ML20204J133
| ML20204J133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Haddam Neck, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1988 |
| From: | CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204H467 | List:
|
| References | |
| EOP-3.1-51, NUDOCS 8810240546 | |
| Download: ML20204J133 (13) | |
Text
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PRO EDUR COVER SHE T AR 5 1988 PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REV.NO.
EOP 3.1-51 Manual Alignment of RHR to HPSI Cross Tie Valves 1
lR"'OR P. Rainha l ATE 77347gg lDEPT.
Ops l
TECHNICAL REVIEW i
2 OPERATIONS M/
HEALTH PHYSICS I
ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY
, [ REACTOR ENGR.
SECURITY
[ MAINTENANCE STORES INST. & CONTROL CM ADMIN.
[ RECORDS l
[
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[
]
[
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[
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DEPARTMENT HEAD REVIFJ6f l
COMPLETE / B!ENNIAL REVIEW 7 YES NO PORC REVIEW REQUIRED?
[YESUNO ENVIRONNENTAL IMPACT 7 YES2NO YES2No WJOR REVISCN7 A CH ANGE TO INTENT 7 YES NO WRITTEN SAFETY EVALUATCN ATTACHED 7 YES[ N'A UYES[NO YEShNO UNREVOWD SAFETY OUESTION?
SAFETY EVALUATON REQUIRED?
q APPROVAL l
DEIAk 5F TEy /
DATE SU)
NDENT
. \\ Os 3-n -bt
.Mbd IURC M LE RNd 50.
BATE FROCEDURE EfTICT1VE DATE REQUIRES UCEASED OPER ATUR REVIEW? I 86-8\\
slu g 45 6B vES X NO O i
9 87 ACP 1.2 6.5, Attachttent 8.1
!!A2288n8?a88ha p
EOP 3.151 Rev. 1 APR 5 1986 Connecticut Yankee R.*E693.PSY"8 ""*d"*
8 Operations MANUAL ALIGNMENT OF RHR TO IIPSI CROSS TIE VALVES 1.0 DISCUSSION 1.1 This procedure provides irtstructions for manual alignment of the RHR pump discharge to HPSI pump suction cross tie Salves in the event that SI MOV 24 or RH MOV 874 are not operable.
2.0 SYMPIOMS 2.1 SI MOV 24 will not operate either electrically or manually.
2.2 RH MOV 874 will not ograte either electrically or manually.
3.0 ALTTOMATIC ACTIONS None 4.0 IMMEDIATE ACHONS None This procedure is entered from ES 1.4, TRANSFER TO TWO PAT 11 RECIRCULAT10N, Step 3 c. or Step 3 e.
5.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS r
CAUTION:
DO NOT OPERATE IPSI PUhfPS WITH EITHER St MOV 901 OR St.Sf0V 902 ( RHR PUMP DISCHARGE TO HPSI PUAfP SUCTION CROSS TIE VALVES } OPEN. LPSI PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE WILL OVER PRESSURIZE THE HPSI BOOSTER PUhtP.
L J
5.1 Start one HPS! pump.
Page 1 of 3
EOP 3.151 Rev. 1 APR 5 1986 SIEE ACnON/ EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED r
7 CAUTIONt PERFORhi THE FOLLOWING ONLYIF AREA RADIATION LEVELS PERh!!T Eb7RY.
L J
5.2 RIIR pit radiadon level QQIQ ECA 1.1, permits entry.
LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLAST RECIRCULATION, Step 1.
5.3 Unblock, cut air into and IE Ril FCV 796 can EQIbe unblocked open Ril FCV 796, and opened.
TiiEN QQIQ ECA 1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLAST RECIRCULATION, Step 1.
5.4 Cose recire isoladon valve on the shutdown HPS! pump (SI V 857A or SI V 857B).
5.5 Close HPS! suction from RWST on shutdown lips! pump (S! MOV 854A or SI MOV 8548),
r 1
CAUTIONt ENSURE BOTH LPSI PUAfP C0b7ROL SWITCHES ARE IN TPO BEFORE PERFORAllNG STEP $.6.
