ML17212A368

Near-Term OL Human Engineering Rept on St Lucie 2 Control Room.

ML17212A368
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	07/06/1981
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17212A365	List: ML17212A364 ML17212A368 ML17212A369
References
RTR-NUREG-0660, RTR-NUREG-0700, RTR-NUREG-660, RTR-NUREG-700, RTR-NUREG-CR-1580 NUDOCS 8107210314
Download: ML17212A368 (103)

Text

NTOL

SUMMARY

HUMAN ENGINEERING REPORT ON ST- LUCIE .UNIT:NO '2': CONTROL ROOM Prepared for: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Prepared by: Florida:Power & Light Company July 6, 1981 81072103i4 Bi07iS PDR ADOCK 05000389 A PDR

I I

I I

SUMMARY

HUMAN FACTORS REPORT TO NRC

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On April 29, 1981, the Essex Corporation was contracted, by the Florida Power a Light Company (FPGL) to provide Human Engineering (HE) consulting services to assist in the assessment of several nuclear power plant control rooms as required by Task I.D. of NUREG-0660 and suggested guidelines in NUREG/CR-1580. One task of Essex's was to conduct a preliminary prelicensing review of the St. Lucie Unit No. 2 Control Room (CR), the results of which (Appendix No. 1) are to be transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) along with this summary report. This report of the St. Lucie Unit No. 2 Nuclear

~1'uman En ineerin Assessment Power Plant Control Room report, along with a schedule for the implementation of work items and/or engineering review programs necessary to correct these Human Engineering Discrepancies (HED's) which were identified as having a significant impact on safety related operating effectiveness. NUREG/CR-1580 was used to establish the guidelines of the preliminary HED review since the final guidelines (NUREG-0700) had not been issued as of the date this review was conducted.

I I

The Essex Corporation performed a preliminary assessment of the St. Lucie Unit No. 2 CR for the purpose of identifying conspic-ious Human Factors Engineering (HFE) discrepancies which could have a significant impact on safety related operating effective-ness.

The overall control room assessment. included, but was not limited to; CR workspace and environment

2. Labels and job performance aids 3 ~ Controls 4 Displays

5. Annunciators and warnings

6. Computer display systems 7 ~ Control and display layout and integration The evaluation was accomplished by:

l. Establishing discrete tasks

2. Determining objectives for each task

3. Developing a methodology for implementation

4. Results (Data Reduction and Analysis)

I I

'I

There were f ive (5) items which were not complete and/or avail-able on SL-2 during Essex's review. They were:

CR Communications System 2~ Procedures 3 ~ Radiation Monitors 4 ~ Reactor Protection System 5 ~ TMI Post, Accident Auxiliary Panel These items will be discussed in more detail in the Findings and Action section of this report.

To aid in review of this summary report as well as the Essex Preliminary Assessment of SL-2 (Appendix No.l) the actions in-tended and scheduling will4 be presented in three sections under Findings and Actions, as follows;

1. Panel by panel discrepancies

2. Generic discrepancies

3. Other topics and/or equipment not covered by Items 1 and 2 above 2 ' FINDINGS AND ACTIONS This section addresses the action and scheduling proposed by FP&L with regard to addressing these items identified as being HED's in the Essex "Preliminary Human Engineering Assessment of the St.

Lucie Unit No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant Control Room" report. Lay-out and discrepancies unique to specific panels are discussed below.

I 2.1 Discussions of Findin s and Actions b Panel 2.1 .1 Panel 201 Electrical, Turbine and Generator A. The mainsteam drain valve indicator lights are used to show the drain valve's position. The present orienta-tion of the indicator lights would not cause an error during a safety related activity since these valves are not associated with any safety related activities. In the event a drain valve is indicated to be in an OFF normal position, the secondary side field operator is dispatched to make a detailed investigation of the situation. Reorientation of this display would not change or improve present plant operating effective-ness, therefore no action is intended for this item.

B. Turbine gland steam is placed inservice during second-ary side warmup. Once placed inservice no further operator action is required. This system does not involve any safety related activities and is not required to be manipulated during any periods of plant transients. Reorientation of this control and display would not change or improve present operator effective-ness, therefore no action is intended for this item.

