ML20210J026

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Summary of Operating Reactor Events Meeting 86-08 on 860317 to Discuss Events Occurring Since Last Meeting on 860310
ML20210J026
Person / Time
Site: Dresden, Mcguire, Fermi, Oyster Creek, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Susquehanna, Columbia, Turkey Point, River Bend, Diablo Canyon, La Crosse, Zion, McGuire, 05000000
Issue date: 03/24/1986
From: Holahan G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-86-008, OREM-86-8, NUDOCS 8604030334
Download: ML20210J026 (22)
v • d • e


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. .s N 2 4 gg MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING ON MARCH 17, 1986 - MEETING 86-08 On March 17, 1986, an Operating Reactor Events meeting (86-08) was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors and their representatives on events which occurred since our last meeting on March 10, 1986. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. In addition, the assignment of follow-up review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the statut of previous assignments are presented in Enclosure 3.

Completion dates have been assigned for items in Enclosure 3. Each assignee should review Enclosure 3 with regard to their respective responsibilities.

Note that several assignments are approaching the due date. Please.be responsive and advise ORAB (D. Tarnoff, x29526) if the target completion date cannot.

be met.

Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ encl:

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E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 so N24g MEMORANDUM FOR
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM
Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING ON MARCH 17, 1986 - MEETING 86-08 On March 17, 1986, an Operating Reactor Events meeting (86-08) was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors and their representatives on events which occurred since our last meeting on March 10, 1986. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. In addition, the assignment of follow-up review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Enclosure 3.

Completion dates have been assigned for items in Enclosure 3. Each assignee should review Enclosure 3 with regard to their respective responsibilities.

Note that several assignments are approaching the due date. Please be responsive and advise ORAS (D. Tarnoff, x27864) if the target completion date cannot be met.

q .r y o S

0 Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ encl:

See next page l

l

Harold R. Denton cc: D. Eisenhut J. Donohew J. Taylor J. Zwolinski C. Heltemes S. Long T. Murley, Reg. I H. Bailey J. Nelson Grace, Reg. II J. Henderson J. Keppler, Reg. III J. Bradfute R. D. Martin, Reg. IV E. Adensam J. B. Martin, Reg. Y J. Stang R. Starostecki, Reg. I D. Hood R. Walker, Reg. II M. J. Campagnone 4- C. Norelius, Reg. III B. J. Youngblood E. Johnson. Reg. IV S. Stern D. Kirsch, Reg. Y J. Norris H. Thompson W. Butler F. Miraglia S. Varga R. Bernero D. Lynch T. Speis-W. Russell T. Novak F. Schroeder W. Houston B. Sheron D. Ziemann D. Crutchfield G. Lainas V. Benaroya W. Regan D. Vassallo E. Jordan E. Rossi R. Baer E. Weiss R. Hernan S. Showe S. Rubin i

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- j ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (86-08)

MARCH 17, 1986 NAME DIVISION NAME DIVISION G. M. Holahan NRR/0 RAS E. Jordan IE/DEPER B. Boger NRR/DHFT R. Bernero NRR/ DBL

. J. Donohew NRR/BWD#1 R. Baer IE/DEPER V. Benaroya NRR/F0B-A K. Kniel NRR/DSR0 W. Haass IE/VPB T. Novak NRR/PWR-A W. Regan NRR/PWR-B T. Speis NRR/DSR0 J D. Vassallo NRR/ DBL C. Rossi NRR/PWR-A L. Kelly NRR/0 RAS D. Humenansky OCM/LZ R. Hernan NRR/PPAS C. Ader OCM C. Miller. NRR/PWR-B F. Miraglia NRR/PWR-B E. Weinkam NRR/PWR-A J. Zwolinski NRR/BWD#1 N. Trehan NRR/ DBL M. Virgilio NRR/ORAS M. Srinivasan- NRR/ DBL J. T. Beard NRR/0 RAS S. Stern NRR/ DBL J. Bradfute NRR/BWD#3 G. Lainas NRR/ DBL D. Tarnoff NRR/0 RAS

