IR 05000454/2007006

IR 05000454-07-006 and 05000455-07-006, on 07/16/2007-08/03/2007; Byron Station, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML072570387
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	09/14/2007
From:	Skokowski R A NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB3
To:	Crane C M Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-07-006
Download: ML072570387 (21)

Text

September 14, 2007

Mr. Christopher M. CranePresident and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: BYRON STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONAND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000454/2007006 AND 05000455/2007006

Dear Mr. Crane:

On August 3, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a teaminspection of problem identification and resolution at your Byron Station, Units 1 and 2.

The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on August 3, 2007, with Ms. Snow and other members of your staff.This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as theyrelate to the identification and resolution of problems, compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. On the basis of thesample selected for review, the inspection team concluded that Byron was generally effective in the identification, evaluation, and resolution of problems. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter andits enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document C. Crane-2-Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system(ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA Mark A. Ring for/Richard A. Skokowski, ChiefBranch 3 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos. 50-454; 50-455License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 05000454/2007006 and 05000455/2007006

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:Site Vice President - Byron StationPlant Manager - Byron Station Regulatory Assurance Manager - Byron Station Chief Operating Officer Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services Vice President - Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director Licensing Manager Licensing - Braidwood and Byron Senior Counsel, Nuclear Document Control Desk - Licensing Assistant Attorney General Illinois Emergency Management Agency State Liaison Officer, State of Illinois State Liaison Officer, State of Wisconsin Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission B. Quigley, Byron Station

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000454/2007006; 05000455/2007006; 07/16/2007-08/03/2007; Byron Station, Units 1and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems.The inspection was conducted by a Senior Resident Inspector, two regional specialists, andan Illinois Emergency Management Agency inspector. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

"Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated July 2006.Identification and Resolution of ProblemsOverall, the inspection team determined that the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was effectivein the identification, evaluation, and resolution of problems. The inspection team determined that the licensee typically identified problems and placed them in the CAP. The inspection team identified that operating experience was utilized and considered. The inspection team noted that the licensee was effective in conducting root cause and apparent cause evaluations and effectively resolved most problems categorized as more significant. Based on interviews, observations of plant activities, reviews of the CAP and the Employees Concerns Program, the inspection team determined that site personnel were willing to raise safety issues.A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

3

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) (71152B)a.Assessment of the Corrective Action (CA) program (1)Inspection ScopeThe inspection team reviewed the procedures describing the licensee's CorrectiveAction Program (CAP). The licensee identified problems for evaluation and resolution by initiating issue reports (IRs) that were entered into the condition reporting system.

The IRs were subsequently screened for operability, categorized by significance, and assigned for further evaluation and resolution.The inspection team evaluated the methods for assigning and tracking issues to ensurethat issues were screened for operability and reportability, prioritized for evaluation and resolution in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance, and tracked to identify adverse trends and repetitive issues. In addition, the inspection team interviewed plant staff and management to determine the staff's understanding of, and involvement with the CAP.The inspection team reviewed IRs to assess whether the licensee adequately evaluatedand prioritized identified problems. The issues reviewed encompassed the full range of evaluations, including root cause analyses, apparent cause evaluations, and commoncause analyses. Samples of IRs that were assigned lower levels of significance were also reviewed by the inspection team to ensure they were appropriately classified. The review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the inspection team reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to preclude recurrence. The inspection team observed selected daily Station Ownership Committee (SOC) IR screening meetings, in which station personnel reviewed new IRs for prioritization and assignment. The inspection team also reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for

selected items.The inspection team reviewed the corrective actions associated with selected IRs todetermine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspection team reviewed IRs for repetitive problems to determine whether previous corrective actions were effective. The inspection team also reviewed station timeliness in implementing corrective actions and their effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspection team reviewed corrective actions associated with selected non-cited violations (NCVs) and findings to determine whether the station properly evaluated and resolved these issues.This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolutionas defined by Inspection Procedure 71152.

4(2)AssessmentNo findings of significance were identified.

.1 Identification of IssuesThe team concluded, in general, that the station identified issues and entered them intothe CAP at the appropriate level.

