ML18152B411

LER 99-003-00:on 990331,potential Loss of Charging Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Main CR Fire.Station Deviation Was Issued on 990331.With 990428 Ltr

ML18152B411
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	04/28/1999
From:	Grecheck E VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
99-203, LER-99-003-01, LER-99-3-1, NUDOCS 9905050111
Download: ML18152B411 (7)

Text

e e 10CFR50.73 Virginia Electric And Power Company Surry Power Station 5570 Hog Island Road Surry, Virginia 23883 April 28, 1999 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 99-203 Attention: Document Control Desk *sPS:CGL Washington, D. C. 20555 Docket No.: 50-280 50-281 License No.: DPR-32 DPR-37

Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

/

Report No. 50-280, 50-281/1999-003-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours,

~~

E. S. Grecheck Site Vice President Enclosure Commitments contained ii') this letter: None.

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr: R. A. Musser NRG Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station

' . J 9905050111 990428 ~ \

PDR ADOCK 05000280 S PDR

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 (6-1998) EXPIRES 06/30/2001 Estimaled burden per response to comply with this mandatory informalion collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back lo industry.

Forward comments regarding burden estimate lo the Records LICENSEE !;VENT REPORT (LER) Management Branch'(T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Papel"NOrk Reduction Project (3150-0104). Office ot Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) 0MB control number. the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information.collection.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE(3)

SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 1 05000 - 280 1 OF5 TITLE (4)

Potential Loss of Charging Pumps Due to Main Control Room Fire I EVENT DATE (5) II LER NUMBER (6) I REPORT DATE (7) I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) I SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000-281 FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER 03 31 99 1999 -- 003 -- 00 04 28 99 05000-OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9) N 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2}(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

..... ER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) X 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x)

(10) 10 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) or in NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME E. S. Grecheck, Site Vice President I ( ; ; ; ; N ; ; ; : ; ~ ; l ; e Area Code)

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIX TO EPIX N/A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

IX I NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

As part of the ongoing Configuration Management Project's integrated review of fire protection and in conjunction with review of recent industry operating experience events, it was determined that the potential to- lose the charging/high head safety injection pumps in the event of an Appendix R main control room fire existed at Surry Power Station. The Surry procedure for the main control room fire, as written at the time of the reviews, was inadequate. The procedure did not include specific direction to ensure that charging/high head safety injection

_suction alignment and control was established and maintained in a time frame to minimize the possibility of volume control tank depletion and potential loss of the charging pumps. These circumstances placed the station outside its Appendix R design basis for both units in that the potential loss of charging/high head safety injection pumps could result in the inability to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition in the event of an Appendix R MCR fire. This situation resulted in no safety consequences or implications and is being reported pursuantto 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(C).

e e NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 (6-1998) EXPIRES 06/30/2001 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into lhe licensing process and fed back to industry.

Forward comments regarding burden estimate lo the Records LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Management Branch (T -6 F33). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) OMS control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required lo respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

SURRY POWER STATION , Unit 1 05000 - 280 1 OF5 TITLE (4)

Potential Loss of Charqinq Pumps Due to Main Control Room Fire I EVENT DATE (5) I LER NUMBER (6} I REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000-281 FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER 03 31 99 1999 -- 003 -- 00 05000-RATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

. MODE (9) N 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) X 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 100 7, 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) or in NRG Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME I (;;;)N;~u;:;~;l~de Area Code)

E. S. Grecheek, Site Vice President COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX TO EPIX N/A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES X INO SUBMISSION DATE (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 si!lgle-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

As part of the ongoing Configuration Management Project's integrated review of fire protection and in conjunction with review of recent industry operating experience events, it was determined that the potential to lose the charging/high head safety injection pumps in the event .

of an Appendix R main control room fire existed at Surry Power Station. The Surry procedure for the main control room fire, as written at the time of the reviews, was inadequate. The procedure did not include specific direction to ensure that charging/high head safety injection suction alignment and control was established and maintained in a time frame to minimize the possibility of volume control tank depletion and potential loss of the charging pumps. These circumstances placed the station outside its Appendix R design basis for both units in that the potential loss of charging/high head safety injection pumps could result in the inability to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition in the event of an Appendix R MCR fire. This situation resulted in no safety consequences or implications and is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.7~(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(C).

e e 0

. *.I 1 NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGUl.:.ATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LEA NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000 - 280 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER Surrv Power Station, Unit 2 05000: 281 1999 --003-- 00 2 of 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

1.0 DESCRIPTION

OF THE EVENT As part of the ongoing Configuration Management Project's integrated review of fire protection and in conjunction with review of recent industry operating experience events, it was determined that the potential to lose the charging/high head safety injection (HHSI) pumps [EIIS: CB/BQ-P] in the event of an Appendix R fire existed at Surry Power Station.

Specifically, it was determined that a postulated main control room (MCR) fire could result in the loss of both units' charging/HHS! pumps due to depletion of the volume control tank (VCT) [EIIS: CB-TK] and could render the charging cross-connect ineffective. The recent reviews revealed that the timeliness of manually aligning the charging/HHS! pump suction from the VCT to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) [EIIS: BQ-TK] in order to protect the pumps is critical.

In response to a fire in the Surry MCR, a fire contingency action (FCA) procedure directs several actions to be completed on both units prior to MCR evacuation; these actions included tripping the reactor, tripping the turbine, and stopping the reactor coolant pumps.

The MCR fire FCA, as written at the time of these reviews, included the following actions.

Subsequent to MCR evacuation, remote unit operation is established from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP), located in the Emergency Switchgea_r Room. From the ASP, letdown flow was isolated to conserve reactor coolant system inventory and charging flow was controlled manually by flow control valves (FCVs) [EIIS: CB-FCV]. Because*the control of the FCVs may not be available due to fire damage or loss of instrument air, they are not credited in the analysis of an Appendix R MCR fire. Subsequently in the FCA for the MCR fire, operation of at least one charging/HHS! pump was verified and then verification of alignment to the RWST was performed. The control circuits _for the motor operated isolation valves [EIIS: CB/BQ-ISV] in the charging/HHS! pump suction lines from the VCT and the RWST are routed through the MCR and are not fire protected.

Therefore, the fire may render these valves inoperable. In addition, the automatic swap-over from the VCT to the RWST may not be available. Depletion of the VCT, loss of charging/HHS! pump suction, and potential loss of both units' charging/HHS! pumps could result. Therefore, the charging cross-connect between Units 1 and 2 could also become ineffective.

The FCA for the MCR fire was inadequate in that it did not include specific direction to ensure that charging/HHS! suction alignment and control was established and maintained in a time frame to minimize depletion of the VCT and potential loss of the charging/HHS!

pumps. These circumstances place the station outside its Appendix R design basis for both units in that the potential loss of charging/HHS! pumps could result in the inability to achieve .and maintain a safe shutdown condition in the event of an Appendix R MCR fire.

With Units 1 and 2 operating at 100% and 76% power, respectively, a non-emergency one-hour report to the NRC was completed at 1947 hours0.0225 days <br />0.541 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.408335e-4 months <br /> on March 31, 1999 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1 )(ii)(B) for a condition outside the (Appendix R) design basis of the plant and 10CFR50.72(b)(1 )(ii)(C) for a condition not covered by the

e e

-~ NRG FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGU~TORY COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEEEVENTREPORT (LE~

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000 - 280 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000: 281 1999 --003-- 00 3 of 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A) (17)

1.0 DESCRIPTION

OF THE EVENT (continued) operating and emergency procedures. Similarly, this report is being submitted pursuant to 1OC FRSO. 73( a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10CFRSO. 73( a)(2) (ii) (C).

2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS It is considered highly unlikely that a fire in the MCR would result in the loss of the charging pumps, based on the following considerations:

• The MCR is continuously manned by a staff whose primary function is to operate the plant safely and to observe any abnormal conditions. Many members of the Operations staff are trained as fire brigade members, and the required minimum fire brigade staffing is onsite at all times. *

• Based on a 37-minute fire loading, a fire iri the MCR fire area would be of moderate duration, as defined in the Appendix R Report.

• Fire/smoke detectors and wall-mounted fire extinguishers are located throughout the MCR fire area.

• Loss of both units' automatic function of swap-over from the VCT to the. RWST due to a MCR fire is considered unlikely because the controls for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are physically separated in the MCR. Only one charging/HHS! pump is n*eeded to achieve a safe shutdown condition ori both units considering the charging cross-connection between the Units 1 and 2 Chemical and Volume Control .Systems.

• In view of the MCR and fire brigade staffing, fire/smoke detection, fire loading, physical separation, and accessibility of fire extinguishers, a MCR fire would be detected- and suppressed by the fire brigade in a timely fashion.

• Given these considerations and the fact that a MCR fire, resulting in the loss of the charging/HHS! pumps did not occur, this situation resulted in no significant safety consequences or implications, and the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time.

3.0 CAUSE The cause for this situation is believed to be an incor:nplete understanding of the time sensitivity of actions required to avoid the potential loss of the charging/HHS! pumps as a

e e NRG FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LEA NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000 - 280 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000 ~ 281 1999 --003-- 00 4 of 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A} (17) 3.0 CAUSE (continued) result of an Appendix R MCR fire. This incomplete understanding resulted in the development of procedures that did not include specific direction to ensure that charging/HHS I suction alignment and control was established .and maintained in a time frame to minimize the possibility of VCT depletion and potential loss of the charging/HHS!

pumps.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

Upon identification that potential loss of the charging/high head safety injection pumps in the event of an Appendix R fire applied to Surry, a station deviation was issued on March 31, 1999. As a result of the station deviation, the administrative procedure for the Fire Protection Program at Surry was reviewed. This procedure includes definition of standard compensatory measures to be taken if identified alternate shutdown equipment is not operable. For an inoperable charging/HHS! pump, the standard compensatory measure is to implement an hourly fire watch within 14 days. Although no equipment had been declared inoperable relative to the station deviation, a 14-day administrative clock t<?

establish a fire watch was conservatively entered at 1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br /> on March 31, 1999.

A non-emergency one-hour report to the NRC was completed at 1947 hours0.0225 days <br />0.541 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.408335e-4 months <br /> on.

March 31, 1999 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)91)(ii)(C).

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The FCA for the MCR fire was revised on April 1, 1999 to ensure that at least one charging/HHS! pump on each unit is maintained in a condition to operate in the event of a MCR fire. The specific procedural revisions included additional actions to protect the non-running charging/HHS! pumps (by placing them in "pull-to-lock" in the MCR prior to evacuation and upon arrival at the ASP) until alignment of the charging/HHS! pump suction from the VCT to the RWST is verified.

The 14-day administrative clock to establish a fire watch was exited upon implementation of the revised FCA for the MCR fire. Prior to implementation, Operations personnel were advised of the FCA revisions during shift briefings.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE No further action is required to prevent recurrence of these circumstances, which are

e e NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR. REGULATORY

. COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000 - 280 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000: 281 1999 --003-- 00 5 of 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE (continued) believed to be an isolated case. Completion of the ongoing fire protection integrated review will provide assurance that no other similar conditions exist.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS None.

8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER None.

9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION None.