TXX-6381, Final Deficiency Rept CP-77-D Re Operation of Safeguard Actuation Reset Circuitry.Initially Reported on 770920. Operating Procedures ICI-4013A & ICI-4014A Revised & in Review Prior to Issuance.Procedures Expected by 870930

Final Deficiency Rept CP-77-D Re Operation of Safeguard Actuation Reset Circuitry.Initially Reported on 770920. Operating Procedures ICI-4013A & ICI-4014A Revised & in Review Prior to Issuance.Procedures Expected by 870930

ML20214U756
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	06/05/1987
From:	Counsil W TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
CP-77-D, IEB-77-02, IEB-77-03, IEB-77-2, IEB-77-3, TXX-6381, NUDOCS 8706110324
Download: ML20214U756 (2)

Text

a

. M,. Log # TXX-6381

="- --. File #10110 1 .~" 907.3

= = Ref: 10CFR50.55(e) 118 ELECTRIC m,, g June 5, 1987 L are wne i k r hemkm U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 OPERATION OF SAFEGUARD ACTUATION RESET CIRCUITRY (IEB 77-03)

SDAR: CP-77-D (FINAL REPORT)

Gentlemen:

Our letter, logged TXX-2481 and dated September 20, 1977, was concerned with Westinghouse AR Relays with latch attachments (Ref. IE Bulletin No. 77-02, your letter dated September 12,1977) and on-line testing of Westinghouse Solid State Protection System (Ref. IE Bulletin No. 77-03, your letter dated September 12,1977). This was a reportable issue per 10CFR50.55(e).

Both bulletins were concerned with Westinghouse AR Relays. Bulletin IE 77-02 reported a design deficiency for certain types of Westinghouse AR Latching Relays and was a hardware problem. Bulletin IE 77-03 was a software problem, identifying modifications to on-line test procedures for the Westinghouse Solid State Protection System (WSSPS), which had to be made in order to detect contact closure failure of the Westinghouse AR Relay which would not normally be detectable by any other means.

In our letter to you we inadvertently concluded that the second bulletin (IE 77-03) covered changes which had to be made to operating procedures only if the relays covered by the first bulletin (IE 77 02) were utilized at the plant. We therefore advised that "since we will be receiving only corrected equipment, this augmented testing is not applicable".

After further review, we have concluded that the modification to the procedure is necessary to periodically com)1etely test the safeguard actuation reset circuitry. Should any part of t1e circuit (including any relay) being tested by the modification fail, safety injection could not normally be reset and/or blocked to allow initiation of recirculation.

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TXX-6381 Jun3 5, 1987 Page 2 of 2 Although this issue is not being tracked as an open item by the Commission (See NRC IR 50 445/84-22, 50-446/84-07), we wish to inform you that the correctiveactionisbeingimplemented. Operating procedures (TCI-4013A &

ICI-4014A Unit 1 Train "A and Train "B", respectively) have been revised and are in review prior to being issued. The Unit 1 procedures will be issued by September 30, 1987. After Unit 1 procedures are issued, similar modifications will be incorporated for Unit 2 procedures and they will be issued by June 30, 1988.

Very truly yours, l'A W. G. Counsil JCH/mlh c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV ResidentInspectors,CPSES(3 copies)