The team's review of operating experience reports identified that the licensee was appropriately including the issues into the CAP. The licensee also used the CAP to document instances where previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed. The inspection team noted that relatively few deficiencies were identified by external organizations (including the NRC)that had not been previously identified by licensee personnel.The team selected three high risk systems, which included the non-essential servicewater, condensate system, and the 120 volt direct current electrical distribution system to review in detail. The team's review was to determine whether the licensee was properly monitoring and evaluating the performance of these systems through effective implementation of station monitoring programs. The team interviewed the system engineer of the applicable system, non-license operators, and performed partial system walk-downs of the systems. A five year review of the 480 volt Molded Case Circuit Breaker (MCCB) and fire protection issues was also undertaken to assess the licensee's efforts in monitoring for system degradation due to aging aspects.

.2 Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The team concluded that the licensee had properly prioritized issues based ontheir safety significance, and that issues were generally well evaluated.

The team did not identify any issue reports that were not properly prioritized. In addition, the team observed several SOC and management review board committee (MRC) meetings, and concluded that both committees generally ensured the proper prioritization and appropriate investigation assignments for plant issues. Examples of SOC actions taken were to assign work requests, evaluations, and/or corrective action to specific departmental groups. The team observed the MRC function in an oversight role of the SOC. For example, the MRC changed the SOC recommended action of some issues based on committee dialogue and additional station awareness of the issue. The MRCperformed grading of investigative CAP products to provide feedback on product quality to the sponsoring manager. The team concluded that issues were properly prioritized and generally well evaluated.However, the team questioned the licensee regarding two IRs that had been througheither the SOC or the SOC and MRC and warranted additional evaluation of prompt operability. In both cases observed, additional data gathering and assessments by the team determined that no actual operability concern existed. These IRs represented near misses in that there was information in the IRs that should have called into question the operability of plant equipment but the review committees failed to recognize.

5ObservationsFire ProtectionThere were a large number of issues being identified by licensee and NRC personnelin the area of fire protection. These issues dealt with hardware issues, surveillance issues, documentation, and corrective action. Many of these issues were NRC identified. Examples included: missing beam fire protection (three examples), failure to test remote shutdown panel switches, problems with the pre-fire plan and the fire protection report, fire dampers not installed, and CO 2 operability with open doors. Inaddition, a large number of issues have been identified by licensee personnel, many of these issues have been legacy or long standing issues. The team observed significant effort to address the individual issues and observed significant effort addressing four groups of hardware issues by the Plant Health Committee; but there appeared to be little effort to perform an overall assessment of the fire protection related issues.

.3 Effectiveness of Corrective ActionThe inspection team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in the resolutionof problems and implementation of corrective actions.

The problems identified using a root or apparent cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with program and NRC requirements. The inspection team concluded that corrective actions were generally completed in an appropriate time frame.Observations480 Volt Molded Case Circuit Breakers (MCCBs)

The inspection team performed a review of the high failure rate of Westinghouse 480V MCCBs. The number of documented failures was: outage B2R12 - 44 of 120 tested (37 percent), outage B1R14 - 63 of 165 tested (38 percent), and outage B2R13 - 18 of 94 tested (19 percent). The team noted that based on failure laboratory analysis completed by a licensee contractor, all identified failures were attributed to breaker bar twisting. The lab also concluded that fixed magnetic breakers have not shown problems with tripping high out-of-tolerance (OOT). While there was much evidence to support breaker bar twisting as the cause of these failures, the inspection team also noted there was evidence of age-related degradation, such as dried and separated grease, that appeared to be dismissed by the licensee.Also during the inspection team's review of the MCCB failures, as documented in thelicensee's corrective action program, the team noted that the licensee's practice was not to consider all problems as failures. For example, the licensee did not consider individual phases with as-found OOT or breakers that did not reset following testing as failures. The inspection team found at least one example in the licensee's corrective action program (IR 446538) of MCCBs that did not reset following testing, and three cases with individual phases with as-found OOT. The inspection team ascertained that the three cases of OOT phase settings were analyzed by the licensee's contractor, which determined that the failures were due to hardened grease.

