ML20235J247
| ML20235J247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1987 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235J246 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-87-19, 50-389-87-18, NUDOCS 8710010366 | |
| Download: ML20235J247 (31) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1987019
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' UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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REGION 11
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' 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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SEP 2 51987
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Report Nos.: 50-335/87-19 and 50-389/87-18
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Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
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9250 West Flagler Street-
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Miami..FL 33101
Docket Nos: 50-335 and 50-389
License Nos:
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Facility Name: St. Lucie
Inspection conducted. Au ust 25-September 4, 1987
Inspector:
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D6te S'igned-
A. L. Cunningham
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Accompanying Personnel:
G. W. Bethke
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D. R. Brewer
C.. R. Bryan
W. W. Stansberry
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-K.D/ Testa.
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Approved by:-
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T. R. Decker, Chief
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Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
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Division of Radiation Safety
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and Safeguards
SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual
radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results:
No violations or deviations were' identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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- J. W. Dickey, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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- J. S. Odom, Site Vice President - Plant Turkey Point
- G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager
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- J. B. Harper, Superintendent of Quality Assurance
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- J. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
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- J. J. Maisler, Emergency Planning Manager
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- G. Casto, Emergency Planning
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- R. Sipos, Services Manager
- S. Shaw, Communications Supervisor
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- L. J. Snipes, Communications Manager
- H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics
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- R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- C. L. Wilson, Department Head, Mechanical Maintenance
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- J. K. Hays, Director - Nuclear Licensing
- E. Beurrier, Health Physics Supervisor
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- C, Ward, Site Emergency Coordinator
A. W. Taylor, Emergency Planning Technician (Turkey Point Plant)-
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craf tsmen,
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engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members;.und
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office personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspector
- H. E. Bibb
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- Attended Exit Interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 27, 1987, with
those persons indicated in the paragraph above.
The inspector described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below.
The exercise weaknesses identified in Paragraphs 8 and 14, below,
were discussed and clarified with the Site Emergency Coordinator. via
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telephone on September 4, 1987. No dissenting comments were received from
the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection..
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Closed) Violation 50-335, 50-389/87-08-01:
Failure to submit Revision 16
of Radiological Emergency Plan to the NRC within 30 days of the effective
date.
Inspection disclosed that the licensee had impismented
administrative measures to preclude untimely issuance of REP Revisions.
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4.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that
provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion
of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and
organizationpursuantto'10CFR50.47(b)(14), Paragraphia.FofAppendixE
to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of
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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in
detail with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no major
scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent
during the exercise. The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from
the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
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The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised
the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient
information to the States, counties, local government and federal agencies
consistent with their participation in the exercise.
The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and
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personnel through 'use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists
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participating in the exercise. The controllers provided adequate guidance
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throughout the exercise.
The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill adequately
exercised the participating groups of. the licensee's organization and
offsite local emergency support agencies.
Both licensee and offsite
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support agencies also demonstrated a significant commitment to training
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and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists
participating in the medical emergency drill. Neither prompting nor undue
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interaction between controllers and players was observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
AssignmentofResponsibility(82301)
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This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that
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adequate staff was available to respond to an energency pursuant to 10 CFR
50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific
guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed that specific energency assignments were made for
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the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff
was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response
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organization was augnented by designated licensee representatives;
however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or
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continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not
required.
Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review
of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number
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of t/ained technical personnel were available for cohtinuous staffing of
the augmented emergency organization, if needed,y
The inspectors also observed act'Sation, staft.hig,iand' operation of'the'
emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations
Support Center (OSC), Emergency 0perations Facility (EOF), and near-site
Emergercy News Center (ENC).
W, e required staffing and assignment of
responsibility at .these' facilities were corisistent with the licensee's
Energency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
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The licensee's onsite emergency'organiNtiob was observed to assure that
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pursuant
to
the
following
requirements
were
10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of. NUREG-0654:
(1)
unambiguous definition of responsibilities for: emergency response; (2)
prqvision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident
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response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite
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and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspectors observed that the initial on ite emergency organization was
adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional
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positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency
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response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift
and available on-shift personnel.
The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed
the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the
simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by
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the Station Manager.
Required interactions between the licensee's
emergency ' response organization end State and local support agencies were
adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
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No violations or deviations were 1Jentified.
7.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
1his area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification
and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee
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pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
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specific guidance prorrJ1 gated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance
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recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
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An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and
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properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe emergency
classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed.
Licensee
actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations donfirmed that the emergency classification system was
effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan
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and Implementing Procedures.
The system was observed to be adequate for
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classification of , the simulated accident sequences..
The ' emergency
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procedures provided for initial .and continuing mitigating actions during
the simulated emergency.
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'No violations or deviations were identified.
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Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observedz to ' assure that' procedures were established for
notification of. State and local response organizations 'and emergency
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial: and follow-up'-
messages to response organizations was establ.ished. ,This area was further
observed to assure. that means to' provide early'. notification to the
populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D , of Appendix E n to.10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and ' procedures were
established and available for use'in providing information regarding the
simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response
organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented ' emergency response
organizations, if required.
Inspection also disclosed.that the. licensee
consistently failed to- implement prompt notification of the State and
counties within the -15-minute time regime following declaration of the
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Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE), Site' Area Emergency, and General
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Emergency.
In the case of the NOUE, delay in notification was traceable
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to the State of Florida's procedural requirement to verify the validity of
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the licensee's notification.
This then required the State to call the
licensee for verification prior to implementing its notification of the
counties and local response agencies.
