ML20205A395
| ML20205A395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1999 |
| From: | Marschall C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Hutchinson C ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903300372 | |
| Download: ML20205A395 (40) | |
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- "80g UNITED STATES
- e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a a E 3 j REGloN IV 611 RYAN PLAZA drive, sulTE 400
+ ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064 y g MAR I 91999 C. Randy Hutchinson, Vice President Operations Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Operations, Inc. i 1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR)- ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
On February 9,1999, the NRC staff completed a PPR of Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO). The !
staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated l understanding of safety performance. The results are uced by NRC management to facilitate j planning and r".ocation of inspe con resources. PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior n:3nagement meeting (SMV.) reviews. PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long-term trends but emphasize the last 6 months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance. The PPR for ANO involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period January 4,1998, to January 25,1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of February 4,1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on March 5 1998.
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2,1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim in which the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
At the beginning of the current period of detailed focus (April 22,1998), Unit 1 was shut down in Refueling Outage 1R14. The reactor was restarted on May 9,1998, and achieved full power on May 18. The unit operated at or near 100 percent power until December 25, when operators manually tripped the reactor in response to a large influx of fish at the intake structure that
. obstructed water flow to the circulating water pumps. Operators restarted the plant on December 27. On December 28, operators manually tripped the reactor at 12 percent power in response to another large influx of fish at the intake canal. The reactor was taken critical on January 5,1999, and reached 100 percent power on January 7, remaining at or near 100 percent power through the end of the assessment period.
Uriit 2 operated at or near 100 percent power with reductions in power for routine testing and maintenance. On May 20 operators shut down the unit to Mode 3 for condenser tube leak repairs. On May 21, the reactor was cooled down to repair a leak in an unisolable emergency 9903300372 990319 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G PDR
a Entergy Operations, Inc. feedwater system drain line socket weld. Operators restarted the reactor on May 23, and the unit achieved 100 percent power on May 25. "A December 14, operators began the planned coastdown to Refueling Outage 2R13. On January 8,1999, with the reactor at 75 percent power, operators commenced a plant shutdown to begin the refueling outage. The plant remained shutdown through the end of the assessment period.
Overall, the performance of ANO was acceptable. Operators continued to demonstrate conservative operation, focusing on safety and questioning details of plant conditions.
Maintenance workers generally performed work using approved work controls and demonstrated skill and a questioning attitude; however, occasional lapses in attention to detail by instrumentation and con;rols technicians continued to result in inadvertent equipment actuations. Additionally, conditions and failures of plant equipment not required by Technical Specifications continued to cause a challenge to plant operations. Engineering provided effective day-to-day support for operations and maintenance activities. Radiological protection programs, physical security, and emergency preparedness were effectively implemented; however, an exercise weakness was identified in one emergency response facility.
Operators demonstrated conservative operation, consistent with previous assessments. They focused on safety, questioned details of plant conditions, and identified, properly diagnosed, and corrected conditions adverse to safe plant operation. Licensed operator response to plant transients was very good; however, insufficient monitoring and communication of plant system response and steam generator water levels by operators resulted in an unexpected automatic actuation of the Unit 2 emergency feedwater system during a plant shutdown. In addition, although the event occurred af ter the assessment period, licensed operators, relying on inadequate procedures, inadvertently drained the refueling pool and reactor to a reduced inventory level. Applicants for operating licenses performed well during examination. Only core )
inspection efforts are scheduled over the next 8 months. l Maintenance staff performance continued to be consistent with that previously observed.
Workers generally performed work using approved work controls, and demonstrated skill and a ,
questioning attitude. As previously observed, occasional lapses in attention to detail by l instrumentation and controls technicians resulted in inadvertent equipment actuations. For example, Unit 1 technicians actuated Emergency Feedwater Train B while performing
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surveillance activities, and a technician interrupted power to reactor vessel level monitoring system Channel 1 by using an uncontrolled power strip. The licerisee maintained good general material condition of standby safety-related systems. However, secondary plant equipment ,
conditions and postaccident sampling system failures continued to challenge plant operations. i Examples included a Unit 2 main condenser tube leak that required a plant shutdown for repair, and a cracked wcid on a Unit 2 emergency feedwater system drain line that required a plant cooldown to repair. Core inspection efforts have been determined to be adequate to monitor I performance over the next 8 months. l l
Engineers continued to provide effective day-to-day support for operations and maintenance activities. One example of weak engineering support for the diesel fire pump system was noted, in that engineering personnel demonstrated a lack of understanding of the diesel fire pump system and the operating limits associated with this engine. A core program safety system engineering inspection is scheduled during the next 8 months.
Emergy Operations, Inc. Radiological protection programs continued to be acceptably implemented. Radiation protection staff controlled radiological controlled areas and work occurring within them, with only occasional er.ceptions. Daily physical security activities were well conducted and equipment was in good material condition with one exception. In the area of emergency preparedness, overall performance during the biennial exercise was generally good. An exercise weakness was identified in the operations support center because radiological protection practices'were not properly demonstrated. Only core inspection efforts are scheduled over the next 8 months.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arriva at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Entergy Operations, Inc. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance. In addition, the PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normalissuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence. Enclosure 2 provides definitions for some of the information listed in the PIM.
1 This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the ANO PPR review. It is i provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and l personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 3 details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program has been provided in this letter so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
Because of the anticipated changes to the inspection program and other initiatives, this inspection schedule is subject to revision. Any changes to the schedule listed will be promptly discussed with your staff. If you have any questions, please contact me at (817) 860-8185.
Sincerely, s ,
i Charles S. Marschall, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-313 50-368 License Nos.: DPR-51 NPF-6
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Entetgy Operations, Inc.
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant issues Matrix
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan cc w/ enclosures:
Executive Vice President l
& Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Vice President Operations Support 2ntergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286 Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power l 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 l Rockville, Maryland 20852 l l
County Judge of Pope Cotnty I Pope County Courthouse Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Winston & Strawn 1 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 3502 David D. Snellings, Jr., Director Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management -
Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30 Little Rock, Arkansas 72205 3867 Manager - ;
Rockville Nuclear Licensing Framatome Technologies 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 Rockville, Maryland 20852
Entergy Operations, Inc. -
5-
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Junior Hanbrick, OES Coordinator Pope County No. 4 Emergency Lane Russellville, Arkansas 72801 j i
Les Thone, ES Coordinator l Yell County Courthouse ,
Union Street Dardenelle, Arkansas 72834
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1 Thorpe Hamilton, ES Coordinator Johnson County OES P.O. Box 546 Clarksville, Arkansas .72830 Eldon Thomas, ES Coordinator Logan County OES Logan County Cot.:thouse ,
Paris, Arkansas 72855 )
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Ted Gipson, ES Coordinator l Conway County 105 Eisenhower Street Morrilton, Arkansas 72110 )
John Ed Chambers, til Mayor, City of Danville P.O. Box 69 Danville, Arkansas 72833 Jim Clay .
