ML20155C291
| ML20155C291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1988 |
| From: | Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Congel F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155C285 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8810070354 | |
| Download: ML20155C291 (1) | |
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- j Federal Emergency Management Agency l l Washington, D.C. 20472 ;
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- MEMORANDUM FOR
- Frank J. Congol i
' Director l l Division of Radiation Protection and I
Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reacter Regulati n .
V. S. Nucle egulatory Comni on i FROM: Richard . Krimn v Assistant Associate Director l Office of Natural and Technological Hazards l
SUBJECT:
Final Exercise Report of the March 23, 1988 Exercise of ,
t Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for .
Arkansas Nuclear One l Attached is a copy of the final exercise report of the March 23, 1988 t I exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans site- !
specific to Arkansas Nuclear One. Thir, was a full-participation exercise ,
with the State of Arkansas and Pope, Logan, Johnson, Yell and Conway :
l Counties. This final exercise report was prepared by the Region VI '
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office staff.of the Federal Emergency Managenent Agency.
There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise; nor were there any areas requiring corrective action. Based on the results of this exercise, :
the offsite radiological energency plans and preparedness remain adequate to !
provide reasonable assurance that appropriate me0sures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the ever;t of an accident j at Arkansas Nuclear One, and the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on January 27, ,
1982, remains in effect.
If you should have any questions, please contact me at 646-2971.
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FINAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT Nuclear Power Plant Arkansas Nuclear One
'- Owner: Arkansas Power and Light Location of Plant State of Arkansas I
Russellville, Arkansas
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- Date of Report: August 9,1988
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' Date of Exercise March 23,1W8
Participants:
State of Arkansas f- Pope County Logan Cour.t;
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Johnson County t Yell County Conway County St. Mary's Hospital Pope County Ambulance Service Paris Care Center Clarksville Care Center Danville Care Center t,,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region VI I 800 N. Loop 288 Denton. Texas 78201 I
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CONTENTS A B B R E VI ATIO N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v INT R O D U CTIO N A N D A UTHO RIT Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vil 1 E X E R C IS E B A C K G R O U N D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Ex e rc ise Su m m ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2 F ede ral E v al ua t ors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 1. 3 Ex ere lse Obj ec t ives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3.1 Arkansas Power and Light Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3.2 St a te/ County Objec tives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4 Exercise Scenario Narrative Sum mary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.4.1 Exerc ise T! m eline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 1. 5 Ev alua t ion C ri t e ri a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2 E X E R C ISE EVA L U ATIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.1 A rk ansas S t a t e Ope ra t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.1.1 S t a t e EOC - C on w ay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.1.2 Technical Operations Control Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.1.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1.4 Jo in t M edia C e n t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5
2.2 County Government and Local Response Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.2.1 P ope C o un ty E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 l'
2.2.2 Jo hnso n C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.2.2.1 Jo hnson County EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.2.2.2 Clarksville Reception / Care Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.2.3 Logan C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.2.3.1 Log a n C o u n t y E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.2.3.2 Paris Reception / Care Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2.2.4 Y e ll C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.2.4.1 Y t li C o u n t y E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.2.4.2 Danville Reception / Care Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2.2.5 Co nw ay Coun ty EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
- 2. 3 U t ili t y Su ppo r t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.3.1 Medical Support - St. Mary's Hospital / Pope County A m bula nc e Se rv ic e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 3 TRACK!NG SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ............. 49 4 EV A LU ATIO N O F OBJ E CTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 a
4.1 Summary of FEM A Objectives Remaining to be Met . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.2 FEMA Objec tives Tracking - Arkansas Nuclear One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 iii w -
TABLES 1 Defielencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective Actions for the March 23,1988 Arkansas Nuclear One Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 2 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to Be Met - Arkansas Nuclear One................................................................... 52 3 FEMA Exercise Objectives Tracking Chart - Arkansas Nuclear One . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 l
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A88REV!ATIONS '
ANL Argonne National Laboratory ANO Arkansas Nuclear One AP&L Arkansas Power and Light ARDON Arkansas Department of Health ASEOC Arkansas State Emergency Operation Center P
DEC Duty Emergency Coordinator DOE Department of Energy
' Department of Trt.naportat!:n DOT
.ECC Emergssey Comr.anleations Center a
EMS Emergency Medical Servloe
- ENS Early Notifloation System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Faellity i EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Protection Zone ESO Emergency Servlees Offleer FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency CERMS Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitoring System HHS Health and Human Servlees
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HPSI High Pressure Safety Injection JIC Joint Information Center l
K! Potassium tod:de I
i NERN Nuclear Emergency Radio Network NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OES Office of Emergency Services PAA Protective Action Advisory
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PAG Protective Action Guide ;
PAS 8 Post Aceldent Sampling System PIT Pub!!c Information Team RCS Reactor Coolant System ;
REX-87 Radlolegical Emergency Response Exercise-1987 '
RATL Radiological Response Team Leader ;
SAE Site Area Emerfency '
SDO Staff Duty Officer ,
t SPDS Safety Parameter Display System TLD Thermoluminescent Doelmeter TOCC Technical Operations Control Center TOCD Technical Operations Control Director i
USDA United States Department of Agriculture USFDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration l
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INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility for all off-site nuclear power facility planning and response.
FEMA's immedle.te basic responsibilities in Flxed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Response Planniar includes e Taking the lead in r,lf-sito emergency response planning and in the review and evalua:!on of State and local government energvn9y plans ensurina that the plans meet the Federal er!teria set forth in NUREO-06l4 .)EMA REP-1, Rnv.1 (November 1980).
i e Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can be implemented on the basis of obervation and evar ation of an exercise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdictions.
- Coordinatir.;r the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved D c'.tl agencies. Representatives of these agencies listed slow serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which !s chaired by FEMA.
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- U.S. En'fironmentti Protection Agency (EPA)
- U.S. Departmea.t of Energy (DOE) !
- U.S. Departe " c' Health and th. nan Service s, {DHHS)
- U.S. Depatta:eu of Transporta':en (DOT)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- U.S. Department of the Intcctor i
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1 1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND The March 23, 1988 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) was the third exercise in the second six-year cycle of testing and demonstration of the 39 FEMA RVI REP Exercise Objectives. This exercise involved full participation by the State and 11 five of the local jurisdictions included in the ANO emergency response planning area.
Following the exercise, on March 24, 1988, the Federal evaluators met at the exercise. At 8:00 a.m. the 1:00 p.m., to conduct a preliminary Federal evaluators met with evaluation State andoflocal the exerc results of, ise participants to
, discuss their preliminary findings. At 3:30 p.m., a public critique of the exercise was held in the AP&L training center auditorium.
Section 2 of tl!s report provides narratives of exercise evaluator observations and descriptions of Defielencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for Impmvemen+ for each 'of the jurisdictions and field activities participating in the exercise.
Section 3 of this report provides a summary listing of exercise Deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and Areas Requiring Corrective Action, including those needing priority attention. The summary is in tabular format which provides space for
, State and local jurisdiction responses and schedules for corrective actions.
Sect!on 4 of this report compiles, in tabular format, all FEMA Objectives Met or Yet to bo Achieved, developed from NUREG 0654, as well as a summary sheet of those I FEMA Objectives which have not been satisfactorily met or tested to date.
The findings presented in this report were reviewed by the RAC Chairman of FEMA Region VI. FEMA suggests that State and local jurisdictinns take corrective actions in response to each of the problems indicated in the report, and that the State I submit a schedule for addressing those problems. The Regional Director of FEMA is
'!' responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs l
I and Support, Washington, D.C., that Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and
, local plans, as appropriate, i ,
l The following provides a t,rief overview of the exercise performances of the l State of Arkansas and County Governments. More detailed explanatory discussions of
'L performancis d Individual agencies are provided under the appropriate location in Section 2 of this report.
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1.1 EXERCISE
SUMMARY
State of Arkansas Operations _ _ _
State operations for the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) exercise were directed by the Arkansas Department of Health's Technical Operations Control Director (TOCD) located in the Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC) in Russellville, Arkansas.
The State EOC was operational and several State agency representatives participated in the exercise. Other State agency representatives were put on a stand-by statur, ready to respond if required. A representative of the Arkansas S, tate Police was als.) located at the TOCC.
All State agencies participating in the exercise demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for responding to a nuclear emergency. The exercise evaluators noted tiie Areas Requiring Corrective Action and the Areas Recommended for Improvement detailed in Section 2 of this report. The State TOCC and the State EOC ara more than adequate facilities to support required State operations either in exercises or actual radiological emergencies.
Individual narratives, in Section 2 of this report, provide detailed explanations of State functions which were demonstrated during this exercise.
Local Government Operations Five counties are part of the planning area for ANO. Four of these are located within the 10-mile plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone. Each county has its own off-site radiological emergency response role and responsibility. All five counties participated fully and collectively in the 1988 exercise, in accordance with the exercise objectives developed during pre-exercise planning.
Performance by all counties in this exercise wr rated as adequate. However, several Areas Recom*nended for improvement were noteri.
Individual .w :stives in Section 2 of this report provide detailed descriptions of the performan. - each of the local response organizations that participated in this exercise.
1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Eighteen Federal evaluators participated Iri evaluating the Maich 23, 1988 exercise. These individuals, their agencies and their evaluation assignments are listed below.
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Evaluator Agency Evaluation Location Gary Jones FEMA Overall Coordination Travis Ratcliff FEMA State EOC (Conway)
Hank May EPA AR DOH TOCC (Russellville)
Dan Santini ANL AR DOH TOCC (Russellville)
Gary Sanborn NRC Joint Media Center (ANO Plant Site)
Dana Cessna FEMA Joint Media Center (ANO Plant Site)
John Slaten DOE Field Mon. Team #1 Harry Harrison FEMA Field Mon. Team #2 Leon Zellner FDA Field Mon. Team #3 Gary Kaszynski ANL Pope County EOC (Russellville),
Tom Carroll ANL St Mary's Hospital Pope County Ambulance Service s
Gordon Veerman ANL St. Mary's Hospital i Pope County Ambulance Service Al Lookabaugh ANL Johnson County EOC (Clarksville)
Clarksville Reception / Care Center Al Miller DOT Johnson County EOC (Clarksville) i
-( Lee Peyton FFMA Logan County EOC (Paris)
Ed Robinson ANL Logan County EOC (Paris) i Paris Reception / Care Center "i Carl McCoy FEMA Yell County EOC (Dardanelle)
L Mike Brooks FEMA Yell County EOC (Dardanelle)
Danville Reception / Care Center Gene Nunn FEMA Conway County EOC (Morrillton) i
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1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1.3.1 Ariranama Power & Light (AP&L) Objectives
- 1. Begin the exercise outside of normal working hours (between midnight and 6:00 a.m.)
- 2. Classifying and upgrading the emergency through the General Emergency classification.
- 3. Notification and deployment of the initial Response Staff (IRS).
Initial Response Organization (IRO), and the Corporate Emergency Response Staff as dictated by the scenarlo.
- 4. Make r.otifications to the Arkansas DepaAment of Health within 15 minutes of the declaration of an Emergency Class.
- 5. Make emergency class notifications to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (may be simulated if the NRC chooses not to participate in the exercise). ,
- 6. Preparation of an initial news release from the Corporate office.
- 7. Activation of the Technical Support Center within one hour following the declaration of an Alert.
- 8. Activation of the Operational Support Center following the declaration of an Alert.
- 9. Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility within one hour following the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
- 10. Activation of the Joint Media Center at the EOF.
j 11. Activation of the Little Rock Support Center.
- 12. Demonstrate the use of communications equipment during transfer of the Corporate Emergency Response Staff from Little Rock to ANO.
- 13. Establishment of communications between the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Little Rock Support Center, NRC-(simulated), and State and local emergency response officials.
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- 14. Demonstrate coordination between the Control Room, Technical
- Support Center, Operational Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility and Little Rock Support Center throughout the exercise.
- 15. Transfer cemmand and control responsibilities (and maintain continuity) from the Initial Response Staff to the Initial Response Organization to the fully augmented Emergency Respc.ue Organization.
1G. Demonstrate coordination with State officials.
- 17. Demonstrate coordination between the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility and the Arkansas Department of Health on Protective Action Recommendations.
- 18. Production and delivery of information in joint AP&L and State
- and Federal (if in attendance) news conference from the EOF Joint Media Center.
- 19. Activation of the Emergency Medical Team.
- 20. Emergency Medical Team response to a simulated injured and radioactively contaminated individual (s) at St Mary's Hospital.
- 21. Transportation of a simulated injured and radioactively con-taminated individual (s) to St Mary's Hospital.
- 22. Coordination between AP&L and St Mary's Hospital staff for the ha.dling or a :Imulated injured and radloactively contaminated Individual (s).
- 23. Radiation monitoring of plant areas by the onsite section of the
'- Emergency Radiation Team.
i 24. Demonstrate offsite radiological field monitoring by the offsite
' section of the Emergency Radiation Team.
I, 25. Demonstrate coordination of offsite radiological field monitoring
' with State Personnel, i 26. Demonstrate radiation / contamination monitoring of the EOF.
- 27. Demonstrate coordination between field monitoring teams and dose assessment Personnel.
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- 28. Demonstrate dose assessment capabilities as dictated by the scenarlo. .
- 29. Demonstrate the capability of the Post Accident Sampling System to analyze the primary system (RCS).
- 30. Utilize the Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitoring System and the Safety Parameter Display System. ,
- 31. Evacuate the Plant and/or Exclus!on Area and demonstrate initial f and continued onsite personnel accountability following evacuation. (Personnel will not be evacuated to offs'.e Care Centers).
- 32. Demonstrate the ability to control access to the Exclusion Area and the establishment of road blocks.
- 33. Demonstrate security procedures for the Emergency Operations Facility.
- 34. Formation of Repair and Damage Control Teams and demonstrate initial recovery and reentry actions. ,
- 35. Coordination with the Arkansas Department of Health to
. downgrade and terminate the emergency.
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. 1 1.3.2 State / County Objectives Objective - Off-Site Jurisdiction (s) 1.* Ability to mobilize staff and STATE - TOCC and EOC: CONWAY, activate facilities promptly. JOHNSON, LOGAN, POPE, and YELL COUNTIES 3.* Ability to make decisions and STATE - TOCC and EOC: CONWAY, coordinate emergency activities. JOHNSON, LOGAN, POPE, and YELL COUNTIES 4.* Adequacy of facilities and displays STATE - TOCC and EOC: CONWAY,
' to support emergency operations. JOHNSON, LOGAN, POPE, and YELL COUNTIES 5.* Ability to communicate with all STATE - TOCC and EOC: CONWAY, appropriate locations, organiza- JOHNSON, LOGAN, POPE, and YELL tions, and field personnel. COUNTIES 6.* Ability to mobilize and deploy fleid STATE - TOCC monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
7.* Appropriate equipment and pro- STATE - TOCC cedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
8.* Appropriate equipment and pro- STATE - TOCC cedures for measurement of air-I borne radtplodine co.'centrations as
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low as E' uCl/cc in the presence of noble gases.
! 9.* Appropriate equipment and pro- STATE - TOCC cedures for collection, transport,
', analysis, of samples of soll,
' vegetation, snow, water and milk.
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- 0bjectiv.es for which capability is required to be demonstrated during each full-participation exercise.
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. o e e Objective Off-Site Jurisdiction (s) 10.* Ability to project dosage to the . STATE .TOCC public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAGs, available shelter, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.
13.* Ability to alert the public within STATE - TOCC the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial Instructional message within 15 minutes.
15.* Organizational ability and ra- STATE - TOCC: LOGAN COUNTY sources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
- 16. Organizational ability and re- STATE - EOC: LOG AN and YELL sources necessary to deal with COUNTIES impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
- 17. Organizational ability and STATE - EOC: LOGAN COUNTY resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
- 18. Organizational ability and re- LOGAN and YELL COUNTI) p sources. necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-Impaired Individuals within the plume EPZ.
- 20. Ability to continuously monitor and STATE - TOCC: CONW AY, JOHNSON, control emergency worker expo- LOGAN, POPE and YELL COUNTIES sure.
- Objectives for which capud.ity is required to be demonstrated during each full-participation exercise.
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Objective Off-Site Jurisdiction (s)
- 22. Ability to supply and administer KI, ' JOHNSON and LOGAN COUNTIES once the decision has been made to do so.
- 23. Ability to effect an orderly evacua- POPE COUNTY tion of onsite personnel.
- 24. Ability to brief the med!a in a STATE - PIT clear, accurate, and timely manner.
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- Adequacy of procedures for regis- LOGAN COUNTY tration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
- 23. Adequacy of facilities for mass LOGAN and YELL COUNTIES care of evacuees.
- 29. Adequate equipment and proce- JOHNSON and LOGAN COUNTIES dures for decontamination of eraergency workers, equipment, and vehic.es.
30.* Adequacy of EMS transportation, POPE COUNTY (w/ utility' support) perJonnel, and procedures for handling contaminated individuals includintf proper decontamination of vehicle and equipment.
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- Adequacy of hospital facilities and POPE COUNTY (St. Mary's Hospital) procedures for handling contam-Insted Individuals.
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- Adequacy, operabi!Ity, and effec- STATE - EOC, TOCC, PIT: CONWAY, k' tive use of emergency communica- JOHNSON, LOGAN, POPE and YELL tion equipment and the adequacy of COUNTIES communications procedures and methods. .
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Objective Off-Site Jurisdiction (s) 1 37.* Ability to monitor Emergency STATE - EOC, TOCC, P!T: CONWAY, ;
Classification' levels' continuously ~ JOHNSON, LOGAN, POPE and YELL '
and implement procedures in a COUNTIES timely manner.
- 38. Capability to effectively process STATE - PIT all incoming messages in a timely manner.
39* Existence of authority in activating STATE - TOCC: YELL and LOGAN reception center (as necessary) in a COUNTIES timely manner.
1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
The following is an overview of the exercise events:
The exercise is scheduled to begin at 5:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 23, 1988.
Jnit I has been operating at 100% power for 60 days. Currently "A" decay heat pump is oat of service for motor bearing replacement and "B" service water pump is inoperable in order to remove and rewind the pump motor. Additionally, operators have noted a slight up vard trend in RCS activity. Based on these initial conditions, the unit will be in an actan statement per Unit 1 Tech Spec 3.3.1. The action statement will require the unit to bt in hot shutdown by 11:00 a.m. on 03/23/88. In order to comply'with this action statement, Operations Management has directed the unit to be shut down at a rate of 15% per hour beginning at 5:00 a.m. The Shift Operations Supervisor will Instruct operators to begin the shutdown and will then declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) based on an established Emergency Action Level (EAL).
The Staff Duty Officer (SDO) at Little Rock is notified of the NOUE declaration and in turn notifies the Technical Operations Control Director (TOCD). The decision is made to not activate the entire State Radiological Response Team (State RRT) at this time. ,
At 8:30 a.m. the failed fuel lodine monitor indicates greater than 2.2 = 106 cpm (very high RCS activity); therefore AP&L declares an Alert emergency class based on an established EAL.
Immediately following notification of the Alert Emergency Class the State RRT is activated per standard operating procedures. By 9:45 a.m. the Little Rock segment is
' Objectives for which capability is required to be demonstrated during each full-participation exercise.
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enroute, the NP&RP segment has begun TOCC and PIT activation, and local EOCs are operational.
At 10:30 a.m., while the plant contim.es to shut down at 15% per hour, a malfunction in' main stream isolation valve C /-2691 results in closure of the valve causing a reactor trip from approximately 20% power. The RCS leak rate increases to approximately 10 gpm and fuel cladding failure willincrease to greater than 10% AP&L declares a Site Area Emergency (SAE) based on an established EAL.
Notifications are made in the appropriate sequence. Members of the State RRT arrive at the TOCC and organize for accident assessment and decision-making postures.
The potential for release prompts a PAA for the evacuation of London Elementary School and then a PAA for the evacuation of the two-mile EPZ. Appropriate actions are taken pertaining to EWS (ANS) and care center activation.
At 12:00 p.m., AP&L declares a General Emergency based upon occurrences which include a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) resulting in core uncovery and fuel cladding failure increase to 36% When reactor building isolation occurred, hydrogen purge system control valve CV-7446 failed to open due to a failed contractor in the power supply breaker. A break in the two-inch line leading to CV-7446 occurred at the penetration which resulted in an uncontrolled release of activity from the containment building atmosphere to the upper north piping penetration room and ultimately to the offsite environment.
Appropriate actions are taken by offsite authorities to monitor and assess the situation and protect the health and safety of the public.
At approximately 1:40 p.m., AP&L's Repair and Damage Control Team success-fully terminates the leak from containment and offsite release rates begin to diminish.
By 2:30 p.m., effluent monitors indicate background levels and discussions to downgrade the GE begin between AP&L, the Arkansas Department of Health, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Health Department field teams will continue to monitor until the plume dissipates.
The exercise will terminate at approximately 4:00 p.m.
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- Simulations
- 1. All meter readings other than background - although use of survey meters will be demonstrated.
( 2. All air filter analyses - although use of the air samples, field counting techniques, and MCA counting techniques will be demon-strated.
- 3. Environmental samples other than air, soil, and vegetation.
- 4. Calling in of off-duty school bus drivers.
t
- s 13 -
- 6. Evacuation and reentry of school children and residents.
Notes:
- 1. Hot-line procedures at the TOCC will not be demonstrated.
- 2. TOCC field teams will not dress out in ant! contamination clothing.
i
- 3. Environmental samples will not be sent to the fixed radiochemistry laboratory facility in Little Rock.
- 4. The Atkins Emergency Worker Center will not be activated.
- 5. With the exception of Paris High School, no care center will be physically activated.
- 6. Demonstration of the Nuclear Emergency Data Transfer System (NEDTS)is not an objective of this exercise.
- ^
r . , _ _ . , . , , . . . _ _ _ , , _ ,. ., __,v , , , ,
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Responding FEMA Time Agency Activity Problems / Notes Objective No.
0500 AP&L Operations management directs .
that Unit I be shut down due to the unit being in an action stateoent per Tech Spec .
3.3.1. The Shift Operations Supervisor declares a Motifi-cation of Unusual Event.
0515 AP&L/ State Notification of Unusual Event 36, 37, 38 (NOUE) is made by AP&L to the Arkansas Department of Health
~
U (ADH) Emergency Communications
- Center (ECC).
0515- State
- SDO contacts the Technical TOCD instructs the SDO to 36, 37 Operations Control Director stand by for further instruc-
~
(TOCD) and informs the TOCD tions.
of the NOUE.
9 2
3 -- , w y . -- - - - ,
Responding FEMA ~
Time Agency Activity Problems / Notes Objective No. ,
- The TOCD contacts the Radio- Decision made to not activate 21, 3, 36 logical Response Team Leader entire State Radiological' (RETL) to discuss the situa- Response Team (BRT) at MUE, '
tion. but that TOCD, RRTL, Little ' ~~ '
Rock SD0 and Communications Supervisor should arrive at ADH as soon as possible.
A*. s o ,' Russellville SD0 and MP&RP Program Manager should :-
arrive at MP&RP office as 8 ton -
as possible.
- Both SD0s, the Communica- 1, 2, 36 $-
tions Supervisor and the MP&RP Program Manager are instructed to proceed to -
their respective of fices as soon as possible.
State / Notification of the NOUE 3, 5, 36, 38 Conway, declaration ^ is made to all Johnson, local entities.
Logan, Pope and Yell Coun-ties 0615 State Personnel called in begin to 1 .
arrive at normal duty sta- ,
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Responding FEMA Time Agency Activity , Problems / Notes Objective No.
0700 State /AP&L TOCD arrives at ADH and OES and local governments will 1, 3, 5, 36, 38 contacts AP&L for a situation receive updates upon re-update. Personnel at Little quest. Based on information Rock and Russellville are from AP&L, decision to not briefed on information re- activate entire team is recon-ceived from AP&L. firmed.
0730 State Other RRT members begin Personnel are briefed on the 1, 3 arriving at normal duty situation upon arrival and are stations in Little Rock and asked to review Standard Oper-Fusse11ville. ating Procedures (SOPS) for their specific RRT duties.
Personnel scheduled to leave u on routine business are told to remain in the building until further notice.
0830 AP&L The Shift Operations Super-visor declares an Alert due to '
very high reactor coolant system (RCS) activity. ,
0845 AP&L/ State Alert notification ~is made by 5, 36, 37, 38 AP&L to the ADH ECC.
0850- State /
- SDos and TOCD are informed Activation of the RET and TOCC 1, 3, 5, 6 0910 Local of Alert declaration. are automatic at Alert Covern-ments
- OES is notified of *he 5, 36, 37, 38 Alert.
4
Responding FEMA Time Agency Activity Problems / Notes Objective No. ,
- Local governments are noti- 5, 36, 37, 38 fied of the Alert.
- OES notifies support agency Individual ESLOs decide wheth- 1,3,4 liaison officers (ESLOs) of er to report to the State EOC the Alert and continues to or to operate from their own address problems not related duty stations. Several non to the ANO emergency AMO-related problems are han-situation. died by the State EOC through-out the exercise.
0915 State / TOCD issues a Protective Some drivers may be difficult 3, 5 Local Action Advisory (PAA) concern- to reach. $
Covern- ing calling off-duty school ments bus drivers in all school districts.* ,
0930- State / Little Rock RRT.and communica- The Accident Assessment Group 1, 5, 6, 36, 37 0945 Local tions van leave the ADH (AAC), RETL and TOCD monitor Covern- enroute to the Technical events and communicate, as ments Operations Control Center necessary by radio.
(TOCC).
- TOCC is operational. 1, 4, ',
, 36, 37, 38
- The PAA will be issued, but calling of off-duty school bus drivers will be simulated.
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+. .v Responding FEMA Time Agency Activity Problems / Notes Objective No. ,
- Public Information Team 1, 4, 24, 36, -
(PIT) is operational. 38
- Local EOCs are operational. 1, 4, 20, 22, 37 1030 AP&L Site Area Emergency is declared due to indications ,
that there is greater than 10Z fuel cladding failure.
'1045 AP&L/ State Site Area Emergency (SAE) 36, 37, 38 notification is made to the U TOCC by AP&L.
1050 State TOCD is informed of SAE via 5 radio (if still enroute to the TOCC).
1055- State /
ments
- Members of Little Rock RRT 9, 10 who are arriving at the TOCC organize for radiochemistry screening, accident assess-ment, and field team opera-tions.
- EWS activation will be simulated; siren (test) will occur at a later date.
Responding FEMA Time Agency Activity Problems / Notes Objective.No.
- Telephone c - nications are 5 established between ADH and AP&L counterparts. ,
- The TOCD issues a PAA for The potential for a release 3, 10, 37 the precautionary evacuation prompts the advised evacuation of * * . London
. Elementary of children.
Senool,* activation of the Emergency Worker center,*
and activation of appro-priate care centers.*
1130 State /
- Accident Assessment is func- 4, 7, 10 5.
Local ticast from the TOCC and can Covern- use information from AP&L .
ments and field teams to aske dose projections to assist in protective action advi-sories.
- TOCD issues PAA for the pre- Plant conditions prompt PAA 3, 10, 37, 39 cautionary evacuation of the for evacuation.
two mile EPZ.
1145 State ADH field monitoring teams are 39 deployed for radiation moni-toring activities.
- The PAA will be issued; all other actions are simulated.
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- - .S Responding FEMA Time Agency Activity Problems / Notes Objective No. ,
1200 AP&L A Ceneral Emergency is 6, 7, 8, 20 -
declared due to the loss of two fission product barriers and impending failure of the third barrier.
~
1215 AP&L
- Ceneral Emergency (CE) noti- Release is underway.
State / fication is made to the TOCC local by AP&L.
Covern-ments
- Evacuation of persons in two-mile EPZ is underway.
e 1230 State /
- All organizations and loca- 5 Local tions are informed of the Covern- CE.
ments
- TOCD issues PAA for the , 3, 10, 37 evacuation of persons in affected sectors.
- Covernor is asked to issue a 3 Proclamation of Disaster Emergency.
1245- State /
- Field ~ teams continue to Amount of radiciodine in the 7, 8 ~ _
1430 Local monitor and track the release too small to produce Covern- plume. Air samples will be detectable levels (IE-7 uCi/1) ments taken to monitor for radio- by field personnel. Air iodine. samples must be analyzed at the TOCC.
=
Responding FEMA Time Agency Activity Problems / Notes Objective No.
- Accident Assessment con- 10 tinues to provide data to 1 '
the TOCD for protective action advisories.
- The PIT continues to provide 24 public information. _
- TOCD continues to oversee 3, 5 offsite activities and main-tains contact with AP&L, OES and State Police liaisons, and local governments , c$
throughout the emergency.
- Local governments take the Several problems are addressed 15, 16, 17, 18, appropriate actions neces- by the appropriate entities. 29 sary to implement the evacu-ation and respond to prob-less associated with the ' ~
~ emergency - and also prob-lees not related to the radiological emerges.cy.
i
- Conway County participation I ends.
- Evacuees
~
arrive at care Some evacuees may be contami- 28 centers. nated. ,
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. s Responding FEMA Time Agency Activity Problems / Notes Objective No. .
1300 AP&L An on-site response team _,
=*mher is injured. "
1330 AP&L/ Pope
- The victim is transported to The victim and the ambulance 30, 31 ,
County hospital for treatment and are contaminated.
Ambulance contamination.
Service / .
St. Mary's e Johnson County participation Hospital ends.
1430 AP&L/ State The potential for deescalating The releana has been termi- 3 from Ceneral Emergency is be- nated ar.d the initiating con-ing considered. ditions are under control. UV 1445 State /
- Field teams continue to 7, 8 Local , monitor and track the plume Covern- as it clears the area and ments dissipates.
- Later, field teams are in- 9 structed to collect. soil and vegetation samples and to ~
return to the TOCC.
- Local governments and care centers have discontinued pa rtic,ipation as appro- "
priate.
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. 23 1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA The Arkansas Nuclear One exercise evaluations that follow in Sec. 2 of this report are based on applicable standards and criteria set forth In Sec. II of NUREG 0654-FEMA-REP 1 REV 1 (Nov.1980). FEMA Region VI evaluated the exercise using the Modular Format.
Following the narrative for each participating organization or off-site activity, Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for Improve-ment are presented with accompanying recommendations. Any identitled Deficiencies would cause a finding that the off-site preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a nuclear emergency. At least one Defielency in this category would necessitate a negative finding, and would require one or more remedial drills to demonstrate corrective action has been accomplished.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action include those activities where demonstrated performance during the exercise was evaluated and considered faulty. Corrective actions are considered necessary, but other factors indicate reasonable assurance that, in the event of a nuclear emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health.and safety of the public. This category should be relatively easy to correct in comparison to those classified as Deficiencies.
Areas Recommended for Improvement are also listed for each off-site activity or jurisdiction.
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34 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, REV 1 (Nov.1980), and exercise objectives and observations, an evaluation has been performed of the March 23,1988 ex1rcise at Arkansas Nuclear One. This evaluation, including Deficiencies, Areas Requir.N Corrective Action, and Areas Recommended for Improve-ment is presented herein. FEMA Region VI will maintain close !!alson with the State and local governments in determ!ning the required corrective actions (including time frames for accomplishing the corrections) in accordance wie. established criterla and guidelines.
2.1 ARKANSAS STATE OPERATIONS The following includes evaluations of operations at the State EOC in Conway, the Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC) at Russellville, the Radlological Field Monitoring Teams, and the Joint Information (Media) Center (JIC).
2.1.1 State EOC - Conway Narrative Activation and staffing procedures were adequately demonstrated. The State EOC is staffed on a 24-hour per day basis. Notification of an Unusual Event was received at 5:45 a.m. At 9:12 a.m. the Alert Message was received and the State Calldown was initiated and completed at 9:52 a.m. Agencies and Individuals included on the list were: Governor, Civil Air Patrol, Game and Fish Commission, National Guard, Red Cross, State Police, Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department, Pollution Control and Ecology, and Corps of Engineers. Seven Individuals completed full staffing of the EOC by 8:00 a.m.
The Deputy OES Director gave frequent belefings to the staff present and through his staff made timely decisions and coordinated all emergency activities. He demonstrated good leadership and a grasp of the procedures by responding promptly and appropriately to problems built into the exercise. Decision-making procedures were excellent.
Physical facilities at the EOC were adequate to support emergency operations.
The EOC is located in Conway, Arkansas, and has ample space, lighting, furnishings and equipment. All activities were conducted in the operations room adjacent to the Communications Center. Backup power is available onsite but was not demonstrated during this exercise. Maps and display boards were available and adequate and were used throughout the exercise.
Communications facilities and procedures were very good. The primary com-munication link to the TOCC was land-!!ne telephone. Telephone messages were recorded on official notification forms. The State Protective Action Advisory (PAA) 4 e
i p .
. a5 ;
- l forms were also used. The State OES !s equipped with a General Electric Base radio system capable of contacting any mobile unit in the State. They have both commercial and direct (dedicated) lines which were utilized during the exercise.
All messages were logged for datafax, radio, and telephone traffic. There was good control of messages from receipt through logging, distribution, and posting of pertinent Information on the display boards.
The State OES demonstrated the ability to effectively call upon outside support age.1cles by contacting the American Red Cross for meals for Yell County and the Corps of Engineers to stop a runaway barge on the river.
The State OES had all state resources available as required and appropriate to the situation including the National Guard and the Department of Human Services. The
. State OES requested Union Pacific Railroad to move a train blocking a road in Morrilton.
' In summary, the State OES successfully demonstrated FEMA objectives 1,3,4,5, 36 and 37.
4 DEFICIENCIES .
i None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None.
}
i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.
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2.1.2 Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC) t' I
^
Narrative f The Technical Operations Control Center (TOCC) is located in the Arkansas National Guard Armory in Russellville, approximately eight miles southeast of the ANO
,' plant. There is a capability to relocate the TOCC to a backup site outside the EPZ If necessary. The Armory is well suited for use as a TOCC. It has ample room for 24-hour l
operations and possessc9 all required equipment, supplies and excellent displays.
Activation of the TOCC began about 9:45 a.ta., following receipt of the ALERT notification, when one of the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) communicators began set-up of the communications room. Additional staff, including the field teams, from the Russellville and Little Rock ADl! offices, arrived between 9:45 and 10:08 a.m.
L
r 36
- 1 The TOCC was declared operational on the arrival of the Technical Operations Control l Director (TOCD). All concerned locations were immediately nottfled that the TOCC was ;
operational at 1008 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.83544e-4 months <br />. The ADH communications van, with radio capability equal to that located in the TOCC, arrived from Little Rock at about 10:35 a.m. an'd set-up outside the Armory.
During the exercise, both primary (radio) and backup (telephone) communications systems were used from the TOCC. Communications capability was maintained,' with all appropriate locations, at all times except for a short radio outage to Conway County.
