ML20236F905

Forwards Final Rept on Incident Involving CC Drega.Rept Reviewed by Commission Determined Rept Should Be Released to PDR

ML20236F905
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	06/26/1998
From:	Rosano R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Reid D VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP.
References
50-271-97-07, 50-271-97-7, NUDOCS 9807060009
Download: ML20236F905 (7)

Text

n Juna.26, 1998 Mr. Donald A. Reid Senior Vice President, Operations Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

~ RD 5, Box 169 Feny Road

' Brattieboro, Vermont 05301

SUBJECT:

FINAL REPORT ON INCIDENT INVOLVING CARL C. DRfiGA

Dear Mr. Reid:

On September 4,1997, inspection Report 50-271/97-07 was issued to Vermont Yankee (W),

describing a recent reactive inspection of VY's access authorization program. This inspection was prompted by an August 1997 incident in which Carl C. Droga, an individual who had worked i at and had unescorted access to W, shot and killed several people before being killed by police. l

! The inspection concluded that your access authorization program met the applicable regulatory I requirements. I Enclosed is the Final Report on Incident involving Carl C. Drega, including the staff's summary of j programmatic implications of the incident. The Commission reviewed the Report and determined '

that it should be released to the Public Document Room. Since you were one of the licensees whose facilities were inspected due to this incident, a copy of the report is forwarded for your information.

in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Piactice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely, l Original signed.by_ l Richard P. Rosano, Acting Chief :l l ' Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

Enclosure:

As stated

[

cc See next page. '

Distribution: l File Center 1 G. Smith, RI  !

r PDR. T. J. Carter YT 0980136 j PSGB r/f /

. J. Roe .

, D. Matthews l A. Chaffee y R. Rosano DOCUMENT: G:UtOSANOCREGA

4. . - . w.: .co - - 2.em ,

..u,,,,.

OFFICE NBCPSGB:DRPM lF l l l

_NAME- RPRosano F DATE 06/a6/98 06/ /98 06/ /98

- _. y 9907060009 990626 E l;aa = a==ggi -

% C@r

O. Reid V:rmont Ycnkse Nucirr Power St: tion cc: -

Regional Administrator, Region i Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Corporation 475 Allendale Road .

185 Old Ferry Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Brattleboro,VT 05301 Mr. David R. Lewis Resident inspector Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station 2300 N Street, N.W. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20037-1128 P.O. Box 176 Vemon, VT 05354 Mr. Richard P. Sedano, Commissioner.

. Vermont Department of Public Service Mr. Peter LaPorte, Director  ;

120 State Street,3rd Floor ATTN: James Muckerheide i Montpelier,VT 05602 Massachusetts Emergency Management l

l Agency l Pubhc Service Board 400 Worcester Rd.

State of Vermont P.O. Box 1496 120 State Street Framingham, MA 01701-0317 l Montpelier, VT 05602 .

I Jonathan M. Block, Esq.

Chairman, Board of Selectmen Main Street

- Town of Vemon P. O. Box 566 i P.O. Box 116 Putney, VT 05346-0566  !

Vemon, VT 05354-0116 j

. Mr. Michael J. Daley i l Mr. Richard E. McCullough Trustee and Legislative Representative i

Operstmg Experience Coordinator New England Coalition on Nuclear Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Pollution, Inc.

P.O. Box 157 Box 545 Govemor Hunt Road Brattleboro, VT 05301 Vemon, VT 05354 G. Dana Bisbee, Esq.

Deputy Attomey General 33 Capitol Street

- Concord, NH 03301-6g37 Chief, Safety Unit Office of the Attomey General l

One Ashburton Place,19th Floor l

~ Boston, MA 02108 Ms. Deborah B. Katz Box 83 Shellbume Falls, MA 01370 Mr. Raymond N. McCand'ess Vermont Division of occupational and Radiological Health Administration Building Montpelier,VT 05602 Mr. Gautam Sen Licensing Manager l

i

.s Final Report on incident involvina Carf C. Drena

1. Overview .

On August 19,19g7, Carl C. Droga was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. Droga was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement officers.'

When it was discovered that Droga had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee (1992 and 1995), Pilgrim (19g7), and Indian Point 3 (19g7) as a temporary employee, NRC dispatched an inspection team composed of a senior inspector from Region I and a senior program manager from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's (NRR's) Safeguards Branch (PSGB),~ Division of Reactor Program Management, assisted by an investigator from the Office of investigations' (Ol's) Mald Office in Region 1.2 The objective of the visits was to determine through inspection, interviews, and records checks whether (a) the licensees' access authorization programs were property implemented and administered, (b) the licensees' access control equipment was properly installed and operated and the appropriate procedures were implemented, (c) the licensees' fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs were property implemented and administered, and (d) the licensees conducted adequate background investigations of Droga, considered the information developed during that investigation, and acted property in granting

(- him unescorted access.

The inspections did not identify violations of regulations or licensee commitments with respect to the access authorization programs, access control equipment, or FFD programs. Furthermore, the inspectors concluded through interviews and records checks that the individual had not l exhibited aberrant behavior that would have warranted a denial of unescorted access o authorization by any of the three licensees for which he worked.

l' Following review of the inspection findings, PSGB initiated a study of the potential programmatic i

implications of the incident. Specifically, in light of the finding that there were no violations, the '

staff considered the two programmatic components of access control, that is, access

! authorization and entry controls, to determine whether additional requirements might reduce the I i

' in early reports of the investigation into this matter, comments made concoming the possibility that Droga had been stockpiling explosives, or components usefulin constructing explosives, at his house. In a search of his residence, bomb-making materials were found.

t-According to comments made to NRC's Office of investigations Field Office in Region I, the l Federal Bureau of investigation did not find any indication of what Droga had planned to do with

! the explosive devices.

2 i During the inspection effort, it was reported that Droga had worked at Seabrook. The inspectors determined that although Droga had applied for employment at Seabrook, he was asked to leave the property and was ultimately not hired after he attempted to live in his trailer on company grounds. The licensee did conclude, however, after completing the access authorization process that it had begun, that Droga would have been granted authorization for unescorted access at Seabrook but for the incident involving living in his trailer on company grounds.

ENCLOSURE

2 likelihood that a person who might pose a threat to the public health and safety could gain unescorted access to licensed facilities.

11. Reculatory Basis Since Droga worked as a temporary employee, the regulations concoming granting of unescorted access authorization to temporary employees were examined. Regulations in 10 CFR 73.56(c)(2) allow licensees' access authorization programs to specify conditions for -

permitting temporary access. Regulatory Guide 5.66 (RG), Section B, irns,ryer.ies the

. guidelines for temporary access in the appended NUMARC 89 01, Tsuidelines for Access Authorization Programs," to which all commercial power reactor licensees have committed, as discussed in Section Ill.B.2, below.

Ill. EjD$DRE inspections 'were conducted at the three facilities at which Droga worked: Vermont Yankee (inspection Report [lR] 50-271/9707, August 26,1997), Pilgrim (IR 50-293/9709, Augast 27-28, l 1997), and Indian Point 3 (IR 50 298/9708, August 29.19g7). With respect to licensee commitments at each site, the inspection team -

reviewed the access authorization program commitments and procedures, 1 tested the access control eqt.if,,T. eat (metals and explosives detectors, x-ray machines) reviewed the FFD and behavioral observation programs and procedures, and af ied the training program records for supervisors (to ensure that required FFD and t@eavioral observation training had been conducted).

With respect to Droga, the inspechon team - I interviewed his former supervisors and co-workers, ,

reviewed the licensees' records of background screening conducted before granting unescorted access authorization to Droga, and

_ reviewed Droga's general employee training records and FFD chemical testing records.

A. Inspection and Compliance issues

1. Access Authorization Program The inspectors examined components of the licensees' access authorization programs, including procedures for background screening, psychological evaluation, processing of criminal historyinformation, and decia.iearreking. Special attention was paid to the processing of Droga's application for unescorted access authorization. No violations were found in the implementation of the access authorization programs at the three licensed facilities at which Droga had been employed.

~ 2. Access Control Equipment and Procedures The inspectors reviewed the licensees' installation instructions, operating procedures, and testing procedures for access control equipment in place at the primary access

3 portals through which personnel are processed onto the site. Security force members were interviewed and observed carrying out tests of the equipment. The inspectors l found no violations in the installation or operation of the access control equipment and l found adequate testing procedures and schedules of testing at each of the licensed +

facilities at which Droga had been employed.

t l 3. Fitness-for-Duty Program l The inspectors reviewed procedures for chemical testing and also reviewed general l employee and supervisory training for fitness for duty. Special attention was paid to l

Droga's experience (for general employee training) and to his supervisors (for supervisory training). The inspectors found no violations in the implementation or management of the FFD programs or in the conduct of training at the three licensed facildies at which Droga had been employed.

4. Granting of Unescorted Access Authonzation in reviewing the information found by the licensees in conducting background screening for Droga, the inspectors did not find sufficient reason to expect a licensee to deny unescorted access for him. Furthermore, after reviewing records of Droga's performance and interviewing his supervisors, the inspMors concluded that there was no basis for a licensee to revoke Droga's unescorted access authorization.

B. Programmaticissues

! 1

1. Current Requirements '

Current NRC requirements would not have prevented Droga from gaining authorization for unescorted access. This conclusion is bome out by the fact that licensees that complied with their commitments and the NRC's expectations concoming the granting of access authorization appear to have had an adequate basis to grant Droga unescorted access. 1 L

The decision to grant unescorted access is intertwined with the decision to employ an -  !

individual. Consequently, the NRC has established no disqualifying criteria for )

licensees to use in decidmg whether to grant unescorted access and expects the licensees to rely on required information in making their own decisions. .The staff is satisfied that the three licensees did what would be expected and complied with current ,

requirements and commitments in their physical security plans. The staff is also I satisfied that the licensees made reasonable decisions in deciding to grant Droga l unescorted access, considering du information available to the licensees when the decisions were made.

2.' New Requirements The staff considered whether additional background checks would provide a higher

. levei of assurance as to an individual's integrity, such as contacts with local law enforcement, review of driving records, and telephone interviews with the applicant's A

r

_mm___. m._m._ ___ _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - -

4 neighbors or associates. These additional checks could uncover personal data not found in more formal records (such as employment records, psychological evaluations, 1 and existing criminal records) and could provide the hiring licensee with new tools for evaluating personal traits and judging the appropriateness of granting unescorted access to an individual. The staff decided that such additional checks would require the expenditure of additional resources by the licensees with no resulting quantifiable increase in assurance concoming the individual's integrity. The staff also determined that licensees might face complex legal challenges in using such information to deny access, an action that, in practical terms, would effectively deny employment.

Therefore, requiring such additional checks would not be appropriate at this time.

The staff also considered whether the conditions for grantir'g femporary unescorted access should be changed. The granting of temporary access, that is, authorization for i

unescorted access before a complete background investigation is completed, carries with it certain implied risks. However, licensees experience periodic fluctuations in site populatiori, including large-and short-term-increases in the site workforce during outages that necessitate quick tumaround in granting access, a need that is satisfied by the granting of temporary access by the licensees to the new hires. NUMARC 89-01, the appendix to RG 5.66, states that temporary access authorization will be based on (a) verification of identity, (b) psychological evaluation, (c) credit check, (d) one developed reference, (e) the initiation of a criminal history check, and (f) a check of the applicant's employment history for the past year. When the licensee has completed those steps and considered the information obtained, it may grant temporary authorization for unescorted access to the applicant for not more than 180 days pending completion of the checks required by the access authorization program.

The staff met with Nuclear Energy institute officials to discuss the Personnel Access Data System (PADS), a computer-based system for recording background information on employees who have worked with temporary access authorization at one or more nuclear power facilities. PADS provides a corps of" pre-approved" nuclear employees whose unescorted access authorization can be granted by successive licensee employers who subscribe to PADS and who access it for a record of the applicant's history in the industry. This systerr,, when it is fully operational and reaches 100 percent subscription by the nuclear power industry, could provide substantial savings in time and money in the access authorization program, as we!! as an increase in the overall assurance that temporary employees are trustworthy and reliable.

Considering the progress being made to implement PADS, the staff recommends no changes to the agency's approach to grants of temporary unescorted access at this time, if PADS does not reach full subscription, if future incidents in temporary access warrant, or if conditions in the industry's application of access authorization change, the staff will reconsider this position and determine whether new requirements are necessary.

IV. Recommendations A. Current Requirements ,

. d

! l 5

The staff recommends no changes to current requirements at this time.

B. New Requirements The staff recommends no new requirements at this time.

e l

l l

i-i e

l I

l-