6The inspection team compared the licensee's testing, and preventive maintenanceto Westinghouse Bulletins 04-13 (Replacement Solutions for Obsolete Classic Molded Case Circuit Breakers, UL Testing Issues, Breaker Design Life and Trip Band Adjustment) and 06-2 (Aging Issues and Subsequent Operating Issues for Breakers That are at Their 20 Year Design/Qualified Lives; UL Certification/Testing Issues Update) as well as Information Notice 93-64 (PERIODIC TESTING AND PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE OF MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS).

Both the Westinghouse Bulletins and the Information Notice described the aspects of age-related degradation, including dried and separated grease. Additionally, the OE recommended periodic cycling of the MCCBs, and/or breaker replacement after 20 years in mild environment applications. Most of the 480 Volt MCCBs have been in service for greater than twenty years, and some have shown indications of age-related degradation. Although the licensee had evaluated the OE, they determined not to implement the recommendations. Based on the questions from the inspection team, the licensee is reevaluating the MCCB preventive maintenance activities and frequency.

The licensee's decision not to implement the OE recommendations is not a violation of NRC requirements. Furthermore, the team assessed the MCCB failures as captured in the licensee's corrective action program, and there were no incidences severe enough to be considered a significant condition adverse to quality, therefore no violations of NRC requirements occurred.

b.Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)(1)Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the licensee's implementation of the station operating experienceprogram. Specifically, the team reviewed implementation of operating experience program procedures, attended CA program meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected 2006 and 2007 monthly assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The purpose of the team's review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience in the performance of daily activities. Specifically that OE was used in the evaluation of issues, departmental assessments, Nuclear Oversight (NOS) audits,and the use of OE was effective in preventing repeats of previous industry events. The team also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented. (2)AssessmentThe team did not identify any findings of significance in this area. In general, with theexception of the MCCB issue described above, OE information was being well utilized at the station. The team observed that Exelon fleet internal OE and industry OE were discussed by licensee staff to support review activities and CAP investigations.

During licensee staff interviews, the team identified that the use of OE was being considered during daily activities.

7 c.Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits(1)Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed selected focused area self-assessments (FASA), check-inself-assessments, and Nuclear Oversight audits of the corrective action program, technical human performance, engineering design control and programs, maintenance, operations and system performance monitoring. The team evaluated whether these audits and self-assessments were being effectively managed, were adequately covering the subject areas, and were properly capturing identified issues in the CAP. In addition, the team also interviewed licensee staff regarding the implementation of the audit and self-assessment programs.(2)AssessmentNo findings of significance were identified.

The team concluded that the licensee's departmental assessments and nuclearoversight audits were effective at identifying plant deficiencies and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold level. Assessments and audits were thorough and probing. The auditing and assessing teams were comprised of personnel with appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities, which resulted in the identification of plant deficiencies, plant improvement recommendations, and plant strengths. Assessments and audits properly characterized issues, and identified issues were subsequently placed into the CAP. In addition, the team concluded that 2007 PI&R FASA was a very good effort that resulted in a quality product.

d.Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment(1)Inspection ScopeThe team interviewed selected members of the licensee's staff to determine if therewere any impediments to the establishment of a safety conscious work environment.

In addition, the team discussed the implementation of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) with the ECP Coordinators, and reviewed their 2006/2007 activities to identify any emergent issues or potential trends. Licensee programs to publicize the CAP and ECP programs were also reviewed.(2)AssessmentNo findings of significance were identified.

The staff was aware of, and generally familiar with the CAP and other station processes,including the ECP, through which concerns could be raised. Staff interviews identified that issues could be freely communicated to supervision, and that several of the individuals interviewed had previously initiated IRs. In addition, a review of the types of issues in the ECP indicated that site personnel were appropriately using the corrective action and employee concerns programs to identify issues. The team interviewed the ECP Coordinators and concluded that they were focused on ensuring all site individuals 8were aware of the program, comprehensive in their review of individual concerns, andused the corrective action and employee concerns programs to appropriately resolve

issues.4OA6Meetings

.1 Exit MeetingThe team presented the inspection results to Ms. M. Snow and other members oflicensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 3, 2007.

