ML20113E726

Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Removal of Inclined Fuel Transfer Sys Primary Containment Blind Flange While Primary Containment Required to Be Operable

ML20113E726
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	06/28/1996
From:	ILLINOIS POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20113E723	List: ML20113E726 U-602587, Application for Amend to License NPF-62,allowing Removal of Inclined Fuel Transfer Sys Primary Containment Blind Flange While Primary Containment Required to Be Operable
References
NUDOCS 9607080304
Download: ML20113E726 (6)

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Marked-Up Pages from the Technical Specifications 1

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9607080704 960628 PDR ACOCK 05000461 p PDR

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. LS-96-006 Page 2 of 3 PCIVs 3.6.1.3 1

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.2 -----------------NOTES------------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment 31 days isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment, drywell, and steam tunnel and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

SR 3.6.1.3.3 ----------------NOTES------------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative

- controls.

IbdbE Et t  :.. __________ .______________.________ . I Verify each primary containment Prior to isolation manual valve and blind flange entering MODE 2 that is located inside primary or 3 from containment, drywell, or steam tunnel MODE 4, if not and is required to be closed during performed accident conditions is closed. within the previous 92 days (continued) i.

CLINTON 3.6-16 AmendmentNo.JHI

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3. Not required to be met when the Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS) primary containment blind flange is removed, provided that the fuel building fuel transfer pool water levelis maintained 2 el. 753 ft. and the IFTS transfer tube drain valve (s) remain (s) closed, except that the IFTS tube drain valve (s) may be opened under administrative controls.

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Attachment .4 to U-602587 LS-96-006 Page 2 of 3 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note is included to clarify that PCIVs open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the PCIVs are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.3 This'SR verifies that each ' primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange located inside primary containment, drywell, or steam tunnel, and required to be closed during accident conditions, is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For devices inside primary containment, drywell, and steam tunnel, the Frequency of " prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days", is appropriate since these devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

-Te Notes are added to this SR. The first Note allows l 4 r[ree va ves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note is included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are cpen.

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NSERT SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.6.

The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate (continued)

CLINTON 8 3.6-24 RevisionNo.[

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A third note is added to allow removal of the Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS) blind flange when primary containment operability is required. This provides the option of operating the IFTS system when primary containment operability is required. Requiring the fuel building fuel transfer pool water level to te 2 el. 753 ft. ensures a sufficient depth of water over the highest point on the transfer tube outlet valve in the fuel building fuel transfer pool to prevent direct communication between the containment building atmosphere and the fuel building atmosphere via the inclined fuel transfer tube. Since the IFTS transfer tube drain line does not have the same water seal as the transfer tube, and the motor-operated drain valve remains open when the carriage is in the lower pool, administrative controls are required to ensure the drain line flow path is quickly isolable in the event of a LOCA. Further, any leakage through the IFTS drain line would be treated by the Standby Gas Treatment System prior to release to the environment. The pressure integrity of the IFTS transfer ube combined with the seal created by water depth of the fuel building fuel transfer pool, and the administrative control of the drain line flow path create an acceptable barrier to prevent the post-accident containment building atmosphere from leaking into the fuel building.

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