Telephone backup was used and communications were maintained. The communications room staff performed their duties professionally and effectively. The single telefax machine performed flawlessly, but there is no backup. On one occasion, there was a delay In sending outgoing messages due to a series of incoming messages from the utility. It is recommended that a backup telefax machine be obtained. Then, during heavy message traffic periods, one machine can be used for incoming messages and one for outgoing messages.
i At 11:01 a.m., the TOCC received a hard-copy message from AP&L Indicating that the exercise situe;on had now been upgraded to a Site Area Emergency. The message was announced to the TOCC staff and preparation of an EBS message to the public was begun. At 11:13 a.m., the message (Message G-1) was authorized for immediate release. The communicator who transmitted this message, and the two subsequent EBS messages, cid not log the transmission times or enter the times on the EBS message forms. This information could be important for later documentation of actions during an exercise or actual event. It is recommended that EBS message transmission times be logged, and the times also be entered on the actual message form. A second EBS message (Message E-1) was prepared and approved for transmittal at 11:55 a.m. At 11:57 a.m. and 11:59 a.m., the TOCC received verbal (telephone) and hard copy (telefax) messages that a General Emergency had been declared at ANO and a radioactive release was in progress. A third EBS message (Message E-2), directing Immediate evacuation of Zone E, and a small portion of Yell County, south of Lake Dardanelle, adjacent to the Logan County border, was ready for transmission to the EBS station at 12:04 p.m. Concurrence with the PAA inttlating this message, was obtained from Logan and Yell Counties by 12:09 p.m. The 15 minute alert and notification requirement was met by the State for all traee messages.
Protective Action Advisories (PAAS) were also prepared and issued by the TOCD. PAA Number 1 recommended the precautionary alerting of school bus drivers for quick response in the event school evacuations were required. PAA Number 2 recommended the precautionary evacuation of London School which is located less than two miles from the ANO plant. PAA Number 3 recommended the precautionary evacuation of Zone G due to the possibility of the loss of the last containment barrier, and PAA Number 4 recommended the evacuation of Sectors 10 through 13 out to ten miles from the plant. During the development of the later PAAS, the TOCD was faced with difficult deelslons because the utility made a Protective Action Recommendation which the loca; governments could not implement. The State and ANO use sectors and mileJ which the State translates to zones with identifiable geographical barriers for the public. Zone G comprises a radial distance approximately 2 miles from the plant. All
o
. 27 the other zones extend to approximatelf 10 miles radial distance from the plant and are designed to follow sector lines as closely as possible. When the utility recommended 5-mile radial evacuation, the State had to determine between advising evacuation of the
. entire 10-mile EPZ or evacuation of only down-wind zones. The State decided to advise evacuating only down-wind zones. When it was found that a small portion of an unaffected zone should also be included in the evacuation, the TOCD decided not to recommend evacuation of the unt!re zone, but chose instead to recommend evacuation of
- only the affected area. h; 4 recommended that the State and ANO develop a compromise on how evacuatM and/or sheltering areas are to be described so that little or no interpretation will I:n required during future exercises or should an actual emergency event ever occm.
The State Field Monitoring Teams assembled and were briefed at the TOCC.
Following deployment, tl.ey maintained radio communications with the f! eld team controller at the TOCC at all times. Team locations, in relation to the plume, were carefully plotted aci dosimeter readings were obtained at approximately 30-minute intervals to insura that radiation doses were minimized. Monitoring data, transmitted from the field teams to the TOCC, was used for manual dose calculations and for comparison with computer dose projections. The fleid data provided to the teams by the controllers was not, in many cases, consistent with the plume projections generated by the computer. However, good professional judgement was used to accurately plot the plume. The new PC system was used to make plume projections with manual input of Gaseous. Effluent Radiological Monitoring System (GERMS) data supplied, by the utility by telephone modem connection. Backup dose projection was by hand calculation using nomograms and formulae. Both primary and secondary methods were demonstrated. A similarity in computer file names between the "re al-tim e" data file constantly maintained in the computer, and the exercise data file entered by the utility scenario developer, resulted in some "actual" rather than "simulated" data being accessed during the exercise, and some plume dose rate projections that were inconsistent with the cenario. During the early stages of the exercise, the "vent" with the highest release rate was selected as the single release data-point. This vent continued to be used even though later data Indicated releases at that point were declining and other vent points with higher readings. Thus, the total source term was not used and low plume dose rate estimates could have occurred. However, the TOCC staff demcnstrated good judgment in manipulating the information available to them and correctly describing the shape and conditions of the plume. They did not believe the zero values for plume update number 3 and acted accordingly. These minor problems are, for' the most part, the 'esult of exercise artificialities as, during a real event, there could be no confusion of fue names and the computer program automatically includes and considers all eleven monitored release points (vents) in data development.
During the development of PAA H, a disagreement developed v 'th the utility I over the proper protective actions to be taken. The TOCC overrode the utility recommendation and evacuated a smaller area and did not recommend sheltering as the utility t.ad suggested. The TOCC action.3 were dictated, in part, by the nature of the
- plan, and in part by the differences in the means of designating protective action areas.
4 L
a 20 -
In summary, all FEMA RVI exercise objectives assigned to the TOCC (Nos.1, 3, 4, 5, 6,10,13,15,16,17, 20, 36, 37 and 39) were fully met.
DEFICIENCIES None.
AREA 8 REQUIRINO CORRECTIVE ACTION None.
AREA 5 RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT e
Description:
The single telefax machine has no backup. On one occasion, there wr.s a delay in transmission of outgoing assages .
due to a serics of incodng messages from the utility.
Recommendation: Obtain a backup teleft... nachine. Then, during heavy message traffic periods,' one mcentne can be used for incoming messages and one for outgoing'meaages.
Description:
EBS message transmission timen were not logged or entered on the EBS message forms.
Recommendation EBS message trensmission times be logged and entered on the actual message form.
2.1.3 Radlological Field Monitoring Teams 1
Narrative - Field Team i1 The mobilization and deployaient of State Radiological Response Team RRT) personnel from I,lttle Rock coald not be totally observed from the TOCC. !! was observed that the State o .. ild arrive at the TOCC in a timely manner with all necessary equipment to pvWe equired radiation monitoring. .
The State RRT arrived at the TOCC at 10:47 a.m. Upon arrival, r! eld tea.n personnel were organized. and Team #1' began a check of equipment using a written checklist. Instrumentation was checked for Qkration and calibration status. All tratruments were found to have been calibrated within a quarterly time frame of the exercise date. Ambient radiation levels were adequately determined using appropriate equipment and procedures. Fleid teams were brlefed on current plant and meteorological conditions, exposure control, and use of emergency backup communications. Team members' watches were synebvemed at 11:35 a.m. Team #1 was directed to proceed to l
.4 w
.s .
- 39 area 13Al to perform the initial radiation survey and was under way 57 minutes after arrival at TOCC.
Team #1 demonstrated effective use of communications equipment, even when communication became diffuult. The emergency backup system to OES was demon-strated at one point, and the team kne.v how to further effectively use emergency
. communication methods.
Team #1 adequately den mstrated their ability to use ap procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine uCl/cc as low in the as E'gropriate presence of nobla gases. They also demonstrated their ability to collect soll, water, and vegetation samples. Samples were bagged, labeled, and radiation monitored. Care was taken to prevent the possible spread of contamination to equipment, vehicle, and personnel.
Toam #1 more than adequately demonstrated their ability to continuour.ly monitor and control emergency worker exposure through simulated radiation surveys and proper use of dostmetry equipment. Dostmeter readings were checked every half hour and reported to the TOCC.
In summary, Team #1 successfully demonstrated FEMA objectives 1,5,6,7,8,9, 20, 36, and 38.
I DEFICIENCICS None.
l, AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None.
i._
,, AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT i -- None.
Narrative - Field Team #2 The demonstrations of the operability and effective use of routine and
.. emergency communlettion equipment and the adequacy of procedures and methods to communicate with field personnel were met. The primary radio system used was the The OES radio was available and Arkansas Department of Hn.th's radio net.
.. demonstrated as a standby e % sup system.
Mobilization and dn:wyment of the field teams from Little Rock in a timely manner were not observable at the TOCC. The teams are nottfled from the Arkansas Department of Health's offices in Little Rock following either a decision to activate the
30
=
team by the TOCD or notification of an Alert emergency class. Therefore, the actual mobilization process was not observable. The teams were activated at Alert and arrivated at the TOCC at 10:47 a.m. Upon arrival at the TOCC, field teams were briefed on current plant and meteorological conditions, team responsibilities and exposure control procedures. Team #2 ran through a thorough check of equipment using a written checklist. Team members' watches were synchronized at 11:35 a.m. At 11:36 a.m., teams were ready for deployment to the field.
Amblent radiation levels were adequately determined using appropriate equip-ment and procedures. Team #2 used the G-M for low-Ic.el radiation and lon chamoer instrument for high-level radiation, as applicable at each location visited. Care was taken to prevent the possible spread of contamination to equipment, vehicle and personnel. Team #2 was cble to locate and navigate in the field to find all preselected sampling points. Maps were followed and both team members were familiar with the geographic area.
Team #2 was required to take one air sample during the exercise. Appropriate procedures and equipment were used to determine airborne radiolodine as low as
- E-7 uCl/cc in the presence of noble gases. An air pump was used to draw a measured sample of air across a charcoal filter (silver zeollte "11ters were availaole in the kits but were net used). The air pump was properly calibrated for the appropriate flow rate.
Sample cartridges were quickly screened with the G-M to determine if shielding were
- r. quired during transport to the lab. Sample cartridges were then labeled and double begged prior to pick up.
The procedures and equipment used to collect, transport, and analyze samples of soll, vegeta; ion, and water were demonstrated by Field Team #2. This team had and used the appropriate equipment and did know the applicable procedures.
Team #2 adequately demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure through the proper use of dosimetry equipment and procedures. Each team member was provided with a dosimetry kit which contained: two low-range (0-200 mR), one mid-range (0-20 R), and one high-range (0-200 R) self-reading dosimeters a TLD and record keeping cards. Team members read their dosimeters
- approximately every half hour and properly recorded dose readings. The maximum allowable dose without authorization (25 R) was known by team members. The team was aware that they should leave the area if that exposure dose was reached, and that they should report to the team controller for further instructions. The team was equipped with full anti-contamination suits and protective equipment (i.e., coveralls, boots, gloves, respirators, etc.).
FEMA objectives met by Team #2 were 1,5,6,7,8,9,20, and 36.
DEFICIENCIES None.
' A .
. 31 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None. ,
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.
Narrative - Field Team #3 The team leader received notification 2t the Little Rock offlee. The second team member (driver) was not notified at this time. A substitute driver (Area Sanitarian) was used until the designated driver could be contacted and met the fle!d team at the
- first monitoring site. This demonstrated that a substitute driver was available and that under actual emergency conditions the designated driver could be contacted when working away from the office in Clarksyllie and meet the team at the first monitoring site.
All team members and support personnel arrived at the TOCC with all Instruments and sampling equipment. All personnel appeared well tralned and prepared to perform their necessary support functions.
There was continuous contact with the TOCC and other field teams. As a backup to the Department of Health's radio network, the use of the OES radio was demonstrated.
All fleid team members from Little Rock arrived at the TOCC at 10:47 a.m. A .
substitute driver (Area Sanitarian) was recruited and the designated driver notifled the team that he would meet them at the first monitoring site. He arrived in time to assist with the collection of the first sample. All teams were deployed at 11:45 a.m.
Equipment and procedures for monitoring ambient radiation levels were demonstrated adequately. The proper Instrument was used for the type and level of radiation. Team #3 also demonstrated the proper procedures for contamination control for personnel, vehicle and survey Instruments.
Team #3 demonstrated the appropriate equipment and procedures to obtain an air sample in order to properly measure radiolodine for field conditions. The filter was properly handled and labeled for transport to the TOCC.
The team had a list of all Instruments and sampling equipment. Also, the team had SOPS for equipment use and proper sample collection. The team did not have the speelfled container for a soll sample. The soll was collected in plastic bags, which were adequate for sample collection and transportation to lab. Also, during the exercise last year, March 18,1987, it was noted that Team #3 did not have a soll sample container.
The team demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control person.9el exposure. At the time of deployment, a G-M survey meter was operabf a during the entire field exercise to detect any changing radiation levels within the vehicle. In 4
6
=m
s e, 32 -
addition, the self-reading dosimeters were frequently checked. Records were ,
maintained, so that cumulative radiation exposures could be estimated at all times.
Upon deployment, the team performed a radio check and demonstrated the effective and proper procedures in the use of all communications equipment during the exercise. The team experienced no problems with equipment operation and demonstrated '
the proper use of backup systems.
In summary, Team #3 successfully demonstrated FEMA objectives I,5,6,7, 8,9, 20 and 36.
t DEFICIENCIES None.
AREAS REQUIRINO CORRECT!YE ACTION :
None. ,
J AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
Description:
Soll sample containers were not in the field bag.
, Recommendation: Ca:ry sample collection containers in a bag apart from the other miscellaneous supplies.
2.1.4 Joint Media Center i
Narrative 1
The Public leformation Team (P!T) was operational at 9:15 a.m.,' minutes after
- the Alert declaration. Rapid mobilization and activation was made possible because the PIT's emergency work location is, for most PIT members, its normal work area.
l Both the P!T's working space and areas used to conduct media briefings and other ,
l The only drawback to this news production / gathering activities was adequate.
arrangement is the location of the media center relative to the plant. As pointed out in
. previous exercises, it is unlikely the media center could be used during an actual radiological emergency. Emphasis should be placed on making alternate arrangements.
The PIT was able to communicate with all appropriate locations and organiza-l tions with no problems.
l i
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- 33 I
.. . I The PIT demonstrated an excellent capability to provide information to the media promptly and accurately. Additionally, the PIT was aggressive in disseminating important protective. actions information for the public. However, one significant problem occurred as the result of AP&L actions. The problem involved AP&L making public its protective action recommendations which differed from prottative actions actually implemented by State and local governments. This created a large potential for confusion and a distraction had the media noticed this situation. AP&L released this information on its periodic status reports made available to the media in the media work
, area.
The PIT sncountered no significant problems !n communications with other parts of the off-site emergency response organizations.
By virtue of having developed new procedures, the PIT was able to demonstrate dramatic improvement in its ability to track the receipt and dissemination of Important Information. These procedures, tested in draft form, provide careful control over all Incoming and outgoing messages and expedite the PIT's dissemination of important information. As demonstrated, this system also facilitated excellent coordination of i information with AP&L. Implementation of these procedures also corrected an Area Requiring Corrective Action from the previous exercise involving the PIT's inability to provide information In a clear, acetirate and timely fashion.
In summary, FEMA objectives 1, 4, 5, 24, 36, 37 and 38 were met.
DEFICIENCIES None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
, None.
i 6 _.
AREAR RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
Description:
The location of the media center to the plant is not conducive to safe operations should an actual radiological
- emergency occur.
c.
Recommendation: Provide an alternate location for the media center.
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a 1.2 COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS l 2.2.1 Pope County EOC- ;
(
Narrative :
Activation and staffing occurred following receipt of the notifloation of unusual event (NOUE). The deelslon to activate at the NOUE rather than the ALERT was a '
prerogative for staffing that was appropelately exercised. Appropriate staffing levels by all necessary response ageneles was evident. All agency representatives were activated l and arrived promptly at the EOC. Full staffing was essentially completed by 7:15 a.m. ,
The County Judge and the Emergency Coordinator provided the essential emergency !
response direction and control. Other representatives at the EOC included members of !
- the Sheriff's Department, Fire Department - City of Russellville, Red Cross / Marine i
! Reserve Chief, State OES, and the Police Department. Overall, settaation of these j personnel was prompt and the staffing levels were appropelate to the level of j
! partielpation. In addition, Pope County is to be commended for the level of participation j and high level of interest demonstrated during the exercise. Pope County showed ;
i enthusiasm and diligenee in following up each component of their plan and treated each !
change in the emergency classifloation level (ECL) with a sense of urgency. Pope County !
} continues to show Improvement in every area but espeelally radiologleal exposure
- l control.
l Emergency operations management continued to funetton at a level ;
3 commensurate with the excellent demonstration at the previous year's remedial drill. . ;
{ Additional improvements were also identifled in management relating to linowledge of f j the plans in implementing protective settons and anticipating potential problems. The l County Judge and the Emergency Coordinator directed their staff throughout the ;
j exerelse to implement protective actions. Throughout the exercise, controller-Input ;
- problems were reviewed, analyzed and appropriately administered. It was evident that j the County Judge and Emergency Coordinator have further famillarized themselves with ;
r the county's response nettons and were able to coordinate implementation of the actions l through the agencies represented at the EOC It is suggested that belefings be held more frequently to update the staff on current planned status and implementation activities. t
! Also a review of the county concept of operations regarding proteettve actions advisocles !
! (versus proteettve action directives) and associated county concurrence is need d. '!
j Furthermore, generic checklists developed to prompt the Center Director on funda- '
l mental response actions (notifloation of special needs individuals, etc.) would prove
!- useful following receipt of ECLs and/or PAAS. Overall. continued improvements in emergency operations management were noted. ,
l The Pope County EOC la located in the Pope County Detention Center in f Russellville, Arkansas. The EOC was established in a meeting room within that facility j where it was set up following activation of staff. As indicated to the evaluators, the [
facility was essentially operational at 7:15 a.m. All maps, status boards and displays that i were appropriate to their emergency response functions were set up and utilized f i
t p t -m - r ,- m m - m m ,e,--s
.c 35 throughout the day. Status boards were updated regularly, maps were used to identify appropriate traffic control points and displays were used to document the status of the emergency. It is suggested that color overlays be used to identify affected sectors on the plume EPZ map. The adequacy of the facility was clearly demonstrated.
The primary communication system linking the Pope County EOC with the TOCC and the other county EOCs was the NERN System. Telephones were used for backup communications and individual agencies used radios to communicate with their field personnel. Throughout the exercise, the primary system functioned properly. The Sheriff's Department staff was famillar with the use of all primary equipment as well as backup equipment. As the need arose, the staff was knowledgeable in the means to communicate with any Individual at any of the other response locations. Inquiries from .
the State regarding status of implementing actions were carried out quickly and effectively throughout the exercise. There appeared to be clear communication lines between Pope County EOC and Hector Care Center.
An effective system is in place to inventory, distribute and document emergency worker exposure control in Pope County. Adequate numbers and types of dosimeters were available at the Pope County EOC for distribution to emergency workers located there. According to the radiological officer, other exposure control kits were available at various locations in the county for distribution to emergency workers. Equipment inventories are conducted quarterly and emergency worker training programs are in place. The assignment of responsibflity for exposure control rests with the radiological officer who was knowledgeable in demonstrating the technical aspects of radiological exposure control. The emergency worker exposure control kit consisted of direct-read dosimeters, permanent record dosimeters, KI, exposure control cards and Instructions on the use of KI. The limits for emergency worker excess dose authorizations as well as the interval for recording dose readings were presented by the radiological officer. It would prove useful to include in the record keeping sheet a time interval for recording doses and Instructions for placement of the dosimeters on emergency workers. There continues to be improvements in the exposure control concept of operations for Pope County.
A controller input message at approximately 11:00 a.m. prompted the testing of f
the objective for coordination of onsite evacuation of personnel. The Emergency Coordinator delegated responsibility for coordinating these activities to the County Sheriff. The County Sheriff assessed the situation and made determinations on establishing traffic control points to expedite evacuation of onsite utility personnel. The appropriate traffic control points were identified immediately and all necessary condit!ons were evaluated.
The Pope County EOC monitored each amergency classification level (ECL) by radio contact with the TOCC and responded quickly with follow-up phone calls when the classification status changed. When PAA #5, calling for emergency evacuation was received, Pope County was the first EOC to note that the General Emergency (GE) had not been announced. Pope Ccunty is to be commended for noting this immediately upon receipt of PAA #5, and notifying the TOCC to announce the GE.
In general, Pope County responded immediately to each PAA and ECL by reading each message out loud once by the communications officer, discussing it amoag the EOC
- e, 36
~
members, designating an EOC member responsibility for action and creating a checklist for follow-up to ensure that the actions had been completed. However, Pope County missed checking item 6D, Evacuation of Zone E on PAA #4. The communications officer noted that the.TOCC had to interrupt each ECL announcement to make sure that all county EOCs had properly understood item #8 (Ccodition Requiring Notification) on the Emergency Class Notification Form. The State should consider moving this item to the end of the form or deleting it all together, s'nce Pope County EOC felt emergency actions could be unnecessarily delayed in recording end Interpreting the meaning of detailed technical jargon presented in item #8 of the Emergency Class Notification Form.
In summary, FEMA objectives 1, 3, 4, 5, 20, 23, 30, 31, 36 and 37 were met.
DEFICIENCY None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None.
> AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT J
e
Description:
Driefings were held too infrequently.
Recommendations: Pope County could benefit from more frequent briefings ev m if these briefings are a reiteration of previous messages.
,se briefings could facilitate discussion and perhaps "trigger" actions or special circumstances that should be considered. The content of the briefings could include what is happening at the utility, the TOCC and other counties so that Pope County can understand how other EOCs are responding even if they are not directly affected.
l i
- Description All EOC actions were acted upon immediately and from the collective memory of EOC members. If certain mcmbers j
are absent, the potet.tlal to overlook an item exists.
Recommendations: Pope County should prepare a checklist of 1 acticn items triggered by changes in emergency classification
! levels. Each message received by the EOC provoked discussion about necessary action and response, but the potential to miss an l action item exists, especially in a real emergency when EOC
! members are attending to their designated areas of responsibility, i The checklist simplifies the process of deelslon making and reduces 1
=
J.. .
, . . 37 the possibility of overlookiig areas to be covered. The checklist
. would prioritize items within each emergency classification level to show which items require immediate actions
" " ~ ~ ~
and which items may~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~
be momentarily deferred.~ '
m *
Description:
Emergency facilities and access to these facilitles during an emergency was well known to members of the EOC, but
!, not visually apparent from the EP7. map.
Rooommendation: A facilities overlay (perhaps color-coded) would permit the EOC to visually ident!!) mffected areas, points of access control and the relative position of the plume with one viewing of the EPZ map. Although not required, the overlay (s) would greatly simplify who is likely to be affected, evacuation routes, and all facilities available for response.
i
! 2.2.2 Johnson County 2.2.2.1 Johnson County EOC I -
Narrative
!.~
The Johnson County EOC is located in the basement of the County Courthouse in 4[, Clarksville, Arkansas. It contains all items necessary to operate for an extended period l'-
of time. An additional display reflecting the latest emergency classification levels !s needed. The E5 coordinator kept the staff aware of the levels throughout the exercise.
A clock in the operations room would also be helpful.
]
Activa'slon and staffing of the EOC followed the . notification of the Alert Classification. The EOC was declared operational and staffed 25 minutes after the i {L. Alert. The staff is alerted by radio pagers and also could be notified by telephone. A i
suffielent number of the EOC staff were present to handle the problems of the exercise.
, , The EOC was managed by a very capable E5 coordinator with the County Judge
{ present to make additional decisions. Periodic briefings were made by the EM i ^> coordinator to keep the staff updated at all times. The staff displayed a high state of .
._, training and were very knowledgeable concerning their responsibilities. Messages were processed and handled in a timely manner.
(, The EOC has ample communications to maintain contact with the TOCC and surrounding counties and to all of their emergency agencies and veh!cles throughout the county. No hard copy device was available for the exercise, but the ES coordinator advised they were in the process of obtaining one. Effective use of all communication equipment and procedir 's was observed with the exception of one transmission not preceded by "This is an exercise message."
t 38
. 1 Dos! meters, TLDs, record keeping cards and K! were issued to emergency workers during the exercise. The decision to take K! was not lasued to Johnson County from the TOCC. The EOC managers successfully demonstrated their ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
The scenario was suffielent to test all objectives of this exercise; therefore objectives 1, 3, 4, 5, 20, 22, 36 and 37 were all met.
DEFICIENCIES t i
None, i AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS None.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
- Descriptions No display board to reflect changes in emergency l classification levels was available. i i
Recommendation: Obtain an emergency classification level status board and utilize it in the next exercise. t i
2.2.2.2 Clarksville Reception / Care Center i Narrative The Johnson County Emergency 'tanagement Coordinator mobilized the radiological monitors along with members of the Lamar and other volunteer rural fire i fighters to demonstrate the monitoring and decontamination of a vehicle. The area l selected to decontaminate the vehicle was located in an open field across from the Clarksyllie High School. !
l The radiological monitors were all very knowledgeable and well trained in monitoring procedures. One member properly suited out in "anti-C" clothing; the !
remaining members simulated dressing out. The vehicle was properly checked for '
contamination: one hot-spot was located with information furnished by a controller.
Smear samples were taken and, af ter the vehicle was washed down, smear samples were -
taken again and properly packaged and labeled. The entire vehicle was monitored. !
Correct procedures were observed throughout the entire demonstration of monitoring and 1 decontamination of a vehicle. This indicated that all personnel had been well trained and were knowledgeable about the procedures of monitoring and decontamination of j i
i 3
a
.s 39 vehicles. As a result, demonstration of vehicle monitoring and decontamination corrected ARCA #87-3 from the 1987 exercise.
Radlo contact was maintained with the EOC throughout the demonstration.
In summary, FEMA objectives I,5 and 29 were met. This removes (ARCA) 87-3 from the last exercise.
, DEFICIENCIES None.
AREAS REQUIRINO CORRECTIVE ACTION None.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.
2.2.3 legan County 2.2.3.1 Logan County EOC Narrative The Logan County Sheriff's office Communications Center received the NOUE declaration and immediately notified the County Emergency Services Coordinator. The
- Coordinator contacted the County Judge and discussed the situation with him. The decision was made to do nothing until further information was received. At 8:45 a.m.,
the county received the ALERT notification in both the Sheriff's office and the Emergency Services communications facility. The Emergency Services Coordinator Initiated his staff call-up procedures and the entire staff, includingt the County Judge,
{ the Deputy ES Coordlnt. or (County EMS Coordinator), two communicators, a Sheriff's
.. Deputy, the RDO, the l'S secretary and three Red Cross representatives, was present at the EOC by 9:05 a.m.
The County EOC, a small facility located in the basement of the County Cove %e in Paris, Arkansas, is limited in space. However, the ability to expand into the hw <ay outside the EOC, and into the snackbar across the hall allows sufficient room for wquate operations at this facility. The EOC has suffielent furniture and equipment and the appropriate maps and displays to support its required emergency functions. The EOC also has excellent checklists and up-to-date operational Instructions for the various staff members.
9
- r.
60 ,
i
. i After reviewing the situation with the ES Coordinator, the RDO began the '
preparation of emergency worker dosimetry kits and made a radiological survey of the EOC area to serve as a basellne for later surveys. The kits included direct reading and ,
permanent record dosimeters, instructions for use of the kits and dose record cards. K! !
was available at the EOC for issue if required.
j At 10:56 a.m., Logan County received notification of the Site Area Emergency.
~
The County Judge immediately ordered precautionary positioning of county emergency
- response forces (simulated) and alerted the Reception and Care (R/C) Center at the Paris .
I H!gh School. The R/C Center was activated at 11:30 a.m. to meet the schedule for the class that would act as incoming evacuees. It is noteworthy that the County Judge and l
the ES Coordinator displayed an impressive grasp of the situation and the potential ;
problems, and anticipation of the requirements for action. They responded, throughout !'
the exercise, to controller inputs and live play, decisively and expeditiously. These i inputs included problems involving traffic control, access control, traffic obstructions and handling of mob!11ty-impaired persons within the plume EPZ.
) :
t The County received tt's notification of the General Emergency at 12:27 p.m.
{ and the County Judge immed'ately issued a Court Order for the evacuation of Zone E j (Sectors 11,12 and 13). ".hls action provided legal basis for the county to require
- evacuation of the threate'.ed area. Protective Action Recommendations from the TOCC
- were monitored and ne'.ed on with dispatch. The County Judge and the ES Coordinator J maintained a contimuus watch on the situation and initiated other appropriate actions as they were required The area of Logan County within the EPZ was declared evacuated at approximately 1
- 15 p.m.
The EOC communications room, a small alcovw off of the main EOC room,
- maintained continuous communications with the TOCC and all field forces throughout the exerelse with no problems or outages. All communications equipment functioned i properly and was used effectively. Activities at the Logan County EOC were l terminated, with permission of the TOCC, at approximately 2:30 p.m.
1
- In summary, FEMA objectives 1, 3, 4, 5,15,16,17,18, 20, 22, 36, 37 and 39 were fully met at the Logan County EOC.
I DEFICIENCIES j None.
1 j !
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1
l None.
! AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None, e
e 1
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. 41 7
2.2.3.2 Paris Reception / Care Center !
I
~
Narrative (
The Paris High School Reception / Care Center received notification to activate
. their faellity at 11:30 a.m. The Center Manager (the High School Prinelpal)Immediately notified the assistant manager and began enlling the balance of the center staff via the t telephone and a two-way radio. Amerlean Red Cross and County Health Department !
, personnel arrived to set up the Reception and Care Center and Fire Department i personnel, la protective clothing and with appropriate dostmetry, established the i monitoring and decontamination area. A chemistry class from the high school served as [
simulated evacuees and were processed through the center as though they had arrived !
from the contaminated area. The (simulated) evacuees were monitored on a paper j step-on pad at the entrance to the center and, if found to be clean, directed to the Red
, Cross for registration and processing. If they were found to be contaminated, they were :
sent, by a different route, to the decontamination area where they were re-monitored, !
their possessions secured and their contaminated clothing secured in double plastle bags ;
for later cleaning or disposal. - They,were then directed to the decontamination showers !
where they were monitored once again and provided with clean clotFing. From here, !
they were sent to the Red Cross for registration. The entire Reception / Care center I staff, including the monitoring team, was well trained and performed their functions with , ;
skill and enthusiasm. Additionally..the students at the school, both the members of~ the i chemistry class, who were simulated evacuees, and the other students who were only [
observers of the events at their school, are to be commended for their excellent behavior {
during the exeretse. They are a credit to their school and their community. !
At 12:45 p.m., a Sheriff's Deputy was directed to the center from the area of the i plume. On being monitored, ha and his vehlele were found to be contaminated. The !
deputy was directed through the decontamination process at the center and the vehicle f was directed to a decontamination area at the fairgrounds (one block from the R/C i j Center). At the vehicle decontamination area, the wash-down water was contained by !
'- dikes and held for later disposal. i l
Although not an objective of this exercise, there was an excellent demonstration of response by the Emergency Medleal Service at the R/C Center. One of the monitors suffered a (simulated) heart attack and required immediate medical attention and l transportation to a hospital. The ambulance arrived quickly and, on learning of the ,[
possible contamination of the patient, the ambulance crew donned gloves and bootles. l Then, following good contamination control procedures, the patient's vital signs were l
[' taken, oxygen was administered, his contaminated clothing was removed and begged and i L. he was prepared for transport. The Interior of the' ambulance was protected from (
contamination by spread sheets and the careful wrapping of the patient. l
[, in summary, FEMA objectives 1, 5, 20,27, 28 and 29 were fully met at the Paris !
High School R/C Center. I f
i l<
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42 ,
DEFICIENCIE8 None.
^
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.
2.2.4 Ye!! County 1.2.4.1 Yen County EOC Narrative The Yell County EOC is located in the Courthouse of the county seat of Yell County at Danville, Arkansas. The county courtroom doubles as ty EOC, with the joint Emergency Management / sheriff's communications center located in the basement of the courthouse.
I Staff mobilization and fac!!!ty activation were adequately demonstrated when ,
l the Yell County Sheriff's office dispatcher in Danville received a call from the TOCC at 5:07 a.m. reporting a NOUE. This call was verifled by the use of a code word. Using a typed call down list, the dispatcher immediately informed the County OES Coordinator, County Judge and Deputy OES Coordinator who responded to the EOC and began moving
- all telephones, radlos, maps, charts, display boards, etc. from the Sheriff's dispatch office to the court room. The County Judge made the decision to mobilize the EOC staff at 9:15 a.m., upon receipt of the Alert-Status notification. All 14 members and agency representatives were present at 9:30 a.m.
Agencies represented at the EOC included: County Judge, Emergency
, Management Director, Deputy Emergency Management Director, Sheriff's Office. Yell County Care Center, Dardanelle Fire Department, County Board of Education. Yell ,
i County Health Department, Yell County Fire Department, Yell County Sheriff's Department, Dardanelle Pollee Department, Ola Police, Yell. County Police - Danville, and County Mounted Patrol.
Security was established at 9:30 a.m. and maintained throughout the exercise by the establishment of a Sheriff's Deputy at the entrance door.
, The EOC operation was effectively managed by the County Judge and the OES
! Coordinator. Throughout the period of the exercise, both Individuals demonstrated
]
43 excellent judgement and control. Problems and events were handled in a timely, accurate manner. Decisions involving other agencies represented in the EOC were coordinated effectively and other members were frequently consulted regarding those activities within the purview of their office. Briefings were held as messages were received, insuring that all present were kept Informed regarding all aspects of the exercise. The County Judge would read the message aloud and announce the response snd/or action necessary to satisfy the problem.
The courtroom, which is utilized for EOC operations, is a large comfortable room containing adequate space, furniture, and other resources necessary to carry out emergency response duties and responsib'.llties. Upon notification of an Alert, all equipment necessary for the conduct of the drill or emergency is trtnsported fedm the communications center to the courtroom.
The county courthouse is equipped for 24-hour emergency operations with a full kitchen, showers and bunks in the basement. Backup power is available for the communications center but was not demonstrated during this exercise. It is powered by natural gas. Butane can be used during an emergency that interrupts the gas supply.
Displays, maps, and status boards were adequate and were frequently used in decision making. Several of the display boards were not mounted at eye level. All messages were synopsized on the Status Board which made it difficult to read.
Evacuation routes, population densities, relocation centers, access control points, and radiological monitoring points are not shown on displays but are available in the county plan, which was frequently referenced throughout the exercise. The staff frequently used written checklists and procedural references in the performance of their duties.
The ability to communicate with all locations and field personnel was demonstrated first by the receipt of information from the TOCC by the dispatcher.
Af ter all communications equipment was moved to the EOC, a deputy sheriff served at communtentions officer. He utilized the NERN radio system and the dedicated hot line from the TOCC to communicate with local EOCs, the licensee and the EOF. EBS was not utilized during this exercise but stations KCAB, KWKK and KARV are the local EBS
, stations which will be utilized for general public information. Communications systems
' at the EOC consist of dedicated 'andline with police radio and commercial telephone as backups. The communications center is equipped with a low-band nuclear-incident radio. Through the telephone, the communicator can automatically designate which locations are to be automatically dialed. Local hospitals and schools are all equipped with tone-alert Early-Warning radios, as are the sheriff's offices and police departments
[ in Danville and Dardanelle. Ambulances are in constant contact through mobile radios.
L- The Fire Department radio is backed up by the Sheriff's dispatcher. Radiological monitoring team personnel vehicles have radios (six members also carry pagers) as do the County Mounted Patrol vehicles.
Communications to the State EOC are relayed through the TOCC by NERN radio. There is no direct radio to the State EOC.
The hard-copy facsimile was not tested during this exercise. It was reported to be out of order due to the facility changing its system. Until the communications
s.
44
- systems were functional in the EOC, all calls were promptly answered, and upon completion, the message form was immediately hand-carried to the EOC.
i j Radiation exposure was excellently monitored and controlled. Adequate radiation monitoring equipment was available and well maintained. The radiation control officer charged, zeroed, and issued TLDs, high-band (0-200 R) and low-band (0-200 MR) dosimeters to all present (with Instructions). The one Individual who was dispatched to search for a possible downed aircraft was a trooper who carries protective clothing and radiation monitoring equipment in his vehicle. A standard record card was utilized to
- record the names of those to whom the dosimeters were issued and would have been used to record readings. As the EOC was not near the exposure plume, there were no readings conducted. Thirty-six sets' of the above described equipment are available.