The team asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.4OA7Licensee-Identified ViolationsNo findings of significance were identified.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

M. Snow, Plant Manager

R. Chalifoux, Corrective Action Program Coordinator

S. Fruin, Acting Operations Director

C. Gayheart, Work Control Manager

A. Giancatarino, Engineering Director

W. Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager

S. Kerr, Chemistry Manager

W. Kouba, Nuclear Oversight Manager

J. Langon, Regulatory Assurance

S. Swanson, Maintenance DirectorNuclear Regulatory Commission

R. Skokowski, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3

2ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSEDOpened NoneOpened and Closed

None

Closed None

Discussed None

3

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

ISSUE REPORTS GENERATED DUE TO THE INSPECTIONIR

656295; NRC Senior Resident Identified Debris in FME Zone 1 Around SFP; August 1, 2007IR

656855; Oil Usage Log Used Inconsistently; August 3, 2007

IR 657030; Aggregate Review of Fire Protection Issues is Warranted; August 3, 2007

IR 657070; Further Evaluation Needed for Molded Case Circuit Breakers; August 3, 2007

IR 657546; Potential FME Concerns Spent Fuel Pool Area; August 6, 2007ISSUE REPORTS REVIEWED DURING INSPECTIONIR

374050; Security Fence Down; September 16, 2005IR

349478; Operations First Quarter CAP Trending - Outage Related Events; July 1, 2005

IR 370681; NOS ID'd Root Cause Corrective Actions Deficiencies; September 6, 2005

IR 373962; Potential Adverse Trend in Unplanned Non-Shutdown LCO Entries;

September 15, 2005

IR 375009; Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Cleaning Process; September 19, 2005

IR 379616; Safety and Radiation Practices; September 9, 2005

IR 387581; Unit 2 Reactor Trip On Loss Of CD/CB PP 2A; October 19, 2005

IR 383201; No Fall Protection; October 7, 2005

IR 383326; Below Standard Crane Observation; October 7, 2005

IR 383706; Production over Safety; October 9, 2005

IR 384780; Liquid Nitrogen Cylinders Not Secured, October 11, 2005

IR 430826; 2A D/G Exhaust Screens Dirty; December 16, 2005

IR 445208; U1 Pressurizer Sample Point Isolation Failure; January 23, 2006

IR 446973; Un-insulated Battery Terminal Leads; January 28, 2006

IR 458698; Safety Issue for the 2B SI Pump Room; February 25, 2006

IR 463574; 2006 NRC Mod And 50.59 Inspection-Ops Rounds Not Updated; March 8, 2006

IR 465905; Ladder Safety Posts; March 13, 2006

IR 465952; Auxiliary Building Safety Concern, March 13, 2006

IR 469894; Abandonment Of RSH FP Header And Hose Stations; March 23, 2006

IR 472530; Check in Assessment of Clearance and Tagging; December 29, 2006

IR 477497; RWST Level Operability Impacted by Transmitter Calibration; April 11, 2006

IR 478456; Fire Dampers Not Installed in Fire Rated Barriers; April 13, 2006

IR 497784; UCSR Confined Space; June 7, 2006

IR 498672; 2CS019B Valve Stroke Not Performed due to Safety; June 10, 2006

IR 507048; D/G Door Posting not Obeyed; July 7, 2006

IR 509274; 10CFR Part 21 For ESF Batteries; July 14, 2006

IR 524692; Cover for Light Fixture in Battery Room 211 broke; August 28, 2006

IR 525011; Focused Area Self Assessment of Reactivity Management; December 20, 2006

IR 527105; Potential Ignition Sources in the ESF Battery Rooms; September 4, 2006

IR 529577; Refueling Machine Hazards; September 11, 2006

IR 531453; Cable Tray Energized; September 15, 2006

IR 534573; Good Catch; September 22, 2006

IR 535213; ED Reset; September 19, 2006

IR 536001; ED Reset; September 25, 2006

IR 549324; Found Battery Room Door Unlocked; October 26, 2006

IR 551404; Engineering - Potential Trend - Human Error Prevention; October 31, 2006

4IR

556440;

CDBI-Problems With Calculation BYR2000-062/BRW-00-0111-E;

November 10, 2006

IR 560234; Focused Area Self Assessment of B2R13 Outage Readiness; January 31, 2007

IR 562375; CDBI Calculation BYR04-016 Assumptions; November 22, 2006

IR 569941; NOS ID'd Corrective Action Assignments Not Properly Closed; December 15, 2006

