ML20128M002
| ML20128M002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1985 |
| From: | ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128L997 | List: |
| References | |
| SPDS-DST-001, SPDS-DST-1, NUDOCS 8507110524 | |
| Download: ML20128M002 (16) | |
Text
i Docum:nt No.:
SPDS-DST-001 Rzvision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY CLINTON POWER STATION SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST PLAN REVISION O
/ -,
Date: 6 /8 I Prepared by:
,/,/J,
/
V S S V67/ Team Reviewed by.
Date:
/ $5 Nuclear Training
/
0[/. 86~
Reviewed by
[
h Date:
SPDS Project Manager
' b'85 Reviewed by:
Date:
' Pl'atit Operations Date: [ //
Approved by:
Ma
/
/
V6V Projectynager SP 8507110524 850709 PDR ADOCK 05000461 F
Documsnt No.: SPDS-DST-001 Ravision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 Clinton Power Station SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test Plan i
Table of Contents T
Section Pm 1.0- SCOPE OF DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST l-1
2.0 BACKGROUND
PERSPECTIVE 2-1 3.0 TEST METHODOLOGY 3-1 3.1 Scenario Selection Process 3-2 3.2 Shift Complement Utilized 3-4 3.3 Test Evaluators & Functions 3-5 3.4 Simulation Data Gathering & Equipment 3-6 3.5 Test Conduct 3-7 4
3.6 Test Evaluation Criteria 3-8 4.0
SUMMARY
4-1 I
4
..e-
..n
.n..
Documznt No.:
SPDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 1.0 SCOPE OF DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST The objective of the Clinton Power Station (CPS) Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is to provide a concise display of critical plant variables (categorized according to Critical Safety Functions (CSFs)) to the Main Control Room (MCR) operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably assessing the safety status of the plant. The CPS SPDS has been implemented as part of the Plant Process Computer System, which is an integral part of the NUCLENET control room design. The SPDS has been designed to meet the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement #1, using the guidance specified in NUREG-0800, " Standard Review Plan",
Section 18.2.
This document describes the purpose, scope, performance and evaluation methods for the SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test (DST). The DST will be performed using the CPS Simulator.
Such testing is to be performed under the requirements of the SPDS Verification and Validation (V&V)
Program Plan, as approved for CPS.
The primary purpose of the SPDS DST is to demonstrate, through " man-in-the-loop" simulations, that the design objectives of the SPDS have been met at CPS. The primary objective will be fulfilled by running simula-tor scenarios and viewing operator responses both with and without SPDS.
The decision to perform such testing is a result of concerns identified by the NRC Staff during the December 1984 SPDS Design Verification Audit. These concerns have been resolved by implementing several design modifications to the CPS SPDS. Design modifications to the SPDS display formats, human factors enhancements, and a reevaluation of the SPDS Parameter Set constitute the primary changes which have been made.
The DST will meet the following objectives:
1.
Verify that the information presented on the four CPS SPDS displays does not preclude the MCR operator from safely shutting down the plant; 2.
Assess SPDS impact upon MCR personnel in Critical Safety Function Problem detection / resolution and execution of the action steps specified in the CPS Emergency Operating Procedures; 3.
Observe and evaluate the proposed CPS MCR staffing interaction with the SPDS under dynamic plant conditions; 4.
Evaluate the relationship between the SPDS displayed information and information available elsewhere in the MCR and how the operators utilize this relationship; and 5.
Obtain operator feedback on the usefulness of the SPDS in performing emergency response actions in the MCR.
The results of these tests will be evaluated to ensure the test objectives were accomplished and to analyze the usefulness of the SPDS.
A separate test results report will be generated to document the DST evaluation.
1-1 4
ww
Docum:nt No.:
SPDS-DST-001 Revision:
0 Date: June 13, 1983
2.0 BACKGROUND
PERSPECTIVE The performance of the SPDS DST has been documented as a requirement of th: V&V program in the following:
1.
CPS Document No. SPDS-RD-101, " Safety Parameter Display System Requirements Document, Revision 2", Section 4.2.4; and 2.
CPS Document No. SPDS-DD-102, " Safety Parameter Display System Design Document, Revision 2",
Section 6.3.