Demonstration of this objective corrected ARCA #87-4 from the 1987 exercise.
Upon receiving a report that the worker who had been dispatched into the plume 1 area had received contamination, the radiation officer announced that the level of exposure exceeded acceptable limits and the worker was advised to immediately report to the reception care center for decontamination.
The ability to adequately monitor classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner, was demonstrated as follows: The TOCC advised the EOC that one section of the county, in wh!ch seven familles reside, was within the plume. Tone-aled activation was simulated and the seven familles were advised to immediately evacuate and report to the reception center. Troopers were Instructed to insure that all routes and access points were clear. They were then asked i to check each home to insure complete evacuation. These troopers drive radio equipped i vehicles and carry protective clothing and dosimeters in their vehicles. All were advised
- to report to the reception center for decontamination upon completleu of evacuation.
I
) For this exercise all calls were received over the dedicated line or the NERN radio. Messages received were transcribed to the sequentially-numbered message form.
l In situations in which a message was not fully understood, the operator requested that l the message be repeated.
In summary, objectives 1, 3,4,5,16,18,20,36, and 37 of this exercise were met l
at the Yell County EOC.
t DEFICIENCIES l
) None.
1 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION l None.
l I
l 1
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l
. 45 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.
2.2.4.2 Danville Reception / Care Center Narrative The Reception / Care Center manager was well versed on county procedures to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees. A walking tour of the facility was conducted to demonstrate this objective.
The center is located in the Danville Higt School. It is capable of handling approximately 1,000 to 1,500 evacuees. The high school is equipped with a full-size kitchen and cafeteria, which could double as a bunking area. The outside entrance to the shower facilities is ideal for the segregation of contaminated Individuals from the rest of the evacuees and control of the decontamination process. The school gymnasium is also adequate for continued congregate care. The high school has ample parking for vehicles. If the center were to exceed 1,500 evacuees, the county could ut!!!ze the facilities of .the Danville First Baptist Church, the National Guard Armory and a Methodist Church which are within 150-200 yards of the Reception / Care Center. The National Guard Armory could only accommodata the bunking of evacuees. However, both churches have adequate kitchen and bunking facilities. Additionally, the Armory and both churches have ample parking space. Their space would only be used as a backup
- to the care center facilltles. The Reception / Care Center has a designated area in the high school for a nursing care station. The care center also has access to the county hospital, which is about two blocks south. The monitoring and decontamination of vehicles was not demonstrated, but was satisfactorily reviewed.
In summary, FEMA objectives 27 ant. 28 were met.
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DEFICIENCIES None.
! AREAS REQUIRINO CORRECT!VF. ACTION
- 1. .
None.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None, u.
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- A.
46 2.2.5 Conway County EOC Narrative The initial warning point for Conway County activation is the Morrilton Police Department Dispatch, which is staffed on a 24-hour basis. Notification of an Unusual ,
Event was received over the NERN system at 6:30 s.m. Immediately upon receipt of this message, the dispatcher notifled the County OES Coordinator and police chief via i telephone. {
Upon receipt of the NOUE, the County OES Coordinatot nottfled six of his staff i
by car radio to be on standby and then reported to the EOC at which time he activated a call list of 12 'ndividuals - eight of whom were placed on standby. Three others reported immediately - the communications operator, Deputy County OES Coordinator and an all-purpose helper. The County Judge and the Mayor were notifled by telephone by 8:20 a.m. All standby personnel were periodically briefed by phone.
Upon receipt of PAA messago #6, which was an update of the Alert Message, the
' Coordinator used a call-down roster and notified his staff to report to the OES. This call !
was made at 10:35 a.m. and all staff reported by 10:45 a.m. Each was briefed as they arrived. The County Judge and a City representative reported and were briefed. Upon i receipt of this message, the police department dropped out of the communications link. !
(The alert message, which was sent at 9:12 a.m., was never received at the Conway County EOC. It should have been received by the Morr!! ton Police Department, but it appears the TOCC failed to include this location as a recipient.) l
\
The County ES Coordinator served as the authorized representative of the ;;
County Judge since the Judge could not be present. The Coordinator gave frequent l briefings to the staff and contacted the Mayor and County Judge via telephone and l i
briefed each of them with each change in alert status. The Coordinator displayed good leadership and a grasp of the procedures by responding promptly and appropria'ely to ;
problems built into the exercise and free-play messages provided by the State Controller. [
Decision making and procedures were excellent even though the County Judge, Sheriff. (
Police Chief nor Mayor were present. These individuals will be present when the County ' [
is a full-play participant in order to test the County's decision-making and f implementation process. {
i The physical facilities at the EOC were adequate to support emergency !
operations. The EOC is located in the basement of the Morrilton Post Office, and has ample space, lighting, furnishings and equipment. It is divided into four rooms: a ;1 communications room, an operations room, a billeting room with two bunks and chairs and a spacious storage room. It also has a backup power unit in the form of an auxillary generator in the parking lot behind the post office.
Maps and display boards were excellent and were used throughout the exercise. ,
The wall maps were located in the Communications Room and the message display boards [
were located in the Operations Room. It would seem to benefit the operation if the maps !
were moved to the Operations Room. This would eliminate interference with the l communications operator since all maps were in his immediate location.
r
4 *
, . 67 Communications equipment and procedures were . adequate. The primary communication link to the TOCC was the NERN rad!o system. All messages were recorded on official notification forms, logged and posted on prominently displayed message boards in the operations room. State Protection Action Advisory (PAA) forms were also used. Other communications equipment available included telephones, statewide OES radlo, police and sheriff's department radio, County Fire Department radio, ambulance and hospital frequency radio, police and local tone alert system for contacting schools and major employers, eight hand-held portable radlos and a pager system for eight staff members.
There were seven dostmeter kits in the EOC and Klis available if needed. There were also plastic-wrapped dosimeter kits stapled to the wall in each room of the EOC along with several kits stored in boxes.
A radiological offleer from the fire department is on the staff and normally runs tests randomly, but was unavailable for this exercise. A substitute radlological officer was available.
In summary, FEM A objectives 1,3, 4, 5,20, 36 and 37 were met.
DEFICIENCIES None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None, i.
2.3 UTILITY SUPPORT I 2.3.1 Medical Support - St. Mary's Hospital / Pope County Ambulance Servlee L.
Narrative At 1:23 p.m., St. Mary's Hospital was notified by ANO of a contaminated injured patient. The Pope County Ambulance Service was almultaneously notifled for trans-portatfor. of the patient and immediately began performing necessary duties to stabilize the patient.
9 h
9
- 1 i e 48 '
As dictated by hospital plans, the emergency department staff noted the necessary patient Information as relayed by the ambulance staff and transmitted the information to the hospital administration for proper verification with ANO. Within 25 minutes from notification, the staff was dressed out in p.*otective clothing, essential equipment was In place, a hot area was designated, and the emergency department was ready to receive the patient.
At 2:02 p.m., the ambulance arrived at the hospital, the patient was unloaded and taken into the emergency room.
Meanwhile, a hospital employee provided security for the ambulance until a health physics technician
- completed a survey of the vehicle. No contamination was found on or in the vehicle. The crew was surveyed and found to be clean.
Overall, the hospital facility was adequate. Necessary equipment was in evidence and properly demonstrated by the hospital staff and ambulance crew. The hospital staff and ambulance crew were knowledgeable and well trained and all procedures in the transportation, reception, decontamination and treatment of the patient were executed in a smooth and professional manner.
The only problem at the hospital remains the back stairs entrance through which the patient enters the emergency department. It is cumbersome and less than desirable and.can be resolved only through remodeling, reconstruction or by utilizing the main entrance of the emergency department while taking proper precautions. The hospital should consider correcting this problem before the next exercise.
In summary, FEMA objectives 1, 5, 20, 30, 31 and 36 were met.
DEFICIENCIES None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
+
Description:
The continuing problem (see previous exercise reports) with the emergency room entrance results in a less than desirable situation.
Recommendation: It is urged that some measures be taken to resolve this problem by either using a different entrance or remodeling the present entrance.
, , . 49 b ,
3 TRACEING SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT
, DEFICIENCIES AND AREA 8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION j Section 2 of this exercise report has provided a listing of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action with recommendations noted by federal evaluators during the most recent exercise conducted on March 23,.1988. The evaluations were based on
,, the applicable planning standards and evaluation eriteria set forth in Sec. !! of the NUREG-0654 FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980) and exercise objectives.
The FEMA Region VI Director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action noted in the exercise will be corrected and such corrections will also be incorporated into the emergency response plans as
! appropriate.
d FEMA Region VI will request that the State of Arkansas and local jurisdictions I participating in the Arkansas Nuclear One exercise submit measures that they will take
}. or intend to take to correct those problems found by the Federal evaluators. If j corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI will request that a detailed plan, i' including dates for scheduling and Imilementing l corrective actions be provided if such actions cannot be instituted immediately.
Table 1 provides a consolidated summary of all Deficiencies and Areas Requiring
! Corrective Action. The table is designed so that space has been allowed to adds (1) the j proposed corrective actions that have been recommended and (2) the projected and actual date of completion. There were no Deficiencies noted in this exercise.
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1 TAH8E I Defleieseles/Arces Respairing Corrective Aetiens for the 38arett 13.1988 Arkammes thselaar One Emmeelse rem c t at .r st.c.
4 4,... a .i i st.t. ts) 4 er.y. 4 4 a,c. c.,,.cti ac s . act= t o.aiei..ci..
c.,,.cai acts . .ith rem inac t ,c.: t u r,.,. 4 c ,teti 4 a.t. i ts .r c ,t.ti 1
a,c 4.c1 . c., c.,,uti c.,,u ti.. ac i . a.t. a % -,y ., ; - 2, n.c. - -i 1
Teck.ical 0,. ..t i .c.. C t .t Ce.t.,
(TOCC) s.ficie.cie.: s area. S.geini.g C.t .cti acts 8
- 888 .
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. . . 51 4 EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 4.1
SUMMARY
OF FEMA OBJECTIVES REMAINING TO BE MET Table 2 on the following pages provides listing of those FEMA Objectives which, according to the FEMA RAC Chairman, have not been satisfactor!!y met or tested and
, which should be incorporated in to the exercise objectives on or by the sixth year of the w!x-year period In which the objectives must be tested. These should be considered in the development of future exercise objectives; as well as those FEMA objectives which,
. . although previously tested and satisfactorily demonstrated, must be tested and evaluated during any Full-Participatton exercise of off-site State and Local response capabilities.
As previously mentioned in the Exercise Background Section, this 1988 exercise is the third of a new six-year cycle.
4.2 FEMA OBJECTIVES TRACE!NG - AREANSAS NUCLEAR ONE Table 3 provides a comprehensive tracking system of FEMA Objectives, NUREG-0654 Reference Elements, Exercise Objectives, Jurisdictional Responsibility, Exercise '
Dates, Identitled Defielencies and Required Corrective Actions, a'nd the Date Specif!c FEMA Objectives Were Met by State and Local agencies. This system will track the progress and status of these data through the six-year exercise cycle in which all FEMA Objectives must be tested.
h b=e8 4
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A
g 52 TABLE 2 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to Be Met - Arkansas Nuclear One FEMA Objective and NUREJ Reference Jurisdiction
- 2. Demonstrate ability to fully Not Tested -- State or Local 1
staff facilities and maintain
- staffing around the clock.
(A2.a, A.4)
- 11. Demonstrate ability to project Objective to be tested.
dosage to the public via ingestion pathway . exposure, based on fleid datal and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PACS and other relevant factors. (I.10, I.11, 4 J.11)
- 12. Demonstrate ability to implement Objective to be tested.
protective actions for ingestion pathway hasards (J.9, J.11)
- 27. Demonstrate adequacy of pro- Not. tested -- Conway County --
cedures for registration and 3/18/87, 3/23/88 radiological monitoring of evacuees. (J.12.1)
- 28. Demonstrate adequacy of f acili- Not tested -- Conway County --
- ties for mass care of evacuees. 3/18/87, 3/23/83 (J.10.h) i
- 29. Demonstrate adequate equipment Not tested in Conway County and Pope and procedures for decontamina- County (Atkins) tion of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles (K.S.4,b) i
- 33. Demonstrate ability to estimate Objective to be tested.
total population exposure.
l (M.4) 34 Demonstrate ability to determine objective to be tested.
and implement appropriate meas-ures for controlled recovery and reentry. (M.1)
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e TANI.E 3 FERIA Esereise Ohjeettwes TrasAlag Chart - Arhe Ilmeneer One Objective at Jeriodictiemal Deficiency or Area
- search 23, IMS Besponsibility Se piring Corrective Sete Objective Met /Isot Iset
, ImInf.C 0614 Esercise Sete of Action (by Tracking ,
1 FDea Objective somber and Descripties aeference (Tes/Do) St at e Local Esercj oe sto. & Bete) State 1ecal I 1. Demoneteate ability to mehilise staf f E.3, E.2 Yes I E 3/23/M 3/23/88 Att met 3/23/84 and activate f acilities promptly. (ML)
(kjec t ive for which capebility obeeld be densmetrated d ring each f tl partscapation esercies)
- 2. Demuestrate abilit y to fully staff A.2.a. We I 1 facilities and esintein staffing A.4 (ML) aseumd the eleck.
L
- 3. De==netrate ability se eene d.ciesene A.I.d. Yes E E 3/23/84 3/23/88 Att met 3/23/84 ,
and to coordsmate emergency activi- A.I.e.
ties. A.2.s (ML) tee W
(aje ti e for which capability should be denometrated dorsag each f ull particspation esercise)
- 4. Dresentrate adequacy ei f ac ilit ies, C.3.a. Vee E I. 3/23/84 3/23/88 A11 acc 3/23/48 equipment, maps and displays to et.2, sr.)
s pport emergenc y operatione. (ML)
( W )ective for which capabilit y should be denometrated during each f ull part ecipation esercine)
- 5. breenstrate ability to communicate er (ML) Yes E E 3/23/84 3/23/84 All met 3/23/88 with all appropriate locations, esganisetsmas and field peroommel.
(Ob jec t ive for which tapebilit y shoeld be dessestrated dering each full participation esercise)
- 6. D-muestrate abilit y se ambilise and 8.8 (5) Tee E 3/23/88 3/23/84 deploy (seld monstering issues is a timely fashion.
(Objective' for eeich capabilit y shueld be demonstrated 4. ring each f.18 particapaties esercises)
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I i TABLE 3 (Cesti$
063ects et Josiedictiesel mediciency .a ares seeeth 23, 1988 asepensibility negoiries Corrective mete enjective sent/sec seet*
ut:4EC 4654 Eneac i oe Sete of acties (by Trackles *
(Tee /me) Local Esercise me. & Sete) State 5.ecal 7 Da4 Object i ve e A t and Seeceipties sederence State
- 12. Demeest rate abilsty to implemoet pre- f.19,J.ll So - E I Eec4ise ettisee ier ieseetIse potbasey J.9 (S&L) -
beseeds. J.!G(96L) .
- 13. Demeesteete abili.y se alors the E.6, Vee I 3/2*,/88 3/23/98 public wethee the 14-eale EFE and app.3 dieseeinate se leitial imet re.ct s ana l me*sese estbis 11 eientes.
(ob jec t ive for stich capablit y she=Id be de==est set ed deeseg each d=Il perticipaties esercies)
- 14. Deesmes rese ability to feeen.lete end E.), E.7 me E 3/1818F 3/14/87
, es sasiemte oppropeiste imetractases (S)
- to tha public is a timely feehien,
- 11. Deemmetrate oesemisetiemet abilit y J.9, Vee 1 x 3/14/87 3/54/0F Aai est 3/23/M med esomeces emeesseer to manage me J.IS.e, onderly e,eceeties of all er port of J.58.s.
the pleen Eft. (S&L)
(Objoc t 6.e ier eMch cepobilisy .
eheeld be demeest rat ed dering each fell participation eserties) ,
De==est eet
- eroamisatiemet a6ility J.As.b yes a I 3/23/m 3/23/08 All met 3/23/06 16.
and geneerces necessary to deel wit h (S&L) sepediment e to e.ecess ige, se lecte-eest meather er teeffic obetractimes. .
Ves 3 x 3/23/s4 3/23/88 All mac 3/23/98 II. r eteate ersemisatieaal abilit y J.50.) ,
end reseeeces oncessery to centrol (S&L) access to en eweceased eve 4.
erseeisetiesel abilit y J.50.4 feo I 3/23/94 All met 3/23/84
- 18. Dweses.eets med eenceeces necessaey to ef fect me it) eederly eweceetion of mobility-impelred individeale erithis the plasse Ett.
1
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TAIBt23(C W -_
Objective et Jurisdis.iemet Defieleecy or Aree merch 23,1988 Seepensibi;ity W iriep Corrective Sete Objective met /Isot slet asumEC MS4 Esercise Sete of htise (by 2reching .
EtmA Objective mueber and toscripties Seference (Veelse) State 14 cal Esercise Be. & Sote) St ate Lacet 4
i
- 19. h st rate erseelset iesel ability J.9, se 1 3/23/08 Att previemely and researcos neceses y to et feet me J.10.g est l orderly e.acuation of echoote withis the pImme Ef1.
I 20. De==estrate abilit y to contiewe=ely E.3.e. fee 1 1 3/23. 45 3/23/M Als est M2 3.'SS meester med centret emerseacy verber E.3.6 1 e s posee e. (ML)
! (Objec tive for .esch cepebility
- should be deaeostrered dorsag each f elt participeties esercies) i 21 5>=seest rate obitisy te .he the deci- J.te.f me X 4/?/M. w
! eien, bened em predeterslead crite- (ML)
' rae, eAettar te loswo El to emergency
{ workere e-ad for the generet s , ele-
, ties.
t
- 22. Dreemetrate ability to e.ppl y and J.10.e fee X X 4/2/M teet' 4/2/44 l Yell & Pese i
edesesster Et, esce the deciesen hee (ML4 Ceesty sece j been made to de .
' naet 19231M '
Mm&
LeGen Come, -
ties seCe -
- 23. Demoner-ste ability to effect se J.2 Yes 1 3/23/06 samt 3/23/M erderly evecest ies of on site Pope Co.
pere n .t.
- 24. Demeestrate abilit y to betet tLe C.3.e. Vee X 3/23144 amCA SF-8, cor- 3/23/M media is e eteer, ecc.rese, aM C.4.e. rected 3/23/88 timely meneer. (5) 9 9
e e
r Q $*
4 *
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o . 3 TABLE 3 (ContW, e
objective at Jurisdictionat Deficiency or Area '
March 23, 1988 Responsibility Sequiring Corrective Date o' jective Met /Not Met uuSEC 0634 Esercise Date of Action (by Trackin8 ,
FEMA Objective Number and Description Reference (Yes/No) State Local Esercise No. & Date) State Lccal
- 25. Descastrate ability to provide C.4.S (S) Yes 1 3/18/07 3/18/87 advance coordination of information released.
- 23. Demonstrate ability to establish and C.4.c (S) No X 4/2/86 ,
operate rumor control la a coordi-mated fashion.
27 temons. rate adeaesc, '
yr w . dates J.12 (L) Yes X 3/23/88 Met 3/14/87
- *Ji legical Johnson &
(-ar registratiem monitoring of evacue_m. Pope Co. EOCs
^
Met 4/2/88 Yell County (Objective for d.i c:a capability should le demo 62treted during each Met 3/23/48 full partir.ipsti.c eserc'se) . LoSan County un Not tested N Connesy County
- 28. Demaastrate adequacy of facilities J.10.h Yes X 3/18/87 Met 3/18/87 for mass care of evacuees. (L) Pope & John-son Counties Het 3/23/84
. LoSen & Yell Counties
- 22. Dem astrate adequate equipment and K.S.a. Yes 3 3/U/ 5Jf AsCA 87-3 Clarks- Net 3/23/88 precedures for decontamination of K.S.b, wille Seception/ LoSam and emergency workers, equipment, and (L) Care Center cor- Johnson Co.
vehiclas. rected 1/23/84 Met 6/11/87 Pope Countyg
. (Ob ject ive for which capability 4/2/86 Yell should be demonstrated during eac*. County f e!! participatim esercise) Not tested Connesy County 4
.e W
TABLE 3 (Conti$
Objective as ', risdictional Deficiency or Area March 23, 1988 Responsibility Requiring Corrective Date Objective Met /Not Met NUREC 0434 Esercise _Date of Action (by Trackina FLMA Objective Number and Descripties Reference (Yes/No) State I.mcal Esercise No. & Dete) State local' ,
- 30. Demoestrate adequacy of EMS transpor- L.4 (L) Yes X 3/23/88 ' Met 3/23/88 tation, perseasel and precedures for Pope County handling contaminated individuals 3/23/88 secteding proper decontamination of Utility vehicle and equipment. -
support (Objective for which cepability should be demonstrated during each ,
fell participation esercise)
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital L.1 (L) Yes 1 3/23/88 3/23/88 facilities and procedores for han- Utility dting contaminated individuals. support-(Objective for which capability Os should be demonstrated during each felt participation esercise)
- 32. Demonstrate ability - to identif y need C.1.a. No X 3/18/87 3/1f/87 for, request, and obtain Federal C.1.b (S) assistance.
- 33. Demonstrate ability to estimate total M.4 (S) No I population esposure.
~
- 34. Demoostrate ability to determine and M.1 (S&L) No X X implement appropriate measures for centrolled recovery and reentry.
- 33. Demonstrate the ability te effec- C.4 (5) No X 3/18/87 3/18/87, tively call upon and utiliae outside support agencies when local capabili-ties are exceeded.
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1 TABLE 3 (ComtY) 9 Objective at Jurisdictional Deficitacy or Area March 23. 1988 Responsibility Requiring Corrective Date Objective Met /Not Me:
NUREC 0654 Esercise Date of Action (by Tracking Reference (Yes/No) Local Esercise No. & Date) State Local '
FDta Objective %mber and Description State
- 36. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability F.1 (S&L) Yes I E 3/23/84 3/23/88 All met 3/23/88 and effective use of emergency com-musicaties equipment and the adequacy of communicatsome procedures and mot he+ .
( C' tctive for which capability i should be descastrated du sag each full participation esercise)
- 37. Drasest rate ability to monitor Emer - F.I (S&L) Yes X X 3/23/84 3/21/84 All met 3/23/84 gency Classification levels continu-ously and implement procedures in a timely manner. t.n e
(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each
- full participation esercise)
- 38. Demonstrate capability to ef fectively E (S&L) Yes 1 1 3/18/87 3/11/87 ARCA 47-1 ARCa 87-1 All met 3/23/88 JIC corrected JIC cor-l process all incoming / outgoing mes-sages in a timely mammer, including 3/23/88 rected the documenting of both actual and 3/a3/as j simulated messages.
- 39. Demonstrate that authority esists in A.2.a. Yes X X 3/23/84 Mitt Met 3/23/84 4
coordinating and activating a recep- A.) (S&L) 3/24/88 Johnson Co.
tion center (as necessary) in a TIEC EOCl i
Not met Pope timely manner.
Co. EOC I
(Ob jec t ive for which capability Def. 87-1 should be demonstrated during each Met 6/11/87
- Pope Co. EOC j full participation esercise) Met 3/23/84 Logan Co. EOC Met 4/2/86 Yell County 1
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