IR 05000506/2007022
| ML20203N996 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, 05000506  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1986 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203N990 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-85-099, EA-85-99, NUDOCS 8605060256 | |
| Download: ML20203N996 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )
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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-454 Byron Nuclear Station, Unit 1 ) License No. NPF-37
) EA 85-99 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I
Commonwealth Edison Company, Chicago, Illinois 60690 (licensee) is the holder of License No. NPF-37 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) which authorizes the licensee to operate the Byron Nuclear Station, .
Unit 1, Byron, Illinois in accordance with the conditions specified therei II An inspection of the licensee's activities was conducted May 6 through July 22, 1985. The inspection identified that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty was served upon the licensee by letter dated October 2, 198 The Notice states the nature of the violations, the provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission requirements that the licensee had violated, the aggregate severity level of the violations, and the amount of civil penalty proposed for the violations. An answer dated November 21, 1985 to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil 8605060256 860502 PDR ADOCK 05000454 G PDR
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-2-Penalty was received requesting that the severity level of the violations be reduced or alternatively that the civil penalty be totally mitigate III After consideration of the licensee's reply to the Notice of Violation and arguments for mitigation of the proposed civil penalty, the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, for the ~ reasons set forth in the Appendix to this Order, has determined that the violations identified in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty were properly
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classified at Severity Level III but that the $50,000 civil penalty should be mitigated by 50 percent based on the licensee's extensive corrective actio IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295), and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000) within thirty days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 2055 ._
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V The licensee may, within thirty days of the date of this Order, request a hearing. A request for a hearing shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement. A copy of the hearing request also shall be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 2055 If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of hearin If the licensee fails to request a hearing within thirty days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings and, if payment
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has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collectio In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
(a) whether the licensee violated NRC requirements as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, and (b) whether, on the basis of such violations, this Order should be sustaine FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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- k Ja "sMYT lo , or Of ce of Inspection and Enforcement
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Dated at Jethesda, Maryland, this)Sday of May 198 _ _ _ - , , . _ . -. _
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APPENDIX EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION In its November 21, 1985 response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty for Byron Station Unit I dated October 2, 1985, the licensee admits the violations occurred as stated in the Notice but requests that the NRC consider reclassifying the violations in the aggregate from Severity Level III to Severity Level IV or, alternatively, if the severity level is not changed, the proposed penalty shculd be reduced by 100 percent because the licensee meets the criteria for mitigation as described in Section V.B. of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. During a management meeting in the NRC Region III office on December 23, 1985, the Commonwealth Edison Company staff stated they believed the violations should be classified under Supplement IV rather than Supplement Provided below are a summary of the licensee's response in support of its request and the NRC's evaluation of the licensee's respons LICE.'4SEE'S ASSERTION THAT THE INCORRECT SUPPLEMENT WAS CITED The licensee stated the violations described in the Notice were incorrectly classified under Supplement I of the Enforcement Policy and should have been classified under Supplement IV since all the violations related to radiologica safety problem NRC RESPONSE The NRC staff has reviewed this matter and agrees with the licensee that the violations described in the Notice are more properly classified under Supplement IV of the Enforcement Polic LICENSEE'S ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCTION OF SEVERITY LEVEL The licensee admits the violations did occur as stated in the Notice; however, e