IR 571955; Headache from D/G Exhaust; December 21, 2006

IR 577680; Pressure Gage on Halon Bottle Reading Low; January 11, 2007

IR 578710; Backlog of IR Closure Reviews and Trending; January 12, 2007

IR 580189; Halon Bottle Pressure Low, Out of Specification; January 18, 2007

IR 580456; Fear and Distraction - Submitted Anonymously; January 18, 2007

IR 594142; Actions from NSRB Meeting Minutes from January 9 - 10, 2007; January 9, 2007

IR 594524; Acid Leak; February 22, 2007

IR 601107; NOS ID'd Corrective Action Program Processes Not Rigorous; March 8, 2007

IR 613708; Containment Isolation Valve 2-CC-9518 Failed Leak Rate Test; April 5, 2007

IR 615351; Minor Injury to Mechanic; April 10, 2007

IR 617200; Fixed Ladder with Structural Defects; April 14, 2007

IR 624042; Compressed Gas Cylinders Not Stored Properly; May 1, 2007

IR 644020; PI&R Focus Area Self-Assessment Deficiency; June 25, 2007

IR 649815; New PORV Controller Lessons Learned; July 12, 2007

IR 649853; Pump is Turning the Wrong Way after Controller Modification; July 12, 2007

IR 653305; 1D Steam Generator PORV Work Window Exceeded Estimate by more than plus or minus 10 percent; July 17, 2007

IR 653669; NOS ID'd 2Q07 Yellow (Chronic) Rating for RP Department; July 25, 2007

IR 654619; CAP Evaluations Overdue; July 27, 2007

IR 655144; Maintenance Rule Action Conflicts with Regulatory Guide 1.160; July 30, 2007

IR 655683; Inappropriate Closure of Incorrect ACITS; July 30, 2007Fire Protection IssuesIR

148945; Small Hole in AEER Wall Leads to LCOAR Entry; March 13, 2003IR

148903; Fire Seals in Unit 1 Aux Electrical Equipment Room; March 13, 2003

IR 210467; Degraded Fire Hose; March 24, 2004

IR 227598; NOS ID'd Adverse Trend Fire Protection Program Deficiencies; June 10, 2004

IR 228104; Fire Truck Missing Two 5 inch Quick Lock Adapters as Found by Surveillance;

June 13, 2004

IR 276473; Conduit in 1A D/G Room; November 17, 2004

IR 277138; Firehose Issues While Staging for Clearance Order; November 28, 2004

IR 320569; Components on Fire Truck Inventory Missing; April 3, 2005

IR 325192; Degraded Hoses on Foam Machines; April 15, 2005

IR 336345; New Fire Seals not Being Added to Fire Seal Inspections; May 18, 2005

IR 429839; FP Hose Station Found Without Nozzle; December 2, 2005

IR 432581; 0BOSR

FP-Q1 Fails to Meet Acceptance Criteria; December 10, 2005

IR 465154; Fire Truck Missing Gated Wye; March 12, 2006

IR 477513; Extent of Condition on Fire Piping; April 2006

IR 504408; Fire Truck Hose Issues; June 28, 2006

IR 504946; Fire Hose Testing Procedures Need Updating; June 29, 2006

IR 506972; Work Order Identified Two Hoses Requiring Replacement; July 3, 2006

IR 509629; Valve 0FP475 Could Not Be Flushed; July 13, 2006

IR 509738; Unplanned LCOAR Entry on Hose Station 250; July 15, 2006

IR 516253; Potential Document Issues with Fire Hoses; August 2, 2006

5IR

520780; Lessons Learned Fire Protection Foam System Maintenance; August 16, 2006IR

542454; Fire Protection Report Discrepancies; October 10, 2006

IR 593370; Fire Proofing Removed without PBI Initiated; February 19, 2007

IR 594075; Perform Common Cause Analysis on Piping Leaks in the Fire Protection System;

February 21, 2007

IR 598079; Fire Proofing Issue Identified; March 1, 2007

IR 601728; Fireproof Thermafiber Insulation Impairment; March 9, 2007

IR 601978; Steel Beam Missing Fire Protection Board; March 10, 2007

IR 602010; Fire Truck Needs More Hose; March 10, 2007

IR 602838; Steel Beam Missing Fire Protection Board Unit 2 Area 7; March 12, 2007

