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Category:INSPECTION REPORT
MONTHYEARIR 05000335/19990111999-10-0808 October 1999 Partially Deleted Insp Repts 50-335/99-11 & 50-389/99-11 on 990827 & 990907-08 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support Re Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IR 05000335/19960221996-11-14014 November 1996 Insp Repts 50-335/96-22 & 50-389/96-22 on 961114.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Configuration Mgt & 10CFR50.59 Programs IR 05000335/19940021994-03-11011 March 1994 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/94-02 & 50-389/94-02 on 940207-11.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Physical Security Program for Power Reactors,Audits & Alarm Stations & Communications IR 05000335/19920231992-12-14014 December 1992 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/92-23 & 50-389/92-23 on 921130-1204 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Vital Area Barriers & Alarms, Lighting,Assessment & Testing,Maint & Compensatory Measures IR 05000335/19910131991-07-11011 July 1991 Insp Repts 50-335/91-13 & 50-389/91-13 on 910610-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Physical Security Program for Nuclear Power Reactors,Mgt,Plans, Audits,Barriers,Detection & Assessment Aids IR 05000335/19910041991-04-15015 April 1991 Insp Repts 50-335/91-04 & 50-389/91-04 on 910123-0318.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations Review,Maint & Surveillance Observations,Review of Special Repts & Review of Nonroutine Events IR 05000335/19900251990-11-0707 November 1990 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/90-25 & 50-389/90-25 on 901009-12.Noncited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Records & Repts,Alarm Stations,Communication & Training IR 05000335/19900261990-10-31031 October 1990 Insp Repts 50-335/90-26 & 50-389/90-26 on 901022-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Isi,Including Review of Unit 1 Plan for Outage & Associated ISI Administration Procedures IR 05000335/19890111989-05-15015 May 1989 Partially Withheld Safeguards Insp Repts 50-335/89-11 & 50-389/89-11 on 890327-31 (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21). Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Security Program Plan Audits & Protected & Vital Area Barriers IR 05000335/19880231988-11-0202 November 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-23 & 50-389/88-23 on 880925-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures,Mgt Effectiveness & Security Organization.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) ML20151Y6841988-08-16016 August 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-20 & 50-389/88-20 on 880803 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Circumstances Surrounding Failure to Control Access to Vital Area IR 05000335/19880111988-06-14014 June 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-11 & 50-389/88-11 on 880523-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Special Nuclear Matl Control & Accounting IR 05000335/19880121988-06-0909 June 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-12 & 50-389/88-12 on 880516-20 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Program Audit,Security Sys Power Supply & Communications ML20235J2471987-09-24024 September 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-19 & 50-389/87-18 on 870825-0904.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Evaluation of Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise. Exercise Scope & Objectives Encl IR 05000335/19870021987-03-20020 March 1987 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/87-02 & 50-389/87-02 on 870217-26 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Area Inspected:Intrusion Detection Sys Being Employed as Detection Aid in Canal Opening IR 05000335/19870011987-02-26026 February 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-01 & 50-389/87-01 on 870113-0207.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices,Station & Corporate Mgt Practices & Overall Plant Operations IR 05000335/19860271987-01-26026 January 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/86-27 & 50-389/86-26 on 861216-870112.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Activities for Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance, Site Security Procedures & QA Practices ML20207J1891986-12-17017 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-335/86-25 & 50-389/86-24 on 861117-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Mod Welding,Inservice Testing Program for ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves & Inspector Followup Items ML20212P2101986-08-26026 August 1986 Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/86-19 & 50-389/86-18 on 860804-08 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21). Violation Noted:Vehicle Control IR 05000335/19860111986-08-0707 August 1986 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/86-11,50-389/86-10, 50-335/86-17 & 50-389/86-16 on 860414-0625 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Access Control to Vital Areas IR 05000335/19850351986-01-17017 January 1986 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-35 & 50-389/85-35 on 851216-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt effectiveness-security Program & Security Organization. Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000335/19850211985-10-0808 October 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-21 & 50-389/85-21 on 850813-0923.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices & Site Security Procedures IR 05000335/19850241985-10-0101 October 1985 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-24 & 50-389/85-24 on 850916-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Effectiveness & Security Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000387/19850291985-09-23023 September 1985 Meeting Repts 50-387/85-29 & 50-388/85-24 on 850828 Re Rescheduling of Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Exam. Region Agreed to Administer One Instructor Certification & One Senior Operator Exam on 851120 & 21,respectively IR 05000335/19850231985-09-17017 September 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-23 & 50-389/85-23 on 850826-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Chemistry & Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves IR 05000335/19850201985-09-0404 September 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-20 & 50-389/85-20 on 850709-0812. Violation Noted:Operating Procedure 2-0960030, DC Ground Isolation, Not Adequately Established & Maintained ML20133N9121985-07-25025 July 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-16 & 50-389/85-16 on 850624-28. Violation Noted:Failure to Control Environ Conditions for Calibr of Measuring & Test Equipment IR 05000335/19850171985-07-17017 July 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-17 & 50-389/85-17 on 850611-0708. Violation Noted:Unit 2 Plant Mods to Prevent Testing of Relays Not Implemented,Resulting in Plant Transient IR 05000335/19850141985-06-26026 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-14 & 50-389/85-14 on 850610-14.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves,Ie Bulletin 80-08 & Inspector Followup Items IR 05000335/19850111985-06-19019 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-11 & 50-389/85-11 on 850515-0610.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Overall Plant Operations & QA Practices IR 05000335/19850121985-06-12012 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-12 & 50-389/85-12 on 850513-17.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Programs IR 05000335/19850011985-06-0505 June 1985 Safeguards Insp Repts 50-389/85-13 & 50-335/85-01 on 850512-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures & Security Audit Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000335/19850101985-05-30030 May 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-10 & 50-389/85-10 on 850409-0513. Violation Noted:Failure to Have Established Procedure to Properly Realign Instrument Air Portion of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve IR 05000335/19840231984-08-17017 August 1984 Insp Repts 50-335/84-23 & 50-389/84-25 on 840715-0811.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operation,Ie Bulletins,Unit 1 Reactor Trip & Previously Identified Items IR 05000335/19820241982-07-21021 July 1982 IE Safety Insp Repts 50-335/82-24 & 50-389/82-30 on 820628- 0701.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Training & Qualifications of contractor-supplied Temporary QC Inspectors & Records IR 05000389/19820271982-07-21021 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-27 on 820622-25.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preservice Insp,Welding of Internals,Previous Insp Finding & IE Bulletins IR 05000389/19820311982-07-14014 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-31 on 820630-0702.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Methods for Evaluating Plant Emergency,Maint & Operating Procedures & Review of Preoperational Test Program & Plant Tour IR 05000335/19820191982-07-13013 July 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-19 & 50-389/82-25 on 820614-18.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Backfit Program, Site Organization & Onsite Design Activities IR 05000335/19820261982-07-0707 July 1982 IE Inquiry Rept 50-335/82-26 on 820615-17.Inquiry Initiated to Determine Facts Surrounding Observations That Individual of Training Staff Was Talking to Examinees Prior to Reactor Operator & Senior Reactor Operator Exams IR 05000335/19820211982-06-30030 June 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-21 & 50-389/82-26 on 820515-0610.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Observation, Safety Verification,Ie Notices & Circulars & Preoperational Testing IR 05000335/19820201982-06-22022 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-335/82-20 on 820601-04.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Instrumentation & Equipment, Respiratory Protection,Health Physics Organization & Qualifications & LER Followup IR 05000389/19820231982-06-18018 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-23 on 820525-28.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Implement QA Requirements Fully IR 05000389/19820241982-06-15015 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-24 on 820525-28.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Components & Sys, Quality Records,Electrical Cables & Terminations,Work & Work Activities & Licensee Identified Items IR 05000389/19820061982-06-14014 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-06 on 820521-26.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previous Inspector Findings & Witnessing RCS Hydrostatic Test IR 05000335/19820151982-06-11011 June 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-15 & 50-389/82-21 on 820411-0514. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Implement Procedure for Locking Safety Valves in Required Position IR 05000335/19820161982-05-28028 May 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-16 & 50-389/82-18 on 820426-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Qa Program Design Control Procurement,Const of Facility & Interviews W/ Personnel IR 05000389/19820191982-05-26026 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-19 on 820426-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preservice insp,safety-related Structures Outside Containment,Previous Insp Findings & Licensee Identified Items IR 05000335/19820141982-05-20020 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-335/82-14 on 820419-22.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Qc & Confirmatory Measurements Including Review of Lab QC Program,Chemistry & Radiochemistry Procedures & Airborne Effluent Sampling IR 05000389/19820131982-04-27027 April 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-13 on 820329-0402.Noncompliance Noted:Use of Incorrect Calibr Block for Psi Ultrasonic Test of Weld 123-2 IR 05000389/19820121982-04-0707 April 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-12 on 820317-19.Noncompliance Noted: Design & Installation of Fire Protection Yard Piping Sys Not Specified to Meet Requirements of NFPA-24 1999-10-08
[Table view] Category:NRC-GENERATED
MONTHYEARIR 05000335/19990111999-10-0808 October 1999 Partially Deleted Insp Repts 50-335/99-11 & 50-389/99-11 on 990827 & 990907-08 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support Re Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IR 05000335/19960221996-11-14014 November 1996 Insp Repts 50-335/96-22 & 50-389/96-22 on 961114.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Configuration Mgt & 10CFR50.59 Programs IR 05000335/19940021994-03-11011 March 1994 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/94-02 & 50-389/94-02 on 940207-11.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Physical Security Program for Power Reactors,Audits & Alarm Stations & Communications IR 05000335/19920231992-12-14014 December 1992 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/92-23 & 50-389/92-23 on 921130-1204 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Vital Area Barriers & Alarms, Lighting,Assessment & Testing,Maint & Compensatory Measures IR 05000335/19910131991-07-11011 July 1991 Insp Repts 50-335/91-13 & 50-389/91-13 on 910610-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Physical Security Program for Nuclear Power Reactors,Mgt,Plans, Audits,Barriers,Detection & Assessment Aids IR 05000335/19910041991-04-15015 April 1991 Insp Repts 50-335/91-04 & 50-389/91-04 on 910123-0318.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations Review,Maint & Surveillance Observations,Review of Special Repts & Review of Nonroutine Events IR 05000335/19900251990-11-0707 November 1990 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/90-25 & 50-389/90-25 on 901009-12.Noncited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Records & Repts,Alarm Stations,Communication & Training IR 05000335/19900261990-10-31031 October 1990 Insp Repts 50-335/90-26 & 50-389/90-26 on 901022-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Isi,Including Review of Unit 1 Plan for Outage & Associated ISI Administration Procedures IR 05000335/19890111989-05-15015 May 1989 Partially Withheld Safeguards Insp Repts 50-335/89-11 & 50-389/89-11 on 890327-31 (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21). Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Security Program Plan Audits & Protected & Vital Area Barriers IR 05000335/19880231988-11-0202 November 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-23 & 50-389/88-23 on 880925-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures,Mgt Effectiveness & Security Organization.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) ML20151Y6841988-08-16016 August 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-20 & 50-389/88-20 on 880803 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Circumstances Surrounding Failure to Control Access to Vital Area IR 05000335/19880111988-06-14014 June 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-11 & 50-389/88-11 on 880523-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Special Nuclear Matl Control & Accounting IR 05000335/19880121988-06-0909 June 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-12 & 50-389/88-12 on 880516-20 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Program Audit,Security Sys Power Supply & Communications ML20235J2471987-09-24024 September 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-19 & 50-389/87-18 on 870825-0904.