it does not believe the violations were properly categorized as a Severity Level III problem collectively or in any other manner. The licensee contends that when the incidents occurred the radiation protection program performed its function of protecting many other workers from overexposures and contamina-tion. Thus, the licensee argues that these incidents do not support a finding that its radiation protection program was unable to perform its intended functio At worst, the licensee insists that its program failed under very limited circumstance In support of this contention, the licensee describes the actions taken by its personnel during the three radiological events. In the first two events, which involved containment entries on April 17 and May 1,1985,(1) a radiation work permit was issued to cover the job, (2) preplanning of containment entry took place and helped to minimize exposure, and (3) personnel entered containment with proper dosimetry that was functional and conservatively set to alarm below administrative levels. In the July 1,1985 event, which involved removing contaminated insulation from a leaking valve, (1) the plant area was properly posted as being contaminated and the source of contamination was known, (2)
contaminated personnel followed policy for exiting a radiation area by surveying themselves, and (3) a radiation occurrence report was generated, which prompted management involvement and resolution of the issu . _ . - - . _ - -
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-2-The licensee concludes that the three events did not result in a system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended function under certain conditions. Further, the licensee argues that none of the exposures which led to the proposed civil penalty, whether taken individually or cumulatively, constituted serious safety events as that term is used for the purpose of a Severity Level III violation. In addition, the licensee insists that none of the exposures were significant, none exceeded regulatory limits, and none presented a substantial potential for exposure in excess of regulatory limit NRC RESPONSE The NRC acknowledges that the licensee took certain actions, as described in the licensee's response, before personnel engaged in activities that resulted in three separate violations of regulatory requirements. However, the NRC staff does not believe that the licensee realized the extent of the problem or took adequate steps to prevent the other events. The NRC staff's evaluation of these events considered a number of points that were absent from the licensee's response but which significantly affected the NRC staff's conclusio In the April 17, 1985 event, a shift foreman (SF), an equipment attendant (EA),
and a radiation-chemistry technician (RCT) entered containment to locate a .
reactor coolant system leak. A Type 11 radiation work permit (RWP) was issued; each individual was assigned an administrative dose limit of 200 mrem and each was provided with an alarming dosimeter set to alarm at 150 mrem. The three individuals made inspections inside containment and exited with the RCT's and SF's dosimeters in an alarm status. Although the SF's dosimeter had alarmed, he and the EA again entered containment to look for a misplaced flashlight without being accompanied by an RCT. None of the three individuals took adequate steps to limit their total radiation doses to no more than 200 mre As a result, all three exceeded the administrative dose limit. The final doses were 260 mrem (SF), 295 mrem (EA), and 254 mrem (RCT). The NRC staff believes this sequence of events demonstrated a failure of Byron plant personnel to follow established radiological safety procedure In the May 1,1985 event, after a detector became stuck during the Unit 1 flux map standup test, the Shift Engineer (SE) initiated a work request to have electrical maintenance (EM) workers enter containment and repair the proble The health physics (HP) foreman completed an emergency RWP without being aware that additional detectors had been removed and that radiation levels in the area where the repairs were to be performed had increased from SmR/hr to 5-7R/h The technical staff and the control room personnel were aware of the new detector positions but they did not convey this information to the SE or HP forema The HP foreman was confused about emergency entry requirements and did not request that radiation-chemistry technicians (RCT) provide continuous surveillance of the ems. Although the HP foreman requested that the RCTs survey containment, the results of the survey were not available to the HP foreman before the ems entered containment. The HP foreman issued alarming dosimeters to the ems but did not instruct them to leave the work area if the
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-3-dosimeters alarmed. The EM foreman was told the dose rate in containment was approximately SmR/hr and he was not aware that additional in-core detectors had been withdrawn. The ems entered containment without RCT coverage and approximately-1 minute later their dosimeters alarmed. However, instead of leaving the area, the ems remained an additional 2-to-3 minutes until their work was complete This sequence of events also demonstrates a failure of Byron plant personnel to properly comunicate and follow established radiological safety procedure The technical staff who repositioned the detectors and significantly increased the hazards did not communicate this to the SE. Neither the SE nor the HP foreman were aware of these changes when ems were directed to enter containment without continuous RCT coverage, without understanding actual dose rates and stay time, and without understanding what to do if a dosimeter should alar In the July 1, 1985 event, a mechanical maintenance crew, consisting of a foreman, an "A" mechanic, and a "B" mechanic, removed insulation from a valve which the work request clearly indicated was leaking radioactive liquid and was causing the surrounding area to become contaminated. Although the foreman knew that the insulation surrounding the leaking valve was probably contaminated and although he had observed a sign that stated " Contact Rad / Chem Before Entry" on the entrance door to the piping penetration area where the repairs were to be performed, the foreman did not request Rad / Chem to evaluate the hazard and did .