IR 622255; Fire Barrier Walkdown; April 26, 2007

IR 625999; Oil Storage Tank Room Fire Damper Dropped; May 6, 2007

IR 630782; NRC Steel Beam Fireproofing Questions; May 17, 2007

IR 638778; Fire Truck Inventory Comes Up Short; June 9, 2007

IR 650463; Fire Pre-Plan Discrepancies Identified; July 16, 2007

IR 652278; NRC Inspectors Identified that

IR 577680 Lacked a Basis for Operability;

July 20, 2007

IR 654830; Full Scope of Fire Seal Repair Not Identified; July 28, 2007

IR 655346; No CERA Blanket Found in Fire Seal; July 16, 2007

IR 655788; BOL Needs Clarification; July 31, 2007

0BOSR

FP-Q5, Revision 7, "Fire Response Truck and Backup Mobile Card Inspection"

CC-AA-201; Plant Barrier Control Program, Revision 6

Standing Order 07-035; Guidance for Fire Protection CO2 or Halon Zone Operability, July 30, 2007

0BOSR

FP-Q5, "Fire Response Truck and Backup Mobile Cart Inspection," Revision 7

NOSA-BYR-07-01; CAP Audit Byron Station; March 9, 2007

Quick Human Performance Investigation Report

649952, "FP Hose Flow Verification not Performed per Surveillance," July 13, 2007

REFERENCESIR

593317, Action Item 3; Results of the Safety Culture Survey Performed August 2006;

April 3, 2007

BAP 1100-3A3; "Pre-Evaluated Plant Barrier Matrix," Revision 21

594777-04; Self-Assessment for Preparation for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution

PI&R) Inspection; June 2007

Meeting Summary Byron Nuclear Safety Review Board July 12 and 13, 2005

Meeting Summary Byron Nuclear Safety Review Board October 20 and 21, 2005

Meeting Summary Byron Nuclear Safety Review Board January 23 and 24, 2006

Meeting Summary Byron Nuclear Safety Review Board May 15 and 16, 2006

Meeting Summary Byron Nuclear Safety Review Board August 23 and 24, 2006

Meeting Summary Byron Nuclear Safety Review Board January 9 and 10, 2007

Meeting Summary Byron Nuclear Safety Review Board May 7 and 8, 2007

RP-BY-300-1005; RP Guidance for Water Transfers and System Flushing; Revision 0

RP-BY-1081-2; RP Performance Program; Revision 4

BAP-1100-3; Plant Impairment Program; Revision 18

Work Order

994874; Halon Bottle Pressure Low, Out of Specification

NOS CAP Audit

NOS-BYR-07-01; March 30, 2007; IR 571154

NOS Audit LCO Work Window Performance; December 2, 2005, IR 278945

NOS audit LCO Work Window CAP Quality; August 2, 2006,

IR 442751

6ACE and Exelon Corporate White Pater; December 12, 2006,

IR 523038; ACE for Uncontrolled High Radiation Area,

NCV 2006-04-03; September 9, 2006, IR 531013

ACE for Tritium Release to the Environment,

NCV 2006-04-02; February 14, 2006, IR 478372

LS-AA-115; Operating Experience; Revision 10

LS-AA-120; Issue Identification and Screening Process, Revision 7

LS-AA-125; Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure, Revision 11

LS-AA-125-1001; Root Cause Analysis Manual; Revision 6

LS-AA-125-1002; Common Cause Analysis Manual; Revision 5

LS-AA-125-1003; Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual; Revision 7

LS-AA-125-1004; Effectiveness Review Manual; Revision 2

LS-AA-125-1005; Coding and Analysis Manual, Revision 5

LS-AA-126; Self-Assessment Program; Revision 5

LS-AA-126-1001; Focused Area Self-Assessments; Revision 4

LS-AA-126-1005; Check-In Self Assessments, Revision 3

LS-AA-126-1006; Benchmarking Program, Revision 1

NO-AA-200-002; Nuclear Oversight Regulatory Audit Procedure; Revision 10

NO-AA-200-002-1001; Exelon Nuclear Audit Handbook; Revision 11

OP-AA-102-103, Operator Work-Around Program; Revision 1

EI-AA-1; Employee Issues; Revision 1

EI-AA-101; Employee Concerns Program; Revision 6

EI-AA-100-1003; Employee Issues Advisory Committee Notification; Revision 0

EI-AA-101-1002; Employee Concerns Program Trending Tool; Revision 3

LS-AA-1006; "NRC Cross-Cutting Analysis and Trending," Revision 1

RP-AA-203-1002; Response to ED Reset Alarms; Revision 0

WC-AA-101-1004; On-Line Maintenance for LCO Components; Revision 4

Executive Review of Exelons Nuclear's Learning Programs, Monthly for July 2005 through June 2007

Executive Review of Exelons Nuclear's Learning Programs for June 2007FME Reactor Vessel And Spent Fuel PoolIR

123845; Loose Paint Chip Fell Into Reactor Vessel-Retrieval Required; September 20, 2002IR

177721; Paint Chips Discovered In FME Zone 1; September 26, 2003

IR 217076; Paint Chips In The Spent Fuel Pool; April 27, 2004

IR 518222; Foreign Material Found In Spent Fuel Pool; August 9, 2006

IR 519131; Loose Paint Contributing To SFP FME Issue; August 11, 2006

IR 611673; B2R13-Paint Chips Noted On Staged Material In Crosstown; April 2, 2007

IR 613143; FME Challenge, Paint Chips Need Scraped and Vacuumed; April 4, 2007Procedure PlacekeepingIR

601900; NOS ID Placekeeping not being performed in work package; March 10, 2007IR

603735; NOS ID Placekeeping not being performed in work package; March 14, 2007

IR 612677; NOS ID Operations' Placekeeping deficiency; April 4, 2007

IR 617878; NOS ID Poor Placekeeping in ECCS Flow Balance Test; April 16, 2007

IR 618015; NOS ID Operations' Placekeeping deficiency; April 20, 2007

IR 620343; NOS ID Cross Cutting Placekeeping Deficiencies in B2R13; April 22, 2007

IR 624419; NOS ID Simulator Training Session without Set Placekeeping; May 1, 2007

HU-AA-104-101; Procedure Use and Adherence NOS Site Status Report July 17, 2007

Operations Policy 700-14

7480 Volt Molded Case Circuit BreakersIR

124871; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Test Out of Tolerance; September 27, 2002IR

211383; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Test Out of Tolerance; March 28, 2004

IR 211384; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Test Out of Tolerance; March 28, 2004

IR 211386; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Test Out of Tolerance; March 28, 2004

IR 211390; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Test Out of Tolerance; March 28, 2004

IR 311885; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Test Out of Tolerance; March 12, 2005

IR 380420; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Test Out of Tolerance; September 30, 2005

IR 380467; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Test Out of Tolerance; September 30, 2005

IR 381472; MCCB Testing Repair Plan Incomplete; October 3, 2005

IR 441548; Feed Breakers for Pressurizer Heaters Failed Surveillance; January 12, 2006

IR 449192; Heat Degradation; February 2, 2006

IR 477913; AP6 Maintenance Rule Unacceptable Trend; April 12, 2006

IR 483813; MCCB Testing Failures; April 27, 2006

IR 531766; Breaker Tripped Out of Tolerance High; September 15, 2006

IR 531898; Out of Tolerance HFB Breaker 132X1 1AP23E; September 16, 2006

IR 531909; Out of Tolerance HFB Breaker 132X1 1AP23E D4; September 16, 2006

IR 532016; Molded Case Breaker 1AP92E-A4 Failed to Trip; September 16, 2006

IR 532974; Aggregate Impact of Breaker Testing Failures; September 19, 2006

IR 534855; B1R14 LL Molded Case Circuit Breaker (MCCB) Testing; September 22, 2006

IR 560339; Breaker Failure Due to Lack of Lubrication; November 20, 2006

IR 594463; Breaker Did Not Open When Trip Plate Depressed; February 22, 2007

IR 633252; Breaker 1LL62JA-C Will Not Shut "Off"; May 24, 2007

MA-AA-723-325 Westinghouse/Cutler-Hammer MCCB Trip Testing; Revision 6

MA-AA-716-210-1001 Motor Control Centers/MCCBs Maintenance Test Template; Revision 8