It was noted'that, although the
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State implements notification of the counties, the . licensee bears -
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responsibility for all notification, including the State, Federal, and -
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county.
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The above finding, and the significant delay in notification of the' Site
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Area Emergency and General Emergency in . excess of 15 minutes, was
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discussed with licensee representatives.during the critique conducted on
August 27, 1987, and the telephone conversation of September 4,-1987. The
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licensee committed to review the subject findings and implement indicated'
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c'orrective actions.
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Exercise Weakness 50-335/87-19-01, 50-389/87-18-01:
Notification of
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emergency classifications within the required 15-minute time regime.
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Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt-
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communications among principal response organizations and emergency
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personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to
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10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of
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The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's
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emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF), the licensee
and offsite response organizations, and the. offsite environmental
monitoring teams and the TSC/ EOF.
The inspectors also observed
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information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency
organization.
Emergency communications and communication systems were
significantly ' improved, and consistent with emergency response
requirements.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. Energency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and
equipnent to support an emergency response were provided and maintained
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pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
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and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
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emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.
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Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise
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included the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support
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Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.
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Control Room - The Unit 2 Control Room was provided for'the exercise
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Shift Supervisor and his staff.
Required communications equipment,
Control Room procedures and documents were readily available.
The
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inspector observed that, following review and analysis of the
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sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted
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promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and
factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
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Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those
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personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective
management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded
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overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for
orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of
their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel
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demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system
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and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and
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declare the proper emergency classification.
The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to consistently
and effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required
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mitigating actions in a timely manner.
It was noted that a detailed
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log of the facility's activities was maintained by the Shift
Supervisor throughout the exercise.
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Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly.
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staffed following notification. by the Emergency Coordinator of. the
simulated ' emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant ~ of their' emergency.
duties; authorities, and responsibilities.
Required operation of the
facility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The TSC.was provided with
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adequate equipment for. support of the assigned staff.
.During operation' of.the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely
monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as
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required.
Status boards and related- visual' aids were strategically..
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located to facilitate viewing ' by the .TSC staff.
Dedicated
communicators were - assigned to : the ' facility.
Notification is -
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discussed in Paragraph 8, above.
Inspection disclosed' the following additional findings, namely:
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(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions
were readily implemented and factored-into problem-solving exercises;.
(2) assumption of duties by the Emergency' Coordinator was definite
and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the
Control Room to the TSC was firmly declared and announced to the TSC
staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent, 'and consistent
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with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions;
(5) accountability, including identifying. missing personnel,. was
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readily implemented within the accepted time regime and ' was
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consistent with the: scope. of the' scenario; (6) TSC Controllers were
effective in identifying minor scenario problems and interacted with
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players without prompting.
The transfer' of authority and specific
responsibilities by the Emergency. Coordinator to .the EOF Recovery
Manager following activation of the EOF was prompt, effective and
consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and implementing
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procedures.
Frequent and effective communications occurred between
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the respective facility managers.
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Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC' was' promptly staffed
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following activation of the emergency plan by the. Emergency
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Coordinator.
An inspector observed that teams were promptly-
assembled, briefed, and dispatched.
A health physics technician-
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accompanied each team.
The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant
of his duties and responsibilities.
During operation.. of this
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facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and
documented.
The OSC Supervisor demonstrated . effective management and- control
practices. -The Coordinator frequently updated his staff .regarding
plant status, and thoroughly briefed each investigation and repair
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team prior to.-their deployment to the accident areas.
It was noted
by the NRC evaluators and licensee observers, however, that the OSC
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public address system was not activated.
No apparent adverse effects
were noted; however, this finding was documented during the
licensee's . Controller / Evaluator Critique for review and corrective
action,
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Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) - The E0F was located
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approximately 10.5 miles west of the plant. ' The facilit- was
adequately equipped and staffed to support the required ruponse to
the simulated emergency.
E0F security was prompty established and was ' included as a routine
requirement for preparation and activation of the facility.
Status
boards and other related visual aids were. strategically located and
were readily accessible for viewing by the EOF staff.
Dedicated'
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communications were assigned to the facility, and all required
notifications were promptly made.
The E0F principal staff freely interacted with State. and county
representatives assigned to the facility.
The subject
representatives were routinely informed of plant status, and were
consistently factored into the the decision-making process addressing
required and proposed protective measures and decisions. Transfer of
authority and responsibilities of the TSC Emergency Coordinator to
the E0F Recovery Manager, attending activation of the facility, was
firm and effective.
The Recovery Manager was updated on the status
of the emergency and was thoroughly briefed on previous and proposed
mitigating actions.
EOF communications with the Control Room, TSC,
and OSC were maintained throughout the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and
equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and
offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
During the exercise, the
engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing
plant status and providing recommendations to the Emergency Director
concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems
and equipment, prevention and/or control of radioactive releases, and
prompt termination of the emergency condition.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant
group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant
based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements.
Offsite-
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radiological monitoring' teams were dispatched to determine the level of
radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radiological effluent data were received in the TSC, where dose
calculations were computed and factored into the exercise. All resultant-
data were consistent with projected scenario. parameters.
Radiological field monitoring teams were neither observed nor evaluated by
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the NRC; however, inspectors assigned to the TSC and EOF observed dose
assessment activities and related coordination and management of field
monitoring teams deployed to identify, monitor, and track offsite
radiological releases.
Accordingly, the licensee demonstrated effective
interaction with State field monitoring teams' and the State . dose
assessment group assigned to the EOF.
Dose assessment and projection
calculations performed by the TSC, E0F, and State throughout the release
period were compared and determined to readily agree within acceptable
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limits.
