ML20210Q789

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Summary of 990713 Conference Call with Util Re Licensee Proposed Exemption Request ,as Supplemented by Ltr Re Emergency Preparedness
ML20210Q789
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 08/10/1999
From: Scaletti D
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Masnik M
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
NUDOCS 9908160120
Download: ML20210Q789 (3)


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,  ! WASHINGTON, D.C. 30666s1001 August 10, 1999

%.....+o MEMORANDUM TO: Michael T. Masnik, Chief Decommissioning Section Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Dino Scaletti, Senior Project Manag ,

Decommissionirg Section eq Project Directorate IV and Decommissioning Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL WITH COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY REGARDING THE ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION SPENT FUEL POOL The staff held a conference call with Commonwealth Edison on Tuesday, July 13,1999, to discuss the licensee's proposed exemption request dated April 13,1999, as supplemented by letter dated July 8,1999, regarding emergency preparedness. Those participating in the conference call were Diane Jackson, A. Gill, and George Hubbard from the NRC and K. Ainger and others from Commonwealth Edison Company.

The following questions and answers were discussed:

1. For the loss of spent fuel pool (SFP) inventory and cooling, describe the alternative methods / personnel actions that are proceduralized, if any, (and what criterion triggers them to occur) to instruct personnel to implement altemate methods of pool cooling to demonstrate that the time available is adequate to restore cooling.

Licensee's Resoonse The licensee indicated that the level is monitored by instrumentation and by personnel. The abnormal operating procedure for loss of pool cooling level is entered on a low level alarm.

The proposed defueled station emergency plan submitted July 8,1999, stated that if the level reaches 613-foot elevation, a station " Unusual Event" would be initiated. Although the licensee is planing to modify the SFP makeup systems, at least two sources of water will be available for SPF makeup. For the Zion pools, the 613-foot elevation maintains water 23 feet above the spent fuel. Approximately 289 hours0.00334 days <br />0.0803 hours <br />4.778439e-4 weeks <br />1.099645e-4 months <br /> would be needed to reduce the level from 24 feet (Iow level alarm at 614'-4") to 4 feet above the fuel due to boil off (approximately 77 hours8.912037e-4 days <br />0.0214 hours <br />1.273148e-4 weeks <br />2.92985e-5 months <br /> would be needed to reduce the level from 8 feet to 4 feet above the fuel due to boil off). The licensee stated that radiation alarms also could alert personnel to low water level. The licensee stated that the time available and the increased level of station attention would be adequate for personnel to restore cooling prior to reaching a water level that would limit personnel access. 1 qfC\ D 9908160120 990810

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Michael T. Masnik August 10, 1999 l

2. A cask drop accident was not considered in the submittal. Explain why a cask drop would not be an accident that needs to be considered for offsite consequences for your plant. 1 Licensee's Response A cask drop analysis is included in the defueled safety analysis report. The analysis concluded that due to the pool design and cask movement procedures that a dropped cask cannot I damage the fuel stored in the spent fuel storage pool. The licensee stated that because the cask drop analysis was part of its licensing basis and no fuel damage could occur, that they did not consider the cask drop again in the submittal.
3. For the fuel handling accident, the assembly was dropped onto the pool floor, as opposed to the top of the spent fuel storage racks. Typically, a licensee evaluates the bounding scenario or both scenarios. Explain why this adequately bounds a spent fuel i handling accident for your pool. If it does not bound a release from a drop on top of the I storage racks, please provide this evaluation. l I

Licensee's Resoonse i The licensee stated that the analysis for the spent fuel assembly drop and the resultant  ;

complete release of radioactive gases assumed that no water was in the spent fuel pool for iodine scrubbing. Because no scrubbing or shielding benefits were credited, the licensee stated that there would be negligible difference in dose between an assernbly drop on the floor and on top of the racks for this scenario.

The staff concluded that the information provided by the above responses in addition to the information provided in the submittals provides sufficient information for a staff safety determination and no further information is necessary.

Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304

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D:Ck b Michael T. Masnik August 10, 1999 We

2. A cask drop accident was not considered in the submittal. Explain why a cask drop would not be an accident that needs to be considered for offsite consequences for your plant.

Licensee's Response A cask drop analysis is included in the defueled safety analysis report. The analysis concluded that due to the pool design and cask movement procedures that a dropped cask cannot damage the fuel stored in the spent fuel storage pool.' The licensee stated that because the cask drop analysis was part of its licensing basis and no fuel damage could occur, that they did not consider the cask drop again in the submittal.

3. For the fuel handling accident, the assembly was dropped onto the pool floor, as opposed to the top of the spent fuel storage racks. Typically, a licensee evaluates the bounding scenario or both scenarios. Explain why this adequately bounds a spent fuel handling accident for your pool. If it does not bound a release from a drop on top of the storage racks, please provide this evaluation.

Licensee's Response The licensee stated that the analysis for the spent fuel assembly drop and the resultant complete release of radioactive gases assumed that no water was in the spent fuel pool for iodine scrubbing. Because no scrubbing or shielding benefits were credited, the licensee stated that there would be negligible difference in dose between an assembly drop on the floor and on top of the racks for this scenario.

The staff concluded that the information provided by the above responses in addition to the

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information provided in the submittals provides sufficient information for a staff safety determination and no further information is necessary.

Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304 DISTRIBUTION:

Docket File PUBLIC PDIV-D r/f DScalleti EPeyton DJackson AGill GHubbard To receive a copy of tnis cocument, indicate "c" in the box OFFICE PDIV-2(Py , PDIV-2/LA PDIV-2/SC NAME DScalqttk EPeytoY MMasnik M DATE R^ / IS /99 8/D /99 $ / N /99 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\PDIV-3\ Zion \e-plan telecon.wpd OFFICIAL RECORD COPY i

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