Mayor, City of Paris P.O. Box 271 Paris; Arkansas 72855 Marvin Vinson Mayor, City of Clarksville P.O. Box 409 Clarksville, Arkansas 72830 i Carolyn McGee Mayor, City of Dardanelle P.O. Box 360 Dardanelle, Arkansas 72834
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Entergy Operations, Inc. ,
Johnnie Waldo Mayor, City of Dover P.O. Box 258 Dover, Arkansas 72837 Don Ezell Mayor, City of Atkins P.O. Box 128 Atkins, Arkansas 72823 Phil Carruth
. Mayor, City of Russellville P.O. Box 428 Russellville, Arkansas 72811 Donald Stiles Mayor, City of London P.O. Box 130 London, Arkansas 72847 Stewart Nelson Mayor, City of Morrilton City Hall P.O. Box 583 Morrilton, Arkansas 72110 Wayne Bradley County Judge Pope County Courthouse 100 West Main Street - ,
Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Gary Moore Judge, Yell County Danville Courthouse P.O. Box 219 Danville, Arkansas 72833 D. H. Pettingill County Judge Conway County Courthouse 117 South Moose, Room 203 Morritton, Arkansas 72110
Entergy Operations, inc. .
2 Mike Jacobs 4
County Judge -
Johnson County Courthouse
. P.O. Box 278 Clarksville, Arkansas' 72830 l Bill Grist
- ~ County Judge Logan County Courthouse Room 22 ;
Paris, Arkansas 72855 ;
l Federal Emergency Management Agency R. L. ' Buddy" Young, Regional Director Region IV, Federal Center 800 North Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201-3698 Division of Radiation Control & Emergency Management Arkansas Department of Health Dave Snellings, Director 4815 W. Markham St., Siot 30 Little Rock, AR 72205-3867 1
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'. Entergy Operations, Inc. q)g ;g 77; l bec to DCDM bec distrib. by RIV: .
Regional Administrator. Resident inspector DRP Director DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
DRS Director MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/C) RIV File Project Engineer (DRP/C) Chief, NRR/ DISP /PIPB Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) Chief, OEDO/ROPMS . .
' B. Henderson, PAO T. Boyce, NRR/ DISP /PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO - Records Center, INPO W. Travers, EDO (MS: . 16E15) C. Gordon 4 Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR l Associate Dir, for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)
Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR ]
Chief, Regional Operations and Program Management Section, OEDO
, J. Hannon, NRR Project Director (MS: 13H3)
C. Nolan, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13H3) i l
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300107 DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRP\DRPDIR\PPR\ANO To receive copy of document. Indicate in box: "C" = Copy withotg enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:DRP/C C:DRP/C l D:D W l D:DRP RECONCUR DPLoveless:df CSMarschall ATH% ell KEBrockman s CSMarschalIyT
[' 3/ /99 3/- /99 3/ (1/99 3/' -/99 3/ O /99 l OFFICIAL RECORD COPY l
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Entergy Operations, Inc. MAR I 91999 bec to DCD (IE40) bec distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator Resident inspector DRP Director DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
DRS Director MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/C) RIV File Project Engineer (DRP/C) Chief, NRR/ DISP /PIPB Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) . . Chief, OEDO/ROPMS ,
T. Boyce', NRR/ DISP / PIPS B. Henderson, PAO l C. Hackney, RSLO Records Center, INPO i W. Travers, EDO (MS: 16E15) C. Gordon Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR I Associate Dir. for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR ;
PPR Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies) l Chief, inspection Program Branch, NRR l Chief, Regional Operations and Program Management Section, OEDO J. Hannon, NRR Project Director (MS: 13H3) I C. Nolan, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13H3)
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1 DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRP\DRPDIR\PPR\ANO To receive copy of document, Indicate in box: "C' = Copy withoyf enclosures *E" = Copy with enclosures "N' .: No copy RIV:DRP/C C:DRP/C D:DFag D:DRP RECONCUR DPLoveless;df CSMcrschall ATH% ell KEBrockmarnr; CSMarschal@l 3/- /99 3/ /99 3/ fl/99 3/ n/99 3/R /99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 1/16/99 POS IR 98-10 NRC OPS 1A 3A Unit 2 operators demonstrated good communications and control of the work evolutions when placing the shutdown cooling system in service to remove decay heat from tN reactor coolant system. Unit 2 operators demonstrated good attention to detail, communications, and control while draining the r6 actor coolant system and conducting midloop operations. Unit 2 operators demonstrated good command and control during a plant shutdown as evident by peer checking, attention tc detail, and thorough briefings. Unit 1 operators demonstrated good communications, procedural adherence, and command and control during the reactor startup following completion of corrective actions for the shad run problem.
1/16/99 POS 1R 98-10 NRC OPS 1A 3A During a tour of the switchyard, an operator demonstrated a good questioning attitude and took prompt action when the inspector identified that unauthorized vehicles were present in the switchyard.
1/16/99 STR 1R 98-10 SELF OPS 1B 3A Unit 1 operators responded well to indications of degraded circulating water flow caused by a large influx of fish into the intake structure. Operators manually tripped the reactor on two occasions and took appropriate actions following the trips. The licensee's corrective actions were comprehensive and significantly improved the performance of the intake structure traveling screens.
1/16/99 NEG IR 98-10 NRC OPS 1A 1C Overall, the licensee established good controls for planned work in the switchyard, in one instance, however, switchyard controls were not effectively implemented. While Unit 2 was in reduced inventory, personnel troubleshooting the Startup Transformer 3 voltage regulator were not briefed on the controts established for work in the switchyard. In addition, centrol room personnel did not know of vehicles in the switchyard associated with the troubleshooting.
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. c PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 12/5/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC OPS 1A 3A Unit 2 operators demonstrated good preparation for placing a new battery charger in service. Operators and an electrician promptly identified and corrected an alignment problem with a switch inside of the charger.
i 12/5/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC OPS 1A 2A 3A Following a failure of the Channel D excore upper detector, the licensee properly evaluated the long-term impact of operating the plant with the affecied Unit 2 plant protection system trips bypassed 10/24/98 POS IR 98-08 SELF OPS 1A Unit 2 operations took appropriate actions for operabi'ity, monitoring, and repair of Plant Protection System instrumentation that momentarily spiked low on two occasions.
10/8/98 POS IR 98-08 SELF OPS 1B 3A Unit 1 control room operators communicated well with auxiliary operators in the field during a Feedwater Heater E1 A level transient. Additionally, operations personnel demonstrated conservative decision making when they reduced reactor power during the transient.
10/6/98 POS IR 98-08 SELF OPS 1A 3B Unit 1 operations personnel were very knowledgeable of the system piping configuration, containment penetration operability conditions, licensee commitments, and Technical Specification requirements for Containment Penetration 40 isolation and firewater reactor building isolations valves.
9/14/98 NEG IR 98-302 NRC OPS 3B The licensee initially failed to submit an acceptable examination for administration to operator license applicants for the operating test portion of the examinations.
2 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 9/12/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC OPS 2A Good housekeeping practices and component material condition was noted in the Unit 1, Train A. Reactor Building Spray Pump Room and with Unit 2 Train A, emergency diesel generator The system valve line-up was in accordance with the procedure. Components in the field were properly identified and labeled. No ;
material deficiencies were noted that had the potential to impact system operation.
9/11/98 POS IR 98-302 NRC OPS 3A 3B Five applicants for reactor operator licenses and all six senior operators license applicants passed their examinations. The applicants exhibited good performance, and use of good communication practices, as well as peer checks. .
t 9/1/98 NEG IR 98-301 NRC OPS 3B The operating test material was inadequate for administration as submitted.
r 8/28/98 POS IR 98-301 NRC OPS 3A 3B All 14 (6 reactor operators and 8 senior operators) ll cense applicants passed their examinations. The applicants exhibited good oversight and peer checking and effective communications.
8/1/98 VIO IR 98-06 NRC OPS 1C 3A SA Fifteen licensed operators failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55 for SLIV maintaining an active license. As a result, these operators stood control room watches with inactive licenses. The failure to satisfy the minimum shift manning requirements specified in Technical Specifications was determined to be a no response required violation of TS 6.2.2. ,
8/1/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC OPS 1C 3A 5A The use of informal markings on the side ci the diesel fire pump Fuel Oil Day Tank T-29 to determine tank level and the lack of formal controls on these markings indicated an isolated weakness in the control of measuring and test equipment.
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e PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 5/23/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC OPS 1A 3A Unit 2 operators performed well during the evolution to bring the Unit 2 reactor critical. The approach to criticality was deliberate and well controlled.
5/21/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC OPS 1A 2A 3A Unit 2 operators demonstrated good monitoring and control while performing a reactor coolant system cooldown to facilitate repairs to an emergency feedwater drain line. Plant mode changes were closely monitored and properly logged.
5/20/98 NEG lR 98-05 SELF OPS 1A 2A 3A insufficient monitoring and communication of plant system response and steam generator water levels by operators resulted in an unexpected automatic actuation of the Unit 2 emergency feedwater system during a plant shutdown. A previously identified problem with the reactor trip override feature of the feedwater control system was not communicated to others in the operations department.
5/9/98 STR 1R 98-04 NRC OPS 1A 3A Unit 1 operators performed well during the evolution to bring the Unit 1 reactor critical. The approach to criticality was deliberate and well controlled.
5/8/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC OPS 2A 3A Unit 1 control rods functioned as expected while latching, withdrawing, and during the performance of rod drop testing. Previous problems with sticking of control rods during rod movement were not experienced during this testing.
Operators conducted the testing well and in accordance with procedures.
5/7/98 POS IR 98-01 NRC OPS 3B Senior reactor operators, operations shift superintendents, and planning and scheduling senior reactor operators clearly understood the philosophy of the Maintenance Rule and their specific responsibilities regarding the Maintenance Rule program implementation. .
5/7/98 POS 1R 98-04 NRC OPS 2A 2B The licensee's walkdown and cleanup of the Unit 1 reactor building was effective in preparing Unit 1 for power operation.
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PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX
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DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES l 4/25/98 STR IR 98-04 NRC OPS 1A 3A Unit 1 operators performed well during drain down of the reactor coolant system to reduced inventory. Operators monitored reactor coolant system (RCS) levels and maintained good communications during the evolution.
4/24/98 POS IR 98-04 SELF OPS 1B 3A 2A Unit 1 operators responded quickly and appropriately to the sudden failure of a temporary flexible steam pipe installed to conduct emergency feedwater (EFW) pump turbine overspeed testing.
3/31/98 VIO IR 98-04 LIC OPS 1A 3A 4C Unit 1 operators authorized the temporary release of a hold card on a SLIV motor-operated valve circuit breaker without obtaining the authorization of two lead craftsmen signed in on the hold card. The circuit breaker was subsequently closed and the valve was stroked. Although no personnel were injured, this error created the potential for a personnel injury or fatality. This was determined to be a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. Although the licensee had implemented a number of corrective actions following a similar near miss event in January 1997, recurring errors in the implementation of the hold card process indicated that these corrective actions have not been effe ctive in preventing recurrence of hold card errors.
3/28/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC OPS 1A 1C 3A Unit 2 operators performed well during several major plant evolutions, including a reactor shutdown to begin Steam Generator Tube Inspection Outage 2P98, placing the shutdown cooling inservice, draining the reactor coolant system to reduced inventory, mid-loop operations, and a reactor startup. Operators consistently demonstrated strong command and control, communications, use of procedures, response to abnormal indications, and control of trainees.
Management oversight of these activities was appropriate. The walkdown and cleanup of the Unit 2 containment building was effective in preparing Unit 2 for power operation.
5 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE l
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 3/28/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC OPS SA 5B A quality assurance audit of a computer code used to calculate the Unit 2 time to core boiling and time to core uncovery was thorough and probing. The audit identified a potential error in the assumptions regarding RCS vent path size, which the licensee adequatley resolved.
2/14/98 STR 1R 98-02 NRC OPS 1B 2A 5B The licensee responded approp'ately to the failure of position indication for one control rod during the Unit 1 reactor startup. Instrumentation and control personnel demonstrated good system knowledge and understanding of Technical Specifications in evaluating the cause and impact of the position indication failure.
2/14/98 STR 1R 98-02 NRC OPS 2A 2B 3A The licensee effectively planned, scheduled, and implemented an on-line 18-month inspection of Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1. As a result, the EDG was returned to service approximately 29 hours3.356481e-4 days <br />0.00806 hours <br />4.794974e-5 weeks <br />1.10345e-5 months <br /> earlier than originally scheduled. The material condition of the EDG was very good.
2/14/98 NCV IR 98-02 LIC OPS 1A 3A 5A During a startup of the Unit 1 reactor, control room operators failed to select the sequence mode for withdrawal of the regulating groups, as required by the procedure. The reactor operator demonstrated a good questioning attitude and good system knowledge in questioning the alignment of the rod control system and stopped the rod withdrawal to resolve his concern.
1/23/98 WK IR 97-08 SELF OPS 3B While attempting to remove water from a Unit 1 main generator hydrogen vent, a detonation occurred in a vacuum cleaner when workers did not recognize the combustible hazard. They were focused on troubleshooting and did not app!y system knowledge. Safety training that was immediately conducted by the licensee's paint department demonstrated good insight and application of plant experience to other routine evolutions.
6 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES ,
1/23/98 STR 1R 97-08 LIC OPS 5A SC During a Unit 2 quality assurance audit, the licensee identified a potential failure to perform surveillance requirements for the reactor protection logic as required by Technical Specifications. The licensee took prompt measures to assure TS i operability requiremer'Is were met until resolution of the requirements was !
comp leted. Testing was accomplished within Technical Specification time interval i requirements.
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PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 1/16/99 POS IR 98-10 NRC MAINT 2A 2B 3A The testing of the Unit 2 main steam safety valves was well coordinated and performed in accordance with the test procedure.
12/5/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC MAINT 3A 3B Unit 1 maintenance personnel performed well during the performance of preventative maintenance on 4160 voit Magne-Blast circuit breakers. Personnel demonstrated a thorough understanding of breaker operation and were knowledgeable of previous industry problems experienced with these breakers 12/5/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC MAINT 1A 3A Unit 2 operators and instrumentation and control technicians performed well during the performance of plant protection system testing. Due to a previous failure of the Channel D excore upper detector, personnel demonstrated increased caution and sensitivity during the performance of the testing 9/25/98 POS IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 3A 3B Unit 2 maintenance personnel transferred the dry fuel storage cask from the rail car to the independent spent fuel storage installation in accordance with approved procedures and radiation work permits. Licensee personnel observed safety precautions and properly controlled observers during the movement of the cask. Supervisory involvement was observed during the evolution.
9/23/98 NCV IR 98-08 SELF MAINT 3A 4C Due to procedural inadequacies and a lack of expectations for the use of peer ch'ecking and self checking for maintenance technicians, Unit 1 I&C technicians inadvertently actuated Emergency Feedwater Train B while performing surveillance activities and a noncited violation was issued.
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PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 9/29198 POS IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 3A 3B 5A Calibration and troubleshooting of Unit 2 shutdown cooling and Low Pressure Safety injection flow instrumentation was performed by knowledgeable l&C technicians using appropriate procedures. Technicians demonstrated good system and theoretical knowledge, questioning attitude, peer checking, and housekeeping practices on multiple occasions during surveillance and repair activities.
9/12/98 NEG IR 98-07 LIC MAINT 1C Licensee Event Report 50-313/96-010, " inadequate Procedure Revision Resulted in not having Tested the Reactor Protection System High Temperature Trip Function as Required by Technical Specifications." The inspectors verified the immediate and long term corrective actions described in the licensee's letter dated December 19,1996 and found them to be adequate and complete. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
9/12/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC MAINT 2B 3A 3B Unit 1 and Unit 2 maintenance and surveillance activities were performed professionally by qualified workers knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and diagnostic equipment, and in accordance with approved procedures.
Technicians demonstrated good ALARA practices, communication, self-checking, and peer-checking skills during the activities observed. Good system engineering involvement was observed during surveillance activities.
9 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
a PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES c
9/12/98 NEG IR 98-07 LIC MAINT 1C (Closed) LER 50-368/96-005-01 " Surveillance Testing of Plant Protection System and Postaccident Monitoring Instrumentation." The inspectors verified the immediate and long term corrective actions described in the licensee's letter dated January 30,1997 and found them to be adequate and complete. This non-repetitive, licenaee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
8/31/98 NEG IR 98-07 SELF MAINT SC 3B Unit 2 Technical Specifications were entered when a technician interrupted power to reactor vessel level monitoring system (RVLMS) Channel 1 by using an uncontrolled power strip located inside the system cabinet that also powered system components. The licensee missed an opportunity to prevent the less of RVLMS Channel 1 power when they initiated system specific corrective actions for a similar event that occurred in 1996. The problems had no safety significance, but they represent isolated examples of weak corrective action.
8/1/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC i. AiNT 3A 3C Unit 2 mechanics demonstrated a lack of familiarity with a job order in not recognizing that an ignition source permit was required to perform work on the charging system. Appropriate safety precautions were established for establishing a freeze seal and the work was performed in accordance with the work plan. Although some deficiencies were found with the work plan instructions, these deficiencies did not impact the work.
6/20/98 POS 1R 98-05 NRC MAINT 3A Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed well. Unit 1 instrumentation and control technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude in verifying the proper location of a potentiometer which was informally labeled.
10 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 6/20/98 NEG IR 98-05 SELF MAINT 2A The material condition of safety-related equipment on both units was generally very good. However, both units experienced problems with the material condition of plant equipment which complicated the routine operation of the plant.
Examples included the failure of a Unit 1 condensate pump, a Unit 1 condenser vacuum system malfunction which resulted in lowering main condenser vacuum, a Unit 2 main condenser tube leak which required a plant shutdown to repair the tube, and a cracked weld on a Un'!. 2 emergency feedwater system drain line which required a plant cooldown to repair.
5/9/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC MAINT 4A 3C 2A The licensee successfully completed a major modification to replace the Unit 1
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reactor building purge valves. Problems encountered during installation and postmodification testing were appropriately resolved. The inspectors noted good management and quality control oversight of the activity. '
5/7/98 VIO IR 98-01 NRC MAINT 4C A violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to SLIV identify a functional failure of a swing charger during a surveillance test, which in combination with two previously identified failures, allowed the licensee to exceed the 125 Vdc system's reliability performance criteria without providing an evaluation for establishing necessary goals to monitor the effectiveness of maintenance.
