ML20211A834

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/86-09 & 50-306/86-11.Corrective Actions:All Work Requests Affecting Fire Barriers Reviewed Before Work Allowed to Start

ML20211A834
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	10/03/1986
From:	Larson C NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:	Guldemond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
NUDOCS 8610170042
Download: ML20211A834 (2)

Text

4 Northem States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis. Minnesota 55401 Telephone (612) 330-5500 October 3, 1986 Mr. W. G. Guldemond, Chief.

Projects Branch 2 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60 Response to Inspection Reports No. 282/86009 and 306/86011 In response to your letter of September 5, 1986, which transmitted Inspection Reports No. 282/86009 and 306/86011, the following information is offered.

Violation #1 "G.

Penetration Fire Barriers 1.

All penetration fire barriers in fire area boundaries protecting equipment required to be operable shall be operable.

2.

If Specification 3.14.G.1 cannot be met, a continuous fire watch shall be established on at least one side of the affected penetra-tion (s) within one hour.

Restore the inoperable penetration fire barriers to Cpecable statue within 14 days or submit a special report to the Commission within 30 days outlining the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for reatoring the barriers to Operable status."

Contrary to the above, prior to July 28, 1986, penetration fire barrier 1657 was inoperable for a period of time in excess of the requirements stated in Technical Specification 3.14.G.2.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

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OCT 61986 g%

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e Northem States Power Company October 3, 1986 Page 2 Respouse The open fire penetration was discovered at about 1040 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.9572e-4 months <br /> on July 29 during the 18-month surveillance of fire barriers. A fire watch was posted within one hour and the penetration was sealed by 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br />. Full compliance has been achieved.

It is not known how long the penetration had been open. A pipe had been removed from the penetration and it may not have been resealed at that time.

To improve the work control process, and to reduce the chance of degrading fire barriers, all work requests affecting fire barriers are now reviewed by the fire protection system engineer before work is allowed to start.

It was concluded that the time clock for taking action and reporting started at discovery of the opening, and that actions taken after discovery were within Technical Specifica-tion requirements; therefore, no report was made.

Violation #2 10 CFR Part 50 Section 72 (Immediate Notification Requirements For Operating Nuclear Power Reactors) states in part that the licensee shall notify the NRC within four hours of the occurrence of any event that results in an unplanned actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF).

Contrary to the above, on August 1, 1986 an unplanned start of the 21 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump occurred and the NRC was not notified of this within four hours.

This is a Severity Level V violation.

Response

This event was discussed with involved personncl. Full compliance has been achieved. The event report is being reviewed by all operations personnel to remind them that any unplanned start of engineered safety features equipment is reportable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This event was reported to the NRC as Unit 2 LER 86-004.

a'**\\

C E Larson Vice President, Nuclear Generation c: Regional Administrator-III, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC G Charnoff

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