TXX-6642, Part 21 & Final Deficiency Rept CP-87-14 Re Inoperability of Fire Detection Alarm Sys W/O Notifying Responsible Group. Initially Reported on 870520.Personnel Counseled.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) or Part 21

Part 21 & Final Deficiency Rept CP-87-14 Re Inoperability of Fire Detection Alarm Sys W/O Notifying Responsible Group. Initially Reported on 870520.Personnel Counseled.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) or Part 21

ML20237H763
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	08/12/1987
From:	Counsil W, Keeley G TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
REF-PT21-87 CP-87-14, TXX-6642, NUDOCS 8708170348
Download: ML20237H763 (2)

Text

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- - - - - - Log # TXX-6642

== File # 10110 h j 913.1

= = Ref # 10CFR50.55(e) 1UELECTRIC August 12, 1987 wmm c. counsa Executive Vice hesident U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 SYSTEM OPERABILITY DURING TESTING l SDAR: CP-87-14 (FINAL REPORT)

Gentlemen:

On May 20, 1987, we verbally notified your Mr. Ian Barnes of an incident which indicated that administrative controls between Operations and Start-Up personnel were violated. Specifically, fire detection alarm systems were rendered inoperative without proper notification of the specified group vested with the responsibility of implementing and maintaining the fire protection program. Our last interim report, logged TXX-6525, was submitted June 19, 1987.

A review of the events associated with the incident has been conducted to determine the adequacy of the administrative controls established for i coordination between the Start-Up and Operations personnel and whether the i events that took place are reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFR Part 21.

Results of the review indicate that portions of the fire detection alarm panels were disabled by the control room operators to eliminate " nuisance" al arms . The panels, which are not fully operational, are under the control of Start-Up for testing, but when testing is not in progress, are used as an enhancement to the interim fire protection program. These actions occurred at a time when no start-up test engineer was available. Adequate administrative controls existed (TIM-860745 dated May 20,1986) to instruct operators on the appropriate notification responsibilities if it became necessary to disable any fire detection panels, but in this case, these instructions were not followed. We have determined this instance to be an isolated case. However, to preclude reoccurrence of this type of problem, Operations personnel have been reminded of the requirements for notification of Start-Up and Fire Protection personnel when impairments of this kind are necessary.

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TXX-6642 August 12, 1987 Page 2-An engineering evaluation has also been performed to c'etermine if this incident created a substantial safety hazard to the extent that there was a major reductiori in the degree of protection provided to ensure the public health and safety. The evaluation concluded that, due.to the insignificant amount of combustibles in the affected area, there was no major reduction in the degree of protection to the public.

In summary, this specific incident is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and/or 10CFR Part 21 for the following reasons:

1. No deficiency in design or construction (or in administrative controls related to design or construction) existed.

2. There was no major reduction in the degree of safety to the public.

Records supporting this conclusion are available for your inspectors to review at the CPSES project site.

Very truly yours, S Ghd4 W. G. Counsil By: - '

G. S. Keeley f/f Manager, Nuclear b ang '

JCH/mgt i c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV l Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3) l

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