5/7/98 VIO IR 98-01 NRC MAINT 3A 3C inconsistent management oversight and implementation of the Maintenance Rule SLIV program contributed to a scoping violation (turbine building surnp) of 10 CFR 50.65(b).
11 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ,
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 5/7/98 NCV IR 98-01 LIC MAINT 3A 3C Two systems (i.e., emergency lighting and communications) were examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b). This licensee-identified and corrected vioaltion is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
5/7/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC MAINT 3A The 'icensee's overall approach to performing risk ranking of structures, systems, and components for the Maintenance Rule program was adequate and their performance criteria for reliability and unavailability of structures, systems, and components were commensurate with assumptions in the probabilistic risk assessment. The significant involvement of probabilistic risk assessment personnel in expert panel deliberations was a strength 5/7/98 VIO IR 98-01 NRC MAINT 4C Four examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) were identified for the failure SLIV to establish adequate measures to demonstrate that the performance of structures, systems, and components were effective!y controlled by the licensee's preventive maintenance efforts.
5/7/98 VIO IR 98-01 NRC MAINT 4C A violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) was identified for the licensee's failure to SLIV establish goals commensurate with safety for the main steam safety valves.
4/27/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC MAINT 4A 3A 3B Modifications to Unit 1 reactor building spray system motor-operated valves were completed by knowledgeable technicians in accordance with approved procedures. Technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude when unexpected water was encountered during valve disassembly and when a procedural clarification was required for drilling a hole to accommodate a disc retaining dowel pin.
12 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 3/28/98 NEG IR 98-03 NRC MAINT 3A 3C A lack of thorough preplanning for a modification to Unit 2 component cooling water containment isolation valves resulted in seven revisions to the modification package after work had started.
3/28/98 NEG IR 98-03 NRC MAINT 1C Although the licensee took appropriate precautions during construction of a large gantry crane in the vicinity of the Unit 1 main transformers and Startup Transformer 2, the licensee had not conducted a qualitative or cuantitative risk assessment of the activity using probabilistic safety assessment tools and several weaknesses were identified with the plant impact evaluation.
3/11/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC MAINT 28 A noncited violation was identified for the failure to comply with Section XI ASME Code Examination requirements to properly distribute examinations in the Unit 1 second 10-year inservice inspection interval.
2/14/98 VIO IR 98-02 LIC MAINT 3A 3B The failure of Unit 1 l&C technicians to remove three electrical jumpers following SLIV a surveillance test of a reactor protection system channel was identified as a violation. The surveillance procedure lacked sufficier i detail and the technicians failed to resolve a question about the installation of the jumpers during the previous shift. The technicians lacked experience in performing the surveillance under shutdown conditions. This performance deficiency was similar to previous performance items which were the subject of NRC enforcement.
i 13 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE t
i PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX TEMPLATE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA ITEM CODES ,
1/23/98 WK IR 97-08 LIC MAINT 3A 2B SC The 480 and 4160 volt breakers at Units 1 and 2 have been maintained in i accordance with approved procedures. An error in updating maintenance ;
procedure.s resulted in a delay of the evaluation of the impact of new i maintenance requirements for both types of breakers. Subsequent review of the new maintenance requirements indicated that some safety-related breakers at r both units had not been overhauled. A program that addresses correction of identified deficiencies was under development. .
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14 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE i
PREDECISIONAL PLD'T ISSUES MATRIX
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DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM l CODES j 1/16/99 POS iR 98-19 NRC ENG 3A 4B Engineering documentation for two plant modifications was accurate, preserved the design basis, and contained clear instructions.
12/5/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC ENG 3A 4B Reador engineers and maintenance personnel performed well during the receipt of new fuel for Unit 2. The prejob brief was thorough, in-depth, and included -
lessons learned from previous activities. Inspection and movement of the fuel was conducted by knowledgeable, experienced personnel and included supervisory oversight. The licensee established effective housekeeping and foreign material controls during the activity.
12/5/98 POS 16 98-09 NRC ENG 2A 3A 48 The licensee's engineering staff provided good support to other organizations in evaluating plant problems, including the failure of the Unit 2 Channel D excore upper detector and unit service water system piping leaks.
8/24/98 POS IR 98-07 LIC ENG 4B SA Chemistry technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude when they identified water discharging from the shared Unit 1, Unit 2, emergency cooling pond spillway when the water level was below the top of the dam. The licensee promptly investigated the condition and found it to be normal for the water lev';'
which was not lowered fully below the spillway, at the time of discovery.
8/1/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC ENG 4B Engineering personnel demonstrated good engineering foresight and communicated well with craft personnel in developing two options for the repair of an unisolable leak on an emergency feedwater system drain line weld.
8/1/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC ENG 4B Engineering personnel demonstrated a lack of understanding of the Diesel Fire Pump P-6B system and the operating lirrits associated with this engine. The engineering support for this system was determined to De weak.
15 ARe~ANSAS NUCLEAR ONE !
.c PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 8/1/98 eel IR 98-06 NRC ENG 2A 2B 48 The failure to incorporate app oriate requirements and acceptance limits as specified by the applicable de a documents to o'cmonstrate that the Diesel Fire Pump Engine P-6B would perform satisfactori!y in service was identdied as an apparent violation of TS 6.8.1.f. Violation Issued in 98-08.
5/9/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC ENG M An inspection of Unit 1 high pressure injection (HPI) nozzles revealed that the nozzles were intact and free from breakage or cracking. Inspection results were properly recorded and dispositioned.
5/9/98 NEG IR 98-04 NRC ENG 4A 4B The licensee resolved an NRC identified discrepancy with a conversion factor used to correlate the volume of water in the Unit 1 reactor building sump with indicated sump level. A procedure was revised to correct the nonconservative value in the procedure.
5/9/98 NEG IR P 04 NRC ENG 2A 2B Unit 1 experienced a 36 percent failure rate when 53 of 149 safety-related 120 Vac molded case circuit breakers failed overcurrent trip testing. Similar testing of 10 480 Vac safety-related molded case circuit breakers yielded no failures.
5/9/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC ENG 4A Modifications to Unit 1 decay heat removal system isolation valves to prevent pressure locking between them were installed as designed.
5/9/98 POS IR 98-04 SELF ENG 2A 5B The licensee conducted a comprehensive review of the Unit 1 stuck control rod issue and developed a good action plan to identify the cause of the sticking. The licensee concluded that the previous problems assaiated with control rod sticking were the result of binding in the control iod drive mechanisms (CRDMs).
Although inspection of the CRDM internals for the two stuck rods did not reveal a conclusive root cause, the licensee determined that the probable cause was the presence of very small debris in the CRDM "Mich migrated there from the RCS.
16 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL ,
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX l
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 5/7/98 POS IR 98-01 NRC ENG 3B System engineering supenriosrs manifested a strong understanding of the administrataive controls related to the implementation of the Maintenance Rule.
System engineers demonstatated a thorough understanding of the Maintenance Rule and their associataed responsibilities.
4/24/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC ENG 2B 4A The licens- t lectively demonstrated that the Unit 1 penetratio'n room venti!ation : im remained operable with damper seals deflated and supported their justificat., . for not replacing the seals every 5 years.
3/28/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC ENG 4A 4B Engineering evaluations and design changes were comprehensive and supported plant operations and modification and maintenance activities. One exception was noted with the limited change package associated with motiifications to component cooling water containrnent isolation valves.
3/11/95 VIO IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4C A violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 was identified SL IV pertaining to a change made to the calibration requirements of Engineering Standard HES-72,"ANO Eddy Current Data Acquisition," Revision 0, without use of either a standard change notice or revision of the engineering standard.
3/11/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4C A violation of Criterion IX of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 was identified SLIV pertain:ng to the failure to assure use of a phase rotation setting, for analysis of plus po'nt probe eddy current data, that was consistent with the setting that was used in the Appendix H (of the Elect.-ic Power Research Institute "PWR Steam Generator Examination Guidelines") qualification of the procedure.
2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 NRC ENG 4C The failure to provide measures to ensure the correct translation of seismic SLIV design requirements to instrument tubing installations and the maintenance of this configuration during plant operations in Unit 1 was identified as an examp:e of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill.
17 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONA1. PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 2/6/98 WK IR 97-21 NRC ENG 5B The lack of a review by the licensee of a sample of existing design calculctions to determine if the types of past problems identified by the licensee existed within other calculations was identified as a weakness.
2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 LIC ENG 3A 4A The failure to properly check ine adequacy of an engineering report that failed to SL IV account for instrument error in a calculation of vortexing in the borated water
, storage tank was identified as an example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil.
2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 NRC ENG 4A 4C The failure to procedurally incorporate a vendor recommended feedwater flow SLIV limit of 1500 gpm to a single steam generator into plant operating procedures was identified as a violation vi 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 LIC ENG 4B 4C Three apparent violations were identified associated with activities involving the SLIV removal of the borated water storage tank vacuum relief valve for maintenance EA 97- and testing on December 4,1996. The apparent violations involved the failure to 574 perform proper safety evaluations as described in 10 CFR 50.59, the failure to perform the vacuum relief valve testing under plant conditions as prescribed in the test procedure in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and the failure to utilize the correct design control processes (temporary alterations) for the temporary cover configurations placed over the valve flange in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill. UPDATE: NRC letter did 3/18/98 issued two severity level IV violations.
2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 NRC ENG 3B 4A The failure to properly verify the piping configuration design inputs to a design SLIV calculation was identified as the first example of violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111 18 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
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PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX -
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM ,
CODES 2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 NRC ENG 3B 4A The failure to properly verify the design adequacy in four design calculations was SLIV identified as additional examples of a victation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
- Criterion Ill. -
1/23/98 NCV IR 97-08 NRC ENG 4C 10 CFR 70.24 violation on criticality monitors. Discretion using section Vil B.6 of s EA 98- the enforcement policy.
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19 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE l
e PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 1/16/99 POS 1r 98-10 NRC PS 1C 3A The inspectors periodically reviewed security measures and operations throughout the inspection period and noted that they were properly implemented.
1/16/99 POS IR 98-10 NRC PS 3A During routine tours of the plant and observations of plant activities, the inspectors foend that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices.
1/16/99 NEG IR 98-10 NRC PS 3A 4B Obvious errors in an ALARA review checklist revealed weaknesses in the preparation and review of the checklist.
1/15/99 STR IR 99-02 NRC PS 3A 3B Overall, good exposure control programs were effectively implemerr 1. High radiation areoo were properly controlled and posted. Radiation prc ction job coverage was appropriate far radiological work observed. Contint ,os air monitors, portable air samplers, and high efficiency particulate air ster ventilation units were appropriately used to monitor and limit worker's airborna exposures.
Radiation workers used the contamination monitoring equipment properly.
Radioactive material containers were properly labeled, posted, and controlled.
Radiological postings were conspicuous and clear.
20 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 1/15/99 STR 1R 99-02 NRC PS 3A 3B A very good ALARA program was effectively implemented. Radiological work i permit packages were well planned, and ALARA personnel were appropriately involved during the outage planning stage. Lessons learned from past similar work were incorporated into the radiological work packages. The Unit 21999 outage exposure budget of 89 person-rem was approximately 17 person-rem less than the 1997 Unit 2 refueling outage actual exposure, and was established with appropriate involvement by ALARA. representatives and the station's ALARA managers' committee. Effective chemistry shutdown plans and controls were in place to accomplish the successful reduction of reactor coolant system dose rates approximately 23 percent.
1/15/99 POS IR 99-02 NRC PS 3C Housekeeping throughout the radiological controlled area was very good. Areas were free of debris, and tools and equipment staged for work in-progress were properly stored.
1/15/99 POS IR 99-02 NRC PS SA The 1998 and 1999 quality assurance radiation protection surveillance schedule covered appropriate areas of the radiation protection program to provide management with a good assessment of the program. No problems or negative trends were noted during the review of radiological conditions reports written since October 1998.
12/5/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC PS SA 5B SC The licensee responded appropristely to the identification of an unattended security weapon within the r! ant.
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PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX l
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 10/24/98 NEG IR 98-08 NRC PS 2A 2B SC The reliability of the Units 1 and 2 Post accident Sampling Systems has been poor due to problems with system hardware, detectors, and the system computer. The licensee closely monitored the availability and reliability of the systems and has been very responsive to correct emergent issues. The licensee's plans to upgrade the system computer and evaluate long-term system improvements were reasonable.
10/24/98 NEG IR 98-08 NRC PS 3A During the performance of radiation surveys on a newly loaded dry fuel storage cask, health physics technicians demonstrated good ALARA practices and were knowledgeable of requirements contained in the Certificate of Compliance.
Minor discrepancies were identified with the radiation surveys performed and postings associated with the loaded cask.
10/24/98 eel IR 98-08 NRC PS 48 The failure to incorporate appropriate requirements and acceptance limits as VIO IR 98-06 specified by applicable design documents to demonstrate that Unit 1/ Unit 2 SL-IV Diesel Engine Fire Pump P-6B would perform sati-sfactorily while in service was identified as a violation of TS 6.8.1 22 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM COCCS 10/23/98 STR 1R 98-19 NRC PS 3A 3C Implementation of the external and intemal exposure control progr.3ms was good. Workers were knowledgeable of work area radiological conditions and j controls. Radiological controlled areas were posted and controlled properly.
Radiation sirvey information was current and accurate. A good calibration and response test program was maintained for radiation survey instruments and the whole-body counters. Overall, an effective and aggressive AI. ARA program was implemented. The 1997 3-year average dose of 118 person-rem was below the PWR national average of 144 person-rem. The projected 1998 3-year average dose of 82 person-rem indicates an improving trend. An effective quality assurance audit program was maintained providing management a good assessment of the health physics program. Audit findings were included in the corrective action program. Timely corrective actions were implemented for audit findings.
10/23/98 NEG IR 98-19 NRC PS 3A 5B Condition Report CR-ANO-1-1998-0475 pertaining to health physics personnel failing to survey exhibited weak corrective actions and lacked documented evidence to support that all corrective actions were performed. No violation was issued for the failure to survey because open corrective actions from a previous NRC violation should reasonably prevent a recurrence.
10/23/98 POS IR 98-19 NRC PS 3A Housekeeping throughout the radiological controlled area was good.
23 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
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PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM ,
CODES 10/22/98 STR 1R 98-20 NRC PS 1C The er.iergency preparedness program was properly implemented. The emergency plan and procedures were properly maintained. The annuni review of emergency action levels was adequately documented. Emergency response facilities were maintained in a state of operational readiness. Equipment, supplies, and procedures were maintained ar;d available for use. The emergency planning staff was properly trained and maintained good awareness of industry events. The emergency response crganization was trained in accordance with the licensee's procedures. Audits and assessments of the emergency preparedness program provided good insight into program performance. An effective program was used for tracking internal task assignments. Potential areas for improvement identified by the licensee were aggressively pursued. Corrective actions were implemented in a time!y manner.
An effective training tracking program was in place.
10/22/98 POS IR 98-20 NRC PS 1C The overall performance of two shift crews during walkthroughs using the training simulator was very good. Teamwork, supervisory oversight, and effective use of dose assessment results during the scenarios were very good. Assessment of plant conditions, classification of emergencies, notifications of offsite agencies, protection of plant personnel, dose assessment and protective action recommendations were performed properly and in a timely manner. The critique of crew performance was thoroegh and provided good feedback for areas of improvement.
24 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE '
PREDECISIO%AL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 9/4/98 POS IR 98-16 NRC PS 1C Performance in the physical security area was very good. An excellent security system testing and maintenance program was conducted and properly documented. A very good protected area barrier and cietection system were maintained. Compensatory measures were effectively implemented. A very good program for reporting security events was in place. A very good security training program had been implemented.
9/4/98 NEG IR 98-16 LIC PS 4B During weekly testing, the security diesel generator overheated and automatically shut down. Temporary measures to improve air flow inside the diesel generator building improved operations. Permanent measures to improve building air flow are in progress.
8/26/98 NEG IR 98-07 NRC PS SC 3A Two deficient air sampling charcoal cartridge holders were left in service when Units 1 and 2 radiation protection technicians failed to review radiation work permits to identify deficient inservice iodine sample holders. A review of the operating and radiological conditions relevant to the inservice sample holder indicated that an unmonitored release to the work space had not occurred.
8/21/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 2A 2B Habitability in the TSC was properly monitored and maintained; however, air sampling results using high-volume air samplers were potentially non-conservative due to air sainpler cartridge sealing problems. Prompt corrective actions were taken to address the generic air sampler problem.
25 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
. 1 PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 8/21/98 WK IR 98-15 NRC PS 3A 1B 3B An exercise weakness was identified in the OSC because radiological protection practices were not properly demonstrated: (1) some briefings did not include '
expected radiological conditions, (2) forms functioning as radiation work permits were not completed, (3) one team did not stay together, (4) representative surveys in the work areas were not always performed, and (5) proper contamination controls, such as, checking protective clothing and handling contaminated objects without protection, were not always demonstrated.
8!21/98 POS IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 3A 3B Overall, performance was generally good. The control room (CR), technical support center (TSC), operational support center (OSC), and emergency operations facility (EOF) successfully implemented most essential emergency plan functions including classification, notification, and protective action recommendations.
8/21/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS SA The management critique was superficial and differed from the NRC inspection team's findings in the areas of CR communications (the licensee identified this area as a strength), OSC radiation protection practices, and exercise conduct and control. Peer evaluators and offsite agency participation in the management critique made a positive contribution to an otherwise less than average critique process.
8/21/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 3A 3B The exercise scenario was challenging from an operations standpoint but inplant radiological conditions did not challenge radiation protectica personnel. Some aspects of exercise conduct and control, such as, the use of undesigrated site personnel as controllers / participants, exercise preparation in the CR simulator, inconsistent data, and unrealistic /over-simulation, detracted from the training value of the exercise.
26 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 6/20/98 STR 1R 98-05 NRC PS 3A Consistent with observations made in NRC Inspection Reports 97-07,98-02,98-13,98-14, and 98-03, access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices. Personnel and peckage access, personnel searches, and applicat;ons of temporary lighting in areas where equipment, components, and truck trailers were stored were properly implemented.
5/1/98 Neg IR 98-14 NRC PS SA The annual audit of the security program was adequate, but would have been considered more effective had it been more performance based.
5/1/98 VIO IR 98-14 NRC PS 1A 4A A violation of the security plan was identified involving the licensee's failure to SLIV provide an audible feature for one of the security alarm systems. Only a visual alarm signal had been provided for this system.
5/1/98 STR 1R 98-14 NRC PS 1C Background investigation screening files were complete and thorough. A very good program had been established for denying, revoking, and appealing unescorted access authorization.
5/1/98 STR 1R 98-14 NRC PS 2A Performance in the physical security area remained very good with no overall trend. Alarm stations were redundant and well protected. Very good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained. A very good program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained. Assessment aids provided a high quality and complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones. Changes to security programs and plans were reported within the required time frame. A very good security event reporting program was in place.
