Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Listed TS to Eliminate Core Alterations as Applicable Condition for Which Associated LCO Must Be Met
	ML20107L001
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	04/19/1996
From:	; ILLINOIS POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20107K992	List: ML20107L001; U-602569, Application for Amend to License NPF-62,revising Listed TS to Eliminate Core Alterations as Applicable Condition for Which Associated LCO Must Be Met;
References
	NUDOCS 9604290123
	Download: ML20107L001 (51)
	v • d • e

q Attechment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002

~

Primary containment and Drywell"fftilakf'dn $strumentation 3.3.6.1

)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME N.

As required by N.1 Isolate the affected Imediately Required Action F.1 penetration flow and referenced in path (s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

jN.2.1.

uspend C0

/ mediately l

ALTERATI S.

AND

.2.

Suspend movement of-Imediately q

irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary 1

containment.

AND

(' >)

{ N.2.8 Initiate action to Imediately l

suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

O.

As required by_

0.1 Isolate the affected Imediately Required Action F.1 penetration flow and referenced in path (s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

~

s OR 0.2 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

9604290123 960419 PDR ADOCK 05000461 p

PDR AmendmentNo./

CLINTON 3.3-53 l

]

Attcchusnt 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 f

Page 3 of 24 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Tabte 3.3.6.1 1 (page 3 of 6)

Primary Containment and Drywett Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED -

OTNER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWASLE 1

FUNCTION CXINDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION F.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 2.

Primary Contalnment and cryvett Isetation (continued)

s. Containment Bullding (c),(d) 4 N

st 3.3.6.1.1 5 500 aft /hr fuel Trenefer Poot st '3.3.6.1.2 Ventitation Plane st 3.3.6.1.5 RadietIon-Nish st 3.3.6.1.6 h.

Contalrument Bulldfrw 1,2,3 4(b)

I st 3.3.6.1.1 s 400 sNt/hr Enhaust SR 3.3.6.1.2 Radiatten-Nigh 54 3.3.6.1.5 sr J.3.6.1.6 (c),(d) 4 N

st 3.3.6.1.1, s 400 eft /hr st 3.3.6.1.2 st 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6

{

l. Contelnaent Buildine 1,2,3 4(b)

I st 3.3.6.1.1 s 400 edt/hr Continuous Centaltment

$4 3.3.6.1.2 Purse (CCP) Enhaust st 3.3.6.1.5 Radletten-NIsh st 3.3.6.1.6 (c),(4) 4 N

st 3.3.6.1.1 s 400 at/hr st 3.3.6.1.2 st 3.3.4.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 J. Reacter Vessel Water 1,2,3 4(b)

I st 3.3.6.1.1 t -147.7 inches Level-Lew Lou Low, st 3.3.6.1.2 Levet 1 st 3.3.6.1.3 st 3.3.6.1.5

.st 3.3.6.1.6 (c) 4 0

st 3.3.6.1.1 t -147.7 inches st 3.3.6.1.2 st 3.3.6.1.3 st 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 k.

Containment Pressure-(e) 2 I

st 3.3.6.1.1 5 3.0 paid Nish st 3.3.6.1.2 st 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 L.

Manuel Inftletten 1,2,3 2(b)

J st 3.3.6.1.6 NA (c),(d) 2 N

st 3.3.6.1.6 NA (continued)

(b) Also regired te initlete the associated drywelt isolation fmetton.

(c) Durtne operations with a potentlet for dretning the reactor vessel.

(d) During movement of Irradiated fuel assee6Lles in the primary or sec0hdary contaltunent.

(e) MODES 1, 2, and 3 with the associated PCIVs not closed.

CLINTON 3.3-57 Amendment No.-95, g

. to U-602569-LS-96-002 8

1 Pags 4 of 24 I

. Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 1

3.3.6.1 l

?

1 I

i Table 3.3.6.1 1 (page 5 of 6)

Primary containment and Drywett Isolation Instrumentation 1

3 APPLICABLE CONDITIONS 4

MODES 04 REQUIRED REFERENCED OTNER CHANNELS FtoM SPECIFIED PER REQUltED sul%EILLANCE ALLOWASLE FUNCitou CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION F.1 REtuttEMEWis VALUE 4

i 4

j 3.

RCic system Isolation (continued)

J. Drywett Pressure -

i Nlsh

~

1,2,3 2

I st 3.3.6.1.1 5 1.86 pelg st 3.3.6.1.2 st 3.3.6.1.3 st 3.3.6.1.5 54 3.3.6.1.6 k.

Manuel Initletion 1,2,3 2

J st 3.3.6.1.6 NA

4. Reactor Water Cteer g (RWQJ) system Isotation e.

Differentlet Flow -

1,2,3 2

I SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 66.1 spm Nigh SR 3.3.6.1.2 st 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.4

b. Difforentlet 1,2,3 2

1

$4 3.3.6.1.2 s 47 seconds Flow Timer st 3.3.4.1.6 st 3.3.6.1.6 c.

RWCU Neet Excheneer 1,2,3 2 per room I

st 3.3.6.1.1 s 205*F E @lpment toon st 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature Nish st 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 d.

RWCU Pump toons 1,2,3 2 per room I

st 3.3.6.1.1 s 202*F Temperature-Nish st 3.3.6.1.2 st 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 e.

Meln steen Line Tuinet 1,2,3 2

I st 3.3.6.1.1 s 171*F Ashlent Temperature-st 3.3.6.1.2 NIsh st 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 f.