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Evaluation of Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise. Exercise Scope & Objectives Encl IR 05000335/19870021987-03-20020 March 1987 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/87-02 & 50-389/87-02 on 870217-26 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Area Inspected:Intrusion Detection Sys Being Employed as Detection Aid in Canal Opening IR 05000335/19870011987-02-26026 February 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-01 & 50-389/87-01 on 870113-0207.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices,Station & Corporate Mgt Practices & Overall Plant Operations IR 05000335/19860271987-01-26026 January 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/86-27 & 50-389/86-26 on 861216-870112.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Activities for Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance, Site Security Procedures & QA Practices ML20207J1891986-12-17017 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-335/86-25 & 50-389/86-24 on 861117-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Mod Welding,Inservice Testing Program for ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves & Inspector Followup Items ML20212P2101986-08-26026 August 1986 Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/86-19 & 50-389/86-18 on 860804-08 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21). Violation Noted:Vehicle Control IR 05000335/19860111986-08-0707 August 1986 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/86-11,50-389/86-10, 50-335/86-17 & 50-389/86-16 on 860414-0625 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Access Control to Vital Areas IR 05000335/19850351986-01-17017 January 1986 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-35 & 50-389/85-35 on 851216-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt effectiveness-security Program & Security Organization. Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000335/19850211985-10-0808 October 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-21 & 50-389/85-21 on 850813-0923.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices & Site Security Procedures IR 05000335/19850241985-10-0101 October 1985 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-24 & 50-389/85-24 on 850916-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Effectiveness & Security Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000387/19850291985-09-23023 September 1985 Meeting Repts 50-387/85-29 & 50-388/85-24 on 850828 Re Rescheduling of Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Exam. Region Agreed to Administer One Instructor Certification & One Senior Operator Exam on 851120 & 21,respectively IR 05000335/19850231985-09-17017 September 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-23 & 50-389/85-23 on 850826-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Chemistry & Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves IR 05000335/19850201985-09-0404 September 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-20 & 50-389/85-20 on 850709-0812. Violation Noted:Operating Procedure 2-0960030, DC Ground Isolation, Not Adequately Established & Maintained ML20133N9121985-07-25025 July 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-16 & 50-389/85-16 on 850624-28. Violation Noted:Failure to Control Environ Conditions for Calibr of Measuring & Test Equipment IR 05000335/19850171985-07-17017 July 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-17 & 50-389/85-17 on 850611-0708. Violation Noted:Unit 2 Plant Mods to Prevent Testing of Relays Not Implemented,Resulting in Plant Transient IR 05000335/19850141985-06-26026 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-14 & 50-389/85-14 on 850610-14.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves,Ie Bulletin 80-08 & Inspector Followup Items IR 05000335/19850111985-06-19019 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-11 & 50-389/85-11 on 850515-0610.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Overall Plant Operations & QA Practices IR 05000335/19850121985-06-12012 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-12 & 50-389/85-12 on 850513-17.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Programs IR 05000335/19850011985-06-0505 June 1985 Safeguards Insp Repts 50-389/85-13 & 50-335/85-01 on 850512-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures & Security Audit Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000335/19850101985-05-30030 May 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-10 & 50-389/85-10 on 850409-0513. Violation Noted:Failure to Have Established Procedure to Properly Realign Instrument Air Portion of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve IR 05000335/19840231984-08-17017 August 1984 Insp Repts 50-335/84-23 & 50-389/84-25 on 840715-0811.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operation,Ie Bulletins,Unit 1 Reactor Trip & Previously Identified Items IR 05000335/19820241982-07-21021 July 1982 IE Safety Insp Repts 50-335/82-24 & 50-389/82-30 on 820628- 0701.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Training & Qualifications of contractor-supplied Temporary QC Inspectors & Records IR 05000389/19820271982-07-21021 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-27 on 820622-25.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preservice Insp,Welding of Internals,Previous Insp Finding & IE Bulletins IR 05000389/19820311982-07-14014 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-31 on 820630-0702.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Methods for Evaluating Plant Emergency,Maint & Operating Procedures & Review of Preoperational Test Program & Plant Tour IR 05000335/19820191982-07-13013 July 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-19 & 50-389/82-25 on 820614-18.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Backfit Program, Site Organization & Onsite Design Activities IR 05000335/19820261982-07-0707 July 1982 IE Inquiry Rept 50-335/82-26 on 820615-17.Inquiry Initiated to Determine Facts Surrounding Observations That Individual of Training Staff Was Talking to Examinees Prior to Reactor Operator & Senior Reactor Operator Exams IR 05000335/19820211982-06-30030 June 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-21 & 50-389/82-26 on 820515-0610.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Observation, Safety Verification,Ie Notices & Circulars & Preoperational Testing IR 05000335/19820201982-06-22022 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-335/82-20 on 820601-04.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Instrumentation & Equipment, Respiratory Protection,Health Physics Organization & Qualifications & LER Followup IR 05000389/19820231982-06-18018 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-23 on 820525-28.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Implement QA Requirements Fully IR 05000389/19820241982-06-15015 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-24 on 820525-28.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Components & Sys, Quality Records,Electrical Cables & Terminations,Work & Work Activities & Licensee Identified Items IR 05000389/19820061982-06-14014 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-06 on 820521-26.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previous Inspector Findings & Witnessing RCS Hydrostatic Test IR 05000335/19820151982-06-11011 June 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-15 & 50-389/82-21 on 820411-0514. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Implement Procedure for Locking Safety Valves in Required Position IR 05000335/19820161982-05-28028 May 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-16 & 50-389/82-18 on 820426-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Qa Program Design Control Procurement,Const of Facility & Interviews W/ Personnel IR 05000389/19820191982-05-26026 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-19 on 820426-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preservice insp,safety-related Structures Outside Containment,Previous Insp Findings & Licensee Identified Items IR 05000335/19820141982-05-20020 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-335/82-14 on 820419-22.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Qc & Confirmatory Measurements Including Review of Lab QC Program,Chemistry & Radiochemistry Procedures & Airborne Effluent Sampling IR 05000389/19820131982-04-27027 April 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-13 on 820329-0402.Noncompliance Noted:Use of Incorrect Calibr Block for Psi Ultrasonic Test of Weld 123-2 IR 05000389/19820121982-04-0707 April 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-12 on 820317-19.Noncompliance Noted: Design & Installation of Fire Protection Yard Piping Sys Not Specified to Meet Requirements of NFPA-24 1999-10-08
[Table view] Category:INSPECTION REPORT
MONTHYEARIR 05000335/19990111999-10-0808 October 1999 Partially Deleted Insp Repts 50-335/99-11 & 50-389/99-11 on 990827 & 990907-08 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support Re Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IR 05000335/19960221996-11-14014 November 1996 Insp Repts 50-335/96-22 & 50-389/96-22 on 961114.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Configuration Mgt & 10CFR50.59 Programs IR 05000335/19940021994-03-11011 March 1994 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/94-02 & 50-389/94-02 on 940207-11.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Physical Security Program for Power Reactors,Audits & Alarm Stations & Communications IR 05000335/19920231992-12-14014 December 1992 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/92-23 & 50-389/92-23 on 921130-1204 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Vital Area Barriers & Alarms, Lighting,Assessment & Testing,Maint & Compensatory Measures IR 05000335/19910131991-07-11011 July 1991 Insp Repts 50-335/91-13 & 50-389/91-13 on 910610-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Physical Security Program for Nuclear Power Reactors,Mgt,Plans, Audits,Barriers,Detection & Assessment Aids IR 05000335/19910041991-04-15015 April 1991 Insp Repts 50-335/91-04 & 50-389/91-04 on 910123-0318.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations Review,Maint & Surveillance Observations,Review of Special Repts & Review of Nonroutine Events IR 05000335/19900251990-11-0707 November 1990 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/90-25 & 50-389/90-25 on 901009-12.Noncited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Records & Repts,Alarm Stations,Communication & Training IR 05000335/19900261990-10-31031 October 1990 Insp Repts 50-335/90-26 & 50-389/90-26 on 901022-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Isi,Including Review of Unit 1 Plan for Outage & Associated ISI Administration Procedures IR 05000335/19890111989-05-15015 May 1989 Partially Withheld Safeguards Insp Repts 50-335/89-11 & 50-389/89-11 on 890327-31 (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21). Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Security Program Plan Audits & Protected & Vital Area Barriers IR 05000335/19880231988-11-0202 November 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-23 & 50-389/88-23 on 880925-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures,Mgt Effectiveness & Security Organization.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) ML20151Y6841988-08-16016 August 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-20 & 50-389/88-20 on 880803 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Circumstances Surrounding Failure to Control Access to Vital Area IR 05000335/19880111988-06-14014 June 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-11 & 50-389/88-11 on 880523-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Special Nuclear Matl Control & Accounting IR 05000335/19880121988-06-0909 June 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-12 & 50-389/88-12 on 880516-20 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Program Audit,Security Sys Power Supply & Communications ML20235J2471987-09-24024 September 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-19 & 50-389/87-18 on 870825-0904.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Evaluation of Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise. Exercise Scope & Objectives Encl IR 05000335/19870021987-03-20020 March 1987 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/87-02 & 50-389/87-02 on 870217-26 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Area Inspected:Intrusion Detection Sys Being Employed as Detection Aid in Canal Opening IR 05000335/19870011987-02-26026 February 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-01 & 50-389/87-01 on 870113-0207.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices,Station & Corporate Mgt Practices & Overall Plant Operations IR 05000335/19860271987-01-26026 January 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/86-27 & 50-389/86-26 on 861216-870112.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Activities for Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance, Site Security Procedures & QA Practices ML20207J1891986-12-17017 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-335/86-25 & 50-389/86-24 on 861117-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Mod Welding,Inservice Testing Program for ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves & Inspector Followup Items ML20212P2101986-08-26026 August 1986 Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/86-19 & 50-389/86-18 on 860804-08 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21). Violation Noted:Vehicle Control IR 05000335/19860111986-08-0707 August 1986 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/86-11,50-389/86-10, 50-335/86-17 & 50-389/86-16 on 860414-0625 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Access Control to Vital Areas IR 05000335/19850351986-01-17017 January 1986 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-35 & 50-389/85-35 on 851216-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt effectiveness-security Program & Security Organization. Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000335/19850211985-10-0808 October 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-21 & 50-389/85-21 on 850813-0923.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices & Site Security Procedures IR 05000335/19850241985-10-0101 October 1985 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-24 & 50-389/85-24 on 850916-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Effectiveness & Security Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000387/19850291985-09-23023 September 1985 Meeting Repts 50-387/85-29 & 50-388/85-24 on 850828 Re Rescheduling of Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Exam. Region Agreed to Administer One Instructor Certification & One Senior Operator Exam on 851120 & 21,respectively IR 05000335/19850231985-09-17017 September 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-23 & 50-389/85-23 on 850826-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Chemistry & Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves IR 05000335/19850201985-09-0404 September 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-20 & 50-389/85-20 on 850709-0812. Violation Noted:Operating Procedure 2-0960030, DC Ground Isolation, Not Adequately Established & Maintained ML20133N9121985-07-25025 July 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-16 & 50-389/85-16 on 850624-28. Violation Noted:Failure to Control Environ Conditions for Calibr of Measuring & Test Equipment IR 05000335/19850171985-07-17017 July 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-17 & 50-389/85-17 on 850611-0708. Violation Noted:Unit 2 Plant Mods to Prevent Testing of Relays Not Implemented,Resulting in Plant Transient IR 05000335/19850141985-06-26026 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-14 & 50-389/85-14 on 850610-14.