2.1 .1 C. The generator feed and megavar indicators are independ-ent instruments used during different periods of operation. The placement of the turbine generator governor (speed control) and generator controls, with respect to the generator speed and megavar indicators, are consistent with industry standards. These controls and/or indicators are not required to be manipulated during safety related activities. Reorientation of these controls and displays would not change or improve operator effectiveness, therefore no action is intended for this item.

D. Turbine and reactor trip pushbuttons are placed in areas of high visibility so that inadvertent actuation would not occur. Presently no action is planned for this i tern.

E,F, G. Labeling and demarcation of the generator megavar displays, diesel generator controls and displays as well as the DEH valve test pushbuttons and legend lights will be accomplished during the implementation portion of the ongoing labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program.

The review is scheduled to be completed prior to fuel load.

2.1 .1 H. Non-glare glass will be installed on diesel generator 2B frequency meter.

2.1 .2 Panel 202 Feedwater and Condensate A. The chemical recorders located between the auxiliary feedwater controls and indicators are scheduled to be moved prior to core load to support installation of the auxiliar'y feedwater automatic initiation system.

B, C. The heater drain pump controls and auxiliary feedwater

'i pump and valve controls will be reviewed during the ongoing labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program. The review is sched-uled to be completed prior to fuel load.

D. The auxiliary feedwater header flow trend recorders are scheduled to be reversed to be consistent with their associated controls as soon as the required supporting engineering documentation is completed.

I 2.1 .2 E. The primary water storage tank level display, as well as the transfer pump controls, are not associated with the makeup control functions and displays located on Panel 205. Relocation of these controls and displays would require the operator to split his attention between the 205 and 202 panel during filling of the primary water storage tank. FP&L feels these items are properly located and intends no further action.

F~ The subject main steam isolation valves and feedwater block valves are not required to be manipulated during normal plant operation. However, their status and also manipulation would be required during containment iso-lation and safeguards actuation. Due to the fact that these controls are of prime concern during certain safety related functions, they are placed on Panel 202. FP&L intends no further action.

2.1 .3 Panel 203 - Reactor Coolant S stem Ag BgC, D. Items A, B, C and D will be reviewed during the present ongoing labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program. These items will be prioritized and corrective actions initiated prior to fuel load.

E. An engineering review of the referenced meter mounting scheme will be initiated to investigate the rasing and/or canting of the subject meters.

l 1

4

2.1 .4 Panel 204 Nuclear Instrumentation A. The present orientation of the selector switch would not cause an error during a safety related activity.

Relocation of the selector switch would not improve present plant operating effectiveness, therefore no action is intended at this time.

B. The normal T-AVG and T-REF displays, used 'uring control rod manipulation, are located immediately to the right of the CEA controls. Relocation of the redundant displays would not improve present plant operating effectiveness, therefore no action is intended at this time.

C. Presently operators use the Sequence of Events Recorder (SER) to determine the associated chain of events with regard to a reactor and turbine trip. The SER prints out first and all subsequent trips and time of occur-

~

ence. Presently no further action is planned with regard to this item.

D. The reactor trip pushbuttons are placed in an area of high visibility so that inadvertent actuation could not occur. Presently no action is planned for their relocation.

E. If the same HE discrepancies are reproduced on SL-2, they will be addressed by:

1. Removing anti-glare glass from CRT cover 2-. Placing a shield over the CRT to reduce incident light to the display.

5, 2.1 .5 Panel 20S Chemical Volume and Control S stem A. Relabeling of HIC-1110 will be accomplished during the implementation portion of the ongoing labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program. The. review is scheduled to be com-pleted prior to fuel load.

B. A review of the letdown, charging and VCT controls is scheduled for review during the ongoing labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program. FP&L and EBASCO will examine altern-atives and address prior to fuel load.

C. The primary water transfer pumps located on Panel 202 are not associated with the makeup control functions and displays located on Panel 20S. Relocation of these transfer pump controls would require the operator to split his attention between the 20S and 202 panel during filling of the primary water storage tank. FP&L feels these items are properly located and intends no further action.

D. The annunciator controls and color coding will be corrected for consistency during the ongoing labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program which is scheduled for completion prior to fuel load.

2.1 .5 E. The subject liquid waste flow valves'ndicating lights and labeling will be corrected to be consistent with

,standard conventions as soon as the required support engineering documentation is completed.

