ML20198T030
| ML20198T030 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1998 |
| From: | Marschall C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Hutchinson C ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9901120102 | |
| Download: ML20198T030 (23) | |
Text
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t o/ %, UNITED STATCS l*' [ r g, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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..E" (j REGION IV i1 .g 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 400 ARLINGTON TEXAS 76011 8064
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L DEC 291998 (E
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U L C. Randy Hutchinson, Vice President (Operations Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Operations, Inc.
-1448 S.R. 333 h .Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967. .i i 1 L
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION PLANNING REVIEW (IPR)- ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
L . On December 2,1998, the NRC staff completed a unique inspection Planning Review (IPR) of L Arkansas Nuclear One. The staff normally conducts Semiannual Plant Performance Reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety
. performance and adjust inspection resources. However, due to the suspension of the
, Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance process, we implemented an abbreviated Inspection Planning Review for plant issues and to develop inspection plans. The IPR for L ' Arkansas Nuclear One involved the participation of both Reactor Projects and Safety divisions l in evaluating inspection results and safety performance trends for the period of April 23 to
!. - October 28,1998.' This IPR provided NRC management with a current summary of licensee
- performance trends since the last Plant Performance Review.
Based upon this review, inspection resources have been prioritized and scheduled. No changes have been made to the inspection resources for your facility.
. Enclosure 1 contains an historica! listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues L ; Mr*% (PIM), that was considered during this IPR process to arrive at an integrated view of IL r see perforrnance trends. . The PIM includes only items from inspection reports and other
' docketed correspondence between the NRC and Entergy. Operations, Inc. . The IPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM,' including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC
- inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration, j 0 - Enclosure 2 is a general description of the PIM table labels. This material will be placed in the j NRC Public Document Room. j This letter also advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Arkansas Nuclear
' One IPR.' It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and tu allow for o scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival
, "onsitet Enclosure 3 details our inspection plan for Arkansas Nuclear One over the next i8 months.' The' rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is
! provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident
. inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature. We will inform you
, of any changes to the inspection plan.
L' sI 9901120102 981 1 PDR- ADOCK O 13 g r 1:- a PDR n
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Entergy. Operations, Inc. If you have any questions, please contact me at (817) 860-8185. !
Sincerely, ,
3 i y ,
Q . ,
Charles S. Marschall, Chief Project Branch C .
Division of Reactor Projects 4 i
Docket Nos.: 50-313 i 50-368 -
License Nos.: DPR-51. j NPF6 j l
Enclosures:
l
.1. Plant Issues Matrix )
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels 3.' _ Inspection Plan cc w/onclosures:
Executive Vice President --
. & Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations. inc.-
~ P.O. Box 31995 -
~
~ Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Vice President
. Operations Support -
Entergy Operations, Inc. -)
P.O. Box 31995 . ,
) Jackson, Mississippi 39286 :
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
. ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power; 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 ,
, - Rockville, Maryland' 20852
! County Judge of Pope County
- Pope County Courthouse .
Russellville, Arkansas 72801
.Winston & Strawn
. ;,1400 L Street, N.W.
. Washington, D.C. 20005-3502
=j
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! . Entergy Operations, Inc. l l David D. Snellings, Jr., Director Division of Radiation Contro! and Emergency Management-Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30 Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867- ,
Manager Rockville Nuclear Licensing
. + _._ - . - . . - . - - - - . - . - . _ . - _ - - . _ . . . -
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- l. 1 Entergy Operations, Inc. -4 ;'
UEC 2 9 lceg E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS) i: 'E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
' E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FX7)
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! bec distrib. by RIV: i l Regional Administrator Resident inspector ;
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DRP Director MIS System j Branch Chief (DRP/C) RIV File i Project Engineer (DRP/C) DRS-PSB Lrych Chief (DRP/TSS) Carol Gordon Records Center, INPO '
L .The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
! Deputy Regional Administrator C. A. Hackney l
Commissioner Dieus B. Henderson, PAO i Commissioner Diaz B. Murray, DRS/PSB j Commissioner McGaffigan SRis at all R!V sites
' Commissioner Merrifield W. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G 21) ,
I. Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR - !
R Associate Dir. for Insp;, and Tech. Assmt, NRR - 1
~ SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies). l
' J. Hannon, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-H-3)
' N. Hilton, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-H 3) 'l C. Nolan, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-H 3) j i
'/ l
- I l J
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l DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPDIR\lPR\ANO To receive copy of document, indicate in box:)h = Copy without enclosures 'E' = Copy with enclosures 'N' = No copy RIV:C:DRP/E D:DRn - DD:DRP / D:DRP M- '
CSMarschall;df* ATH9Tv4LD KEBrpcifman TPGwynn 7 12/17/98 (DPL) 12f6/98 g /98 [12/tt/98 previously concurred - OFFICIAL RECORD COPY l
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Entergy Operations, Inc. DEC 2 91998.
E Mail report to T. Frye (TJF) -
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Docuinent Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bec to DCD (IE01)
. bec distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator Resident inspector DRP Director MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/C) RIV File -
' Project Engineer (DRP/C) ' DRS PSB Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) Carol Gordon The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15) Records Center, INPO Deputy Regional Administrator C. A. Hackney .
Commissioner Dicus B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz B. Murray, DRS/PSB
- Commissioner McGaffigan SRis at all RIV sites Commissioner Merrifield W. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G 21)
A 4ociate Dir. for Projects, NRR
. Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)
J. Hannon, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-H-3)
N. Hilten, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-H-3)
C. Nolan, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-H-3)
-ToDOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPDIRf1 \ R\ANO receive copy of document, Indicate in bor/c' = Copy without enclosures 'F. = Copy witn enclosures "N' = No copy RIV:C:DRP/E D DRn DD:DRP / D:DRP _ 1)
CSMarschall;df* ATHo"wdid KEBrpefman TPGwynn G 12/17/98 (DPL) = 12 6 /98- g /98 12/t%/98
- previously concurred OFFICIAL RECORD COPY p , .,.y r y ^
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 9/14/98 NEG IR 98-302 NRC OPS 3B The licensee initia!!y failed to submit an acceptable examination for administration to operator license applicants for the operating test porthn of the examinations.