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves,Ie Bulletin 80-08 & Inspector Followup Items IR 05000335/19850111985-06-19019 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-11 & 50-389/85-11 on 850515-0610.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Overall Plant Operations & QA Practices IR 05000335/19850121985-06-12012 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-12 & 50-389/85-12 on 850513-17.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Programs IR 05000335/19850011985-06-0505 June 1985 Safeguards Insp Repts 50-389/85-13 & 50-335/85-01 on 850512-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures & Security Audit Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000335/19850101985-05-30030 May 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-10 & 50-389/85-10 on 850409-0513. Violation Noted:Failure to Have Established Procedure to Properly Realign Instrument Air Portion of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve IR 05000335/19840231984-08-17017 August 1984 Insp Repts 50-335/84-23 & 50-389/84-25 on 840715-0811.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operation,Ie Bulletins,Unit 1 Reactor Trip & Previously Identified Items IR 05000335/19820241982-07-21021 July 1982 IE Safety Insp Repts 50-335/82-24 & 50-389/82-30 on 820628- 0701.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Training & Qualifications of contractor-supplied Temporary QC Inspectors & Records IR 05000389/19820271982-07-21021 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-27 on 820622-25.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preservice Insp,Welding of Internals,Previous Insp Finding & IE Bulletins IR 05000389/19820311982-07-14014 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-31 on 820630-0702.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Methods for Evaluating Plant Emergency,Maint & Operating Procedures & Review of Preoperational Test Program & Plant Tour IR 05000335/19820191982-07-13013 July 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-19 & 50-389/82-25 on 820614-18.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Backfit Program, Site Organization & Onsite Design Activities IR 05000335/19820261982-07-0707 July 1982 IE Inquiry Rept 50-335/82-26 on 820615-17.Inquiry Initiated to Determine Facts Surrounding Observations That Individual of Training Staff Was Talking to Examinees Prior to Reactor Operator & Senior Reactor Operator Exams IR 05000335/19820211982-06-30030 June 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-21 & 50-389/82-26 on 820515-0610.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Observation, Safety Verification,Ie Notices & Circulars & Preoperational Testing IR 05000335/19820201982-06-22022 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-335/82-20 on 820601-04.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Instrumentation & Equipment, Respiratory Protection,Health Physics Organization & Qualifications & LER Followup IR 05000389/19820231982-06-18018 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-23 on 820525-28.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Implement QA Requirements Fully IR 05000389/19820241982-06-15015 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-24 on 820525-28.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Components & Sys, Quality Records,Electrical Cables & Terminations,Work & Work Activities & Licensee Identified Items IR 05000389/19820061982-06-14014 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-06 on 820521-26.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previous Inspector Findings & Witnessing RCS Hydrostatic Test IR 05000335/19820151982-06-11011 June 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-15 & 50-389/82-21 on 820411-0514. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Implement Procedure for Locking Safety Valves in Required Position IR 05000335/19820161982-05-28028 May 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-16 & 50-389/82-18 on 820426-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Qa Program Design Control Procurement,Const of Facility & Interviews W/ Personnel IR 05000389/19820191982-05-26026 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-19 on 820426-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preservice insp,safety-related Structures Outside Containment,Previous Insp Findings & Licensee Identified Items IR 05000335/19820141982-05-20020 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-335/82-14 on 820419-22.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Qc & Confirmatory Measurements Including Review of Lab QC Program,Chemistry & Radiochemistry Procedures & Airborne Effluent Sampling IR 05000389/19820131982-04-27027 April 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-13 on 820329-0402.Noncompliance Noted:Use of Incorrect Calibr Block for Psi Ultrasonic Test of Weld 123-2 IR 05000389/19820121982-04-0707 April 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-12 on 820317-19.Noncompliance Noted: Design & Installation of Fire Protection Yard Piping Sys Not Specified to Meet Requirements of NFPA-24 1999-10-08
[Table view] Category:UTILITY
MONTHYEARIR 05000335/19900251990-11-0707 November 1990 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/90-25 & 50-389/90-25 on 901009-12.Noncited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Records & Repts,Alarm Stations,Communication & Training IR 05000335/19900261990-10-31031 October 1990 Insp Repts 50-335/90-26 & 50-389/90-26 on 901022-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Isi,Including Review of Unit 1 Plan for Outage & Associated ISI Administration Procedures IR 05000335/19890111989-05-15015 May 1989 Partially Withheld Safeguards Insp Repts 50-335/89-11 & 50-389/89-11 on 890327-31 (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21). Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Security Program Plan Audits & Protected & Vital Area Barriers IR 05000335/19880231988-11-0202 November 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-23 & 50-389/88-23 on 880925-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures,Mgt Effectiveness & Security Organization.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) ML20151Y6841988-08-16016 August 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-20 & 50-389/88-20 on 880803 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Circumstances Surrounding Failure to Control Access to Vital Area IR 05000335/19880111988-06-14014 June 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-11 & 50-389/88-11 on 880523-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Special Nuclear Matl Control & Accounting IR 05000335/19880121988-06-0909 June 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-12 & 50-389/88-12 on 880516-20 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Program Audit,Security Sys Power Supply & Communications ML20235J2471987-09-24024 September 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-19 & 50-389/87-18 on 870825-0904.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Evaluation of Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise. Exercise Scope & Objectives Encl IR 05000335/19870021987-03-20020 March 1987 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/87-02 & 50-389/87-02 on 870217-26 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Area Inspected:Intrusion Detection Sys Being Employed as Detection Aid in Canal Opening IR 05000335/19870011987-02-26026 February 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-01 & 50-389/87-01 on 870113-0207.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices,Station & Corporate Mgt Practices & Overall Plant Operations IR 05000335/19860271987-01-26026 January 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/86-27 & 50-389/86-26 on 861216-870112.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Activities for Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance, Site Security Procedures & QA Practices ML20207J1891986-12-17017 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-335/86-25 & 50-389/86-24 on 861117-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Mod Welding,Inservice Testing Program for ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves & Inspector Followup Items ML20212P2101986-08-26026 August 1986 Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/86-19 & 50-389/86-18 on 860804-08 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21). Violation Noted:Vehicle Control IR 05000335/19860111986-08-0707 August 1986 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/86-11,50-389/86-10, 50-335/86-17 & 50-389/86-16 on 860414-0625 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Access Control to Vital Areas IR 05000335/19850351986-01-17017 January 1986 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-35 & 50-389/85-35 on 851216-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt effectiveness-security Program & Security Organization. Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000335/19850211985-10-0808 October 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-21 & 50-389/85-21 on 850813-0923.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices & Site Security Procedures IR 05000335/19850241985-10-0101 October 1985 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-24 & 50-389/85-24 on 850916-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Effectiveness & Security Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000387/19850291985-09-23023 September 1985 Meeting Repts 50-387/85-29 & 50-388/85-24 on 850828 Re Rescheduling of Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Exam. Region Agreed to Administer One Instructor Certification & One Senior Operator Exam on 851120 & 21,respectively IR 05000335/19850231985-09-17017 September 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-23 & 50-389/85-23 on 850826-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Chemistry & Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves IR 05000335/19850201985-09-0404 September 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-20 & 50-389/85-20 on 850709-0812. Violation Noted:Operating Procedure 2-0960030, DC Ground Isolation, Not Adequately Established & Maintained ML20133N9121985-07-25025 July 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-16 & 50-389/85-16 on 850624-28. Violation Noted:Failure to Control Environ Conditions for Calibr of Measuring & Test Equipment IR 05000335/19850171985-07-17017 July 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-17 & 50-389/85-17 on 850611-0708. Violation Noted:Unit 2 Plant Mods to Prevent Testing of Relays Not Implemented,Resulting in Plant Transient IR 05000335/19850141985-06-26026 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-14 & 50-389/85-14 on 850610-14.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves,Ie Bulletin 80-08 & Inspector Followup Items IR 05000335/19850111985-06-19019 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-11 & 50-389/85-11 on 850515-0610.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Overall Plant Operations & QA Practices IR 05000335/19850121985-06-12012 June 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-12 & 50-389/85-12 on 850513-17.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Programs IR 05000335/19850011985-06-0505 June 1985 Safeguards Insp Repts 50-389/85-13 & 50-335/85-01 on 850512-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures & Security Audit Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000335/19840231984-08-17017 August 1984 Insp Repts 50-335/84-23 & 50-389/84-25 on 840715-0811.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operation,Ie Bulletins,Unit 1 Reactor Trip & Previously Identified Items IR 05000335/19820241982-07-21021 July 1982 IE Safety Insp Repts 50-335/82-24 & 50-389/82-30 on 820628- 0701.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Training & Qualifications of contractor-supplied Temporary QC Inspectors & Records IR 05000389/19820271982-07-21021 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-27 on 820622-25.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preservice Insp,Welding of Internals,Previous Insp Finding & IE Bulletins IR 05000389/19820311982-07-14014 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-31 on 820630-0702.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Methods for Evaluating Plant Emergency,Maint & Operating Procedures & Review of Preoperational Test Program & Plant Tour IR 05000335/19820191982-07-13013 July 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-19 & 50-389/82-25 on 820614-18.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Backfit Program, Site Organization & Onsite Design Activities IR 05000335/19820261982-07-0707 July 1982 IE Inquiry Rept 50-335/82-26 on 820615-17.Inquiry Initiated to Determine Facts Surrounding Observations That Individual of Training Staff Was Talking to Examinees Prior to Reactor Operator & Senior Reactor Operator Exams IR 05000335/19820211982-06-30030 June 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-21 & 50-389/82-26 on 820515-0610.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint Observation, Safety Verification,Ie Notices & Circulars & Preoperational Testing IR 05000335/19820201982-06-22022 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-335/82-20 on 820601-04.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Instrumentation & Equipment, Respiratory Protection,Health Physics Organization & Qualifications & LER Followup IR 05000389/19820231982-06-18018 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-23 on 820525-28.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Implement QA Requirements Fully IR 05000389/19820241982-06-15015 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-24 on 820525-28.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Components & Sys, Quality Records,Electrical Cables & Terminations,Work & Work Activities & Licensee Identified Items IR 05000389/19820061982-06-14014 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-06 on 820521-26.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previous Inspector Findings & Witnessing RCS Hydrostatic Test IR 05000335/19820151982-06-11011 June 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-15 & 50-389/82-21 on 820411-0514. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Implement Procedure for Locking Safety Valves in Required Position IR 05000335/19820161982-05-28028 May 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-16 & 50-389/82-18 on 820426-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Qa Program Design Control Procurement,Const of Facility & Interviews W/ Personnel IR 05000389/19820191982-05-26026 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-19 on 820426-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preservice insp,safety-related Structures Outside Containment,Previous Insp Findings & Licensee Identified Items IR 05000335/19820141982-05-20020 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-335/82-14 on 820419-22.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Qc & Confirmatory Measurements Including Review of Lab QC Program,Chemistry & Radiochemistry Procedures & Airborne Effluent Sampling IR 05000389/19820131982-04-27027 April 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-13 on 820329-0402.Noncompliance Noted:Use of Incorrect Calibr Block for Psi Ultrasonic Test of Weld 123-2 IR 05000389/19820121982-04-0707 April 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-389/82-12 on 820317-19.Noncompliance Noted: Design & Installation of Fire Protection Yard Piping Sys Not Specified to Meet Requirements of NFPA-24 IR 05000335/19820011982-04-0202 April 1982 IE Insp Repts 50-335/82-01 & 50-389/82-01 on 820309-12. Noncompliance Noted:Installation of Masonry Wall Expansion Anchors Inadequately Inspected 1990-11-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