F. Installation of a suitable square root extractor and qualified display, along with proper calibration procedures, is presently scheduled to be completed during the units first refueling outage.

2.1 .6 Panel 206 Emer enc Core Coolin S stem and Com onent Coolin Water S stem A. The low head and high head safety injection controls and displays are scheduled for a detailed engineering review during the labeling, system/subsystem demarca-tion, syntax and annunciator review program. , The review is scheduled for completion prior to fuel load.

B. The emergency core cooling controls and diplays are scheduled for review during the labeling, system/sub-system demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program. The review is scheduled for completion prior to fuel load with implementation of labeling and de-marcation requirements prior to fuel load.

10

I 2.1 .6 C. The hydrazine control and display system arrangement on Control Panel 206 is due to the fire separation cri-teria. This item will be reviewed during the labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program. The review is presently scheduled for completion prior to fuel load.

D. The shutdown displays and controls are arranged to comply with present channel/fire separation criteria.

The displays and controls will be reviewed, during the labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program to determine I what control/

display interfaces are achievable. Presently no immediate relocation of controls or displays are planned.

E The CCW from RC pumps heat exchanger flow meters (FIS-14-15-A,-B,-C and -D) were placed to satisfy the Engineering Safety Features Actuation System (ESAF) requirements. These indicators are not directly associated with the controls in question. The flow indicators are checked by the operator periodically and relocation of the displays would violate the design requirements of the ESAF System.

. Presently this item is not scheduled for any action.

11

1 2.1 .6 F. HIC-3638 process controller will be reorientated to achieve consistency with control room convention, as soon as the required supporting engineering documen-tation is completed.

2.1 .7 Miscellaneous Panels A. The matrix relay hold pushbutton is only used during periodic checkout of the reactor protection system. If the associated reactor trip breakers are not reset prior to testing the alternate channel the unit would experience a reactor trip. Presently the RPS system is not installed on SL-2 and will have to be reviewed for this item upon its installation prior to fuel load.

B. There is no room to reposition the HVAC controls in question above the 34 inch plane. These controls are infrequently operated and 'do not pose any control/dis-play problems with regard to interpretation. The controls for the reactor regulating system are used during normal calibration intervals and are not required to be manipulated during plant operation.

Presently, there is no further action planned with regard to these items.

C ~ The impact trend recorder legend will be relocated during the labeling, system/subsystem demarcation, syntax and annunciator review program. The review is scheduled for completion prior to fuel load.

12

l l

2.1 .7 D. The indicating light lenses on valve FCV-25-8 on the HVAC panel will be changed to agree with standard plant convention (green indicates valve closed and red indicates valve open).

E~ Keys are placed in a secure key cabinet as required by present security requirements. The key storage and access program for those keys required in the CR will not be changed since their use is not required for immediate operator action. Keys will be provided at the remote shutdown panel to allow the operator immediate access.

2.2 GENERIC DESCREPANCIES This section summarizes common discrepancies and outlines the review program and/or corrective action to be taken. The following section identifies the discrepancy as arranged in the following manner:

0 Discre anc Descri tion - Brief statement of the human engineering discrepancy.

o Status Review programs to establish corrective action to be taken and feasability.

1. Labeling review

2. System/Subsystem Demarcation Review

3. Syntax Review

4. Annunciator Review

5. Detailed System Interface a Engineering Review 13

Im lementation Present scheduling is such that most items will be completed prior to fuel load; however, those items requiring detailed engi-neering review, procurement of qualified instrumenta-tion and/or controls will tentatively be scheduled such that initial scoping will be completed prior to core load.

A. Indicates review and scheduled repair prior to fuel load.

B. Indicates detailed engineering review com-pleted prior to fuel load. Scheduling or repair subject to engineering and material availability.

C. Preliminary scope of work to be completed prior to fuel load with recommendations and 1

implementation schedule.

o ~Cetegor Category assignment is a sub-jective determination of error risk (High, Moderate, Some) as well as safety relatedness of the oper-ator activities.

14

5' Category 1 High risk of operator error in safe-ty related activity Category 2 Moderate risk of operator error in safety related activity Category 3 - Some risk of error in safety related activity Category 4 Risk of error in non safety related activity Category 5 Additional evaluation required 15

~ g~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~+5 ST LUCIE UNIT $ 2 LABELS AND JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY LABEL CONTENTS

l. Abbreviations are not used consistently in labels.