9/12/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC OPS 2A Good housekeeping practices and component material condition was noted in the Unit 1. Train A.
Reactor Building Spray Pump Room and with Unit 2 Train A, emergency diesel generator. The system valve line-up was in accordance with the procedure. Components in the field were properly identified and labeled. No material deficiencies were noted that had the potential to impact system operation.
9/11/98 POS 1R 98-302 NRC OPS 3A 3B Five applicants for reactor operator licenses and all six senior operators license applicants passed their examinations. The applicants exhibited good performance, and use of good communication practices, as well as peer checks.
2/1/98 NEG IR 98-301 NRC OPS 3B The operating test material was inadequate for administration as submitted.
8/28/98 POS IR 98-301 NRC OPS 3A 3B All 14 (6 reactor operators and 8 senior operators) license applicants passed their examinations. The applicants exhibited good oversight and peer checking and effective communications.
8/1/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC OPS 1C 3A 5A The use ot informal markings on the side of the diesel fire pump Fuel Oil Day Tank T-29 to determine tank level and the lack of formal controls on these markings indicated an isolated weakness in the control of measuring and test equipment.
8/1/98 VIO IR 98-06 NRC OPS 1C 3A 5A Fifteen licensed operators failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55 for maintaining an active SL IV license. As a result, these operators stood control room watches with inactive licenses. The failure to satisfy the minimum shift manning requirements specified in Technical Specifications was determined to be a no response required violation of TS 6.2.2.
5/23/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC OPS 1A 3A Unit 2 operators performed well during the evolutica to bring the Unit 2 reactor critical. The approach to criticality was deliberate and well contro!!ed.
5/21/98 POS IF. 98-05 NRC OPS 1A 2A 3A Unit 2 operators demonstrated good monitoring and control while performing a reactor coolant system cooldown to facilitate repairs to an emergency feedwater drain line. Plant mode changes were closely monitored and properly logged.
5/20/98 NEG IR 98-05 SELF OPS 1A 2A -3A Insufficient monitoring and communication of plant system response and steam generator water levels by operators resulted in an unexpected automatic actuation of the Unit 2 emergency feedwater system during a plant shutdow.n. A previously identified problem with the reactor trip override feature of the feedwater control system was not communicated to others in the operations department.
5/9/98 STR 1R 98-04 NRC OPS 1A 3A Unit 1 operators perforrned well during the evolution to bring the Unit 1 reactor critical The approach to criticality was deliberate and well controlled.
October 28,1998 1 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 5/8/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC OPS 2A 3A Unit 1 control rods functioned as expected while latching, withdrawing, and during the performance of rod drop testing. Previous problems with sticking of control rods during rod movement were not experienced during this testing. Operators conducted the testing well and in accordance with procedures.
5/7/98 POS IR 98-01 NRC OPS 3B Senior reactor operators, operations shift superintendents, and planning and scheduling senior reactor operators clearly understood the philosophy of the Maintenance Rule and their specific responsibilities regarding the Maintenance Rule program implementation.
S/7/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC OPS 2A 28 The licensee's walkdown end cleanup of the Unit 1 reactor building was effective in preparing Unit 1 tor power operation.
4/25/98 STR 1R 98-04 NRC OPS 1A 3A Unit 1 operators performed well during drain down of the reactor coolant system to reduced inventory.
Operators monitored reactor coolant system (RCS) levels and maintained good communications during the evolut;on.
4/24/93 POS IR 98-04 SELF OPS 1B 3A 2A Unit 1 operators responded quickly and appropriately to the sudden failure of a temporary flexible steam pipe installed to conduct emergency feedwater (EFW) pump turbine overspeed testing.
3/31/98 VIO IR 98-04 LIC OPS 1A 3A 4C Unit 1 operators authorized the temporary release of a hold card on a motor-operated valve circuit SLIV breaker without obtaining the authorization of two lead craftsmen signed in on the hold card. The circuit breaker was subsequently closed and the valve was stroked. Although no personnel were injured, this error created the potential for a personnel injury or fatality. This was determined to be a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. Although the licensee had implemented a number of corrective actions following a similar near miss event in January 1997, recurring errors in the implementation of the hold card process indicated that these corrective actions have not been effective in preventing recurrence of hold card errors.
3/28/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC OPS 1A 1C 3A Unit 2 operators performed well during several major plant evolutions, including a reactor shutdown to begin Steam Generator Tube inspection Outage 2P98, placing the shutdown cooling inservice, draining the reactor coolant system to reduced inventory, mid-loop operations, and a reactor startup.
Operators consistently demonstrated strong command and control, communications, use of procedures, response to abnormalindications, and control of trainees. Management oversight of these activities was appropriate. The walkdown and cleanup of the Unit 2 containment building was effective in preparing Unit 2 for power operation. (Sections 01.1,01.2, O1.4,01.6, O1.7, and 01.8).
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October 28,1998 2 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE 1
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM
, CODES 3/28/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC OPS SA 5B A quality assurance audit of a computer code used to calculate the Unit 2 time to core boiling and time to core uncovery was thorough and probing. The audit identified a potential error in the assuntyions regarding RCS vent path size, which the licensee adequatley resolved (Section 01.5).
2/14/98 STR 1R 98-02 NRC OPS 1B 2A 5B The licensee responded appropriately to the failure of position indication for one control rod during the Unit 1 reactor startup. Instrumentation and control personnel demonstrated good system knowledge and understanding of Technical Specifications in evaluating the cause and impact of the position indication failure.
2/14/98 NCV 1R 98-02 LIC OPS 1A 3A SA During a startup of the Unit 1 reactor, control room operators failed to select the sequence mode for withdrawal of the regulating groups, as required by the procedure. The reactor operator demonstrated a good questioning attitude and good system knowledge in questioning the alignment of the rod control system and stopped the rod withdrawal to resolve his concern.
2/14/98 STR IR 98-02 NRC OPS 2A 2B 3A The licensee et'ectively planned, scheduled, and implemented an on-line 18-month inspection of Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1. As a result, the EDG was returned to service approximately 29 hours3.356481e-4 days <br />0.00806 hours <br />4.794974e-5 weeks <br />1.10345e-5 months <br /> earlier than originally scheduled. The materiai condition of the EDG was very good.
1/23/98 WK IR 97-08 SELF OPS 3B While attempting to remove water from a Unit 1 main generator hydrogen vent, a detonatbn occurred in a vacuum cleaner when workers did not recognize the combustible hazard. They were focused on troubleshooting and did not apply system knowledge. Safety training th7t was immediately conducted by the licensee's paint department demonstrated good insight and application of plant experience to other routine evolutions (Section 01.2).
1/23/98 STR 1R 97-08 LIC OPS SA SC During a Unit 2 quality assurance audit, the licensee identified a potential failure to perform surveillance requirements for the reactor protection logic as required by Technical Specifications. The licensee took prompt measures to assure TS operabi!ity requirements were met until resolution of the requirements was completed. Testing was accomplished within Technical Specification time interval requirements (Section 01.3).
12/12/97 STR 1R 97-07 NRC OPS 1A Unit 2 waste control operators were thorough in conducting turnover, knowledgeable of conditions on their watch station, and familiar with procedure requirements, system design and operation, and related theoretical topics (Section 01.4).
12/6/97 STR 1R 97-18 NRC OPS SB SC Quality assurance audit requirements were appropriately implemented. Good quality assurance audits with meaningful results were performed (Section 07.2).
l 12/6/97 NCV IR 97-18 NRC OPS SA A noncited violation was identified for the inadvertent program omission of the requirement to perform emergency and security plan audits under the cognizance of the safety review committee (Section O7.2).
October 28,1998 3 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE l
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 12/6/97 STR 1R 97-18 NRC OPS SB The in-house events assessment group, the condition review group, and the corrective action review board, played key roles in the licensee's corrective action program implementation and were effectively accomplishing their review functions (Section 01.1).
12/6/97 STR 1R 97-18 NRC OPS 2B Control room deficiencies and operator work-arounds were few and well managed (Section O7.1).
12/6/97 VIO IR 97-18 NRC OPS 4C SB The plant safety committee was generally effecGve in assuring safety for emerging activities, such as SLIV modifications and procedure changes. However, a 10 CFR 50.59 violation was identified for the failure to perform a written safety evaluation for a plant safety committee-approved change to a procedure definition of a " continuous fira watch," as described in the Final Safety Analysis Reports (Section O7.5).
12/6/97 STR 1R 97-18 NRC OPS 58 The reviews and corrective actions for operating experience were controlled and that the industry events analysis program was managed appropriately. The licensee effectively incorporated industry experience into the corrective action program (O7.6).
12/6/97 STR 1R 97-18 NRC OPS SA SB SC The licensee generally used condition reports very effectively for documenti . :onditions adverse to quality, determining sound root causes, addressing operability and reportabiuy requirements, identifying generic concerns, and ensuring that plant staff implemented corrective actions in a timely manner (Section O1.1).
11/6/97 STR IR 97-06 NRC OPS 48 The licensee's analysis of the potential for reactor overpower during EFW testng was c3mprehensive and the licensee had not exceeded 100 percent power. The licensee revised procedures to preclude exceeding 100 percent power (Section 01.4).
11/6/97 WK IR 97-06 LIC OPS 3A The licensee inadvertently moved a restricted fuel assembly to a nonrestricted location due to a misread map location. They subsequently reanalyzed the fuel assembly as nonrestricted. The licensee took appropriate corrective actions on this event to enhance the procedure (Section 01.2).
11/6/97 STR 1R 97-06 NRC OPS 1A The inspectors found the emergency feedwater (EFW) system to be properly aligned and in good material condition (Section 01.3) 9/12/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC MAIN 28 3A 3B Unit 1 and Unit 2 maintenance and surveillance activities were performed professionally by qualified T workers knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and diagnostic equipment, and in accordance with approved procedures. Technicians demonstrated good ALARA practices, communication, self-checking, and peer-checking skills during the activities observed. Good system engineering involvement was observed during surveillance activities.
October 28,1998 4 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE- ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 9/12/98 NEG 1R 98-07 LIC MAIN IC (Closed) LER 50-368/96-005-01 " Surveillance Testing of Plant Protection System and Postaccident T Monitoring Instrumentation." The inspectors verified the immediate and long term corrective actions described in the licensee's letter dated January 30,1997 and found them to be adequate and complete. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
9/12/98 NEG IR 98-07 LIC MAIN 1C Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-313/96-010, " Inadequate Procedure Revision Resulted in not having T Tested the Reactor Protection System High Temperature Trip Function as Required by Technical Specifications." The inspectors verified the immediate and long term corrective actions described in the licensee's letter dated December 19,1996 and found them to be adequate and complete. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Victation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
8/31/98 NEG IR 98-07 SELF MAIN SC 3B Unit 2 Technical Specif* Itions were entered when a technician interrupted power to reactor vessel T level monitoring syste i RVLMS) Channel 1 by using an uncontro!!ed power strip located inside the system cabinet that also powered system components. The licensee missed an opportunity to prevent the loss of RVLMS Channel 1 power when they initiated system specific corrective actions for a similar everit that occurred in 1996. The problems had no safety significance, but they represent isolated examples of weak corrective action.
8/1/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC MAIN 3A 3C Unit 2 mechanics demonstrated a lack of familiarity with a job order in not recognizing that an igrution T source permit was required to perform work on the charging system. Appropriate safety precautons were established for establishing a freeze seal and the work was performed in accordance with the work plan. Although some deficiencies were found with the work plan instructions, these deficiencies did not impact the work.
6/20/98 NEG IR 98-05 SELF MAIN 2A The material condition of safety-related equipment on both units was generally very good. However, T both units experienced problems with the material condition of plant equipment which complicated the routine operation of the plant. Examples included the failure of a Unit 1 condensate pump, a Unit 1 condenser vacuum system malfunction which resulted in lowering main condenser vacuum, a Unit 2 main condenser tube leak which required a plant shutdown to repair the tube, and a cracked weld on a Unit 2 emergency feedwater system drain line which required a plant cooldovm to repair.
6/20/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC MAIN 3A Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed well. Unit 1 instrumentation and control T technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude in verifying the proper location of a ,
potentiometer which was informally labeled.
5/9/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC MAIN 4A 3C 2A The licensee successfully completed a major modification to replace the Unit 1 reactor building purge T valves. Problems encountered during installation and postmodification testing were appropriately resolved. The inspectors noted good management and quality control oversight of the activity.
October 28,1998 5 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANTISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 5/7/98 VIO IR 98-01 NRC MAIN 3A 4C A violation of 10 CFR 50.65(1)(3) was identified for the licensee's failure to demonstrate the balance SL IV T of reliability and availability for a Unit 1 periodic assessment.
5/7/98 VIO IR 98-01 NRC MAIN 4C Four examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) were identified for the failure to estabbsh SLIV T adequate measures to demonstrate that the performance of structures, systems, and components were effectively controlled by the licensee's preventive maintenance efforts.
5/7/98 /IO IR 98-01 NRC MAIN 4C A violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to identify a functional failure SLIV T of a swing charger dunng a surveillance test, which in combination with two previously identified failures, allowed the licensee to exceed the 125 Vdc system's reliabihty performance critena without providing an evaluation for establishing necessary goals to monitor the effectiveness of maintenance.
5/7/98 VIO IP 98-01 NRC MAIN 4C A violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) was identified for the licensee's failure to establish goals SLIV T commensurate with safety for the main ssteam safety valves.
5/7/98 NCV IR 98-01 LIC MAIN 3A 3C Two systems (i.e., emergency lighting and communications) were examples of a noncited violation of T 10 CFR 50.65(b). This licensee-identified and corrected vioattion is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
5/7/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC MAIN 3A The licensee's overall approach to performing risk ranking of structures, systems, and components for T the Maintenance Rule program was adequate and their performance criteria for reliability and unavailability of structures, systems, and components were commensurate with assumptions in the probabilistic risk assessment. The significant involvement of probabilistic risk assessment personnel in expert panel deliberations was a strength 5/7/98 VIO IR 98-01 NRC MAIN 3A 3C Inconsistent management oversight and implementation of the Maintenance Rule program contributed SLIV T to a scoping violation (turbine building sump) of 10 CFR 50.65(b).
4/27/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC MAIN 4A 3A 3B Modifications to Unit I reactor building spray system motor-operated valves were completed by T knowledgeable technicians in accordance with approved procedures. Technicians demonstrated a 9ood questioning attitude when unexpected water was encountered during valve disassembly and when a procedural clarification was required for drilling a hole to accom.nodate a disc retaining dowel pin.
3/28/98 NEG IR 98-03 NRC MAIN 1C Although the licensee took appropriate precautions during construction of a large gantry crane in the T vicinity of the Unit 1 main transformers and Startup Transformer 2, the licensee had not conducted a qualitative or quantitative risk assessment of the activity using probabilistic safety assessment too8s and several weaknesses were identified with the plant impact eva!uation (Section M1.3).
3/28/98 NEG IR 98-03 NRC MAIN 3A 3C A lack of thorough preplanning for a modification to Unit 2 component cooling water containment T isolation valves resulted in seven revisions to the modification package after work had started (Section M1.2).
October 28,1998 6 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 3/11/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC MAIN 2B A noncited violation was identified for the failure to comply with Section XI ASME Code Examination T requirements to properly distribute examinations in the Unit 1 second 10-year inservice inspection interval.
2/14/98 VIO IR 98-02 LIC MAIN 3A 3B The failure of Unit 1 I&C technicians to remove three electrical jumpers fonowing a surveillance test of SLIV T a reactor protection system channel was identified as a violation. The surveillance procedure lacked sufficient detail and the technicians failed to resolve a question about the installation of the jumpers during the previous shift. The technicians lacked experience in performing the surveillance under shutdown conditions. This performance deficiency was similar to previous perfonnance stems which wero the subject of NRC enforcement.
1/23/98 WK 1R 97-08 LIC MAIN 3A 2B SC The 480 and 4160 voit breakers at Units 1 and 2 have been maintained in accordance with approved T procedures. An error in updating maintenance procedures resulted in a delay of the evaluation of the impact of new maintenance requirements for both types of breakers. Subsequent review of the new maintenance requirements indicated that some safety-related breakers at both units had not been overhauled. A program that addresses correction of identified deficieracies was under development (Section E2.1 and E2.2).
12/12/97 STR IR 97-07 NRC MAIN 3A The surveillance activities performed by the licensee were completed by knowledgeable workers T following approved procedures. Licensee personnel were knowledgeable of the components being tested and demonstrated good communications skills (Section M t.3).
12/12/97 STR IR 97-07 NRC MAIN 3A The licensee showed good radiological work practices during a containment entry. The job order work T instructions were followed (Section M1.2).
12/12/97 STR 1R 97-07 NRC MAIN 3A Maintenance performed by the licensee was done professionally and thoroughly. All work was T pertarmed according to procedures by knowledgeable personnel. Supervisory involvement was seen in all the maintenance activities observed (Section M1.1).
12/6/97 STR IR 97-18 NRC MAIN 2A The extemal material condition of the observed structures, systems, and components appeared to be T good (Section M2.4).
12'6/97 WK IR 97-18 NRC MAIN SB SC The licensee assessments were effective in identifying good recommendations for maintenance; T however, the licensee did not aggressively followup on some recent assessment findings (Section M7.1).
12/6/97 STR IR 97-18 NP.C MAIN 2B Job crders were property used for the repair and replacement of plant equipment (Section M2.2).
T 12/6/97 WK IR 97-18 NRC MAIN 3C 5A The established process for manisgement field observations of maintenance activities was not T aggressively implemented (Section M7.2).
October 28,1998 7 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE l
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE .
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 11/6/97 STR 1R 97-06 NRC MAIN 3A The surveillance activities performed by the licensee were done by knowledgeable workers following T approved procedures. Licensee personnel were knowledgeable of the components being tested and demonstrated good communications (Section M1.3).
11/6/97 STR 1R 97-06 NRC MAIN 3A Unit 2 maintenance technicians demonstrated good work practices and knowiedge when repairing T exhaust manifold leaks and replacing fuel injectors on the emergency diesel generator (EDG). Their questioning attitude and experience properly identified and corrected inaccuracies in the job order (JO) which were introduced during the planning phase (Section M1.2).
11/6/97 STR 1R 97-06 NRC MAIN 3A Maintenance performed on three seperate activities was completed in a professional and thorough T manner. All work was performed according to procedures by knowledgeable personnel. Appropriate supervisory involvement was seen in all the maintenance activities observed (Section M t.1).
8/24/98 POS lR 98-07 LIC ENG 4B SA Chemistry technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude when they identified water discharging from the shared Unit 1. Unit 2, emergency cooling pond spillway when the water level was below the top of the dam. The licensee promptly investigated the condition and found it to be normal for the water level, which was not lowered fully below the spi!!way, at the time of discovery.
8/1/98 VIO IR 98-06 NRC ENG 2A 2B 4B The failure to incorporate appropriate requirements and acceptance limits as specified by the SLIV applicable design documents to demonstrate that the Diesel Fire Pump Engine P-6B would perform satisfactonly in service was identified as an apparent violation of TS 6.8.1.f.
8/1/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC ENG 4B Engineering personnel demonstrated a lack of understanding of the Diesel Fire Pump P-6B system and the operating limits associated with this engine. The engineering support for this system was determined to be weak.
8/1/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC ENG 48 Engineering personnel demonstrated good engineering foresight and communicated well with craft personnel in developing two options for the repair of an unisolable leak on an emergency feedwater system drain line weld.
5/9/98 NEG IR 98-04 NRC ENG 2A 2B Unit 1 experienced a 36 percent failure rate when 53 of 149 safety-related 120 Vac molded case circuit breakers failed overcurrent trip testing. Similar testing of 10 480 Vac safety-related molded case circuit breakers yielded no failures. ADD TO IR 97-201 URI PIM,97-201-14.
5/9/98 NEG IR 98-04 NRC ENG 4A 4B The licensee resolved an NRC identified discrepancy with a conversion factor used to correlate the volume of water in the Unit 1 reactor building sump with indicated sump level. A procedure was revised to correct the nonconservative value in the procedure.
5/9/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC ENG 4A Modifications to Unit 1 decay heat removal system isolation valves to prevent pressure locking between them were installed as designed.
October 28,1998 8 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES E!9/98 POS 1R 98-04 NRC ENG 2A An inspection of Unit 1 high pressure injection (HPI) nozzles revealed that the nozzles were intact and free from breakage or cracking. Inspection results were property recorded and dispositioned.
5/9/98 POS IR 98-04 SELF ENG 2A 58 The licensee conducted a comprehensive review of the Unit 1 stuck control rod issue and developed a good action plan to identify the cause of the sticking. The licensee concluded that the previous problems associated with control rod sticking were the result of binding in the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs). Although inspection of the CROM intemals for the two stuck rods did not reveal a conclusive root cause, the licensee determined that the probable cause was the presence of very small debris in the CRDM which migrated there from the RCS.
5/7/98 POS IR 98-01 NRC ENG 3B System engineering superviosrs manifested a strong understanding of the administrataive controls related to the implementation of the Maintenance Rule. System engineers demonstatated a thorough understanding of the Maintenance Rule and their associataed responsibilities.
4/24/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC ENG 2B 4A The licensee effectively demonstrated that the Unit 1 penetration room ventilation system remained operable with damper seats deflated and supported their justification for not replacing the seals every 5 years.
3/28/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC ENG 4A 4B Engineering evaluations and design changes were comprehensive and supported plant operations and modification and maintenance activities. One exception was noted with the limited change package associated with modifications to component cooling water containment isolation valves (Sections 01.3,01.5, M1.2, M1.4, and E.1).
3/11/98 VIO 1R 98-12 NRC ENG 4C A violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 was identified per'aining to a change made SLIV to the calibration requirements of Engineering Standard HES-72, *ANO Eddy Current Data Acquisition," Revision 0, without use of either a standard change notice or revision of the engineering standard.
3/11/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4C A violation of Criterion IX of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 was identified pertaining to the failure to SLIV assure use of a phase rotation setting, for analysis of plus point probe eddy current data, that was ,
consistent with the setting that was used in the Appendix H (of the Electric Power Research Institute
'PWR Steam Generator Examinatior. Guidelines") qualification of the procedure.
2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 NRC ENG 3B 4A The failure to property verify the piping configuration design inputs to a design calculation was SLIV identified as the first example of violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion ill 2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 LIC ENG 3A 4A The failure to property check the adequacy of an engineering report that failed to account for SLIV instrument error in a calculation of vortexing in the borated water storage tank was identified as an example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111.
