|
| |
|
| Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. | | Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. |
Line 138: |
Line 176: |
| b. Assessment In general, OE was effectively used at the station. The inspectors observed that OE was discussed as part of the daily station planning meetings, at shift turnover meetings, and at maintenance pre-briefings. Also, the inspectors determined that OE was appropriately reviewed during causal evaluations. During interviews, several licensee personnel commented favorably on the use of OE in their daily activities. | | b. Assessment In general, OE was effectively used at the station. The inspectors observed that OE was discussed as part of the daily station planning meetings, at shift turnover meetings, and at maintenance pre-briefings. Also, the inspectors determined that OE was appropriately reviewed during causal evaluations. During interviews, several licensee personnel commented favorably on the use of OE in their daily activities. |
|
| |
|
| The inspectors noted that the OE evaluation for a relay failure that resulted in the inoperability of a safety-related train at Harris (Action Request (AR) 1233871) was somewhat limited in scope. The evaluation identified that similar relays were used at Monticello, but in non-safety related equipment; therefore, no actions were required. However, there was no documented evaluation whether a failure of these relays in the affected equipment could have had any significant operational impact. The licensee documented this issue as CAP item 1252873. | | The inspectors noted that the OE evaluation for a relay failure that resulted in the inoperability of a safety-related train at Harris (Action Request (AR) 1233871) was somewhat limited in scope. The evaluation identified that similar relays were used at Monticello, but in non-safety related equipment; therefore, no actions were required. |
| | |
| | However, there was no documented evaluation whether a failure of these relays in the affected equipment could have had any significant operational impact. The licensee documented this issue as CAP item 1252873. |
|
| |
|
| Findings No findings were identified. | | Findings No findings were identified. |
Line 145: |
Line 185: |
|
| |
|
| ====a. Inspection Scope==== | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| The inspectors assessed the licensee staff's ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits. | | The inspectors assessed the licensee staffs ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits. |
|
| |
|
| b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold level. The audits and self-assessments were completed by personnel knowledgeable in the subject area, and the quality of the NOS audits was thorough and critical. The self-assessments were acceptable but were not at the same level of quality as the NOS audits. The inspectors observed that CAP items had been initiated for issues identified through the NOS audits and self-assessments. | | b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold level. The audits and self-assessments were completed by personnel knowledgeable in the subject area, and the quality of the NOS audits was thorough and critical. The self-assessments were acceptable but were not at the same level of quality as the NOS audits. The inspectors observed that CAP items had been initiated for issues identified through the NOS audits and self-assessments. |
|
| |
|
| The inspectors observed selected meetings of the Performance Assessment Review Board and reviewed board meeting minutes over the past six months. The Board provided oversight for the CAP including the self-assessment program. The inspectors identified no issues with the Board's performance during the inspection. | | The inspectors observed selected meetings of the Performance Assessment Review Board and reviewed board meeting minutes over the past six months. The Board provided oversight for the CAP including the self-assessment program. The inspectors identified no issues with the Boards performance during the inspection. |
|
| |
|
| Findings No findings were identified. | | Findings No findings were identified. |
Line 156: |
Line 196: |
|
| |
|
| ====a. Inspection Scope==== | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| The inspectors assessed the licensee's SCWE through the reviews of the facility's ECP implementing procedures, discussions with ECP coordinators, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results of licensee safety culture surveys. | | The inspectors assessed the licensees SCWE through the reviews of the facilitys ECP implementing procedures, discussions with ECP coordinators, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results of licensee safety culture surveys. |
|
| |
|
| b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the plant staff were aware of the importance of having a strong SCWE and expressed a willingness to ra ise safety issues. No one interviewed had experienced retaliation for safety issues raised, or knew of anyone who had failed to raise issues. All persons interviewed had an adequate knowledge of the CAP and ECP process. These results were similar to the findings of the licensee's safety culture surveys. Based on these interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable SCWE. | | b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the plant staff were aware of the importance of having a strong SCWE and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. No one interviewed had experienced retaliation for safety issues raised, or knew of anyone who had failed to raise issues. All persons interviewed had an adequate knowledge of the CAP and ECP process. These results were similar to the findings of the licensees safety culture surveys. Based on these interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable SCWE. |
|
| |
|
| The inspectors noted that the licensee had taken proactive efforts to address a declining SCWE trend within the Security force. This trend had been identified through self-assessments and audits conducted in 2009. The number of issues self-identified by the security staff had increased since the corrective actions were implemented. | | The inspectors noted that the licensee had taken proactive efforts to address a declining SCWE trend within the Security force. This trend had been identified through self-assessments and audits conducted in 2009. The number of issues self-identified by the security staff had increased since the corrective actions were implemented. |
Line 164: |
Line 204: |
| Additionally, during interviews with the inspectors, Security staff commented favorably on the licensee initiatives to improve the SCWE. | | Additionally, during interviews with the inspectors, Security staff commented favorably on the licensee initiatives to improve the SCWE. |
|
| |
|
| The inspectors determined that the ECP process was being effectively implemented. The review of the selected ECP issues indicated that site personnel were appropriately using the CAP and ECP to identify concerns. However, many staff were unaware of the | | The inspectors determined that the ECP process was being effectively implemented. |
|
| |
|
| other avenues the licensee had to raise concerns (collectively known as the PEACH process). For example, most staff were unaware of the Differing Professional Opinions (DPO) program for addressing engineering issues. Additionally, some newer staff confused safety culture with industrial safety. Similar issues were identified during the 2008 PI&R inspection. The licensee captured these issues as CAP item 1252870. | | The review of the selected ECP issues indicated that site personnel were appropriately using the CAP and ECP to identify concerns. However, many staff were unaware of the other avenues the licensee had to raise concerns (collectively known as the PEACH process). For example, most staff were unaware of the Differing Professional Opinions (DPO) program for addressing engineering issues. Additionally, some newer staff confused safety culture with industrial safety. Similar issues were identified during the 2008 PI&R inspection. The licensee captured these issues as CAP item 1252870. |
|
| |
|
| Findings No findings were identified. | | Findings No findings were identified. |
Line 175: |
Line 215: |
| ===.1 Exit Meeting Summary=== | | ===.1 Exit Meeting Summary=== |
|
| |
|
| On October 1, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. O'Connor and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary. | | On October 1, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. OConnor and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary. |
|
| |
|
| ATTACHMENT: | | ATTACHMENT: |
|
| |
|
| =SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= | | =SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= |
Line 183: |
Line 223: |
| ==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== | | ==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== |
|
| |
|
| Licensee | | Licensee |
| : [[contact::H. Butterworth]], Fleet Operations Standards Director | | : [[contact::H. Butterworth]], Fleet Operations Standards Director |
| : [[contact::P. Byers]], Security Manager | | : [[contact::P. Byers]], Security Manager |
| : [[contact::J. Early]], Emergency Preparedness Manager | | : [[contact::J. Early]], Emergency Preparedness Manager |
| : [[contact::N. Haskell]], Engineering Director | | : [[contact::N. Haskell]], Engineering Director |
| : [[contact::M. Holmes]], Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager | | : [[contact::M. Holmes]], Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager |
| : [[contact::K. Jepson]], Business Support Manager | | : [[contact::K. Jepson]], Business Support Manager |
| : [[contact::J. Mestad]], Employ Concerns Program Manager | | : [[contact::J. Mestad]], Employ Concerns Program Manager |
| : [[contact::D. Neve]], Regulatory Affairs Manager | | : [[contact::D. Neve]], Regulatory Affairs Manager |
| : [[contact::J. Ohotto]], Design Engineering Manager | | : [[contact::J. Ohotto]], Design Engineering Manager |
| : [[contact::T. O'Connor]], Site Vice-President | | : [[contact::T. OConnor]], Site Vice-President |
| : [[contact::S. Porter]], System Engineering Manager | | : [[contact::S. Porter]], System Engineering Manager |
| : [[contact::S. Radebaugh]], Acting Plant Manager | | : [[contact::S. Radebaugh]], Acting Plant Manager |
| : [[contact::S. Sharpe]], Operations Manager | | : [[contact::S. Sharpe]], Operations Manager |
| : [[contact::G. Sherwood]], Program Engineering Manger | | : [[contact::G. Sherwood]], Program Engineering Manger |
| : [[contact::T. Toglery]], Nuclear Oversight Manager | | : [[contact::T. Toglery]], Nuclear Oversight Manager |
| : [[contact::J. Windchill]], Fleet Performance Assessment Manager | | : [[contact::J. Windchill]], Fleet Performance Assessment Manager |
| Nuclear Regulatory Commission | | Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
| : [[contact::K. Riemer]], Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects | | : [[contact::K. Riemer]], Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects |
|
| |
|
| ==LIST OF ITEMS== | | ==LIST OF ITEMS== |
Line 207: |
Line 247: |
| ===OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED=== | | ===OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED=== |
|
| |
|
| Opened: URI | | Opened: |
| : 05000263/201007-01 HELB Analysis Potentially Non-Conservative | | URI |
| Attachment
| | : 05000263/201007-01 HELB Analysis Potentially Non-Conservative Attachment |
| | |
| ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | | ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== |
| The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection.
| |
| : Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.
