ML20217H703
| ML20217H703 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07003091 |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1999 |
| From: | Merritt Baker, Wescott R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9910220180 | |
| Download: ML20217H703 (7) | |
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, October 18, 1999 MEMORANDUM TO: Rob:rt Pi:rson, Chi:f Sp:ci21 ProJ cts Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS THRU: Michael Tokar, Chief TWRS Section Special Projects B.ancn Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS FROM: M. N. Baker /4!
R. G. Wescott /s/
TWRS Section Special Projects Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS
SUBJECT:
TRIP REPORT TO RICHLAND, WASHINGTON, FOR SEPTEMBER 27,19ers, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 Summarv:
Mr. Nick Baker and Mr. Rex Wescott attended a number of meetings in thrs BNFL inc. offices :n Richland, Washington, on September 27,1999 through September 29,1999, inc!uding design review meetings on the electrical single-line diagrams and diesel generators, high level waste and low activity waste ventilation, fire protection issues, metter design / hazards, as well as the Topical meeting cn " Explosive Hazards - Part 2."
. More detailed information on the subject meetings is provided in the attachments to this memorandum.
Attachments: 1.' RPP-WTP Melter Design /
' Hazards Meeting 2.' Electrical Single-Line agy
- 7 Q')W Diagrams Meeting
- 3. Ventilation Design Review Meeting g"% L -g.gp
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' 4. Topical Meeting on _
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5.- Fire Protection Meeting Docket: 70-3091 Disiribubon: kRC File Center PUBLIC ' NMSSr# FCSSr# SPB r#
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ley DATE 10 10/ @ /99 C = COVER . E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 9910220180 99101'8 1 PDR- ADOCK 0700 ,
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NUCLEAR RE2ULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 30816c001
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Oc.tober 18, 1999 EMORANDUM TO: Robert Pierson, Chief Special Projects Branch DMsion of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS THRU: Michael Tokar, Chief TWRS Section Special Projects Branch
. Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguerds, NMSS FROM: M. N. Baker . Mk-R. G. Wescott de r a#M TWRS Section Special Projects Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS
SUBJECT:
TRIP REPORT TO RICHLAND, WASHINGTON, FOR SEPTEMBER 27,1999, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30,1999 Summarv:
Mr. Nick Baker and Mr. Rex Wescott attended a number of meetings in the BNFL inc. offices in Richland, Washington, on September 27,1999 through September 29,1999, including design review meetings on the electrical single line diagrams and diesel generators, high level waste and low activity waste ventilation, fire protection issues, melter design / hazards, as well as the Topical meeting on " Explosive Hazards - Part 2."
More detailed information on the subject meetings is provided in the attachments to this memorandum.
Attachments: 1. RPP-WTP Melter Design /
Hazards Meeting
- 2. Electrical Single-Line Diagrams Meeting
- 3. Ventilation Design Review Meeting
- 4. Topical Meeting on Explosive Hazare
- 5. Fire Protection Meeting Docket: 70-3091 l
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~ REPORT.ON ELECTRICAL SINGLE-LINE DIAGRAMS September 28,1999
-Two meetings were held in the BNFL Inc. offices on September 28,1999, on the status of electrical design of the Radiation Protection Program-Waste Treatment Plant (RPP-WTP) facility. They were attended by BNFL inc. electrical design personnel, Department of Energy-
' Office of River Protection (DOE-ORP) personnel, DOE Regulatory Unit (RU) support personnel, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters personnel.
.The first meeting was in regard to the electrical single-line diagrams, which depict the arrangement of power supplies to al; the basic facility areas. At the present time, the facility is divided into plant areas by function, such as high level waste receipt and transfer, melter feed preparation, melter glass formers, etc.
The single-line diagrams were a preliminary (Revision "A") issue, and will be required for the firm price cost estimate around mid-December 1999. The basis of Design (BOD) requires 25 percent spares on electrical equipment, and will use traditional estimating methods, instead of obtaining commercial quotations for equipment.
At the time of the meeting,'two Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were shown. They are to supply power to the important To Safety (ITS) equipment. They have automatic starting capability, and are expected to supply the ITS equipment within 10-30 seconds after loss of
- both sources of off-site power. A third diesel generator is shown as manual start, but may be
, revised to auto-start.' It is characterized as " Standby," and is shown to supply power to the melter (s) electrodes, and other users. Gencrally, these users, such as the metters, are important for commercial reasons. They require restoration of power within approximately 15-20 minutes.
Some discussion took place regarding the classification of some equipment items as important to Safety (ITS). The melter feed tank agitator, for example, should NOT be classified as important to safety, but it is needed for proper waste form qualification. It is expected that melter feed would be stopped in the event of a complete loss of off-site power, and the melter
. feed tank agitator would have a requirement to operate for one to four hours prior to resuming feed, to ensure that the waste / glass former slurry was completely mixed. This load may be
- assigned to the Standby Diesel Generator (SDG). Other loads, such as in-cell lighting, cranes, and shield doors may be re-classified as NOT important to safety. They would not be operated during a loss of off-site power. The off-gas and vessel ventilation blowers are ITS. i
' BNFL inc. is evaluating the Electrical supply system using an Electrical Transient Analysis i
- Program (ETAP) to determine failure modes and reliaMty.' .
i The meeting attendees reviewed the Standby Diesel Gent rator System Description. It is currently being reviewed intemally by various BNFL inc. engineering disciplines. Most of the system description and requirements are taken from institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers standards. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) are listed as Seismic Category 111 in accordance with the BNFL Seismic Analysis & Design Criteria DC-W375-
-ST0001.
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, REPORT ON VENTILATION DESIGN REVIEW September 28,1999
- A meeting was held in the' BNFL Inc. officas on September 28,1999, for design review of the
- Low activity waste (LAW) and high lever waste (HLW) vitrification facilities ventilation systems.
The review covered the project status, and overview of the basic methodology, codes and ,
standards used, and explanation of the LAW and HLW ventilation drawings, l
- The review meeting started with an explanation of the various zones (C5 = highest potential for contamination to C1 = clean areas). The designation of C4 is for temporary high contamination areas, and is not shown on drawings. The air flow is from C1 > C2 > C3 > C4 > C5, then through high efficiency particulate air filters (HEPA) and exhausted. Some air is directly exhausted from zones C2 and C3.
Codes and standards to be used in the design include: j ASME AG-1: Safety-related systems and components ANSI N509 and ANSI N510: Air cleaning systems and components DOE-STD-3020 and UL 586: HEPA filters AMCA Standards: Fans SMACNA Standards: Ductwork
' The presentation of the ventilation drawings included volume and instrumentation diagrams ,
(V&lDs)of the LAW and HLW C2 supply system. extract systems for the various "C" zones, !
container storage supply and extract systems, rnelter off gas and vessel vent extract systems, and C3 to C5 in-bleed units. Discussions of the V&lDs included current issues and concerns and open items. Melter cell heat up and possible structural deformation from the loss of ventilation during a seismic event was considered a significant open item.
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. TOPICAL MEETING ON EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS-2 September 28,1999 l
The 13* Topical Meeting was held in the BNFL inc. offices on September 28,1999. The main topics discussed were hydrogen generation and mitigation. The meeting was well attended by Department of Energy Regulatory Unit (DOE-RU) personnel, as well as RU support personnel
. from DOE-Richland Operations Office, DOE-Headquarters, Oak Ridge, and Los Alamos National Laboratory.: Mr. Robert Pierson, Mr. Nick Baker, and Mr. Rex Wesectt attended from
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission HOs, along witn Mr. Robert White, from Southwest Research Institute (Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses). A large number of BNFL Inc.
engineering and support personnel were in attendance.
The contract Best Basis inventory (bbl) was compared to the results of Tank Farm samples from AN-105 and AN-107, as well as the Hanford Environment Impact Statement. The concentration of some isotopes were found to be a factor of five LOWER than the bbl. This l could reduce the consequences of an accident by a similar factor. '
There was a detailed presentation by Fauske & Associates Inc. /BNFL Inc. supporting l
-consultant) on hydrogen mixing and episodic releases. It was fo, lowed by a presentation on the consequences (unmitigated) of hydrogen combustion. Both deto.1ations and deflagrations were addressed. No credit was taken in the consequence analysis for me building or high efficiency particulate air (HEPA).. filters. This is a change from earlier preseritations. ;
1 BNFL Inc. has determined that an active hydrogen control system (vessel vent system) should 1 1 be used, and presented the details of a conceptual system. The reliability of such an active
= system (failure frequency of 1.2 E-06 per year) was explained, based on the fault tree analysis in the pre-meeting report. The seismic analysis (probability of a seismic event) was not included, but will be resolved in the timeframe of March 2000, when the seismic analysis is performed. Currently, it is assumed that all Important to Safety (ITS) equipment must be seismically qualified, and electrical power will be supplied from the emergency diesel generators, which are also to be seismically qualified. - The role of hydrogen monitors was left l
. open, pending an evaluation of operating needs. The design for venting lon exchange columns is scheduled for March 2000.
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Fauske & Associates also presented a discussion on the fiammability of melter off-gases. The concern is the possibility of forming H2 or CO in the melter off-gas. Organic salts and the sugar l(sucrose) added to the waste / glass mixture are the sources of these gases. The Ellingham Diagram for equilibrium of CO/CO 2, Fe2O3/Fea4 O and H /H2 2O in the off-gas was reviewed. The off-gas temperature and oxidizing conditions are fairly weil known. The exact details are
};' proprietary information based on the GTS Duratek test melter, and were not presented. The
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l event sequence requires a gross over-addition of sugar coupled with a substantial increase in
- the off-gas flow rate, it was felt that there is no operating situation the' could lead to a 200 percent over-addition of sugar or 400 percent increase (surge) in metter off-gas. Some data from tests of melter off-gas surges performed at both the Savannah River "M" Area metter and the test melter are available, and surges of only 150 percent to 200 percent have been observed, which are considerably less than the 400 percent surge that is required for this event. The RU will submit a question regarding the proprietary data from GTS Duratek.
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, REPORT ON FIRE PROTECTION MEETING September 29,1999 Mr. Rex Wescott and Mr. Nick Baker attended a meeting held in the BNFL inc. offices on
- September 29,1999, covering a number of fire protection issues. Members of the Department
. of Energy-Regulatory Unit, (DOE-RU) DOE-Headquarters, DOE-Office of River Protection were on hand. There were a number of presentations by Bechtel personnel (subcontractor to BNFL Inc.). The meeting was intended to put these topics "on the table' and solicit some input from DOE on the approach.
BNFL Inc. is looking into utilizing the Hanford fire department for fires, HAZMAT, and EMT response in lieu of a facility Fire Brigade per National Fire Protection Association 600. They report less than seven r"nutes' response time for all Tank Farm areas.
No revisions to the Safety requirements Document are expected. BNFL Inc. will comply with J DOE Standard 1066 (1999). A number of clarifications were presented because the facility will I be privately owned, compared with government owned facilities.
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- A preliminary outline of the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) was presented. The FHA will be submitted as part of the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) . Any changes to the FHA will be handled by the Design Change Authorization (DCA) process during Phase B-1 of the project.
Much of the meeting centered on the need for sprinklers and protection of structural steel in specific areas within the facility, it was noted that bel (Dilafield) does not use many sprinklers in their facilities for var!ous reasons, including criticality considerations. For the Tank Waste Remediaton Systems facility, the example of the Pretreatment "C5" area was discussed. The shield wall surrounding the feed tanks, receipt tanks, and ion exchangers, in spite of being four feet thick, will not be assigned a fire rating because of the many penetrations, as well as oil-l filled shield windows and, therefore, will not be consideree I a fire area boundary. Hence, much of the processing area of the pretreatment building was considered to be one large fire area with definable subsections defined as iire zones.- The pretreatment "C5" area was one fire zone and the surrounding bulge and operator access areas were ,other fire zones. Since there are no combustibles in the Pretreatment Cell C5 fire zone and no means of personnel entry, the decision was made to neither install sprinklers nor fire proof the structural stee! ;n the cell.
Structural steel is to be protected in all other areas. The "C3" areas adjacent to the
~ Pretreatment Cell include the " bulges," which typically contain piping components, valves, and canned-motor pumps. ~ BNFL Inc. proposed to not sprinkler-protect these areas as well
- Because they are designed for some contact maintenance, there is the possibility of the presence of " transient combustibles" such as lubricants or solvents, which might be brought into the bulges for various maintenance activities. Just outside the bulges are the "C2" (operator access) areas, which are to be sprinklered.
There was general agreement that lack of fire suppression in the "C5" fire zone was probably appropriate, in regard to the unsprinklered bulge areas, there were differing opinions. DOE
. suggested that BNFL inc. perform a fire hazard analysis and model of just one bulge and aisle area, and decide if the evaluation helps them to determine the best approach. The NRC ;
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2 regulatory philosophy would probably strongly favor the placement of sprinklers unless the l
= integrated safety analysis provided some significant safety or ALARA reasons for not providing sprinklers.
In regard to not fire protecting the structural steelin the C5 fire zone, BNFL inc. considers the
. decision to be consistent with DOE and uniform building codes (UBC) criteria. DOE questioned llhis assumption but was not conclusive. The NRC criteria require the building to be of Type i
. construction as defined by NFPA 220 (Building Construction). This requires fire ratings for structural members including floors, and protection would _ be required for the structural steel to meet the fire rating requirements.
BNFL inc. has suggested that another fire protection meeting should be held around January 2000, to assess the design decisions at that time. This would be well prior to the' submittal of
- the PSAR/ Corrective Action Request.
Since this was not a topical meeting, there is no clear vehicle for documenting any decisions that were made it was decided that BNFL inc. would submit meeting minutes for comment by the DOE-RU.
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