2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 NRC ENG 4A 4C The failure to procedura!!y incorporate a vendor recommended feedwater flow limit of
- mo gpm to a SLIV single steam generator into plant operating procedures was identified as a violation of V . FR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
October 28,1998 9 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANTISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE- SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 LIC ENG 48 4C Three apparent violatons were identified associated with activities involving the removal of the SLIV borated water starage tank vacuum relief valve for maintenance and testing on December 4,1996.
EA 97- The apparent violations involved the failure to perform proper safety evaluations as described in 10 574 CFR 50.59, the failure to perform the vacuum relief va;ve testing under plant conditions as prescribed in the test procedure in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Cnterion V, and the failure to utilize the correct design control processee (temporary alterations) for the temporary cover configurations placed over the valve flange in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B Cnterion
!!!. UPDATE: NRC letter dtd 3/18/98 issued two severity level IV violations.
2/6/98 VIO IR 97-21 NRC ENG 3B 4A The failure to properly verify the design adequacy in four design calculatbns was identified as SLIV additional examples of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion !!L 2/6/93 VIO IR 97-21 NRC ENG 4C The failure to prcvide measures to ensure the correct translation of seismic design requirements to SLIV instrument tubing installations and the maintenance of this configuration during plant operations in Unit 1 was identified as an example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion !!!.
2/6/98 WK IR 97-21 NRC ENG 5B The lack of a review by the licensee of a sample of existing design calculations to determine if the types of past problems identified by the licensee existed within other calculations was identified as a l weakness.
1/23/98 NCV IR 97-08 NRC ENG 4C 10 CFR 70.24 violation on criticality monitors. Discretion using section Vil B.6 of the enforcement EA 98- policy.
l 026 10/23/98 POS 1R 98-19 NRC PS 3A Housekeeping throughout the radiological controlled area was good.
10/23/98 STR 1R 98-19 NRC PS 3A 3C implementation of the external and intemal exposure control programs was good. Workers were ,
knowledgeable of work area radiological conditions and controls. Radiological controlled areas were l posted and controlled properly. Radiation survey information was current and accurate. A good l calibration and response test program was maintained for radiation survey instruments and the whole-body counters. Overall, an effective and aggressive ALARA program was implemented. The 1997 3-year average dose of 118 person-rem was below the PWR national average of 144 person-rem. The projected 1998 3-year average dose of 82 person-rem indicates an improving trend. An l effective quality assurance audit program was maintained providing management a good assessment of the health physics program. Audit findings were included in the corrective action program. Timely corrective actions were implemented for audit findings.
10/23/98 NEG IR 98-19 NRC PS 3A 58 Condition Report CR-ANO-1-1998-0475 pertaining to health physics personnel failing to survey exhibited weak corrective actions and lacked documented evidence to support that all correct %
actions were performed. No violation was issued for the failure to survey because open corrective actions from a previous NRC violation should reasonably prevent a recurrence.
October 28,1998 10 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 10/22/98 POS IR98-20 NRC PS 1C The overall performance of two shift crews during walkthroughs using the training simulator was very good. Teamwork, supervisory oversight, and effective use of dose assessment results during the scenarios were very good. Assessment of plant conditions, classification of emergencies, notifications of offsite agencies, protection of plant personnel, dose assessment and protective action recommendations were performed property and in a timely manner. The critique of crew performance was thorough and provided good feedback for areas of improvement.
10/22/98 STR 1R98-20 NRC PS 1C The emergency preparedness program was properly implemented. The emergency plan and procedures were property maintained. The annual review of emergency action levels was adequately documented. Emergency response facihties were maintained in a state of operational readiness.
Equipment, supplies, and procedures were maintained and available for use. The emergency planning staff was property trained and maintained good awareness of industry events. The emergency response organization was trained in accordance with the licensee's procedures. Audits and assessments of the emergency preparedness program provided good insight into program performance. An effective program was used for tracking intemal task assignments. Potential areas for improvement identified by the licensee were aggressively pursued. Corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner. An effective training tracking program was in place.
9/4/98 POS IR 98-16 NRC PS 1C Performance in the physical security area was very good. An excellent security system testing and maintenance program was conducted and properly documented. A very good protected area barrier and detection system were maintained. Compensatory measures were effectively implemented. A very good program for reporting security events was in place. A very good security training program had been implemented.
9/4/98 NEG IR 98-16 LIC PS 48 During weekly testing, the security diesel generator overheated and automatically shut down.
Temporary measures to improve air flow inside the diesel generator building improved operations.
Permanent measures to improve building air flow are in progress.
9/4/98 NEG IR 98-16 LIC PS 4B During weekly testing, the security diesel generator overheated and automatically shut down.
Temporary measures to improve air flow inside the diesel generator building improved operations.
Permanent measures to improve building air flow are in progress.
9/4/98 POS IR 98-16 NRC PS 1C Performance in the physical security area was very good. An excellent security system testing and maintenance program was conducted and property documented. A very good protected area barrier and detection system were maintained. Compensatory meassres were effectively implemented. A very good program for reporting security events was in place. A very good security training program had been implemented.
October 28,1998 11 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANTISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 8/26/98 NEG IR 98-07 NRC PS SC 3A Two deficient air sampling charcoal cartridge holders were left in service when Units 1 and 2 radiation protection technicians failed to review radiation work permits to identify deficient inservice iodine sample holders. A review of the operating and radiological conditions relevant to the inservice sample holder indicated that an unmonitored release to the work space had not occurred.
8/21/98 WK 1R 98-15 NRC PS 3A 18 3B An exercise weakness was identified in the OSC because radiological protection practices were not properly demonstrated: (1) some briefings did not include expected radiological conditions, (2) forms functioning as radiation work permits were not completed (3) one team did not stay together, (4) representative surveys in the work areas were not always performed, and (5) proper contamination controls, such as, checking protective clothing and handling contaminated objects without protecton, were not always demonstrated.
8/21/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS SA The management critique was superficial and differed from the NRC inspection team's findings in the areas of CR communications (the licensee identified this area as a strength), OSC radiation protection practices, and exercise conduct and control Peer evaluators and offsite agency participation in the management critique made a positive contribution to an otherwise less than average critique process.
8/21/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 3A 38 The exercise scenario was challenging from an operations standpoint but inplant radiological conditions did not challenge radiation protection personnel Some aspects of exercise conduct and control, such as, the use of undesignated site personnel as controllers / participants, exercise preparation in the CR simulator, inconsistent data, and unrealistic /over-simulation, detracted from the training value of the exercise.
8/21/98 POS IR98-15 NRC PS 1C 3A 3B Overall, performance was genera!!y good. The control room (CR), technical support center (TSC),
operational support center (OSC), and emergency operations facility (EOF) successfully implemented most essential emergency plan functions including classification, notification, and protective action recommendations.
8/21/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 2A 28 Habitability in the TSC was properly monitored and maintained, however, air sampling results using high-volume air samplers were potentially non-conservative due to air sampler cartridge sealing problems. Prompt corrective actions were taken to address the generic air sampler problem.
8/21/98 WK IR 98-15 NRC PS 3A 3C IB An exercise weakness was identified in the TSC for failure to complete initial accountability within 30 minutes of the site area emergency declaration.
6/20/98 STR IR 98-05 NRC PS 3A Consistent with observations made in NRC Inspection Reports 97-07, 98-02,98-13,98-14, and 98-03, access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were property posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices. Personnel and package access, personnel searches, and applications of temporary lighting in areas where equipment, components, and truck trailers were stored were property implemented.
5/1/98 NEG IR 98-14 NRC PS The annual audit of the security program was adequate, but would have been considered more effective had it been more per1ormance based.
October 28,1998 12 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 5/1/98 Neg IR 98-14 NRC PS SA The annual audit of the security program was adequate, but would have been considered more effective had it been more performance based.
5/1/98 STR 1R 98-14 NRC PS 2A Performance in the physical security area remained very good with no overall trend. Alarm stations were redundant and well protected. Very good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained. A very good program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained.
Assessment aids provided a high quality and complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
Changes to security programs and plans were reoorted within the required time frame. A very good secunty event reporting program was in place. Senior management support for the security organization was very good.
5/1/98 STR 1R 98-14 NRC PS Background investigation screening files were complete and thorough. A very good program had been established for denying, revoking, and appealing unescorted access authorization.
5/1/98 VIO IR 98-14 NRC PS 1A 4A A violation of the security plan was identified involving the licensee's failure to provide an audible SLIV feature for one of the security alarm systems. Only a visual alarm signal had been provided for this system.
5/1/98 STR 1R 98-14 NRC PS 1C Background investigation screening files were complete and thorough. A very good program had been established for denying, revoking, and appealing unescorted access authorization.
5/1/98 VIO IR 98-14 NRC PS A violation of the security plan was identified involving the licensee's failure to provide an audible SLIV feature for one of the security alarm systems. Only a visual alarm signal had been provided for this system.
5/1/98 STR IR 98-14 NRC PS Performance in the physical security area remained very good with no overall trend. Alarm stations ,
were redundant and well protected. Very good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained. A very good program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained.
Assessment aids provided a high quality and complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
Changes to security programs and plans were reported within the required time framo. A very good security event reporting program was in place. Senior management support for the security organization was very good.
4/26/98 POS 1R 98-04 SELF PS 1A 3A Unit 1 health physics technicians took appropriate actions in response to an individual with facial and intemal contamination.
4/14/98 VIO IR 98-13 NRC PS 1A A violation was identified for the failure to perform a radiological survey prior to workers insta!!ing SLIV rigging on the polar crane resulting in four personnel contamination events. The failure to survey was a result of mis-communications between the craft workers and health physics staff involving the location of the actual work area.
October 28,1998 13 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 4/14/98 STR 1R 98-13 NRC PS 1C Overall, effective exposure control programs were in place. High and locked high radiation areas were properly controlled and posted. F,adiological surveys were documented in a clear consistent manner.
Effective controls were in place to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination. Continuous air monitors and lapel samplers were used to property monitor worker radiological airbome conditions.
High efficiency particulate air filter ventilation units were appropriately used to control airbome concentrations. The whole body counter calibration program was appropriately implemented 4/14/98 STR 1R 98-13 NRC PS 1C An effective ALARA program was implemented. Outage exposure goals were challenging. The person-rem exposure for both enits during 1997 was 117. This was the lowest person-rem exposure in the operational history of the Arkansas Nuclear One.
4/14/98 VIO IR 98-13 NRC PS 1C A violation, with two examples, was identified involving the failure to maintain procedures consistent SLIV with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. One example was a radiological survey procedure in which the word "should" was used in lieu of "shali" as required by 10 CFR 20.1501(a). The second example involved a bioassay procedure which entailed a method for calculating committed effective dose equivalent from the inhalation of radioactive material using uptake values in lieu of intake values as required by 10 CFR 20.1204(h)(1) when using the conversion factor that one ALI is equivalent to 5 rems.
4/14/98 VIO 1R 98-13 NRC PS 1A 3A A violation, with four examples, was identified for the failure to determine the radiological conditions in SLIV work areas before issuing radiation work permits. This violation was similar to a violation identified in NRC inspection Report 97-15. Corrective actions were not effective to correct the previous violation.
4/7/98 POS IR 98-04 SELF PS 1C SB The licensee conducted appropriate inspections in response to a potential tampering event associated with foreign material found in bearings on the Unit 1 main turbine generator.
3/28/98 ViO IR 98-03 NRC PS 3A Radiation protection technicians failed to update Unit 2 radiological information postings to reflect the SLIV results of radiation surveys conducted in the auxiliary building during periods of changing radiological conditions. This failure to follow proceduras was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation of Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (Section R1.2).