2. Content of labels is not consistent.

3. Incorrect labels.

16

5 I

ST LUCIE UNIT 02 LABELS AND JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS C

Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY LABEL CODING

l. Labels are highly similar.

'k

2. Pushbuttons have two labels which present redundant l

information.

3. Component labels are not larger than component posi-tion labels.

4. Labels are color coded based l on power supply, not system.

5. Some labels are read due to difficult to insufficient l

color contrast between label surface and print.

Sg~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~gN ST LUCIE UNIT 42 LABELS AND JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY LABEL READABILITY

1. Characters on labels are separated by less than the minimum recommended space (1/6) character height).

2. Line spacing on labels is inadequate (less than 1/2 the character height).

3. Many abbreviations in labels 3 on the HVAC, plant auxiliaries and line repeat panels are followed by periods.

4. Readability of labels is reduced because of font style.

18

ST LUCIE UNIT 42 LABELS AND JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY LABEL LOCATION AND MAINTENANCE

l. Pointers overlap index on N/A Operators use these devices for trend.

Recorder paper has proper scale.

3 large horizontal trend recorders. Presently no action. is intended.

2. Key-operated switches have taped-on labels.

3. Engraved labels were not filled in and have now be-come obscured by grease, grime and dirt.

4. Labels have been placed 2 under displays in almost all cases and are often obscured by the equipment they are intended to identify.

5. Labels are not directly on controls and displays.

19

Sg ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Qllfy~

ST LUCIE UNIT 0 2 LABELS AND JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY LABEL LOCATION AND MAINTENANCE (Cont.)

6. Labels are not located in 1,2 a consistent manner through-out the control room, making it difficult to identify component groupings.

7. Labels are not located on the most uncluttered surface.

8. Labelling of units on trend 1 recorders, counters and pro-cess controllers is incon-sistent and often redundant to the control label.

9. There is no indication on two color trend recorder as to which color represents an actual reading and which represents the set point.

20

ST LUCIE UNIT 02 LABELS AND JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY LABEL LOCATION AND MAINTENANCE (Cont.)

10. There are unlabelled posi-tions on rotary controls (observation made in Unit fl RPS Panel).

ll. Many trend recorders have blank labels or labels which do not explain the display's function.

12. A number of controls and displays have labels which are either missing or appear to be incorrect.

21

ST LUCIE UNIT N2 LABELS AND JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY DEMARCATION

l. Summary labels and demar- 1,2 cation lines are not used to identify and separate systems surrounding mimics.

Labels do not always appear above mimic areas.

2. There is little or no use 1,2,5 of summary labelling or de-marcation to identify func-tionally related components.

22

ST LUCIE UNIT 52 LABELS AND JOB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY.

MIMIC USABILITY

1. Mimics are not consistently 2 color coded.

2. Not all mimic lines term-

. inate at a label or labelled component.

3. Insufficient use of mimics 1,2,5 in control room. At present, they are only used for elec-trical systems.

23

0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ +Ill ST LUCIE UNIT 42 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY CONTROLS DIFFICULT TO USE

1. Process controllers on benchboard indicate set point with a green strip attached to cover, causing serious parallax problems.

2. Critical pushbuttons are N/A These pushbuttons are placed in located 69, 64 and 60 in., highly visible areas such that respectively, above the inadvertent actuation can be standing surface. minimized. Presently no action is intended.

3. Not all controls and dis-plays used in normal oper-ations are located between 34 and 74 in. above the floor.

4. Feedback provided for con- N/A Indicator lights give status of trols use is breaker posi- breaker control and breaker protec-tion rather than actual tion. Operator uses associated pump state. pressure and. flow indicators to deter-mine actual system status.

24

ST LUCIE UNIT e 2 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY CONTROLS SUBJECT TO IN-ADVERTENT ACTIVATION

l. Once setpoints are set on process controllers, no N/A The process controllers in question are generally located in low body means are provided to guard and hand traffic areas. No action is against accidental moving intended.

of the controls.

2. Critical controls are unguarded.

25

ST LUCIE UNIT 42 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY VIOLATIONS OF CONTROL CONVENTIONS

l. All switch keys are in- N/A All key switches are oriented in the Visual indication is serted with teeth pointing same manner.

down used to monitor switch position. No yction is intended at this time.

2. Off position is not vertical N/A All key switches are oriented in a in key operated switches. similar manner. Visual indication is used to monitor switch position. No action is intended at this time.

3. Rotary switch position conventions are violated in a number of cases.

26

ST LUCIE UNIT 42 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY CONTROL LAYOUT AND SUBSTITUTION ERRORS

1. Functionally related con-trols and displays are not collocated.

2. Controls used together are 1,2 not in close proximity.

3. Functionally similar or '1,2 identical primary controls are not consistently arranged and located from panel to panel.

27

ST LUCIE UNIT <<2 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY CONTROL LAYOUT AND SUBSTITUTION ERRORS (Cont.)

4. Minimum separation for N/A These are non-safety related items.

controls not achieved. The pushbuttons in question are large and inadvertent activation of two at once is not likely.

No further action is intended.

5. Controls not arranged by importance or frequency of use.

28

ST LUCIE UNIT 52 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY CONTROL CODING

1. Key operated switches 2.

are not consistently color coded.

2. Key operated switches have unlabelled positions.

3. Flags on breaker controls are obscured by control handles.

29

W gE ST LUCIE UNIT 52 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY COLOR CODING (Cont.)

4. Covers on all legend push- l,2 buttons are interchange-able.

5. Directional arrows on top 3 of T-handle RESET controls-are the same color as the rest of the rest of the handle.

6. A number of rotary selector 2 switches have directional markings or arrows which are not presently filled with a contrasting paint pigment.

7. Control have no differen- N/A Presently there is no action intended 3 tial coding for pumps, fans, in this area. It is felt that addi-or valves (except in label tional coding would place severe re-wording). striction with label visibility and would not enhance present operator effectiveness.

30

I Illa' W W W W W W gE W W W W ST LUCIE UNIT 02 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY ANNUNCIATOR INFORMATION UNCLEAR OR NOT PROVIDED

1. There are a number of unnecessary annunciators.

2. There are no annunciators for the Hydrazine system.

'.

Some annunciators used in startup will be normally on during full power situations.

4. The only indication that N/A The present annunciator system is an annunciator has been consistent with FPL's standard design.

cleared is the extinguish- Clearing of an annunciator is indica-ment of the light. tive of a back to normal condition which does not require operator action.

No action is intended at this time.

31

M '

W W W W W W W W W M ST LUCIE UNIT 02 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY PRIORITIZATION NOT PROVIDED

1. Permissive displays are N/A These permissives alert the operator to located on annunciator changing conditions which require his panels which should be attention or action. FPL feels these reserved for alarm alarms are properly located and no further displays. action is intended.

2. Important annunciators are not color or position coded except on annunciator panel C. That panel is also the only one with a first out reset function.

32

I I

I I

I I

~

g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Hl ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8$

+~'T LUCIE UNIT 42 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY ANNUNCIATOR TITLES DIFFICULT TO READ/INTERPRET

l. Annunciator font size is not sufficient for reliable.

reading, particularly at distances greater than several feet.

2. Many annunciator titles 3,4 are too wordy.

33

I I

ST LUCIE UNIT 52 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY ANNUNCIATOR CONTROLS MISLEADING

l. Annunciator button labels are unreadable.

2. Location of similar buttons 5 is not the same from panel to panel, and they are not in the same order from panel to panel.

3. Annunciator pushbuttons are inconsistently labelled.

Summary labels are some-times used, sometimes missing. Abbrevations are used inconsistently.

34

ST LUCIE UNIT 52 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY INCONSISTENT ANNUNCIATOR LAYOUT

l. Annunciator windows are 4,5 not above the systems they address.

35

ST LUCIE UNIT 52 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY AUDIBLE ANNUNCIATORS POORLY CODED

l. Annunciator audibles are located behind the panels, making it difficult for operators to localize the alarm.

2. Annunciator audibles sound at ambient (basal) noise levels.

36

5 ST LUCIE UNIT 02 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY CODING IS UNCLEAR OR MISLEADING

1. Two of the three lights associated with each of the listed switches are red.

2. Vertical scale indicator lights have multiple meanings. The same light can mean either "high set-point exceeded", or "scale power on".

3. Labels for rotary switch control positions are not oriented horizontally and position labels are ob-scured by the control handle.

4. Because of the layout of 1,2 displays and labels, un-related displays appear related.

37

ST LUCIE UNIT 52 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY LACK OF LAMP TESTING/

LAMP ADJUSTABILITY

1. There are no lamp testing capabilities for simple indicator lights, legend lights, or the CEA Position Display.

2. There is no dimming control N/A Ambient lighting conditions will for illuminated displays. either be in the normal condition or the emergency lighting condition.

Presently the display illumination is not found to be distracting during the reduced'lighting condition. Brighter displays are desirable during the transition period while the operator's eyes are still adjusting to the lighting conditions. FPL intends no further action at this time.

38

~ gSI ST LUCIE UNIT <<2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY DISPLAY INFORMATION IS OBSCURED

1. LEDs are not constructed to minimize reflection of ambient illumination from the display cover.

2. Extreme values are obscured N/A Meters were selected such that indi- 5 on vertical meters due to cators operate in the mid 2/3 of the meter design. scale. The Post Accident instruments have been integrated into the control board such that the operator should have a comprehensive view of the control 3; The pointers on all process board from his desk location. The oper- 3 controller vertical scales ator can view these numerals above and and all circular meters below the pointer to determine meter obscure scale numerals. reading. An OFF normal condition should be readily visible from this vantage point at which time he would be able to make a more detailed in-vestigation and assessment of the situation. No further action is intended with regard to Items 2 and 3.

39

ST LUCIE UNIT 02 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY DISPLAY INFORMATION IS OBSCURED (Cont.)

4. Glare makes displays difficult to read.

5. Displays are located well N/A These items require no operator inter- 4 above eye level. face during normal plant operation.

They provide no control function and their relocation would not improve the operator effectiveness during normal or OFF normal operating conditions.

FPL intends no further action with this item.

40

ST LUCIE UNIT 02 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Descri tion STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY DISPLAYED INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET OR READ

1. Multiple decimal points appear on NIXIE tube displays.

2. Coding is not used on multiple scale trend re-corders to denote which scale is associated with which trend information.

3. Small vertical trend re-corders on CR panels use indices which are difficult to- read and have no scale markings.

4. There are more than 9 N/A These recorders provide trend minor marks on many large information to the operator such trend recorders. that he can determine an OFF normal condition, at a glance. He then can make a detailed investigation. FPL feels the instruments are properly selected and intends no further action.

41

i i

~

I

ST LUCIE UNIT 42 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY DISPLAYED INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET OR READ (Cont.)

5. Major marks on small vertical N/A A high level or low level alarm is indicators are less than .5 annunciated at which time the operator inch apart. would make a more detailed investi-gation. Presently, FPL intends no further action on this item.

6. Information from some ver- 5 tical indicators, trend re-corders and process controllers is not presented in a directly usable form (values multiplied by a constant.)

7. Paper on trend recorders does N/A not match scale.

42

sg ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~gal ST LUCIE UNIT 02 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY DISPLAYED INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET OR READ (Cont.)

8. Parallax exists between the N/A These recorders show trend information 2 display scale and the pen and are not indicators. The chart.

on trend recorders. paper is scaled and the trend compared over some period of time. Presently, FPL intends no further action.

9. Radiation monitor trend N/A recorders are of the impact variety. Portions of the NOTE: The radiation monitoring system numeric symbols do not for Unit 2 is di'fferent than print, symbols are printed Unit l and will be re-evaluated over one another, and there for this item.

are too many symbols (up to 23 on an individual recorder),

making the output impossible to interpret.

43

ST LUCIE UNIT 02 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discrepanc Description STATUS IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY DISPLAY LAYOUT IS MIS-LEADING, DIFFICULT TO USE

1. Strings of five or more l,2 vertical meters are used, which makes the mid-string components difficult to identify.

44

2.3 SPECIAL AND OTHER TOPICS Several areas of control room review were addressed by evaluating components and environment in the SL-1 CR, since the associated equipment or state of CR completion prohibited the taking of data in Unit No. 2. These areas are discussed in this section along with comments and scheduling of repairs.

2.3 .1 Di ital Data Processin S stem (DDPS) and Se uence of Events Recorder (SER)

The DDPS to be installed in Unit No. 2 is to be opera-tionally and visually identical to the system installed on SL-1. The following are responses to the noted HED's.

A. Some of the information provided by the DDPS is for use by the reactor engineering department. Some conversa-tions and descriptions have been provided at the terminal output such that the operators can use the information if desired. Presently no further action is intended with this item. Category 3 B. The projection displays are subject,to poor uniformity of brightness and poor background contrast as well as incomplete display due to normal failure and/or aging of display bulbs. FP&L will address the problem by improving maintenance of the bulbs. Category 5 45

2.3 .l C. FP&L has requested their Instrumentation and Control group to review the possibility of modifying the software such that the hourly log will have units indicated on the heading column. Category 3 D. The original software provided with DDPS cross refer-ences address locations with descriptions. Presently consideration is being given to performing a pre-liminary scope of syntax review on the DDPS; however, a detailed study and implementation could not take place until the overall plant syntax review is completed.

Presently the syntax review is scheduled for completion sometime prior to fuel load and the DDPS review cannot start until sometime after with implementation depen-dent on software development and compatibility of terms with current program addresses. The earliest project date for implementation is the first refueling.

Category 4 E ~ The DDPS printer can be advanced a few lines by the operator to view the last line of output. FPSL intends no further action with regard to this item. Category 4 46

2.3 .1 F. Presently there are no provisions in the software to provide for highlights by color, labels or other

\

means. The Instrumentation and Control group has been requested to perform a preliminary scope to determine

'feasibility of such an effort. Preliminary scoping is to be completed prior to fuel load. Category 5 G. The Sequence of Events Recorder does output in time sequence starting with the first time flagged event and ending with the last. When a demand log of the preceeding events is requested it can be interrupted by an incoming alarm. Presently FP&L intends no further action on this item since time sequencing is sufficient to determine the cause of trip and chain of events following.

2.3 .2 Control Room Environmnt and La out SL-l was used to evaluate CR environment in terms of lighting and noise. These data are deemed somewhat generalizable to the SL-2 control room for the following reasons:

47

0 Lighting systems are highly similar. Exceptions include; 1) use of colored lights in some places in the SL-1 CR, and 2) reduced lighting achieved by operators in the SL-1 CR by turning off several banks of lights.

These exceptions will reduce incidence light in the control room. Light measurements were taken under the above conditions.

Layouts of the CRs is highly similar, as are placements of noise/sources such as vents, cooling fans, etc.,

located within the control room. It is pointed out, however, that sound attenuating features are evident in the SL-1 CR (wall panels), which may not be provided in SL-2. Further, noise sources outside the SL-2 CR (for example, the turbine) will probably have different effects on CR ambient noise. Noise data from SL-1 are somewhat more suspect than ambient lighting data.

Workspace arrangement and visibility observations were also taken, in part, from the SL-1 Control Room. Since overall CR layouts are highly similar, these data are considered generalizable to the SL-2 CR.

Survey results indicate that ambient lighting levels are generally good. Incident light in the main operation area ranged from 68 to 107 foot-candles in the bench portion of the boards, and 38 to 54 foot-candles on the vertical portion of the boards. Lighting levels behind the control boards was somewhat less, as low as 22 foot-candles.

Incident light at the reactor operator's console was measured to be 87 foot-candles. With all lights turned on, a maximum of 170 foot-candles was noted by the reactor operator's desk. One potential area of concern is incident light uniformity on the main boards. Nonuniformity of incident light does not appear to pose a problem, however, to the operators.

A problem noted with lighting was that there are no direct means to test the operability of emergency CR lighting.

FPGL is examining means to provide emergency lighting test capability.

Ambient (basal) noise was generally within the NUREG 1580 Guidelines. One point over the safeguards panel measured 67 dB(A), two dB(A) above the Guidelines'imit. This is not considered to be excessively above the limit. However, there may exist other unidentified noise sources in SL-2, or fewer noise sources. Direct evaluation of SL-2 noise levels 49

cannot be made until the unit is operational. Peak noise levels reached 80 dB(A) at the safeguards panel. The primary source of noise seemed to be a low frequency resonance coming from the turbine deck.

Two areas of concern which were identified in CR layout are as follows:

A. The handrail running along the front of the benchboard obscures vision to many controls and displays. The handrail for SL-2 will be designed and installed such that obscuring vision to controls and displays will not take place.

B. Portions of the radiation monitors and HVAC are obscured by other boards. The radiation monitor operators control console will be placed such that the operator is allowed easy access. The obscured portion of the HVAC panel does not contain any information which would be required by the operator while performing any task in areas of the control room where the line of sight to the panel is impaired. It should be noted also that the HVAC controls and display for SL-2 are not located in the same location on SL-l.

FPGL presently plans no further action on this item.

50

2. 3 .3 Communication The communication system for SL-2 has, as yet, not been designed in terms of control room locations, accesses, etc. Further, the communications console in SL-1 is being redesigned and will be reproduced on SL-2. FP&L has requested Essex Corporation to review and comment on the preliminary design when it is made available. An evaluation of CR communications has not, as of this date, been completed.

2.3 .4 Personal Protective Gear Evaluation of personal protection equipment was conducted in the SL-1 control room. The gear, storage and packaging is to be the same in SL-2. The following are responses to the noted HED's.

A. The respirator and air pack face masks presently in use are of standard design. The protective covering over the lense is easily removed prior to placing the mask on and provides no obstruction. FPaL presently plans no further action on this item.

51

I 2.3 .4 B. The face masks used at St. Lucie are capable of r

accepting the operators eye glasses as well as the corrective lenses designed for use with the mask. The company purchased corrective lenses are maintained by the Health Physics group to assure their availability to properly authorized personnel. FP&L presently plans no further action on this item.

C. FP&L Health Physics group will be requested to scope and evaluate the use of additional speech communication devices prior to fuel load.

D. FP&L will incorporate full packaged suits into their emergency clothing program for the control room.

2.3 .5 Procedures Documents Emergency procedures for the SL-2 CR were under preparation at the time of review. FP&L will generate the following emergency procedures based on CE .guidelines for NRC CRDR audit review:

o Main Steam Line Break o Blackout operation o Loss of Reactor coolant o Steam Generator Tube Rupture 52

2.3 .5 These procedures are being written using a format discussed in the report, Review of Effectiveness of Emer enc Proce-dures for 0 erator Use, written by Lund Consulting, for Combustion Engineering. The format being employed is the "Layered Format," suggested by the authors as being preferably to narrative type format (as is used in SL-1).

Further, language, syntax, and nomenclature is to be constrained to achieve consistency. FP&L has taken this position in order to expedite their procedure preparation effort in a timely and effective manner.

Essex has not currently reviewed the procedures, nor reviewed in depth the document from which the procedure format is being selected. Walkthroughs using the emergency procedures have not been conducted. However, the NRC has conducted a review of the CE Guidelines and FP&L is preparing those emergency operating procedures required for the prelicensing in accordance with the subject reviewed procedure guidelines.

Essex will review a sample of procedures while performing the detailed system/task analysis review presently scheduled to start after SL-1's detailed review is completed in late November of 1981.

53

I I

I

2.3 .6 Radiation Monitors The radiation monitoring system at SL-2 was not available at the time of the evaluation. The radiation monitors in SL-1 is not representative of those planned for SL-2. The units to be purchased for SL-2 are designed and built by the General Atomics Company (GA). An indication of the human engineering of these units is provided in Appendix B of the attached . Essex Report. The evaluation was conducted, initially, for the Carolina Power and Light Company. The system evaluated by Essex is similar to the standard GA unit which was purchased for the SL-2 control room. The Essex report, along with Appendix B, will be forwarded to Ebasco for a detailed review, evaluation and scoping of achievable backfits to the GA units.

3 ' CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS A variety of human engineering discrepancies have been noted in the SL-2 control room. Backfits to be conducted at SL-2 by FPaL will greatly enhance operability of the CR. For systems not evaluated (e.g., communications) due to uncompleted designs, FPGL commitment to achieve adequate HE design prior to fabrication should serve to avoid discrepancies and, therefore, enhance oper-ation of these systems. Where discrepancies have been identi-fied, but appropriate and suitable backfits have not been identi-fied, further examination of the discrepancies is required in order to select and schedule backfits.

54

APPENDIX 1