Senior management support for the security organization was very good.
27 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLM!T ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SLdRCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 4/26/98 POS l3 98-04 SELF PS 1A 3A Unit 1 health physics technicians took appropriate actions in response to an individual with facial and I.iternal contamination.
4/14/98 STR 1R 98-13 NRC PS 1C Overall, effective exposure control programs were in place. High and locked high radiation areas were properly controlled and posted. Radiological surveys were documented in a clear consistent manner. Effective controls were in place to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination. Continuous air monitors and lapel samplers were used to properly monitor worker radiological airbome conditions. High efficiency particulate air filter ventilation units were appropriately used to control airbome concentrations. The whole body counter calibration program was appropriately implemented 4/14/98 VIO IR 98-13 NRC PS 1A 3A A violation, with four examples, was identified for the failure to determine the SLIV radiological conditions in work areas before issuing radiation work permits. This violation was similar to a violation identified in NRC Inspection Report 97-15.
Corrective actions were not effective to correct the previous violation.
4/14/98 STR IR 98-13 NRC PS 1C An effective ALARA program was implemented. Outage exposure goals were challenging. The person-rem exposure for both units during 1997 was 117. This was the lowest person-rem exposure in the operational history of the Arkansas Nuclear One.
28 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PREDECISIONAL PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 1
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 4/14/98 VIO IR 98-13 NRC PS 1C A violation, with two examples, was identified involving the failure to maintain SLIV procedures consistent with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. One example was a radiological survey procedure in which the word "should" was used in lieu of "shall" as required by 10 CFR 20.1501(a). The second example involved a bioassay procedure which entailed a method for calculating committed effective dose equivalent from the inhalation of radioactive material using uptake values in lieu of intake values as required by 10 CFR 20.1204(h)(1) when using the conversion factor that one ALI is equivalent to 5 rems.
4/14/98 VIO IR 98-13 NRC PS 1A A violation was identified for the failure to perform a radiological survey prior to SLIV workers installing rigging on the polar crane resulting in four personnel contamination events. The failure to survey was a result of mis-communications bet'Wn the craft workers and health physics staff involving the location of the actual work area.
4/7/98 POS IR 98-04 SELF PS 1C 5B The licensee conducted appropriate inspections in response to a potential tampering event associated with foreign material found in bearings on the Unit 1 main turbine generator.
3/28/98 VIO IR 98-03 NRC PS 3A Radiation protection technicians failed to update Unit 2 radiologicalinformation SLIV postings to reflect the results of radiation surveys conducted in the auxiliary building during periods of changing radiological conditions. This failure to follow procedures was determined to be a Severity Leve! IV violation of Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
29 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
e w * , .
ENCLOSURE 2 t;FNFR %I. DESCRilTION OF PtM T Mll E I.ABFI.S Attual date 4 an esent sw significant inue for timme itenn that hate a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the information w as issued (such as the LER date), er, for inspection reports, the last !
date d the inspection perhxt.
Type he categorization of the Iwue - see the T3 pr Item Cale table.
\Ft N \l.P t uncthmaa Area Comics: OPS for Operations; M tlNT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
%erres 'Ihe docunwnt that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report er LER for Licenwe Esent Report, fu ide ntification of w ho docosered inue: N for NRC; L for Licenwe; or S for Self Identifying (esentsk hsac Ikuriptwa Iktsils of the twue inwn the LER test or frten the IR Esecutise Summaries.
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Codes Template Codes - see table.
'PE ITEM CODES TE%IPLATE COI)ES t.A > nfoecenwn; Actbm f.etter with Cisil Penalty I Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations: E. - Operations During Transients; and C - Pngrann t 11 & afuerenirnt 1*cretum No Cisil Penalty gp ,
Strengtb' Oserall Strong I.icenwe Performance
_ 2 Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes M cAnew Oserall M eak I.icenwe Performance 3 Human Performance: A - Work Performrnce; B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities / Training; C - % swk t El
- Ewalatsd Fnforceme t item- M miting Final NRC Action Ensironment
\10 % kdation Irsel I, ll. Ill, or BY 4 Engineer;ng/lksign: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes NCV %.m-Cited 4 iolatWm 5 Problem Identification and Resolution: A - Identification: 5 - Analysis; and C- Resolution lit \ Iksiation inun I enwe Commitment to NRC P,artne Indisidual Genut Inspection Finding NOTES:
Eels are apparent siolations of NRC requirements that are being conddered for escalated enforcement action Neguise Indniduse Penw laspection Finding in accordance with the *CeneralStatement of Policy and Procedureof r NRC Enforcement Action" tEnforcement Policy), NCREG-f ML lloweser,the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the iER l.icenwe Esent Report to the NRC issues blentified by the Er:Is and the PIM entries may be nmxiified when the flaat decisions are made. E,; fore t areudsed Item fnmiInspecten Report the NRC makes its enforcement decisAen, the licensee ,ill be presided with an opportunity to either tI)
. t kl" respond to the apparent siolation or (2) request a predecisional enforcevrent conference.
lxensing i icendng love from NRR "
CRis are unreselsed items atmut which nuwe information is required to d(.crnune wlather the issue in MtsC Mewellancenn - Emegency Preparedness Finding tEP), question is an acceptable item. a desiation, a ne=conformance, or a siolation. Howeser, the NRC has not Dedared Emergen y, Namconformance Issue, etc. r. ached its final cunctusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified w hes= the final conclusi ms are made.
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
Enc'osure 3 ARKANSAS NUCl. EAR ONE INSPECTION PLAN IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary instruction Cora inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
INSPECTION TITLE / NUMBER OF DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION / COMMENTS PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS IP 81700 Physical Security inspection 1 4/26 -30/99 Core Inspection IP 84750 Effluent and Environmental 1 4/26 -30/99 Core inspection Monitoring IP 86750 Transpnttstion of Radioactive 1 6/28 - 7/2/99 Core Inspection Materials IP 71001 Licensed Operator Requalification 3 7/19-23/99 Core inspection I Program Evaluation IP 64704 Fire Protection 2 7/26 - 30/99 Cure Inspection IP 93809 SSEI and Safety Evaluations 7 8/2 -16/99 Core inspection
& 37001 IP 40500 Corrective Action Program Review 2 11/1 -11/5/99 Core lospection IP 84750 Radioactive Wasta Program 1 10" -10/22/99 Core Inspection implementation ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
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