12/17/97 WK IR97-20 NRC PS 1C A process had not been established for excluding inaccurate meteorological monitoring data from the performance reports.
12/17/97 STR 1R97-20 NRC PS 3B Personnel responsible for implementing the radiological environmental monitoring program were properly trained and qualified. A proper staff was maintained for implementing the radiologk.at environmental monitoring program. Management provided excellent support for the program.
12/17/97 STR IR97-20 NRC PS 1C A good radiological environmental monitoring program was implemented. Environmental monitoring stations were properly maintained with operable and calibrated equipment.
12/17/97 STR 1R97-20 NRC PS 1C A good meteorological monitoring program was implemented. The meteorological tower was maintained in excellent condition.
October 28,1998 14 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
e .
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOUaCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 12/12/97 WK IR 97 37 NRC PS 8 When the Unit 2 Phase C main transformer deluge manual pull station was activated, the licensee responded to the potential tampering in accordance with sitt security procedures. Initial achvities did not consider the possibility that other safety-related systems could have also been affected. When questioned about the potential for tampering, the licensee initiated their tampering precedures, implemented interim guidance, and werified the condition of safety-related equipment. The licensee also upgraded their procedures for potential tampering events (Section F1.1).
12/6/97 WK IR 97-18 NR0 PS 2A While housekeeping in both units was generally good, housekeeping in the Unit 2 control element drive mechanism control system room was poor (Section M2.4).
11/E8/97 STR 1R 97-22 NRC PS 2A A very good secunty backup power supply system was in place.
11/28/97 STR IR 97-22 NRC PS 2A Very good protected area barriers and detection systems were maintained.
11/28S 7 POS IR 97-19 NRC PS 1C Exposure controls were imptomented appropriately. High radiation areas were controlled properly.
Radiological area posting was correct. Dosimetry was properly esed. Dosimetry recordc. were maintained as required. Good respiratory protection and whole-cody counting programs were implemented.
11/28/97 POS IR 97-19 NRC PS 1C The ALARA program produced good results. The 3-year avurage exposure per unit was below th )
national average for pressurized water reactors. For 1994-1997, the site 3-year average person-rem totals declined significantly. ALARA improvement ideas and lessons leamed were captured and utilized well 11/28/97 STR 1R 97-22 NRC PS 38 An excellent security training program had been implemented.
11/28/97 POS IR 97-19 NRC PS 3B Good training programs were implemented for radiation protection technicians and professiona's. The topics addressed in radiation protection training were appropriate. Professionals were provided sufficient opportunities to maintain a satisfactory level of expertise. The radiation protection organization was adequately qualified.
11/28/97 POS IR 97-19 NRC PS 3C Licensee oversight of radiation protection activities was good. Corporate assessment, and quality assurance surveillances were frequent and diverse enough to provide management with accurate information on the effectiveness of the radiation prctection program. The licensee effectively implernented corrective actions in a timely manner for identified conditions.
11/28/97 VIO IR 97-19 NRC PS 1C A violatic, was identified, because the licensee failed to secure radioactive material from SLIV unauthorized remova; or access and failed to store a radioactive source in accordance with procedural requirements.
11/28/97 WK IR 97-19 NRC PS 1C There were vulnerabilities in the licensee's program for conditionally releasing items from the radiologica: controlled area.
October 28,1998 15 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
-..... ._.m._ _ _ . . . . _ . . m .. . . .- .. -.. . ... . _. . ._ _.
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ,
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODES 11/6/97 STR IR 97-06 NRC ' PS - 3A - During the decontamination of Unit 2 spent resin storage tanks, health physics technicians demonstrated proper concern for as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) levels and safety. ,
Radiation work permits (RWP) and JOs were property followed (Section R1.1).
5 t
i f
October 28,1998 10 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
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e ENCLOSURE 2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS Actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the informatiort was issued (such as the LER date), or, for inspection reports, the last date of the inspection period.
Type The categorization of the issue - see the Type item Code table.
SFA SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINT for Maintenanc.a; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.'
Szurces The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.
ID Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).
fisue Mscription Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.
Codes Template Codes - see table, TEMPLATE CODES TYPE ITEM CODES 1 Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; 8 - Operations During EA Enforcement Action Letter with Civil Penalty Transients; and C - Programs and Processes ED Enforcement Discretion - No Civil Penalty 2 Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance p , ,
Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance Abilities I Training; C - Work Environment eel
- Escalated Enforcement item - Waiting Final NRC 4 Engineering / Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Action Processes VIO Violation Level I,11, Ill, or IV 5 Problem identification and Resolution: A -Identification; B - Analysis; and C - r NCV Non-Cited Violation Resolution NOTES-*
DEV Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC ,
Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for Pssitive Individual Good inspection Finding escalated enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy),
l Negative Individual Poor Inspection Finding NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC on the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, URI" Unresolved item from inspection Report the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the Licensing Issue from NRR 8PParent violation or (2) request a predecisionai enforcement conference.
Licensing MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness F!nd;ng URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to (EP), determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a i Declared Emergency, Nonconformance issue, etc. nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final I l conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entnes may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
4
ENCLOSURE 3 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE INSPECTION PLAN IP - Irspection Procedure Ti - Temporary Instruction Core inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
INSPECTION TITLE / NUMBER OF DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION / COMMENTS PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS IP 37001, Engineering Inspection 2 3/29-4/3/99 Core inspection 64704 IP 71001 Requalification Inspection 3 7/19-24/99 Core Inspection IP 83750 Occupational Radiation 1 1/11-15/99 Core Inspection Exposure IP 84750 Radioactive Waste Treatment. 2 4/26-30/99 Core Inspection and Effluent and Environmental -
Monitoring IP 81700 Physical Security Program 1 4/26-30/99 Core inspection IP 86750 Transportation 1 6/7-11/99 Core inspection IP 93809 Engineering 5 8/2-6/99 Core Inspection 8/16-20/99 8/30 - 9/3/99
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