ML20215K570

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Rev 0 to Procedure Dcrdr 5.2, Verification of Implemented Human Engineering Discrepancy Corrections
ML20215K570
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/23/1987
From: Holland W
ILLINOIS POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20215K548 List:
References
DCRDR-5.2, NUDOCS 8705110253
Download: ML20215K570 (8)


Text

Attachm:nt 3 to U-600895 Page 1 of 5 ILLINOIS 70lER COMPANY l NO. DCRDR 5.2 REV. 0 I

CLINTON POWER STATION l TITLE Verification of Implemented HED l Corrections DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW l l DATE 2-23-87 PAGE 1 of 5 REVIEWED BY J .13- APPROVED BY 7[ J7!87 Project /6gineer/Date l Pr6g' ram Manager /Date i

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This procedure establishes the method and requirements for verifying that the implemented corrective actions to Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) comply with established guidelines and do not create a new !TdD.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This procedure applies to all review team members and to the personnel of contractors and subcontractors of either Torrey Pines Technology or Illinois Power involved in the Detailed Control Room Design Review.

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 Clinton Power Station DCRDR - Program Plan dated September 1984.

3.2 Torrey Pines Technology proposal number GACP 41-212.

3.3 Illinois Power Purchase Order Number X-03757.

3.4 Clinton Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review -

Operating Experience Review Report.

3.5 Procedure DCRDR 5.1, HE0 Assessment and HED Improvement.

3.6 Procedure DCRDR 3.3, Photographic Record of HEOs.

3.7 2rocedure DCRDR 4.1, Operating Experience Review.

, 3.8 Procedure DCRDR 4.2, Control Room Survey 3.9 Procedure DCRDR 4.4, DCRDR & E0P Integrated SFTA 3.10 Procedure DCRDR 4.5, DCRDR & E0P Integrated Verification 3.11 Procedure DCRDR 4.6, DCRDR & EOP Integrated Validation SS/355 5110253 870328 1 ADOCK 0500 P

Attachnent 3 to U-600895 l Page 2 of 5 ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY l NO. DCRDR 5.2 REY. O I

CLINTON POWER STATION l TITLE Verification of Implemented HED l Corrections DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW l l DATE 2-23-87 PAGE 2 of 5 I

I 4.0 DISTRIBUTION Distribution List No. 1.3.

5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5.1 The DCRDR Program Manager will'be responsible for approval of this procedure and changes thereto.

5.2 The DCRDR Principal Investigator and Project Engineer will be responsible for the review and implementation of this procedure under the contract authority.

6.0 REQUIREMENTS 6.1 OBJECTIVE The objective of the Verification of Implemented HED Corrections (VIHC) is to ensure that the implemented corrective actions for existing HEDs conform to the guidelines used with procedures in references 3.5 HE0 Assessment and HED Insrovement 3.7 Operating Experience Review 3.8 Control Room Survey 3.9 DCRDR & E0P Integrated SFTA 3.10 DCRDR & E0P Integrated Verification 3.11 DCRDR & E0P Integrated Validation and assure that they do not introduca new HEDs.

1 l

SS/355

Attschmsnt 3 1 to U-600895 j l Page 3 of 5 -

ILLIN0IS POWR COMPANY l NO. DCRDR 5.2 REV. 0 [

l .

[;

CLINTON PORR STATION l TI_TLE Verification ~of Implemented HED "

l Corrections DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW l l DATE 2-23-87 PAGE 3 of 5 I

i 6.2 TASKS The overall VIHC phase will include the following specific activities:

- Preparation of a VIHC survey form to assess each implemented corrective action. (Figure 1)

- Complete a VIHC survey form for each implemented corrective action.

- Preparation of a report summarizing the VIHC findings.

6.3 METHODOLOGY The methodology will follow the checklist procedure used during the ,

Control Room Survey, Reference 3.8, for each corrective action.

Each corrective action will be reviewed by a human factors special-ist recording the data on a VIHC survey form (Figure 1). The review will determine whether the corrective action complies with the guidelines or impacts on the SFTA.

A Reference / Comment space is provided for corrective actions that do not comply with the guidelines or impact the SFTA. The human factors specialist will provide a brief statement explaining how the listed control room item or device does not satisfy the guideline or convention.

If the corrective action complies with the guidelines, the completed VIHC form is filed with the HED.

If the corrective action does not comply with the originating guide-line, the completed VIHC form and HED are submitted to the AIT for additional assessment per Procedure 5.1. ]

If the corrective action does not comply with guidelines other than  !

the originating one, this new compliance is documented on an HED I form and submitted to the AIT for assessment. I l

Diagrams or photographs will be used as necessary to clarify a corrective action that does not satisfy the guideline.

SS/355 l

Attachm:nt 3 to U-600895 l Page 4 of 5 ILLINOIS poler COMPANY l NO. DCRDR 5.2 REV. 0 l

CLINTON POWER STATION l TITLE Verification of Implemented HED l i

l Corrections DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW l l DATE 2-23-87 PAGE 4 of 5 I

I 6.4 DOCUMENTATION t

The VIHC effort will be documented in a VIHC Summary Report.

7.0 EFFECTIVE DATE This procedure becomes effective immediately upon approval.

l l

4 5

SS/355

1 Attachm:nt 3 l to U-600895

.l Page 5 of 5 ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY NO. DCRDR 5.2 REV. O CLINTON POWER STATION TITLE Verification of Implemented HED l Corrections DETAILED CONTROL ROOM bESIGN REVIEW l DATE 2-23-87 PAGE 5 of 5 P

I I

DETAILEO CON (ROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW VERIFICATION OF IMP!EMENTED HED CORRECTIONS (VIHC) f a

085tRVt4. . . _ . .. f DATE. PAGE OF LOCATION _ . . _ . _ . . . .

GulClutt CAITERIA ITIM NO . . _ . . M0 AgitRthCE NO: .

f

$09'Cf of let0- I COAAECTIVE ACfl04

i. rhe .e,.e e e e. - e .h . , s es.o..

8.1 82 8.3 ._ - . 6.4 . . . . _ _ 85 88  ;

87 88 89 . _ _ '

Osse the terrottawe atten compey web the aheve .et.d geadstums?

tcherb e.e  !

2. Does the correcteve arsame ame.st the $7TA? I l

MFEMiltt/Coassetst; s

i.

WAGAAM/PtIOTO NO :

l i

A l

Figure 1. Sample Verification of Implemented HED Correction Form

Attrchment 4 to U-600895 JUSTIFICATION FOR REVISING THE DISPOSITION OF HEDs 6.6,009 and 6.9.007 s.

1 I

i l

l

'Attachmtnt 4-

.to U-600895

~Page 1 of.2 e

Indication Visibility Concern on P680 Panel- HED 6~6,009

'1.- .

1 HED 6.6,009 identified concerns with.the visibility of some indications on the P680 console. (P680 is the nuclenet control console.) Two concerns were originally identified: When an operator was in a seated position some controls and status. lights were not visible, and when the operator was in.a standing position the top row of annunciators in the center section of the panel were not visible due to the panel overhang. ,

I The corrective action proposed for this HED centered on-the panel-overhang. (The management review team evaluated the visibility of lights and controls and determined that no corrective action was required.) The corrective action originally proposed for the overhang -

> concerns was to cut out a section directly.over the annunciators.

However, further review of this HED indicates that the originally proposed corrective action is not warranted. Based on the following justification the panel overhang will not be removed. ,

a. The purpose of the overhang removal is to enhance operator view of P680 (center section) annunciators when standing close to the panel. Since operators do not typically stand in that location, and since the annunciators are clearly visible to other operators.in the control room, it appears that the benefit of this change is marginal. Experience to date has shown that plant operations are not impeded by the current configuration.
b. Removal of this lip may introduce / create significant lighting-glare problems on the CRTs and the full core display.
c. The disruption to control room and panel operation created by l this work could adversely effect plant safety during any plant condition.

f d. Cutting the overhang may introduce metal filings or other debris into the P680 panel and possibly affect its circuitry.

t

2. Remote Shutdown Panel Reactor Water Level Indication - HED 6.9.007 HED 6.9.007 identified a concern on the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP).

The concern was that the reactor water'1evel on the RSP indicators.

could only be read to +60 inches above instrument zero. At one point j in CPS No. 4003.01, REMOTE SHUTDOWN, when alternate shutdown cooling is

, utilized'to bring the reactor to cold shutdown, it is necessary to' fill i the reactor to the level of the main steam lines (approximately 120 i inches above instrument zero) so that a recirculation path back to the suppression pool can be established through an open safety relief valve i (SRV).

In order to resolve this Category B HED, IP stated they would install j indicators to monitor the water level up to the main steam lines.

4

Attachmsnt 4 to U-600895 Page 2 of 2 Upon further evaluation, it was determined that the instrumentation currently installed on the RSP is adequate to shut down the reactor in accordance with CPS 4003.01. Installation of additional instrumentation is not required for the following reasons.

a. In the event the need to evacuate the Main Control Room arises and, the reactor must be shutdown from the RSP, level indication is provided up to 60 inches. This corresponds to approximately 320 inches above top of active fuel,
b. If, while at the RSP, the Alternate Shutdown Cooling mode is utilized to bring the reactor to cold shutdown conditions, the operator is directed to slowly fill the vessel to the main steam lines utilizing the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system. With the level indication available, the operator can verify that the level is or is not increasing. If the level increases to the upper limit of the level indicators and no other system manipulations are made, level will continue to increase to the main steam lines and flow out the open SRV.

If level is not increasing using the CRD system, the operator is directed to utilize the RHR system to increase level, and the operator can verify increasing level up to approximately 60 inches.

Thus, adequate reactor core cooling can be maintained in the cold shutdown condition utilizing the above methods without additional reactor water level instrumentation.

E _ ____ _