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not obtain protective clothing. As a result the "B" mechanic's hands and the "A" mechanic's shoes were contaminate The foreman's failure to contact the Rad / Chem Department when the work request clearly stated the valve was leaking radioactive liquid, the failure to determine dose rates, the failure to obtain protective clothing, and the failure to learn of special radiological precautions to be taken before entering a controlled area also demonstrates a failure to follow established radiological safety procedures. This matter becomes more significant when one considers that after the foreman became aware that personnel had been contaminated, he did not contact Rad / Chem for assistance but instead elected to have mechanics
"A" and "B" decontaminate themselves. It was fortuitous that a passing RCT observed the decontamination efforts and took charg Each of these three events demonstrates (1) a failure of supervisory and other personnel to know and follow established radiological safety procedures, (2) a failure to adequately train personnel, and (3) a failure to ensure that personnel make effective use of the Radiation Safety Departmen In addition, in all three events plant personnel worked in areas with significant radiological hazards and there was the potential for these personnel to receive radiation doses in excess of NRC limits. Although each violation could be classified separately, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, the violations were categorized in the aggregate as a Severity Level III problem to focus on the underlying cause; namely, a lack of adequate control of the radiation safety progra _
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-4-LICENSEE'S ARGUMENTS FOR MITIGATION OF THE CIVIL PENALTY The licensee contends that an adequate basis exists for 100 percent mitigation of the proposed civil penalty. In support of the contention it addresses the five factors contained in Section V.B. of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. The licensee states that it (1) promptly identified and reported the three events described above, (2) took prompt and comprehensive corrective action in response to these incidents, (3) had no previous violations involving the general area of radiation protection, and (4) did not have prior notice of similar events because, although two of the administrative overexposures occurred quite close in time, there was not adequate time to disseminate information before the second incident occurre NRC RESPONSE After reviewing the licensee's response, the NRC staff has concluded that sufficient justification has been provided to allow partial mitigation of the proposed civil penalt In reaching this decision the following factors were considere The licensee reported the May 1 and July 1, 1985 events although not required to do so. However, the NRC does not agree that the licensee took immediate ,
action to correct the problems upon discovery since several weeks passed before corrective action was initiated. Subsequently however, the licensee did take extensive corrective action at the Byron Station and at corporate levels. The corrective action at the Byron Station included radiation protection awareness sessions that involved retraining approximately 1250 persons. The training sessions stressed individual responsibility, use of radiation work permits, use of protective clothing, computing stay times in radiation fields, use of Radiation Occurrence Reports, and use of Personnel Contamination Report Radiation Chemistry Management conducted meetings that addressed the May 1 and July 1,1985 events with station departments and the Radiation Chemistry staf At the corporate level, Nuclear Health Physics conducted an intensive review of Byron Station's radiation protection program during the period July 15-19, 1985. The team was comprised of individuals from Byron as well as other operating plants. The team made 40 broad-scope recommendations for improving the radiation protection program. The licensee has already completed 39 of these recommendation Based on these considerations, the NRC staff has concluded that a 50 percent reduction of the base civil penalty is appropriate. The licensee's prior good performance in the general area of concern when balanced against the occurrence of three radiological events in a period of less than 3 months leads the NRC staff to conclude that no further adjustment of the base civil penalty is appropriat NRC CONCLUSION The licensee has provided a sufficient basis for partial mitigation of the proposed civil penalty. The NRC has determined that a 50 percent reduction in the proposed civil penalty is appropriate in this case. Accordingly, civil penalties in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars are impose _ _
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MAY 0 21986 Commonwealth Edison Company
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