, A. Dromerick IE/EGCB T. Rotella NRR/BWD#1 G. Murphy NOAC/0RNL R. Buck NRR/BWD#1 D. Allison IE/EAB V. Hodge IE/EGCB S. Long IE/DEPER H. Bailey IE/DEPER D. Zukor AE00/ROAB M. Chiramal AE00/ROAB G. Klingler IE/0RPB E. Weiss IE/DEPER J. Henderson IE/EGCB E. Brown AE00/ROAB

ENCLOSURE 2 4

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 86-08 l

l MARCH 17, 1986 OYSTER CREEK REACTOR SCRAM WITH COMPLICATIONS NEW PROBLEMS WITH GE-TYPE HFA RELAYS

, RIVER BEND STATION FSAR/AS-BUILT DESIGN DISCREPANCY McGUIRE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM POTENTIAL FLOW DEFICIENCIES UNDER DESIGN BASIS CONDITIONS LACROSSE IGNITION IN OFFGAS SYSTEM OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST WNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION AUDIT SUSQUEHANNA-1 OMISSION OF PRESERVICE EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN PRIMARY PRESSURE B0UNDARY WELDS ZION-1 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER MALFUNCTION (W TYPE DB-50)

FERMI-2 RPS BREAKER FAILURE

I 0YSTER CREEK - REACTOR SCRAM WITH COMPLICATIONS MARCH 6, 1986 - (J. N. DON 0 HEW, ORPM NRR)

PROBLEM: SCRAM FROM SPURIOUS SIGNAL DURING QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE ON TURBINE STOP VALVES (TSV).

SIGNIFICANCE: COMPLICATIONS FOLLOWED SCRAM.

DISCUSSION:

  • PLANT RESPONDED AS DESIGNED---OPERATORS FOLLOWED

" REACTOR LEVEL" E0PS; BUT NOT SCRAM PROCEDURES

  • OPERATOR DID NOT SWITCH MODE SWITCH TO " SHUTDOWN" AS REQUIRED BY SCRAM PROCEDURES. THIS COMPLICATED THE EVENT.
  • 45 SECONDS LATER MSIV CLOSURE AND OPERATOR WAS UNPREPARED FOR THE SPURIOUS SIGNAL.
  • MINOR CONTAMINATION OCCURRED TO 8 PLANT WORKERS FROM AIRBORNE RELEASES; SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED.
  1. 1 STOP VALVE) AND REPAIRED.
  • MSIV CLOSURE IN JUNE.1985 EVENT SHOWED SAMC PROBLEM.

OPERATOR CAN NOT DRIVE IN CONTROL RODS UNTIL RCS PRESSURE BELOW 600 PSIG AFTER MSIV CLOSURE SCRAM.

BOTTOM-LINE:

  • PLANT WAS NEVER IN AN UNCONTROLLED CONDITION.
  • RESIDEh r INSPECTOR BELIEVES OPERATOR'S RESPONSE TO THE EVENT WAS REASONABLE AND PLANT EQUIPMENT RESPONDED PROPERLY.

6

i-POST TRIP REVIEW ONE.TSV AT 90% CLOSURE AND ANOTHER TSV LIMIT SWITCH FAILED.

REACTOR SCRAMED AND 2 0F 3 FEEDWATER PUMPS MANUALLY TRIPPED.

LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL AND HIGH-HIGH SCRAM DISCHARGE LEVEL (FROM TWO SCRAMS) TRIPS OCCURRED.

RCS PRESSURE DROPS IN 45 SECONDS TO 850.PSIG MSIV CLOSURE TRIP DUE TO FEEDWATER ADDITION, REACTOR SCRAM AND TURBINE WAS NOT TRIPPED.

TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATOR TRYING TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE BY CLOSING TSV AND TURBINE IS TRIPPED ON TSV CLOSURE OPERATOR DID NOT MANUALLY SCRAM REACTOR AND' TRANSFER MODE SWITCH FROM RUN TO SHUTDOWN.

OPERATOR CONCENTRATED ON FEEDWATER LEVEL CONTROL BECAUSE PAST EVENTS HAVE CAUSED OPERATORS TO BE SENSITIVE TO WATER LEVEL.

OPERATOR DID NOT MANUALLY TRIP TURBINE REACTOR LEVEL ROSE DUE TO MSIV CLOSURE AND AN OPERATING FEEDWATER PUMP.

- REMAINING FEEDWATER PUMP MANUALLY TRIPPED, LEVEL STABILIZED BUT WAS '

ABOVE LEVEL TO OPEN ISOLATION CONDENSER AND TURBINE CONDENSER IS NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE MSIV ARE CLOSED.

OPERATOR USED PORVS TO BRING LEVEL LOW EN0 UGH TO OPEN I

ISOLATION CONDENSER.

OPERATOR FURTHER USED PORVS TO BRING PRESSURE BELOW 600 PSIG TO RESET MSIV CLOSURE SCRAM AND OPEN THE MSIVS

- OPERATOR ISOLATES ISOLATION CONDENSER, IS ON TURBINE CONDENSER AND EVENT IS OVER.

MINOR CONTAMINATION OF 8 PLANT WORKERS OCCURRED FROM AIRBORNE I

' ACTIVITY, AS EXPECTED FROM LOSS OF GLAND SEALING STEAM TO TURBINE AND OPERATION OF ISOLATION CONDENSER VALVES.

QUESTIONS SHOULD TWO REACTOR SCRAMS RESULT IN HIGH-HIGH SCRAM DISCHARGE WATER LEVEL? THE LICENSEE INDICATES THIS IS NORMAL.

WHY 600 PSIG CONSTRAINT ON RESETTING SCRAM FOLLOWING MSIV CLOSURE SCRAM AND LOW CONDENSER VACUUM?

IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH " LEVEL" E0PS HAVING ONLY TWO 0F THREE FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIPPED AND THE REMAINING PUMP NOT THROTTLED FOR THIS EVENT?

SHOULD E0PS HAVE TURBINE MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING REACTOR SCRAM?

NEW PROBLEMS WITH GE-TYPE HFA RELAYS MARCH 6, 1986 (J. T. BEARD, NRR)

PROBLEM:

INTERNAL RELEASE OF RESIN ETC DUE TO INSUFFICIENT CURING DURING MANUFACTURING SIGNIFICANCE:

HFA RELAYS HAVE HAD LONG HISTORY OF PROBLEMS INSTALLATION OF'" CENTURY SERIES" HFA RECOMMENDED BY GE AND NRC (IE BULLETIN 84-02)

USED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT BWR REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND PWR SWITCHGEAR P0TENTIAL COMMON MODE FAILURE MECHANISM CIRCUMSTANCES:

OCTOBER 1983 - A UTILITY REPORTED TO GE " MISTING" ON GLASS COVER

, PLATE ON NUMEROUS RELAYS, 24-48 HOURS AFTER INSTALLATION AND ENERGIZATION JANUARY 1984 - OYSTER CREEK PLANT HAD " MISTING" ON 58 0F 68 RELAYS (10 NOT ENERGIZED)

FEBRUARY 1984, MAY 1984 - GE TEST REPORTS STATED " MISTING" DUE TO ADHESIVE USED TO SEAL GLASS TO COVER PLATE JUNE 1984 - GE SUPPLIED NEW RELAYS TO 0YSTER CREEK (N0 ADHESIVE);

COVER GLASS MISTED WITHIN TWO WEEKS OF ENERGIZATION JANUARY 1986 - GE TEST REPORT STATES:

" MISTING" DUE TO RELEASE OF UNCURED RESIN, CURING AGENTS, OTHER ORGANIC COMPOUNDS USED TO ENCAPSULATE RELAY C0ll, DUE TO INSUFFICIENT CURING DURING MANUFACTURING PROCESS NO ACTUAL RELAY CONTACT FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING TESTS MANUFACTURING PROCESS CHANGED (DECEMBER 1985)

RECOMMENDS BURNISHING 0F CONTACTS AND CLEANING OF ACCESSIBLE INTERNAL PARTS TO PREVENT POSSIBLE MIGRATION OF MIST MATERIAL ONTO RELAY CONTACTS

FOLLOWUP:

OYSTER CREEK PROVIDED VOLUNTARY 50.73 REPORT (MARCH 6, 1986),

DUE TO POTENTIALLY GENERIC IMPORTANCE NRC INITIAL CONCERNS: GE TEST DURATION WAS ONLY 12 MONTHS AND TYPICAL SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL IS 18 MONTHS; VOLATILITY OF UNCURED RESINS; POSSIBLE GUMMING OF ARMATURE MOTION: COMPREHENSIVENESS OF TEST; LACK 0F FIELD EXPERIENCE INFORMATION: NEED FOR ENTIRELY NEW RELAY, DIVERSITY DATA SEARCH INITIATED (ORNL, NPRDS) BY NRR NRR TO DRAFT IE INFORMATION NOTICE NRR, IE TO DEVELOP SUPPLEMENT TO BULLETIN 84-02, IN CONSULTATION WITH OWNERS

RIVER BEND-STATION (RBS) FSAR/AS-BUILT DESIGN DISCREPANCY MARCH 13, 1986 - (S. STERN, NRR)

PROBLEM:

LICENSEE REPORTED DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FSAR AND AS-BUILT DESIGN' 0F MOTOR OPERATED VALVES IN VARIOUS SAFETY SYSTEMS SIGNIFICANCE:

NO IMMEDIATE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE APPARENT.

ACCURACY OF RBS WALKDOWN FOR CONSISTENCY OF AS-BUILT WITH FSAR IN QUESTION.

POTENTIAL PRECURSOR TO OTHER DESIGN PROBLEMS AT RBS.

ADEQUACY OF LICENSEE OVERSIGHT OVER A&E (STONE a WEBSTER ENG.)

IN QUESTION DISCUSSION:

ON 3/13/86, DISCREPANCY NOTED BY RBS DURING ENGINEERING EVALUATION ON MOTOR OPERATED VALVES.

PLANT BROUGHT TO COLD SHUTDOWN.

A8E ANALYSIS SHOWS DISCREPANCY NOT A SAFETY PROBLEM RBS RESTARTED FSAR/AS-BUILT INCONSISTENCY STANDBY BUS VOLTAGE MUST BE GREATER THAN 75% RATED OF MOTOR-RATED V0LTAGE DURING LOAD SEQUENCING.

CLASS IE MOTORS MUST BE CAPABLE OF STARTING ACCELERATING AT 70% OF NAMEPLATE V0LTAGE RATING.

MOTOR ACTUALLY PROCURED AND TESTED AT 80% VOLTAGE RATING.

FOLLOWUP: REGION IV FOLLOWING UP

McGUIRE - NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM POTENTIAL FLOW DEFICIENCIES UNDER DESIGN BASIS CONDITIONS ,

MARCH 11, 1985 (H. BAILEY, IE)

PROBLEM OPERABILITY TEST NOT PERFORMED UNTIL JAN 28, 1986. INITIAL OPERATION OF UNIT 2 WAS JUNE 1983.

SIGNIFICANCE:

NSW SYSTEM FLOW MAY NOT HAVE MET DESIGN BASIS FROM JUNE 1983

. UNTIL JANUARY 28, 1986.

DISCUSSION:

DESIGN BASIS REQUIRES LOCA IN ONE UNIT, A LOSS-0F-0FFSITE-POWER ON BOTH UNITS, LOSS OF LAKE NORMAN AND A SINGLE FAILURE.

LIMITING NSW CONFIGURATION WOULD REQUIRE TWO NSW PUMPS TAKING SUCTION ON A COMMON HEADER FROM THE STANDBY NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER POND.

PREVIOUS TESTING DID NOT TEST THE DESIGN MAXIMUM FLOWRATE REQUIRED UNDER THE AB0VE. CONDITIONS.

PROBLEM DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF TROUBLESHOOTING NSW COMPONENT LOW FLOW PROBLEMS.

COMPONENT FLOW PROBLEMS CAUSED BY SILT FROM LAKE NORMAN. HEAT EXCHANGERS WERE CLEANED.

EVIDENCE OF NSW OPERABILITY PRIOR TO JAN 28, 1986 NOT CONCLUSIVE AT THIS TIME DUE TO THIS COMPONENT HEAT EXCHANGER CLEANING PRIOR TO JANUARY 28 TEST.

E RECALCULATION LOWERED REQUIRED NSW FLOWS FOR SOME COMPONENT COOLING WATER AND REACTOR BUILDING COOLING.

TESTING TO REBALANCE AND LOWER NSW FLOWS INDICATED A NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD (NPSH) PROBLEM AT THE HIGHER INITIAL FLOWS.

NSW SYSTEM TESTED SUCCESSFULLY ON JANUARY 28, 1986 WITH CLEAN HEAT EXCHANGERS AND REVISED COMPONENT FLOWS.

FOLLOW-UP:

LICENSEE STUDYING LONG TERM IMPROVEMENTS TO SILTING PROBLEM.

MEETING BETWEEN REGION II AND LICENSEE ON MARCH 14, 1986.

NSW SYSTEM PERFORMANCE STILL UNDER REVIEW BY REGION II AND HEADQUARTERS. PROBLEMS WITH SYSTEM FLOW AND EFFICIENCY DEGRADATION DUE TO HEAT EXCHANGER SILTING.

McGuire - Iluclrar Servica (NSW) System '

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LACROSSE-IGNITION IN OFFGASS SYSTEM MARCH 6, 1986 (S. M. LONG, IE)

PROBLEM: THE TURBINE OFFGAS STREAM WAS IGNITED DURING SAMPLING ACTIVITIES SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: P0TENTIALLY GENERIC CONCERN FOR POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEMS---USE OF SILVER ZE0 LITE.

CIRCUMSTANCES:

LICENSEE WAS SAMPLING 0FFGAS STREAM TO DETERMINE EFFICIENCY OF FINAL FILTERS SILVER ZEOLITE CARTRIDGES WERE USED FOR IODINE SAMPLING INSTEAD OF USUAL CHARC0AL CARTRIDGES ABOUT 2 MINUTES AFTER SAMPLING PUMP WAS STARTED, TECHNICIAN NOTED WATER DROPLETS FORMING IN SAMPLE TUBE DOWNSTREAM 0F THE SILVER ZE0 LITE ABOUT 1 MINUTE LATER, THERE WAS A LOUD BANG AND A FLASH INSIDE THE SAMPLING TUBING A PRESSURE SPIKE AND TEMPERATURE RISE OCCURRED IN THE OFFGAS SYSTEM CONCURRENT WITH BANG ,

SILVER ZE0 LITE CARTRIDGES WERE FOUND TO BE VERY HOT; PLASTIC CARTRIDGE CASES AND TYG0N TUBING WERE BURNT DISCUSSION:

ZE0 LITE CARTRIDGE WAS INITIALLY DEHYDRATED (5% M0ISTURE CONTENT)

ENERGY OF HYDRATION MAY HAVE HEATED CARTRIDGE AB0VE AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AT 150*F, SILVER ZE0 LITE MAY CATALYZE RECOMBINATION OF H2 AND 02 '

RECOMBINATION ENERGY MAY HAVE HEATED CARTRIDGE TO FLASH TEMP.

FOLLOWUP:

RESIDENT INSPECTOR REPORTED EVENT TO REGION LICENSEE POSTED ON INP0 NOTEPAD SANDIA IS INVESTIGATING FOR RESEARCH IE WILL ISSUE INFORMATION NOTICE

FIGURE 2 0FFGAS SAMPLING ASSEMBLY

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OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST WNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION AUDIT MARCH 3-7, 1985, (JOHN 0 BRADFUTE, NRR)

PROBLEM: THE FIRE PROTECTION AUDIT CONDUCTED BY REGION V RESULTED IN APPROXIMATELY EIGHT ISSUES THAT ARE P0TENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF THE APPROVED FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM SIGNIFICANCE: POTENTIAL FOR COMPROMISE OF SAFE SHUTDOWN PATH IN THE EVENT OF CONTROL ROOM OR SPREADING ROOM FIRE DISCUSSION:

THE ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THE INSPECTION:

l - SUBSTITUTION OF AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM FOR REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING TO ACHIEVE SAFE SHUTDOWN

- CABLE TRAY SUPPORT INSULATION NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MANUFACTURER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

- UNANALYZED WORST CASE CONDITION RECENTLY IDENTIFIED BY LICENSEE

- ALL CASES OF " HOT SHORTING" 0F LOW VOLTAGE ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ANALYSED

- LICENSEE'S ANALYSES WOULD ALLOW CORE UNC0VERY DURING SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING A FIRE

- ANALYSES PERFORMED TO BURNS & R0WE CRITERIA RATHER THAN THE LICENSEE'S OWN QA PROGRAM 4

- CABLE SEPARATION IN SPREADING ROOM MAY NOT MEET APPROVED FIRE i

PROTECTION PROGRAM

- SHIELD WALL HEIGHT MAY NOT BE PER APPROVED FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM FOLLOW-UP:

NRR MEETING WITH SUPPLY SYSTEM.

NRR REEVALUATION OF WNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM LEVEL 3 VIOLATIONS AND SUBSTANTIAL CIVIL PENALTIES ARE POSSIBLE 4

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SUSQUEHANNA UNIT 1 - OMISSION OF PRESERVICE EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN PRIMARY PRESSURE B0UNDARY WELDS IDENTIFIED MARCH 6, 1986 (J. B. HENDERSON, IE)

PROBLEM: DURING SECOND REFUELING, LICENSEE FOUND THAT WELD EXAMINATIONS (REQUIRED BY NRC TO BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO INITIAL CRITICALITY)

HAD NOT BEEN PERFORMED, SIGNIFICANCE: VIOLATION OF REGULATIONS, LOSS OF IMPORTANT DATA CIRCUMSTANCES:

SOME PRIMARY PRESSURE BOUNDARY, SOME CLASS 2 APPR0XIMATELY 200 L.F. TOTAL PRESERVICE EXAMINATION (UT) 100% - NO RADIATION FIELD INSERVICE EXAM SAMPLE ALARA SAMPLE EXAMINED REPETITIVELY MFG (ASTM) SPECS REQUIRE 100% RADIOGRAPHY LICENSEE PROPOSES NO COMPENSATORY ACTION ALL WELDS ARE LONG-SEAM WELDS; RECENT FOSSIL PLANT PIPE RUPTURES WERE AT LONG-SEAM WELDS FOLLOWUP:

APPARENTLY NOT GENERIC REGIONAL ACTION: TBD NRR ACTION: TBD

ZION REACTOR TRIP BREAKER MALFUNCTION (W TYPE DB-501 MARCH 3, 1986 (J. T BEARD, NRR)

PROBLEM:

ONE REACTOR TRIP BREAKER (RTB) RESPONDED SLOWLY DURING TESTING ,

SIGNIFICANCE:

APPARENTLY INADEQUATE VENDOR PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS GENERIC APPLICABILITY i s r

CIRCUMSTANCES:

AUTOMATIC,. SHUNT TRIP FEATURE HAD BEEN INSTALLED RECENTLY BY WESTINGk90SE (W) PLANT CONDUCTING BREAKER RESPONSE TIME TESTS '

RTB IB T00K_0,190 SECONDS TO TRIP (VS, VENDOR DESIGN SPECIFICATION OF 0,160 SECONDS, LICENSEE ADMINISTRATIVE LIMIT OF 0.500 SECONDS, AND NOMINAL TIME OF 0,080 SECONDS)

RTB'1A RESPONDED SATISFACTORILY PERSONNEL ERROR UPON RE-INSTALLATION CAUSED TURBINE TRIP x AND REACTOR TRIP. s FOLLOWUP:

LICENSEE "OUARANTINED" RTB; REQUESTED E TECHNICAL' ASSISTANCE REGION II DISPATCHED SPECIALIST TO SITE s SPECIAL LUBRICATION OF MAIN FRAME COMPONENTS OF RTB BY l'

H ENGINEER CORRECTED SLUGGISHNESS; UVTA AND SHUNT TRIP s l HAD PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY THROUGHOUT LUBRICATION NOT INCLUDED IN VENDOR'S RECOMMENDED PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IE INFORMATION NOTICE TO BE DRAFTED (BY R-II/0 RAS)

FERMI RPS BREAKER FAILURE MARCH 16, 1986 (J. T. BEARD, NRR)

PROBLEM:

CLASS IE RPS EQUIPMENT PROTECTION BREAXER FAILURE ON DEMAND SIGNIFICANCE:

POTENTIAL ~ GENERIC APPLICABILITY CIRCUMSTANCES:

UNIT IN COLD SHUTDOWN TRANSFERRING ONE RPS BUS FROM MG SET TO ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE MS SET TRIPPED; ONE EQUIPMENT PROTECTION ASSEMBLY (EPA)

TRIPPED, OTHER DID NOT TRIP LOCAL MANUAL TRIP INITIATION CAUSED:

- 10-SECONDS RESPONSE (VS, 0,160 SECONDS)

- NO-TRIP ON SECOND ATTEMPT, FOLLOWUP:

BREAKER " QUARANTINED" INSPECTOR SENT TO SITE IF ADDITIONAL FAILURE OCCURS, REGION MAY INITIATED " AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM"

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REACTOR SCRAM

SUMMARY

WEEK ENDING 03/16/86 '

I. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA DATE SITE UNIT POWER RPS CAUSE COMPLI- YTD CATIONS TOTAL 03/11/86 ZION 1 100 A EQUIP N'O 1 03/12/86 DIABLO CANYON 2 100 A EQUIP NO 4 03/14/86 DIABLO CANYON 1 100 A PERSONNEL YES 1 03/15/86 TMI 1 100 A EQUIP NO 2 03/16/86 WNP 2 1A EQUIP NO 1

. s.:

SUMMARY

OF COMPLICATIONS SITE UNIT COMPLICATIONS DIABLO CANYON 1 SI ACTUATION SIGNAL, MSIVs did not close

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s _. . . .. . ._ _ _ ._w _w sa - - _ m._ . _ . _ __-:--..- . .u II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 03/16/86 SCRAM CAUSE POWER NUMBER NUMBER 1985 OF NORMALIZED (6) WEEKLY SCRAMS (5) TO 1985 AVERAGE (3) (4)

    • POWER >15%

EQUIP. RELATED >15% 3 3.O 5.4 (68%)

PERS. RELATED(7) >15% 1 1.0 2.0 (25%)

OTHER(8) >15% 0 0.0 0.6 ( 7%)

    • Subtotal **

4 4.0 8.0 n:

    • POWER <15%  ;

EQUIP. RELATED <15% 1 1.0 1.3 (54%)

PERS. RELATED <15% 0 0.0 0.9 (38%)

OTHER <15% 0 O.O O.2 ( 8%)

    • Subtotal **

1 1.0 2.4

      • Total ***

5 5.0 10.4 MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS TYPE NUMBER NUMBER 1985 OF NORMALIZED WEEKLY SCRAMS TO 1985 AVERAGE MANUAL SCRAMS O O.0 1.0 AUTOMATIC SCRAMS 5 5.0 9.4 l

o

3 NOTES

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK 0F INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUN THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUN. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN R0D MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS'AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE.
2. RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM ,

4

3. 1985 INFORMATION DERIVED FROM RECENT ORAS PRELIMINARY STUDY OF UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS IN 1985. WEEKLY DATA DETERMINED BY TAKING TOTAL TRIPS IN A GIVEN CATEGORY ~8 DIVIDING BY 52 WEEKS / YEAR
4. IN 1985, THERE WERE AN ESTIMATED TOTAL 0F 541 AUTOMATIC 8 MANUAL UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS AT 93 REACTORS (HOLDING FULL POWER LICENSES). THIS YIELDS AN AVERAGE RATE OF 5.8 TRIPS PER REACTOR PER YEAR 8 AN AVERAGE RATE OF 10.4 TRIPS PER WEEK FOR ALL REACTORS.

- 5. BASED ON 93 REACTORS HOLDING A FULL POWER LICENSE, AS OF 2/1/86

6. NORMALIZED VALUES ALLOW COMPARISON TO 1985 DATA BY MULTIPLYING ACTUAL 1986 VALUE BY: 93 REACTORS IN 1985 NUMBER OF REACTORS REPORTING
7. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS
8. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.

ENCLOSURE 3 I l

Page No. 1 03/18/86 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETINS FOLLOWUP ITEMS AS OF MEETING 86-08 ON MARCH 17 , 1986 (IN ASCENDING PIETINS DATE, NSSS VENDOR, FACILITY ORDER)

MEETI~3 FACILITY RESPONSIBLE TASK DESCRIPT!CN SCHEDULE CLOSED DATE COMMENTS NUMBER / NSSS VENDOR / DIVISICM/ COMPLET. BY DOCUMENT, MEETINS EVENT DESCRIP. INDIVIDUAL DATE(S) PIETING, ETC.

DATE 85-13 TURKEY POIKT 3 PSB IMILHDAN J . REVIEW ADEGUACY OF 60VERNDR 03/30/96 CPEN / /

C/13/85 W / POST-TRIP / DESIGN ON TURBINE DRIVEN AFW 01/05/86 LOSS OF AFW PUMPS 10/13/85 86-03 ARKANSAS 1 NRR /MIRA6LIA F REVIEW BASIS FOR FACILITY 03/31/86 CLOSED 03/17/86 01/27/86 BW / DESIGN / OR161NAL DESIGN MODIFICATION // MARCH 7,1996 DEFICIENCY IN AND BASIS FOR FURTHER // MEMD F.

EMERSENCY MODIFICATIONPROPOSEDBY MIRA6LIA TO 6.

FEEDWATER SYSTEM LICENSEE. HOLAMAN 86-03 ARKANSAS 1 IE / JORDAN E IDENTIFY WHAT IS ACTUAL DESIGN 03/31/96 DPEN / /

01/27/86 BW / DESIGN / IN B&W PLANTS //

DEFICIENCY IN //

EMER6ENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 86-03 TMI 1 INTR IMOLAHAM 6 CONSIDER SUPPLEMENTAL IE NOTICE 03/31/86 OPEN / /

01/27/96 BW / PARTIAL IE / JORDAN E ON RECENT TRIP BREAKER PROBLEMS //

LOSS OF NNI //

86-03 MC6UIRE DHFS/I!EMANN D REVIEW NOVEMBER 1, 1995 Mc6UIRE 04/30/86 OPEN / /

01/27/86 W / START-UP / EVENT AND DETERMINE IF FAILURE //

WITH DESRADED TO REPA!R VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR //

HPSI SYSTEM PRIOR TO START-UP WAS IN V!DLATION OF TECH SPECS REQUIREMENT l

86-04 DPISDEN 3 NRR /BERNER0 R DISCUSS WITH BWRS OWNERS 6ROUP 03/31/86 DPEN //

02/10/86 6E / FIRE IN / THE PROBABILITY OF POLYURETHANE //

l DRYWELL ISN! TING DURINS OPERATION AND // '

EIPANSION6AP APPEND!! R COMPLIANCE ISSUE 86-06 W PLANTS IE / JORDAN E REVIEW REPORTABILITY OF ITEMS 03/20/86 OPEN / /

03/03/36 W / SINGLE / SUCH AS SINGLE FAILURE OF P-10 // .

FAILURE OF INTERLOCK //

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION INTE2 LOCK P-10 l

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