TSC, E0F, and State Coordinators conducted consistent and
effective command and control of field teams throughout the subject phase
of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines established for
protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and
in place, and whether protective actions for emergency workers, including
evacuation of nonessential personnel, were promptly implemented pursuant
to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654.
The protective measures decision-making process was observed by the
inspectors.
For each emergency classification defined, appropriate
inplant and offsite protective measures were reviewed.
Protective
measures recommendations were consistent with the. current Radiological
Emergency Plan and the scope and objectives of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling
radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented
consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b) guidelin
for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure
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specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout
the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers.
Periodic radiological . surveys were conducted in the emergency response
facilities. _ Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of
emergency actions.
Adequate protective clothing and respiratory
protection was available for use as required.
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Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and
radiation area access appeared adequate.
Health Physics Supervisors were
observed to thoroughly brief. survey, investigative, and repair teams prior
to their deployment into radiation controlled areas.-
Dosimetry was
available and effective.ly used.
High-range dosimeters were also available
and fully used where required.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Public Education and Information (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated
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emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to
10CFR50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of ' Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
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specific criteria promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance.of the
exercise.
The information included details on how the. public would.be
notified and the initial actions which should be taken during an
emergency. A rumor control program was also in place.
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An NRC inspector was assigned to observe and evaluate activation.
staffing, and routine operation of the near-site Emergency News Center
(ENC). The following evaluations were made:
(1) the number of telephones
available to resident press representatives was ' adequate; (2) accurate
information was contained in news releases; (3) periodic press briefings
and related updates were frequent; (4) visiting media personnel were
prohibited from interfering with operation and management of the ENC;
(5) information provided to the public was simply stated and readily
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understandable.
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It was noted, however, that, contrary to Section 4.1 of Procedure 1103
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(Duties of the Emergency Information Manager), the timing and content of
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all news releases were not formally approved by the Emergency Control
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Officer prior to actual release.
Only verbal approval was given by the
subject officer.
Consistent with Section 4.1 of the cited procedure,
approval implies signature or identifiable initials of the cognizant
manager or officer.
Licensee management agreed with this finding as
discussed during the Exit Interview conducted on August 27,-1987, and the-
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telephone conversation initiated by the NRC on September 4,1987, to
clarify and confirm final NRC inspection findings.
The licensee
representative committed to review the subject item and clarify required
approval to indicate formal signature as the sole means of approval of all
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news releases issued from the near-site ENC.
Exercise Weakness 50-335/87-19-02, 50-389/87-18-02:
Failure of ENC
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Emergency Control Officer to properly approve all news releases prior to
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issuance of same to the public.
This item will be reviewed during
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subsequent inspections.
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15.
Recovery Planning (82301)
This
area
was
reviewed
pursuant
to
the
requi rements
in
10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E. to 10 CFR 50, and the
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654.
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The licensee conducted a recovery planning meeting prior to termination of
the exercise.
Licensee planners discussed and established the following:
administrative and logistical support, manpower and engineering services,
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radiological surveillance, development and assignment of a recovery
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organization consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing
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Procedures.
A comprehensive review of reentry plans and status was
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conducted.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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16.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were
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brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective
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action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to
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10 CFR 50, and specific guidance - promulgated in Section II.N of
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The inspectors observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique
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following termination of the exercise.
The subject critique involved a
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detailed discussion and analysis of required improvements, weaknesses, and
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deficiencies identified during the exercise. All findings were documented
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for review and correction.
Positive findings were also discussed and
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recorded for presentation during the formal NRC/ Licensee critique.
The
critique was effectively managed, controlled, and directed to
identification / documentation of substantive findings and indicated
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improvements.
The conduct and content of the cited critiques were
consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17.
Inspector Follow-up (92701)
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a.
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-335/85-15-01:
Need to
send HP and Chemistry procedures implementing Radiological Emergency
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Plan to the NRC in accordance with Appendix E,Section IV of
10 CFR 50.
Inspection disclosed that pertinent health physics and
chemistry procedures and revisions thereof will be routinely
forwarded to the NRC, as required.
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-335/86-IN-98, 50-389/86-IN-98:
Offsite medical
services.
Inspection disclosed that supplemental or backup medical
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services consistent with the subject IE Information Notice have been
provided.
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c.
(Closed) ! IFI - 50-335/86-12-01, 50-389/86-11-01 (Exercise Weakness):
Delegation of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities without' ensuring
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that timely information flow / updates are provided to the recipient.'
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Inspection disclosed that. required transfer 'of responsibilities. from
the Emergency- Coordinator to. the recipient 'was : decisively 1 and '
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effectively implemented and included detailed information updates Las
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. required.
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-d.
.(Closed) IFI 50-335/87-EP-01, 50-389/87-EP-01:
Verify audibility off
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' alarms in high-noise areas (Bulletin 79-18).
The inspector land:a
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cognizant licensee- representative requested the Shift Supervisor-
actuate site alarms as a. routine practice. _ Having located themselves-
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in the maximum noise' area of .the, plant' (plant; cooling water intake'
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pumps), both persons determined that the subject alarms were readily
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18. Federal: Evaluation Team Report-
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The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional; Assistance Committee .
and Federal Emergency Managenent Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the
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activities of offsite' agencies during this exercise will be forwarded'by-
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separate correspondence.
Attachment:
Exercise Scope and Objectives
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OBJECTIVES
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PEOPLE . . . SERVING PEOPLE -
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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
ST. LUCIE PLANT
EVALUAT.ED EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
AUGUST 26,1987
A.
General Objectives
1.
Notification of Emergency Response Personnel
a. Demonstrate the ability to promptly notify and communicate
information to NRC, State and local authorities.
2.
Emergency Response Facilities, Equipment, and Communications
Demonstrate the ability to staff the Technical Support Center (TSC),
a.
the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF), and the Emergency News Center (ENC).
b. Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC,
c. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of
designated emergency response equipment.
d. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of
emergency communication equipment.
3.
Direction and Control
a. Demonstrate the ability of each emergency. response facility manager
to maintain command and control over the emergency response
activities conducted within the facility throughout the exercise.
b. Dernonstrate the ability to gather, assess, and disseminate information
to the public and governmental officials regarding the status of the
emergency conditions and the status of emergency response activities
per regulatory time restraints.
c. Demonstrate the ability to initiate and coordinate emergency response
activities in an efficient and timely manner.
EP3:2 RPTS.
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d. Demonstrate the ability of emergency response personnel to execute
the S t.
Lucie Plant
Radiological Emergency Plan through ~ its
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associated Emergency Plan implementing Procedures.
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4.
Accident Assessment
a. Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room, TSC, and EOF to
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analyze current plant conditions, and their potential consequences, and
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provide recommendations for mitigating actions,
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5.
Radiological Assessment
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a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate on-site, in-plant, and off-site
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radiological monitoring activities.
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b. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the TSC and ' EOF dose
assessment activities.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to . control and coordinate - the . flow of '
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Information regarding off-site radiological consequences between
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radiological assessment personnel stationed at the TSC and the EOF.
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6.
Protective Response
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a. Demonstrate the ability to adequately control radiation exposure to .
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on-site emergency workers.
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b. Demonstrate the ability for the Emergency Coordinator and/or
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Recovery Manager to determine Protective Action Recommendations -
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for the public per regulatory time restraints.
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7. . Training & Exercise
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a. Demonstrate the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness training
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program through the critique of trained participants'in a practical
demonstration.
b. Demonstrate the effectiveness of actions . taken to correct past
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identified weaknesses in the emergency preparedness program.
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c. Demonstrate the ability of participants and controller / evaluators to-
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evaluate and' critique their exercise performance.
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B.
Specific objectives for those activities conducted from the ' Control Room. -
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- Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center.
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Direction and Control
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L a. Demonstrate.the precise and , clear transfer of Emergency. Coordinator :
responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC. ,
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b. - Demonstrate ithe abilliyf of! each/ facility) manager to' periodically:
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inform facility personnel ' f the status of the emergency situation and
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the plant conditions. .
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.c. Demonstrate the ability to timely and. accurately transfer,information1
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between ' emergency response .f acilities.'
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d. Demonstrate.- the- ability? of- the l TSC1 and OSC to coordinate the
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deployment of emergency teams.
2.
' Accident Assessment
a. Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to mAke a timely
-
determination of the probable cause of lthe incident,' and perform
mitigating actions to place ' the affected unit 'in a safe, stableL
- condition.
b. Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to s'upport the Control Room (
efforts to identify the probable cause of .an incident, mi_tigate the
consequences of that incident,'and place the affected unit in a safe, .
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stable condition.
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c Demonstrate . the ' abilit'y' of theE NuclearM Plant LSupervisor Land -
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. Emergency Coordinator to classify an emergency condition. -
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3.
Radiological Assessment
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a. Demonstrate .the ability of the TSC to direct and, OSC _to deploy on-
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site and off-site radiological monitoring teams in a timely manner. ,
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b. Demonstrate the ability.; off the on-site surveyL team 1 personnel to
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efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures: to perform . dose .
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rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples, and other
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prescribed on-site and in-plant radiological monitoring activities. .
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c. Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments and projections-
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on-site ' and ' off-site radiological. conditions' to: . support the;
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formulation of protective action recommendations.-
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d. Demonstrate the: ability ' to assess.1$ formation available Lfrom the -
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containment and effluent high-level radiation monitoring systems and
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respond accordingly.
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EP3:2 RPTS.
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e. Demonstrate the ability to analyze samples drawn from the. in-plant-
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normal and post-accident sampling systems, and assess the. resultant .
data.
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4.
Protective Response
'a. Demonstrate the ability : to ' formulate. and implement' ' on-site
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protective action' measures in a timely manner.
C.
Specific' Objectives for those' Activities Conducted ~ from the Emergency -
Operations Facility and Ernergency News Center.
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Emergency Response Facilities and Communications
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a. Demonstrate real time. activation of. the EOF' from the Juno Beach
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Office and staff in a timely manner.
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b. Demonstrate.that adequate communications exist between ' FPL and-
offsite agency emergency facilities.
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2.
Direction and Control
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a. Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of the responsibility' to
notify offsite agencies, and issue Protective Action Recommendations
from the Emergency Coordinator to the ' Recovery Manager.
3.
Accident Assessment
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a. Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to support the on-site efforts
to identify the cause of an incident, mitigate the consequences of that
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incident, and place the affected unit in a safe, stable condition.
b. Demonstrate as necessary, the abilityito 'obtain vendor and other
outside resources to assist accident analysis and mitigation efforts.
4.
Radiological Assessment
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a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate FPL ' off-sitej radiological
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monitoring activities with those conducted by the State.
b. Demonstrate the ability to perform assessments and projections of
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off-site radiological conditions to support the timely, formulation _of'
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protective action recommendations.
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c. Demonstrate the ability.to' coordinate and compare FPL off-site dose'
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assessment activities with those conducted by the State.'
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d. Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the'. flow of
' information regarding off-site radiological consequences with State
radiological assessment personnel.'
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5.
Protective Response
a. Demonstrate that decisions.can be made in a timely; manner regarding
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protective action recommendations for the geaerai public within the
Plume Exposure (10-mile) Emergency' Planning Zone (EPZ), and can be
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communicated to State and local authorities within regulatory time
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restraints.
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6.
Public Information
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a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the' preparation, review and
release of information with State and local government _ agencies as
appropriate; and provide : accurate, clear and timely . information
releases to the news media.
D.
Specific Portions of the Emergency Response that will not be tested.
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Site evacuation.
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Real time activation of the Emergency News Center.
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3.
Real time response by the Emergency Information Manager.
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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COM*ANY
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TIMELINE ard MINI-SCE2MRIOS
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ST LUCIE EVALUATED ^ EXERCISE
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Revisionc7/07/87
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Unit 2.
.Irii tial? Conditions
The! Unit'hau justLreturned to.;100% powerLfo11owing:
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an uncomplicated l trip. . .(Unit -returned' toipower
on' August ~25 at 10:OO;pm).
.end-of-lif e with120 da9511ef ti l before .
Unit
2 ' is'-near
scheduled ref ueling.
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RCS activi'ty has shown
an increase- sinceEreturning:to-
t
operation.
Initiallactivity[:upon returnfto.powed;was
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4 uci/ml I-131 DEO.
The. 8:00 am? sample. indicated
.9."
p
uci/m1' I-131 DEO.:
2-A
Auxiliary
feedwater , pump- is..outiofiserv' ice for
inboard bearing replacement.
Estimated time)-to re'pairy
is 7' hours.
2-B Charging' pump is out of service'to replace packing.
Estimated time ,to ' repairE is 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.:
A small primary / secondary- tube
leak
i ri .S/G
2-A was.
detected
upon. return
._to
power;
. leak.has remained'
steady at. approximately .06 gpm.
Periodic' containment' anomaly check
is .due. this s'hift'
coordinated with
HP to begins at 10:15 am.
'. Cont ai nment '
mini purge is in - progress at this time.
1 PORV
block . valve
is
out
of ; service,. ' cl osed ' and '
" ~de-energi:ed"due
to burned-out . motor.
Estimated ~ time-
to repair is twelves hours.
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Unit 1 Conditions
Unit 1 is at 100% power--120 ' days into < current : cycl e.
All equipment operablefand available.
Meteor ol ogi c al . conditions ~
1ar e '
typical-
-for.> South
..
Thegpresent: temperature.is.83 degrees-F.-
and the wind is variable at.1 to 3' mph.
Forecast for
today'is partly cloudy; winds from the east to south-
east at
approximately 5 mph.
There is'a 50% chance'of.
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thunderstorms.
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10:00
Exercise commences.
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10:15
Nuclear Operator (NO)
and
Health
Physics
Tech. (HP)
enter containment for anomaly check.
10:30.
NO calls control rocm from containment asking permis-
sion to
backseat manual letdown isolation valve V-2593
a
and informs NPS that backseating this
valve has worked
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in the past.
10:40
NPS or ANPS grants permission for backseat.
10:50
NO has
no success backseating valve using reach red so
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he takes it upon himself to enter cubicle and physical-
)
ly backseat valve using a valve wrench.
HP objects but
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cannot stop NO.
When
NO
applies
pressure
to valve,
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bonnet cracks, releasing l ar ge amounts of steam.
NO is
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scalded, jumps away, hits
head on
angle iron,
and is
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knocked unconscious
(which will lead to fatality).
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Cracked bonnet creates a .85 gpm primary system leak.
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10:55
HP calls control room for help after pulling uncon I
scious operator from the valve area and carrying him to
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personnel hatch.
Burns to the HP's face and wrists are
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received in the process.
11:00
While dragging the
operator
out
of
the containment
the HP
cuts the
face of
the inner
door seal causing
inner door seal failure.
The HP is
extremelv
excited
about
the
condition of
operator
and
fails
to
close
the
inner docr befcre
opening the outer door.
The
ringfeeder (clutch) which
shculd not allow this to occur has become corroded (due
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to a l ack of pm) and is not
wori:ing properl y.
The HP
succeeds in
opening the outer door with the inner door
open, but in doing so shears the Geneva latch plate (at
--a
defective
area,
i.e.
manufacturing
flaw) and the
outer door cannot be l atched.
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Alarm
in
the
Control
Room
will
indicate
that the
personnel hatch is open.
Ops
should
curtail
miqi purge at this time reali:ing
that a potential primary leak is in progress.
Neither
butterfly
valve
completely
rescats.
Ops should be
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unaware of this leak path due to open airlock centri-
buting'to any increase in plant vent monitor.
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11:05
First aid team arrives at personnel hatch and
finds HP
Tech. semi-conscious and NO dead.
11:10
Centrol room
receives call 'from first aid team on the
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status of i n .i ur i e s and that both hatch doors are open.
11:15
A NOTIFICATION of UNUSUAL EVENT should
be declared for
contaminated. injured worker prior to first aid vehicle
leavina site f or hospi tal .
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Control' room leak rate procedure indicates
a total .95
gpm primary leek.
NPS sends
in a second containment entry team to verify
that pressure boundary leakage enists.
Operations
d ep ar t <nent
secures
inner
hatch
door and
informs Technical group to_do a. seal test on inner. door,
(outer door will not lock down).
Within approximately 15
minutes
of
being
made aware
that
both
hatch
doors
are
left open the NPS should
declare an UNUSUAL EVENT based on a loss of containment
4
integrity.
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11:30
Tech group begins eeal test on inner personnel hatch.
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11:40
Verification from
containment entry team that pressure
boundary leakage enists
causes
the
to institute
shutdown at 1% per minute.
11:45
Tech
aroup
test
the
inner
door
seal and fir.ds-the
Icakaae to be 15. 000 SCCt1.
12:00
The
Mechanical
maintenance
department
checks
with
stores
and
finds
there
are
spare Geneva plates and
they inform the HPS they will have the
personnel hatch
repaired in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
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12:15
V-2593 leak increases to 55 gpm.
12:20
- ~At 60%
power, shutdown rate increases to 2% per minute
to address recognition of the larger leak rate.
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12:30
. . Media rumors of unconfirmed number of
deaths and major
reactor problems at St. Luci e pl ant.
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At
approximately
this. time,. EC should declare ALERT
f
based on >50 gpm mismatch between
charging and letdown
with other indications of primary leak in containment.
12:40
During controlled
shutdown, NPS/EC
attempts to' swap A
.
and D
Aun-Transformer
breakers
to
start-up position
(offsite power).
2B f ails to swap but remains closed.
Ops will attempt to start B
diesel which
will~ fail tc
start.
12:55
Reactor
at
appr oni mat el y
20%
power
and
holding to
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complete repairs to B
Aun
.ransformer
breaker
and B
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diesel,
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12:00
Contingency message
may be
given at
this time to ECO
>
to activate EOF due to increased media attention.
1!:10
2-D Start-up breaker is
repaired.
Cause was
a loose
,
connector on cont'ol power fuse block.
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Shutdown resumes,
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13:15
Bonnet-on
V-2592 ":ippers"
off valve, increasing leak
f
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rate to approximately 4550 gpm.
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13:10
Start-up
breaker
reopens
and
2B
diesel
generator
still not
repaired causing
loss of
all B-side power,
includino 29 Aun. feed pumps.
C Aux feed pump
used to
<
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supply feed water to A and B steam generators; trips on
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Ops must get T . D.
to reset overspeed latch.
Upon
reset,
2C
Aux
pump starts but tqips
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again on overspeed.
T.O.
reports
oil
level
in gov.
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control low and coes out to find oil.
In the meantime,
RCS is indicating saturated conditions.
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All B-side saf eguards are of f .
13:5S
Pe-sonnel hatch is repaired
but the
seal has
not yet
been confirmed bv a satisfactory leak test.
Mini-purgo
is still leaking but it is
not obvious
to the Control
Room that
the valves
did not
seat or
that any addi-
tional leakpath from containment exists.
As
containment
pressure
increases,
release
exits
containment
through
mini-purge
and
escapes into the
environment.
90% of
the release
is taken
up by the
Auxiliary
Building
Supply
Fans
-(directly
above the
area where the mini-purge
is
located);
10% escapes
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unmonitored into the environment.
.
core
uncovered
at
this
time.
A
GENERAL
13:45
I Reactor
EMERGENCY should be declared shortly af ter the reccani-
tion
of
the
loss
of
3
fission
product
barriers.
Protective Action Recommendations should be:
Evacuate
0-2
miles.
complete
radius;
Evacuate
2-5
miles, complete radius; shelter 5-10 miles, compl ete
radius.
Sectors N,P,0 affected WNW sector.
A SITE
AREA EMERGENCY may initially be declared due to
the
primary
leak
being
areater
than
charging pump
capacity.
This should be escalated short1v af ter ccre
uncovery.
13:55
T.O.
puts oil in 2C Aun
feedwater pump.
Pump start is
successful
and
feeding
Total time
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without AFW approximately y 30 minutes.
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2B Start-up Transf ormer br eaker is repaired
and B-side
power is restored.
14:00
EOF should be operational at this time.
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14:15
H2-Analv:.or indicating 1.0% H2 in containment.
14:30
Due
to
increased
pressure
in
containment, airborne
<
r =idicacti ve r el ease f rom containment via the mini-purge
intake increases.
Release exits the Aun Building.
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unmonitored, and'is picked up by the Auxiliary Building
ventilation intake.
Increased' activity is detected by
radiation
monitors
throughout
the
Aun
Building and
through the
plant vent.
Control Rocm becomes aware of'
the existence of another release' path.
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14:45
With 'H2 recombiners in
operation,
is sigwly
being reduced in containment.
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15:00
Small doses are being measured beyond 2 miles from*the
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plant.
Doses
are
not
significant
enough
to prompt
further PARS.
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15:20
Containment
pressure continues to reduce as plant
regains control of incident.
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Plant goes into
recirculation
phase- at approximately
!
this
time.
When
this
occurs,
dose
rates and air
!
acti vi ty in the
Aun.
Building
increase significantly
due
to
cases
in
escaping from LPSI pump leaks.
Some addi ti on al activity is released through
the plant
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vent.
16: 00
Pl ant reaches shutdown cooling temperature.
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Emergency repair
crews succeed in securing mini-purge
~
% isolation value, terminating the release f rom contain-
ment.
17:30
Containment hydrocen
further reduces,
plant conditions
appear stable.
10:00
Exercise is ter minated.
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MINI-SCENARIO #1
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CONTAMINATED INJURY AND DEATH
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10:15 am
Nuclear Opera' tor,
with Health' Physics coverage, enter '
Unit 2 containment to
perform periodic . anomaly check.
Once
inside. containment,
NO
gets a pipe wrench from
the rack at the base'of the stairway
and begins rounds
of
the
outside
of
biowall
area of containment.
tech.
performs
typical
rad
surveys
(beta / gamma and
neutron) and finds normal readings.
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10:30
Upon
reaching
the
regenerative
heat exchanger area,
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the NO hears
a
steam
leak
coming
from
the letdown
isolation
valve
cubicle.
NO
calls
the NPS to get
permi s si on
to
the -leaking
valve
JV-2593) !
which
has
a
wisp
of
steam releasing from the steam !
area.
The NO has
had
personal
experience
w(th this
valve
leaking
before
and
has
stopped
leaks
there
simply by backseating using the
reach . rod.
The NPS
concurs and
allows the
NO to attempt backseating this ,
valve.
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10:50
The NO tries to backseat the valve with no success.
He
is irritated
that this failed because he convinced the
NPS that he could stop the leak and now f eels
that the
NPS will
think less f avorably of his expertise.
While
the HP has his back to the NO to set down the
REM ball I
(survey
meter),
the
NO
grabs
the
pipe
wrench and i
enters the cubicle to manually backseat the valve.
yells at
the NO
and orders
him to
exit the cubicle.
The NO' hooks up the pipe wrench to
give one
hard pull
1
on the
valve and
does so.
This cracks the bonnet and
releases a burst of steam.
The startled
NO gasps and
knhales the
superheated steam
as it
scalds his face. i
--
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He jumps back, strikes a piece of angle iron with
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his head, falls back over the valve and onto the floor.
The.HP tech. enters the cubicle
and. pull s
out the NO,
,
burning an
exposed area of his neck and both wrists in
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the process as his PC's part at tape down points.
10:55
The HP tech, extremely excited
and
in
pain
from his
burns, manages
to pick
up the NO over his shoulder in
a firemans carry and get him up the
stairs and
to the
personnel
batch
area.
He
sees
the PA next to the
hatch and calls the control room requesting help.
The
tech.
opens
the
inner
per sonnel
hatch dcor and
drags the
NO in
(cutting the
inner door
seal in the
process)
and
now
begins
to
feel
the pain from his
burns greatly increasing.
He
becomes
more panicked
and somewhat
disoriented and
fails to close the inner
'
hatch before opening the
outer hatch.
The ringfeeder
!
- _ _ _ - - _ _ - .
.
.
.
i
'l
4
i
15: 45
A maintenance
team is organized to secure the release.
!
Dose rates in the
area 'will
prompt
authori:ation of
ij
emergency exposure considerations.
.]
..
16:30
The' release
is
terminated' as
the
maintenance team
l
finds a way to secure the release.
(It is anticipated
1
that
a
blind
will be placed over the release
{
path.)
j
-l
Messages associated with this mini-scenario are:
1,10,12,17
l
l
l
3
{
b
i
'
,.
h
l
l
l
1
l
c
or
.-
.
1,,' *e
~
- . .
.
e ,
sP
0
_ - - _ - - - - . _ __ _ - _ . - . - _ . _ _ _ - - - - . - -
--
,
.
.
MINI-SCENARIO #2
I
,
l
BROKEN PERSONNEL HATCH
2
j
11:00 am
Alarm
in
the
Control
Room
will
indicate
that the
personnel hatch is open but it will not
immediately be
known that
both doors
are open.
This alarm will stay
I
on until someone is sent to investigate.
f
11:15
When someone responds to
close
the
doors,
the inner
!
door will
close but the outer door will not lock.
The
1
Tech. Department will be
called to
do a
leak test on
I
the personnel
hatch to
verify that
the inner door is
'j
sealed.
'
11:45
Tech.
Department
will
report
that
15,000
SCCM
is
leaking between
the inner
door, the outer door cannot
,
be closed and locked, therefore, a
loss of containment'
i
integrity exists.
The
plant should enter Tech. Dpec.
action statement 3.6.1.1.
(
12:00
Mechanical Maintenance
inspects
the
door,
finds the
problems
(corroded
ringfeeder
and
sheared
Geneva
l
plate),
and
finds
spare
part
for
Geneva
plate in
stores.
They estimate
that they
can fix the door in
two hours.
J
13:35
Maintenance
fixes
the
outer
personnel
hatch
door.
!
When
the
Tech.
Department
comes- to
check the leak
i
rate, the first test fails but the tester
finds oil in
the flow
gauge and
has to go get other leak rate test
equipment in order to perform the test.
14:00
Tech.
Department
finds
equipment,
returns
to
the
personnel
hatch,
and
retests to find personnel hatch
sealed.,.
It should become apparent to the
Control Room
--
q) ... b y
this
time
that another containment failure exists
-
j[,y, as activity is still being released via the
plant vent
t. ' and ECCS.
4.
,
.
~
.~-
Messages associated with this mini-scenario are:
10,13,16,17,18
26,47
l
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
__
_
_ _ . . _ _ _ ._;
_
.
.
(clutch),
which
would
nor mal l y
prevent
this
from
occurring, breaks due to_ lack of preventive maintenance
and
the
outer
per sonnel
hatch
opens,
shearing the.
Geneva plate in the process.
11:00
The HP tech. collapses af ter pulling the NO
out of the
airlock
and
down
the
stairs.
. Security- is at the
personnel hatch and tries to
ai d
by. calling
via the.
<
security radio to get first aid.
The
First
aid / Decontamination
' Team
responds, taking
care of the injured HP and doing'whatever
they can for
the already
dead NO,
until offsite medical assi st ance
arrives.
Offsite
medical
assistance
will transport
the contaminated / injured
HP tech. to Lawnwood Hospital
and leave the dead NO on site.
4,6,8,h,20,21,
Messages associated with this mini-scenario are
,
23(7), 24
t
!
I
l
1
l
l
l
l
l
'
T.
_..
'
- g
$
\\
s: .
N9
g;
i.
1
l
l
!
1
.
__
_ _ . _ _
_
.,
.
.
4
1
MIN 1-SCENARIO #'3
4
MEDIA ATTENTION ADDRESSING DEATH AT-SITE-
Revised 7/7/87,
,
11:30 am
Police
scanner
report
is
overheard by .a reporter .at
Stuart News.
l
Rumors about
the death
onsite begin. to. spread a'round-
L
the plant, workers.
A' contract
l aborer . overhear s and
calls WTVX (Channel 34).
saying that
he thinks someone
~
died.inside. the' reactor
at~the' plent.
He: won ' t give
his name and. upon' being-questioned,l getsynervous andL
hangs up.
A
camera. crew that 'is on the' beach -filming '
tourists is cent.to the site.
11:45
The
Stuart.
News
reporter,-
being
knowledgeable' of-
protocol
with
the_' press
by 1FPL,
calls
Corpo(ate
l
Communications to get some verification of'this story.
12:00
The WTVX camera crew finds a plant worker,
an apprent--
1
ice electrician,
who is
leaving'the -site to move 1 bis
pregnant wife out of. their, beach- front' condo
2 miles
south
of
the
site.
'The
plant . worker
was in the
control
room
area
around
11:00'
am' and
heard
the
and
some
talk
of- the injuries and the
primary leak
in containment.
As : rumors spread ' amena
other workers about the death-of the,NO.'the' apprentice
elec trici an becameL worri edi and' left
to' evacuate his.
wife.
When approached
by the news crew, the electri-
cian gives
a.
seemingly . accurate,
but- not truthful,
account of the events in progress.
12:20
More rumors
are generated byf the 2 ambulance .staf f . af ter,
arriving'at Lawnwood.
An ER : nurse overhears
the talk
^~~of
ddaths
at St.
Lucie and call s her. husband . who ' .i s ' a
J., printer at The Fort Pierce.NewsgTribune.
He,.in turn,
,
,
j5. perpetuates
the
rumor
that
dead ' workers .are being
,
d.; brought into the hospital from a'
radioactiveLexplosion
at
the
plant
and
thel ambulance.had toLleave; people
Lehind, probably because they were radioactive.
12:30
A reporter from 'The?. Fort
Pierce
News
Tribune calls
Corporate Communications
to get
at story on'the' deaths
at St1 Lucie.- A news crew is:en the-way to
the ENC as
well
as
TV
crews. from' Palm- Beach. Channel 124.and'
.
Channel 5: who have called the: paper f or finf ormation.~
12:55
It is expected that,.in light of the degraded' condition
at
the
plant
and
the increased media attention over
the death, the EOF will initiate activation.
Personnel
will leave the Juno Beach Of fice by this time.
(:
l
l
'
.,
o_ _ . .
__._.m_mhm__m.mu-_
.
.
4
. r.
Messages associated with this mini-scenars.o.are:
23, 33,3,4
I
i
!f
.
3
b
I'
,
1
l
.
I
1
i
--
.
O
e
i#O '
.
.-a-x---_m
4
-
4
.
.
.
MINI-SCENARIO #4
RELEASE FROM MINI-PURGE (VALVES 1-FCV-25-26, 2-FCV-25-36)
10:00 am
Containment
purge
is
in
progress for normal venting
and anticipation of anomaly check scheduled for 10:15.
11:00
Once primary leak
is
realized
by
Control
Room, the
containment purge
will be terminated.
When mini purge
isolation
valves
(1-FCV-25-26,
I-FCV-25-36)
shut,
neither close
completely.
Due to
lack of' preventive
maintenance, one valve han a corroded seal area and the
other
locks
up
slightly
open.
Initial
switches
indicate closed
in
the
Control
Room
as
the valves
actuate enough
toward the
closed position to trip the
closed switch.
Release
path is
not detectable until
acti vi ty in containment, combined with high containment-
pressure, force release'through mini-purge.
.
,
13:15
Bonnet on letdown i sol ati on
val ve
(V-2593)
comes off
I
"
initiating
a
small
break
LOCA.
As RCS flashes to
steam and releases to containment, containment pressure
.
increases.
l
13:30
The
core
is
uncovered,
causing
a
major release of.
i
radioactive materials into containment as fuel cladding
'
f ail s.
Containment pressure at 10 psig f orces radio-
active
release
out
of
containment
vi s
mini purge,
i
This release goes f rom the purge
room outside contain-
j
ment,
out
the
intake
filters,
and
into
the
area
i
between the Auxiliary
Building,
Containment,
and the
j
1
l
Fuel
Handling
Building.
The HVS-4-A/B fans pick up
l
the
majority
of
the
radioactive
release
(90%) and
carry it
back into
the Auxiliary Building and out the
i
plant vent.
CIAS
causes
the
Fuel
Handling Building
- Supply fans
to stop
so the release is not taken up by
,g t; hose fans.
.
~
,%
1The majority of the release is
dispersed f airly evenly
' throughout the Auxiliary Building and exits to the
'
environment,
monitored
by
the
plant vent and ECCS A
and B effluent monitors.
The
remaining
10%
of the
release not
taken up
by the Auxiliary Building Supply
fans (HVS-4-A/B) disperses to the environment
f rom its
exit outside of containment.
.
15:15
An HP
team is
sent from the TCS to do a survey inside
the RCA and outside the Auxiliary-Building.
When they
reach the
area near
the release, they get indications
of plume inversion.
Upon further
investigation, they
hear a whistle sound (air passing through the mini-
purge isolation valses).
J
_
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -