RBG-18701, Attachment of Final Deficiency Rept DR-138 Re ITE-Gould Type 2150 Overload Relays Out of Calibr.Relays Sent Back & Replaced w/L10 Overload Relays.Response to Request for Addl Info Re Surry & North Anna SPDS Encl

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Attachment of Final Deficiency Rept DR-138 Re ITE-Gould Type 2150 Overload Relays Out of Calibr.Relays Sent Back & Replaced w/L10 Overload Relays.Response to Request for Addl Info Re Surry & North Anna SPDS Encl
ML20129B006
Person / Time
Site: Surry, North Anna, River Bend, 05000000
Issue date: 08/20/1984
From:
GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20129A998 List:
References
FOIA-85-87 DR-138, RBG-18701, NUDOCS 8506050069
Download: ML20129B006 (5)


Text

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o ATTACHMENT August 20,' 1984 RBG- /f?#/

DR-138 Could Type 2150

, Overload Relays Background and Description of the Problem The problem involves 1TE-Could Type 2150 overload relays. Du ring iield testing of Gould Type 2150 overload relays, the Preliminary Test Organization (PTO) found the overloads out of calibration.

Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N5D) No. 4135 was written to identify and correct the condition pertaining to the motor overload problem. When Gould was contacted, it was discovered that Gould's factory test equipment was also out of calibration.

After recalibration by"Gculd, PTO still found that overloads were trippin5 out of range. To resolve this problem, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) personnel went to Gould's facilities to witness-testing as noted in Trip Report No. C-RBS-T-00512. After ..

extensive testing, it was concluded that type 250 overload relays are far more sensitive to ambient temperature conditions than the manufacturer's published ambient temperature conditions than the manufacturer's published ambient correction factor curves indicated.

Safety Implications . . -

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The problem with the type 2150 overload relays required extensive - -

evaluation, testing, and eventual replacement of..the. type 2150 relays. m. -

with L.10. overload relays. The type 2150 relays did not operate in _

accordance'with the performance specifications. Had this problem .

remained uncorrected Class IE 480-V motors and motor-operated valves -

g. (MOVs) would potentially,not trip and alarm at 125 percent to 140 lij n$-

percent as required by SWEC . This could result in damage to the motor g or MOV, consequently jeopardizing the safe shutdown of the plant.

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{ogective Action -

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gkom As corrective action, the type 2150 overload relays were sent back

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'O m to Could for recalibration.

s SEs uso No. 4366 and enssneering and Design Coordination Repore (ssDcR) 4 ..

N "" No. P-21,142A were written to correct the problem and prevent its .

recurrence by replacing all type 2150 overload relays with L10 overload -

relays. In addition, new selection criteria for selecting motor ..

overload heaters were developed in E6DCR No. P-21,256 to revise Appendix c /M.-

F of Specification No. 248.00, installation specificationNuclear Docume'ni ConfrIlbI.

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O REQUEST F08 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l V .

CONCERNING THE - )

SURRY 1 AND 2 AND NORTH ANNA 1 AND 2 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM ,

i Each operating reactor shall be provided with a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The Commission approved requirements for an SPDS are defined in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. In the Regional workshops on Generic Letter ,

82-33 held during March 1983, the NRC discussed these requirements and the staff's review of the SPDS.

Prompt implementation of the SPDS in operating reactors is a design goal of prime importance. The staff's review of SPDS documentation for operating reactors called for in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 is designed to avoid delays l' resulting from the time required for NRC staff review. The NRC staff will not review operating reactor SPDS designs for compliance with the .

requirements of Supplement 1 of NUREG-0737 prior to implementation unless a pre-implementation review has been specifically requested by licensees. The  !

licensee's Safety Analysis and SPDS Implementation Plan will be reviewed by the NRC staff only to determine if a serious safety question is posed or if in The NRC staff review to accomplish O the thisanalysis is seriously will be directed at (a) adequate.

confirming the adequacy of the parameters selected to be displayed to detect critical safety functions, (b) confirming that means are provided to assure that the data displayed are valid, (c)

,confinning that the' licensee has consnitted to a human factors program to ensure that thesodisplayed comprehended information as not to mislead the operator,can be readily(perceived and andd) confirming tha SPDS will be suitably isolated from electrical and electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are used in safety systems. If, based on this review, the staff identified a serious safety question or seriously inadequate analysis, the Director of IE or the Director of NRR may require or direct the licensee to cease implementation.

The staff reviewed the SPDS safety analysis provided by Virginia Electric &

Power Co. (Reference 1). The staff was unable to complete its evaluation because of insufficient information. The following additional information is required to continue and complete the SPDS evaluation:

- ISOLATION DEVICES

a. For each type of device used to accomplish electrical isolation, describe the specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application (s). This description should include elementary diagrams when necessary to indicate the test configuration and how the maximum credible faults were applied to the devices, b.- Data to verify that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were the maximum voltage / current to which the device ,

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. ..2-could be exposed, and define how the maximum voltage / current was j detennined.

Lc. Data to verify that the maximum credible fault was applied to j the output of the device in the transverse mode (between signal and return) and other faults were considered (i.e., open and short circuits).

d. Define the pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.
e. Provide a comitment that the isolation devices comply with the environmental qualifications (10 CFR 50.49) and with the seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing.
f. Provide a description of the measures taken to protect the safety systems from electrical interference (i.e., Electrostatic Coupling, EMI, Comon Mode and Crosstalk) that may be generated by the SPDS.

- HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM Provide a descrip' tion of the display system, its human factored design, and the methods used and results from a human factors program to ensure that the displayed infonnation can be readily perceived and comprehended so as not to mislead the operator.

- DATA VALIDATION Describe the specific methods used to validate data displayed in the SPDS. Also describe how invalid data is defined to the operator.

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REFERENCE Letter from W. L. Stewart (VEPCO) to H. R. Denton (NRC) dated February 8,.

1984,with. enclosure.

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Heading n thia line below chould het (one hesdirg to o p:g])

Encunsuu3 - 1 '

FUI A iM.85 -87 RELEASABLE, EXEMPT. WITIIHOLD IN PART. OBTAIN FROM OI:llQ, RELEASABILITY DETERMINATION BY OTilER OFFICES RELEASABLE DOCUMENT 10 CFR

9.5 DESCRIPTION

(i.e.,siuhject line or EXIGIPTinN NO. IF EXEftPT &

DATE OF REASON, OR At:t:ESSitMafio.IN PDM IMM;UNENT ORICINATOR RECIPIENT report title and number (n), no. of pageu August 20 Gulf States U.S. NRC Attachment to Gulf States letter to NRC dated Releasable 1984 Utilities 8/20/84;

Subject:

DR-138 Gould Type 2150 Overload R,elays (lpg)

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REMARKS: -

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