Reactor Vesset Water 1,2,3 4

I st 3.3.4.1.1 k -67.7 inches Level-Low Low, st 3.3.6.1.2 Level 2 st 3.3.4.1.3 st 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 (c) 4 0

st 3.3.6.1.1 t -47.7 Inches st 3.3.6.1.2 l

st 3.3.6.1.3 i

SR 3.3.6.1.5 i

st 3.3.6.1.6 i

s. Stencby Liquid control 1,2 2

L st 3.3.6.1.6 NA system inittetlom h.

Manuel Initletion 1,2,3 2

J st 3.3.6.1.6 NA (c),(d) 2 N

st 3.3.6.1.6 NA i

(continued)

(c) During operations with a potentlet for dretning the reactor vessel.

3 (d) During "a""

' ' '. movement of irradieted fuel assen6Lles in the primary or seco ry contelnment.

l y

)

1 CLINTON 3.3-59 Amendment No. -96,/

. Attcchment,3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Paga 5 of 24 d

Secondaly Containment Isolation Instrumentation i

3.3.6.2 l

Table 3.3.6.21 (page 1 of 1) secondary Contaltwent Isolation Instrunentation APPLICA8LE MODES AND REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER TRIP SURVEILLANLE ALLOWASLE FUNCTION CONolfl0NS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1.

Reactor vesset Water 1,2,3,(a) 2 sa 3.3.6.2.1 t -47.7 inches Level-Lou Lou, Level 2 st 3.3.6.2.2 sa 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 2.

Drywett Pressure-High 1,2,3 2

SR 3.3.6.2.1 5 1.88 psis SR 3.3.6.2.2

.sa 3.3.6.2.3 st 3.3.6.2.4 st 3.3.6.2.5 3.

Containment Sullding fuel (a),(b) 2 st 3.3.6.2.1 s 500 aft /hr Transfer Pool ventilation st 3.3.6.2.2 Plenus Exhaust SR 3.3.6.2.4 Radtation - HIsh st 3.3.6.2.5 4.

Contairment sullding 1,2,3, 2

st 3.3.6.2.1 s 400 aft /hr Exhaust Radiation-Nigh (a),(b) sR 3.3.6.2.2

^

st 3.3.6.2.4 sR 3.3.6.2.5 5.

Containment sultding 1,2,3, 2

SR 3.3.6.2.1 s 400 aft /hr continuous contairment (a),(b)

SR 3.3.6.2.2 Purge (CCP) Emhaust SR 3.3.6.2.4 Radt atIon - Nish SR 3.3.6.2.5 6.

Fuet sullding 3.xhaust 1,2,3, 2

sR 3.3.6.2.1 s 17 aft /hr Radiation-HIsh (c) sa 3.3.6.2.2 st 3.3.6.2.4 st 3.3.6.2.5 7.

Manuet Initiation 1,2,3, I

sa 3.3.6.2.5 NA (a),(b)

(a) During operations uith a potentist for draining the reactor vessel.

(b) Dur i ng - " --- ^ -' - - ' ' ' movement of irradiated fuel asseabiles in the primary or secondary containment.

(c) During movement of irradiated fuel assem6tles in the fuel building.

CLINTON 3.3-64 AmendmentNo.JP!I

Attcchment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pc s 6 of 24 Control Room Ventilation ystem Instrumentation l

3.3.7.1 7-

\\

Tabte 3.3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Room Ventitation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE j

MODES OR OTHER REQUIRED l

SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS TRIP SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE l

1.

Contrcl 1,2,3, 1/ intake SR 3.3.7.1.1 s to sA/hr Room Air (a),(b)

SR 3.3.7.1.2 l

Intake SR 3.3.7.1.3 Radiation I

Monitors (a) During operations with a potentlet for draining the reactor vesset.

{

(b) Duri ng = "

""-

of Irradiated fuel assembtles in the primary or secondary containment.

l

)

1 l

I I

i l

CLINTON 3.3-77 Amendment No.pf

Attcchment.3,to U-602569, LS-96-002 Pega 7 of 24 Primaiy Containment Air Locks 3.6.1.2

(,

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Locks LCO 3.6.1.2 Each primary containment air lock shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

H00ES 1, 2, and 3,

NOTE-----.------------------------

The following Applicabilities apply only to the upper containment personnel air lock.

n.

cane u vro m nue l

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary l

or secondary containment, and During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

)

NOTES------------------------

d air lock 1.

Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs of the affecte components.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each airs, lock.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required t.ctions of LCO 3.6.1.1, " Primary 3.

Containment," when air lock leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

(continued)

\\

l l

CLINTON 3.6-3 AmendmentNo./

i

Attechment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 PrimarYI,cntakndnt.AirLccks 3.6.I.2

')

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Required Action and

NOTE------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A, 8, or C not met during movement of irradiated E.I Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in the irradiated fuel primary or secondary assemblies in the containment,-GORE primary and secondary N or containment.

OPDRVs.

AND 1"*afME / ""**Y'O 1

/ E/2.

Initiation action to Immediately

\\

suspend OPDRVs.

i O

es CLINTON 3.6-7 Amendment No.

Attcchment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Page 9 of 24 pg y 3.6.1.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

(

3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

LCO 3.6.1.3 Each PCIV shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODES 4 and 5 for RHR Shutdown Cooling System suction from the reactor vessel isolation valves when associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, " Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation," Function 5.c.

NOTE--------------------------

The following Applicabilities apply only to secondary containment bypass leakage isolation valves.

O c::.; COP.: "i'5"_^Z:0Mr.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the l

primary or secondary containment, and I

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

.-------..-------.---------------NOTES------------------------------------

1.

Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by PCIVs.