MONTHYEARIR 05000335/19990111999-10-0808 October 1999 Partially Deleted Insp Repts 50-335/99-11 & 50-389/99-11 on 990827 & 990907-08 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support Re Physical Security Program for Power Reactors PNO-II-99-037D, on 990915,Hurricane Floyd Was Located Approx 380 Miles Southeast of Wilmington,Nc.Ctr of Hurricane Was Estimated Near Latitude 28.8 North & Longitude 78.8 West. Storm Was Moving Northwest at 14 Mph.Max Winds Were 140 Mph1999-09-15015 September 1999 PNO-II-99-037D:on 990915,Hurricane Floyd Was Located Approx 380 Miles Southeast of Wilmington,Nc.Ctr of Hurricane Was Estimated Near Latitude 28.8 North & Longitude 78.8 West. Storm Was Moving Northwest at 14 Mph.Max Winds Were 140 Mph PNO-II-99-023, on 990601,one CEA Descended Into Reactor Core for Unknown Reasons,With Unit 2 Rated Power.Licensee Noted Voltage Fluctuations on CEA Power Supplies.Licensee Is Continuing to Investigate CEA Problems1999-06-0808 June 1999 PNO-II-99-023:on 990601,one CEA Descended Into Reactor Core for Unknown Reasons,With Unit 2 Rated Power.Licensee Noted Voltage Fluctuations on CEA Power Supplies.Licensee Is Continuing to Investigate CEA Problems ML20217G3081998-03-25025 March 1998 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $88,000.Violation Noted:Licensee Failed to Correctly Translate Design Change Into Procedure ML20202D8761997-02-12012 February 1997 Investigation Rept 2-96-042 on 961106.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Investigated:Allegation of Falsification & Backdating of Emergency Preparedness Document.Partially Deleted IR 05000335/19960221996-11-14014 November 1996 Insp Repts 50-335/96-22 & 50-389/96-22 on 961114.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Configuration Mgt & 10CFR50.59 Programs ML20134J2391996-07-31031 July 1996 Investigation Rept 2-95-008 Re Alleged Discrimination Against Instrumentation & Control Technician for Reporting Safety Concerns ML20134N0901996-01-31031 January 1996 Partially Deleted Investigation Rept 2-94-018.Allegation Not Substantiated IR 05000335/19940021994-03-11011 March 1994 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/94-02 & 50-389/94-02 on 940207-11.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Physical Security Program for Power Reactors,Audits & Alarm Stations & Communications PNO-II-93-001, on 930112,plant Commenced Shutdown Due to RCP Vibration.Unit 2 Being Placed in Cold Shutdown,Mode 5.State of Fl Notified1993-01-13013 January 1993 PNO-II-93-001:on 930112,plant Commenced Shutdown Due to RCP Vibration.Unit 2 Being Placed in Cold Shutdown,Mode 5.State of Fl Notified IR 05000335/19920231992-12-14014 December 1992 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/92-23 & 50-389/92-23 on 921130-1204 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Vital Area Barriers & Alarms, Lighting,Assessment & Testing,Maint & Compensatory Measures IR 05000335/19910131991-07-11011 July 1991 Insp Repts 50-335/91-13 & 50-389/91-13 on 910610-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Physical Security Program for Nuclear Power Reactors,Mgt,Plans, Audits,Barriers,Detection & Assessment Aids IR 05000335/19910041991-04-15015 April 1991 Insp Repts 50-335/91-04 & 50-389/91-04 on 910123-0318.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations Review,Maint & Surveillance Observations,Review of Special Repts & Review of Nonroutine Events IR 05000335/19900251990-11-0707 November 1990 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/90-25 & 50-389/90-25 on 901009-12.Noncited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Records & Repts,Alarm Stations,Communication & Training IR 05000335/19900261990-10-31031 October 1990 Insp Repts 50-335/90-26 & 50-389/90-26 on 901022-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Isi,Including Review of Unit 1 Plan for Outage & Associated ISI Administration Procedures PNO-II-90-048, on 900820,shutdown of Unit 2 in Excess of 48 H.Caused by High Vibration of Main Generator Exciter Bearing.Licensee Expanding Scope of Insp & Root Cause Analysis.Unit Scheduled to Begin Refueling Outage on 9009151990-08-22022 August 1990 PNO-II-90-048:on 900820,shutdown of Unit 2 in Excess of 48 H.Caused by High Vibration of Main Generator Exciter Bearing.Licensee Expanding Scope of Insp & Root Cause Analysis.Unit Scheduled to Begin Refueling Outage on 900915 PNO-II-89-066, licensees Prepared for Adverse Weather Conditions Due to Hurricane.Briefings Held W/Key Managers on Responsibilities to Check All Trailers,Secure Crane Hooks & Increase Emergency Food Supplies1989-09-21021 September 1989 PNO-II-89-066:licensees Prepared for Adverse Weather Conditions Due to Hurricane.Briefings Held W/Key Managers on Responsibilities to Check All Trailers,Secure Crane Hooks & Increase Emergency Food Supplies IR 05000335/19890111989-05-15015 May 1989 Partially Withheld Safeguards Insp Repts 50-335/89-11 & 50-389/89-11 on 890327-31 (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21). Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Security Program Plan Audits & Protected & Vital Area Barriers IR 05000335/19880231988-11-0202 November 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-23 & 50-389/88-23 on 880925-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures,Mgt Effectiveness & Security Organization.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) ML20151Y6841988-08-16016 August 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-20 & 50-389/88-20 on 880803 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Circumstances Surrounding Failure to Control Access to Vital Area IR 05000335/19880111988-06-14014 June 1988 Insp Repts 50-335/88-11 & 50-389/88-11 on 880523-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Special Nuclear Matl Control & Accounting IR 05000335/19880121988-06-0909 June 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/88-12 & 50-389/88-12 on 880516-20 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Program Audit,Security Sys Power Supply & Communications PNO-II-87-069, on 871012,Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Declared NOUE Based on Potential for Hurricane Force Winds & Technical Support Ctr Activated for Mgt of Storm Preparation & Operations.St Lucie Also Made Severe Weather Preparations1987-10-13013 October 1987 PNO-II-87-069:on 871012,Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Declared NOUE Based on Potential for Hurricane Force Winds & Technical Support Ctr Activated for Mgt of Storm Preparation & Operations.St Lucie Also Made Severe Weather Preparations PNO-II-87-066, on 871008,licensee Calculated Leakage Above Required Tech Spec Limits.Cause Could Not Be Identified. Reactor Shut Down Based on Leakage & Results of Containment Insp1987-10-0606 October 1987 PNO-II-87-066:on 871008,licensee Calculated Leakage Above Required Tech Spec Limits.Cause Could Not Be Identified. Reactor Shut Down Based on Leakage & Results of Containment Insp ML20235J2471987-09-24024 September 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-19 & 50-389/87-18 on 870825-0904.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Evaluation of Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise. Exercise Scope & Objectives Encl ML20215K8951987-06-17017 June 1987 Exam Rept 50-335/OL-87-01 on 870420-22.Exam Results:Six Reactor Operators & Two Senior Reactor Operators Passed Oral & Written Exams.Master Exams Encl IR 05000335/19870021987-03-20020 March 1987 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/87-02 & 50-389/87-02 on 870217-26 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Area Inspected:Intrusion Detection Sys Being Employed as Detection Aid in Canal Opening PNO-II-87-019, Region II Will Dispatch Augmented Insp Team on 870319 to Review Circumstances Associated W/Problem Re Possible Corrosion Caused by Deposits of Crystalline Boric Acid on Reactor Head & Surrounding Areas1987-03-18018 March 1987 PNO-II-87-019:Region II Will Dispatch Augmented Insp Team on 870319 to Review Circumstances Associated W/Problem Re Possible Corrosion Caused by Deposits of Crystalline Boric Acid on Reactor Head & Surrounding Areas IR 05000335/19870011987-02-26026 February 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/87-01 & 50-389/87-01 on 870113-0207.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices,Station & Corporate Mgt Practices & Overall Plant Operations ML20211H2511987-02-0606 February 1987 Exam Rept 50-335/OL-86-02 on 861117.Exam Results:All Candidates Passed Oral & Written Exams & One Senior Reactor Operator Passed Written Reexam IR 05000335/19860271987-01-26026 January 1987 Insp Repts 50-335/86-27 & 50-389/86-26 on 861216-870112.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Activities for Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance, Site Security Procedures & QA Practices ML20207J1891986-12-17017 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-335/86-25 & 50-389/86-24 on 861117-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Mod Welding,Inservice Testing Program for ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves & Inspector Followup Items IR 05000335/19860131986-12-0101 December 1986 SALP Repts 50-335/86-13 & 50-389/86-12 for Nov 1984 - Apr 1986 PNO-II-86-066, on 860920,leaking Relief Valve on Storage Tube on Hydrogen Trailer Discovered.Other Tubes Isolated from Leak,Area Roped Off & Smoking Prohibited.Event Terminated on 8609211986-09-22022 September 1986 PNO-II-86-066:on 860920,leaking Relief Valve on Storage Tube on Hydrogen Trailer Discovered.Other Tubes Isolated from Leak,Area Roped Off & Smoking Prohibited.Event Terminated on 860921 ML20212P2101986-08-26026 August 1986 Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/86-19 & 50-389/86-18 on 860804-08 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21). Violation Noted:Vehicle Control IR 05000335/19860111986-08-0707 August 1986 Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-335/86-11,50-389/86-10, 50-335/86-17 & 50-389/86-16 on 860414-0625 (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21).Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Access Control to Vital Areas ML20204H7291986-08-0404 August 1986 EN-86-059:on 860807,notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in Amount of $25,000 Will Be Issued to Licensee Based on Failure to Provide Adequate Barriers to Equipment & Inadequate Security Insps ML20205B1211986-07-25025 July 1986 Exam Rept 50-335/OL-86-01 on 860610-12.Exam Results:Three of Four Senior Reactor Operator Candidates Passed Written Exam & All Four Passed Oral Exam & One Reactor Operator Candidate Failed Oral & Written Exam.Exam Encl PNO-II-86-040, on 860606,util Took Facility Out of Svc to Begin Plugging 17 Degraded Steam Generator Tubes.Unit Will Be Shut Down Approx 2 Wks.Tube Degradation Discovered on 860523 in Eddy Current Data Taken During Oct-Dec 19851986-06-0909 June 1986 PNO-II-86-040:on 860606,util Took Facility Out of Svc to Begin Plugging 17 Degraded Steam Generator Tubes.Unit Will Be Shut Down Approx 2 Wks.Tube Degradation Discovered on 860523 in Eddy Current Data Taken During Oct-Dec 1985 PNO-II-86-032, on 860428,iron Workers Employed by Util Contractor Walked Off Job & Set Up Picket Lines at All Four Entrances to Facility.Union Workers Refusing to Cross Picket Lines.Security Forces & Senior Reactor Operators on Job1986-04-28028 April 1986 PNO-II-86-032:on 860428,iron Workers Employed by Util Contractor Walked Off Job & Set Up Picket Lines at All Four Entrances to Facility.Union Workers Refusing to Cross Picket Lines.Security Forces & Senior Reactor Operators on Job ML20140B6311986-03-11011 March 1986 Exam Rept 50-335/OL-85-02 on 851216-20.Exam Results:All 16 Candidates Administered Oral Exams Passed & 14 of 15 Candidates Administered Written Exams Passed IR 05000335/19850351986-01-17017 January 1986 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-35 & 50-389/85-35 on 851216-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt effectiveness-security Program & Security Organization. Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) PNO-II-86-004, on 851203,util Discovered That Individual Cleaning Sludge Out of Steam Generator Received Higher than Expected Exposure in Late Nov/Early Dec.Caused by Lack of whole-body TLD Other than TLD on Upper Arm1986-01-0909 January 1986 PNO-II-86-004:on 851203,util Discovered That Individual Cleaning Sludge Out of Steam Generator Received Higher than Expected Exposure in Late Nov/Early Dec.Caused by Lack of whole-body TLD Other than TLD on Upper Arm PNO-II-85-110A, on 851122,Hurricane Kate Downgraded to Tropical Storm.No Adverse Effects Occurred to Licensed Facilities in Storm Path1985-11-22022 November 1985 PNO-II-85-110A:on 851122,Hurricane Kate Downgraded to Tropical Storm.No Adverse Effects Occurred to Licensed Facilities in Storm Path PNO-II-85-110, on 851119,Hurricane Kate Centered Slightly Inland Over North Central Cuba,About 150 Miles South of Key West,Fl.Diesel Generators at All Three Sites Operable.Turkey Point Declared Unusual Event on 8511181985-11-19019 November 1985 PNO-II-85-110:on 851119,Hurricane Kate Centered Slightly Inland Over North Central Cuba,About 150 Miles South of Key West,Fl.Diesel Generators at All Three Sites Operable.Turkey Point Declared Unusual Event on 851118 PNO-II-85-105A, on 851109,minor Damage to Regular Lifting Rig Identified Following Lifting of Core Internals Upper Guide Structure Free of Reactor Vessel.Unusual Event Declared on 851106 Terminated1985-11-12012 November 1985 PNO-II-85-105A:on 851109,minor Damage to Regular Lifting Rig Identified Following Lifting of Core Internals Upper Guide Structure Free of Reactor Vessel.Unusual Event Declared on 851106 Terminated PNO-II-85-105, on 851106,while Removing Core Internals Upper Guide Structure,One Lifting Rig Attachment Failed.Refueling Operations Halted W/Structure in Apparently Stable Position. NSSS Vendor Being Contacted1985-11-0606 November 1985 PNO-II-85-105:on 851106,while Removing Core Internals Upper Guide Structure,One Lifting Rig Attachment Failed.Refueling Operations Halted W/Structure in Apparently Stable Position. NSSS Vendor Being Contacted IR 05000335/19850211985-10-0808 October 1985 Insp Repts 50-335/85-21 & 50-389/85-21 on 850813-0923.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Compliance,Operator Performance,Qa Practices & Site Security Procedures IR 05000335/19850241985-10-0101 October 1985 Physical Security Insp Repts 50-335/85-24 & 50-389/85-24 on 850916-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Effectiveness & Security Program.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d) & 73.21) IR 05000387/19850291985-09-23023 September 1985 Meeting Repts 50-387/85-29 & 50-388/85-24 on 850828 Re Rescheduling of Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Exam. Region Agreed to Administer One Instructor Certification & One Senior Operator Exam on 851120 & 21,respectively 1999-09-15
[Table view] |
See also: IR 05000335/1987019
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' UNITED STATES I
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, o. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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. ,8 P
! - ' ' ' ..' n. REGION 11
.. g ' Ij ' 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
- t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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SEP 2 51987
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Report Nos.: 50-335/87-19 and 50-389/87-18 j
Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company _j
9250 West Flagler Street- "
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Miami..FL 33101
Docket Nos: 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos: DPR-67 and'NPF-16
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Facility Name: St. Lucie
Inspection conducted. Au ust 25-September 4, 1987
Inspector: \ - 1_ ' f/ //A'7 l
A. L. Cunningham .
D6te S'igned-
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L Accompanying Personnel: G. W. Bethke
D. R. Brewer
C.. R. Bryan
W. W. Stansberry
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-K.D/ Testa. r
Approved by:- w <f f4 8 5' 7 ;
T. R. Decker, Chief _
Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section '
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Division of Radiation Safety
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and Safeguards
SUMMARY <
Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual ;
radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: No violations or deviations were' identified.
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REPORT DETAILS I
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1. Persons Contacted :
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Licensee Employees ]
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- J. W. Dickey, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- J. S. Odom, Site Vice President - Plant Turkey Point
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- G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager ,
- J. B. Harper, Superintendent of Quality Assurance 1
- J. Barrow, Operations Superintendent !
- J. J. Maisler, Emergency Planning Manager )
- G. Casto, Emergency Planning i
- R. Sipos, Services Manager
- S. Shaw, Communications Supervisor l
- L. J. Snipes, Communications Manager
- H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics j
- R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- C. L. Wilson, Department Head, Mechanical Maintenance j
- J. K. Hays, Director - Nuclear Licensing ;
- E. Beurrier, Health Physics Supervisor j
- C, Ward, Site Emergency Coordinator
A. W. Taylor, Emergency Planning Technician (Turkey Point Plant)-
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craf tsmen, j
engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members;.und l
office personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspector
2. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 27, 1987, with
those persons indicated in the paragraph above. The inspector described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below. The exercise weaknesses identified in Paragraphs 8 and 14, below,
were discussed and clarified with the Site Emergency Coordinator. via --
telephone on September 4, 1987. No dissenting comments were received from
the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection..
3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Closed) Violation 50-335, 50-389/87-08-01: Failure to submit Revision 16
of Radiological Emergency Plan to the NRC within 30 days of the effective
date. Inspection disclosed that the licensee had impismented
administrative measures to preclude untimely issuance of REP Revisions.
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4. Exercise Scenario (82301) l
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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that
provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion
of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and
organizationpursuantto'10CFR50.47(b)(14), Paragraphia.FofAppendixE
to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of
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NUREG-0654. q
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in
detail with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no major
scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent
during the exercise. The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from
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the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization. ;
The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised
the onsite emergency organization. The scenario provided sufficient
information to the States, counties, local government and federal agencies
consistent with their participation in the exercise.
The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and ,
personnel through 'use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists l
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participating in the exercise. The controllers provided adequate guidance
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throughout the exercise.
The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill adequately
exercised the participating groups of. the licensee's organization and
offsite local emergency support agencies. Both licensee and offsite i
support agencies also demonstrated a significant commitment to training l
and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists j
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participating in the medical emergency drill. Neither prompting nor undue
interaction between controllers and players was observed.
No violations or deviations were identified. 3
AssignmentofResponsibility(82301)
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This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for i
emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that ,
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adequate staff was available to respond to an energency pursuant to 10 CFR
50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific
guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed that specific energency assignments were made for n
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the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff
was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response I
organization was augnented by designated licensee representatives;
however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or '
continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not
required. Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review ,
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of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number
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of t/ained technical personnel were available for cohtinuous staffing of
the augmented emergency organization, if needed,y
The inspectors also observed act'Sation, staft.hig,iand' operation of'the'
emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations
Support Center (OSC), Emergency 0perations Facility (EOF), and near-site
Emergercy News Center (ENC). W, e required staffing and assignment of
responsibility at .these' facilities were corisistent with the licensee's
Energency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified. ;
6. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
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The licensee's onsite emergency'organiNtiob was observed to assure that
the following requirements were j
ig .tunented pursuant to
10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of. NUREG-0654: (1)
unambiguous definition of responsibilities for: emergency response; (2)
, prqvision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident 3
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response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite i
and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspectors observed that the initial on ite emergency organization was :
adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional j
positions within the organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency )
response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift
and available on-shift personnel. The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed
the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the
simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by )
the Station Manager. Required interactions between the licensee's ~!
emergency ' response organization end State and local support agencies were
adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise. ]
No violations or deviations were 1Jentified. )
7. Emergency Classification System (82301)
1his area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification
and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee i
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, i
specific guidance prorrJ1 gated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance i
recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28. l
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An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and j
properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe emergency
classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed. Licensee
actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations donfirmed that the emergency classification system was
effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan '
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and Implementing Procedures. The system was observed to be adequate for J'
classification of , the simulated accident sequences.. The ' emergency
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procedures provided for initial .and continuing mitigating actions during
the simulated emergency.
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'No violations or deviations were identified.
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' 8. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observedz to ' assure that' procedures were established for
notification of. State and local response organizations 'and emergency
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial: and follow-up'-
messages to response organizations was establ.ished. ,This area was further
observed to assure. that means to' provide early'. notification to the
populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D , of Appendix E n to.10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and ' procedures were
established and available for use'in providing information regarding the
simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response
organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented ' emergency response
organizations, if required. Inspection also disclosed.that the. licensee
consistently failed to- implement prompt notification of the State and
counties within the -15-minute time regime following declaration of the
Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE), Site' Area Emergency, and General ]
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Emergency. In the case of the NOUE, delay in notification was traceable i
to the State of Florida's procedural requirement to verify the validity of 1
the licensee's notification. This then required the State to call the
licensee for verification prior to implementing its notification of the
counties and local response agencies. It was noted'that, although the ,
State implements notification of the counties, the . licensee bears - l
responsibility for all notification, including the State, Federal, and - J
county. j
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The above finding, and the significant delay in notification of the' Site 1
Area Emergency and General Emergency in . excess of 15 minutes, was 1
discussed with licensee representatives.during the critique conducted on 1
August 27, 1987, and the telephone conversation of September 4,-1987. The ;
L licensee committed to review the subject findings and implement indicated' !
c'orrective actions. -
Exercise Weakness 50-335/87-19-01, 50-389/87-18-01: Notification of
emergency classifications within the required 15-minute time regime.
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9. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt- ,
communications among principal response organizations and emergency j
personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to '
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10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of
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NUREG-0654.
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The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's a
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emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF), the licensee
and offsite response organizations, and the. offsite environmental
monitoring teams and the TSC/ EOF. The inspectors also observed i
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information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency
organization. Emergency communications and communication systems were
significantly ' improved, and consistent with emergency response
requirements.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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I 10. Energency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and
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equipnent to support an emergency response were provided and maintained
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pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the l
emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein. {
Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise l
included the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support J
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Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.
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a. Control Room - The Unit 2 Control Room was provided for'the exercise
Shift Supervisor and his staff. Required communications equipment, l
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The {
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Control Room procedures and documents were readily available.
inspector observed that, following review and analysis of the I
l sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted
promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and
factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises. 4
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Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those l'
personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective
management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded
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overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for
orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of
their duties, responsibilities, and authorities. These personnel
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demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system )
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and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and
declare the proper emergency classification.
The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to consistently ;
and effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required i
mitigating actions in a timely manner. It was noted that a detailed
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log of the facility's activities was maintained by the Shift
Supervisor throughout the exercise.
b. Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly. 1'
staffed following notification. by the Emergency Coordinator of. the
simulated ' emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant ~ of their' emergency.
duties; authorities, and responsibilities. Required operation of the
facility proceeded in an orderly manner. The TSC.was provided with 1
adequate equipment for. support of the assigned staff.
.During operation' of.the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely .;
monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as
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required. Status boards and related- visual' aids were strategically..
located to facilitate viewing ' by the .TSC staff. Dedicated
communicators were - assigned to : the ' facility.
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Notification is -
discussed in Paragraph 8, above.
Inspection disclosed' the following additional findings, namely: ~'
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions
were readily implemented and factored-into problem-solving exercises;.
(2) assumption of duties by the Emergency' Coordinator was definite
and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the
Control Room to the TSC was firmly declared and announced to the TSC
staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent, 'and consistent a
with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions;
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(5) accountability, including identifying. missing personnel,. was 4
readily implemented within the accepted time regime and ' was /
consistent with the: scope. of the' scenario; (6) TSC Controllers were
effective in identifying minor scenario problems and interacted with .
players without prompting. The transfer' of authority and specific -)
responsibilities by the Emergency. Coordinator to .the EOF Recovery
Manager following activation of the EOF was prompt, effective and
l consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and implementing i
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procedures. Frequent and effective communications occurred between ;
! the respective facility managers. ;
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c. Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC' was' promptly staffed l
l following activation of the emergency plan by the. Emergency l
Coordinator. An inspector observed that teams were promptly-
assembled, briefed, and dispatched. A health physics technician- '
accompanied each team. The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant
of his duties and responsibilities. During operation.. of this e
facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and
documented. ;
The OSC Supervisor demonstrated . effective management and- control
practices. -The Coordinator frequently updated his staff .regarding
plant status, and thoroughly briefed each investigation and repair
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team prior to.-their deployment to the accident areas. It was noted
by the NRC evaluators and licensee observers, however, that the OSC .
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public address system was not activated. No apparent adverse effects
were noted; however, this finding was documented during the
licensee's . Controller / Evaluator Critique for review and corrective
action,
d. Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) - The E0F was located '
approximately 10.5 miles west of the plant. ' The facilit- was
adequately equipped and staffed to support the required ruponse to
the simulated emergency.
E0F security was prompty established and was ' included as a routine
requirement for preparation and activation of the facility. Status
boards and other related visual aids were. strategically located and
were readily accessible for viewing by the EOF staff. Dedicated'
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communications were assigned to the facility, and all required
notifications were promptly made.
The E0F principal staff freely interacted with State. and county
representatives assigned to the facility. The subject
representatives were routinely informed of plant status, and were
consistently factored into the the decision-making process addressing
required and proposed protective measures and decisions. Transfer of
authority and responsibilities of the TSC Emergency Coordinator to
the E0F Recovery Manager, attending activation of the facility, was
firm and effective. The Recovery Manager was updated on the status
of the emergency and was thoroughly briefed on previous and proposed
mitigating actions. EOF communications with the Control Room, TSC,
and OSC were maintained throughout the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and
equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and
offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the
engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing
plant status and providing recommendations to the Emergency Director
concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems
and equipment, prevention and/or control of radioactive releases, and
prompt termination of the emergency condition.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups. An inplant
group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant
based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite-
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radiological monitoring' teams were dispatched to determine the level of
radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radiological effluent data were received in the TSC, where dose
calculations were computed and factored into the exercise. All resultant-
data were consistent with projected scenario. parameters.
Radiological field monitoring teams were neither observed nor evaluated by j
the NRC; however, inspectors assigned to the TSC and EOF observed dose
assessment activities and related coordination and management of field
monitoring teams deployed to identify, monitor, and track offsite
radiological releases. Accordingly, the licensee demonstrated effective
interaction with State field monitoring teams' and the State . dose
assessment group assigned to the EOF. Dose assessment and projection
calculations performed by the TSC, E0F, and State throughout the release
period were compared and determined to readily agree within acceptable {
limits. TSC, E0F, and State Coordinators conducted consistent and
effective command and control of field teams throughout the subject phase
of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines established for
protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and
in place, and whether protective actions for emergency workers, including
evacuation of nonessential personnel, were promptly implemented pursuant
to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654.
The protective measures decision-making process was observed by the
inspectors. For each emergency classification defined, appropriate
inplant and offsite protective measures were reviewed. Protective
measures recommendations were consistent with the. current Radiological
Emergency Plan and the scope and objectives of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling
radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented
for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure
consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)
(11) and guidelin
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specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout
the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers.
Periodic radiological . surveys were conducted in the emergency response
facilities. _ Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of
emergency actions. Adequate protective clothing and respiratory
protection was available for use as required.
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9.
Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and
radiation area access appeared adequate. Health Physics Supervisors were
observed to thoroughly brief. survey, investigative, and repair teams prior
to their deployment into radiation controlled areas.- Dosimetry was
available and effective.ly used. High-range dosimeters were also available
and fully used where required.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated j
emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to
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10CFR50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of ' Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific criteria promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance.of the
exercise. The information included details on how the. public would.be
notified and the initial actions which should be taken during an
emergency. A rumor control program was also in place.
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An NRC inspector was assigned to observe and evaluate activation.
staffing, and routine operation of the near-site Emergency News Center
(ENC). The following evaluations were made: (1) the number of telephones
available to resident press representatives was ' adequate; (2) accurate
information was contained in news releases; (3) periodic press briefings
and related updates were frequent; (4) visiting media personnel were
prohibited from interfering with operation and management of the ENC;
(5) information provided to the public was simply stated and readily j
j understandable. 1
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It was noted, however, that, contrary to Section 4.1 of Procedure 1103 j
(Duties of the Emergency Information Manager), the timing and content of .
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all news releases were not formally approved by the Emergency Control !
Officer prior to actual release. Only verbal approval was given by the l
subject officer. Consistent with Section 4.1 of the cited procedure,
approval implies signature or identifiable initials of the cognizant
manager or officer. Licensee management agreed with this finding as ;
discussed during the Exit Interview conducted on August 27,-1987, and the-
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telephone conversation initiated by the NRC on September 4,1987, to
clarify and confirm final NRC inspection findings. The licensee
representative committed to review the subject item and clarify required ;
approval to indicate formal signature as the sole means of approval of all
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news releases issued from the near-site ENC.
Exercise Weakness 50-335/87-19-02, 50-389/87-18-02: Failure of ENC l
Emergency Control Officer to properly approve all news releases prior to
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issuance of same to the public. This item will be reviewed during
subsequent inspections.
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15. Recovery Planning (82301)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requi rements in
10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E. to 10 CFR 50, and the
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654. l
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The licensee conducted a recovery planning meeting prior to termination of
the exercise. Licensee planners discussed and established the following:
administrative and logistical support, manpower and engineering services, .
radiological surveillance, development and assignment of a recovery !
organization consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing j
Procedures. A comprehensive review of reentry plans and status was j
conducted. j
No violations or deviations were identified. .
16. Exercise Critique (82301) i
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were l
l brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective -1
action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to l
,
10 CFR 50, and specific guidance - promulgated in Section II.N of l
l NUREG-0654.
1
The inspectors observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique 1
following termination of the exercise. The subject critique involved a ,
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detailed discussion and analysis of required improvements, weaknesses, and
deficiencies identified during the exercise. All findings were documented
i for review and correction. Positive findings were also discussed and .
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I recorded for presentation during the formal NRC/ Licensee critique. The
critique was effectively managed, controlled, and directed to
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identification / documentation of substantive findings and indicated
improvements. The conduct and content of the cited critiques were
consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17. Inspector Follow-up (92701)
l a. (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-335/85-15-01: Need to
send HP and Chemistry procedures implementing Radiological Emergency
l Plan to the NRC in accordance with Appendix E, Section IV of
10 CFR 50. Inspection disclosed that pertinent health physics and
chemistry procedures and revisions thereof will be routinely
forwarded to the NRC, as required.
b. (Closed) IFI 50-335/86-IN-98, 50-389/86-IN-98: Offsite medical
services. Inspection disclosed that supplemental or backup medical
l services consistent with the subject IE Information Notice have been
provided.
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c. (Closed) ! IFI - 50-335/86-12-01, 50-389/86-11-01 (Exercise Weakness):
Delegation of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities without' ensuring 1 1
that timely information flow / updates are provided to the recipient.'
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Inspection disclosed that. required transfer 'of responsibilities. from I
the Emergency- Coordinator to. the recipient 'was : decisively 1 and ' ,
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effectively implemented and included detailed information updates Las j
. required. !
i -d. .(Closed) IFI 50-335/87-EP-01, 50-389/87-EP-01: Verify audibility off
l ' alarms in high-noise areas (Bulletin 79-18). The inspector land:a 1
cognizant licensee- representative requested the Shift Supervisor-
actuate site alarms as a. routine practice. _ Having located themselves- .
in the maximum noise' area of .the, plant' (plant; cooling water intake' ,
pumps), both persons determined that the subject alarms were readily l
audible.- 1
18. Federal: Evaluation Team Report- l
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional; Assistance Committee .
and Federal Emergency Managenent Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the i
activities of offsite' agencies during this exercise will be forwarded'by- !
separate correspondence.
Attachment:
Exercise Scope and Objectives
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FLORtDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ]
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OBJECTIVES
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PEOPLE . . . SERVING PEOPLE -
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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
ST. LUCIE PLANT
EVALUAT.ED EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
AUGUST 26,1987
A. General Objectives
1. Notification of Emergency Response Personnel
a. Demonstrate the ability to promptly notify and communicate
information to NRC, State and local authorities.
2. Emergency Response Facilities, Equipment, and Communications
a. Demonstrate the ability to staff the Technical Support Center (TSC),
the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF), and the Emergency News Center (ENC).
b. Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC,
OSC, EOF, and ENC.
c. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of
designated emergency response equipment.
d. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of
emergency communication equipment.
3. Direction and Control
a. Demonstrate the ability of each emergency. response facility manager
to maintain command and control over the emergency response
activities conducted within the facility throughout the exercise.
b. Dernonstrate the ability to gather, assess, and disseminate information
to the public and governmental officials regarding the status of the
emergency conditions and the status of emergency response activities
per regulatory time restraints.
c. Demonstrate the ability to initiate and coordinate emergency response
activities in an efficient and timely manner.
EP3:2 RPTS.
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d. Demonstrate the ability of emergency response personnel to execute
the S t. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan through ~ its -;
associated Emergency Plan implementing Procedures. 1
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4. Accident Assessment
a. Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room, TSC, and EOF to
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analyze current plant conditions, and their potential consequences, and i
provide recommendations for mitigating actions, j
5. Radiological Assessment
U
a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate on-site, in-plant, and off-site .i
radiological monitoring activities. j
b. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the TSC and ' EOF dose
assessment activities.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to . control and coordinate - the . flow of ' )
Information regarding off-site radiological consequences between j
radiological assessment personnel stationed at the TSC and the EOF.
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6. Protective Response , j
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a. Demonstrate the ability to adequately control radiation exposure to . 1
on-site emergency workers. ]
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i b. Demonstrate the ability for the Emergency Coordinator and/or )
l Recovery Manager to determine Protective Action Recommendations - /
l for the public per regulatory time restraints.
7. . Training & Exercise
a. Demonstrate the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness training -(
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program through the critique of trained participants'in a practical
demonstration.
b. Demonstrate the effectiveness of actions . taken to correct past
j identified weaknesses in the emergency preparedness program.
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c. Demonstrate the ability of participants and controller / evaluators to- i
evaluate and' critique their exercise performance.
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B. Specific objectives for those activities conducted from the ' Control Room. - '
- Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center.
l. Direction and Control !
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L a. Demonstrate.the precise and , clear transfer of Emergency. Coordinator : ;
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responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC. , ,
b. - Demonstrate ithe abilliyf of! each/ facility) manager to' periodically: '
inform facility personnel 'of the status of the emergency situation and . , j
the plant conditions. .
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.c. Demonstrate the ability to timely and. accurately transfer,information1 j
between ' emergency response .f acilities.' j
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d. Demonstrate.- the- ability? of- the l TSC1 and OSC to coordinate the
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deployment of emergency teams.
2. ' Accident Assessment
a. Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to mAke a timely -
determination of the probable cause of lthe incident,' and perform
mitigating actions to place ' the affected unit 'in a safe, stableL
- condition.
b. Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to s'upport the Control Room (
efforts to identify the probable cause of .an incident, mi_tigate the
consequences of that incident,'and place the affected unit in a safe, . :i
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stable condition.
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c Demonstrate . the ' abilit'y' of theE NuclearM Plant LSupervisor Land - j
. Emergency Coordinator to classify an emergency condition. - -J
Radiological Assessment
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3. ,
a. Demonstrate .the ability of the TSC to direct and, OSC _to deploy on- I
site and off-site radiological monitoring teams in a timely manner. , j
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b. Demonstrate the ability.; off the on-site surveyL team 1 personnel to -l
efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures: to perform . dose . 1
rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples, and other j
prescribed on-site and in-plant radiological monitoring activities. .
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c. Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments and projections-
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~f on-site ' and ' off-site radiological. conditions' to: . support the;
formulation of protective action recommendations.- "i
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d. Demonstrate the: ability ' to assess.1$ formation available Lfrom the - h
containment and effluent high-level radiation monitoring systems and ')
respond accordingly. l
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e. Demonstrate the ability to analyze samples drawn from the. in-plant-
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normal and post-accident sampling systems, and assess the. resultant .
data. i
4. Protective Response
'a. Demonstrate the ability : to ' formulate. and implement' ' on-site
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protective action' measures in a timely manner.
C. Specific' Objectives for those' Activities Conducted ~ from the Emergency -
Operations Facility and Ernergency News Center. !
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1. Emergency Response Facilities and Communications ]
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a. Demonstrate real time. activation of. the EOF' from the Juno Beach c
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Office and staff in a timely manner. j
b. Demonstrate.that adequate communications exist between ' FPL and-
offsite agency emergency facilities. ,
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2. Direction and Control 1
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a. Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of the responsibility' to
notify offsite agencies, and issue Protective Action Recommendations
from the Emergency Coordinator to the ' Recovery Manager.
3. Accident Assessment
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a. Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to support the on-site efforts
to identify the cause of an incident, mitigate the consequences of that
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incident, and place the affected unit in a safe, stable condition.
b. Demonstrate as necessary, the abilityito 'obtain vendor and other ;
outside resources to assist accident analysis and mitigation efforts.
4. Radiological Assessment
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l a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate FPL ' off-sitej radiological -l
monitoring activities with those conducted by the State.
b. Demonstrate the ability to perform assessments and projections of !
off-site radiological conditions to support the timely, formulation _of'
l protective action recommendations. ]
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c. Demonstrate the ability.to' coordinate and compare FPL off-site dose'
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assessment activities with those conducted by the State.'
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EP3:2 RPTS.
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d. Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the'. flow of
' information regarding off-site radiological consequences with State
radiological assessment personnel.'
Protective Response I
5.
a. Demonstrate that decisions.can be made in a timely; manner regarding !
protective action recommendations for the geaerai public within the
Plume Exposure (10-mile) Emergency' Planning Zone (EPZ), and can be ,
communicated to State and local authorities within regulatory time i
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restraints.
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6. Public Information
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a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the' preparation, review and
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release of information with State and local government _ agencies as
appropriate; and provide : accurate, clear and timely . information
releases to the news media.
D. Specific Portions of the Emergency Response that will not be tested. -1
l 1. Site evacuation. J
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2. Real time activation of the Emergency News Center.
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3. Real time response by the Emergency Information Manager. 1
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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COM*ANY
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TIMELINE ard MINI-SCE2MRIOS
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ST LUCIE EVALUATED ^ EXERCISE
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Revisionc7/07/87
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Unit 2. .Irii tial? Conditions
The! Unit'hau justLreturned to.;100% powerLfo11owing:
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an uncomplicated l trip. . .(Unit -returned' toipower
on' August ~25 at 10:OO;pm).
Unit 2 ' is'-near .end-of-lif e with120 da9511ef ti l before .
scheduled ref ueling.
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RCS activi'ty has shown an increase- sinceEreturning:to-
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operation. Initiallactivity[:upon returnfto.powed;was
4 uci/ml I-131 DEO. The. 8:00 am? sample. indicated .9."
uci/m1' I-131 DEO.: p
2-A Auxiliary feedwater , pump- is..outiofiserv' ice for
inboard bearing replacement. Estimated time)-to re'pairy
is 7' hours.
2-B Charging' pump is out of service'to replace packing.
Estimated time ,to ' repairE is 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.:
A small primary / secondary- tube leak i ri .S/G 2-A was.
detected upon. return ._to power; . leak.has remained'
steady at. approximately .06 gpm.
Periodic' containment' anomaly check is .due. this s'hift'
coordinated with HP to begins at 10:15 am. '. Cont ai nment '
mini purge is in - progress at this time.
is out of ; service,. ' cl osed ' and '
1 PORV block . valve
" ~de-energi:ed"due to burned-out . motor. Estimated ~ time-
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to repair is twelves hours.
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Unit 1 Conditions
Unit 1 is at 100% power--120 ' days into < current : cycl e.
All equipment operablefand available.
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Meteor ol ogi c al . conditions ~ 1ar e ' typical- -for.> South
Florida. Thegpresent: temperature.is.83 degrees-F.-
and the wind is variable at.1 to 3' mph. Forecast for
today'is partly cloudy; winds from the east to south-
east at approximately 5 mph. There is'a 50% chance'of.
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thunderstorms.
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10:00 Exercise commences. {,
10:15 Nuclear Operator (NO) and Health Physics Tech. (HP)
enter containment for anomaly check.
10:30. NO calls control rocm from containment asking permis-
sion to backseat manual letdown isolation valve V-2593 a
and informs NPS that backseating this valve has worked j
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in the past.
10:40 NPS or ANPS grants permission for backseat.
10:50 NO has no success backseating valve using reach red so i
he takes it upon himself to enter cubicle and physical- )
ly backseat valve using a valve wrench. HP objects but -
cannot stop NO. When NO applies pressure to valve, ]
bonnet cracks, releasing l ar ge amounts of steam. NO is j
scalded, jumps away, hits head on angle iron, and is {
knocked unconscious (which will lead to fatality). j
Cracked bonnet creates a .85 gpm primary system leak. I
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HP calls control room for help after pulling uncon I
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10:55
scious operator from the valve area and carrying him to i
personnel hatch. Burns to the HP's face and wrists are l
received in the process.
11:00 While dragging the operator out of the containment
the HP cuts the face of the inner door seal causing
inner door seal failure.
The HP is extremelv excited about the condition of
operator and fails to close the inner docr befcre
opening the outer door. The ringfeeder (clutch) which
shculd not allow this to occur has become corroded (due
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to a l ack of pm) and is not wori:ing properl y. The HP
succeeds in opening the outer door with the inner door
open, but in doing so shears the Geneva latch plate (at
--a defective area, i.e. manufacturing flaw) and the
- outer door cannot be l atched.
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Alarm in the Control Room will indicate that the
personnel hatch is open.
Ops should curtail miqi purge at this time reali:ing
that a potential primary leak is in progress. Neither
I butterfly valve completely rescats. Ops should be
unaware of this leak path due to open airlock centri-
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buting'to any increase in plant vent monitor.
11:05 First aid team arrives at personnel hatch and finds HP
Tech. semi-conscious and NO dead.
11:10 Centrol room receives call 'from first aid team on the
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status of i n .i ur i e s and that both hatch doors are open.
11:15 A NOTIFICATION of UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared for
contaminated. injured worker prior to first aid vehicle
leavina site f or hospi tal . ,
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Control' room leak rate procedure indicates a total .95
gpm primary leek.
NPS sends in a second containment entry team to verify
that pressure boundary leakage enists.
Operations d ep ar t <nent secures inner hatch door and
informs Technical group to_do a. seal test on inner. door,
(outer door will not lock down).
Within approximately 15 minutes of being made aware
that both hatch doors are left open the NPS should
declare an UNUSUAL EVENT based on a loss of containment
integrity. 4
'
11:30 Tech group begins eeal test on inner personnel hatch.
l 11:40 Verification from containment entry team that pressure
boundary leakage enists causes the NPS to institute
shutdown at 1% per minute.
11:45 Tech aroup test the inner door seal and fir.ds-the
Icakaae to be 15. 000 SCCt1.
12:00 The Mechanical maintenance department checks with
stores and finds there are spare Geneva plates and
they inform the HPS they will have the personnel hatch
repaired in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
l 12:15 V-2593 leak increases to 55 gpm.
12:20 - ~At 60% power, shutdown rate increases to 2% per minute
to address recognition of the larger leak rate.
I
12:30 . . Media rumors of unconfirmed number of deaths and major
reactor problems at St. Luci e pl ant.
i
At approximately this. time,. EC should declare ALERT f
based on >50 gpm mismatch between charging and letdown
with other indications of primary leak in containment.
During controlled shutdown, NPS/EC attempts to' swap A
.
12:40
and D Aun-Transformer breakers to start-up position
(offsite power). 2B f ails to swap but remains closed.
Ops will attempt to start B diesel which will~ fail tc
start.
appr oni mat el y 20% power and holding to
12:55 Reactor at
___-.
_ _ _ _ _ _ . - _
-.
5 1
. . 4
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.1
1
breaker and B j
complete repairs to B Aun .ransformer
diesel,
i'
Contingency message may be given at this time to ECO
12:00 >
to activate EOF due to increased media attention.
2-D Start-up breaker is repaired. Cause was a loose ,
1!:10
connector on cont'ol r power fuse block. {
Shutdown resumes,
t
off valve, increasing leak f
13:15 Bonnet-on V-2592 ":ippers" Reactor trips. . j
rate to approximately 4550 gpm.
l
breaker reopens and 2B diesel generator
13:10 Start-up
all B-side power,
still not repaired causing loss C
~
Aux
of
feed pump used to <
includino 29 Aun. feed pumps.
supply feed water to A and B steam generators; trips on
to reset overspeed latch.
overspeed. Ops must get T . D. l
Aux feedwater pump starts but tqips j
Upon reset, 2C
again on overspeed. T.O. reports oil level in gov. !
In the meantime,
control low and coes out to find oil. *
l
l
RCS is indicating saturated conditions.
(
t
All B-side saf eguards are of f .
13:5S Pe-sonnel hatch is repaired but the seal has not yet
been confirmed bv a satisfactory leak test. Mini-purgo l
is still leaking but it is not obvious to the Control
that any addi-
Room that the valves did not seat or
tional leakpath from containment exists.
As containment pressure increases, release exits
and escapes into the
containment through mini-purge
environment. 90% of the release is taken up by the
Auxiliary Building Supply Fans -(directly above the
area where the mini-purge is located); 10% escapes
.
-
unmonitored into the environment.
A GENERAL
13:45 I Reactor core uncovered at this time.
EMERGENCY should be declared shortly af ter the reccani-
tion of the loss of 3 fission product barriers.
Protective Action Recommendations should be: Evacuate 2-5
Evacuate 0-2 miles. complete radius;
miles, complete radius; shelter 5-10 miles, compl ete
radius. Sectors N,P,0 affected WNW sector.
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY may initially be declared due to
the primary leak being areater than charging pump
capacity. This should be escalated short1v af ter ccre
uncovery.
T.O. puts oil in 2C Aun feedwater pump. Pump start is
13:55
successful and feeding steam generators. Total time
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. . . .
.
.. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . .
-.
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without AFW approximately y 30 minutes.
I
2B Start-up Transf ormer br eaker is repaired and B-side
power is restored.