| |
| : Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
| |
| : PLANT PROCEDURES
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : FP-PA-ARP-01 CAP Action Request Process Revision 27
| |
| : FG-PA-CAE-01 Corrective Action Effectiveness Review Manual Revision 6
| |
| : FG-PA-ACE-01 Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual Revision 17
| |
| : FG-PA-RCE-01 Root Cause Evaluation Manual Revision 17
| |
| : FG-PA-CTC-01 CAP Trend Code Manual Revision 12
| |
| : FP-PA-OE-01 Operating Experience Program Revision 14
| |
| : FG-PA-KPI-01 Performance Indicator Data Reporting Revision 0
| |
| : FP-E-SE-02 Component Classification Revision 4
| |
| : EWI-05.02.01 Maintenance Rule Program Document Revision 16
| |
| : B.5.12 System Basis Document:
| |
| : Area Radiation Monitor Revision 3 B.7.1 System Basis Document:
| |
| : Liquid Radwaste Revision 2
| |
| : CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 114145-13 Incorrect Grounding Trucks Installed in 4KV
| |
| : Cubicles 9/8/2008
| |
| : AR 1150968
| |
| : Continuing Issues With FME Control on Turbine Floor 8/20/2009
| |
| : AR 1168344-01 TS Action for CREF Exited Prior to all PMTs Being Completed
| |
| : 3/8/2009
| |
| : AR 1166773-01 Adverse Trend in Rigor of Implementing SOER Recommendations
| |
| : 2/26/2009
| |
| : AR 1170876 Lack of Safety Related Material Control/Traceability
| |
| : 9/14/2009
| |
| : AR 1167946-01 Level A and B CAs Closed to Actions Outside the CAP 3/21/2009
| |
| : AR 1205719-02 ARM S&C Refurb Not Performed IAW Tech Manual 12/4/2009
| |
| : AR 1211312 NOS Finding:
| |
| : Configuration Control Performance Issues 3/3/2010
| |
| : AR 1226594 Work Tasks Authorized Without Proper C/O C/L
| |
| : Hung 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 1228190 NOS Finding-Weak Barriers in Work Management
| |
| : 5/25/2010
| |
| : AR 1237891 Failed Bellows Spring in Positioned Removed from
| |
| : CV-1242
| |
| : 6/28/2010
| |
| : AR 1158526 Adverse Trend In Work Package Quality
| |
| : 2/10/2008
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 01167235
| |
| : AR 01167240
| |
| : AR 01173666
| |
| : AR 01155107
| |
| : AR 01184941
| |
| : AR 01167237
| |
| : AR 01139421
| |
| : AR 01160675
| |
| : AR 01143116
| |
| : AR 01232720
| |
| : AR 01158536
| |
| : AR 01157274
| |
| : AR 01150364
| |
| : AR 01151413
| |
| : AR 01213390
| |
| : AR 01211101
| |
| : AR 01190071
| |
| : AR 01189968
| |
| : AR 01188955
| |
| : AR 01187271
| |
| : AR 01177444
| |
| : AR 00826605
| |
| : AR 01083164
| |
| : AR 01151933
| |
| : AR 01154270
| |
| : AR 01153455
| |
| : AR 01116586
| |
| : AR 01136919
| |
| : AR 0123272
| |
| : AR 01182625
| |
| : AR 01196988
| |
| : AR 01194357 Potential Trend WM ID'd in Ops 4
| |
| th Qtr 2008 DRUM
| |
| : Potential Trend JP&P ID'd in Ops 4
| |
| th Qtr 2008 DRUM
| |
| : Adverse Trend in FME issues
| |
| : Ops CSE ID's AFI in Objective 3 Adverse Trend: work plan changes made w/o review & approval Potential trend DP ID'd in Ops 4
| |
| th Qtr 2008 DRUM Adverse Trend in Program Management Issues
| |
| : AFI Independent FSA Monti Human Performance Adverse Trend in OSHA reportable injuries Recirc riser relay did not respond to de-energize
| |
|
| |
| position during IST
| |
| : LOR Annual Operating Exam Issues
| |
| : Proposed NRC Violation - Reactor Level Control
| |
|
| |
| - 9/11 Scram HPCI failed to trip when Rx level rose to 48" Rx Low Low Water Level signal received during
| |
| : CRD pump start Voltage of cell 116 in #17 battery is at 2.07 Volts Not all Tech Specs were entered
| |
| : 2009 Ops CSE - AFI Objective 5 AFI 5.1 A SBGT Flow Not Within Band Assessment AFI ID'd for licensed operator
| |
|
| |
| medicals
| |
| : B SBGT failed to operate as expected
| |
| : Adverse Trend - Procedure performed without OPS Auth. GE Part 21 (SC05-03) Potential to exceed low pressure limit Main Steam Line plugs interfere with separator removal SPDS Disp 710 showing incorrect configuration of circuit breaker
| |
| : NRC Commitments in procedures not meeting
| |
|
| |
| requirements Station challenged by projects interface/alignment issues Unplanned rise in Offgas Radiation and Stack
| |
| : WGRM's Loss of motor cooling to Div II RHRSW Pumps
| |
| : LPCI Select Interlock Channel Functional Test Failure Adverse Trend; Inadequate maintenance of QA
| |
| reports Adverse Trend; Badge control by site personnel Door-18, Condenser room flood door found closed
| |
| : 1/29/2009
| |
| : 1/29/2009
| |
| : 3/18/2009
| |
| : 10/13/2008
| |
| : 6/09/2009
| |
| : 1/29/2009
| |
| : 9/07/2010
| |
| : 11/26/2008
| |
| : 8/5/2008 5/13/2010
| |
| : 11/7/2008
| |
| : 3/26/2009
| |
| : 9/21/2008
| |
| : 9/21/2008
| |
| : 1/12/2010
| |
| : 2/17/2009
| |
| : 7/20/2009
| |
| : 7/20/2009
| |
| : 7/10/2009
| |
| : 6/28/2009
| |
| : 4/9/2009
| |
| : 3/30/2005
| |
| : 3/20/2007
| |
| : 9/24/2008
| |
| : 10/8/2008
| |
| : 10/2/2008
| |
| : 10/31/2007
| |
| : 5/6/2008
| |
| : 6/25/2010
| |
| : 5/19/2009
| |
| : 9/9/2009
| |
| : 8/20/2009
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 01178894
| |
| : AR 01159084
| |
| : AR 01150362
| |
| : AR 01151075
| |
| : AR 01216130
| |
| : FME - Drier Measurement Platform Wheel Inadequate shutdown margin during
| |
| : EOC-23 core
| |
|
| |
| alterations Reactor Scram Number 121 occurred on Sept
| |
|
| |
| th, 2008 Ops Trng CSE identifies AFI's in Objective 1-4 Performance gaps to industry standards not recognized
| |
| : 4/20/2009
| |
| : 11/13/2008
| |
| : 9/12/2008
| |
| : 9/18/2008
| |
| : 1/30/2010
| |
| : AR 01144214-02 Trend-RCE Grades Low in 2 Areas
| |
| : 7/2008
| |
| : AR 01173245 Actions to Address Equipment Problems are Shortsighted
| |
| : 4/15/2009
| |
| : AR 01186832 Core Spray Pump Quarterly Test Terminated Due to No Flow
| |
| : 6/25/2009
| |
| : AR 1191812 Adverse Trend in Failure Rates to ACEs Assigned to Projects
| |
| : 7/31/2009
| |
| : AR 01216127
| |
| : PI.2-2 ACEs Do Not Always Address Org or Prgrm Contributors
| |
| : 1/30/2010
| |
| : AR 01174411 PRNMS:
| |
| : Ineffective Condition Evaluation
| |
| : CE01162340-02
| |
| : 3/23/2009
| |
| : AR 01187909 Accountability in Meeting CAP Action Due Dates Tracking 7/2/2009
| |
| : AR 01238254 PI&R FSA AFI:
| |
| : Rigor in Resolving NRC Violations Not Consistent
| |
| : 6/22/2010
| |
| : AR 1222439 MNGP EPU Mod 3 Surveillance
| |
| : 3/12/2010
| |
| : AR 01208801 Three NRC X-Cutting Findings in One Aspect
| |
| : 2/1/2009
| |
| : AR 01216516 Station hs Three Potential Findings in One NRC Xcut Aspect
| |
| : 2/2/2010
| |
| : AR 01215513 Potential Adverse Trend Recent Events/Near Misses 1/27/2010
| |
| : AR 01170720 Inconsistent CAP Problem Statements CA Quality
| |
| : ACE Quality
| |
| : 2/25/2009
| |
| : AR 01232886 Adverse Trend-Corrective Action Backlog Exceeding Goal
| |
| : 5/14/2010
| |
| : AR 01150601 Ops Tng CSE Identifies Ineffective Closure of CA
| |
| : 9/15/2008
| |
| : AR 01157287 Red
| |
| : KPI-NRC Cross Cutting Aspects (H.4.c.) Oversight
| |
| : 10/29/2008
| |
| : AR 1226438 Site Received Fourth P.1.c Cross Cutting Aspect from NRC 4/8/2010
| |
| : AR 01147103 Adv Trnd in Organization Perf. Leads to Near Miss Events
| |
| : 8/9/2008
| |
| : AR 01137245 Station KPI for NRC Cross-Cutting Issue-
| |
| : Potential Red
| |
| : 5/9/2008
| |
| : AR 01184816 Evaluation of Project Dept Clock Resets During
| |
| : 2009 Outage
| |
| : 6/8/2009
| |
| : AR 01163396 Adverse Trend in HU Identified in 3 Quarter 2008
| |
| : Site DRUM
| |
| : 2/22/2008
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 01135426 CAPRs From RCEs Non Institutionalized
| |
| : 4/23/2008
| |
| : AR 01138493 Adverse Trend in Human Performance
| |
| : 5/22/2008
| |
| : AR 01158802 Potential Adverse Trend-Station Cross Cutting Issues PI&R
| |
| : 11/11/2008
| |
| : AR 1161531 Reoccurring Qualification Issues at Monticello
| |
| : 2/05/2008
| |
| : AR 1199160 Unexpected
| |
| : AR-10 Discharges on the Range
| |
| : 2/01/2010
| |
| : AR 1140153 Adverse Trend in Refueling Floor Activities
| |
| : 2/17/2009
| |
| : AR 1169027 High Radiation Controls Violation
| |
| : 06/01/2010
| |
| : AR 1170636 Security Human Performance Adverse Trend
| |
| : 03/24/2009
| |
| : AR 1161679 Potential Adverse Trend - Security Weapons / Ammo Handling
| |
| : 01/16/2009
| |
| : AR 1210338 Adverse Trend - BRE Issues
| |
| : 2/30/2010
| |
| : AR 1150642 Incomplete Information Sent to NRC on an Operator's License Renewal Application
| |
| : 09/15/2008
| |
| : AR 1136955 Adverse Trend in Service Water Radiation Monitor Flow 05/07/2008
| |
| : AR 1177731 Adverse Trend in LLRT Radiation Exposure
| |
| : 04/10/2009
| |
| : AR 1164409 Increased Trend in Badge Control Issues
| |
| : 03/02/2009
| |
| : AR 1135335 Adverse Trend in Emergency Planning Drill /
| |
| : Exercise Report Timeliness
| |
| : 08/21/2008
| |
| : AR 1215924 EP Department Performance Has Declined
| |
| : 03/12/2010
| |
| : AR 1174197 Lengthy Out Of Service Time for EP Equipment
| |
| : 07/31/2009
| |
| : AR 1216118 EP 1-1 ERO personnel Make Knowledge Based Errors 09/03/2010
| |
| : AR 1215924 Site EP Precursors to Further Declining Performance
| |
| : 10/29/2010
| |
| : AR 1188771 Follow-up PAR Development Inaccurate /
| |
| : Untimely 11/17/2009
| |
| : AR 1135335 Adverse Trend in Emergency Planning Drill /
| |
| : Exercise Report Timeliness
| |
| : 08/21/2008
| |
| : AR 1215924 EP Department Performance Has Declined
| |
| : 03/12/2010
| |
| : AR 1217199 Security Officer Failed to Perform a Security Patrol 08/31/2010
| |
| : AR 1168195 Rx Water Soluble Co-60 No Longer Trending Down 02/05/2009
| |
| : AR 1207385 SGI Package Not Properly Marked
| |
| : 03/31/2010
| |
| : AR 1204338 New Security Door to Intake Tunnel Found Closed
| |
| : 04/23/2010
| |
| : AR 1156598 Security Force on Force Exercises
| |
| : 08/21/2009
| |
| : AR 1238171 Unexpected Dose rates Encountered During RWCU
| |
| : BW 06/21/2010
| |
| : AR 1164240 Movement of Radioactive material Not in Accordance with AWI
| |
| : 01/02/2009
| |
| : AR 1196952 Low level of Tritium in Monitoring Well (MW-9)
| |
| : 09/09/2009
| |
| : AR 1207960
| |
| : AR 01214941
| |
| : Unexpected Change in DW CAM Particulate Activity Inadequate Documentation of Design Inputs
| |
| : 2/10/2009
| |
| : 2/22/2010
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 01222023
| |
| : AR 01214814
| |
| : AR 01197923
| |
| : AR 01228141
| |
| : AR 01176068
| |
| : AR 01179388
| |
| : AR 01194527
| |
| : AR 01195119
| |
| : AR 01197202
| |
| : AR 01171823
| |
| : AR 01174949
| |
| : AR 01227229
| |
| : AR 01166312
| |
| : AR 01170967
| |
| : AR 01088210
| |
| : AR 01139415
| |
| : AR 01137297
| |
| : AR 01209649-01
| |
| : AR 01065983
| |
| : AR 1088210-01
| |
| : AR 01181868
| |
| : AR 01192130
| |
| : AR 01190129
| |
| : AR 01120865
| |
| : AR 01166314
| |
| : AR 01107707
| |
| : AR 01166308
| |
| : AR 01155275
| |
| : P-109C, 13 RHRSW Pump D/P in Alert Range
| |
| : Adverse Trend in Bearing Failures on 11 CRD
| |
| : Pump
| |
| : CBDI FOF Mod Did Not Assess Impact to T-44
| |
| : Tank SRV Lift Test Surveillance Interval Potentially Missed Thin Pipe Identified During MIC Exam On 18 A
| |
| : RHRSW
| |
| : Appendix J Programmatic Deficiencies Post-Modification Testing Issues Adverse Trend in Engineering Department HP
| |
| : Clock Resets
| |
| : CDBI- Calculation Quality- Adverse Trend
| |
| : EPU-Wiring Discrepancy Discovered in Field Adverse Trend in Feedwater Heater Level Transmitter Replacement
| |
| : 1AR XFMR Lockout Caused By 1N^ Ground
| |
| : Fault Declining Trend-Engineering Work Process-Work Control Mgmt Adverse Trend Control of Engineering MTE
| |
| : Part of Head Vent Line Not Insulated
| |
| : D10 125VDC Div 1 Battery Charger Unavailability Exceeds MR Goal
| |
| : D10 Exhibits Erratic Voltage Output During Surveillance Clearance and Tagging Issues Degraded HELB Flow Path Over The SLAE Room Missing Instillation On The Head Vent Valve
| |
| : Manifold Equalizing Valve Failure Causes 'B' Main Steam Line Flow Isolation Instrument to Become Inoperable
| |
| : Work Performed Without Adequate Tag-Out Protection Failure to Promptly Identify Failed SBGT
| |
| : Surveillance Failures of V-AC-4 (B4305) and V-AC-5 (B3305)
| |
| : Adverse Trend for Engineering Non-Mod
| |
| : EC Backlog Failures of V-AC-4 Declining Trend for Engineering- Process Failure Mode-RR1
| |
| : Increasing Trend for System Health Assessment
| |
| : KPI 04/06/2010
| |
| : 03/31/2010
| |
| : 11/02/2009
| |
| : 05/14/2010
| |
| : 03/31/2009
| |
| : 04/23/2009
| |
| : 11/13/2009
| |
| : 09/25/2009
| |
| : 11/11/2009
| |
| : 03/04/2009
| |
| : 10/25/2009
| |
| : 04/14/2010
| |
| : 2/19/2009
| |
| : 05/29/2009
| |
| : 09/21/2010
| |
| : 09/29/2010
| |
| : 05/09/2008
| |
| : 2/04/2010
| |
| : 01/05/2007
| |
| : 04/20/2007
| |
| : 05/12/2009
| |
| : 08/03/2009
| |
| : 08/21/2009
| |
| : 05/22/2009
| |
| : 01/22/2009
| |
| : 09/19/2007
| |
| : 01/01/2009
| |
| : 10/14/2008
| |
| : Attachment ROOT, APPARENT AND COMMON CAUSE EVALUATIONS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 1140145 Incorrect Grounding Trucks Installed in 4KV
| |
| : Cubicles 6/6/2008
| |
| : EFR 1140145-24 Effectiveness Review of
| |
| : CAP 1140145-05 Truck Installation Procedure
| |
| : 11/6/2009
| |
| : EFR 114145-25 Effectiveness Review of Grounding Truck Installation
| |
| : 11/6/2009
| |
| : AR 1150968 JLG Lift Basket Contacts 115 KV
| |
| : 9/17/2008
| |
| : EFR 1150968-10 Effectiveness Review for AR
| |
| : CAP 1150968 Lift Contacts 115 KV
| |
| : 9/30/2009
| |
| : PCR 1152979 Revise
| |
| : FP-SC-GEN-08 Revision 2
| |
| : 9/30/2008
| |
| : AR 1158526 Adverse Trend in Work Package Quality
| |
| : 11/7/2008
| |
| : AR 1166773 Adverse Trend in Rigor of Implementing SOER Recommendations
| |
| : 1/26/2009
| |
| : AR 1167946 Mid Cycle FSA
| |
| : AFI 11-CAsClosed to Actions Outside the CAP
| |
| : 2/3/2009
| |
| : AR 1168344 TS Action for CREF Exited Prior to all PMTs Being Completed
| |
| : 2/5/2009
| |
| : AR 1170876 Lack of Safety Related Material Control/Traceability
| |
| : 2/25/2009
| |
| : AR 1183728 Continuing Issues with FME Control on Turbine Floor 5/29/2009
| |
| : AR 1183728 Continuing Issues with FME Control on Turbine Floor 5/29/2009
| |
| : AR 1166773-01 Adverse Trend in Rigor of Implementing SOER Recommendations
| |
| : 1/26/2009
| |
| : AR 1167946-01 Level A and B CAs Closed to Actions Outside the CAP 2/3/2009
| |
| : AR 1168344 TS Action for CREF Exited Prior to All PMTs Being Completed
| |
| : 2/5/2009
| |
| : AR 1202466 Adverse Trend in Double Disc Gate Valve LLRT Performance
| |
| : 10/14/2009
| |
| : AR 1205719 ARM S&C Refurb not Performed IAW Tech Manual 11/4/2009
| |
| : AR 1211312 NOS Finding:
| |
| : Configuration Control Performance Issues 12/18/2009
| |
| : AR 1226594 Work Tasks Authorized Without Proper C/O C/L
| |
| : Hung 4/9/2010
| |
| : AR 1228190 NOS Finding-Weak Barriers in Work Management
| |
| : 4/20/2010
| |
| : AR 1237891 Failed Bellows Spring In Positioned Removed from
| |
| : CV-1242
| |
| : 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 1095181 PRA Compliance With Regulatory Guide 1.200
| |
| : 6/5/2007
| |
| : AR 1121269 SOER 07-02 on Intake Cooling Water Blockage
| |
| : 2/14/2007
| |
| : AR 01237478 PI&R FSA; All req's for
| |
| : CAP 01189206 not performed
| |
| : 6/16/2010
| |
| : AR 01237558 PI&R FSA; Trend in security trng team used for shift needs
| |
| : 6/16/2010
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 01237585 PI&R FSA; CAP closed out to action in GAR
| |
| : 6/16/2010
| |
| : AR 01237702 PI&R FSA; Documenting Completion of actions unclear in 2 FBMs
| |
| : 6/17/2010
| |
| : AR 01237779 PI&R FSA; No CAP tracking completion of Top Ten Eqp. Items
| |
| : 6/17/2010
| |
| : AR 01237802 PI&R FSA; No action to track completion of work under B CAP
| |
| : 6/17/2010
| |
| : AR 01237820 CAP extension documentation missing, found during PI&R FSA
| |
| : 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 01237838 PI&R FSA - CAPR process not followed for form revision 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 01237839 PI&R FSA: Typos and dated info in Ops Burden Report 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 01237876 PI&R OE evaluation uploaded in sharepoin is not correct 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 01237905 PI&R FSA - overdue operating experience actions 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 01237917 2010 PI&R FSA: Lack of documentation for level of effort
| |
| : 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 01237928 2010 PI&R FSA: CAP not written for identified issue 6/18/2010
| |
| : AR 01238082 PI&R FSA CAPs - INPO AFIs don't considtently meet standards
| |
| : 6/21/2010
| |
| : AR 01238284 PI&R FSA AFI: Root Cause Statements - CA Line of Sight 6/22/2010
| |
| : AR 01238292 PI&R FSA AFI: Independent workers applying own standards on CAP initially
| |
| : 6/22/2010
| |
| : AR 01243250 PI&R FSA - Ops Status Notes Not Sustainalbe for Fire Pump
| |
| : 7/28/2010
| |
| : AR 01243411 PI&R FSA Review ACE to CE for
| |
| : 01174955
| |
| : 7/29/2010
| |
| : AR 01243430 PI&R FSA corrective action for
| |
| : AR 1199936
| |
| : 7/29/2010
| |
| : AR 01243485 PI&R FSA - CAP Improperly closed to no action
| |
| : 7/29/2010
| |
| : AR 01243644 PI&R FSA -
| |
| : CAP 01141018 Screening N Notes are incorrect
| |
| : 7/30/2010
| |
| : AR 01243728 PI&R FSA - EFR assignment
| |
| : CAP 01165741 had no goal stated
| |
| : 7/30/2010
| |
| : AR 01244435 PI&R Inspection self assessment identified 4kv rooms issue
| |
| : 8/5/2010
| |
| : AR 01139415 D10 125VDC Battery Charger Unavailability exceeds MR goal
| |
| : 5/30/2008
| |
| : AR 01155593 Inability to attract personnel due to Industry Competition
| |
| : 10/15/2008
| |
| : AR 01158868
| |
| : RF 24
| |
| : MS 38 for preoutage work in jeopardy
| |
| : 11/11/2008
| |
| : AR 01159308 IR24
| |
| : MS 13 for work order planning above control band 11/15/2008
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 01167860 Mid cycle FSA AFI 3 - Insufficient operations staffing plan
| |
| : 2/3/2009
| |
| : AR 01179605 Greater than 1 yr will be needed to qualify a SM candidate
| |
| : 4/25/2009
| |
| : AR 01180220 Quality issues found on Isophase Bus Cooling System 4/30/2009
| |
| : AR 01200192 Emergent Contractor Trng request diverts Maint Training resource
| |
| : 9/29/2009
| |
| : AR 01217990 EP Drill - Not enough controllers in the Plant during drill
| |
| : 2/12/2010
| |
| : AR 01227941 RWCU restoration time discrepancy
| |
| : 4/19/2010
| |
| : AR 01230850 EM&P Resource Availability impacts scheduled work 5/3/2010
| |
| : AR 01233699 Operations unable to support system walkdown
| |
| : 5/20/2010
| |
| : AR 01237487 Personnel removed from Training to cover Shift staffing need
| |
| : 6/15/2010
| |
| : AR 01240903 Supervisor pulled from training to meet staffing needs 7/9/2010
| |
| : AR 01227056 One Live Ammo Round at STF Mixed with Training Rounds
| |
| : 4/13/2010
| |
| : AR 01225619 Unable to Obtain Definitive Reading of TS
| |
| : Required Parameter
| |
| : 4/2/2010
| |
| : AR 01181388 "B" Safety Relief Valve Leaking
| |
| : 5/8/2009
| |
| : AR 01243585 Program Deficiencies From PHC Not Incorporated into CAP 7/30/2010
| |
| : AR 01181249 HPCI Governor Valve Failed to Open During Overspeed Test
| |
| : 5/7/2009
| |
| : AR 01083169 Crack Like Indication on Steam Dryer Found in
| |
| : 2007 RFO 3/20/2007
| |
| : AR 01070668 Rx Bldg RR Doors Switched in HELB Gothic Model 1/8/2007
| |
| : AR 01206949 Incorrect Severity Assigned to
| |
| : CAP 01184369-02
| |
| : 11/16/2009
| |
| : AR 01243568 PI&R FSA Potential
| |
| : AR 1150849 Screening
| |
| : 7/30/2010
| |
| : AR 01225682 1AR Transformer Pad Has Sunk about 1 inch since Install
| |
| : 4/4/2010
| |
| : AR 01225762 #12 RHRSW Pump has Excessive Packing Leakage 4/5/2010
| |
| : AR 01225888
| |
| : SW Pump Inducing Vibrations on 13 ESW
| |
| : Pump
| |
| : 4/6/2010
| |
| : AR 01225997 CAP Closure Review-"B" Action Closure Quality Issues 4/6/2010
| |
| : AR 01226060 12 RFP L.O. Cooler Piping Rusting Through Upstream of
| |
| : TI-1555
| |
| : 4/6/2010
| |
| : AR 01135291 Internal Threads on WDW7 Look Bad
| |
| : 4/22/2008
| |
| : AR 01135409 Questionable Off-Gas Sample
| |
| : 4/23/2008
| |
| : AR 01136879 Oil Flush on 11 Service Water Motor Ineffective
| |
| : 5/6/2008
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 01137901
| |
| : The Site Lacks a Single Tracking Mechanism for
| |
| : Failed PMTs
| |
| : 5/15/2008
| |
| : AR 01138283
| |
| : CAP 1102406 Trending Closed to "B' ACE With No Reference
| |
| : 5/20/2008
| |
| : AR 01138824 Battery Chargers Maintenance Rule Status Declining
| |
| : 5/27/2008
| |
| : AR 01178034 Employee Exceeded Work Hours
| |
| : 4/13/2009
| |
| : AR 01179554 SBLC Tank Level is Lower After Draining and Refilling
| |
| : 4/25/2009
| |
| : AR 01179701 Lack of Alternative Access Increases Operator Response Time
| |
| : 4/27/2009
| |
| : AR 01216080 Snowmelt Causes Possible EOP Entry Alarm
| |
| : 1/29/2010
| |
| : AR 01217767
| |
| : RR-4902 Has Incorrect Chart paper During Test
| |
| : 289-A 2/11/2010
| |
| : AR 01219159 Alt N2 Train Pressures at Low End of Allowed Operating Band
| |
| : 2/19/2010
| |
| : AR 01212202 RCIC is Conservatively Declared Inoperable
| |
| : 2/31/2009
| |
| : AR 01212209 Both LPCI Subsystems Declared Inoperable During Venting
| |
| : 2/31/2009
| |
| : AR 0119936 Voltage Drop Evaluation for RHR and RHRSW
| |
| : ASCO Sol. Valves
| |
| : 9/28/2009
| |
| : AR 01197431
| |
| : CDBI-Undocumented Assumption in Calculation
| |
| : 06-104 9/12/2009
| |
| : AR 01200723 CDBI P-111B Calculated Starter Voltage Lower Than Expected
| |
| : 10/2/2009
| |
| : AR 01210817 NRC Feedback on Reportability of SBGTS Event
| |
| : 2/15/2009
| |
| : AR 01150773 Some Station Log Entries Were Not Made During SCRAM 121
| |
| : 9/16/2008
| |
| : AR 01151413 Rx Low Low Water Level Signal Received During CRD Pump Start
| |
| : 9/21/2008
| |
| : AR 01200304
| |
| : AO-2945 Failed to Open During 0253-01 "A" SBGT QTRLY Test
| |
| : 9/29/2009
| |
| : AR 01220488 NRC Violation for Failure to Make 10CFR50.72 Notification
| |
| : 3/1/2010
| |
| : AR 01175537 NDE Examiner Procedure Non-Compliance
| |
| : 3/29/2009
| |
| : AR 01216894 Loss of Offsite Power 10CFR50.72 Reporting Reqts. 2/4/2010
| |
| : AR 01082564 Reactor Core Water Level Recorder Found Failed Upscale 3/16/2007
| |
| : AR 01131103
| |
| : ITS 125V DC Charger SR 3.8.4.2-Option 2
| |
| : Unachievable
| |
| : 3/14/2008
| |
| : AR 01106816 Charcoal Filter Iodine Loading Calcs Non-Conservative
| |
| : 8/14/2007
| |
| : AR 01143954 11/12 CT Pump Operation Safety Enhancement Opportunity
| |
| : 07/13/2008
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 01243644 PI&R FSA-
| |
| : CAP 01141018 Screening N Notes are Incorrect
| |
| : 07/30/2010
| |
| : AR 01237813 Buried Pipe Health Report Issues/ Exemplary Rating Questioned
| |
| : 06/18/2010
| |
| : AR 01158314 11 Air Compressor PM Deleted But Has NRC Commitement
| |
| : 11/05/2008
| |
| : AR 01184683 Adverse Trend-DW Floor and Equipment Drain Sump Issues
| |
| : 06/05/2009
| |
| : AR 01184683-03 EFR- Effectiveness of Potentiometers DWEDS,DWFDS
| |
| : 07/31/2010
| |
| : AR 01197773 Revise
| |
| : ISP-RHR-0558-01 as Interim Action for
| |
| : RCE 1181868
| |
| : 11/09/2009
| |
| : AR 01197769 Revise 0056 as Interim Corrective Action For
| |
| : RCE 1181868
| |
| : 2/11/2009
| |
| : AR 01181868 Leaking Manifold Valve for
| |
| : DPIS-2-117A B Stm Line Flow
| |
| : 05/13/2009
| |
| : AR 01093089 Non-Conservative Input to AST Post- Local pH
| |
| : 06/15/2009
| |
| : AR 01064602 Shortcomings in Cross Referencing CAPS and
| |
| : WRs 06/10/2008
| |
| : AR 01087740 Pipe Downstream of
| |
| : PCV-1242 is Significantly Thinned 06/05/2009
| |
| : AR 01070668 RX Bldg RR Doors Switched in HELB Gothic Model 01/16/2009
| |
| : AR 01127660 Surveillance 1467 Extended Twice
| |
| : 03/29/2008
| |
| : AR 01119232 Abandoned Limit Swithces in Second Floor EFT Building 03/27/2008
| |
| : AR 01107610 3 Inch Movement on Moisture Sep. to 14B Htr Pipe 07/15/2009
| |
| : AR 01105975 Guidance for Use of Third RBCCW Heat Exchanger Inadequate
| |
| : 09/30/2008
| |
| : AR 01130761
| |
| : CV-1729 Not Controlling at 7000gpm, Results in Unplanned LCO
| |
| : 03/12/2008
| |
| : AR 01149748 Loss of Level Indication C MSDT Dump Controller
| |
| : LC-1003 09/05/2008
| |
| : AR 01243477 Question Regarding the Control of Radiograpers
| |
| : 07/29/2010
| |
| : AR 01129677 Area for Improvement
| |
| : 03/03/2008
| |
| : AR 01243430 PI&R FSA Corrective Action for
| |
| : AR 1199936
| |
| : 07/29/2009
| |
| : 01150085 Possible Inconsistency Between MPR Setpoint and Calc Input
| |
| : 09/10/2008
| |
| : 01149441 Results of MET CSP Assessment Concluded Further Migration
| |
| : 09/03/2008
| |
| : 01079705 LAR Required for Use of Tormis Code Methodology
| |
| : 2/28/2007
| |
| : 01197771
| |
| : 011977701
| |
| : Revise
| |
| : ISP-RHR-0552-01 as interim action for RCE1181868
| |
| : Revise 0060 As Interim Corrective Action for
| |
| : RCE1181868
| |
| : 09/15/2009
| |
| : 09/15/2009
| |
| : 09/15/2009
| |
| : 09/15/2009
| |
| : Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : 01197768
| |
| : 01197774
| |
| : 252368
| |
| : 250089
| |
| : 2149351
| |
| : 01159968
| |
| : Revise 0060 As Interim Corrective Action for RCE1181868
| |
| : Revise
| |
| : ISP-RHR-0558-02 As Interim Action for
| |
| : RCE 1181868
| |
| : NRC-PI&R-Question on Classification of DW
| |
| : Sumps NRC PI&R- CA's Not Created for Interim RCE
| |
| : Actions Several NRC Findings had Improper
| |
| : AR Assignments per
| |
| : ARP-01
| |
| : IPB Mod Design Issues with Service Water Valves
| |
| : 10/10/2010
| |
| : 09/16/2010
| |
| : 10/04/2010
| |
| : 11/20/2008
| |
| : OPERATING EXPERIENCE
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : OE 31215 Jet Pump Wedge Wear
| |
| : 5/25/2010
| |
| : 01175420 NRC
| |
| : IN 2009-03:
| |
| : Solid State Protection System Card Failure Results in Spurious Safety Injection Actuation and Reactor Trip
| |
| : 6/11/2009
| |
| : 01137557 Station OE Evaluation of Industry Documents
| |
| : 5/13/2008
| |
| : 01143701 Station OE Evaluation of
| |
| : OE 26794
| |
| : 7/10/2008
| |
| : OE 31105 Water Detected in a Cable Pit Beneath a MCC
| |
| which Contained Safety-Related Cables
| |
| (Cook Plant)
| |
| : 5/7/2010
| |
| : 01245020 Station OE Evaluation of
| |
| : OE 31283
| |
| : 8/10/2010
| |
| : 01149696 Fisher Information Notice 1997-01, Supplement 1
| |
| : 9/5/2008
| |
| : 01193202 MNGP OE Evaluation of PINGP
| |
| : AR 01192430
| |
| : 8/11/2009
| |
| : 01126257 Part 21:
| |
| : GE Fuel Rod Thermal-Mechanical Methodology
| |
| : 2/05/2008
| |
| : Weekly OE Screening Minutes
| |
| : 06/10/2010
| |
| : 01180269
| |
| : Fleet OE Evaluation of INPO OE28618
| |
| : 01142237 OE26962 Flux Map Gaps Ginna
| |
| : 2/02/2009
| |
| : 01145374 Station OE Screen Team Review of OE for Week
| |
| : 07/18/2008
| |
| : 09/23/2008
| |
| : 01142952 Westinghouse Detached P-Grid Dimples
| |
| : 01/09/2009
| |
| : 01149492 Station OE Screen Team Review of OE For Week of 08/29/2008
| |
| : 10/31/2008
| |
| : 01157701
| |
| : Station OE Evaluation of EO for Week of
| |
| : 10/31/2008
| |
| : 09/30/2009
| |
| : Attachment
| |
| : AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS AND
| |
| : SELF-ASSESSMENTS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : 01121234
| |
| : FASA of
| |
| : XCELs Energy's MNGP EPU Outage Project Readiness
| |
| : 2/17/2008
| |
| : 1205004 EPU Outage Readiness Assessment 6/10/2010 2010-02-014 Corrective Action Program 5/14/2010 2010-01-029 Corrective Action Program 3/12/2010
| |
| : SAR 01205025 PI&R Readiness 9/9/2010
| |
| : SAR 01249160 Site Roll-up Meeting Results 1
| |
| st and 2 nd Quarter 2010 SAR01116710
| |
| : Component Design Bases Inspection Focused Self-Assessments
| |
| : 11/17/2008
| |
| : NOS 1 st Quarter 2010 Assessment Report 05/14/2010
| |
| : NOS 4th Quarter 2009 Assessment Report 03/01/2010
| |
| : QF-0426 Focused Self-Assessment MNGP Dry Cask Loading Readiness Revision 2
| |
| : QF-0402 Fleet Focused Self Assessment Report: Reportability
| |
| : SAR 01117506
| |
| : Revision 3
| |
| : 1133118 Exposure Monitoring and Dose Control 11/06/2008
| |
| : CONDITION REPORTS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : AR 1250188 NRC PI&R Process Control for WO from
| |
| : CA Process
| |
| : AR 1250127 NRC PI&R:
| |
| : Closure Documentation for
| |
| : 1150601-06 Inadequate
| |
| : 9/17/2010
| |
| : AR 1250089 NRC PI&R:
| |
| : CAs Not Created for Interim RCE Actions
| |
| : 9/16/2010
| |
| : AR 1249923 NRC PI&R:
| |
| : NRC is Questioning Status of
| |
| : 25V DC 9/15/2010
| |
| : AR 1251890 PI&R:
| |
| : Inconsistencies in Observation Program 9/29/2010
| |
| : AR 1249158 Contactor Oversight Insufficient to Prevent Performance Issues
| |
| : 10/11/2010
| |
| : AR 1243583 Incorrect CAP Severity Determination 9/24/2010
| |
| : AR 1252870 NRC PI&R:
| |
| : PEACH Process Not Well Understood
| |
| : 10/5/2010
| |
| : AR 1252873 OE Not Well Evaluated Beyond the Event 10/5/2010
| |
| : Attachment
| |
| : MISCELLANEOUS
| |
| : Number Description or Title Date or Revision
| |
| : 3784 A(1) Action/Performance Improvement Plant Revision 0
| |
| : NSPM CAP Screening Package 9/16/2010
| |
| : Performance Assessment Review Board Package 9/14/2010
| |
| : Alignment Teamwork and Oversight Meeting 9/15/2010
| |
| : WO 384150
| |
| : IC-RHR,
| |
| : ISP-RHR-0552-01 RX Recirc Loop
| |
| : DP-LPCI INTR FUNCT T
| |
| : 01/27/2010
| |
| : WO 00388188
| |
| : IC-RCI, 0060 RCIC High Steam Flow Sensor Test 2/18/2010
| |
| : Attachment
| |
| ==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
| |
| : [[USED]] [[]]
| |
| : [[ACE]] [[Apparent Cause Evaluation]]
| |
| : [[ADAMS]] [[Agencywide Document Access Management System]]
| |
| : [[AR]] [[Action Request]]
| |
| : [[CAP]] [[Corrective Action Program]]
| |
| : [[CFR]] [[Code of Federal Regulations]]
| |
| : [[CAQ]] [[Condition Adverse to Quality]]
| |
| : [[DPO]] [[Differing Professional Opinion]]
| |
| : [[DRP]] [[Division of Reactor Projects]]
| |
| : [[DRUM]] [[Department roll-up meeting]]
| |
| : [[ECP]] [[Employee Concerns Program]]
| |
| : [[GAR]] [[General Action Request]]
| |
| : [[HELB]] [[High Energy Line Break]]
| |
| : [[HPCI]] [[High Pressure Coolant Injection]]
| |
| : [[IMC]] [[Inspection Manual Chapter]]
| |
| : [[IN]] [[Information Notices]]
| |
| : [[IP]] [[Inspection Procedure]]
| |
| : [[IST]] [[In-service test]]
| |
| : [[LER]] [[Licensee Event Report]]
| |
| : [[MNGP]] [[Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant]]
| |
| : [[MPFF]] [[Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure]]
| |
| : [[NCV]] [[Non-Cited Violation]]
| |
| : [[NOS]] [[Nuclear Oversight]]
| |
| : [[NRC]] [[]]
| |
| : [[U.S.]] [[Nuclear Regulatory Commission]]
| |
| : [[OE]] [[Operating Experience]]
| |
| : [[PARS]] [[Publicly Available Records System]]
| |
| : [[PM]] [[Preventive Maintenance]]
| |
| : [[PI&R]] [[Problem Identification & Resolution]]
| |
| : [[RCIC]] [[Reactor Core Isolation Cooling]]
| |
| : [[RHR]] [[Residual Heat Removal]]
| |
| : [[RHRSW]] [[Residual Heat Removal Service Water]]
| |
| : [[RPS]] [[Radiation Protection Specialist]]
| |
| : [[RPS]] [[Reactor Protection System]]
| |
| : [[SCAQ]] [[Significant Condition Adverse to Quality]]
| |
| : [[SCWE]] [[Safety-Conscious Work Environment]]
| |
| : [[SDP]] [[Significance Determination Process]]
| |
| : [[SFP]] [[Spent Fuel Pool]]
| |
| : [[USAR]] [[Updated Safety Analysis Report]]
| |
| WO Work Order
| |
| T. O'Connor -2-
| |
|
| |
| No violations or findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with
| |
| : [[10 CFR]] [[2.390 of the]]
| |
| : [[NRC]] [['s "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the]]
| |
| : [[NRC]] [[Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (]]
| |
| : [[PARS]] [[) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).]]
| |
| : [[ADAMS]] [[is accessible from the]]
| |
| NRC Website
| |
| at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Sincerely,
| |
| /RA/
| |
| Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
| |
|
| |
| Docket No. 50-263
| |
| License No. DPR-22
| |
| Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000263/2010007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
| |
|
| |
| cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServe
| |
| : [[DISTRI]] [[BUTION]]
| |
| : See next page
| |
|
| |
| DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPIII\1-Secy\1-Work In Progress\MON 2010 0007 PIR.docx Publicly Available
| |
| Non-Publicly Available
| |
| Sensitive Non-Sensitive To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
| |
| : [[OFFICE]] [[]]
| |
| : [[RIII]] [[N]]
| |
| : [[RIII]] [[]]
| |
| : [[ERIII]] [[]]
| |
| : [[RIII]] [[]]
| |
| : [[NAME]] [[NShah KRiemer:cs]]
| |
| : [[DATE]] [[11/09/10 11/10/10]]
| |
| : [[OFFICI]] [[AL]]
| |
| : [[RECORD]] [[]]
| |
| : [[COPY]] [[Letter to]]
| |
| : [[T.]] [[O'Connor from K. Riemer dated November 10, 2010]]
| |
| : [[SUBJEC]] [[T: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING]]
| |
| : [[PLANT]] [[]]
| |
| : [[PROBLE]] [[M IDENTIFICATION]]
| |
| : [[AND]] [[]]
| |
| : [[RESOLU]] [[TION INSPECTION]]
| |
| : [[REPORT]] [[05000263/2010007]]
| |
| : [[DISTRI]] [[BUTION]]
| |
| : Daniel Merzke
| |
| RidsNrrDorlLpl3-1 Resource
| |
| RidsNrrPMMonticello
| |
|
| |
| RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
| |
|
| |
| Steven West Steven Orth Jared Heck
| |
|
| |
| Allan Barker
| |
|
| |
|
| Carole Ariano
| |
| Linda Linn
| |
| : [[DRPIII]] [[]]
| |
| DRSIII Patricia Buckley
| |
| Tammy Tomczak
| |
| : [[ROP]] [[reports Resource]]
| |
| }} | | }} |
|
---|
Category:Inspection Report
MONTHYEARIR 05000263/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2023004 IR 05000263/20244012024-01-22022 January 2024 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000263/2024401 IR 05000263/20234022023-12-13013 December 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000263/2023402 IR 05000263/20230032023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2023003 and 07200058/2023001 IR 05000263/20230102023-09-0707 September 2023 Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection Report 05000263/2023010 IR 05000263/20230052023-08-30030 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (Report 05000263/2023005) IR 05000263/20230022023-08-0707 August 2023 Plantintegrated Inspection Report 05000263/2023002 IR 05000263/20235012023-07-13013 July 2023 Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 05000263/2023501 IR 05000263/20230012023-05-0404 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2023001 IR 05000263/20234012023-05-0404 May 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000263/2023401 IR 05000263/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1 (Report 05000263/2022006) IR 05000263/20220042023-01-17017 January 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2022004 IR 05000263/20220122022-12-15015 December 2022 Triennial Inspection of Evaluation of Changes, Tests and Experiments Baseline Inspection Report 05000263/2022012 IR 05000263/20220132022-11-21021 November 2022 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000263/2022013 IR 05000263/20223012022-11-21021 November 2022 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000263/2022301 IR 05000263/20220032022-11-17017 November 2022 Reissue - Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2022003 ML22307A1822022-11-14014 November 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2022003 IR 05000263/20224032022-10-19019 October 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000263/2022403 (Public) IR 05000263/20220052022-08-29029 August 2022 Updated Inspection Plan for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (Report 05000263/2022005) IR 05000263/20220022022-07-28028 July 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2022002 IR 05000263/20220012022-05-10010 May 2022 Generation Plant - Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2022001 IR 05000263/20224022022-05-0505 May 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000263/2022402; Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Report 07200058/2022401 IR 05000263/20224012022-03-28028 March 2022 Generation Plant - Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000263/2022401 IR 05000263/20210062022-03-0202 March 2022 Annual Assessment Letter for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1 (Report 05000263/2021006) IR 05000263/20210042022-01-28028 January 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2021004 and 07200058/2021001 IR 05000263/20214022021-12-16016 December 2021 Triennial Material Control and Accounting Report 05000263/2021402 IR 05000263/20214202021-11-15015 November 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report Cover Letter 05000263 2021420 IR 05000263/20210032021-10-27027 October 2021 Plan, Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2021003 IR 05000263/20210102021-10-0808 October 2021 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000263/2021010 IR 05000263/20210112021-09-29029 September 2021 Plan - Temporary Instruction 2515/194 Inspection; Ibspection Report 05000263/2021011 IR 05000263/20215012021-09-0101 September 2021 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000263/2021501 IR 05000263/20210052021-09-0101 September 2021 Updated Inspection Plan for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2 (Report 05000263/2021005) IR 05000263/20210022021-08-0303 August 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2021002 IR 05000263/20210012021-04-30030 April 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2021001 IR 05000263/20200062021-03-0404 March 2021 Annual Assessment Letter for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (Report 05000263/2020006) IR 05000263/20200102021-03-0202 March 2021 Reissue - Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000263/2020010 IR 05000263/20200042021-01-20020 January 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2020004 ML21013A4222021-01-13013 January 2021 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000263/2020010 IR 05000263/20203012020-12-0909 December 2020 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000263/2020301 IR 05000263/20204022020-12-0303 December 2020 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000263/2020402 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000263/20200152020-11-0909 November 2020 NRC Inspection Report 05000263/2020015 IR 05000263/20200032020-11-0909 November 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2020003 IR 05000263/20200132020-10-13013 October 2020 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000263/2020013 IR 05000263/20204012020-09-22022 September 2020 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000263/2020401 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000263/20200052020-09-0101 September 2020 Updated Inspection Plan for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (Report 05000263/2020005) IR 05000263/20200022020-08-0303 August 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2020002 IR 05000263/20200142020-06-30030 June 2020 License Renewal Phase IV Report 05000263/2020014 IR 05000263/20200122020-05-26026 May 2020 Inspection of the Implementation of EA-13-09: Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions Report 05000263/2020012 IR 05000263/20200012020-05-0404 May 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2020001 IR 05000263/20200112020-03-31031 March 2020 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000263/2020011 2024-01-31
[Table view] Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24025A9362024-01-31031 January 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0055 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) IR 05000263/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2023004 ML24024A0722024-01-24024 January 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Onticello, Supplement to Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation IR 05000263/20244012024-01-22022 January 2024 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000263/2024401 L-MT-23-054, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 82024-01-11011 January 2024 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 8 L-MT-23-047, License Amendment Request: Revision to the MNGP Pressure Temperature Limits Report to Change the Neutron Fluence Methodology and Incorporate New Surveillance Capsule Data2023-12-29029 December 2023 License Amendment Request: Revision to the MNGP Pressure Temperature Limits Report to Change the Neutron Fluence Methodology and Incorporate New Surveillance Capsule Data L-MT-23-056, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 Part 22023-12-18018 December 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 Part 2 ML23349A0572023-12-15015 December 2023 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Revision to Correspondence Service List for Northern States Power - Minnesota IR 05000263/20234022023-12-13013 December 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000263/2023402 L-MT-23-042, 2023 Annual Report of Changes in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.462023-12-11011 December 2023 2023 Annual Report of Changes in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 L-MT-23-052, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 72023-11-30030 November 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 7 L-MT-23-051, Update to the Technical Specification Bases2023-11-28028 November 2023 Update to the Technical Specification Bases L-MT-23-049, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 12023-11-21021 November 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 ML23319A3182023-11-15015 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation IR 05000263/20230032023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2023003 and 07200058/2023001 L-MT-23-043, 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Request Regarding OMN-17, Revision 1. VR-092023-11-13013 November 2023 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Request Regarding OMN-17, Revision 1. VR-09 L-MT-23-038, License Amendment Request to Revise Monticello Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.6.62023-11-10010 November 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Monticello Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.6.6 L-MT-23-046, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Round 2 - Set 12023-11-0909 November 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Round 2 - Set 1 ML23291A1102023-10-23023 October 2023 Environmental Audit Summary and RCIs and RAIs ML23285A3062023-10-12012 October 2023 Implementation of the Fleet Standard Emergency Plan for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant and the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant L-MT-23-041, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Confirmation of Information Set 22023-10-0303 October 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Confirmation of Information Set 2 L-MT-23-037, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 32023-09-22022 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 3 ML23262B0372023-09-19019 September 2023 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the 2023 Monticello and Prairie Island Plant Decommissioning Funding Status Reports ML23248A2092023-09-18018 September 2023 Proposed Alternative VR-11 to the Requirements of the ASME OM Code Associated with Periodic Verification Testing of MO-2397, Reactor Water Cleanup Inboard Isolation Valve ML23256A1682023-09-13013 September 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation and Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Voluntary Security Clearance Program 2023 Insider Threat Program Self-Inspection IR 05000263/20230102023-09-0707 September 2023 Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection Report 05000263/2023010 L-MT-23-036, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 2 and Supplement 62023-09-0505 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 2 and Supplement 6 ML23214A2412023-08-31031 August 2023 Letter: Aging Management Audit - Monticello Unit 1 - Subsequent License Renewal Application IR 05000263/20230052023-08-30030 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (Report 05000263/2023005) L-MT-23-035, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 52023-08-28028 August 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 5 ML23241A9732023-08-21021 August 2023 Request for Scoping Comments Concerning the Environmental Review of Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1, Subsequent License Renewal Application (Docket No. 50-263) L-MT-23-034, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 12023-08-15015 August 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to Request for Additional Information Set 1 ML23222A0122023-08-10010 August 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation and Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Changes in Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence ML23215A1312023-08-0909 August 2023 License Renewal Regulatory Audit Regarding the Environmental Review of the Subsequent License Renewal Application IR 05000263/20230022023-08-0707 August 2023 Plantintegrated Inspection Report 05000263/2023002 L-MT-23-028, 2023 Refueling Outage 90-Day Inservice Inspection (ISI) Summary Report2023-07-31031 July 2023 2023 Refueling Outage 90-Day Inservice Inspection (ISI) Summary Report L-MT-23-032, 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) Request Regarding MO-2397, VR-112023-07-31031 July 2023 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) Request Regarding MO-2397, VR-11 ML23198A0412023-07-28028 July 2023 LRA Availability Letter ML23206A2342023-07-25025 July 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, and Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Changes in Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence ML23201A0352023-07-24024 July 2023 Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and Request for Information ML23202A0032023-07-21021 July 2023 Independent Spent Fuel and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Submittal of Quality Assurance Topical Report (NSPM-1) L-MT-23-031, Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 4 and Responses to Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 12023-07-18018 July 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement 4 and Responses to Request for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 ML23195A1732023-07-14014 July 2023 Revision of Standard Practice Procedures Plan IR 05000263/20235012023-07-13013 July 2023 Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 05000263/2023501 2024-01-31
[Table view] |
Text
ber 10, 2010
SUBJECT:
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2010007
Dear Mr. OConnor:
On October 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.
The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 1, 2010, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
The inspection concluded that your staff was effective at identifying problems and incorporating them into the corrective action program (CAP). In general, issues were appropriately prioritized, evaluated, and corrected; audits and self-assessments were thorough and probing, and operating experience was appropriately screened and disseminated. Your staff was aware of the importance of having a strong safety-conscious work environment and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. The inspectors also observed that actions taken to address a declining trend in Human Performance appeared to be effective.
However, your staff was not fully effective in addressing an adverse trend in contractor oversight and in work control and planning, which had begun earlier this year. Although both issues were captured in the CAP program, the underlying causes were not fully understood. This resulted in corrective actions being more reactive, instead of proactive, when responding to related issues.
The inspectors were concerned that this adverse trend, if not resolved, would negatively impact the significant number of work activities planned for next year. No violations or findings were identified during this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000263/2010007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION III==
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Report No: 05000263/2010007 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Location: Monticello, MN Dates: September 13 - October 1, 2010 Inspectors: N. Shah, Project Engineer - Team Lead D. Sand, Acting Resident Inspector - Monticello C. Scott, Reactor Engineer G. ODwyer, Reactor Engineer M. Phalen, Plant Support Specialist Approved by: Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000263/2010007; 09/13/2010 - 10/01/2010; Monticello Nuclear Generating Station;
Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems.
This team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and the resident inspector.
No violations or findings were identified.
Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was good. Issues were effectively identified, evaluated and corrected. Nuclear Oversight (NOS) audits and department self-assessments were generally critical and identified issues that were captured in the (CAP). Operating Experience (OE) was well communicated and appropriately evaluated. A strong safety culture was evident, based on interviews with licensee staff and a review of the types of issues captured in the CAP and Employee Concerns Program (ECP).
The inspectors observed that the evaluation of OE in Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) had improved since the 2008 PI&R inspection. Specifically, ACEs now discussed whether the failure to properly evaluate previously identified OE was a potential precursor of the event.
The licensee took proactive efforts to address a declining trend in the Security Department Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). The inspectors received positive feedback during interviews with Security officers, and noted an increasing trend in the number of issues identified by the Security force.
The licensees actions to address the previous cross-cutting issues in Human Performance and a potential cross-cutting issue in Issue Evaluation appeared good. The corrective actions appeared appropriate and the inspectors noted improving performance over the last six months in these areas.
However, the inspectors noted that the licensee had recurring problems with managing the CAP backlog and with ensuring that items identified during management observations were captured in the CAP. The inspectors also identified some examples where licensee staff had changed due dates for subtasks without referencing the source CAP report.
The inspectors identified that CAP implementing procedures did not provide good guidance regarding how to evaluate critical and non-critical component failures. Specifically, some component failures, which could reasonably be considered critical, (i.e., had significant consequences) could be classified as non-critical using the current guidance.
The inspectors observed that there were continuing issues related to work planning and execution and with contractor control. Although both problems were captured in the CAP, the underlying causes were not yet fully understood, resulting in most of the corrective actions being reactive rather than proactive. For example, it was unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were the same issues that were affecting the contractor performance. In addition, as previously stated, some issues identified through management observations associated with these topics may not be captured in the CAP.
Although the station continued to evaluate the issue, it remained an area of concern given the significant outage work planned for the next year.
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R)
The activities documented in sections
.1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of
PI&R as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152.
.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP implementing procedures and attended CAP program meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel.
The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensees CAP since the last NRC PI&R inspection in November 2008. The issues selected were appropriately varied across the NRC cornerstones, and were identified through routine daily plant activities, licensee audits and self-assessments, industry operating experience reports, and NRC inspection activities. The inspectors also reviewed a selection of apparent, common and root cause evaluations for more significant CAP items.
The inspectors performed a more extensive review of the licensees efforts to address ongoing issues with human performance and issue evaluation. This review consisted primarily of a five year search of related issues identified in the CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensees corrective actions.
During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee staffs actions were in compliance with the facilitys CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements.
Specifically, whether licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the stations CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings.
All documents reviewed during this inspection were listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Assessment
- (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification The licensees implementation of the CAP was generally good. Workers were encouraged to identify issues and were familiar with the various avenues available (NRC, CAP, etc). This was evident by the large number of CAP items generated annually, which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A shared computerized database was used for creating individual reports and for subsequent management of the processes of issue evaluation and response. This included determining the issues significance, addressing such matters as regulatory compliance and reporting, and assigning any actions deemed necessary or appropriate.
In reviewing licensee management observations conducted between June and October 2010, the inspectors found several examples of items that were apparently not captured in the CAP. Most of the examples were concerned with industrial safety or work planning issues that should have been captured in the CAP. In one example, a worker observing an industrial safety concern stated that because the worker had not met a management expectation, vice a procedural requirement, the issue wasnt going to be documented in the CAP. The licensee documented the inspectors concern as CAP item 1251890.
The licensee was also good at identifying and resolving trends. The inspectors noted a large number of trends identified through the binning of issues or via the quarterly department roll-up meeting (DRUM) reports.
During the November 2008, PI&R review, the inspectors identified that the licensees trending program was somewhat limited in that it did not always identify trends with issues affecting the same functional area, but having dissimilar aspects. Subsequently, the licensee initiated an effort to assign cross-cutting criteria (analogous to NRC criteria)to apparent and root cause evaluations, which were then trended. Although the inspectors considered this a positive effort, it was too early to determine its overall effectiveness.
Findings No findings were identified.
- (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues Overall, CAP issues were being properly screened. The majorities of issues were of low level and were either closed to trend or at a level appropriate for a condition evaluation.
Licensee staff appropriately challenged CAP items during screening meetings and were cognizant of potential trends. Most issues were closed to a work request or to another CAP item. The inspectors noted that both the parent and daughter documents had the necessary verbiage to document the interrelationship. Although fewer in number, the inspectors did not have any concerns with those issues assigned an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) or root cause evaluation. There were no items in the operations, engineering, or maintenance backlogs that were risk significant, individually or collectively. There were no classifications or immediate operability determinations with which the inspectors disagreed.
Root and apparent cause evaluations were generally of good quality and were well documented. During the 2006 PI&R inspection, the inspectors noted that ACEs did not consider whether the failure to consider industry OE was a precursor to events.
Additionally, licensee management did not always address issues with ACE quality that were identified during the evaluation grading process. The inspectors noted that subsequent ACEs now addressed whether OE was properly used prior to the event and that ACE quality issues were communicated to the originating departments.
Station Procedure FP-E-SE-02, Component Classification, was used by licensee staff to distinguish between a critical and non-critical component failure. The procedure was written specifically to address equipment reliability, but was referenced in the CAP for use during cause evaluations. Although the stated guidance was adequate for equipment reliability considerations, it was not appropriate for CAP evaluations.
For example, this procedure specifically defines any component failure that results in a significant radiological release as a non-critical component failure. From a CAP perspective, any component failure resulting in significant radiological consequences would be critical. The inspectors were concerned that this procedure may result in some component failures being treated as less significant under the CAP, then appropriate. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250116 to review this issue.
Since 2006, the licensee has experienced numerous issues in human performance.
Initially, these issues were primarily of low significance (i.e., did not result in an NRC finding). However, the issues continued through 2008, with the significance of the findings increasing, until an adverse trend in human performance had become evident.
The licensees early efforts to address this trend were largely ineffective, as the licensee originally believed that the human performance issues were limited to specific behaviors or work groups, instead of a more widespread concern involving fundamental human behaviors. Subsequently, the licensee identified that the issues were principally due to a lack of resources and an inappropriate tolerance for risk among workers. Several corrective actions were initiated, including additional training to site workers on configuration control and risk management. The inspectors noted that performance had improved among site workers in the past six months.
However, the licensee was still dealing with an adverse trend in contractor human performance, primarily related to oversight and work planning and execution.
Although this issue was captured in the CAP (items 1249158 and 1247197), the underlying causes are not yet fully understood, and many of the corrective actions, to date, have been more reactive than proactive. For example, it is unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were also affecting the contractor performance. To date, the majority of the issues have been of low significance (i.e., not resulting in an NRC finding); however, the overall trend was similar to the previous issue with site human performance.
Findings
Introduction:
The inspectors identified an Unresolved Item (URI) regarding the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Analyses.
Description:
As part of the review of the ACE for an adverse trend in double disc gate valve (DDGV) local leak rate testing (LLRT) performance documented in CAP 1202466, the inspectors noted that the ACE had determined that the valves performance degradation did not prevent the valves from performing their safety function. The ACE only addressed the valves safety function of providing containment isolation. The inspectors questioned if the safety function of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI),reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) steam supply valves to close after detection of a HELB should have been considered. The licensee responded that the ACE did not need to consider the effect of the valves increased leakage on the HELB analyses because any leakage would not impact the alternate shutdown path. The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and acceptance criteria of the HELB calculations for HPCI, RCIC and RWCU line breaks and identified potential inconsistencies between the calculations assumptions with Technical Specifications and UFSAR allowed values for valve closure times, incorporation of delay actuations, and isolation initiation signals. The licensee entered the NRC concerns with these potential inconsistencies into the CAP by initiating CAP 01252363 on October 1, 2010.
The licensee stated that the calculations were appropriate and provided the inspectors with some original licensing documents for the HELB analyses; however, additional questions remained. This issue will be tracked as URI 05000263/201007-01 pending further NRC review of the licensee responses and the HELB analyses and determination of the original and current licensing bases.
- (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented, commensurate with their safety significance. Those corrective actions addressing selected NRC documented violations were also generally effective and timely.
The inspectors verified that work orders were in place (and scheduled) for selected, open actions that were two years old or greater.
During interviews, the inspectors noted that some individuals did not refer back to the parent CAP when changing due dates for associated subtasks (such as work requests).
The inspectors identified several examples where the revised due dates for subtasks were inconsistent with the parent CAP. Although none of the identified examples were highly significant, the inspectors were concerned that the practice may result in other changes having a greater operational impact. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250089 to evaluate this issue.
The station has a recurring problem with managing the backlog. A recent licensee initiative to redefine the items tracked in the backlog has reduced the numbers, but didnt necessarily address the issue. The licensee currently tracks only Corrective Actions, Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence, and operability issues. Other items, that used to be part of the backlog, were instead tracked as CAP action items. However, the inspectors noted that there was no formal effort to determine whether the CAP action items were being addressed in a timely fashion (i.e., no performance indicator similar to the formal backlog indicator). Since these action items were corrective actions (albeit of lower significance), the inspectors were concerned that some may not get implemented.
Complicating the issue was an apparent mixed message from station management, who expressed the view that the backlog numbers werent important so long as items were being properly managed. Since this issue was already captured in the CAP, the inspectors observations were included as part of the ongoing licensee evaluation.
Findings No findings were identified.
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the facilitys OE program.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed implementing OE program procedures, attended CAP meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensees program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented.
Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Assessment In general, OE was effectively used at the station. The inspectors observed that OE was discussed as part of the daily station planning meetings, at shift turnover meetings, and at maintenance pre-briefings. Also, the inspectors determined that OE was appropriately reviewed during causal evaluations. During interviews, several licensee personnel commented favorably on the use of OE in their daily activities.
The inspectors noted that the OE evaluation for a relay failure that resulted in the inoperability of a safety-related train at Harris (Action Request (AR) 1233871) was somewhat limited in scope. The evaluation identified that similar relays were used at Monticello, but in non-safety related equipment; therefore, no actions were required.
However, there was no documented evaluation whether a failure of these relays in the affected equipment could have had any significant operational impact. The licensee documented this issue as CAP item 1252873.
Findings No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensee staffs ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits.
b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold level. The audits and self-assessments were completed by personnel knowledgeable in the subject area, and the quality of the NOS audits was thorough and critical. The self-assessments were acceptable but were not at the same level of quality as the NOS audits. The inspectors observed that CAP items had been initiated for issues identified through the NOS audits and self-assessments.
The inspectors observed selected meetings of the Performance Assessment Review Board and reviewed board meeting minutes over the past six months. The Board provided oversight for the CAP including the self-assessment program. The inspectors identified no issues with the Boards performance during the inspection.
Findings No findings were identified.
.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees SCWE through the reviews of the facilitys ECP implementing procedures, discussions with ECP coordinators, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results of licensee safety culture surveys.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the plant staff were aware of the importance of having a strong SCWE and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. No one interviewed had experienced retaliation for safety issues raised, or knew of anyone who had failed to raise issues. All persons interviewed had an adequate knowledge of the CAP and ECP process. These results were similar to the findings of the licensees safety culture surveys. Based on these interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable SCWE.
The inspectors noted that the licensee had taken proactive efforts to address a declining SCWE trend within the Security force. This trend had been identified through self-assessments and audits conducted in 2009. The number of issues self-identified by the security staff had increased since the corrective actions were implemented.
Additionally, during interviews with the inspectors, Security staff commented favorably on the licensee initiatives to improve the SCWE.
The inspectors determined that the ECP process was being effectively implemented.
The review of the selected ECP issues indicated that site personnel were appropriately using the CAP and ECP to identify concerns. However, many staff were unaware of the other avenues the licensee had to raise concerns (collectively known as the PEACH process). For example, most staff were unaware of the Differing Professional Opinions (DPO) program for addressing engineering issues. Additionally, some newer staff confused safety culture with industrial safety. Similar issues were identified during the 2008 PI&R inspection. The licensee captured these issues as CAP item 1252870.
Findings No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On October 1, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. OConnor and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- H. Butterworth, Fleet Operations Standards Director
- P. Byers, Security Manager
- J. Early, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- N. Haskell, Engineering Director
- M. Holmes, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager
- K. Jepson, Business Support Manager
- J. Mestad, Employ Concerns Program Manager
- D. Neve, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- J. Ohotto, Design Engineering Manager
- T. OConnor, Site Vice-President
- S. Porter, System Engineering Manager
- S. Radebaugh, Acting Plant Manager
- S. Sharpe, Operations Manager
- G. Sherwood, Program Engineering Manger
- T. Toglery, Nuclear Oversight Manager
- J. Windchill, Fleet Performance Assessment Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Riemer, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened:
URI
- 05000263/201007-01 HELB Analysis Potentially Non-Conservative Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED