ML20136C306

Forwards Revision 2 of Response to IE Bulletin 79-06B. Includes Response to NRC 790725 Request for Addl Info

ML20136C306
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	08/01/1979
From:	Trimble D ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
2-089-1, 2-89-1, NUDOCS 7909190102
Download: ML20136C306 (23)

Text

, - . . - - - - - - - - - - - _

ARKANSAS POWER S LIGHT COMPANY POST OmCE BOX 551 UTTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 3714C00 Augtut 1,1979 i

2- -'

'::. ~. ';. Se;i: i t, Di rector C:h;r :.f Inspection & Enforcan:nt R==i : . :1 l'. 5. .'c:: lear Regulatory Ormission

61. .:.._a Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arl i .;,t on , Texa s 76011

Subject:

Arkansas Nuclear Che-Unit 2 Ibcke t No. 50-363 License No. NPF-6 Response to IE Dulletin No.79-063 (File: 2-1510)

Gent!crnen:

In response to your regnest for addi tional inforrnation (dated July 25, 1979), the attached Revision 2 to our response to IE Butletin No.79-06B incorporates our rrodi fied responses to itens 2a and 10. 'Ihe attached Revision 2 supercedes Revision 1 transmi tted to you by our June 29, 1979, letter.

In response to itens in your request for addi tional infortiation, the following is provided.

Iten 3:

Prcreide a carrnitment for assuring nanual initiation of CI upon actuation of the SIAS until such time as your long tenn rrodification as stated in your response to this bulletin itan, are co pleted. Also, provide assur-ance that you will initiate a rmnual override for the valves in the can-ponent cooling water systen to the RC purp coolers upon actuation of CI provided this action does not lead to unsafe plant conditions.

Response

In developing our original response to Itan 3 of IE Bulletin No.79-06B, we perforted a corplete review of all system that penetrate the Containment Building with the purpose of assuring ourselves that no potential radio-Ivical release path vould exist, following an accident, to the environs.

'Ihe conclusion of our ir.<cstigation was that no such release path protable and that no :nxlifications were needed to our system __ _ _

7909190 / 0 2 MEMBE84 #AooLF GoufH UTILefiES RYSTE M

l

, l l

l 2-0S9-1 Mr. K. V. Seyfri t 2 Augus t 2,1979 to asrare an adequate nurgin of safety. Ikmever, we did cmmit to nuke certa.n audi fication.s to increase the nurgin of safety, and we ruintain t ha i c J :.i tment .

We :-..a t , at this ti-e, conni t to nunual ini tiation of the Containnent

sc.s en Actuation Signal (CIAS). By initiating a CIAS, the Contalment 3:1:ir.; would be carpletely isolated. We do not have the capabili ty to

. .ua'.: o.erride cany desirable nonsafety system once a CIAS has been prera-M regardless of whether that signal is generated nnnually or

=.- i ::117. ,

ne efore, to preclude isolating sane desirable nonsafety systans as well as asr: ring v.e do not place the plant in an unsafe condition, we believe  ;

it is ,=rudent to naintain our original response and procale wi th the l nndifications addressed therein. l Itan 6.br I Pro.-ide assurance that operating procedures will be nodified to keep high pressure injection and charging pmps in operation in accordance with the criteria as provided in Iten 6.b of the bulletin, and as clarified by the following staterent:

"Af ter 50F subcooling has been achieved, termination of high pressure safety injection (HPI) operation prior to 20 minutes is only permissible if it has been determined that continued operation would result in an unsafe plant condition, e.g., attaining pressure /tarperature conditions that could jeopardize vessel integrity or that could have the potential for opening the REV's or safety valves so as to discharge water or a twophase fluid consisting of mater and steam."

Response

We do not wish to carmit to continued operation of the diarging pmps for the following reasons:

l I) ne charging pmps are not required post ILCA to assure carp!!ance with Appendix K.

2) he flow of the charging ptrrps (43 gpn each) is insigni-ficant in carparison to the High Pressure Safety Injection Purps (fIPSI).

l

3) He charging pturps are not safety grade.

2-089-1 Mr. K. V. Scyfri t Augus t 2, I979 41 Continued operation of the chargine lums post IIL\ could increase the RW boron concentration to the point where boron precipi tation could occur.

D_-ing nx nal operation, the charging pams draw suction frun the Volare

. -- . Tank (\UT) . However, upon initiation oI a Safety Injection

a:::. t Signal tSIAS) valves 2CV 4820-2 arxi 2CV 4821-2 autunatically

.N 'sc:ati .g let (km which feeds into thc \Cr. The charging pmps i . '. . :c ..1.ce to operate until a low level is reached in the \CE at v..- . - .e :au level transmitters 2LT 4861 and 2LT 4857 will autamti-es'. ., :.ase Ov' 4873-1 (isolating the \CT) and open 2CV 4950-2 (allow-

...; suc:lan frun the Re fueling Water Tank; IWF), and 2CV 4916-2 (at low-i .; rut ton fran the Boric Acid Makety Tanks). This systan is shown c: 75G Figures 9.3-4 sheets I and 2.

Crr-2us tion Engineering has infonned us that the charging purps should rn: be operated for greater than 1/2 hour post IOCA to preclude in-jection of high boren concentration which could potentially lead to Inron precipation. Therefore, se believe that cagliance with your rapest could place the plant in an unsafe condition and could de-crease the nargin of safety as it applies to the public health and safety.

We understand that your principle concern behind your request to con-tinue operation of the charging pugs is to assure flow capability to the RCS, in the event the RG pressure following a amt i break ILCA was to remin above IIPSI shutof f head. The CE &ners Group has con-pleted and subni tted (to NRC) a significant spectrun of generic smil break IDCA analyses in addition to our plant specific analyses. None of those analyses indicated pressure plateaus above IIPSI slutof f head.

However, this potential situation has been previously addressed for NO-2 and procedures have been inplanented to accanrodate such a situation. The MO-2 pressurizer does not have a imV but instead an FfTM vent line. This is a piece of pipe with two safety grade valves in series vented to the Contair1 ment Duilding atnusphere. In the event RCS pressure were to plateau above HPSI pmp slutof f head, our current proce&res require the operators to take certain actions to depressurize the RG one of which is to open the ECCS vent line. This l action v.ould provide sufficient depressurization of the ICS to estab-i lish HPSI flow.

Therefore, we believe your concern is accounted for in the existing NO-2 design arxl procedures and that our response to Itun (B in our letter of June 29, 1979, is the nust appropriate guideline for opera-l tion and provides for a greater nurgin of safety to the public health and safety.

1

{ .

2-089-1 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit Augus t 2. I979 I t e- 7 :

ih o:e assurance that alI locked safety related valves are positioncxl

2. . i mir. ained in the appropriate position for all nodes of operation.

?'s - + :

C

: es o se to this item in our letter of June 29, 1979, addresstx!

:.e;;- I' valves for all nodes of operation. "Categury E" valves re c.:s ci .is required to be locked, sealed or othenvise secured j  ! .- .c .. correct posi t ion.

i Very truly yours, badetN [

l David C. Trinble i Manager, Licensing l DCr/JTE/ew cc: Mr. W. D. Johnson l

1 U. S. thclear Regulatory I

Camtl ssion i

P. O.13ox 2090 l j Russellville, Ark. 72801 '

i s

l i

l l

1

)

i i

i l

1 l

l l .

l - --

o rw s u ., s . .u a n . . ,. . - . . v. . . . . - . . . . . . . . - .--....- .

ii. Eulietin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the TMI-2 3/26/79 accident included in Enclosure 1 to IE bulletin 79-05A.

a. This revicu should be directed toward understanding: (1) the extre e seriousness and consequences of the simultaneous blocking of both auxiliary feedeter trains at the Three l'ile Islard U 't 2 plant and other actions taken during the early phases of the accident; (2) the apparent operational errors vb.ith icd to the eventual core dmge; (3) that the potential exists, c.:nder certain accident or transient conditions, to have a vater level in the pressurizer sinultaneously with the rea: tor vessel not full cf. water; and (4) the necessity to systi .nically analyze plant conditions and parameters and tae appropriate corrective a: tion.

. 0 erational personnel should te instructed to: (1) not over-ride autoTatic action of engineered safety features unless cenir.;ed operation of engineered safety features will result ir. unsafe plant conditions (see Section 6e.); and (2) not nake operational decisions based solely on a s.ngle plant parameter indication >: hen one or more confirmatory in::ications are ava ilable .

c. All licensed operators and plant canagement and supervisors with operational responsibilities shall participate in this re.ie.v and such p:rticipition shall be docu ented in plant reccrds.

Rescanse:

k'e have revie.ed, in detail, Enclosure 1 of IE Bulletin 79-05 and the seq;ence of events included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-054 Pe have worked closely with fiRC, SEW, and P.et-Ed in gather-i:g, analyzing, and disseminating all data ue have been able to obtain to date to assure that our understanding of the incident is as accurate as possible.

Our reviews have been specifically oriented toward those areas of concern addressed in IE Bulletin 79-06B and have included presenta-tions to the operations staff by NRC, I&E Region IV personr.el, and NP.C Operator Licensing Branch personnel, in addition to thorough reviews and discussion by plant staff personnel. All licensed operators and plant management / supervisors with operational respon-sibilities have participated in these reviews. Ibcumentation as to their participation has been kept.

)

Additional operator instruction and guidance addressing the specific i concerns of item 1.b of IE Eulletin 79-05B are being revised into plant prccedures as detailed in our response to item 6.

2 Question:

2) Paview the actions required by your operating procedures for coping with tra .sients and accidents, with particular attention '

c:

. . Recognitier. of the possibility of fonning voids in the pri-cary coolant systen large enough to cmpromise the core cooling capabili ty, especially natural curculation capability.

. Cpera: ton action required to prevent the fomation of such coids.

. Operator action required to enhance core cooling in the event such voids are fonred (e.g., reinte venting).

Posecr_se :

2a) Tne Arkansas Nucler One -Unit 2 (ANO-2) onergency procedures will be rrodified as a result of the 'Ihree Mi1e Island - thit 2 ('IMI-2) incident, to recognize the possibillty of fonning stean voids in the Reactor Coolant Syston (RCS). 'Ihe operator's need to rronitor the RCS parareters to detect conditions at or near saturation will be eiphasized.

Natural circulation is established by tennination of forced flow (tripping the Reactor Coolant Pinps). Procedures shall require verification of natural circulation and heat rejection to the Steam Generator secondary by confirming that:

RG 'Ih's stabilize af ter coastdcmn of RCPs then tend to decrease.

RCS Delta T tends to decrease (Th and Tc to converge) with 2 decreasing decay heat load af ter RCP coastdcmn.

Continued denand exists for feed flow to the stean genera-tors to naintain stean generator level.

Continued denand exists for turbine bypass, atrresphere dtmps, or safety valves operation to lirait secondary pressure.

Voids in the RCS uny be recognized by:

1) Oscillations in RCP arperage and aP

2) Incore thennocouples indicating superheat

3) Oscillations in nuclear instruerent (cue to reduced shielding as a result of the voids).

3 Zb) "Ihe #D-2 energency procedures wilI be mxiified to minimize the fonnation of such stean voids by:

!) Regairing :he operator to check the reactor coolant '

pressure r.d tetperature during recovery fran a reactor trip and o:her transients in order to achieve and nuintain subcooling of the reactor coolant in the hot and cold legs.

D2 ring "folicsup actions" the c,perators will take steps to naintain at least 50F subcooling in the RCS.

~

Previding for tennination of operation of Fagineered Safety Tea:ures (ESF) systens only when the condi tions h scribed in :he response to 02cstions 6.b.1 and 6.b.2 >a ix t. Thia will aid in the prevention of stean void fdM.c.. ed in sten void elimination should they be fonned and ensure con-tinued core cooling.

2c The ND-2 energency procedures will be nudified to ensure that the core is cooled in the event that such voids are fomed by:

1) Providing for tennination of operation of the ESF Systens when autcnntically actuated by low pressure conditions only when the condi tions described in the response to 02estions 6.b.1 and 6.b.2 are net. This will aid in both the prevention of stean void fonnation and in stean void elimination should they be fonned, thus, ensuring core cooling.

2) Providing for the continued operation of at least one reactor coolant puTp per loop to assist in core cooling during accident conditions if it is advantageous for those accident conditions.

3) Providing for operator action to open Pressurizer BI:S vents in case stean voids are fonned in the RCS and RCS flow and heat rejection to the stean generators is inadequate.

i l

a nd prepa re a nJ inp l er nt a l l cha s);t '. stece:.so ry to perrr.11 conta in-rent isolc ticn thether ::anual or cuu.:.ati:, of all lines those isolation does nct degrade needed sefety features or cooling capability, upon auto.atic initiation of safety injection.

Fere: se_: .

- : hace rec : ad the Contaiinent Isola tion Actuation System (CIAS) i

.-sign er.d t c:edures and have listed belo.e the auto atically actuated i .as '.hich . ;-tide perctration isa'a tion (valve nu.T.bers in paren-

sis):

.: _ u: v !

. -rical and Volute Control Syste.. Letdo.tn (2CV-4821-1 and 2;i-4E?3-2)

n e:: y !_I

2) Cnilled ; 3 ter Sup;1y tc Centairc:ent Coolers (2CV-3352-1)

3) Cnilled ifatcr Supply fror. Contein ent Coolers (2CV-3850-2 and 2CV-3551-1)

4) Cr.;>anent Cooling 1ner to Reactor Coolant Pump Coolers (2CV-5236-1) l

5) Co ponent Cccling '.hter frmi Reactor Coolant Pu.,p Coolers ,

(2CV-5254-2 and 2C'.'-5255-1) l Ca tegory III

6) Contairnent Vent Header (2CV-2400-2 and 2CV-2401-1)

7) F.eactor Coolant Syste?. and Pressurizer Sa:rple (25V-5833-1 and 2SV-5543-2)

8) l'itrogen Supply to Safety injection Tanks (2CV-6207-2)

9) Quench Tank Liquid Sample (2SV-597S-1 and 2SV-5871-2)  ;

10) Safety injection Tank Sa:aple (2SV-5876-2) l l

11) Quench Tank Makeup v?ater Supply (2CV-4690-2)

12) Cor. tai;u-2n . Sur:.p Lrcin (2CV-20f.0-1 and 2CV-2001-2)

13) Contair. ment Purge Iniet (2CV-8289-1, 2CV-8284-2 and l 2CV-C263-1) l l l

._ ._ -_ \

hp) i.vi, r r e:,:.u t e n e ' ruy/n . Supply l .fL V-td14-2)

16) Reactor Drain Tank Drain (2CV-2202-1 and 2CV-2201-2)

I Cateanry !V '

17) Feact:- Coolant Pump Controlled Blecdof f (2CV-4047-2 and 2:V *?*i-1)

.1 Ster Werator Scrapie (2CV-5850-2 and 2CV-SS59-2)

.: A9 Particulate l'onitor in Hydrogen Purge System

'251 -!!31-2, 2SV-8273-1 and 25'.*-S2 71-2)

U., Mr Particulate t'.onitor in Conte.incent Atmosphere Sampic (ISV-5251-2, 2SV-8265-1 and 2SV-9263-2)

'. ) F re Water Supply (2CV-3200-2)

• te- 1 (Category I) above is isolated up n receipt of a Safety cr a Containe:nt Isolation Actuation Inje:tica Sigr.i. (CI AS). Actuation SIAS is Sional generated(SIAS) Tien Reactor Coolar.t Syste is less than or ecual to 1740 psia or when Contain .ent Fuilding pressure is greater than or equal to 18.4 psTi. CIAS is generated when Centain-ment Euilding prcssure is greater than or equal to 18.4 psia.

Ite s 2 throuDh 21 isolate upon receipt of a CIAS. The valves noted in Itcas 2 through 5 (Categcry II) are normally open during power operation r.ince they are in syste.as hiich provide support to r,eeded syste.ms within the Containment Suilding. The vclves noted in Itens 6 through 16 (Category III) are nomally closed during power operaticn and arc only opened periodically by specifi: canual operation, i.e. there is no autz,atic opening of any of these valves. The valves noted in Itecs 17 through 21 (Category IV) are normally open during power operation but are not necessary to be open following receipt of a SIAS.

Since Items in Category II are providing support to systems within the Containment Euilding, the valves should stay open upon receipt of a SIAS to prevent unnecessary equipr.ent damage. The systens represented in Category II contribute to a " normal", orderly cool-down following receipt of a SIAS.

Items in Category III are normally closed during power operation and specific manual operation is required to open the .. Further-nore, to cause full opening of the penetration, specific manual operation of at least two valves is required, each of wiiich requires a specific and deliberate action. Eased on this fact, no changes to the Contairraent Euilding Isolation Syste.r cre needed.

O

.. 4 e i n .e eu m u at nas t ecn ver t:1cd tha t a d ir ec t cent.ec t icn j

betv:cen the Contairraent Suilding at.os;here and tne Aux.iliary 1 Building atrosphere or the environ %:nt does not exist wiiile these penetrations are open bascd on this fact, no changes to the Ocn ta ir. ..- n Building Isolation Systen are needed.

-:.e.:r, tc f_rther increase the r.argin of safety, a desigr. (

' a r;2 i, bE;r; evaluated for iteas in Category 111 and IV

a:e a 5 '. S :] those valves. This design change will provide .

1

- r degree of assurance t!. t no release path to the ac

iti u.i

. {

3 e>.ists upon receipt of a S!AS vithout a concurrent CIAS.

.s r:.:ifi:at'cas resulting fron this evaluation vtill be inple-r :.-ir..  :~ e first availcble plar.t outage to colo shutdown n' ;;ient cccation to accomodate the r.odification following

r,-i tire cf tr' e design change package, but no later than the 9 -5 : efueling cetage.

pue, tion :

4) For facili8ies for .hich the auxiliary feedwater systen is not a4:cotically initiated, prepare and irelement irraediately proce-f.res which require the stctioning of an individual (with no othee ,

at:igned cor.curre.:t duties and in direct and continuous com..,unica-

.ith t'.e cc a.'al rcom) to procptly initiate adequate auxiliary

.te: ta r.c : can generator (s) for those transients or acci-

.- .: . the cc.mse;.ences of which can be limited by such action.

.- --.r is rot applicable to Arkansas tiu: lear One-Unit 2

- . , as t.e Er.ergency feedwater System (EFl:) is designed to

i. n .:ic::;. ir.itiate as part of the Engineered Safety Features

-:  :.i:r. Sys en. (ESFAS). The systen is designed to the latest e: :n ';2.. 1) of Branch Technical Position ASS 10-1.

.:e Desi;r. Basis Events which will cause autonetic Ex.crgency Fie:. 3 er actuation are:

Stear.line F.reak (Insica Containr.ent)

Stecr:line Break (Outside Containment)

Loss cf Main feedwater The variaties which are ronitored to indicate the above events are:

Stear. Generctor Pressure Steam Generater Level Further infon ation on the AN3-2 EF'd System is presented in the AND-2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Sections 7.3.1.1.11.8. and 10.4.9, and in Volume IX, Response te NRC Questions 020.35, 020.54, 222.22, and 222.90.

l l

b) it . ..t.r  : .:t i l i t t i- . p r e; ..t.- . nJ 1:::p .e : . ' . ii:..n::lic t sy 8. rote.:ures

s. ' . :. ..

2.  : Je:.t i f., t :. - pl a r. ' i r.<! i .: ti o:is (. ..t. a , v.ilv. d i sch..: ;<

i' : L.. .. i r e. , vd vs po.. i t ic :4 it..'i .i t i:ci. or valve d ischarge

.. . .. re ture t.: preuur. in.iied i::n) 6.i.i(h pl. at

.- . . - ill/t t e. i (." : t r. i i n : hc. t prt. :.3u ; z er p:.... r

.: ' s . i s .2 ( *. ) c i t. 0;u :.: e::

. ;i. '.. o; r .. .t r.. to n i a . l '.y t i n :. c t'... pc. c 0;. era tect

".' . . . . ' . ) '.. ._ a : ec c c r _ o. I a n t . ,

t. :.i pr cs".ui t is

. ..- te:< p t ;a ir.t io' . ..'r..:1 . u. itic cle :ra of

. .. - ' rcliet valve ('.l d the v.:!ve(< ) r e:;3in

. , e ..

U.L. : . .

. 5 15 r.3' c;> 1;c e.: h to /,r;. ansa 3 ::u:1 car 0 t! nit 2 (f.t:0-2)

- . ....- 2 d s . :1 c: ..::. r a t. ir.clude re. i e,, crete ' relief v..lyc.s

.. p:enoria r. Oce. ;.r. stut ize tion. of Die Pe..cror Coolent

c 3...' i ;. f rec h.!t .) n. r.:cir. of sa fety v. lves cr.d !;i.* i:.:a.. tor E .- t.-'. i a. e Sys tcr ( F.e'5) .

-for.vtic: c:a th. safety valves is prc:e.ted in 5teticr.s 5.2.2 and 5.i.10 tr.c' C; i :< r 5/. of the ic:3-2 f in:1 La fety I. r lys is Peport

( F ,f.R .' . :nium:; tiv.. c tne P.i'5 is prest.r.'.td in 5cci. ion 7.2 of the

, . ' . - 2 : .s no s

3

c. 0, r. - "

. d.ro r..fsri!r cut.i..ric .,:. inn.. or ,.:,gineered

(.-

. . . t n . <. , unles; c r.'i:.a  ! op.ce!ien of cry;ineered

e. ? .

r e:. lil l ret. ult. in uns. fe p!.:nt conji tiarr . for en - .. t M :r.ac.f oper .t in 1 o f tn ;ricered sa fety fea tures

..' rt:acttr se:. c1 i.:.s.[.rity then the 1:Pi should e.r :t.: in b(2) in ki).

,e:~  ; . :_:c , curren tly, or es t revi'.ed to, spec i fy

.- . p.. .;

p. es:.ure it..u t ier. (l:5 ) sys: c..i Ir . been e.. -

/'. .

. :e ! ! te . of Iv.; ; : e .wrc cr.ndt tion ,

. r . - . :: t r, opa. a tion un:.il eilh. r:

t i-:5 P. . prew re injr c tice (LFI) pu ,,s ere in c;.cration e rf il:. ;n,, fe. 20 r ;na:..% or lu:wr; at a rate which i ;ciJ asra t e s .:ble pLnt !. ! . ier; or (2) '.~!.e l'?i sys t< .! h::s bcen in op?ratian for 20 minutes, and el! hn cr.d c old leg te rm:rnure . ..rc a t least 50 degrces beloei the uturation tt .ptra ture for the e.sisting !!CS prcs.wre. If 53 dcgr.: :. suo' tusiin,1 cennot be ria intained a rt.cr I::' cct')f f, the llPi s hall be ree-tivo ted. The degree of sub:c,31iog t2 yond 50 d.s.-es F .ind the icngth of time HPI is in opert. tion shi.11 te li.Tited by the pressure /

te perature connderations for t!.e ve .sel integrity.

c. Opeia

in; pec:ed. ires currently, or are reviscd to, specify j thit i:. the evr'nt of HPl initiation with reactor coolant pur.ps

(!:CF) operating, et 1 cast one F.CF shali resin operating in i cach loop as long as the pui.g(s) is providing forced flow.

d. Operators are provided additional inferration anci instructions to not rely upon pressurizcr level indication alone, but to also exa.T.ine presserizer pressure and other plant paraeter indications in evaluating plant conditien,, e.g., water, inventory in the reactor primary system.

gspo g :

6a) A caution note will be added to the f.!!0-2 caer;;ency procedures instructing the operators not to override the autontic actions of the Engineered Safety fc6 tures (ESF) without first determining the consequer.ces of tht override end consulting with the shift supersiscr. The procedures will also be modified to add c1? -i #y in, : B m '.o ., ie: 0; .:r.' t'ir.  !~ r' ry

spa.i.r.

actuation ant: provide f or orderly ter:isiation of the sp.srious ac tua tion.

10 0!.)  !!:r i :')-P i r.. . nry prm e h . . *:iil f u :..o'li fie I to speci fy I

tI:" iol im!ir * '

!i"n..  !: i " lii ' h :'.- .. re % f ty injeciimi (4 - il ) c.y;t . b . . b . n m . r  ! ic.il l;; ..t br, te.1 b"c .iu .c of .i In i f re, ure cc: fi; ion it r :s: rr ma i, it. .; ration until:

1) t e c. D.

r. .u S.:le ty in.jer. t i m (l l .' l ) 1:. in progress uit.h

e f; . in e x e.c cl Zi

D  ?

t.;' ci el t he situation has fuen l s'chy - .::) ::inute n or ,

q'

!! e as! r ;;tni 1.c.s b ..n in o;. r. tion f6r 20 ninutes, and cp  ; '

rnli! lec *.e .rre tur.. . are at least 50F belos t e v. ', .;o1 te c ':.E rc t a c fo r f.F2 existin 1:CS pressure. ,

If W c. cr .>s subunaling can;ait be mintained af ter fli51 I c r. ', J i, t:  :: PSI shcl! be re..:,:.iica t.?d; or, .

f.S p r.txe s etta as to n

r ul operatir] pressure with l ~

i) tE2 t.r;arcture in t!u hot Or.:! cold legs I aing controlled vith at iem SC" sa:= oolin] by ca: operable steci ger-  !

e st.:'; or,

?) UCcss u.ntinued oyretion t aulei result in i.n unsafe plent condi t. ion.

k) The A:;0-2 " Loss of Coolant /RC Pres:.tre" ea:crgency procedure will be reviscJ to specify:

For becah sizes exceediril i  !;?51 Capaity.

If IIPS) initiatien n !catically eccurs beca-cf le.: beccter Coolant presserc, anc' the rm co9iint pa ps are in o ura tion, ti.un at Ic.ist one RCP/lcop will rw.in in operatioa until 1.ou Presn':re Sa fety Injen' inn flo.: is established ar.d verific.f.

For bre;'< sizcs within !! PSI Capacity: i l

l i It !! PSI initiat;on cutoutically occurs b2ceuse of lu; Reactor Coolant cressure an1 the reactor coolant tri.ps i.rc in opration, than at Icast i one ::cP/locp uill renin in r,per.: tion uatil LP51 injen!.icn or daccy hect is establis:ori cnci verified or contircic:' operatie.n of the RCPs usuid crea te an u isa fe plant conditio.i.

6d) A!!0-F. plcnt pr v.ed. ires ar. baintj revised to reasi a the operators tn rre i tar "C5 pr ee.ce rer. .H t'. :pera i' res fol ly.'i n. transien ts i b, .: ; ; . e ;. . . . .  ::';e .;.: to a i . : s ie i s 'c:di iva , i '. l l

r.ainte.ine .

I I

l l

i

l l e 11 he li ." .: Ihe o.afiiguitf ei !;:,-  ;... rc.ar Lt : {t...i r j i n '.o ..: Lu rin t i on ) ,

!.p cia 1 :.ca1e: fen F.r. ' : ., . : t.;, . . a n.t ;.:.. . .., r e i n .'i. .t t o r . .inti rec.n ra!c r- are !.. in : 4 ( n t . ve : . :! t.it i r.h r.t:n . l a t e .r. I e ra ! i on p '. :: <- e n I L U ;: : .. t:t - y c.!::'_c:! iiy ',Ui ) to tbc current l i ni ic t . ' t ; , r.: t u r .. ::i' ; .1 . o r t. <.. . l t.

. l?i th t Ic r.e .p .c ici j tcale', .h.' op. r0 t er tan r;p i j!y a ,.. f. . rc.re coni t ions relative l L a vc 1. u.,; .

I l

i 1

f 1

i 1

l l

l l

v 12 0:.

• it.n:

i /)  !:n i c. al l . : fe ty-; : l .1 ted va! .y p .i t ions, p<r.itionin:, rc ;oin mnts

.' ..! ['.v. i !. i ic ri n t ro ;- b .". , : r- t h:t. c ve. re lin pr.itione:I (open L i

o - ( 10 .n!) i n a i.. .n.. r to a . ,o re t h pre;- r oj' era tion of enginr. :rmt

fety 1

t ure ;. .W.o revie. re:la t t- I prw.< ! ares, .nc h a , th:r. : for aint.en .. .:. c:s! in :, plon t el sy.l 1i starInp, and '.up rvi sory i

,, ~ r i ad i .: , . .. da il3 /shif t chu ta. ) u:r.;'illance to ensure thai.

.h . M - . c e s i:tontd to L:::ir correct Visi tions folixsing

. e iscr'. r m'cula tir.F. and are :aintained in their proper posi-

-:or ; da. . .; ,d 1 opraiional ;...r! !s.

.3 c~ ,rileted a revici of the EngincercJ Safety feature (ESF)

.11.+.; ci.J their pasi tioning recpircecnts. The ESF systc;as are:

.; C;r i.airacat Isol.. tion Sysic i (CIS) t') Containvit Spray Syste.:; (CSS) c) Cor.tairee:;t Coaling Systc.i (CCS) d) Safety Injection Syste..i (510) e) Pen stration Rom Yentilation Systun (PRVS) f) iOin Stet, Isoinion Systca (1131S) g) E.er.;.incy feed . iter Sys tcu (EFS) h) Che::ical and Volun Control Syste: (CVCS) i) Die.;e1 Fuel Oil and Starting Air Systua j) Erargency flora tion Systc is k) Service llater Based cn tinis revic.:, and our revic's of related procedures, t:e have concim h that nur pro. edares cre ad:cpe ? f.o c.isure tint valves in ESF syst(.is are ..uinta ined in their proper Kisition, or are capable of luin3 properly positioned in the event of an Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Sipal (ESFAS).

The procedures revict:2d are su.writed as follows:

ik ini.cn'ri e - i'r ior es ta';i ng on I.5f syr. u.. i cu t o r st r e s c e, the Control i:sca cust be natifie.! cs reertired by procedura. The i c:fundnt i. rain of the af fec ted f.SF systta uill b2 insp.?cted to verify op . ability prior to ta';ing th: afrrer.icntioned systca out of e

service. 's he int.pection wil l it.cl o !e ch.

c k ing .cna trol b >ard indi-l ca t. ions, iW/ sta t'ss, alan.. s tdus, end veri fication th tt thi last l

l

l .

. 13

' y , c. , ! J..r;. e j".f *iillu I i;c '..! r J. # l 1. s i. = = inI s' /.il dit'l de. Hi- 1

.'re t e.1 ry o , ; . ; i r f .

I IL. : i;l ol .cevite sy'.t.ci ite.lailr. ces pinents  !

t.,r

. ' it .i .' 1e i.

~

. .- p'iro

i .: '. 1vil c . the Valve (s) I tr. ! Io i .oi r. : i.," o u .' :o i .' in ! n.m. e . i.. ; . . ire place.f  ;

. tre if .. i f. .t f..;* td .cr.. " . ;si;.

s', b >t ii .:i i.h e c'rli y :cu t

..  ; r e. -

, m . a ; e ci C":i . ~c . (7r.)tr.. der... if appl ic..ble.

, .: . ! ! .. ..g.: >

. . . : .. . . , f i , . . e ;1 i,. ,,t is n .Nr ( ti inii n t h.:

! ll'..if.; Ct :p } e t i')'1 O!  : i: Padilt.r. .t ud I t .;;0/,il o f .. : < -:. i . e t ,: . , th :,yst; ; is realigncd to its proper

-c=-- --

1,;. ir: (.pe i . I tr , the Control L m: is notified of i

..

... : t i . '. . i e , 21 esit ry b  : t'a in L;. sta tion lig.

> . c , i , c: :.- t. .L are p rlor.:ed to veriIy the ojet chili ty oI i . , . . L t 2. . e.,2 i g.. ; a t .

- All F.f sy;tt:is arc refrircJ by A21F. S?ction XI and/or 1:kaic,! Specifit.;tians to be t::sted to ensure operability.

.c: - i. c;n ric , ve ry accerding to t'10 cap 267nt leia: t?steJ, and O: c :;r for t :siir.J. L;;na caplatio! o f ESF s;/s te.: testin;, sar a.t..  : -:n u. , U,e .;ab,ixi syr.tc.: i:. veri ficd 4.; i s.;;ir M by

>...'1 f.o tu pec;,ccly al i

;ncd to allv.s tisa systect to parfam I i ts * ' 2 ty fu n: Lion. The ver ification of lina.p is done by the I 0; o c L. osirg sign-ofis in ti.e proa d ere.

Duri'e our r.;vi.c. , all mn:eelly operated valves sc2re found to be pruccGrally cce,uircJ to ' . in ti.eir correct position. The pro-cc:!ccca further require the sysPsi linca;u to be varified correct pri':( in docldrir.J th0 sy t . Op0rdb!". Ihr.-!Over, sPVeral of thC5e i vel , c' io sy .h. . a.:t cle. iiie.I as f6::' Codes 1, 2, or 3 were noi.

s Ai c:. ic tt2 '.' ,ty E" listirg (i.e., required to be locked, scain oc r;ti:.: . 3? .;a. urc ! in thair per,v:r pasition). These valvas, ir. tha *iim:e! : :e1 Oil Syr.t..a cnj Diescl Starting 7.i;- Systc<, thou$

not ci .;ified U. CI:ss 1, 2, or 3 will b2 added to the " Cat.nory E' proi.<J:re list .w.I as srch at a rec;uirc:i to ha cnd will be locked, se:ltd, er ot:nn;i.;c secure! in their prcrer p;sition during op3ratica, thus furthar asweing prop':r valve positioning of all safety- rala t 2d v.11ves in their cssociated syste.a. These procedural choy; will be irplccented by Jane 1,197'J.

T:.us, lusol on proce.fural controls cnd this revici, sie feel .

c s sur 2. thH iall sa fety relsi:cd valves are positic:ied in, or are capahic of bin:; rositintiod in their ESF pasition upon rc:cip' cf an E5Fl.5, tu: r .hy ensurir.g the rec;uired response of

{ sysv as to rosl'ala ted events.

Star!.rp All safety-relt.t ri systens are re.;uirect to be operable W5ff5 in the correct pnition) prio.- to and/or dirir.] plcnt start-l up ns cpprcpriate.

1 _. - _ - ,

15 1;') f. . s' is n* r. : - .....'pl.

. . m l ,l i n hir L iu:1.1.c IL'nitor

( ,",'/. : a i - y , y ,','.. , (, . . 1 .:r,,r , .y , ;..:_2 }

• 11 o f *.*

i . c '.; :. ' - . re. c. . - f.! AS f.: clo.r. !!.nr of the

, ,tr a ici i i rca; .:n i: : ,cui t.; r ~.c: iia; oi i. lie Cl.E u;thout

• ' :c I i it

. '. I; n .

.. t .. c S1,.'. c. t.fl1 x a C!65 to close.

.u?L- .1 are norctally clo':c I 6:rita pou.'r onar-1 tion and l .,.tr-

^

,. w 1 o,.'r.: 1.ioa to o!.::n. lhey rcteise a C!AS

! . chi. -;  ?! ns..t 0;en f ollmiing rese tting of tiie Cl.15 with-

'

a.: ir . :.nl (,: era tian.

. .' :e :f 17 are noeii:lly open c:urios: ;xacer n!,cr. tion. They i

.._.-. : C".5 ta clo,2 an.t i:ili not r. pen following resetting of the

" .5 s i '.:..v. <.;. ci fic . m:;:1 of.ere tian.

... s 2 ' Ji :'aira aat 'hnt !!2a45.r) and 8 (Cor.taini.::at l'arge Outlet)

- ;2 a ' ' . ." r # i' t io:: releasa iaberlock be close the systeis auta-

.: tic c !Iy. I te ,; 11 (i!,s'ropn l' urge Sysi.u and Air Particulate

r.itor) c ad 12 (C;nta;. 2nt I.t

.:osphas e Se:apic and Air Particulata l

onucr) h

t2 redi: tion alan.:s in the syr. ten ethich trill anno ici.::e in the C;r. trol Pon.1 to alert operator of a high rarli.ition release.

All of tv above liste:1 valves ara periodically surveillance tested as rey !r.:d by the A*W-2 Technicc1 Spacifications par Section 4.0.5 (A D ;c:1 :n /1 te ; tin?) ani Su .5. ion 3/4. f2.1 (/.ppui: dix "J" to l'"F::!.0 t 'li:r ). Th. CL* S ii verifie:! o,r:rable par Section 3/4.3.2 i of the Tech.tial S;ucific.1tions. 'Ihe radia tian r.:anitoring in.-tru-matuio.. is verilied cp.c. Lie per S2ction 3/4/.3.3 of tna t.i!0-2 i Technical Specifications.

! P.used en the above, the inadvertant relcase of radioactive gases or i

li pi6 by hutatic r.uns follm. ting rerei. ting of the CIAS is not r:s .+ ... . ; :cific tua ml op ratio. of th:! systeas K1uld he re-

.

• N r, ::: the co itt.in .nt p2nci.ra tions, furtherr. ore, auto:atic

i.>r disch6rging rc.dioactive 9.se.; or lit;'sids does not occur

< . p.-i ,r to ini tiati. : of CI.%. Tecn:,fer o f contauinated fluids r sivires specific r.an sal oy; ration.

3 -

g4 pr. . m:.:

};) i' ; i c.

, e

r 0, . 4 .? m :a ; i. i !. .:n ; p o: " l . . Ior.:l1 .r.Lt .

. : . ii; n: d

t. i r. e. .:er l :rt*iill, r.

. r i iv <j . rt i I i. ;.s i ' . O' L .il ! h:

pr i ..i y ( o :i . ii. .-L in . . . . LL.;' . re : , i r6 pa..iing, e ati 1 oc o!: e. ,- . _.! ,..'i. :: c. I i c: i.' . . .

g.. . ; . t: i ! I n. i t i.u :.

.- '. : ; n:I; ..

i p . r '. i . : ' , :re t:i . t s :cle an o. u:rc. ace tr.iai d i:ot li r.'n e.!

.$ - re . .i e r esc:i.. . J sifety fe.itura, in li t:.c?n t i t ion.

. .- t . : ' :. : , . .

tcr.s ai .; is:J iui t e :

J F . :,.:.:. ; r x rlo t:s r: x i . '. t.) p. event transfer v!co hig:

, c.3 : a t ic:; i:..:icc tioa c a .its, nr:d ,

l suc;' sy;.tc n n. is01c.t. d liy the coaLairr::ent i:.ola tion

. :.1 .

. T?e tasis on thich contii;uad op.>r..*iility of the above features ,

i, c .; n. mi .

l

'c-.. a:

l Tne syste::.s d.ui:;cd to ir.':is fer lotentially radioactive pse: end liquids out of tiny Co1Rio .mt. liuildio;1 ot N:0-2 do not a. to. .'.ically discha rg2 undae any co: di tio:.s. Tli c sysic.r.s tha t require sp c ific

, r.mual opera tica cre as follocts (val te nt:i'rrs in parenthesis)- ,

i l 4

1) Chr;ical ct.d tala c C:)ntrol Syst:n Le tder.r. (PCV /.921-1 c.ej ,

2CV /.02.5-2) j

2) Canta. im:ent Ve:nt l' e.:t.c (2CV-2 ':00-? acal PCV-2r.:11-1)

! 3) bactor Co.:lant S;sta: and Prese.urie.-r Sas: pie (2SV-5833 1 and '

2SV-5843-2)

4) Quench Tar.'; LiqJid 5'.:ple (PSY-58/?-l and 2SV-5871-2)

, 5) Sa fety Injec:.icn Tani S. : ple (25Y-5'.;75-2)

6) Contairaent Smp Drain (PCV-2060-1 and 2CV-2051-2)

7) Coatai :~it Purga Inbri. (?CV-22t:9-1, 2CV-!;?C4-2 and 20V-fi?i:3-1)

8) Coatci:r.: cat Pap OJtle t (2CV-8291-1, 2CV-82CG-2 and 2CV-82P,5-1)

'.) F .; ir Pr . ia I;. ' i: i (? .* -2 5,? 1 a r.. ; ;:i." ; ' 1-2 )

10) Pnctor Coolimt Puap Controlled Bie rdorf (?CV *U47-2 c.nd 2C V-4 0 iG-1 )

11) llydru ,e n P : r.; r 'y ,tc.1 ar.4 Air Pa r* ie:t:la f.s ibni tiir (PSV-U231-2, 257-C?/3 1 and ?SV T.':/1-2) 1 i l t

l l l

_ . _ _ _ - _ _ , . ~ . _ . _ _ _I

. 1 (.

,l> .ien:

e < ry u iioi .:en.:e .uu! tr

9) i v.: .v . 8 -t i fy .e -

,'i:n .f. procalu. e ,

t-; cr.w. t: r. th<.y : ';iire:

e. Ver.': : lion, by te t or in_.! i Li.in, of the oper.ibili ty of rd  : *. ,a t ety-:v is. teil ." . t .. prior la the rt ; rtal of any s: r :. ela ted .ya tea f rc : ' ~rvice, .

t' . " ri fif : tion of 'h . c: 're.hi!i ty of oil sa fety-rela ted systeris

ien i .<y are retni ncJ to v i eice follo.-

in.) mintenctnce or tas t Mr.

.. Ed icit notification of involved recctor operational personnel

. ; n::eer a sa fety-related systc.1 is re.aaved feca ci..I returned ta scr.ico.

_.* ; e n.:.2 :

Prior to initiating rca intenance on safety-rcla ted systels, tha re-d:,c. tnt syste.e will be inspected to verify operchility. The inspection v.ill iecluh cim.di..g control hnrd indications, i:0V status, alan.1 ststus, and scrification thi.t th2 last surveillance test dcnonstrated os.vbility and was uithin the surveillance interval. Plant Quality Coatrol procedures retrire tint a Jeb Order be issued for any F.iin-ter.:n;c (.i r fety-rele L24 ("Q") systcis. All Job Orders re:guire aut:.arizatisa by th? ,:f fected uni t's Siiif t Supervisor prior to t: ark ,

ca..un.imj. l Ti;c Ja': Ccd2r foru is curreally bein; ratisoit to sp:cifically iden-tify all P. e-;raintancnce and Post-nainter.ence requirenents, and to

! i. lud: verification tint those r; pircaents cre r.:ct prior to de-c1cring a systc.n or ccmponent OPE:' ELE af ter uaintenance. i

! The revised Job 0. der Fon.: uill ha dezelnyd and iciplea:ented before i

the A: 3-T' core is nada critical follre:iac car current catage.

"h?n parferning testing en a safety-rela ted sy;tua, Af'0-2 Tech Specs adJeess oper.ibility r.T tha re.bc.'ent. systo. Docu..:enta tion is re- l q9fre4, by a tastir.g p: ccelure en. /cr Job Ord2r, by specific check- )

offs end signoffs Lict a safety-related systen is return!d to its

pec;

er operable cer:dition folic.;ing testing of that systo1.

All safety systes t:'en out of service are noted in the Station

! Log cnd note:I on tha s.ifety systc.: status imrd. Current oper-

.i;.. ?- :p n e ; .- y:rU cr ;, ca :i.n i :; ':iit, 'n read all lo;; entries b.:ck to U.eir previor, shif t er for the prerious /

d9s thichever is shorter end cach shif t is require:I to revicu ti e sta tion lo.j, plant annunci: tors, systta sta tus bcrd, and equiprant tag out bool..

17 Ct:es t ion:

10) P.eview pur pranpt reporting procedures for NRC not i ficat ion to a s sre tha t .WC i s no t i fi ed wi thin one hour o f the t irn: the reactor i 5 not in a con t rolled or eqected corgli tion of operat ion. Further t- t!ut ti e an open continuous c<nminication channel shall be s:ablished and anintained wi th hRC.

?e .n:-: .  :

tu :een and will continue to be AP&L's policy to pronptly notify

. w

:-:ar Regulatory Cunnission of any unusual event at Arkansas S:!e u One. This policy is not limi ted to itens which are deuned reportable per the Technical Specifications or federal regulations.

r the event of an energency situation, our procedure for irrple-ree. ting the Frmrgency Plan require early notification of the fisclear Regulatory Cannisston.

To further clarify the above policy and procedure, ve will rmdify the RO Adninistrative Controls Manual and Fmergency Procedure 1202.34 for Personnel Response, to include the following state-ment.

'Upon noti fication by the Shif t Supervisor of an event at ABO, the Duty Fnergency Coordinator will assess the situation as to its seriousness. If the assessrnst indicates that the health and safety of the public might be endangered or there might be a potential for significant public interest (e.g. ,

radioactivi ty release, etc.), AP&L Managanent and MC shall be imnediately notified regardless of the reportability of the event as defined in the Techni-cal Specification or federal regulations."

Notification of NRC wi thin one hour that such a condi tion exis's, ll2 will be via the " hot line" phone which was recently installer! by HEC.

t I

l L.

f- ~. I 1 : : f; 1

l') ! .- .

(,  :

, ; , t. . .! ; , a :..' t. .! l s. ; U. <. i :;; j r.. rit

, .. i t  ;,- i .: o . r . : . :1 .i .t i ...; .. I , .. ,r; i 'ri t re.- -

I ' d e : : '. . .i. i: ...: - the p,i irj i

. t. r.1 .! r.  ;! (. s *: t [ .* ' 'I f .

.. r.-  ;- !m . > (! : '. ;.. n. . . ! :: . . ) : i . i u i .'.; '<f

.. . mi r i in ; ennf re.'

l

=

. I; ll t s.*at.. ' f i *? .t.,

l 1:r c n.:.. i .. nf :n t : . .'. f oi:31 1 :'.t .- l: ol e:e. I L: Oi (p .'istLelie e e

.. . .cu.. .. .. : . . - n. e i~ . . . - :.. ;s e i t t,;,1, .t . '. ;a s o f

.. L ' r. ,J. b ' C on ' .. i. - it f ril d. j i s ec:.. :; ; .' ti t!i

.- .. I ur i i:c e'i <,cuv. a t. I t !;i <. <.,; ;;< : i r. p. .", ::;; e:

". .,F ihr /CiL? Einni O f: i,v A.i.:1.v. ses I?.m. irl (f SM).

)

!. . e; .: e .' it, .:c < r ..t:!c t icii in ti. . !'

/ ci.or C: .;l::al Sy .. '.e. ( :3)

. . . t i ti e :1 ;. .t . s ; - i..< i . :.: i:i t er i e s p n;r.1 ; . i.a e d i o r.

2'.  ;- ,; t- . . i:: i .s n t ?.a pi a:-l e . .: i:ad/:.c c.o:::rcl suc's an ev:nt.

10. :-

. . , t u .  : i; inj r i .c . cr. s12 i. :. i;;ir:: t r> rt .:vc liv r 3e nM:cc h::1-s 'b. ? ;: s ;; ic,.

Di ss il'.' . c: '/t,r s e a i.d n:me.1 :

1) ir. i bl e' p. . by use of forced i fic.- (ik .ctu Co0L .it Pui.p:;) ond/or adjt.:.l. 2ri;.s Lo i'.CS toi-l  ;,2: 2 : u r ,e < s:c: press.:re; i

')

L: .;.. . t ".; ,- es:<.t r ir r v i s Line < te '.;;; sr,::i c si.:. ple li ne ;

3) 3..:, y h t .f.3. i i;a c.ugfi the v.'r.uir,; deg is: i Tier

, 4) 9. r,.'.< v i a t'.; T,igt (,,,, t ) ,g ) s . Py c ) ; na iu t;tt

.,I.u. . cw ,.. .r.

. ,..s.., ., 'i -I ll i. ..

l '

l

9

• 8- .:- -

1 ." 1

..r.' t.

it } , . ,- t ;

e; ., .

'- r

.Ia iL .

.Ii r.. , >

l' 8'ti' fl ' , '* ;I'is'a;' ii.; .

i. j a 1 i '. . . ' .1

.: J.,'.~.

... i. ..

.-5 :r. t :; - i i i. u it,:v. ' .. .. e! ? - ' ! ::. : . v..irj j '. ,- ..- r.. ..

d i

1 1

l I

I I

I 1

l

l 1

.l I

1 I

s l

l l

1