5.6 Open l{ PSI suction from RIIR on shutdown liPSI pump (SI MOV 901 or SI MOV 902).
5.7 Check closed SI MOV 861B Cose SI MOV 861B and any and any one other loop SI one other loop Siisolation MOV, isolation MOV, IE SI MOV 861B EQIclosed, 111EN close any two loop Si isolation MOV's, 5.8 Cose CH MOV 292B and Perform the following:
- a. Locall close CSV 286 and CH V 286B (Charging flow control manual isolation valves).
- b. Cose CRMOV 292B and l
- l
\\
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EOP 3.151 Rev. 1 APR 5 1986
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SIEg AcnON/EXPECIID RESPONSE 7ESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 5.9 Start HPSI pump with suction supplied from RHR pump discharge.
5.10 Stop HPSI pump with suction supplied from RWST.
5.11 GQIQ ES.I.4, TRANSFER TO TWO PATH RECIRCULATION, Step 3 h.
END 6.0 FOOTNOTES
- 1 NRC commitment J. F. Opeka letter to T. E. Murley dated 6/1/86.
7.0 SUhtMARY OF CHANGES Step #
Changes Reasons 5.1 Added valve names increases procedure understanding 5.2 Change wording in caution statement Clarify caution 5.3 Added RNO to step Clanfy procedure inunt 5.8 Change "shut" to "clone" To be consis: ant with other steps 5.9 Change wording Increases procedure understanding 5.10 Change wording increases procedure understanding Page 3 of 3
AUG 3 01986 TABLE OF CONTENTS I
PROCEDURE VOLUME ORPs, Status Trees. FRPs TAB CONTENTS Front Matter Title Page Table of Contents Introductory Remarks OPTIMAL RECOVERY Introductory Remarks PROCEDURE E-0 o E-01 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection o ES-0.01 Radiagnosis o ES-0.1:
Reactor Trip Response o ES-0.2:
Natural Circulation Cooldown o ES-0.3:
Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Vessel (With RVLIS) o ES-0.4:
Natural Circulation Cooldovn 'iith Steam Void in Vessel (Witheut RVLIS) f(.
E-1 o E-It loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant o ES-1.1:
Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization o ES-1.3:
Transfer to RPR Fecirculatten o ES-1.4r Transfer to !ve Path Recirculation E-2 o E-2:
Taultsd Steam Generator Isolatten 0056vtl 1
Aueust 30, 1956
AUG 3 01986 TAB r s'
'.?
TS PROCEDUi':
(Cont'd)
ORPs, Ses: La iraes, FRPs TAB CONTENTS l
E-3 o E-3:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture o ES-3.1:
Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill o ES-3.2:
Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Blovdevn o ES-3.3 Post-SGTR Cooldevn Using Steam Dump ECA-0 o ECA-0.0:
Station Blackout' l
o ECA-0.1:
Station Blackout Recovery Without SI Required o ECA-0.2 Station Blackout Recovery With SI Required ECA-1 o ECA-1.it Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation o
ECA-1.2:
LOCA Outside Containment
(* :...
I ECA-2 o ECA-2.1:
Uncontrolled Depressuri:ation of All Steam Generators ECA-3 o
ECA-3.1:
SCTR With Less of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Pecovery Desired o ECA-3.2:
SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant-Saturated Recovery Oesired o ECA-3.3:
SGTR Withcut Pressurizer Pressure Control l
i 0056V:1 2
August
'O, 1996 J
AUG 3 01956 TABLE OF CONTENTS I
PROCEDURE VOLLHE (Cont'd)
ORPs Status Trees. FRPs TAB CONTENTS STATUS TREES o F-0:
Critical Safety Fianction Status Trees RlNCTION RESTORATION Introductory Remarks TR-S o FR-S-1:
Response to Nuclear Pever Generation /ABiS o FR-S.2:
Response to toss of Core Shutdown TR-C o TR-C.1:
Response to Inadequate Core Cooling i
o TR-C.2:
Response to Degraded Core Cooling o TR-C.3 Response to Saturated Core Cooling 1
i 1
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1 i
I s
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Att eu s t 30 1956
AUG 3 01986 TABLE OF CONTENTS I
PROCEDURE VOLUME (Cont'd)
ORPs Status Trees, TRPs TAB CONTENTS FR-H o TR-H.1:
Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink o TR-H.2:
Response to Steam Generator Overpressure o TR-H.3:
Response to Steam Generator High Level o TR-H.41 Response to Loss of Norms.1 Steam Release Capabilities o FR-H.5:
Response to Steam Generator Lov Level TR-P o FR-P.1:
Response to In=inent Pressuri:ed Therral Shock Condition I
o TR-P.2:
Respense to Anticipated Pressurited Thernal Shock Condition i
5.
TR-Z o
TR-Z.1:
Response to High Containment Pressure o FR-Z.22 Response to Containnent Flooding i
o FR-Z.3:
Response to High Containment Radiatien Level l
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0056V:t 4
August 30. 19E'
TABLE OF CONTENTS PROCEDURE VOLUME (Cont'd)
ORPs, Status Trees, TRPs TAB CONTENTS TR-I o TR-I.!:
Response to High Pressurizer Le tl o
TR-I. :
Response to tow Pressurizer Leve.
o TR-I.3:
Response to Voids in Reactor Vesst1
. s. m.
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0056v:1 5
August 30, 1??'
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AUG 0 019sc 1
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES
)
The Emergency Response procedures (ERPs) provide a network of predefined and I
prioritized sympto=-based response strategies for the management of f
emergency transients.
The resultant guidance provides a systematic approach fort l
1.
evalua,lon of plant symptoms and optimal recovery to an end state in which radiation release and equipment damage are minimized.
2.
explicit identification of the status of Critical Safety Tunctions independent of event scenario, and j
3.
restoration of Critical Safety Tunctions independent of event scencrio.
The Emergency Response Procedures are composed of three major elements:
i o
Optimal Recovery Procedures o
Critical Safety Tunction Status Trees o
Tunction Restoration Procedures The procedures and Status Trees that comprise the Etergency Respense I
Procedures are provided in this volume.
Background infor:atien supporting these procedures and Status Trees are included in the five Backereund
((*
Volumes.
Detailed discussions of the ERG program and items of generic interest are provided in the Executive Volure.
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August 30 1996 l
EOP 3.1-0 7
Rev. 2
(
ATTACHMENT TO ALL EOP's FEB 051988 The following statements can apply to ANY or ALL EOP's. They have been removed from the EOP's to improve EOP clarity.
NOTE:
In the unlikly evert ofloss of all HnSI, LPSI ar;d Charging pum>s during a LOCA, the RHR pumps can be lined up for RCS injection by opening RH MOV-21 and starting the RHR pumps. RCS pressure will have to be reduced to less than 150 psig before injecnon flow will occur. RCS pressure reduction may be accomplished by using the SG's for a heat sink which will help reduce RCS pressere and temperature. Both PORV'S and their block valves may be opened if additional depressurization is required.
All motor operated valves in the safety injection system have manual hand wheels and may be operated manually if necessary and if radiological conditions permit.
The following actions are required to open reactor coolant sample trip valve, SS AOV 950, with containment pressure greater than 5 PSIG to allow operation of the P. A. S. S.
1.
Place the control switch for SS AOV 950 in the close position.
2.
Place the HCP OVERRIDE switch for SOV 950 in the override position.
3.
Place the control switch for SS AOV 950 in the open position to allow flow to go to the P. A. S. S.
System VOIDING can be recognized by:
An unexplained increase in pressurizer level while trying to depressurize the RCS by pressurizer spray valve operation, power operated relief valve operation, or other means.
An unexplained difficulty in reducing system pressure while operating with "solid" conditions in the RCS.
Indication of core exJt thermocouples, reactor head thermocouple or loop temperature readings equal to or greater than saturation temperature for a given RCS pressure.
System VOIDING can be overcome by:
Increasing RCS pressure by means of pressurizer heaters or charging rate to a pressure greater than saturation pressure for a given RCS temperature.
Decreasing RCS temperature by feeding and steaming the steam generators, operation of core cooling equipment, or adjusting RHR cooling flow (if RIIR is in service) to a temperature below saturation for a given RCS pressure.
Increasing RCS flow rate which decreases the probability of hot spots occuring in stagnant or low flow areas of the RCS.
Page 1 of 3
EOP 3.1-0 Rev. 2 I
FEB 0 5 1986 When on emergency power use only pressurizer heater group "A" with EG 2A and pressurizer heater group "E" with EG 28. This selection is necessary because these heater gro are the only groups that will trip and lockout from the diesels should a safety inj,ecu,u on signal occur or be manually initiated.
NOTE: When on emergency power, the 27Y-4 and 27Y-4B lockout relays must be reset before heater group "A" can be used and 27Y-7 and 27Y 7B lockout relays must be reset before heater group "E" can be used.
When on emergency power and a High Pressure Safety injection Pump fails to start, place its control switch in trip pull out and then start the Charging Pump associated with that core cooling train.
RQ NQI override automatic actions of engineered safety features unless the continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions.
BEFORE OPENING any valves that were closed by HCP actuation, verify by available instrumentation that the lines have integrity, will perform their mtended function and will not cause a release path.
CAUTION:
If reactor coolant system pressure is being controlled by use of the pressurizer PORV's, continously monitor Pressurizer Relief Tank pressure, temperature and level and take appropriate actions to maintain PRT integrity.
Venfy pressurizer PORV closure usmg the PORV position indicating lights on the 51ain Control Board and PRT conditions. If a reactor coolant leak to the PRT is identified, then close the PORV block valves.
If the High Pressure Steam Dump Control System fails or one or more of the steam dump valves fail open, the event may be terminated by closing the steam dump header isolation valves (MS4 TOV 520 and MS htOV 553) or by closing all four main steam line trip valves.
Emergency Boration is required if:
1.
An uncontrolled cooldown is occuring and Tave is approaching 50o F less than steady state value.
2.
Two or more control rods fail to drop after a reactor trip.
3.
An unexplained or unexpected positive reactivity addition is occuring.
Page 2 of 3
EOP 3.1-0 Rev. 2 FEB 051983 i
When level in the de nineralized water storage tank gets down to the low level alarm setpoint (54.000 gal.), lineup to transfer water from the primary water storage tank to the demineralized water storage tank as follows:
1.
Check that power is available to the primary water transfer pumps by observing pump breaker position lights on the Main Control Board.
2.
Align the primary water transfer header to the turbine hall by closing PW-V 112 and PW V-415 then opening PW V-111.
3.
Align the turbine hall demineralized water transfer header as follows:
a.
Close DW V 505 (Post Filter outlet valve:.
b.
Check closed DW V 504 (Post Filter bypass valve),
c.
Check closed DW-V 528A (PW to forwarding pump discharge).
d.
Check closed DW-V-1632 (PW to forwarding pump bypass).
e.
Close PW V-541 (Primary water makeup flow meter outlet valve).
f.
Open PW V 542 (Piimary water makeup flow meter bypass valve).
g.
Open PW-V 509 (PWST fill valve).
h.
Open DW V 508 (DWST fill valve).
i.
Check open DW V-1635 (DWST makeup flow meter inlet valve).
j Check open DW V 1634 (DWST makeup flow raeter outlet valve),
c.
Check open DW V 1637 (DWST inlet isolation valve).
4.
Start a primary water pump.
- If containment pressure is greater than 5 PSIG, verify that the 8 PASS valves (SS SOV 150A through D and SS SOV-151 A through D are closed)
- Amendment 72 to Facility Operating License, issued February 19,1986.
The reference,in ES 1.3, to checking RHR Pump AMPS greater than 150 AMPS, correspondes to an RHR flow rate of gn ater than 400 GPM injection through the core deluge lines into the reactor vessel.
Page 3 of 3
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