The DST represents the implementation of these program requirements.
The requirements for SPDS in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 Section 4, are:
a.
The SPDS should provide a concise display of critical plant variables to the control room operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably determining the safety status of the plant.
Although the SPDS will be operated during normal operations as well as during abnormal conditions, the principal purpose and function of the SPDS is to aid the control room personnel during abnormal and emergency conditions in determining the safety status of the plant and in assessing whether abnormal conditions warrant corrective action by operators to avoid further plant degradation. This can be particularly important during transients and the initial phase of an accident.
b.
Each operating reactor shall be provided with a Safety Parameter Display System that is located convenient to the control operators. This system will continuously display information from which the plant safety status can be readily and reliably assessed by control room personnel.
c.
The control room instrumentation required (see General Design Criteria 13 and 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50) provides the operators with the information necessary for safe reactor operation under normal, transient, and accident conditions.
The SPDS is used in addition to the basic components and serves to aid and augment these components. Thus, requirements applicable to control room instrumentation are not needed for this augmentation (e.g., CDC 2, 3, 4 in Appendix A; 10 CFR 100; single-failure requirements). The SPDS need not meet requirements of the single-failure criteria and it need not be qualified to meet Class 1E requirements.
The SPDS shall be suitably isolated from electrical or electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are in use for safety systems. The SPDS need not be seismically qualified, and additional seismically qualified indication is not required for the sole purpose of being a backup for SPDS.
2-1
Docum:nt No.:
SPDS-DST-001 Revicion: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 Procedures which describe the timely and correct safety status assessment when the SPDS is and is not available, will be developed by the licensee in parallel with the SPDS.
Furthermore, operators shou 3d be trained to respond to accident conditions both with and without the SPDS available, d.
There is a wide range of useful information that can be provided by various systems. This information is reflected in such staff documents as NUREG-0835, and Regulatory Guide 1.97.
Prompt implementation of an SPDS can provide an important contribution to plant safety. The selection of specific information that should be provided for a particular plant shall be based on engineering judgement of individual plant licensees, taking into account the importance of prompt implementation.
e.
The SPDS display shall be designed to incorporate accepted human factors principles so that the displayed information can be readily perceived and comprehended by SPDS users, f.
The minimum information to be provided shall be sufficient to provide information to plant operators about:
(1)
Reactivity control (ii)
Reactor core cooling and heat removal from the primary system (iii) Reactor coolant system integrity (iv)
Radioactivity control (v)
Containment conditions The specific parameters to be displayed shall be determined by the licensee.
The elements of the DST plan described in Sections 3.0-3.6 shall evaluate the adequacy of the SPDS design in terms of these primary requirements. This testing shall fulfill the objectives recommended by the NRC Staff during the December 1984 SPDS Design Verification Audit.
2-2 1
l
0 i
Document No.:
SFDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 T'
Date: June 13, 1985
.3.0 TEST METHOD 0 LOGY The DST validation plan for SPDS on the CPS Simulator will involve 5
several distinct phases. The following describes the content of each pha'se in the sequence in which it will occur:
Phase 1 - DST Dcvelopment.
V&V Team Personael, in coordination with Nuclear Training and SPDS Program Management, will develop' the DST scenarios, (see Section 3.1 for details of this process), assign test evaluatoro (V&V Team Personnel, two instructors from the Nuclear Training Department, and personnel trained in Human Factors), establish final evaluation criteria,'and develop.
final details for the conduct of this tert.
During this phase, the evaluation and checklist methodology for the testing will be developed.
Phase II - Preparation for DST (Test Sh' kedown).
a EighthoursofCPSSimulatortimewillbebeservedforthe following preliminaries:
1 1.
Test ability to videotape scenarios; 4 2.
Trials of microphone placement; 3.
Evaluate ability of CPS Simulator to accurately produce chosen scenarios;
/
4.
Familiarize test evaluators with the " Evaluation Log Sheets" and checklist for test conduct; 5.
Familiarize test evaluators, trainers, and human factors personnel, with expected operator response actions; and 6.
Secure clock, clipboards, and miscellaneous equipment reauired'for the test.
l Essentially, this phase will result in familiarization, rest readiness and ensure' hardware availability.
Phase III - Performance of the DST.
Eight hours of simulator time will be reserved for performance of the SPDS DST.
Two MCR shift teams (5 personnel per team - 1 R0 [ control 3'
board operator), 1 R0 (controlling the NUCLENET panel and observing.the SPDS], 1 SRO [ acting as=the Assistant Shift Supervisor / Control Room Supervisor}, 1 SRO [ acting as the Shif t Supervisor), and 1 Shif t Technical Advisor [STA}) will participate in the DST. Each team will be given the same'six l <(F 3-1 4
Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 R vision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 scenarios (3 with SPDS and 3 [different ones! without SPDS).
Each. team will receive 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> on the simulator and 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in the classroom evaluating the results and completing feedback f
questionnaires.
The conduct of the DST is discussed in detail in Section 3.5 and.thus is not repeated here.
Phase IV - Evaluation of Test Results.
The operator response during the selected scenarios will be reviewed (both with and without SPDS) to determine the adequacy and usefulness of the SPDS. Evaluation criteria to be used in this phase are identified and discussed in Section 3.6 of this report and thus are not repeated here.
The test evaluator participants, consisting of V&V Team personnel, the Nuclear Training Department instructors, and Human Factors. personnel, will perform this evaluation.
(
The bulk of these evaluations will be performed immediately
.(t after the DST is completed to maximize the validity of the
,eyesultirg conclusions..
-(
h ' ["
- 3.1 Scenbria Selection Process.
The scenarios for the SPDS DST will be chosen using the following selection criteria:
.,Q (L
1.
.The scenarios, as a group, shall result in at least one alarm actuation for each of the SPDS Critical Safety Functions (CSFs). The SPDS CSFs are listed below, along with their i
associated CPS. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP):
CSF Affected Procedure Level Control (LVL)*
No. 4401.01, " Level Control -
Emergency" it A
Containment Control (CNMT)
No. 4402.01, " Containment Control - Emergency:
None No. 4403.01, "Cooldown d
Emergency" c
Reactivity Control No. 4404.01, " Reactivity (RCTY)
Control - Emergency" 1
i Hydrogen Control No. 4405.01, "Lombustible Gas e
(H2-GAS)
Control - Emergency" C
3-2 i
Y
Dscument No.: SPDS-DST-001 Ravision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 Radiation Release.
No. 4406.01, " Secondary >Cnmt. /
Control (RAD)
Radiation Release Control -
Emergency".
All CSFs, with the exception of "H2-GAS" (the E0P for this has not yet been implemented at CPS), will be tested; 2.
Each CPS E0P shall be exercised (with-the exception of No. 4405.01). This will ensure that a large portion of the required operator action steps will be exercised and evaluated;
-3.
Interfaces with other MCR instruments and controls shall be included in each scenario package.
In particular, the action taken upon an " invalid" data indication on the SPDS shall be evaluated; 4.
Scenarios shall be developed to test multiple equipment failures. This will allow evaluation of operator contingency actions as related to the SPDS Secondary Displays; 5.
Scenario sequences shall be developed to include time-dependent operator action. This criteria. allows for an evaluation of how rapidly the SPDS information can be assessed;.
6.
Operator " team-dependent" actions will be included in'the scenario packages. An analysis of the interface between members of the operating team can then be performed; and 7.
Scenario Limitations - the following limitations shall be placed on each scenario:
H Must be simulatable - i.e., within the current capabilities of the CPS simulator, as designed; Must permit safe plant shutdown from the MCR (i.e., the Remote Shutdown Panel shall not be included in this testing);
Scenarios involving severely degraded-cores shall not be developed (such event sequences are too complex for the given time constraints, may not be simulatable, and
-recovery actions may not be fully accountable within the
! current procedural framework); and The response to each scenario shall.be in accordance with
-current plant design capabilities.
Once the scenario packages have been developed, each will be. categorized in terms of the. corresponding level of complexity (defined both in terms-of the required operator action and the potential risk to plant safety),
as follows:
3-3
r-Documsnt No.: SPDS-DST-001 R vision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 (1) Simple These scenarios are generally of the type classified as
" anticipated plant transients". Examples of such events include a Loss of Condenser Vacuum and a Recirculation Pump Trip without additional major complications or equipment failures.
(2) Moderate These scenarios are generally of the type classified as
" abnormal plant transients". Examples of such events include a Mair, Steam Isolation Valve Closure with a Stuck Open Relief Valve and a Feedwater Runout with an Automatic Depressurization and Low Pressure Core Cooling unavailable for some period of time.
(3) Complex These events are generally classified as " accidents" due to their level of complexity in terms of both operator response and the potential risk to plant safety. Examples of such scenarios include Anticipated Transients Without Scram coincident with a Loss of Main Condenser and a Loss of Offsite Power coincident with a Loss of Coolant Accident.
A total of six scenarios shall be chosen, with two scenarios in each of the categories defined above (one with SPDS available and one without SPDS). The scenarios will be limited to 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in length.
3.2 Shift Complement Utilized The Plant Operations and Technical Departments shall provide for the operating teams to perform the DST. The scenarios will be given in two groups of operators, a Team A and a Team B.
Each team shall be composed of the following trained individuals:
One (1) certified Reactor Operator - will serve as control board operator; One (1) certified Reactor Operator - serving as the NUCLENET panel and SPDS operator; One (1) SRO certified Assistant Shif t Supervisor / Control Room Supervisor.
One (1) SRO certified Shift Supervisor; and One (1) Shif t Technical Advisor (STA).
This represents the expected staffing level for the CPS MCR during postulated plant accident / transient conditions. Use of these manning levels for the DST should enhance the validity of the tested response and simulates the expected realistic interface with the SPDS displays.
Each operator team shall be given the six (6) simulated accident /
transient events, as programmed into the simulator, and their response 3-4
F Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 Rsvision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 actions (3 with SPDS and 3 [different ones] without) will be evaluated with respect to the usefulness of the SPDS under the postulated plant conditions.
- Each operator team shall complete a feedback questionnaire (see Section 3.6 for details) on the advantages / disadvantages of the SPDS and will participate in a follow-up discussion of their responses from the simulator tests immediately after completion of the scenario packages.
3.3 Test-Evaluators and Functions The DST Evaluators shall include the following personnel:
1.
V&V Team Personnel T. L. Riley - V&V Project Manager Licensing Project Engineer-SPDS T. Y. Fukushima (S. Levy, Inc.) - SPDS V&V / Design Background Human Factors for SPDS Plant Systems Background Computer Systems Background A. E. Moersfelder - Consultant V&V Program Manager (CYGNA Energy Services)
Computer Systems Background Plant Systems Background R. B. Porter - Consultant V&V Project Engineer (CYGNA Energy Services)
Computer Systems Background Plant Systems Background P. J. Telthorst - Licensing Project Engineer SPDS Human Factors 1
Plant Systems Background 2.
Nuclear Training Department l,
The Nuclear Training Department shall provide two (2) instructors knowledgeable in the operation of the CPS Simulator, plant systems, Emergency Operating Procedures, and the SPDS.
j In addition, the Training Department shall provide the following engineer:
A..Validivia - Control and Instrumentation Engineer SPDS Design and Programming for the Simulator During the running of the scenario packages, test evaluators shall record notes on log sheets. These log sheets will be developed and included in the DST Results Report. At the conclusion of each scenario, 3-5 i
I
Document No.:
SPDS-DST-001 Rsvision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 and prior to proceeding to the next scenario, evaluators shall rate the operator performance based upon the Test Evaluation Criteria discussed in Section 3.6.
The final evaluation of the scenario ratings shall be the responsibility of the SPDS V&V Team. These ratings shall be recorded for future evaluation of the test.results.
Comments made by the members of each operating team tested will be discussed with the test evaluators in a debriefing session immediately after completion of the scenario packages. Operator comments on specific actions taken, decisions made, and the usefulness of the SPDS will be reviewed later by the test evaluators, and a comparison will be made to ascertain whether the original rating needs modification.
The training instructors will each complete an " Instructor Corrective Action" form for each of the six scenario packages. This form will be developed and included in the DST Results Report. Example information to be identified on this form is as follows:
Plant variables / Entry conditions -
Entry conditions of the plant variables that would exceed their safety limits during the transient.
Emergency Procedure step related to the action required.
The required operator action to be taken.
Instructor Intervention Points.
This set of checklists shall be developed for instructor intervention
' during the execution of the transients, in case the operator responses to the event deviate widely from that called for by the procedures. These intervention points are designed to allow sufficient margin for operator action, and are only used when no action or the wrong action on the part of the operators would adversely impact the successful completion of the transient / accident scenario. This will keep each scenario within the same framework, enhancing consistent evaluation.
3.4 Simulation Data Gathering and Equipment The following DST equipment list shall be utilized during the performance of this test program.
Explanatory notes are provided where considered appropriato:
Item Number Reason 1.
Clock 1
Timeline on videotape 2.
Videotape Camera 2
Record Scenarios for future evaluations, t
3.
Monitor 1
Review of tape results.
3-6
Documsnt No.:
SPDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 4.
Videotape Cassettes 6
5.
Microphones 2
Record operating team (omnidirectional) conversations 6.
Test Evaluator Log 75 Record events and actions.
Sheets 7.
Clipboards 7
8.
Evaluator Rating Scales 3
9.
Videotape Recorder 2
10.
Camera Tripod 2
11.
Simulator Computer 1
To record scenario data.
12.
Tape Recorders 2
13.
Audio Tapes 2
The data from these sources of information will be gathered and tabulated in the DST Results Report. Videotaping of the scenarios will allow review after the test to ensure the ratings and subsequent evaluations are correct and complete.
3.5 Test Conduct Section 3.0 defines four (4) Phases to the DST Plan. Phase I and II arc preparatory in nature and vill not be discussed in detail here.
Prior to this test, the plant operators will be trained (classroom and simulator) on the current SPDS design. Nuclear Training shall be responsible for developing SPDS Lesson Plans and ensuring this training is completed. The success of this test is dependent upon completion of the SPDS training. The V&V Team shall monitor this training program to ensure appropriate objectives are met in preparation for the DST.
Prior to performing the test, the operator teams will be briefed on the purpose, scope and conduct of the DST. This briefing will familiarize the operators to the importance of the DST and will aid in relaxing any pre-test tension on their part. It will be emphasized to the operations personnel participating in the test their performance abilities are not being tested here.
Phase III of the DST involves the actual performance of the test for the SPDS.
In this Phase, scenarios will be run in a predetermined order.
Each operator team will see all six (6) scenario packages. Three (3) scenarios will be run with the SPDS available and three (3) scenarios will be run without the SPDS available.
t 3-7
Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 Scenario packages will be run for a period of 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> each.
Evaluators will record notes on the Test Evaluator Log Sheets. These log sheets will be developed later and included in the DST Results Report. At the conclusion of each scenario, test evaluators will rate the performance based upon the Scenario Evaluation Guidance identified in Section 3.6 of this report. Transients will also be videotaped, recorded for sound and have data captured on the Simulator for later evaluation.
Upon completion of the scenario packages, Phase IV of the DST begins.
The operator teams will view the videotapes and audio recordings. Each operator will be offered the opportunity to comment on his specific actions, decisions, etc., in relationship to what is shown on the recorded events. Specific comments regarding the usefulness of the SPDS during the tested scenarios will be particularly solicited. This narration will be done on a separate tape recorder. This information
~
will be reviewed later, and a comparison will be made to ascertain whether the original scenario ratings need modification.
The last hour of the follow-on debriefing with the operator team members will be used for operators to fill out a questionnaire (see Section 3.6) regarding the usefulness of the SPDS. The operators will be asked to rate the questionnaire itself as part of this process.
During the conduct of the DST, the V&V Project Manager shall perform the function of a Scenario Leader. Any questions from the Test Evaluators (and/or the operators, for those to which the evaluator cannot respond) which might invalidate the scenario package or affect the test results should be directed to the Scenario Leader. Discussion among Test evaluators and among the operating team members and the evaluators should be kept to a minimum (except during instructor intervention - in these cases the discussion should be crisp and clear). This will allow the scenario to proceed without affecting the operating crew being tested or their corresponding response actions. Normal discussion between operating crew members will be encouraged.
3.6 Test Evaluation Criteria Following completion of the DST and the subsequent operator debriefing sessions, the test data will be gathered and tabulated by the V&V Team.
Test data includes the following:
l 1.
Test Evaluator Log Sheets;
(
2.
Instructor Intervention Checklists; 3.
Scenario Videotapes and Audio Recordings; 4
Notes from the follow-on operator debriefings; 5.
Scenario Packages; and 6.
Completed Operator Feedback Questionnaires.
l 3-8
Docum:nt No.: SPDS-DST-001 Rsvicion: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 As noted in Section 3.4, the instructors will complete the ratings from the checklists in item #2 above, using the Scenario Evaluation Criteria, immediately following each scenario package. The Scenario Evaluation Criteria are as follows:
Rating Range Description 3.6 - 4.0 No instructor intervention and no questions asked of instructor. Optimum coordination and system usage was noted.
Operating Team always knew plant status.
3.2 - 3.6 No instructor intervention. Some questions asked of instructor. Good coordination and system usage. Operating Team always knew plant statua.
2.8 - 3.2 Minimal instructor intervention. Some l
questions asked of instructor. Overall good coordination and system usage. Generally knew plant status.
2.5 - 2.8 Moderate instructor intervention. Frequent questions asked of the instructor. Fair coordination and system usage. Operating Team knowledge of plant status was weak on occasion.
1.8 - 2.5 Frequent instructor intervention. Frcquent questions asked of the instructor. Littic coordination.
Systen usage not effective.
Often unaware of plant stetua.
0.0 - 1.8 Constant intervention and questioning.
Response not coordinated. Systems were improperly used. Most times unaware of plant status.
The SPDS V&V Team will assign the final ratings based upon a review of the Instructor Intervention Checklists, discussions with the instructors, and discussions with the Test Evaluators.
The scenario package scores shall be weighted according to their complexity (as defined in Section 3.1).
The weighting factors to be applied shall be determined later, prior to performance of the DST.
The weighted scenario ratings will then be summed and normalized to the 0 - 4.0 scale for final evaluation purposes. This weighting, summing and normalizing process will be performed for the scores from each operator team evaluated and according to whether or not the SPDS was available or unavailable. Thus, for a given operator team, with a set of six (6) scenario scores, the three (3) scores with SPDS available will be weighted summed and normalized, and likewise for the three (3) scores involving those scenarios where SPDS is not available for operator use.
3-9
1 Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 The final weighted and normalized scores between the scenarios with SPDS and those without SPDS will then be compared to determine the net impact due to the SPDS on the operator responses. Generally speaking, high overall scores (on the 0 - 4.0 scale) and a positive delta (overall score with SPDS minus the score without SPDS) will be indicative of an SPDS that has met its design objectives. Low overall scores and/or negative deltas will be evaluated further to allow a determination of the root cause as it relates to the SPDS design function.
In addition to the evaluations and ratings identified above, the operators will each be given an SPDS Feedback Questionnaire. This questionnaire will solicit operator comments on the following example aspects of the CPS SPDS:
1.
Overall usefulness in the scenarios tested; 2.
Display selection capabilities and alarm silence fnnctions -
was the design adequate for MCR usage; 3.
Which display formats were most preferred; 4.
SPDS Critical Safety Functions - were the alarms / setpoints useful for E0P entry condition monitoring; 5.
Is there any parameter information that should have been found on all displays but wasa't; 6.
Wec the plant pictorial representation and other human factors aspects of the SPDS useful in finding information; and 7.
Is the questionnaire a valid cne or can it be improved?
The operator response to these and other questions shall receive a detailed evaluation to assist in the determination if the SPDS meets its design objectives. These responses will be considered in future system design enhancements that may be appropriate for the SPDS. Human Factors consideration of the operator responses to these questions will be l
necessary to ensure consistent evaluation. The responses will be kept confidential in that the individual operator comments will be unknown to l
the V&V Team and others. The overall responses will be tabulated and i
documented in the DST Results Report.
3-10
Document No: SPDS-DST-001 Rt. vision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 4.0
SUMMARY
'The Clinton SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test Plan described herein should demonstrate that 'the SPDS design objectives have been met.
The results of these tests will be tabulated and documented in the DST Results Report.
s
t
.[
i t
- c 4-1
. -..