'
14:00 EOF should be operational at this time.
14:15 H2-Analv:.or indicating 1.0% H2 in containment.
increased pressure in containment, airborne <
14:30 Due to
r =idicacti ve r el ease f rom containment via the mini-purge
intake increases. Release exits the Aun Building. j
unmonitored, and'is picked up by the Auxiliary Building
ventilation intake. Increased' activity is detected by
throughout the Aun Building and
radiation monitors
through the plant vent. Control Rocm becomes aware of'
the existence of another release' path.
i
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hydrogen is sigwly
14:45 With 'H2 recombiners in operation,
being reduced in containment.
l
l 15:00 Small doses are being measured beyond 2 miles from*the l
Doses are not significant enough to prompt
plant.
further PARS.
1
15:20 Containment pressure continues to reduce as plant
regains control of incident. l
Plant goes into recirculation phase- at approximately !
!
this time. When this occurs, dose rates and air
acti vi ty in the Aun. Building increase significantly
due to cases in RCS escaping from LPSI pump leaks. ;
Some addi ti on al activity is released through the plant l
vent.
16: 00 Pl ant reaches shutdown cooling temperature.
-- .
~
1 6': 3 0 i Emergency repair crews succeed in securing mini-purge
% isolation value, terminating the release f rom contain- ;
ment.
Containment hydrocen further reduces, plant conditions
17:30
appear stable.
10:00 Exercise is ter minated.
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MINI-SCENARIO #1
i
CONTAMINATED INJURY AND DEATH
10:15 am Nuclear Opera' tor, with Health' Physics coverage, enter '!
Unit 2 containment to perform periodic . anomaly check.
Once inside. containment, NO gets a pipe wrench from
the rack at the base'of the stairway and begins rounds
of the outside of biowall area of containment. HP
tech. performs typical rad surveys (beta / gamma and
neutron) and finds normal readings.
1
1
10:30 Upon reaching the regenerative heat exchanger area, l
the NO hears a steam leak coming from the letdown
isolation valve cubicle. NO calls the NPS to get
permi s si on to backseat the -leaking valve JV-2593) !
which has a wisp of steam releasing from the steam !
area. The NO has had personal experience
valve leaking before and has stopped leaks there
w(th this
simply by backseating using the reach . rod. The NPS
concurs and allows the NO to attempt backseating this ,
valve. l
10:50 The NO tries to backseat the valve with no success. He
is irritated that this failed because he convinced the
NPS that he could stop the leak and now f eels that the
NPS will think less f avorably of his expertise. While ;
the HP has his back to the NO to set down the REM ball I
(survey meter), the NO grabs the pipe wrench and i
enters the cubicle to manually backseat the valve. HP
yells at the NO and orders him to exit the cubicle.
The NO' hooks up the pipe wrench to give one hard pull 1
on the valve and does so. This cracks the bonnet and
releases a burst of steam. The startled NO gasps and
--
knhales the superheated steam as it scalds his face. i
He 4jumps back, strikes a piece of angle iron with
. -
- _ his head, falls back over the valve and onto the floor.
, The.HP tech. enters the cubicle and. pull s out the NO,
burning an exposed area of his neck and both wrists in
l the process as his PC's part at tape down points.
10:55 The HP tech, extremely excited and in pain from his
burns, manages to pick up the NO over his shoulder in
a firemans carry and get him up the stairs and to the
personnel batch area. He sees the PA next to the
hatch and calls the control room requesting help. The
HP tech. opens the inner per sonnel hatch dcor and
drags the NO in (cutting the inner door seal in the
process) and now begins to feel the pain from his
burns greatly increasing. He becomes more panicked
and somewhat disoriented and fails to close the inner '
hatch before opening the outer hatch. The ringfeeder
!
- _ _ _ - - _ _ - .
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4
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15: 45 A maintenance team is organized to secure the release. !
Dose rates in the area 'will prompt authori:ation of ij
emergency exposure considerations.
.]
.. q
16:30 The' release is terminated' as the maintenance team l
finds a way to secure the release. (It is anticipated 1
that a blind flange will be placed over the release {
path.) j
-l
Messages associated with this mini-scenario are: 1,10,12,17
l
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l 3 {
i b
'
,.
h
l
l
l 1
l
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or .- .
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_ - - _ - - - - . _ __ _ - _ . - . - _ . _ _ _ - - - - . - - --
,
. *
.
MINI-SCENARIO #2 I
,
BROKEN PERSONNEL HATCH l 2
j
11:00 am Alarm in the Control Room will indicate that the
personnel hatch is open but it will not immediately be
known that both doors are open. This alarm will stay I
on until someone is sent to investigate.
f
11:15 When someone responds to close the doors, the inner !
door will close but the outer door will not lock. The 1
Tech. Department will be called to do a leak test on I
the personnel hatch to verify that the inner door is 'j
sealed. '
11:45 Tech. Department will report that 15,000 SCCM is
leaking between the inner door, the outer door cannot ,
be closed and locked, therefore, a loss of containment' i
integrity exists. The plant should enter Tech. Dpec.
action statement 3.6.1.1. (
12:00 Mechanical Maintenance inspects the door, finds the
problems (corroded ringfeeder and sheared Geneva l
plate), and finds spare part for Geneva plate in
stores. They estimate that they can fix the door in
two hours.
J
13:35 Maintenance fixes the outer personnel hatch door. !
When the Tech. Department comes- to check the leak i
rate, the first test fails but the tester finds oil in
the flow gauge and has to go get other leak rate test
equipment in order to perform the test.
14:00 Tech. Department finds equipment, returns to the
personnel hatch, and retests to find personnel hatch
-- sealed.,. It should become apparent to the Control Room
-
q) ... b y this time that another containment failure exists
j[,y, as activity is still being released via the plant vent
t. ' and ECCS.
,
4. .
~
.~-
Messages associated with this mini-scenario are: 10,13,16,17,18
26,47
l
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
_ __ _
_ _ . . _ _ _ ._;
. .
(clutch), which would nor mal l y prevent this from
occurring, breaks due to_ lack of preventive maintenance
and the outer per sonnel hatch opens, shearing the.
Geneva plate in the process.
11:00 The HP tech. collapses af ter pulling the NO out of the
airlock and down the stairs. . Security- is at the
personnel hatch and tries to ai d by. calling via the. <
security radio to get first aid.
The First aid / Decontamination ' Team responds, taking
care of the injured HP and doing'whatever they can for
the already dead NO, until offsite medical assi st ance
arrives. Offsite medical assistance will transport
the contaminated / injured HP tech. to Lawnwood Hospital
and leave the dead NO on site.
Messages associated with this mini-scenario are : 4,6,8,h,20,21,
23(7), 24 t
I
,
!
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1
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T.
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1
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.,
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4
1
MIN 1-SCENARIO #'3
4
MEDIA ATTENTION ADDRESSING DEATH AT-SITE-
Revised 7/7/87, ,
11:30 am Police scanner report is overheard by .a reporter .at
Stuart News.
l Rumors about the death onsite begin. to. spread a'round-
L the plant, workers. A' contract l aborer . overhear s and
calls WTVX (Channel 34).
~
saying that he thinks someone
at~the' plent. He: won ' t give
died.inside. the' reactor
his name and. upon' being-questioned,l getsynervous andL
hangs up. A camera. crew that 'is on the' beach -filming '
tourists is cent.to the site.
News reporter,- being knowledgeable' of-
11:45 The Stuart.
protocol with the_' press by 1FPL, calls Corpo(ate
l
Communications to get some verification of'this story.
The WTVX camera crew finds a plant 1worker, an apprent--
12:00
ice electrician, who is leaving'the -site to move 1 bis
pregnant wife out of. their, beach- front' condo 2 miles
south of the site. 'The plant . worker was in the
control room area around 11:00' am' and heard the
annunciators and some talk of- the injuries and the
primary leak in containment. As : rumors spread ' amena
other workers about the death-of the,NO.'the' apprentice
elec trici an becameL worri edi and' left to' evacuate his.
wife. When approached by the news crew, the electri-
cian gives a. seemingly . accurate, but- not truthful,
account of the events in progress.
12:20 More rumors are generated byf the 2 ambulance .staf f . af ter,
arriving'at Lawnwood. An ER : nurse overhears the talk
,
^~~of ddaths at St. Lucie and call s her. husbandHe,.in . who ' .i s ' a
turn,
J., printer at The Fort Pierce.NewsgTribune.
,
,
dead ' workers .are being
j5. perpetuates the rumor that radioactiveLexplosion
d.; brought into the hospital from a'
- at the plant and thel ambulance.had toLleave; people
Lehind, probably because they were radioactive.
12:30 A reporter from 'The?. Fort Pierce News Tribune calls
Corporate Communications to get at story on'the' deaths
at St1 Lucie.- A news crew is:en the-way to the ENC as
as TV crews. from' Palm- Beach. Channel 124.and'
.
well
Channel 5: who have called the: paper f or finf ormation.~
12:55 It is expected that,.in light of the degraded' condition
at the plant and the increased media attention over
the death, the EOF will initiate activation. Personnel
will leave the Juno Beach Of fice by this time.
(:
l
l
'
.,
o_ _ . . __._.m_mhm__m.mu-_
. .
4
. r.
Messages associated with this mini-scenars.o.are: 23, 33,3,4
I
i
!f
.
3
b
I
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1
l
.
I
1
i
-- .
O
e
i#O '
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.-a-x---_m 4
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MINI-SCENARIO #4
RELEASE FROM MINI-PURGE (VALVES 1-FCV-25-26, 2-FCV-25-36)
10:00 am Containment purge is in progress for normal venting
and anticipation of anomaly check scheduled for 10:15.
11:00 Once primary leak is realized by Control Room, the
containment purge will be terminated. When mini purge
isolation valves (1-FCV-25-26, I-FCV-25-36) shut,
neither close completely. Due to lack of' preventive
maintenance, one valve han a corroded seal area and the
other locks up slightly open. Initial switches
indicate closed in the Control Room as the valves
actuate enough toward the closed position to trip the
closed switch. Release path is not detectable until
acti vi ty in containment, combined with high containment-
pressure, force release'through mini-purge.
"
. ,
13:15 Bonnet on letdown i sol ati on val ve (V-2593) comes off I
initiating a small break LOCA. As RCS flashes to
steam and releases to containment, containment pressure .
increases. l
13:30 The core is uncovered, causing a major release of. i
radioactive materials into containment as fuel cladding '
f ail s. Containment pressure at 10 psig f orces radio-
active release out of containment vi s mini purge, i
This release goes f rom the purge room outside contain- j
ment, out the intake filters, and into the area i
between the Auxiliary Building, Containment, and the j
l Fuel Handling Building. The HVS-4-A/B fans pick up 1
l the majority of the radioactive release (90%) and
carry it back into the Auxiliary Building and out the i
plant vent. CIAS causes the Fuel Handling Building
- Supply fans to stop so the release is not taken up by
.
,g t; hose fans.
~
,%
1The majority of the release is dispersed f airly evenly
' throughout the Auxiliary Building and exits to the
'
environment, monitored by the plant vent and ECCS A
and B effluent monitors. The remaining 10% of the
release not taken up by the Auxiliary Building Supply
fans (HVS-4-A/B) disperses to the environment f rom its
exit outside of containment.
.
15:15 An HP team is sent from the TCS to do a survey inside
the RCA and outside the Auxiliary-Building. When they
reach the area near the release, they get indications
of plume inversion. Upon further investigation, they
hear a whistle sound (air passing through the mini-
purge isolation valses).
J
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -