ML17212A369

Preliminary Human Engineering Assessment of St Lucie Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant Control Room.

ML17212A369
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/12/1981
From:	Baker C, Mosier J, Voss T ESSEX CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17212A365	List: ML17212A364 ML17212A368 ML17212A369
References
NUDOCS 8107210318
Download: ML17212A369 (129)

Text

PRELIMINARYHUMAN ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT OF THE SAINT LUCIE UNIT 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONTROL ROOM Prepared for:

Florida Power R Light Company Prepared by:

CliffBaker 3ane Mosier T. 3. Voss Essex Corporation 333 N. Fairfax Street Alexandria, Virginia 22310 3une 12, 1981 8i072i03i8 8i07i5 PDR ADOCK 05000389 PDR

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Back round On April 29th, 1981, the Essex Corporation was contracted by the Florida Power and Light Company (FPRL) to provide human engineering (HE) consulting services to assist in the assessment of several nuclear power plant control rooms. One task of Essex's was to conduct a preliminary prelicensing review of the Saint Lucie unit 2 control room (CR).

This report presents the results of the preliminary HE review.

Saint Lucie unit 2 (SL-2) is a Combustion Engineering (CE) PWR with Westinghouse turbines and generators. The EBASCO Corporation serves as the Architect/Engineer. The plant is located by the Atlantic Ocean, approximately 12 miles south of Fort Pierce, Florida.

The plant is a two loop PWR that produces 880 Megawatt of electricity. The plant uses seawater for cooling. As of May, 1981, plant construction was approximately 70%

complete.

The control room is configured as shown in Figure 1. As shown, the main boards of the control room (CR) are arranged more or less as a dogleg with plant support and monitoring panels and boards placed at various points in the room. More detailed descriptions of the main boards are provided here:

o Panel 201 This section contains the emergency diesel generators, main plant buses, turbine and generator controls and displays for the plant.

o Panel 202 Located here are controls and instruments concerning condensate system, circulating water, main and auxilliary feedwater system and steam generators.

o Panel 203 This panel contains the controls and displays for, the primary core cooling system.

I o Panel 200 Located here are the primary nuclear instrumentation and control element assemply drive mechanisms.

o Panel 205 This is the Chemical and Volume Control System panel.

o Panel 206 Controls and displays for the Emergency Core Cooling System and Component Cooling Water System are contained in the panel.

SPACE ENGINEERED WASTE MAN &

SAFE GUARD CHEM. & VOL 206 CONTROL 205 COMPUTERIZED CO ~

SEOUENCE OF I REACTIVITY EVENTS Fg CO 204 CABINET CO K C) CI SAFETY RELATED RAD.

REACTOR

~X MONITORING PANELS COOlANT ISEISMIC RMS)

SYSTEM OPERATORS CONTROL ROOM 203 CONSOLE CENTRONIC HIGH SPEED CONDENSATE PRINTER COOUNG WATER CO REACTOR & FDW SYSTEM PROTECTIVE TABLE'ONSOLE 202 CO SYSTEM SEQUENCE TURBINE OF EVEHTS GENERATOR TELETYPE ELEC. AUX.

201 DEH. CONTROL CABINET RADIATION MONITORING CABINETS PlANT AUX.

NON.SEISMIC CONTR. B.

UHE REPEAT SB SA OFFICE PANEL 8$ SB SA NS NS H & V CONTROL FIRE DETEC.

BOARD CONSOLE CPU OFFICE 28 FIGURE I

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1.2 Overall CR Assessment Pur oses Methods and Ob ectives The purpose of the effort was to identify human engineering design discrepancies in the SL-2 control room.

The effort extended to the evaluation of:

o CR workspace and environment, o Labels and job performance aids, o Controls, o Displays, o Annunciators and warnings, o Computer display systems, o Control and display layout and integration.

The assessment was conducted in a set of discrete tasks discussed in the next section.

I 2e0 EVALUATIONAPPROACH, BY TASKS 2.1 Assemble Pro ect Librar 2.1.1 ~ob ectives o To assemble a library of CR related documentations to support the NTOL review, o To organize the documentation for easy access by all NTOL review team members.

2.1.2 Method o The following documents were acquired for inclusion in the library:

System descriptions (FSAR)

PRIDs Software descriptions Training materials Panel layout drawings/CR floor plan Annunciator response procedures Instrument lists 2.1.3 Data Reduction and Anal sis None.

2.2 Develo Photo Mosaic 2.2.1 ~ob ectives o To photograph the CR panels for assembly into a I/O scale mosaic of the current CR configuration, o To prepare a photomosaic suitable for panel evaluation and development of typical reports.

I 2.2.2 Method CR panels were filmed in color in uniform sections (same sized photo representation of panel areas). Each frame was developed into a 1/0 scale of original. Photos were then pieced together into a mosaic for each major panel section, pasted to a board, and covered with an acetate material.

2.2.3 Data Reduction and Anal sis None. The mosaic was used for: 1) surveys (selected); 2) checklists (selected);

3) examination of control/display layout; 0) HED reviews by Essex; and 5) development of typical backfits.

2.3 Conduct of Surve s Control room surveys are presented in this section. These include:

1. Lighting,

2. Emergency gear,

3. Noise,

0. Generic checklist applications.

Given that the St. Lucie 2 CR has not yet been completed, lighting, emergency gear, and noise survey data have been taken from St. Lucie 1. To the extent that these data generalize to the sister plant, St. Lucie 2, they may be used for discrepancy generation.

Specifications for the above were also supplied to FP*L, since unit 1 data will not be precisely coincident with unit 2. Where discrepancies'were identified in unit 1, this is indicated in the Results section of this report.

Objectives, instrumentation, methods, data reduction and analysis, and findings (where applicable) for each survey is described below.

2.3.1 Li htin Surve 2.3.1. I ~Ob ectives The objective of this evaluation was to measure the ambient illumination in the control room and to assess its impact on the operators'bility to read and interpret displays, controls, labeling, and printed matter such as drawings and procedures.

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2.3.1.2 Instrumentation The ambient illumination was measured using a Techtronics J-16 photometer and probe, calibrated prior to use.

2.3.1.3 Method The ambient lighting survey was conducted under normal lighting conditions.

Measurement of ambient illumination was taken at 15 operator positions. These positions included the following:

o Reactor Operator's work desk, o Senior Reactor Operator's work desk, o Each panel, o Each point where reading of printed material might be required, o Back panels behind the main control boards.

The measurements were taken for all positions selected under normal lighting conditions. The light meter was held with the meter pointed at the ceiling, where the position required reading a specific type of printed material. The data were recorded on a form for subsequent analysis.

2.3.1.0 Data Reduction and Anal sis Data were placed on the form shown in Appendix A, and compared to the NUREG 1580 Guidelines covering control room illumination.

2.3.2 Emer enc Garments 2.3.2.i ~Ob ective This task yields information needed to complete the human engineering checklists.

In general the results indicate problems in performing control room operations while using the protective clothing and/or breathing apparatus.

2.3.2.2 Method The accessibility and usability of CR emergency garments was evaluated by visual observation of the equipment, and a cursory use of selected items (e.g., face masks), by a HE analyst.

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2.3.2.3 Data Reduction and Anal sis A list was made that describes factors that might reduce operator reliability, for instance:

o Visibility of breathing apparatus face mask, o Tactile discrimination through gloves, o Speech impairment through face plate, Hearing impairment (noise of breathing apparatus),

o Size of gloved hand (inadvertent actuation).

2.3.3 Generic Checklists 2.3.3.1 ~Ob ective The objective of this review was to determine if the SL-2 control room manifests human engineering shortcomings characteristic of other nuclear power plants.

The objective in reviewing the issues listed as generic industry problems was to provide the reviewer with 1) a point of reference, and 2) a broad, general review of the control room with emphasis on identifying major issues which are highly likely to occur based on reviews of similar plants.

2.3.3.2 Method Using a list of generic discrepancies, a panel by panel and system by system review was conducted. Noted were CR characteristics which violated human engineering practices listed in the generic checklist.

2.3.3.3 Data Reduction and Anal sis Application of generic checklists immediately identifies human engineering discrepancies from the guidelines. As they are identified, discrepancy reports are written and entered into the HED review process.

2.3.0 Noise 2.3A.i ~Ob'ective The objective of this survey was to measure the ambient noise levels in the control room from various operator positions and to assess its impact on the operators'bility to verbally communicate and/or discriminate audible signals. The measurements were made using the Saint Lucie unit 1 control room.

2.3.0.2 Instrumentation In the performance of this study a General Radio Corporation, Model 1983 sound level meter was used.

2.3A.3 Method The performance of this evaluation required the consideration of not jus't normal control room noise but any factors that can add to the overall noise level. Included in this were the occasional noises of very Short duration that can cause high peak levels.

ao Noise Conditions The noise survey started with a basal noise level.

This is the ambient noise without alarms, printers, or communications equipment contributing. Once this measurement has been taken, potential noise sources were integrated into the ambient environment, by measurement of peak noise levels. The following were considered as potential noise sources:

o Audible alarms, o Typers and printers, o Communications equipment (ringing telephones, P.A.s, radios),

o Emergency or atypical environmental control systems (air conditioning, exhaust fans),

o Loud conversation, o External to the Control Room, o Open doors leading out of the control room.

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b.

positions that required verbal communication and/or auditory discrimination of a signal. This included the Reactor Operator's desk position, the Senior Reactor Operator's desk position, two points on the each panel/board, and two positions at back panels requiring communication. Two measurements were taken at each position, one measuring basal noise levels, the other measuring peak noise over approximately a two minute interval. Measurements were taken flat (dB), and in a weighting (dB"A"). A form used to collect those data is contained in Appendix A. The instrument was calibrated before, during and after conduct of the survey.

2.3.0.0 Data Reduction and Anal sis

'The collected data, were compared to the 1580 guidelines. Values that exceed the established limits were noted and a Human Engineering Discrepancy Report was completed.

2.3.5 Desi n Convention Surve 2.3.5.1 ~Ob'ective This survey yielded a listing of design conventions used in the control room, and was used to identify interfaces that violate CR established conventions.

2.3.5.2 Method Examples of controls, displays, labels, etc., were surveyed and conventions recorded.

Where design conventions were used (most or all interfaces surveyed follow the same operational rules) the convention was noted, and deviations from the conventions documented for discrepancy reporting purposes.

2.3.5.3 Data Reduction and Anal sis Where deviations from predominant CR conventions were noted, Human Engineering Discrepancy reports were generated.

I 2.3.6 Checklistin 2.3.6. j ~ob'ective The objective of completing the checklist was to compare the details of the control room design to the Human Factors Guidelines. The detailed items contained in the checkists allowed for a sampling evaluation from the system, panel and generic component level.

2.3.6.2 Instrumentation Certain checklist items require that physical measurements be performed (tape measures, sound meters, and so forth).

2.3.6.3 Methods The completion of the checklists required access to the control room, a basic familiarity with the control room and the systems being evaluated, and the assistance of a qualified operator.

Once appropriate checklists were selected, a packet of checklists was made up for panels or systems to be evaluated. The checklists were then completed in the following manner. Each checklist item was considered, in the CR. When the item did not apply, an "N/A" .was placed in the check column. If the item was complied with, a "yes" was placed in the check column. Where the item was not complied with, a "no" was placed in the check column and the discrepancy was described in detail in the notes column. Where appropriate, examples of discrepant components were noted for reporting purposes.

2.3.6.0 Data Reduction and Anal sis The checklists were reviewed for discrepancies (items marked "no") and compared to the relevant 1580 Guidelines. A Human Engineering Discrepancy Report was completed for each item that did not comply with the guidelines.

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2.3.7 Procedure Review and Develo ment 2.3.7.1 ~Ob ectives Two objectives of this task were: l) to assist FPRL in generating procedures (emergency, startup, and shutdown) using CE procedure specifications as a baseline, and

2) to evaluate the procedures according to the guidelines (format, writing style, and so forth).

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Essex involvement with procedure development involves provision of a procedure specification to aid in the development of human engineered procedures.

2.3.8 HED Reviews

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HED reviews entail two activities: preparation of human engineering discrepancy reports (HEDs) and review processing.

2.3.8.1 Pre aration of Human En ineerin Discre anc Re orts Personnel involved in the Data Collection task (3e0) were instructed to complete a Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) form for each and every identified incidence where the control room design does not comply with Human Engineering Guidelines. No attempt was made during actual data collection to determine whether or not a particular discrepancy was sufficiently important to report.

HEDs were completed for all discrepancies including environmental, layout, instrumentation, job design, etc.

2.3.8.2 ~Ob ective The objective of this task was to provide complete and accurate documentation of all human engineering discrepancies in the control room; to anticipate the specific human errors that might result from the discrepancy; to report the guidelines violated; and where necessary, to record the likely response of the plant system to the error.

2.3.8.3 Method The SL-2 control room was reviewed by data collection personnel and operator-control room interfaces that did not meet the Human Engineering Guidelines were identified. These discrepancies were recorded on a form, "Human Engineering Discrepancy Report" (see Appendix A), which included:

ae A short title for the discrepancy;

b. Hardware or procedures items, nomenclature (label) and panel locations; Ce Human engineering guidelines which were violated;

d. Operator error(s) that might result from the discrepancy;

e. As required, plant and system level consequences of these errors.

Where there are a number of interfaces with the same discrepancy, the same procedures involved, and the same consequences of operator error, one "generic" HED was generated.

The final step in HED preparation was the identification of suitable backfits to reduce/eliminate the discrepancy. Most discrepancies were considered correctable by any of several backfits with different potentials for reducing operator error likelihood and different costs. For instance:

o Change of instrumentation type or location o Addition of repeating displays to improve control/display relationship o Demarcation lines to improve operator localization of controls and/or displays o Use of switch guards to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent or accidental operation o Use of alarms or warnings to advise of a potential error o Use of switch or display color coding to improve operator localization o Use of display range markings (e.g., normal, emergency) to improve display discriminability at a distance o Use of mimic lines to improve sequential control/display operations 12

~ Use of warning labels to caution against specific actions

~ Use of procedural cautions requesting a double-check of a difficult setting

~ Use o f shape coding on switch handles to tactually "separate" switches which could be interchanged in operation

~ Attention given during training to difficult or error-prone control/display operations

~,Use of indications with set points and out-of-tolerance alarm lights to improve discriminability at a distance.

2.3.9 HED Review Processin 2.3.9.1 ~Ob ectives

~ To supply HEDs to FPRL personnel, as they are generated, for review and access

~ To ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the discrepancy data (by FPRL operations and Essex review)

~ To prepare HEDs for reporting purposes.

2.3.9.2 Method As HEDs were generated, copies were forwarded to: 1) Essex for review and

2) FPRL operations for review. Meetings were conducted to discuss HEDs with FP*L personnel to meet the objectives of accuracy of discrepancy data.

2.3.10 Draft Re ort Pre aration and Review 2.3.10.1 ~Ob'ective To provide FPRL a draft report of the NTOL CR assessment, for review and comment prior to release.

2.3.10.2 Method Report writing was ongoing throughout the effort, task objectives, instrumentation, and methods having been written at the beginning of the effort. Findings (HED reports) were continuously reviewed by Essex and FPRL personnel, for inclusion in the report.

FPRL was provided several copies of the draft for operations, engineering, and management review.

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3.0 FINDINGS Findings in the SL-2 control room are discussed in three sections, as follows; (1) panel by panel discrepancies in layout, control/display integration, and discrepancies unique to specific panels, (2) generic discrepancies with controls/displays used in the control room and pervasive discrepancies such as labeling, etc., and (3) other topics such as ambient lighting, noise and so on, not covered by the above.

Discrepancies have been categorized, according to the following:

Category 1 High risk of operator error in safety-related activity Category 2 Moderate risk of operator error in saftey-related activity Category 3 Some risk of error in safety-related activity Category 0 Risk of error in non-safety related activity Category 5 Additional evaluation required.

Assignment of category was made by Essex providing subjective determination of error risk (High, moderate, some) and FPRL assignment of safety relatedness of the operational activities.

3.1 Discussions of Discre ancies b Panels. Panel layout and discrepancies unique to specific panels are discussed below.

3.1.1 Panel 201 Electrical Turbine and Generator A) Controls and displays are not consistently arranged in stereotypic order.

For example, mainsteam drain valves indicator lights are arranged as follows:

Dvl DV3 DV2 DVO DV5 DV6 DV8 DV7 DV9 No action is planned. Category 3

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B) Turbine su pp ort s ystem s (gland steam) indication and control are separated b y reheat ater controls and temperature controls. No action is planned. Category 0 c) Generator S p eed and Megavar M Indication are separated. ind ications e . Thee in ocated at the top of the vertical portion of the boards while controls are located are located at the bottom portion oof th e b enchboard. No action is planned. Category 0 D) Turbine and Rea eactor Trip pushbuttons are loc a te d h igh on the vertical portions of the boards, rendering them i icult to access by short d'ff'm operators. No action is planned. Category 3 E)) The Generator Megavars (VARM-881) d'splays indicate negative and positive values, the displays are no a e e d as to which directions are not label which. In addition ne g a tive values are located to the ri o t h e zero right of position (as is an industry convention). FPRL wi'll address the problem by 1 abeling the directions "lead" an and "1 ag as appropriate. Category 0 F) Layout of thee DieselD Generator controls an d d'isp ays is somewhat confusing due to separation. FPRL will address the problem by d emarcation of these systems. Category 3 G) DEH Valve Test pushbuttons and leegen end liigh ts are visually similar.

' FPRL will address the Control/dis la y substitution errors are C likely.

problem through labeling and demarcation. Category 0 H) DIESEL GEN 2B FREQUENCY FIM-1616 16 meter information is obscured by glare. FP*L will install i non-glare glass on thee meter face.

Cata egory 3 3.1.2 Panel 202 Feedwater and Condensate A) Chemical re corders are located between Aux F ee d water controls and indicators.

Examples of chemical recorders:

1. CONDENSATE DISSOLVED OXYGEN 02-05-1 15

2. FEEDWATER R STM GEN BLOWDOWN PH PHR-05-01 FPRL is to relocate the recorders. Category 3 B) The HEATER DRAIN PUMP 28 control appears to be directly associated with the Aux Feedwater Pump controls. By layout, the steam bypass permisive appears to be the control for HEATER DRAIN PUMP 2A.

Substitution errors are likely. FPRL to address the discrepancy by demarcation and labeling. Category 1 C) Some of the Aux Feedwater Pump and valve controls have unlabeled "Auto" positions. For example:

AUX FW PUMP 2A DISCH to SG 2A VALVE MV-09-9 FPRL will address this problem by providing appropriate labels.

Category 5 D) Aux Feedwater Header Flow trend recorders are arranged, from left to right, as follows:

AUX FEEDWATER AUX FEEDWATER HDR BRC FLOW HDR A FLOW FR-09-2B/2C FR-09-2A with recorders 2B/2C to the left of recorder 2A. This may lead to substitution errors. FPRL is to reverse the recorders. Category 1 E) The Primary Water Makeup Pump controls and PRIMARY WATER STORAGE TANK LEVEL display are located on this panel, not panel 205 where the remainder of the makeup controls and displays are located.

No action is planned. Category 0 16

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F) The Main Steam Isolation Valve controls and Feedwater Blocks are located on panel 206, not on panel 202. FPRL believes that the positioning of these controls is appropriate for mitigating potential accidents, and should not be moved to enhance startup activities.

Layout to be studied via operations analysis. Category 5 3.1.3 Panel 203 Reactor Coolant S stem A) PRIMARY RCS TEMPERATURE indicator intrudes into pressurizer controls and display (LOOP 2A COLD LEG TEMP and LOOP 2B COLD LEG TEMP). FPRL to address via system demarcation. Category 3 B) Layout of Pressurizer level and pressure controls and displays is inconsistent and misleading. Pressure controls are located to the left of level controllers while the level ~dis ia is located to the left of the pressure display. Further, LOOP 2A/2B HOT LEG TEMPERATURE display segregates the pressurizer level and pressure displays. A high likelihood of control and display substitution errors is expected. No action is intended. Category 5 C) Reactor Coolant Pump controls are stacked vertically, while associated displays are horizontally oriented (except pump amps, flow, and coolant temperature which are located directly above the controls). Annunciator controls, located at the bottom portion of the angle in the boards, intrude into the RCP controls and displays. FPRL is examining movement the annunciator controls to panel 200. FPRL will demarcate RCP controls and displays. Category 3 D) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 2B2 appears to be associated with the string of PRESSURIZER BACKUP HEATERS. Control substitution errors are likely. FPRL will address this problem by 1) shape coding RCP control handles and 2) demarcation of the controls for both RCPs and pressurizer backup heaters. Category 1 17

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E) The upper scale on horizontally oriented meters (STM GEN b,P CORE FLOW and COOLANT LOOP TEMP TCOLD/THOT) is difficult to see without crouching. FPRL to either coat or reorient displays. Category 2 3.1.0 Panel 200 Nuclear Instrumentation A) The Reactor Power Recorder Selector control is located above the RCS temperature recorder. No action is planned. Category 0 B) The T-AVG and T-REF displays are located well to the right of the control rod controls. No action. Redundant display is also provided to the immediate right of the CEA controls. Category 3 C) There is no "First out" indication of the annunciator system for the reactor. No action is planned. Category 2 (indication of "first out" is available on the sequence of events recorder).

D) The Reactor Trip controls are located high on the vertical portion of the boards, rendering them difficult to access by a short operator. No action is planned. Category 3 E) CEA CRT is unreadable for the following reasons: dark glass covering obscures setpoint information; the display is subject to excessive glare; bank 7 information is not stable; bank and step labels are obscured by anti-glare glass. This observation was made in the unit 1 control room.

If the design and HE discrepancies are reproduced at unit 2 the problem will be addressed by 1) removing anti-glare glass from CRT cover, and

2) placing a shield over the CRT to reduce incident light to the display.

Category 1

3.1.5 Panel 205 Chemical Volume and Control S stem A) The control:

LETDOWN LEVEL HIC-1110 label is misleading. In actuality, pressurizer level controls letdown, and the controller sets the pressurizer level which halts letdown. FPRL will address the problem by more accurately labeling the control. Category 3 B) The VOLUME CONTROL TANK DISCH VALVE V-2501 and the REFUELING WATER TO CHARGING PUMPS VALVE V-2500 are spacially separated by other letdown, charging and VCT controls. There is a general lack of logical layout of charging, letdown, and VCT controls on this panel. FPRL and EBASCO are to examine alternatives and address prior to fuel load. Category 5 C) PRIMARY WATER MAKEUP PUMPS 2A and 2B are located on panel 202, not on panel 205. No action is planned. Category 0 D) Annunciator controls are guarded and TEST is color coded (red),

inconsistent with coding of other annunciator controls. FPRL will consistently code annunciator controls. Category 0 E) Association of LIQUID WASTE FLOW VALVEs FCV-6627Y and FCV-6627X with control position violates stereotypes. The top set of lights (valve Y) is selected by the control being in the righthand position.

FPRL will correct by reversing the positions of the valve lights and labels. Category 0 F) A nonlinear scale (REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW FRC-2210X) is used and not operationally required. FP*L will install a square root converter in the signal line and rescale the display. Category 0 19

4 3.1.6 Panel 206 I

A) Low Head Safety Injection and High Head Safety Injection are intermixed, rather than grouped by low head or high head. HPSI controls will be demarcated . Plans for relaying out Sl controls and displays are not scheduled. Category 2 B) Emergency Core Cooling equipment is grouped by power supply rather than by function. FPRL will conduct an engineering review. Labeling and demarcation may also be provided. Priority 1 C) Hydrazine Pump status lights (HYDRAZINE PUMP 2A and HYDRAZINE PUMP 2A DISCH VALVE I-SE-07-38) are located well to the right of the HYDRAZINE SPRAY FLOW meter and well to the left of the associated HYDRAZINE 2B pump and Discharge Valve simple indicator lights.

HYDROZINE TANK LEVEL and SPRAY FLOW meters are similarly not located near other hydrazine displays. No action is planned. Category 3 D) Shutdown displays are located well to the right of shutdown cooling controls. No action is planned. Category 3 E) CCW FROM RC PUMPS HX FLOW meters are, located to the far right of the CCW controls. These indicators include 1) FIS-10-15-A, 2) FIS-10-15-B, 3) FIS-10-15-C, and 0) FIS-10-15-D. No action is planned.

Category 2 F) The SI LOOP CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE HIC-3638 process controller operates in a reversed (nonconventional) fashion from other process controls. FPRL will address the problem by achieving consistency for this control with the CR convention. Category 1 3.1.7 Miscellaneous Panels Human Engineering Discrepancies identified on Auxilliary and Support Panels are as follows:

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A) The MATRIX RELAY HOLD pushbutton on the RPS Panel is difficult to use due to control resistance. In addition, the control must be pushed in while controls up to about five feet distant are simultaneously operated.

It is possible to fail to reset Reactor Trip Breakers. This observation was made at SL-1. Category 0 B) Many controls are located below 30 inches on the HVAC Panel and above 70 inches on the back panels (REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEMs 1 and 2). No action is planned. Category 3 C) Impact trend recorder information on the HVAC Panel is obscured by chart identifying points. FPRL will remove and relocate labels.

Category 2 D) The CONTAINMENT CONT./H2 PURGE CONTROL VALVE FCV-25-8 on the HVAC Panel violates color coding of indicator lights (green indicates valve open, red indicates valve closed). FPRL will change lenses on the indicator lights. Category 3 E) Provisions for key storage and access are not provided to make keys immediately accessible. Particular problems exist for the Remote Shutdown Panel. FPRL will address by providing keys at the RSP. No action will be taken in control room. Category 1 3.2 Generic Discre ancies. Control room components and design practices which transcend particular panels are discussed in the section. Table 3 summarizes these identified discrepancies, and is arranged in the following manner:

o Discrepancy description Brief statement of the human engineering discrepancy o Examples Specific examples of CR components which evidence the discrepancy

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o Location Location in the control room for the cited examples which evidence the discrepancy o Action/Comments Contains brief statements regarding FPRL responses to design discrepancies. Where direct corrective action is taken, problems have not been prioritized. Where there has been no direct corrective action, the discrepancy is prioritized.

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 LABELS AND 3OB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments LABEL CONTENTS

1. Abbreviations are not used CCW PUMP 2A (component Panel 206 To be addressed as part consistently in labels cooling water) of relabeling effort.

CCW FROM RCP 2A 1 FLOW Panel 203 Category 3 FIA-1158 (core cooling water)

COMP COOL'G WATER Panel 205

-2. Content of labels is not VAPOR CAVITY PIA-1163, Panel 203 1) To be addressed as part consistent. 1183 of relabeling effort.

BLEED-OFF CAVITY PIA-1153, Panel 203 1173 2) Examples given should both be labeled Bleed-off cavity or vapor cavity.

Category 3

3. Incorrect labels BATTERY VOLTS 2B (VM-001) Panel 201 To be corrected during relabeling BATTERY VOLTS 2B (VM-001) effort. Category 1 meter VM-001 should be cut as BATTERY VOLTS 2A

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 LABELS AND 3OB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments LABEL CODING

1. Labels are highly similar. BORIC ACID GRAVITY FEED Panel 205 To be addressed as part VALVE V-2508 of relabeling effort.

BORIC ACID GRAVITY FEED Panel 205 Category I VALVE V-2509 HPSI TO HOT LEG 2B VALVE Panel 206 V-3551 HPSI TO HOT LEG 2B VALVE Panel 206 V-3523

2. Pushbuttons have two labels which TURBINE TRIP, TRIP Panel 201 Redundant tags will be present redundant information. RCP 2A1 VIBRATION RESET, Panel 203 removed. Category 3 RESET

3. Component labels are not larger SPILLOVER BYPASS VALVE Panel 201 To be corrected as part than component position labels. M/BP2 relabeling effort.

Category 3 Labels are color coded based on CSAS CHANNEL SA Panel 206 To be addressed as part power supply, not system. CGAS CHANNEL SB Panel 206 of relabeling and demarca-tion effort. Category 1

5. Some labels are difficult to Pink labels with white print To be addressed as part read due to insufficient color Orange labels with white print of relabeling and demarca-contrast between label surface tion effort. Category 1 and print.

I TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 LABELS AND 3OB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments LABEL READABILITY

1. Characters on labels are REFUELING WATER TANK Panel 206 To be addressed as part separated by less than the LEVEL LIS-07-2C of relabeling effort.

minimum recommended space LOWER CAVITY TEMPERATURE Category 3 (I/6) character height). TIA-1171

2. Line spacing on labels is THERMAL MARGIN LOW Panel 203 To be addressed as part inadequate (less than 1/2 the SETTING PIA-1102D of relabeling effort.

character height). Category 3

3. Many abbreviations in labels on CONTINUOUS CONT./H2 HVAC Panel To be addressed as part the HVAC, plant auxiliaries and PURGE CONTROL VALVE of relabeling effort.

line repeat panels are followed FCV-25-8 Category 3 by periods.

0. Readability of labels is reduced HOLDUP TANK 2A PRESSURE Pane1205 To be addressed as part because of font style. PIA-6610 of relabeling effort.

Category 3

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 LABELS AND 3OB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments LABEL LOCATION AND MAINTENANCE

1. Pointers overlap index on large GENERATOR TEMPERATURE Panel 201 No action.

horizontal trend recorders. TR-22-30 Category 3

2. Key-operated switches have 125 V DC BUS TIE '2A-2AB Panel 201 Will be addressed as part taped-on labels. of relabeling effort.

Category 3

3. Engraved labels were not filled Will be addressed as part in and have now become obscured of relabeling effort.

by grease, grime, and dirt. Category 3

0. Labels have been placed under Trend recorder above Panel 201 Will be addressed as part displays in almost all cases Reheater Control System of relabeling effort.

and are often obscured by the Category 2 equipment they are intended to identify.

5. Labels are not directly on GENERATOR TEMPERATURE Panel 201 Will be addressed as part controls and displays. TR-22-30 of relabeling effort.

Category 3

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT 82 LABELS AND 3OB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments LABEL LOCATION AND MAINTENANCE(Cont.)

6. Labels are not located in a HPSI HOT LEG 2B VALVE Panel 206 Will be addressed as part consistent manner throughout V-3523 Panel 206 of relabeling and demarca-the control room, making it HPSI-HDR B TO LOOP 2A2 tion effort.

difficult to identify controls VALVE HCV-3616 Category 2 and component groupings.

7. Labels are not located on the CONDENSER VACUUM Panel 202 Will be addressed as part most uncluttered surface. BREAKER VALVES of relabeling effort.

MV-10-1A, MV-10-1B Category 3

8. Labelling of units on trend Control Label: FEEDWATER Panel 202 Will be addressed as part recorders, counters and process TO SG REG VALVE BYPASS of relabeling effort.

controllers is inconsistent and LIC-9005 Category 3 often redundant to the control Unit Label: FEEDWATER label. BYPASS CONTROL SCALE RDG x 1 = % LEVEL

9. There is no indication on two Unit Label: Panel 205 To be addressed as part color trend recorder as to FRC-2210Y i IND. x 1 = GPM of relabeling effort.

which color represents an Category 1 actual reading and which FRC-2210Y IND. x 1 = GPM represents the set point. (no display label on panel)

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT N2 LABELS AND 3OB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments LABEL LOCATION AND MAINTENANCE(Cont.)

10. There are unlabelled positions MATRIX RELAY TRIP SELECT RPS Panel To be addressed as part on rotary control (observation of relabeling effort.

made in Unit Nl RPS Panel). Category 2

11. Many trend recorders have blank BORIC ACID FLOW (missing) Panel 205 To be addressed as part labels or labels which do not of relabeling effort.

explain the displays'unction. FLOW RECORDER FR-25-18 HVAC Panel Category 3

12. A number of controls and Rotary control switch on panel To be addressed as part displays have labels which 201 label missing of relabeling effort.

are either missing or appear Category 1 to be incorrect. VAPOR CAVITY PRESSURE Panel 203 PIA-1172 should read:

UPPER SEAL CAVITY PRESS PIA-1172

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 LABELS AND 3OB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments DEMARCATION

1. Summary labels and demarcation Electrical Distribution Panel 201 To be addressed as part lines are not used to identify Buses of relabeling and system and separate systems surrounding demarcation. Category 0 mimics. Labels do not always appear above mimic areas.

2. There is little or no use of All systems and subsystems To be addressed as part summary labelling or demarcation in CR of relabeling and system to identify functionally related demarcation. Category 1 components.

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 LABELS AND 3OB PERFORMANCE AIDS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Disc re anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments MIMIC USABILITY

1. Mimics are not consistently Electrical Distribution 200 KV Line Repeat Panel FPRL will address through color coded. Electrical Distribution 6.9 KV Panel 201 mimic improvements.

(both mimics are yellow) Category 3

2. Not all mimic lines terminate Line Repeat Panel FP*L will address through at a label or labelled component. relabeling effort and mimic improvements.

Category 2

3. Insufficient use of mimics Safety Injection System, as No action.

room. At present, they in'ontrol well as a number of other Category 2 are only used for electrical systems, would benefit from systems. the use of mimics.

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT //2 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam Ies Location Action/Comments CONTROLS DIFFICULT TO USE

1. Process controllers on PRESSURIZER PRESS Panel 203 Parallax to be removed benchboard indicate set PIC 1100-X by mounting a pointer point with a green strip closer to display scale.

attached to cover, causing PRESSURIZER PRESS Category 2 serious parallax problems. PIC 1100-Y

2. Critical pushbuttons are REACTOR CHANNEL MB Panel 200 No action. Category 3 located 69, 60 and 60 in.,

respectively, above the REACTOR CHANNEL MD Panel 200 standing surface.

REACTOR CHANNEL MA Panel 201

3. Not all controls and displays ANNUNCIATOR TEST, ACK Annunciator box of No action on all items used in normal operations are and RESET line repeat panel except annunciator located between 30 and 70 in. buttons, which are redun-above the floor. Outdoor light swithes, purge Heating and Ventil- dant (not used), and will switches ating panel be removed. Category 3

0. Feedback provided for control BORIC ACID MU PUMPS CVCS Panel No action. Category 3 use is breaker position rather than actual pump state.

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT //2 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments CONTROLS SUB3ECT TO IN-ADVERTENT ACTIVATION

l. Once setpoints are set on PRESSURIZER PRESS Panel 200 No action.

process controllers, no means Category 3, controls are provided to guard against PRESSURIZER LEVEL Panel 204 are generally located accidental moving of the in low body and hand controls. traffic areas.

2. Critical controls are unguarded. TURBINE TRIP Panel 201 Pushbutton guard will be installed by FPRL.

Category 3

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT 82 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments VIOLATIONSOF CONTROL CONVENTIONS

1. All switch keys are inserted All key operated switches Panel 206 No action.

with teeth pointing down. in control room. Category 3

2. Off position is not vertical Panel 206 No action.

in key operated switches. Category 3

3. Rotary switch position NITROGEN TO SI TANK Panel 206 1) Relationships of conventions are violated 2B1 VALVE V-3632 control positions in a number of cases. (e.g., close to the LETDOWN STOP VALVE Panel 206 left, open to the V-2515 right) is conistent.

However, open, for example, may be in the 12 o'lock or 2 o'lock position.

Category 5

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments CONTROL LAYOUT AND SUBSTITUTION ERRORS

1. Functionally related controls MS ISOLATION VALVES Panel 206 Demarcation lines will be and displays are not collocated. CCW FROM RC pumps Panel 206 applied to alleviate some HX FLOW problems. No controls will SG level and pressure Panels 203,206 be relocated. Category 1 displays Low head and high head Panel 206 SI

2. Controls used together are CSAS Channel SA Panel 206 Problem will be addressed not in close proximity. SIAS Channel SA Panel 206 by FPRL by color coding RAS Channel SA Panel 206 changes in labels. No CSAS Channel SB Panel 206 controls will be relocated.

SIAS Channel SB Panel 206 Category 1 RAS Channel SB Panel 206

3. Functionally similar or HEATER PUMP 2A Panel 202 FPRL will address problem identical primary controls HEATER DRAIN PUMP 2B Panel 202 through demarcation. No are not consistently arranged INSTR AIR CONT Panel 206 controls to be relocated.

and located from panel to ISOL HCV-18-1 Category 0 panel. PRIMARY WATER CONT ISOL Panel 206 HCV-15-1

I TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT 82 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments CONTROL LAYOUT AND SUBSTITUTION ERRORS (Cont.)

0. Minimum separation for Reactor Regulator System Panel 200 No action.

controls not achieved. llllland ll2ll Category 0 Continuous rotary selectors Loose Parts Monitor

5. Controls not arranged by ANNUNCIATOR TEST, ACK, Panel 203 FPRL to study feasibility importance or frequency RESET Panel 203 of relocating annunciator of use. Reactor Coolant Pumps buttons to Panel 200.

Category 3

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments CONTROL CODING

1. Key operated switches CHARGING LINE CONTAIN- Panel 205 FPRL will correct to are not con'sistently MENT ISOL VALVE V-2523 make color coding color coded. consistent. Category 2 CCW HDR A FROM FUEL Panel 206 POOL HX VALVE MV-10-13 CCW HDR B TO FUEL Panel 206 POOL HX VALVE MV-10-18

2. Key operated switches have SIAS BLOCK CHANNEL SB Panel 206 FPRL will label blank unlabelled positions. SIAS BLOCK CHANNEL SA Panel 206 positions. Category 3 MSIS BLOCK CHANNEL SB Panel 206 MSIS BLOCK CHANNEL SA Panel 206

3. Flags on breaker controls CIRC WATER PUMP 2A1 Panel 202 FPBcL to correct by are obscured by control and DISCH VA MV-21-181 1) providing different handles. handles or 2) modifying existing handles.

Category 3

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT //2 CONTROLS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments CONTROL CODING (Cont.)

0. Covers on all legend push- Aux Feedwater Valve Panel 202 FPRL will address via buttons are interchangeable. Controllers Panel 200 panel and display ESFAS Panel 203 markings. Category 1 Turbine Controls

5. Directional arrows on top VOLTAGE AD3USTER Panel 201 FPRL will correct by of T-handle RESET controls BASE AD3USTER filling in arrows with are the same color as the contrasting paint.

rest of the rest of the Category 3 handle.

6. A number of rotary selector EXCITER SUPPLY Panel 201 FP*L will fill in with switches have directional BREAKER GENERATOR Panel 201 contrasting paint.

markings or arrows which GROUND DETECTOR Category 3 are not presently filled with a contrasting paint pigment.

7. Controls have no differential SPILLOVER BYPASS Panel 201 No action coding for pumps, fans, or VALVE MV BP2 Category 3 valves (except in label wording). GLAND STM CONDENSER Panel 201 TRANSFER PUMP

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT //2 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments ANNUNCIATOR INFORMATION UNCLEAR OR NOT PROVIDED

1. There are a number of ANNUNCIATOR POWER Annunciator Will be addressed as part unnecessary annunciators. SUPPLY Panel K of annunciator study.

LAUNDRY AND CHEM. Annunciator Category 5 DRAIN Panel N SUMP. HIGH LEVELS

2. There are no annunciators None FPRL will add "OFF NORMAL for the Hydrazine system. LINEUP" alarm.

Category 1

3. Some annunciators used in POWER HIGH RATE OF Annunciator FPRL to examine feasibility start up will be normally CHANGE Panel L of providing additional on during full power TRIP BYPASSED software to defeat selected situations. annunciators above 15%

SI TANK ISOL V-3610, V-3620 Annunciator power. Category 1 MOTOR OVERLOAD ALARM Panel Q Alternative is to color code TRIP "Normally On" Tiles Green-

0. The only indication that All annunciators No action.

an annunciator has been Category 1 cleared is the extinguish-ment of the light.

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments PRIORITIZATION NOT PROVIDED

1. Permissive displays are MSIS ACTUATION CHANNEL Annunciator No action.

located on annunciator A BLOCK PERMISSIVE Panel P Category 1 panels which should be reserved for alarm MSIS ACTUATION CHANNEL Annunciator displays. B BLOCK PERMISSIVE Panel P

2. Important annunciators are DROPPED CEA CEDMICS Annunciator Annunciator study is to not color or position coded Panel K be performed to develop except on annunciator panel CEA POSITION DEVIATION prioritization schemes.

C. That panel is also the +0" (DATA PROCESS) Category 1 only one with a first out reset function.

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments ANNUNCIATOR TITLES DIFFICULT TO READ/INTERPRET

1. Annunciator font size is To be addressed as part not sufficient for reliable of FPRL annunciator reading, particularly at study.

distances greater than Category 1 several feet.

2. Many annunciator titles CHARGING PUMP 2A Annunciator To be addressed as part are too wordy. LOW OIL PRESS TRIP Panel M of annunciator study.

STUFFING BOX LOW OIL LEVEL Category 1 LOW WATER LEVEL SHUTDOWN CODING ISOL Annunciator V-3561, V-3562 OPEN Panel G HIGH SHUTDOWN PRESS

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments ANNUNCIATOR CONTROLS MISLEADING

1. Annunciator button labels TEST Plant Aux Will be addressed as part are unreadable. RESET Panels of relabeling effort.

(ACK labels missing) Category 2

2. Location of similar buttons ANNUNCIATOR Panels 201, 203 FPRL will arrange buttons is not the same from panel TEST and 205 in same order from panel to panel, and they are not RESET to panel.

in the same order from ACKNOWLEDGE Category 2 panel to panel.

3. Annunciator pushbuttons ANNUNCIATOR Line Repeat Panel To be addressed as part are inconsistently labelled. ACKNOWLEDGE of relabeling effort.

Summary labels are some- ACKN Panel 201 Category 2 times used, sometimes Acknowledge label missing Plant Aux Panel missing. Abbreviations are used inconsistently.

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments INCONSISTENT ANNUNCIATOR LAYOUT

1. Annunciator windows are CONDENSATE STORAGE Annunciator Hold'for FPRL scheduling not above the systems TANK HIGH LEVEL Panel G and review to be addressed they address. as part of study.

CONDENSATE STORAGE Annunciator Category 1 TANK LOW LEVEL Panel G These should be located on panel F.

Component cooling annunci- Annunciator ators for RCPs located over Pane13 R S panel S, while indication is provided on panel 3.

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT /k2 ANNUNCIATORS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments AUDIBLE ANNUNCIATORS POORLY CODED

1. Annunciator audibles are Panels 201, 203 FPRL will move audibles located behind the panels, and 205 to top of panel.

making it difficult for Category 1 operators to localize the alarm.

2. Annunciator audibles sound 1) Noise levels to be at ambient (bosao noise surveyed at unit P/2 levels. by Essex. Moving sources to exterior of the boards should dramatically increase signal detection.

2) Sound levels taken at unit 7/I.

Category 1

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT //2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lee Location Action/Comments CODING IS UNCLEAR OR MISLEADING

1. Two of the three lights CONTAINMENT FAN Heating and Ventil- FPRL will correct through associated with each of COOLERS 2HVS-1A, ating Panel IRC lights.

the listed switches are 2HVS-1B, 2HVS-1C, Category 2 red. 2HVS-1D

2. Vertical scale indicator CCW FROM RC PUMPS Panel 206 FPRL will correct lights have multiple HX FLOiV FIS-10-15-D through IRC.

meanings. The same light Category 3 can mean either "high CONTAINMENT PRESSURE setpoint exceeded", or PIS-07-20 "scale power on".

3. Labels for rotary switch AMMETER CONTROLS Panel 201 To be corrected or part control positions are not FOR BUS 2A1, 2A2; 2BI, of relabeling effort.

oriented horizontally and 2B2; DIESEL GEN 2A, 28; Category 2 position labels are EMERGENCY BUS 2A3, obscured by the control 2AB, 2B3.

handle.

0. Because of the layout of S 1 TANK 2B2 ISOLATION FPRL to handle as part displays and labels, VALVE of demarcation effort.

unrelated displays appear Category 1 related. HYDRAZINEPUMP 2B

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments LACK OF LAMP TESTING/

LAMP AD3USTABILITY

1. There are no lamp testing Simple indicators lights All panels FPRL will study the capabilities for simple feasibility of using indicator lights, legend CEA Position Display Panel 200 dual filament bulbs.

lights, or the CEA Position Category 1 Display. Legend lights Panels 201, 202, 205

2. There is no dimming control No action. FPRL does for illuminated displays. not expect ambient lighting to vary.

Category 3

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT N2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments DISPLAY INFORMATION IS OBSCURED

1. LEDs are not constructed PRESSURIZER PRESS PI-1105D Panel 203 Essex will re-evaluate to minimize reflection of PRESSURIZER PRESS Pl-1103D Panel 203 when ceiling light covers ambient illumination from are installed and LEDs the display cover. are functional.

Category 5

2. Extreme values are obscured CONTROLLED BLD-OFF Panel 203 No action.

on vertical meters due to FLOW FIA-1150 Category 2 meter design.

3. The pointers on all process AUX FW PUMP 2A Panel 202 No action.

controller vertical scales AMPERES AM-629 Category 3 and all circular meters obscure scale numerals.

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments DISPLAY INFORMATION IS OBSCURED (Cont.)

0. Glare makes displays Linear Scales Panel 206 Essex to look again after difficult to read. ceiling light diffusers

% OPEN OPSI ("egg crates") have been HDRD TO LOOPS installed.

Category 2

-% OPEN Sl TNK ISOL VALVES Panel 206 Le end Li hts Panel 202 Condensate 2A, 2B, 2C Valves

5. Displays are located well Loose parts monitor alarms Back Panel No action.

above eye level. Category 0 Midway line megawatts HVAC Panel Rx Regulating System (I and 2) Back Panel

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT //2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion E~xam lea Location Action/Comments DISPLAYED INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET OR READ

1. Multiple decimal points appear NIXIE Tube Displays 1) Essex to check Unit II2 on NIXIE tube displays. Priority = 2

2) Observation made at unit III

2. Coding is not used on multiple WASTE GAS FLOW FR-6608 Panel 206 To be addressed as part scale trend recorders to denote of relabeling effort.

which scale is associated with Category 1 which trend information.

3. Small vertical trend recorders UPPER OIL RSVR Panel 203 FPRL will add graduated on CR panels use indices LEVEL LIA-850 scales.

which are difficult to read Category 0 and have no scale markings.

There are more than 9 minor CIRC AND INTAKE COOLING Panel 202 No action.

marks on many large trend WATER TEMP TR-21-3 Category 3 recorders.

BEARING TEMP TR-22-1 Panel 201 FLOW RECORDER FR-25-1B HVAC Panel

TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam lea Location Action/Comments DISPLAYED INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET OR READ (Cont.)

5. Major marks on small vertical UPPER OIL RSVR LEVEL Panel 203 No action.

indicators are less than .5 LOWER OIL RSVR LEVEL Panel 203 Category 0 inch apart.

6. Information from some vertical FEEDWATER PUMP DISCH Panel 202 FPRL will investigate indicators, trend recorders HDR PRESS PSI-09-05 possibly of rescaling and process controllers is not x 100 PSIG displays.

presented in a directly usable form (values multiplied by a STEAM CHEST PRESS Panel 201 Category 3 constant). Pl-22-38A x 10 PSIG

7. Paper on trend recorders does REFUELING WATER TANK Panel 206 To be handled administratively not match scale. LR-07-20 by FPRL.

WATER GAS FLOW FR-6608 Panel 205 Category 3

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TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments DISPLAYED INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET OR READ (Cont.)

3. Parallax exists between the FW AND SG BLOWDOWN PH No action.

display scale and the pen Category 2 on trend recorders. RX MU FLOW AXIALPOWER RATIO RWST LEVEL

9. Radiation monitor trend 1) Essex to check Unit 82.

recorders are of the impact variety. Portions of the numeric symbols do not print, 2) Observation made at unit 1.

symbols are printed over one another, and there are too many symbols (up to 23 on an individual recorder),

making the output impossible to interpret.

4 TABLE 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT II2 DISPLAYS HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORTS Discre anc Descri tion ~Exam les Location Action/Comments DISPLAY LAYOUT IS MISLEADING, DIFFICULT TO USE

1. Strings of five or more STEAM CHEST AREA Panel 203 Will be addressed as vertical meters are used, part of relabeling and which makes the mid-string VAPOR CAVITY AREA Panel 203 demarcation effort.

components difficult to identify. EXPANSION STEAM AREA Panel 201 Category 2 CONDENSOR STEAM AREA Panel 201

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3.3 S ecial and Other To ics Several areas of CR review were addressed by evaluating components and environment in the Saint Lucie Unit 1 CR, since the associated equipment or state of control room completion prohibited the taking of the data in unit 2. 'These areas are discussed in this section.

3.3.1 Di ital Data Processin S stem (DDPS) and Se uence of Events Recorder. An operationally and visually identical system is to be placed in the unit 2 CR. Given this, the DDPS was evaluated in the unit 1 CR. The following discrepancies were noted:

A) Information is not provided in units readily usable by operators, as indicated by a tape-on label providing a constant to convert from thermal power to electrical output. No action is to be taken by FPRL.

Category 3 Projection displays on the DDPS (and on the main CR boards), 1) are of low figure to background contrast, 2) are poorly maintained in that often no symbols are projected, and 3) offer other poor brightness uniformity. FPRL will address the problem by improving maintenance of the bulbs. Category 5 C) DDPS hourly logs output data, but the units are often not indicated.

They must be referenced in documents. FPRL has referred the discrepancy to IRC. Category 3 D) DDPS nomenclature and abbreviations do not correspond to that on the actual boards. No action is intended. Category 0 E) The last line printed on the DDPS printer is not readable without scrolling the paper up several lines. Outputted information is, therefore, not immediately available. FPRL intends to take no action. Category 0 51

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F) Information outputted is frequently not highlighted by color, labels, or means. For example, the following was observed as output:C'ther 59 g3 $/326 +52 8.12.8 $1327 N 852.3

//326 N 852.8 BELIEVABLE STM PRESS FROM 1A DEADBAND = 9.9 (all of the above printed on one line).

FPRL has referred the problem to IRC for review. Category 5 G) The sequence of events recorder does not necessarily output in alarm sequence. To determine, for example, "First out," operators must sort alarm outputs by time of alarms. No other reactor trip first out is provided. FP*L has referred the problem to IRC for review. Category 5 3.3.2 Control Room Environment and La out Saint Lucie unit 1 was used to evaluate CR environment in terms of lighting and noise. These data are deemed somewhat generalizable to the unit two control room for the following reasons:

o Lighting systems are highly similar. Exceptions include 1) use of colored lights in some places in the unit 1 CR, and 2) reduced lighting achieved by operators in the unit 1 CR by turning off several banks of lights. These exceptions will reduce incidence light in the control room. Light measurements were taken under the above conditions.

o Layouts of the CRs is highly similar, as are placements of noise/sources such as vents, cooling fans, etc., located within the control room. It is pointed out, however, that sound attenuating features are evident in the unit 1 CR (wall panels), which may not be provided in unit 2. Further, noise sources outside the unit 2 CR (for example, the turbine) will probably have different effects on CR ambient noise. Noise data from unit 1 are somewhat more suspect than ambient lighting data.

Workspace arrangement and visibility observations were also taken, in part, from the unit 1 Control Room. Since overall CR layouts are highly similar, these data are considered generalizable to the unit 2 CR.

52

Survey results indicate that ambient lighting levels are generally good. Incident light in the main operation area ranged from 68 to 107 foot-candles in the, bench portion of the boards, and 38 to 50 foot-candles on the vertical portion of the boards. Lighting levels behind the control boards was somewhat less, as low as 22 foot-candles. Incident light at the Reactor Operator's console was measured to be 87 foot-candles. With all lights turned on, a maximum of 170 foot-candles was noted by the Reactor Operator's desk. One potential area of concern is incident light uniformity on the main boards.

Nonuniformity of incident light does not appear to pose a problem, however, to the operators.

A problem noted with lighting was that there are no direct means to test the operability of emergency CR lighting. FPRL is examining means to provide emergency lighting test capability.

Ambient (basal) noise was generally within the NUREG 1580 Guidelines. One point over the safeguards panel measured 67 dB(A), two dB(A) above the Guidelines'imit. This is not considered to be excessively above the limit. However, there may exist other unidentified noise sources in unit 2, or fewer noise sources. Direct evaluation of unit 2 noise levels cannot be made until the unit is operational. Peak noise levels reached 80 dB(A) at the safeguards panel. The primary source of noise seemed to be a low frequency resonance coming from the turbine deck.

Two problem areas which were identified'in CR layout, are as follows:

A) Handrail running along the front of the benchboard obscures vision to many controls and displays. FPRL will resdesign the rail for unit 2 such that obscuring vision to controls and displays will not take place.

B) Portions of several boards (Radiation Monitors, HVAC) are obscurred by other boards. (The HVAC controls and displays are not located in the same location at SL-1.) Priority 2 53

3.3.3 Communications The communications system for Saint Lucie 2 has, as yet, not been designed in terms of control room locations, accesses, etc. Further, the communications console in unit 1 I

will probably not be reproduced in unit 2. An evaluation of CR communications has not, therefore, been conducted.

3.3.0 Personal Protective Gear Evaluation of personal protection equipment was conducted in the SL-1 control room. The gear, storage and packaging is to be the same in unit 2. The following are discrepancies identified with the equipment:

A) Respirator and air pack face masks limit vertical and horizontal vision.

In addition, respirator masks had stickers placed on the front of the visors, totally obscuring vision. Category 1 B) Face masks do accommodate eyeglasses, but appropriate corrective lenses are not stored in the Control Room. Category 1 C) Masks severly limit speech communication. FPRL will evaluate alternatives (throat mikes, etc.). Category 1 D) Full suits are not stored in packages. To don a full suit, an operator would have to unpackage appropriately sized suits, gloves, etc, each separately stowed and located. FPRL will package and store while suites individually. Category 3 3.3.5 Procedures Documents Emergency procedures for the SL-2 CR were under preparation at the time of review. FPRL will generate the following emergency procedures based on CE guidelines for NRC CRDR audit review:

o Main Steam Line Break o Blackout operation o Loss of Reactor coolant o Steam Generator Tube Rupture

These procedures are being written using a format discussed in the report, ~Anal sis of Effectiveness of Emer enc Procedures for 0 erator Use, written by Lund Consulting, for Combustion Engineering. The format being employed is the "Layered Format,"

suggested by the authors as being preferably to narrative type format (as is used in SL-1).

Further, language, syntax, and nomenclature is to be constrained to achieve consistency.

FP*L has taken this position in order to expedite their procedure preparation effort in a timely and effective manner..

Essex has not currently reviewed the procedures, nor reviewed in depth the document from which the procedure format is being selected. Walkthroughs using the emergency procedures have not been conducted. However, the NRC has conducted a review of the CE Guidelines and FPRL is preparing those emergency operating procedures required for the prelicensing in accordance with the subject reviewed procedure guidelines.

3.3e6 Radiation Monitors The radiation monitoring system at SL-2 was not available at the time of the evaluation. The radiation monitors in Saint Lucie-1 is not representative of those planned for SL-2. The units to be purchased for SL-2 are designed and built by the General Atomics Company (GA). An indication of the human engineering of these units is provided in Appendix B. The evaluation was conducted, initially, for the Carolina Power R Light Company. The system evaluated by Essex is the standard GA system and is similar to that to be installed in the SL-2 control room.

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0.0 CONCLUSION

S/RECOMMENDATIONS A variety of human engineering discrepancies have been noted in the SL-2 control room. Backfits to be conducted at SL-2 by FPRL will greatly enhance operability of the CR. For systems not evaluated (e.g., communications) due to uncompleted designs, FPRL commitment fo achieve adquate HE design prior to fabrication should serve to avoid discrepancies and, therefore, enhance operation of these systems. Where discrepancies have been identified, but appropriate and suitable backfits have not been identified, further examination of the discrepancies is required in order to select and schedule backfits.

Essex Corporation will continue to work closely with FPRL and EBASCO to resolve open items in backfitting and achieve means to adequately address human engineering discrepancies.

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APPENDIX A I

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NOtSE SURVEY PLANT: DATE: TIME:

TEST CONDUCTED BY:

SOUND LEVEL METER MODEL: MICROPHONE MODEL: CALIBRATION DATE:

SERIAL NUMBER: SERIAL NUMBER:

OPERATOR POSITION:

NOISE CONDITIONISOURCE/DIRECTION OF MEASUREMENT ds dB(A) dB(C) REMARKS

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LIGHTING SURVEY FORM PLANT: DATE: TIME:

TEST CONDUCTED BY:

PHOTOMETER MODEL: CALIBRATION DATE:

SERIAL NUMBER:

LIGHTING CONDITIONS OPERATORIMEASUREMENT POSITION NORMAL EMERGENCY REMARKS

REV. 2 r

HUMAN ENGINEERlNG DISCREPANCV REPORT NO: PLANT/UNIT: DATE:

REVIEWER NAME:

a) HED TITLE:

b) ITEMS INVOLVED:

ITEM TYPE NOMENCLATURE LOCATION PHOTO NO.

c) PROBLEM DESCRIPTION {CITE GUIDELINES VIOLATED):

d) SPECIFIC OPERATOR ERROR(S) THAT COULD RESULT FROM HED:

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e) SUGGESTIONS FOR POTENTIAL BACKFITS:

UTILITYACTIONS NAME DATE REVIEWER SITE MGR.

PROG. MGR.

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ITEMS t 8, g ARE TO BE COMPLETED ONLY IF UTILITYQUESTIONS THE NECESSITY FOR THE BACKFIT.

t) LIST THE PROCEDURES OR OPERATIONS THAT USE THE LISTED ITEMS IN A MANNER TO INDUCE THE OPERATOR ERROR:

0) LIST THE CONSEQUENCES OF OPERATOR ERROR DURING ALL MODES OF OPERATION:

APPENDIX B

INTRODUCTION

1. On November 21, 1980, Essex Corporation-San Diego Facility personnel and one Carolina Power and Light (CPRL) representative visited the General Atomic facilities at La 3olla, California. The purpose of the visit was to perform a Human Factors (HF) review of the RM-11 and RM-23 Radiation Monitoring equipment.

2. Essex personnel performing the evaluation were: Dr. Robert Kinkade, Mr. Larry Durham, and Mr. Charlie Wright. The CPRL representative was Mr. David Phipps.

General Atomic representatives present during the evaluation were Mr. Bud Perkins (Contract Administrator) and Mr. 3im Ward (Engineering).

3. A review was conducted on one RM-23 cabinet (containing 12 RN-23 modules and 8 Leeds and Northrup strip chart recorders), one RM-11 CRT terminal and a supporting line printer.

Figures 1 through 5 illustrate typical RM-23 modules, strip chart recorders, and a CRT terminal.

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Conductor tapes at lower right of CRT are for testing and are not part of the permanent console.

RESULTS OF REVIEW OVERALL SYSTEM

1. The light intensity of both digital displays and CRT displays appear to be satisfactorily clear and legible.

2. The noise output from the printer could affect efficient CR voice communications and efficient use of the CRT terminal. Noise damping, such as internal (to the printer cabinet) acoustic foam, and/or transparent noise shields over the printer should be considered.

3. Labeling of all equipment will be a key factor and should be addressed as early as possible thereby avoiding ARE recommended labeling that may be unclear or confusing.

0. GA reports the system is limited to six grids and six display terminals. From an engineering standpoint these could be significant limiting factors. It also appears that this system does not address perimeter or outlying radiation monitors. If not, where these monitor outputs are displayed should be considered if CR operators may have need for this information.

5. Each CRT terminal is reported to be capable of addressing any monitor or grid in this system. There will be a CRT terminal located in each CR, one in the health physics laboratory, and one in an undetermined auxiliary location.

RM-11 CRT TERMINAL

1. The RM-11 CRT Terminal appears to be the primary operator station for this system. There will be a CRT terminal located in each CR, one in the health physics laboratory, and one in an undetermined auxiliary location.

2. The reviewed CRT display uses colors to code boundries, headings and abnormal values. The colors are easily discriminated with both hue and saturation varied.

3. The RM-11 system uses a grid display (schematic layout) to represent monitor locations within the plant. A grid display logo located in the lower right corner of the screen will flash when an alarm condition is found, directing the operator to the correct grid. This grid logo lacks specific grid numbers but resembles the location of the Grid Selection buttons. Labeling of function and selection buttons is not the best, but could be sufficient with proper training.

0. The Lamp Test button only lights those buttons that have an on/off functions; however, as these appear to be the only simple indicator lights (or backlight pushbuttons) on the keyboard this appears to be adequate.

5. The display terminal has a "HEALTH" label near the "POWER" label and is reported by GA to represent power to the terminal. However, they are not entirely sure of this. If this is true, the label should be changed to "POWER ON".

6. The "ENTER" function button is located on the left side of the numeric keyboard, the second in a column of identically appearing buttons and could cause some delay in operating. This is not a time critical system; however, better location of the "ENTER" button could improve operator performance.

7. The brightness control is located right on the front for individual operator use, with the other control buttons (Vertical/Horizontal hold, etc.) located behind a locked panel on the CRT.

8. There is also a Degaussing button located on the front panel. GA says the CRT needs to be degaussed at intervals. With all the automation of this system, it seems logical that this function could also be automatic, otherwise a Preventative Maintenance program needs to be included for it.

9. The "LIT" button converts all function keys to alphabetical keys for system programming. This capability imposes the requirement for a number of buttons that are not used by Control Room Operators. This could cause some confusion; however, this is not a time critical system. It is recommended that this label be changed to one more descriptive of its function such as "NOR/ALPHA" for normal or alphabetic. Additionally, all function keys should carry a double label indicating function (under normal conditions) and the alpha character (when programming function is on).

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RM-23 CABINET MODULES AND RECORDERS

1. The RM-23 display/control modules are digital display units that are backup units for safety system monitors only. This is due to the CRT not being seismically qualified.

The RM-23's will primarily be used by maintenance personnel or in the event of an accident that includes failure of the CRT terminal. RM-23's will require extensive operator training as all failure indications are in numerical code.

2. The "ON", "ALERT" and "HIGH ALARM"lights are very small and not very intense.

This makes them difficult to detect under normal illuminance conditions. These should be enlarged and their intensity increased if there is any possibility that they must function as primary displays (i.e., primary radiation annunciators).

3. There are an unequal number of strip chart recorders compared to the RM-23 modules. Different combinations of readings from RM-23 modules (up to 3) will be displayed on these recorders. The rationale for this is unclear at this time.

0. The strip chart recorders must be read up close. Beyond four feet an observer cannot determine if they are standard scale or log scale.

5. There is no alarm mechanism to notify the operator of strip chart failure, paper running out, or exhausted ink supply.

6. The strip chart recorders can be fully removed from the cabinet once the retainers are loose. Locks should be installed such that they cannot be inadvertently pulled all the way out and dropped when changing ink and paper.

7. The pen/channel to color on these Leeds and Northrup recorders are different from the majority found in NPP CRs. Based upon a previous recommendation, it is suggested that the sequence be changed to the following:

Pen/Channel Color Red Green Blue

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S. The status indicator lights located on the RM-23 cabinets between the modules and recorders are reported by GA to indicate which RM-23 module is not in service. The fuel handling area monitors have redundant RM-23's, one set in Unit 1 and the other in Unit 0.

This option, and the reason for the redundancy is unclear at this time. Also, the location of the switch for determining Unit 1 or Unit 0 operation is not known. It is possible that these lights, when lighted will indicate a deactivated unit. This could be confusing as it establishes a lighted = off and unlighted = on relationship. Alternatives to this type relationship should be seriously considered.

9. It should be required that no RM-23 modules be mounted such that the readout and associated "HIGH" and "ALERT" lamps are above 70 inches or below 01 inches from the standing surface. If any such modules are to be used as primary displays which must be read precisely and frequently, these modules should be mounted such that their displays are not higher than 65 inches or lower than 50 inches from the standing surface.

I RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the above results, the GA Digital Process Radiation Monitoring System appears to have some human engineering design problems. The above evaluation is based on a very preliminary and cursory review and should not be considered definitive. The CRT displays and the interactive sequences could not be adequately evaluated. The recommendation of Essex is that the configuration, once operational, be evaluated in detail.

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