4.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, " Primary Containment," when PCIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

~ (continued)

)

CLINTON 3.6-9 AmendmentNo.Jef

- Attechment 3 to U-602569 w+.e-LS-96-002 Pegs 10 of 24 PCIVs 3.6.1.3

[

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 0.

(continued)

D.3 Perform SR 3.6.1.3.5 Once per 92 for the resilient days seal purge valves closed to comply with Required Action 0.1.

E.

Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, or D not met in H0DE 1, 2, or 3.

E.2 Be in MODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months ~

F.

Required Action and F.1

NOTE---------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A, applicable.

8, C, or D not met for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during Suspend movement of Imediately movement of irradiated irradiated fuel fuel assemblies in assemblies in primary the primary or and secondary secondary containment.

containment.

r A

s

/

l G.

Re ired Action d

G.1 '

uspend CORE Immediat y ociated Com etion ALTERATIONS.

ime of Condi on A, B, C, or D t met for PCIV(s required to be OPE BLE during CORE ALT /MTIONS.

j (continued)

CLINTON 3.6-14 Amendment No. g I

Attechment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pags 11 of 24 PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

( )f. Required Action and i

E.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion b suspend OPDRVs.

Time of Condition A, B, C, or 0 not met Og for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during R.2 Initiate action to Immediately l

MODE 4 or 5 or during Q

restore valve (s) to 4

OPDRVs.

OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1

NOTES-----------------

1.

Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

j 2.

Not required to be met when the 36 inch primary containment purge valves are open for pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry. Also not required to be met during Surveillances or special testing on the purge system that requires the valves to be open. The 36 inch primary containment-purge lines shall not be opened with a 12 inch primary containment purge line open nor with a drywell vent and purge supply or exhaust line open.

Verify each 36 inch primary containment 31 days purge valve is closed.

(continued)

AmendmentNo.[

CLINTON 3.6-15

Att chmente3:to U-602569eer+w %

LS-96-002 24 83d2:n%aryContainment,i 3.6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment LC0 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 During movement of irradiated fue assemblies in the primary "f,.sggogg,gggaJnment,Q m.._,

6uring operations with a potential for draining the reactor

~

vessel (OPDRVs).

~

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETIdNTIME A.

Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable in MODE 1, containment to 2, or 3.

OPERABLE status.

k i

B.

Required Action and

. B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued) me e

e CLINTON 3.6-43 AmendmentNo.[

Attechment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pags 13 of 24 Secondary Containment,

i 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Secondary containment C.1

NOTE---------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of irradiated applicable.

fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment i;'.;

Suspend movement of, Immediately

^": ?.'.T:"g ^".C. or irradiated fuel j

.I during OPDRVs.

assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

~

1 Y

N k"

bE

/

AND

{ C./2, Initiate action to Immediately l

suspend OPDRVs.

\\- ]

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify secondary containment vacuum is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 2: 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge.

\\

l SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify all secondary containment 31 days equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

1 (continued) a 4

AmendmentNo.[

CLINTON 3.6-44

I c Attachment 3 to3U-602569 s

LS-96-002 Pags 14 of 24 SCIDs 3.6.4.2

)

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers (SCIDs)

~

l LCO 3.6.4.2 Each SCID shall be OPERABLE.

i APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, Qnd l

u venavenue y17; cane During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

NOTES------------------------------------

1.

Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separa'te Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIDs.

(continued)

I CLINTON 3.6-47 Amendment No. 95 4

Attcchment 3 to U-602569.

LS-96-002 Paga 15 of 24 SCIDs 3.6.4.2

)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Required Action and 0.1

NOTE---------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A applicable.

or B not met during i

J movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the Suspend movement of Immediately primary or secondary irradiated fuel containment, ic';;

assemblies in the I

496HHWH%W46N6e or primary and secondary

]

during OPORVs.

containment.

4

.2 spendCdE I

diate,1y l

(

ALTERAThis.

j 4

AND

{ D./2.

Initiate action to Immediately l

suspend OPORVs.

5 a

d I.

1 J

4 AmendmentNo.[

CLINTON 3.6-49

. -to U-602569 r - -

LS-96-002 Page 16 of 24 gg7 g 3.6.4.3 i

3.6 CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS s

3'.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO' 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, and ou ; 3 ;;; ALT ;;T::::,

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETIdNTIME I

A.

One SGT subsystem A.1 Restore SGT subsystem 7 days inoperable.

to OPERABLE status.

/

~s

)

B.

Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

B.2 Be in NODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months 4

(continued) i l

l 1

4 l

CLINTON 3.6-51 Amendment No. 95 I

l

Attcchment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pags 17 of 24 SGT System 3.6.4.3

)

1 qijl ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Required Action and

NOTE------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A l

l not met during l

movement of irradiated C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT Immediately i

fuel assemblies in the subsystem in l

primary or secondary operation.

l containment, i.'r.;

48REWMt@M8N9F or OR l

during OPORVs.

C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

?

C

.2 Sus CORE Imme ately e/

AL TION

/

~T Vi AND C.2.

Initiate action to Immediately l

suspend OPDRVs.

D.

Two SGT subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately l

inoperable in MODE 1, l

2, or 3.

i (continued) l l

T CLINTON 3.6-52 Amendment No.

~ _ - _

Attschment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pega 18 of 24 SGT System.

3.6.4.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION.

COMPLETION TIME E.

Two SGT subsystems E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable during irradiated fuel movement.of irradiated assemblies in the fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary primary or secondary containment.

containmentr uviii's 4MMWHWpF(4MH6N93 or during OPDRVs.

j

.2 Suspend E

/

' /Immedi ely ALTERA NS. /

/

AND E/ 1 Initiate action to Immediately l

/

suspend OPDRVs.

)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each SGT subsystem for 31 days 2: 10 continuous hours with heaters operating.

SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter t'esting in In accordance

- accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP).

SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each SGT subsystem actuates on an 18 months actual or simulated initiation signal.

SR 3.6.4.3.4 Verify each SGT filter cooling bypass 18 months damper can be opened and the fan started.

j AnendmentNo.[

CLINTON 3.6-53

Attcchment 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002. Page 19 of 24 Control' Room Ventilaticn System 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEM 3.7.3 Control Room Ventilation System LCO 3.7.3 Two Control Room Ventilation subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES I, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary rur':.bbk!.

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETI0'N TIME A.

One Control Room A.1 Restore Control Room 7 days Ventilation subsystem Ventilation subsystem

' inoperable.

to OPERABLE status.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

B.2 Be in MODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued) s AmendmentNo.[

CLINTON 3.7-4

Attechrsnt 3 to U-602569

" " ' +

LS-96-002 Control R$$m Venki$ation System 3.7.3 L

I.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Required Action and

NOTE-------------

associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A i

not met during movement of irradiated C.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately i

fuel assemblies in the Control Room primary or secondary Ventilation subsystem containment,.....,3 in high radia' tion Nor mode.

during OPDRVs.

OE C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

(0 1

.2.2 spend F RE

/

I diatel ALTERAT/NS.

/

AND Initiate action to Immediately g

suspend OPDRVs.

j 4

D.

Two Control Room D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately Ventilation subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, l

2, or 3.

4 (continued) 1 i

i CLINTON 3.7-5 AmendmentNo./

4 4

l

Attechnent 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Page 21 of 24 Control Room Ventilation System 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Two Control Room E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately Ventilation subsystems irradiated fuel inoperable during assemblies in the movement of irradiated primary and secondary fuel assemblies in the containment.

primary or secondary 7

containmenti 1."..;

l 4iGRE-Ak44iaANeN9y or E.2[ g

[ Imm[,iateh during OPDRVs.

AND l

{

Initiate action to Immediatefy l

l suspend OPORVs.

1 I

l l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.7.3.1 Operate each Control Room Ventilation 31 days subsystem with flow through the makeup filter for a 10 continuous hours with the l

heaters operating.

l l

SR 3.7.3.2 Operate each Control Room Ventilation 31 days subsystem with flow through the recirculation filter for a 15 minutes.

SR 3.7.3.3 Perform required Control Room Ventilation In accordance filter testing in accordance with the with the VFTP 4

Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

l (continued)

AmendmentNo.[

CLINTON 3.7-6

Attcchmsnt 3 to U-602569

'+v LS-96-002 Pegs 22 of 24 Control Room AC System 3.7.4

.n 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

(,. )

3.7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System LCO 3. 7. 4-Two control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, 00 8 l

2::":; CORE ^L'c I

^T'^"c During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

~

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One control room AC A.1 Restore control room 30 days subsystem inoperable.

AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B.

Two control room AC B.1 Verify control room Once per 4 subsystems inoperable.

area temperature s 86 hours9.953704e-4 days 0.0239 hours 1.421958e-4 weeks 3.2723e-5 months

F.

AND B.2 Restore one control room AC subsystem to 7 days OPERABLE status.

\\

C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated Completion Time of Condition A or AND B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

C.2 Be in MODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

CLINTON 3.7-8 Amendment No.jpd to U-602569-LS-96-002 Pega 23 of 24 Control Room AC System 3.7.4 i

i ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Required Action and

NOTE-------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated D.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately fuel assemblies in the control room AC primary or secondary subsystem in, containmentr J.,:..;

operation.

10RfMM4iAAEGES, or during OPORVs.

0R D.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

Y I

.2.2 uspend RE

/

I ediate ALTERAT/NS.

/

_A_N0 nitiate action to Immediately l

h.2.

suspend OPDRVs.

(continued) h I

CLINTON 3.7-9 Amendment No.

e

Attechront 3 to U-602569 LS-96-002, Page 24 of 24

- Contral Roca AC System

~

3.7.4

['

ACTIONS (continued)

\\.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Required Action and

NOTE-------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition B not met during movement of irradiated E.I Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in the irradiated fuel primary or secondary assemblies in the containment, f;c':;

primary and, secondary l

Nor containment.

l during OPDRVs.

~

E.2 Suspe CORE I

diate1 ALTE IONS.

1 L

AND

{ E./1 Initiate action to Immediately l

suspend OPDRVs.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has 18 months the capability to remove the assumed heat load.

i CLINTON 3.7-10 Amendment No.

to U-602569 LS-96-002 Page1of28 Technical Specifications Bases Changes

i Attechment 4 to U-602569 j

LS-96-002 4

Pags 2 of 28 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation i

B 3.3.5.1 I

BASES APPLICABLE 2.a.

2.h and 2.1.

Containment Buildino Fuel Transfer Pool SAFETY ANALYSES, Ventilation Plenum. Containment Buildino, and Containment i

LCO, and Buildina Continuous Containment Purae (CCP) Exhaust APPLICABILITY Radiation-Hiah (continued) l releases to the drywell are channeled to the suppression pool to maintain the pressure suppression function of the j

drywall.

I The Exhaust Radiation-High signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located on the ventilation exhaust piping coming from the drywell and containment. The j

signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor j

whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel, Four channels of Containment and Drywell Ventilation.

i Exhaust-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross j

failure of the fuel cladding and to ensure offsite doses i

remain below 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 limits.

i These Functions are required to be OPERABLE during 40 M l

l N OPORVs/and movement of irradiated fuel I

assemblies in the primary or secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel s

i failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies must be provided to ensure offsite dose limits are not i

exceeded.

j 2..i.

Reactor Vessel Water level-Low low Low. Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of the primary containment occurs to prevent offsite dose limits from being exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-tow Low Low, Level 1 Function is one of the many Fun.ctions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation signals. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the USAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

In addition, this Function provides an isolation signal to certain drywell isolation valves. The isolation of drywell isolation l

(continued)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.3-146

Attcchment 4 to U-602569 i

LS-96-002 j

Pcg3 3 of 28 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation

^

B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.k.

Containment Pressure-High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Allowable Value was chosen to prevent opening of the APPLICABILITY containment ventilation supply and exhaust isolation bypass valves when excessive differential pressure could result in damage to the associated ductwork.

4 Two channels of the Containment Pressure-High Function are i

I available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

2.1.

Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the primary containment and drywell isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective i

instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability.

t There is no specific USAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function.

It is retained for the isolation 4

function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system (i.e., 1821H-525A and IB21H-S258). There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiaition Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE. This Function is also required to be OPERABLE during 40Ni-M44iAMMN0pmovement of l

j containmentMuel assemblies in primary or secondary irradiated f 0PDRVs. This Function initiates isolation l

of valves which isolate primary containment penetrations which bypass secondary containment. Thus, this Function is also required under those conditions in which secondary containment is required to be OPERABLE.

j 3.

Reactor Core Isolation Coolina System Isolation 1

1 3.a.

RCIC Steam line Flow-Hiah RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Function is provided to detect a break of the RCIC steam lines and initiates closure of the steam line isolation valves.

If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will (continued)

CLINTON B 3.3-148 RevisionNo.[

Attcchment 4 to U-602569.._

LS-96-002 Prinary Centainment and Drywell Is!dM. ion *knUrumentation 8 3.3.6.1

>(

8ASES APPLICABLE 4 '. f.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low low. Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY containment. Thus, this function is also required under those conditions in which a low reactor water level signal could be generated when secondary containment is required to be OPERABLE.

4 h

4.a.

SLC System Initiation 4

The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the. boron solution by the RWCU System (Ref. 4). SLCJystem initiation signals are initiated from the two SLC pump start signals.

There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on j

the position of the SLC System initiation switch.

Two channels (one from each pump) of SLC System Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES I and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, and.these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LC0 3.1.7).

4.h.

Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the RWCU System isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific USAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function.

It is retained for the isolation function as required by the NRC in plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation' push button per trip system.

There is no Allowable Value for this function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE. This Function is also a

required to be OPERABLE during -^~: AT;am wnd movement of

[.

(continued)

\\

CLINTON B 3.3-157 Revision No.

r Attcchment 4 to U-602569

~LS-96-002 Pega 5 of 28 l

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation In'strumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES

)

APPLICABLE 4.h.

Manual Init (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, a

LCO, and irradiated fue as m ies in primary or secondary 1

l l

APPLICABILITY containment OPDRVs. This Function initiates isolation of valves which isolate primary containment penetrations l

which bypass secondary containment. Thus, this Function is also required under those conditions in which secondary containment is required to be operable.

.: s 5.

RHR System Isolation 5.a.

Ambient Temperature-Hiah Ambient Temperature-High is provided to detect a leak from the associated system steam piping.

The isolation occurs l

when a very small leak has occurred and is diverse to the high f. low instrumentation.

If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. This Function is not assumed in any USAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs.

Ambient Temperature-High signals are initiated from thermocouples that are approp,riately located to protect the system that is being monitored. Two instruments monitor each area. Four channels for RHR Ambient Temperature-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the

~

isolation function.

The Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.

[

The RHR Equipment Room Ambient Ten.perature-High Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

In MODES j

4 and 5, insufficient pressure and temperature are available f

to develop a significant steam leak in this piping and significant water leakage is protected by the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function.

I 5.b. 5.c.

Reactor Vessel Water Level--Low. Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the l

fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor or vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the (continued)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.3-158 l

. Attachment 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002 y

Pege 6 of 28 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS M.I. M.2 M.3.1, M.3.2. M.3.3. and M.3.4 (continued) radioactivity releases. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons.

It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components.

If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status.

In this case, the Surveillances may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status.

In addition, at least one door in the upper containment personnel air lock must be closed. The closed air lock door completes the boundary for control of -

potential radioactive releases. With the appropriate administrative controls however, the closed door can-be opened intermittently for entry and exit. This allowance is acceptable due to the need for containment access and due to the slow progression of events which may result from a reactor vessel draindown event. Reactor vessel draindown events would not be expected to result in the immediate release of appreciable fission products to the containment atmosphere. Actions must continue until all requirements of this condition are satisfied.

I N.I. N.2.1. N.2.2 " 2.

0.1. and 0.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path (s) should be isolated (Required Action N.1 or 0.1).

Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable instrumentation Alternately, the plant must be placed in a condit.nen n nurion in which the LCO does not apply.If applicable, a

. ' movement of irradiated fuel assemblies l

cane must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission production release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.3-169

1 Attcchment 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pags 7 of 28 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE

3. 4. 5. 6.

Containment Buildina Fuel Transfer Pool SAFETY ANALYSES, Ventilation Plenum. Containment Buildino. Containment LCO, and Buildino Continuous Containment Purce (CCP), and Fuel APPLICABILITY Buildina Exhaust Radiation-High (continued) detector is input to en Ndividual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel.

Four channels of each of these Exhaust Radiation-High Functions are available and are required to be,0PERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross

~

failure of the fuel cladding.

The Exhaust Radiation-High High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not i

required. In addition, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE during 40RE=#rMRAMONGy OPDRVs/and movement of l

irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel building, as applicable, because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided 1

to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

7.

Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the secondary containment isolation logic that are i

redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels, and. provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific USAR safety analysis that takes credit for tMs Function.

It is retained for the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC-approved licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one marual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

(continued)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.3-179

. to U-602569 4

LS-96-002

)

Paga 8 of 28 i

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation i

B 3.3.6.2 i

BASES l

)

APPLICABLE 7.

Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, l

LCO, and Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are j

APPLICABILITY:

available and are required to be OPERABLE i MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during 40MML44iMM6N9F OPORVs and movement of l

irradiated fuel assemblies in the primar containment or i

Fuel Building, since these are the MODES and other specified i

conditions in which the Secondary Containment Isolation

]

automatic Functions are required.to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to 1

secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

j Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a' t

Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, i

subsystems, components, or variables expressed in th6 i

Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the condition.

l Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the i

Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the 4

l Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation cnannels l

provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that l

allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

I l

M l

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 3 and 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.

This out of service time is only acceptable provided the j

associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases).

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status l

within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.I.

Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and alica operation to 3

continue. Alternately, if it.is not desired to place the i

j (continued) l CLINTON B 3.3-180 Revision No.

)

Attechment 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Page 9 of 28 CRV System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.

Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitors SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitors measure APPLICABILITY radiation levels exterior to the inlet ducting of the MCR.

(continued)

A high radiation level may pose a threat to MCR personnel; thus, a detector indicating this condition automatically signals initiation of the CRV System high radiation mode.

The Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitors Function consists of four independent monitors, two m;,nitors (one from each division) at each of the normal air intakes.

Four channels of Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure,.that no single instrument failure can preclude CRV System high radiation mode initiation. The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel. '

The Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitors Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and during 40RIMttTERRTf0NSy operations with a potential for draining l

the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)fand movement of irradiated fuel y

in the primary or secondarf containment to ensure that control room personnel are protected durir.g a LOCA, fuel handling event, or a vessel draindown event. During MODES 4 and 5, when these specified conditions are not in progress 3.;;.,

^^: ^.LTC^^.!19NGb the probability of a LOCA or fuel l

damage is low; thus, the Function is not required.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to CRV instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables l

expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into j

(continued)

CLINTON B 3.3-217 Revision No.

- to U-602569 -

1 LS-96-002 I

' ' -

J

'Page 10 of 28 5

Primary Containment-Air Locks 4 B 3.6.1.2 m

~

BASES LCO The primary containment air locks are required to be (continued)

OPERABLE.

For each air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock i

must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, i

and both air lock doors mu~st be OPERABLE. The interlock j

allows only one air lock door to be open at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be j

OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is j

sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following i

postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into a

j and exit from primary containment.

l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of' i

radioactive material to primary containment.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are 3

reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, maintaining OPERABLE primary containment air locks in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume is only required during situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated; such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PORVs), i."..., ::^.:

l i

didliHANGNiiyor during movement of irradiated fuel I

assemblies in the primary containment.

4 a

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by Note 1, which allows entry and i

l exit to perform repairs of the affected air lock component.

l If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed for most repairs.

It is preferred that the air lock be accessed from inside primary containment by entering i

through the other OPERABLE air lock. However, if this is not practicable, or if repairs on either door must be performed from the barrel side of the door, then it is permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door, i

F which means there is a short time during which the primary containment boundary is not-intact (during accesi through j

the OPERABLE door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the primary containment boundary is j

temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the primary j

containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door j

is expected to be open. After each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be immediately closed.

j (continut_1 d

i RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.6-8 l

.to U-602569.

a,

,m..

e LS-96-002 Primary TonN iN ek Air Locks B 3.6.1.2 BASES 3

ACTIONS C.l. C.2 and C.3 (continued) both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits.

Required Acti'on C.2 requires that one door in the affected

~

primary containment air locks must be verified closed. This Required Action must be completed within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time.

This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which require 'that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour.

Additionally, the air lock must be restored' to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time-is reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status considering that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock.

0.1 and 0.2 I.f the inoperable primary containment air lock cannot-be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion.

.)l a

Time while operating in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant n.ust be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.ly(reetandE./L If the inoperable primary containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time during OPORVs, J.. '.; : ".: "i!:"".T:0N!; or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, action is required to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material, thus placing the unit in a Condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, MleM=dW6HMdeH6= ends l

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe (continued)

)

CLINTON 8 3.6-12 Revision No.

__ to U-602569 1

LS-96-002, Page,12,of 28 Primary; Containment Air Locks B 3.6.1.2

)

.']

BASES ACTIONS E.le4wey and E (continued) position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequeit potential for fission product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are

~

suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply..If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the

'l fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

j Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 2), as modified by approved 1

..1 exemptions when in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

This SR reflects the

)

leakage rate testing requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established during initial air lock and. primary containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.

Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

The SR has been modified by three Notes.

Note 1 provides an exception to the specific leakage requirements for the primary containment air locks in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3.

When not operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3, primary containment pressure is not expected to significantly increase above normal, and therefore specific testing at elevated pressure is not required. Note 2 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is (continued)

T CLINTON B 3.6-13 Revision No. [

m

_~

m

Attcchment 4.to U-602569 ~ 4

.z.~,....

.,.e LS-96-002 Pega.13 of 28 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES

)

ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner.and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 d

.1.

and

.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the a

LCO does not apply.

If applicable,4MMe9Mee4Me@=ewd l

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. in the primary and secondary containment must be immediately suspended.-

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Al so, i f applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.

Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

If suspending the OPDRVs would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an

,m alternative Required Action is provided to immediately

)

initiate action to restore the valves to OPERABLE status.

This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

i The Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SR 3.6.1.3.1 l

This SR verifies that the 36-inch primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open.for an allowable reason.

If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable.

If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage I

(continued)

CLINTON 8 3.6-22 Revision No.

Attcchment 4 to U-602569-LS-96-002 Pt 14 f 28' i

Sec:ndaryYentaf'nment B 3.6.4.1 i

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i

B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment l

BASES

' BACKGROUND The function of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident-(DBA).

In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the. secondary. containment,..the. secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior'to release to the environment and to i

isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside pr7 mary containment'(e.gc, during operations with a potential for l

draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs),

m..

...,-.m Nor during movement of irradiated fuel I

assemblies in the primary or secondary containment), when primary containment is not. required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment.

The secondary containment is a structure that completely

, ~)i encloses the primary containment (except for the upper

(

containment personnel air lock penetration) and those components that may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. This' structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products.

It-is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump / motor heat load additions). To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for these systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, " Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers (SCIDs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3,

" Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System."

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the secondary containment boundary are a part of the' secondary containment barrier. To maintain,this barrier:

All secondary containment penetrations required to be a.

closed during accident conditions are either:

(continued 1 CLINTON B 3.6-83 Revision No.

4

Attachment.4 to U-602569..

LS-96-002

~

Page 15 of 28

+.

Secendary Centainment

^B 3.6.4.1 1

4 I

BASES h,

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC

~

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Policy Statement.

(continued)

LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission' product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the s

LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), l. :.., -- L l

=##4iMNGMS, or during movement of irradiated fuel

{

assemblies in the primary or secondary containment.

ACTIONS A_,_1.

If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary (continued) l RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.6-85 l

]

_ _ _. to U-602569.

j LS-96-002 i

PaggegnN Centainment B 3.6.4.1 j

BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2 If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Comple'tlon Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at.least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.l_ t " and C l

rs l lVl aI Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies'in the primary or secondary containmentp=99RfMtt99fWMON0y and OPORVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment.

In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fis n products to the i

environmerit. 49ft991991WMON0=end vement of irradiated

[

fuel assemblies must be immediate1 suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPORVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPORVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend (continuedi CLINTON B 3.6-86 RevisionNo./

~. ~ _. _.

(

Attachament 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002 N883No$dah Containment l

B 3.6.4.1 l

\\..

)

BASES g

ACTIONS C.l e and C 4 (continued)

)

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the secondary containment boundary is i

sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related'to secondary containment vacuum variations during the.

applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances.

Furthermore, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal secondary containment vacuum condition.

~1 SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 s

Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and access doors are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur.

Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur.

In this application the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit. The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown.to be adequate based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other controls on secondary containment access openings.

SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 l

The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment.

To ensure that all fission products are treated, (continued) l

\\

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.6-87 1

.Attcchacnt 4 to U-602569_

l LS-96-002 Page 18 of 28 f

SCIDs B 3.6.4.2 l

)

l BASES APPLICABLE the boundary established by SCIDs is required to ensure that l

SAFETY ANALYSES leakage from the primary containment is processed by the l

-(continued)

Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIDs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

l SCIDs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 SCIDs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCID safety function is related to control of offsite I

radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated isolation dampers and valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolittion times are within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic dampers and valves are required to actuate on an automatic isolation signal.

~,

The normally closed isolation dampers, valves, or blind

(~)

l flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual dampers or valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate I

administrative controls, automatic dampers are de-activated and secured in their closed position,.or blind flanges are in place. The SCIDs covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, if applicable, are listed in applicable plant procedures.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, OPERABILITY of SCIDs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIDs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations. with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs)y. ;..,

l (continued) i i

CLINTON B 3.6-90 RevisionNo.[

w-

Attechnent 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pags 19 of 28 SCIDs B 3.6.4.2 l

BASES APPLICABILITY 491@44(4MHON6f or during movement of irradiated fuel l

(continued) assemblies.

Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the l

secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

These l

l controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device.

In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when the need for l

secondary containment isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each l

penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate l

l compensatory actions for each inoperable SCID.

Cpmplying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIDs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required

/\\

Actions.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system (s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCID.

A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more penetration flow l-paths with one SCID inoperable, the affected penetration flow path (s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must l

include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure.

l Isolation barriers that meet this criteria are a closed and de-activated automatic damper, a closed manual damper or valve, or a blind flange.

For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. This Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the low probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIDs to close, occurring i

during this short time.

t

\\

(continued)

CLINTON B 3.6-91 Revision No.

~

_.n.,

, to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pagn 20 of 28

.SCIDs 8 3.6.4.2 i

BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditiont from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

0.1/4-ey and 0.g L If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LC0 does not apply.

If applicable, "" ""*

l movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primar~y and secondary containment must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude corhpletion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend j

OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel 4

draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPORVs are suspended.

i Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies each secondary containment isolation manual valve, damper, and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve or damper manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those SCIDs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

(continued)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.6-93

- _ _ _. _. _. to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pegs 21 of 28 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES.

i APPLICABILITY radioactive material can be postulated, such as during (continued) operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)

GE AT'"".T:Ci or during movement of l

1 irradiate 7....3 fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment.

. ACTIONS A.I With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate i

to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status

~~

within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to'a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.I.C.2.1._".andC.2[t l

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, ir' ; :^^I."/.!:"J.T:^"O or during l

OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should be immediately placed in operation. This Required Action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

(continued)

RevisionNo.[

B 3.6-98 CLINTON

1

.Attcchment 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002

.p Page 22 of 28 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 I.

BASES

.I t

ACTIONS C.I. C.2.1. { ' 1 and C.2,Jf (continued) l An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the unit in a Condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, (WbMT(eNebend movement of irradiated fuel f

assemblies must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a ' component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. This action should.be chosen if the OPDRVs could be impacted by a loss of offsite power. Action must continue until DPDRVs are suspended.

1 l

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving 4

irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LC0 3.0.3 would not specify any action.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is

}

independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either i

case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel g

assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

J D.1 l

If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, l

the SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required j

radioactivity release control function. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

i E.1 @ and E./ 2 When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable,N JMOAHWHMed movement of irradiated fuel assemblics in 1

the primary and secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a

~

vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.

Action must continue until 0PORVs are suspended.

(continued)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.6-99

i -to U-602569 LS-96-002 Page 23 of 28 4

Control Room Ventilation System 4

B 3.7.3 l

{3 i

BASES (continued)

U !

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the Control Room Ventilation System I

must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and i

following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

J

]

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA l

are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations j

in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room Ventilation System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

~

a.

During operations with a patandal for draining, the j

reactor vessel (OPD nd i,

M J-- enDC AITCDATTAMC. sad j

1 i

b pf During ovement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the j

j primary or secondary containment.

i h

ACTIONS Ad i

sith one Control Room Ventilation subsystem inoperable, the

)

l inoperable Control Room Ventilation subsystem must be i

restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE Control Room i

Ventilation subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. However, the ovarall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of Control Room Ventilation System

[

function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low i

probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required 4

capabilities.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable Control Room Ventilation subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed (continued)

)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.7-12 9

Attcchment 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002

,4 Pegs 24 of 28 Control Room Ventilation System B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and 8.2 (continued) l l

Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

l C. I. C.2.1. C n%ef and C.2.[L--

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that L'C0 3.0.3 does not apply.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3,. the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiat.ed fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor l

shutdown.

\\

l During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary l

or secondary containment, l.;.., ;; E nuannu e.Q or during l

OPDRVs, if the inoperable Control Room Ventilation subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE Control Room Ventilation subsystem may be placed in the high radiation mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable,N movement of irradiated l

fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these l

l activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

l (continued)

CLINTON B 3.7-13 RevisionNo.[

i to U-602569 LS-96-002 Page 25 of 28 Control Room Ventilation System B 3.7.3 BASES

{

ACTIONS 0.1 (continued)

If both Control Room Ventilation subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Control Room Ventilation System may i

not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses.

Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

E.1r4 W and E.f b l

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary a

or secondary containment, l_. ;.., GE RT:.-^.!:C:, or during l

OPDRVs, with two Control Room Ventilation subsystems ~

inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require treatment of the control room air. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, 20Rf9ttMRR?f0NPu@ movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPORVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must' continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 and SR 3.7.3.2 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should J

be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing (continued)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.7-14

..~ - - -

1 to U-602569 LS-96-002 Pags 26 of 28 8

i Control Room AC System 2

8 3.7.4 l

l BASES m

APPLICABLE capable 'of removing sensible and latent heat loads from the SAFETY ANALYSES control room, including consideration of equipment j

(continued) heat loads and personnel occupancy requirements to ensure equipment OPERABILITY.

L The Control Room AC System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC l

Policy Statement.

l LCO Two independent and redundant subsystems of the Control Room AC System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at j

least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in

]

the equipment operating. temperature exceeding limits.

The Control Room AC System is considered 0PERABLE when the

{

individual components necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, J

compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated instrumentation and controls. The heating coils and I

humidification equipment are not required for Control Room i

AC System OPERABILITY.

p_,,

(..

)

l APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the control Room AC System must be i

OPERABLE to ensure that the control room temperature will j

not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room AC System OPERABLE is not j

required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations i

under which significant radioactive releases can be j

postulated:

a.

During operations with a 1 for draining the i

reactor vessel (OPDRVs); on p

5.

L. iiis wy nu umpuna,.nu b p:

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment.

(continued) l l

I i

1 RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.7-18 i

. Attachment 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002

+

Page 27 of 28 Control Room AC System B 3.7.4

' 's BASES

/

ACTIONS D. I. D. 2.1.... m and0.2./S l

(continued)

The Required Actions of Condition 0 are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of. irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, i...., ;;u ni.icnn. wiQ or during l

j OPDRVs, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed wjthin the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE control room AC subsystem may be placed immediately in operation.

5 This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would~ prevent actuation will j

occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately j

suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require operation of the control Room Ventilation System in the high radiation mode. This j

places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, N movement of irradiated l

fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment l

must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions i

must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

E.1,,4,ey and E.Jf 2 l

I

~

4 The Required Actions of Condition E.1 are modified by a Note i

indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.7-20

Attachmsnt 4 to U-602569 LS-96-002 M4'

Page 28 of 28 Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES ACTIONS E.1, q and E./ 2.(continued)

J During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, f

...3 wnc nu uvu wny or during OPDRVs, if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B is not met, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require operation of the Control Room Ventilation System in the high radiation mode.

This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, 60RMMefbWiebend handling of irradiated l

fuel in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated J

immediately to suspend OPORVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are

)

suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a j

combination of testing and calculation. The 18 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES 1.

USAR, Section 6.4.

2.

USAR, Section 9.4.1.

RevisionNo.[

CLINTON B 3.7-21

.

ML20107L001

Text

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