NEMA AB 4-2000; Guidelines for Inspection and Preventive Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers used in Commercial and Industrial Applications; 1996

NRC Information Notice 93-64; Periodic Testing and Preventive Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers; August 12, 1993

NRC Information Notice 92-51 Supplement 1; Misapplication and Inadequate Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers; April 11, 1994

Westinghouse Technical Bulletin

TB-04-13; Molded Case Circuit Breakers Westinghouse Technical Bulletin

TB-06-2; Molded Case Circuit Breakers

OPEX SME Review of Westinghouse TB-04-13

OPEX SME Review of Westinghouse TB-06-2

Power Labs Failure Analysis Project Number BYR-13720

Power Labs Failure Analysis Project Number BYR-20989

Power Labs Failure Analysis Project Number BYR-20990

Power Labs Failure Analysis Project Number BYR-20991

Power Labs Special Testing Project Number BYR-21599

Power Labs Failure Analysis Project Number BYR-95259

Power Labs Tech Services Work Request Project

BYR-47998, WR #2241

Power Labs Tech Services Work Request Project

BYR-48218, WR #2252

Byron Quarterly Ship System Report, Auxiliary Power LV1 120/208V

Engineering Change 0000362663

AT 532974-03

8SiltingIR

362882; Mud In WS Lines And Various Coolers On 2AS02PA/B; August 11, 2005IR

381523; 2B AF Diesel Cubicle Cooler Drain Pan Mud Caked; October 3, 2005

IR 397453; No Flow to Upper Motor Cooler, Line Is Plugged; November 10, 2005

IR 462587; 1C CW Pump Bowl Full Of Mud; March 6, 2006

IR 469078; CW Blowdown Air Release Valves Found Plugged With Mud; March 21, 2006

IR 469915; Line Plugged With Silt/Debris; March 23, 2006

IR 471384; SX Blowdown Valve Apparently Plugged With Silt; March 27, 2006

IR 607620; Piping Appears To Be Plugged; March 22, 2007

IR 633689; VI Chiller:

Pressure Indicator Piping Plugged; May 25, 2007

IR 647995; OC WS Pump (Non-Running) Motor Cooling Flow Plugged; July 7, 2007Miscellaneous Operations IssuesIR

532290; Possible Operator Workaround Concerning CW Blowdown; September 17, 200IR

535346; 1HD046B Work Prior to Additional CO Isolation; September 24, 2006

IR 542407; Extent of Condition Review From

IR 538328; October 11, 2006

IR 610812; Extent of Condition in CAP Investigations Needs Improvement; March 30, 2007

IR 610826; NOS ID CAP Corrective Action Effectiveness Attribute DNME; March 30, 2007

IR 622229; NOS ID Procedure Implementation Not Completed at Byron; April 26, 2007

IR 629150; Valve Identified Out of Position; May 7, 2007

IR 629361; MRC Directed Review of Steam Leaks Following B2R13; May 14, 2007

IR 630883; NOS ID Trend in OPS Narrative Logkeeping; May 17, 2007

Standing Order 07-039; Oil Addition Log Documentation; August 7, 2007MiscellaneousByron SOC Agenda for Tuesday, July 17, 2007Byron MRC Agenda for Wednesday, July 18, 2007

Byron SOC Agenda for Thursday, July 19, 2007

OE18517; Siemens Personal ED Resets; June 4, 2004

9

LIST OF ACRONYMS

USEDADAMSAgency-Wide Document Access and Management SystemCACorrective Action

CAPCorrective Action Program

CFRCode of Federal Regulation

ECPEmployee Concern Program

FASAFocused Area Self Assessment

DRPDivision of Reactor Projects

EOCExtent of Condition

IMCInspection Manual Chapter

IRIssue Report

MRCManagement Review Committee

MCCBMolded Case Circuit Breaker

NCVNon-Cited Violation

NOSNuclear Oversight

NRCUnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OEOperating Experience

OOTOut of Tolerance

PI&RProblem Identification and Resolution

RCARoot Cause Analysis

SDPSignificance Determination Process

SOCS tation Ownership Committee