ML20128M235

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Transcript of ACRS Subcommittee on Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 850719 Meeting in Augusta,Ga. Pp 173-454.Supporting Documentation Encl
ML20128M235
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 07/19/1985
From:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
References
ACRS-T-1431, NUDOCS 8507250246
Download: ML20128M235 (417)


Text

,,g $695CM3/

g" UN11ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 f3 V .

LOCATION: AUGUSTA, GEORGIA PAGES: 173 --454 DATE: FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1985

'Y3Af l A28BFEDEBDPY x l

Jo XoSemove" rom ACRSCrice ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

,O Official Reporters k 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001

~

p [72 6 850719 (202) 347-3M T-1431 ppa NATICNW!DE COVERACE t

'3

' 173 L 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

q'{ ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 3

4 5

6 Subcommittee on Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 7

8 9

10 11 Augusta, Georgia

, July 19, 1985 12

() 13

~

14 15 Present: Mr. Jesse C. Ebersola, Chairnan Mr. Glenn A. Reed, Member 16 Mr. David A. Ward, Member i 17 18 19 ***

20 21-22 23

$)

25 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

174 1 2EDCEED1EGH f')

A/ 2 (8:30 a.m.)

3 MR. EBERSOLE: The meeting will come to order, 4 and we can get going, and hopef ully get through in time.

5 This is the second day of a meeting of the 6 ACRS Subcommittee on Vogtle Units 1 and 2.

7 I am Jesse Ebersole, Subcommittee Chairman.

8 The other members are Mr. Glenn Reed and Dave Ward.

9 The purpose of the meeting as we suid 10 yesterday is to review the application of the Georgia Power 11 Company for an operating license for Vogtle Units 1 and 2.

12 Mr. McKinley is the ACRS staff member.

() 13 Rules of participation have been announced as 14 part of the notice of meeting published in the Federal 15 Register July 2nd, 1985.

16 I would ask all speakers to identify himself i

17 or herself.

18 I have at the moment no written comments or ,

19 requests for time to make oral statements from members of 20 the public.

21 We will entertain statements if the party 22 would see Mr. McKinley, considering the limited time we 23 have.

7"x 24 We will proceed with the meeting now. I think L_]

25 the applicant hac tre first shot at the floor. I would ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

175 1 like to remind applicant we have some lef t over open items

\/ 2 yesterday which I have here.

3 It includes emergency, safe and alternate 4 shutdown capabilities. Items left under open items, 5 yesterday.

6 MR. THOMAS: Yes, sir.

7 MR. EBERSOLE: With that I invite you to 8 organize the rest of the schedule in your own fashion.

9 MR. THOMAS: Thank you. The open items will 10 be an integral portion of o'ther presentations during the 11 day.

12 We would like to begin this morning with the

,c~s

1) 13 project management organization during construction. And 14 then-proceed into the operating organization, management 15 phijosophy, in such issues.

16 So we will begin with Mr. Don Foster, Vice 17 President and Project General Manager for the Vogtle 18 proj ect.

19 MR. FOSTER: Good morning. I am Don Foster.

20 I would like to give you a brief overview this morning of 21 our project organization which has been charged with the 22 responsibility for the design, construction, licensing and 23 initial operation of the Vogtle project.

A%j 24 (Slide.)

25 The organization today, and the point that I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

176 1 would like to .make, and these are the principal people

(-) 2 located at the job. site and have the principal 3 responsibilities for the project, completion of Unit 1 and 4 those activities associated with that completion, and then 5 the subsequent completion of Unit 2.

6 As shown on the chart I sit right here as 7 general manager. Up until approximately a month ago I was 8 ser.ior manager for the company at the Vogtle project.

9 Since then, Dick Conway has been assigned to 10 the job site full-time, with the distinct responsibility 11 for the successful completion of Unit 1.

12 MR. THOMAS: He is senior vice president.

(w). 13 MR. FOSTER: Dick reports to -the project 14 management board for the project.

15 I report to Dick for the activities associated 16 with the Vogtle proj ect.

17 On my immediate staff, looking along this 18 line, and again these people are located at the job site, I 19 will go through those positions and their responsibilities 20 for you, then cover some of the other subsequent positions.

s 21 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask a question? The 22 little disclaimer in the upper right-hand corner says this 23 is just a flow sheet for illustration, not necessarily

{} 24 levels of responsibility. Yet that seems to be what you 25 are talking about.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

177 l- MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir, it is a -- relative to p

s 3 k/ 2 level of position in the' organization, as far as maybe a 3 level on the chart, it does not.

4- I might say that an individual in a block 5 located in this area, this area or this, in line with maybe 6 another position, those are not equivalent positions 7 relative to a salary situation or whatever. That is what 8 the disclaimer is intended for.

9 MR. EB ERSOLE: Okay.

10 MR. FOSTER: I have answering to me on'my 11 immediate staff, general manager of engineering. Again, we 12 are the construction manager and are totally responsible

(). 13 for the design, engineering phase, construction phase and 14 initial test of the project.

15 General manager of engineering has the 16 responsibility for all of the engineering functions, 17 technical responsibility that report into the Vogtle 18 proj ect .

19 The Bechtel, the principal architect engineer, 20 reports to the general manager for engineering.

'21 Westinghouse with their associated 22 responsibilities, Southern Company Services again for their 23 responsibilities for the project report into the general 24 manager of engineering who reports in to me.

{}

25 This individual is an employee of Southern ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

17 8

.1 Company Services. He is assigned to me. I, tco, am an

\m) 2 employee of both Southern Company Services and Georgia 2

3 Power Company and have the authorities to direct that work 4 activity through that individual.

5 I have a manager of cost and schedule assigned

-6 to the project and reports to me. He is a Bechtel 7 individual.

8 George Bockhold, General Manager of Nuclear 9 Operation, reports to me for project direction. He reports 10 to Mr. Beckham for operational readiness and as we approach 11 the operating phase, will report to Mr. Beckham for the 12 operation of the facilities.

()

13 . -MR. EBERSOLE: I come from an old outfit that 14 has little bureaucracies that are parallel and sort of 15 fight with each other.

16 I was looking at the general manager of 17 engineering and wondering whether that implied that 18 encompassed design, construction, operation, anything you 19 could imply, engineering-wise. Or am I wrong about that?

20 MR. FOSTER: Excuse me?

21 MR. EBERSOLE: General manager of engineering 22 could be interpreted in a broad sense to encompass design, 23 construction and ultimate operation. Or it could be 24 interpreted in a shorter sense. Just, say, for instance Q(N 25 engineering design and analysis.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

179 1 What is it interpreted here?

13

(/ 2 MR. FOSTER: No, sir. It would be interpreted 3 on the Vogtle project as all of our functions are in the 4 broad sense.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: So it's a focal point of the 6 whole thing?

7 MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir.

8 MR. EBERSOLE: So you have a focused central 9 management at that point?

10 MR. POSTER: Yes, sir, we sure do.

11 In fact, this group of people are charged with 12 supporting all of the functions for engineering.

() 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Great. Thanks. That is what I 14 wanted to hear.

15 HR. FOSTER: Yes, sir.

16 General manager of nuclear construction.

17 Again, we are the construction inager. At the vogtle job 18 site we have full authority and responsibility for that 19 function.

20 We do subcontract our construction work, but 21 basically the subcontractors, basically on a discipline 22 basis, provide people and expertise with Georgia Power 23 Company controlling that entire process, including quality 24 control, furnishing of materials.

)

25 In fact, every physical facility at the Vogtle

[

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. W

.rshington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

180

~

.1 project is owned by Georgia Power Company,- and we supply 2 all materials, consumables and permanent plant components 3 to the contractor for installation and erection.

4 MR. EBERSOLE: What is the functional

  • 5 relationship between the general manager engineering and 6 general manager of the Vogtle nuclear construction?

7 MR. FOSTER: Functional relationship? .

8 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes. Does the general manager 9 of engineering overview the work of the Vogtle nuclear 10 construction?

11 MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir.

12 MR. EBERSOLE: Although it doesn't show on a

() 13 chart-like that.

14 MR. FOSTER: Well, he is s2nior engineering 15 representative on the project.

16 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes.

17 MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir. If there-be a question 18- in this area, there is an engineering organization within i

19 the construction group.

l 20 They are really construction support 21' engineers, not design engineers. They do not have the 22 technical responsibility for the adequacy of design.

. 23 Did I answer your question?

4'S -

24 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, sir.

(_).

t 25 MR. FOSTER: Again we have reporting to me ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

181 l' f unctionally and administrative 1y, general manager of

.A) k_ 2 nuclear construction. We have an administrative manager 3 and project procurement manager.

4 Again, all-the procurement processes at 5 Vogtle are controlled by Georgia Power Company. It is an 6 engineering procurement process. That individual is 7 assigned to me and manages that function at the job site.

8 That does not mean that the engineering 9 organization related to the design of the project were not 10 involved in the process, they were.

11 But again, as Mr. Rice pointed out yesterday,

~

12 the function is controlled from this position.

,r m MR. EBERSOLE:

i ,) 13 -

I see a block that_says vice 14 president and general manager, nuclear operations.

15 MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir, that is Mr. Beckham.

3 16 MR. EBERSOLE: Right. How is his relationship 17 to the engineering; general manager, engineering?

l 18 MR. FOSTER: Well, the general manager of 19 engineering, as the chart shows, reports to me.

20 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

21 MR. FOSTER: He has obligation to support that 22 function as he would any other function -- they would not 23 come together in the sense of a defined organization, but 24 there is la supportive working relationship there.

(~)3 L

25 And, basically, if Mr. Beckham has a problem i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

182-1 with engineering, he probably would go through Mr. Bockhold

's> 2 who would work at the project level with myself and those 3 support organizations to resolve the problem.

4 MR.-THOMAS: This-is-during the construction 5 phase up until we get an operating license. That is the 6 role the vice president and general manager nuclear 7 operations place during the initial, up through the initial 8 test program.

9 MR. EB ERSOLE : Yes.

10 MR. THOMAS: Now, following this presentation, 11 Mr. Beckham will present the organization af ter you get an 12 operating license.

() 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, okay.

14 MR. FOSTER: At that time, there would be a 3

15 transfer, not a transfer of responsibility, but a change in 16 the interface arrangements between nuclear operation and 17 the engineering organization.

18 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

19 MR. FOSTER: That will take place later in the 20 proj ect.

21 MR. EBERSOLE: What I am always looking for is 22 what I guess I would call the point man if you have 23 trouble.

,/ 24 MR. FOSTER: He's sitting right here at the

}

25 end of the table.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

183 l l

l 1 But we support him, and support him oiiginally

(.. )

\/ 2 and functionally. But this would be the point man.

3 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, okay.

4 MR. FOSTER: Throughout the life of the Vogtle 5 project the operating people have been assigned directly to 6 che proj ect.'

7 Since a time like 1977, that is also true for 8 our quality assurance organization.

9 If you remember yesterday, Mr. Rice said that 10 the general -- Vogtle project quality assurance manager 11 reported to me for project coordination. He has been

~

12 working directly and assigned in a sense a location to my n

t j 13 staf f and to the subsequent' proj ect general- manager's staff t 14 since about 1977, I think, providing that direct control 15 ar.d interf ace on a day to day basis, from the corporate 16 quality assurance organization, which Mr. Rice discussed 17 yesterday. That is still intact.

18 In fact, this manager of the Vogtle project 19 quality assurance organization is at the job site and his 20 staff is there, again, interfacing with all these groups 21 ,

relative to the quality' assurance functions performed by 22- that group.

23 In a related sense, under general manager 24 nuclear construction we have the quality control group that

{}

25 perf orms that function f rom the base within that ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

184 1 organization. .

p)

'- 2 Again, we either directly provide quality-3 control for all of our processes there, unless it's 4 assigned ~to a contractor, -if it -is- assigned to a contractor 5 we provide overview and surveillance of that function.

6 Therefore, we have another central point of 7 control for that critical function there in the George 8 organization and project.

9 We have a strong tie to our licensing group.

10 Again, the Vogtle project licensing manager has been 11 assigned to the project staff for the duration to provide 12 that continuous enter play and i.nput to the day to day

() 13 activities of - the' job site.

14 We have one other situation that has 15 developed. I will point- it out at this time.

16 Mr. Connors way, as I mentioned before, senior 17 vice president, project executive for the Vogtle project, 18 is now heading up an effort for the successful construction 19 completion of Unit 1. He's pulled together a staff of 20 people that involve all of these organizations to directly 21 manage that function.

22 He has engineering support here from our field 23 engineering organization. He has construction support from

,24 our field construction group. He has cost scheduling

}

25 support d .ectly answering to him.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

185 1 That situation is in place and those

/lA ,

\_) 2 individuals are managing the day to day work activities for 3 the completion of Unit 1.

4 The rest of--this organization relative to the 5 project staff is in support of that effort or in control of 6 those control functions. And we are dealing with other 7 owner responsibilities associated with the project and 8 completion of Unit 2.

9 Any questions?

10 MR. EBERSOLE: No.

11 MR. WARD: Let me ask. Don, this 12 organization, as Mr. Thomas has said, will stay in place

() 13 until' the - unit No.1 gets a license.

14 But then I presume it.will stay in place, or 15 there will be some change until Unit Number 2 comes along?

16 MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir. I think in a general 17 sense I would explain it this way. As we move into the 18 operation of Unit 1, that function will be tied directly

19 and report into Mr. Beckham f or the operation of Unit 1.

~

20 MR. WARD: Yes.

21 MR. FOSTER: Project organization will stay 22 intact for the related completion functions of Unit 1 and 23 completion of the construction and initial tests and start 24 up activities on Unit 2.

I 25 As that project evolves, that organization too ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

186 1 then will become the Unit 2 function, will report directly g~,

k- 2 to Mr. Beckham.

3 And at the completion of Unit 2, he would be 4 f ully responsible f or -the proj ect.

5 MR. THOMAS: In other words, what you said, 6 don, was that Unit 2 organization will look just like that; 7 in parallel would be Unit 1 operating, which you are going 8 to see.

9 This as far as I know would operate the same 10 way in construction of Unit 2.

11 MR. POSTER: That's right. Mr. Beckham would 12 ,

have that authority and responsibility, I think. Any other

() 13 questions? -

14 MR. EBERSOLE: No, sir.

15 MR. FOSTER: Thank you.

16 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.

17 MR. THOMAS: I know the special interest that

~ '

18 the subcommittee has with how we are prepared to operate, 19 both f rom the kind of people we have, how we are organized, 20 and the various things you are going to hear about, 21 training and so forth that we have in place.

22 So I would like to make a special introduction 23 of the next speaker, Mr. Thomas Beckham. He's the Georgia 4

{} 24 Power Company Vice President and General Manager of Nuclear 25 Operations.

. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 87 1 He is located in the Georgia Power Company

\> 2 offices in Atlanta. He is a graduate of Georgia Tech, with 3 a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering.

4 - Tom has held many positions ^in* testing and 5 operations within the Georgia Power Company. He was two 6 years the manager of the Harley branch, a four unit 7 coal-fired plant.

8 He was five years at plant Hatch during start 9 up of Unit 1. And for more than two and a half years, was 10 Vogtle plant manager, and participated very actively in 11 setting the design aspects of the Vogtle plant at that 12 time.

() 13 He's held a senior-reactor operator's license 14 on the Hatch plant and is a Georgia registered professional 15 engineering. His experience is 21 years.

16 And I am very pleased to present Mr. Tom 17 Beckham to start our discussions of our preparations for 16 operations.

19 (Slide.)

20 MR. BECKHAM: As was stated, I am Tom Beckham, 21 Vice President, General Manager of Nuclear Operations _for 22 the Georgia Power Company.

23 I would like to make two presentations this

{} 24 morning. The first being on management philosophy and the 25 second on organization and management as related to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3"00

188 1 corporate support for the open place of the operation of

?')

G 2 the Vogtle facility.

3 (Slide.)

4 Management philosophy of Georgia Power Company 5 is more than just something that is stated casually.within 6 the halls or around offices. It's a written policy that is 7 put out in our corporate policy manual and signed by our 8 Chairman of the Board.

9 I have put it into this slide to give you some 10 feel for it.

11 The first item is, we put nuclear saf ety above 12 all other things. It is the first priority in the h 13 r construction and-the operation of. our. nuclear-facilities. ..

14 We do not believe in, nor do we allow our 15 units to remain in operation in an unsafe condition.

16 We are also committed to reporting those 17 activities that are required to be reported and those 18 things that should be reported to the people of Georgia and

19 to the regulatory bodies necessary to be knowledgeable of 20 those activities.

21 It is our policy to meet all the requirements 22 and to meet the requirements both of the regulatory bodies

'23 and those requirements that we feel needed to make a e 24 first-class type f acility.

U 25 It is our policy to maintain overview of the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

189 1, plant at thc' appropriate level to be sure that they are 2 operated correctly.

3 -

(Slide.)

4 It is the policy of Georgia Power Company to 5 have a quality assurance program for the purpose of 6 reviewing, mainta3.ning and inspecting plant construction 7 and operation.

8 It's the policy of Georgia Power Company to 9 maintain the personnel exposure of our employees as low as 10 practicable and below the NRC limits.

11 It is our policy to maintain an adequate staff 12 of qualified people to do their respective jobs.

() 13 It. is our policy, as you will hear later on, 14 to provide ongoing training for plant personnel so they may 15 perform their job functions appropriately and in the best 16 manner possible.

17 It is our policy to protect the environment,

'18 keeping the discharges from the plant as low as practicable 19 and below the regulatory limits.

20 Of course, the Institute of Nuclear Power 21 Operations, being a utility-sponsored organization, it is 22 our policy to support them and achieve the standards 23 specified by them.

24 ( Slide. )

25 The plant takes those and they put them into a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

190 1 statement of ten rules. This is just putting them into

~ \~/ 2 what do you do to make the philosophies happen.

3 We want to show you here an emphasis on 4 quality procedures and attention to detail. That is 5 basically what I wanted to show there. But the big picture 6 of this is that we design the process, we construct the 7 process.

8 (Slide.)

9' And we put the process into operation to make 10 this policy work.

11 We then monitor the process. And if we find 12 problems with it, we cor, rect it by feedback.

,m

'()

13 ~-

--The- big picture is that we a're' trying- to 14 achieve excellence in all manners of operation, always 15 placing nuclear saf ety as the first priority and saf ety of 16 the general health and public as a first priority.

17 That completes my first presentation.

18 ,

MR. EB ERSOLE: Let me ask kind of a shot in 19 the dark question about plant shutdown. Coming down to low 20 power levels. ,

21 I will take a hypothetical case that you find 22 trouble in one of the -- trains. It's not in use now.

23 It's for emergency use. But you have a degraded safety 24 system.

25 If you come down to the minimum level for ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ' Washington, D.C.

(202) 347-3700

191 :

l 1 potential accidents you would be at full shutdown, but you .

q?')

\-

2 would also be using the last reserve you had to remove l 3 heat.

4 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir.

5 MR. EB ERSOLE: It's like finding the landing 6 gear is in trouble, so you immediately land the airplane to 7 get on the ground.

8 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir.

9 MR. EBERSOLE: So what would you do if you 10 found an RHE train in trouble, yet you knew if you came 11 down to full cold shutdown you would have to use the only 12 one you had lef t?

() 13 MR .' BECKHAM: . Of course, we'would have a lot 14 of experts involved. But we had a very similar situation 15- on a unit.

16 What we did, Mr. Ebersole, was we got the 17 regulatory agencies very highly involved. We explained to

18 them that the situation was such we felt that the plant 19 would be placed in a less conservative mode of operation.

20 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes.

21 MR. BECKHAM: We spent, I know I personally 22 spent two nights in the general office talking to the phone 23 talking to Gus and others.

/~S 24 We showed our best position was to remain in V

25 plant operation with additional diligence and that is what ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

192

.1 we chose to do.

D)

\,_ 2- MR. EB ERSOLE: Good. That is what I like to 3 hear you say. Hot standby would be a point of retreat 4

which would leave you with your emergency ~ reserve unused 5 yet.

6 MR. BECKHAM: There are other positions but 7 that happened --

8 MR. EBERSOLE: Some of the rules, you know, 9 they plunge toward minimum condition without regard for the 10 fact they are using facilities which now are at an 11 integrated state. That is what I was looking for.

~

12' Any other questions?

O

- ~

13 *a waao= rue re1e member-4 roe wo ed nica 14 provides, gives the license SRO authority to deviate from 15 the procedures if he concludes it's necessary.

16 (Slide.)

17 You have to have that sort of a -- you have to 18 include that provision in any sort of rules.

19 But what do you do in a practical case where 20 the SRO, certainly, if he had only minutes to make a-21 decision, would have to make it on his own.

22 But in most cases where you have a problem in 23 the plant he is going to have longer than that, he will r~g 24 have tens of minutes, or hours.

-(/

25 Who participates in a decision under that sort ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 93 1 of circumstance? Let's say it's something on the back 2 shift, the SRO has a problem, perhaps the sort of thing Mr.

3 Ebersole was talking about.

4

-MR. BECKHAM:~ Let me-be sure-I understand the 5 question. Are you asking something that is not immediately 6 placing the plant in danger, but is a condition that needs 7 to be looked into? Or are you talking for an emergency 8 type condition?

9 MR. WARD: Well, it's immediate in the sense 10 he has to take some action, if it's outside procedures, 11 within 30 minutes or an hour, not within two or three 12 minutes.

ry

( )_ 13 --

Does;he-have any particular~ instructions about 14 consulting with senior staff or engineering staff?

15 MR. BECKHAM: We institute -- we have a duty 16 officer on call 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. He can get ahold of him.

17 If that is not high enough, our senior people in the 18 corporate office, we have duty officers who wear beepers.

f 19 I wear a beeper. I happen to have one on 20 right now. So if you are giving me some period of time to l

21 make phone calls, we normally expect them to get the proper

^

V 22 expertise in there so it is not a snap judgment.

23 If he must shut the plant down, he is trained r~g 24 to. recognize the symptoms and he has the authority to shut l \J

! 25 the plant down.

ACE FEDERAL REIORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

~

194

.. 1 Any licensed operator can shut the plant down A

1-) 2 if he so desires, if he sees that some condition in the

'3 _ plant needs to place it in that position.

4 ~. - , .Obviouslyrhe will-.-have-to explain what 5 happened, why, and what was the reason.- But he has that 6 authority.

7' I don't know that I am answering your 8 question.

9 MR. WARD: Yes, I think that is sufficient.

10 MR. REED: Let's follow that a little bit 11- because I think it borders on something that I experienced-12 in the past, duty and call superintendent roster. You said

)- 113 _ - .you.had a duty: officer;;on call.

14- MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir.

15 MR. REED: They have duty for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and you 16 have a roster.

17 What are the nature of the qualifications for 18 these people? Are they SRO's or former SRO's? Are they 19 really technically well-grounded?

20 You said it could go up further. Certainly we 121 don't want it to go up further to the public relations 22 officers to hold the hand of the shift supervisor. We want 23 it to stay in the technical arena.

24 MR. BECKHAM: That is true. The people that 25 hold-duty officer are trained people, ones that have been ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

195 1 there a long time with a lot of experience.

\/ 2 Ones in the general office are people who have 3 held licenses or have been trained in the area of 4 lightwater reactors; -They understand-the philosophy of the 5 company. They understand the importance of nuclear safety.

6 They understand the importance of not placing power 7 generation above that of nuclear safety.

6 8 They also have access of anyone in the company 9 they need to get expertise to answer questions those 10 particular individuals want.

11 MR. REED: Further follow-up. As we all know, 12 Fourth of July and those kind of things, backup support

() 13 gets lean.- -And-the' duty officer roster.-is~an absolute 14 roster so that there is no running away from the duty 15 commitment; is that correct?

16 MR. BECKHAM: That's correct. I will carry it 17 so far, sir, I have a cabin on a lake. When I fish I have l 18 a beeper I wear while fishing that is out of division so l

L 19 they can reach me at any time.

20 My duty officer must' stay within contact in 21 Atlanta.

! 22 And the plant has the same condition on their 23 duty officer at the plant.

24 MR. EB ERSOLE: All right.

)

[ 25 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir, I think we well i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

196 1 understand that if you are on call, you are expected to be V- 2 there.

3 Many years ago, it's not happened recently, 4 one or two people didn't ~believe that'. They -have -been made 5 believers.

6 MR. . EB ERSOL E : May I follow up with a question 7 or two?

8 This privilege the operator has to take 9 independent action on his own judgment I think is extremely 10 important. His degree of freedom is what I was going to 11 pursue.

12 The plant, it frustrates me no end to find no IV h

'(),

13 written or established set of criteria for'when in a given 14 evolution an operation is going to be automated or it's 15 going to be done by manual sequence.

16 I think we sadly need a basis of decision as 17 to whether we ought mate a function or do it manually.

18 What is the criteria? When do you begin to bring the 19 operator in?

' 20 Do you have any sort of company policy as to 21 when you believe the operator is over burdened and you must t

22 interlock, automate?

23 And on the other hand, say the operator is now

(- 24 a critical element of the safety system and it's not too V) 25 complex, theref ore I will not automate?

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

~

197 1 I am talking about operational philosophy. Do

??wi.

-t s_/ 2 you follow me?

3 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir, I believe so. I know 4 --- - of no written policy-that states that.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you believe you have an 6 adequate degree of automation, or excessive automation?

7 Do you think you have adequate privileges to 8 bypass interlocks and the prerogative to do so if things 9 don't proceed down the schedule sequence?

10 I give you an example with the Hatch plant. I 11 bet there have been times you wished you could get steam to 12 the condensor.

(} 13 . - At leas.t I know of some cases where-that was a 14 wish, but the main steam line isolation valve said no.

15 MR. BECKHAM: With proper review and approval, 16 and that is a conclusive statement because you cannot allow 17 people to arbitrarily change design of the plant, with the 18 proper review and approval, I believe we have a proper 19 balance within our plants of automation versus manual.

20 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have some instruction to 21 the operators, "You can bypass if thus and such. "

22 MR. BECKHAM: He can bypass only if he -- if 23 it's changing the intent of a procedure or changing the (3 24 design of the plant, he can not bypass just arbitrarily.

()

25 He can not just bypass, say, a low vacuum ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

198 1 closure of the main steam line, because that low vacuum l'

\_ ' 2 closure is put in there for a purpose.

3 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

4 -MR.-BECKHAM: - We must- be sure that all the 5 various aspects of the reasoning behind that, design basis 6 of that are properly evaluated and that we do not want 7 someone, just for convenience sake, changing design of the 8 plant.

9 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure. I am trying to home in 10 on how you permit' exercise of freedom when it is necessary 11 to do so.

12 MR. BECKHAM: We permit it, sir, within the f( f 13 -'-

~ proper,- and I go back, within -the proper review and v

14 approval. That would bring in the plant review board.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: He may be in a hurry. I am 16 talking about --

17 MR. BECKHAM: You put the plant in the safe 18 condition to where the --

19 MR. EB ERSOLE: Remember, the desparate effort 20 to get steam to the condensors when Brown's Ferry was 21 burning down.

22 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir.

23 MR. EBERSOLE: They needed to do it. And they 24 did it by, you know, a variety of methods. But they had a g-)3 25 few impediments in the safe path. They bypassed and got ACE FEDERAL REPORTER $, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

199 1 around it and saved the day.

9%

' (-) 2~ Yet, it's difficult to find an expressed or 3 documented set of criteria, rules, for when you can do s

4 that.

5 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir, I understand.

6 MR. EBERSOLE: One sort of fundamental 7 question. Vogtle is a two-unit plant.

8 When you first started Vogtle, you must have 9 raised the question, should I rig this plant so if one unit 10 is in excessive trouble, not within the design basis, the 11 other plant can help it out?

12 Or did you say, no, I will consider that.

L

()- 13 -- - - there is only one: unit-in total-isolation from the-other.

14 There is no cross-over helping functions, whatsoever?

15 MR. BECKHAM: 'here are some common functions 16 in the design of the plar.t But the units are essentially 17 independent of each other.

18 MR. EB ERSOLE : What was the rationale for the 19 common functions?

20 MR. BECKHAM: You have things like the control 21 room building.

22 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure. I am talking about 23 systems, et cetera.

g-) 24 11R. BECKHAM: I may need engineering to help V

25 me. But I don't know of any systems that are dependent, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

200 1 one system uses two systems and we double sized -- i D -2 .MR. EBERSOLE: You road the.Iedundant' system 3 right down the line.

4 MR. THOMAS: That's right.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: And-didn't say, if one system 6 fails, I will _ ask the next unit to help me ouIt?

17- MR. THOMAS: .That's correct.

8 MR. EB ERSOLE: The staff likes it that.way.

9 It makes life simple.

~

10 MR. THOMAS: We like it, too.

11- MR. EB ERSOLE: I have no f urt her questions.

12 Thank you.

() 13 (Slide.)

14 MR. BECKHAM: The next subject is called 15 corporate support, more appropriately called the 16 organization and management of the operating units.

17- (Slide.)

.18 We touched briefly in the past on what Georgia 4

19 Power Company is. I would like to just very briefly go 20 through some of the aspects of the Georgia Power Company.

21 I will do it through this agenda. Give you a 22 little- bit on the general facts, generation facilities we 23 have. Some of our experience, then go into our 24 organizational structure.

25 As I go into organizational structure, I might ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

201 1 point out that we are in the process of augmenting our h,

~!)

s_ 2 organization. It is growing.

3 There will be additional submittals providing 4 --- - this -information-to the-appropriate -channels as it is 5 developed. And at the appropriate times.

6 So there may be some cases in the reporting 7 change and titles that may be new to both the NRC staff --

8 MR. THOMAS: But I believe it's your 9 conclusion that what we have now is an excellent 10 organization and more than adequate.

11 MR. BECKHAM: We are only augmenting. What we 12 have now is adequate, so stated, I believer yes, sir. All fG'i 13 we are doing is augmenting to help.

14 (Slide.)

15 Georgia Power Ccapany operates a large number 16 of units. We have two nuclear units, 37 fossil units, 70 17 hydro electric and 28 combustion turbine units.

18 (Slide.)

19 As you would read in the FSAR we are a 20 wholly-owned subsidiary of the Southern Company, Public L

21 Utility Incorporated, under laws of Georgia, and are 22 engaged in the generation, distribution and sale of 23 electricity throughout the state of Georgia.

n 24 (Slide.)

O 25 There are other owners, joint owners of the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

202 1 facility, Georgia Power Company being the principal owner.

\_/ 2 And we have .three other owners, as listed.

3 (Slide.)

4 -- We would-like~to point out Georgia Power

-5 Company is responsible for the design, construction and 6 operation of'the plant. Georgia Power acts as agent for 7 the other co-owners.

8 Before I get into the staff and details I 9 would like to point out the nuclear operations staff, we 10 presently have 33 people in the general office.

11 (Slide.)

12 All are engineering degrees and we have four O 13 - - -

eer i= ene ereer - we seve eetee #emner et reov1e he 14 .do have high education levels and we have an experience 15 level of 466 years.

16 (Slide.)

17 I would now like to move into the general 18 office organization. I would like to start at the top, Mr.

19 R. W. Scherer, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

20 He has reporting to him Mr. Miller, President 21 of the company.

. 22: Mr. Miller has three people reporting to him,

! 23 Executive Vice President and General Manager, Mr. Baker.

V

(~% 24 Executive Vice President, Power Supply, Mr. Kelly. Senior

)

25 Vice President Division Operations Mr. Gantt. And Finance, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

203 1 Mr. Jobe.

62

(_5) 2 The chain we will follow most specifically 3 will be down the power supply route with Mr. Kelly. Mr.

4 - Kelly is my-executive-vice president.

5 (Slide.)

6 Moving down the chain, Mr. Kelly has Mr.

7. Conway, Senior Vice President Nuclear Power, reporting to 8 him.

9 Mr. Conway's position has presently been 10 described by Mr. Foster. We have senior vice president 11 nuclear operations, Mr. Jim O'Reilly, ny immediate 12 superior.

() 13 Senior Vice~ President, Fossil ~and Hydro, Mr.

14 Head.

15 Vice President, Engineering and Construction 16 Services, Mr. Pinson.

17 And Vice President and General Manager, 18 Quality Assurance, Mr. Paul Rice, you heard from yesterday 19 ( Slide. )

I 20 Moving further down Mr. O'Reilly has reporting 21 to him five people. I report to him as I have previously 22 mentioned.

23 He also has a manager of nuclear training, Mr.

24 Jeff Badgett and support staff under Mr. Badgett.

b<x 25 He has manager nuclear support, mainly ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

204 1 administrative, documentation support and so forth in the p

km 2 general office.

3 A manager of nuclear saf ety and licensing, 4- Gucwa;~and-Manager of-Nuclear-Performance and" Analysis, Mr.

5 Manry.

6 (Slide.)

7 Moving further down into my chain which gets 8 down into the plants, I have reporting to me the Hatch 9 operations, here and the Vogtle operations in this area.

10 I have a manager of engineering liaison, Mr.

11 B emu s.

12 I have just initiated a position manager of

() 13 -

maintenance- and modification. - - - -

14 I have a manager of project engineering, Mr.

15 Jordan; and a manager of radiological safety, Mr. Ewald.

16 Each of these individuals has a staff under 17 them to assist the support of the plant.

18- The liaison position in this area as you see, 19 Southern Company Services is indicated. This is to provide 20 the operating support from Southern Company Services to the 21 operating plant.

22 When they need something done, supply the 23 engineering necessary for the plant to be sure it is 4

24 designed with proper operation input into it, and it's not 25 designed with thoughts and control of nuclear operation.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

205 1 We have Hatch, here. We are setting up for

?)'h

\_ 2 the Vogtle after operation position so they will be 3 available to do that. These are not engineers which input 4 --

-to-the-project-as-such-right now. This'is after operation 5 position.

6 We are increasing our participation in outage 7 planning and maintenance and modification in the corporate 8 office to assist the plant.

9 These are project individuals who assign 10 specific proj ects that need an individual full-time to 11 assist and help the plant get those items done that are of 12 ,

such a nature it would detract from the operation of the

[l x.i 13 plant if he were assigned . totally to the plant manager. .

14 Radiological safety gets the HP, Chemistry and 15 Emergency Preparedness Overview with the corporate office 16 necessary to meet our requirement to assure as low as 17 practicable radiation exposure.

18 (Slide.)

19 We mentioned the Safety Review Board. It 20 reports to Mr. Kelly, who I have showed you on the chart.

21 It will have a Hatch Safety Review Board, a 22 chairman and vice-Chairman. The Vogtle review board is 23 being implemented and looked at now. It will go functional gg 24 at fuel load.

LI 25 MR. WARD: Does that include members from ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

206 1 outside Georgia power?

f')s

(_ 2 MR. BECKHAM: At the present time we have 3 three contracts that are open.

4 --MR. WARD:- Maybe-tell me what is the Hatch?

5 Who is on the Hatch board?

6 MR. BECKHAM: Okay. Mr. O'Reilly is to be 7 chairman. I am to be Vice-Chairman. We are adding another 8 member.

9 We are changing some of the titles right now.

10 We are in the process of transition.

11 We had engineering, safety people, 12 radiological type people. Paul Rice is -- we are looking

() 13 . at him.. All :those items listed in the tech specs.

14 -

MR. WARD: Those are all Georgia Power 15 employees?

16 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir. We have, of course, 17 Southern Company Services available to us, and in the past.

18 We are looking at keeping, we are doing some 19 rearranging in the numbers. But up until today and 20 possibly continuing, there is Southern Company services 21 member on the Safety Review Board, particularly in the 22 fuels area.

23 MR. THOMAS: Core analysis.

24 MR. BECKHAM: Core analysis and so forth.

25 MR. WARD: I see.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

207.

m ML MR. BECKHAM: They are a member of the Safety 2L Review-Board. We have three consultants on blanket order.

3 Wo don't have to -sit and negotiate. Just "We need you to 4.- - come this-morningy"Ltype.

5 MR. WARD: But they are consultants; not 6- members of the board?

7 MR. BECKHAM: That's right.

W 8 MR. WARD: Some utilities, I believe, have 9 chosen to place outside members on the boards.

10 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir, I understand.

11 MR. WARD: You have chosen not to do that, 12 apparently.

13 -Any particular reason?

14 MR. BECKHAM: Because we have a Southern 15 Company Services available to us, like most utilities do 16 not have that expertise readily within.the umbrella 17 company, Southern company.

1-8 We have looked our hand over. And we feel we 19 have the expertise necessary to, within the company, and by 20 adding these extra outsiders on call, we meet what we need 21 to meet.

22 Obviously, we meet the minimum standards. But 23 we have looked at it from what we think we need to meet, 24 and we feel like right now.

m) 25 Now, as with this entire organization, this is ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

208 1 dynamic. If the need changes, there may be a change.

s 2' But right now our decision has been made not 3 to do that.

4 PUtr WARD: What sort of experience would 5 indicate to you the need for adding outside members to your 6 review board? -

9 7 MR. BECKHAM: I think we would have to review 8 those items that were coming up. If we got into a special 9 case where we felt we weren't getting input properly, that 10 on our overview of the board and Mr. Kelly's overview of 11 the board he felt he was not getting a proper review of 12 those subjects he wanted to review, certainly it would be

,a -

13 within-his-discretion to say,- "I want this done- in this f( ])

14 manner."

15 The Chairman, of course, would certainly be 16 able, in asking questions of the board in its 17 deliberations, if he felt like he was not getting 18 appropriate answers and felt like he could best improve 19 that by changing to the method you suggest, I am sure he 20 would have no reason to feel any way he could not make 21 that.

22 Right now we have not had that situation, and 23 have not decided to do that, sir.

24 MR. WARD: Thank you.

)

25 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

209 1 (Slide.)

(l' \

f(_) 2 A question that came up in the SER was 3 independent' safety engineering review group. I would like

. 4- -to-show-you-where-it reports-in now.

5 Reporting in through the manager of nuclear 6 ' performance and analysis, through supervisor of nuclear 7 safety. This being the site, and this being. corporate.

8 We are only required by regulations to put it 9 in place at Vogtle.

10 I would point out we are putting it in place 11 at Hatch because we think if it's a good idea for Vogtle,

12 it will be a good idea for' Hatch.
flf v

. 13 --

.I think: th,ist i's' one of-the ' examples where we

'14 don't necessarily just try to meet the minimum regulations.

15 MR. THOlmS : Tom, could you tell where you had 16 it reported where the staff in its SER indicated that this 17 group was not reporting at a high enough level? And that 18 you think that where you have them reporting now will 19 resolve that issue?

20 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir.

21 (Slide.)

22 I do not have the organization chart that was 23 exactly in place at that time. But I can certainly use p 24 this to give you an example.

U 25- I had a position here, Mr. Lynn Guceba, now ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

210 1 Manager of Nuclear Safety and Licensing.

. 2 Under him he had a nuclear analysis manager.

3 We had it reporting in that area. They had it reporting up 4 to the vice president.

5 They thought that was too close.

s We have 6 moved up that. We made it independent of me, bypasss this 7 chain.

8 MR. THOMAS: How about showing the other slide 9 as to where it comes in now up to the senior vice 10 president, someone reporting to the senior vice president.

11 MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir.

12 (Slide.)

m i

, ) 13 I have-the~ senior vice president right here.

14 Sir?

15 MR. THOMAS: Yes. That will be filed in the 16 FSAR. It's our judgment that will resolve the issue.

17 MR. BECKHAM: That completes my presentation 18 on the corporate support and the organization and 19 management set up to support the Vogtle and Hatch plants.

20 MR. EB ERSOLE: Thank you.

21 MR. THOMAS: Our next subject will be the 22 organization for plant operation. Mr. George Bockhold was 23 on yesterday, and you are familiar with his background and 24 his current position.

<-)

25 (Slide.)

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

F 211 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: George Bockhold, General

'h 'T - .

(J 2 Manager of Vogtle Nuclear Operations Department for Georgia 3 Power.

4 -

- I will-be-talking about the plant operations 5 organization and how we are organized for both start up and 6 operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2.

7 (Slide.)

8 Get right to the organization chart. In some 9 respects we are different than other utilities in that the 10 initial test program, start-up testing reports to me, the 11 general manager f or operations.

15 And I will be showing some more information f) t- ,

13 -

about'that.

14 I would like to go through first the 12 major 15- managers, superintendents that report to me.

16 Start out on initial test program manager, 17 Mike Bellamy. He has working for him really our operations 18 engineering group.

19 We have a superintendent of plant engineer and 20 services, Cliff Miller. Superintendent of engineering 21 liaison.

22 Our engineers at Plant Vogtle are our test l 23 supervisors, and are responsible for systems start up.

l y) r 24 They are responsible f or component testing, flushing and

(/

I 25 the preopen test program.

[

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

E 212 Lt 1 Tied along with that is our maintenance p

(_, 2_ organization that reports to Mike Bellamy. Ard the 3 mechanics, the electricians, the INC technicians. In the 4 = component- testing-those-are-the people - that go - out - and do 5 most of the component testing.

6 The integrated I testing is then organized with 7 operations and appropriate support from those people. So 8 those people are all tied Logether in one organization 9 reporting to Mike Bellamy.

10 I will talk about the special work planning 11 block a little later in the presentation.

12 I would like to shift to the other side of the f)1 13 ~

organization.

14 I have a manager unit operations, Herb Walker.

15 He has the superintendent of operations reporting to him, 10

, 16 Superintendent of Training, Paul Rushton. You will hear a 17 presentation from him.

18 Superintendent of admin, Vince Adgo.

19 Superintendent of Health Physics, Art Rosea.

l 20 Superintendent of Nuclear Chemistry, Holman, 21 and superintendent of regular compliance reporting to him.

22 (Slide.)

23 The next transparency shows the size of the It shows the organizational change.

(-)

v 24 organization.

25 As you see, over the first six months of the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

213 1 year we have been growing in size. The biggest growth in

.f

' x_/ 2 our organization has been associated with the start up 3 piece.

4 We--look at-the middle block ~ here, and we have 5 the operations broken down and start up organization broken 6 down.

7 We have 290 permanent Georgia Power people 8 assigned to start up, and 356 contract people in the start 9 up' organization, a -- 614 people associated with that start 10 up block.

11 In the operations block as shown we have a 12 total of 451 people in that particular block.

The bottom chart is on our ongoing basis, we

(') 13 14 track overtime, and we think that is a good indication of 15 performance. That is why it is shown on this transparency.

16 MR. WARD : George, before you go farther, 17 where in your organization is the man or the group that 18 looks at operating experience from other plants, that 19 reviews, for example, LER's, or that is cognizant of the 20 INPO analyses?

21 MR. BOCKHOLD: Plant analyses superintendent 22 has two groups, regulatory specialists and nuclear 23 operations, QC group.

So this man has that information. We have p)

~

24 25 what we call an operations assessment program in operation.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

214 l We review those items that you mentioned.

!r%

i ) s- 2 MR. THOMAS: And bulletins.

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: Bulletins and circulars and 4 -IMPO-items-and-SOER's. That- kind -of-inf ormation.

5 MR. WARD: The name of the group, names are 6 important sometimes. Regulatory compliance, I guess, 7 bothers me a little bit, as if that is the emphasis.

8 I hope the emphasis on information you get 9 from the IMPO analysis for example isn't on regulatory 10 compliance but --

11 MR. BOCKHOLD: No, we really look for and seek 12 out the items to enhance safety and also availability of j 13 - -

the units.

14 I am going to now talk about the work planning 15 function. We feel it is an important function. It really 16 ties a number of groups together, spread across the entire 17 organization.

18 (Slide.)

19 This is a flow chart and shows the functions 20 of the work planning group.

21 Really, what we do is we assemble supervisors 22 from various organizations to work together and make sure 23 the work flow is planned and organized so the mechanic or gs 24 electrician, when he goes out to do the job, he has the

(_)

25 parts, he has the clearance to do the work. He is ready to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

215 1 go to work and will actually perform the work.

bC 2 In a nuclear plant you have to make sure he's 3 organized. Otherwise he spins his wheels a lot.

4 _.- That-is -the object of this group,- to make sure 5 he works efficiently.

6 You start out with an initiator, somebody 7 needing something accomplished. It gets appropriate 8 approval. Supervisory approval. It comes'into the work 9 planning group.

10 The maintenance organization probably 'is the 11 biggest staff associated with the group. They have what we 12 call work planners, and clerical support. That type of 13 thing.

14 They look at, we have an adequate work 15 description. Is it a duplicate work order? Will it 16 require outside support?

17 Estimate manhours required. Estimate the 18 parts. Fill out the various material requisitions.

19 ,

We review them. We get appropriate permits.

f 20 We have a fairly large computer tracking system that tracks 21 work orders called nuclear plant management information 22 system.

23 That enters. We enter it into the work order 24 now into that system, such that we can find out whether we 25 have those parts. We have automated a lot of this.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

216 1 From there, after the work is looked at and 2 organized, and we have the basic structure, it then goes 3 over to the operations supervisor in that organization.

4 - He looks- at- the plant-mode-that"the work has 5 to be performed in. Impact on tech specs. Special 6 restrictions, precautions, any safety considerations that 7 have to be taken into consideration when the people are 8 going to perform the work. And he prepares the initial 9 clearance.

10 From there it goes to our QC engineering 11 review. We have a QC individual, an engineer in the 12 organization. QC looks at it, assigning points, ll 13 -

safety-related work.

14 Makes a second review on whether the work is 15 non-Q or Q work. Looks at any special considerations in 16 the Q-non/ area.

17 Engineering looks at. Is this a potential 18 design change to the plant, or is it not just really a 19 maintenance activity?

20 Then it would go to the health physics group.

21 We have this work planning organization in place now. We 22 don't have health physics out there now, because we don't 23 have those considerations yet.

m 24 But that is an important part of it when we go 25 to operations. Fill out the radiation work permit.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

217 1 Af ter this is done, we have the package pulled p

2 together. That the worker can go do the work.

3 Then it goes back to maintenance operation.

- - - Supervisors get-together, review-the package and assign a 5 priority.

6 Operations is the prime controller of the 7 priority. Of course, maintenance needs to look at who is 8 doing what and how can we get the work accomplished.

9' -Finally, the package comes out to the maintenance 10 supervisor who ha's many foremen working for him. Goes to 11 the foreman before the work is actually started.

12 Maintenance foreman comes up to the on shift 13 supervisor with -the package.

14 "I got this work. Got these clearances. "

15 The shift supervisor signs off, has clearances 16 installed, and the work can go out and be performed.

17 The shif t supervisor controls and is 18 knowledgeable of what work goes on in the plant.

19 Finally, the journeyman gets out and does the 20 job.

21 We think it's a real good method of pulling 22 the organizations together, keeping the work flowing in a 23 very orderly fashion and making sure that the people that 24 have to do the work don't end up spinning their wheels, so 25 to speak. They can get out there and do the job.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

218 1 ( Slide. )

g' kJ 2 I would like to now review with you the 3 experience and qualifications of the people in nuclear 4

- operations-that-do-~ report to me.

5 Key managers, the 12 department heads that 6 were on the first chart. We all have Bachelor of Science 7 degrees. Five of us have advanced degrees. 108 years 8 combined nuclear experience in the group.

9 When you look at the technical people, 10 permanent technical people in the Georgia Power 11 organization, we have 432 of them. Combined, they have 12 1451 years of nuclear experience.

7

' . 13 This~is~a-breakdown of the types of folks ther 14 are and the years of nuclear experience they have on this 15- side of the column.

16 The three managers have 39 years experience.

17 I won' t read them all out.

18 We broke out the operations organization a 19 little separately. I know you are interested in that.

20 I also have another slide on the shift' 21 operating organization experience. I will really save some 22 of this discussion for that slide.

23 MR. W ARD : Are you going to show us a little 24 bit about how the shift is organized?

25 MR. BOCKHOLD: I don't have a specific slide ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington,'D.C. (202) 347-3700 1

219 !

1 on how the shift is organized. But when I get to that bV 2 slide, if you have additional questions, it's probably 3 appropriate to go over it then.

4 MR. WARD: -All right.

5 (Slide.)

6 MR. BOCKHOLD: I think we are kind of unique 7 for a nuclear power plant. We have more degreed people 8 than other plants and would like to share that with you.

9 We have 173 bachelor's degrees, 21 advanced 10 degrees. This gives the degrees by department.

11 Of the 173 bachelor's degrees,127 are 12 engineering degrees and 32 are techn'ical or science-related O- 13 -

eeeree - .

14 The 21 advanced degrees, four are doctorates 15 and 17 are engineering or technical related degrees.

16 (Slide.)

17 This slide is another way-to look at the

.18 experience of the organization in relationship to cur 19_ requirement, ANSI 18.1 of 1971. And in that slice, looking 20 at the organization, the technical people, of the 432, 21 there are 400 that has certain requirements by that .

22 particular slice.

23 At the time of fuel load, 395 of those will

, 24 fully meet all those requirements. And really, the 25 immediate question comes in what area don't you meet those ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

220 1 r equir ements. I n)

(- 2 If you look at simply the I & C technicians, 3 we have some junior technicians we are training up as part 4

of the organization.- -We- will- appropriately supervise their-5 work until they do meet the appropriate requirements and

~

6 qualifications.

7 89 percent of the staff currently meets the 8 18.1 requirements. 98 percent will have that experience by 9 fuel load.

10 MR. WARD: The increase of nine percent is 11 just due to experience?

12 MR. BOCKHOLD: Experience during start up and p

(_) 13 special other programs that we have" sending people to other 14 plants.

15 MR. WARD: Are y,ou going to talk more about 16 that? To the extent you are getting the hot participation 12 17 experience?

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir. I will actually 19 address that as part of this slide.

! 20 MR. WARD: Okay.

12 1 ( Slide. )

22 MR. BOCKHOLD: Really the two questions you 23 have asked should be addressed as part of this slide.

24 If you want me to go over more after I cover bg 25 the slide --

l L

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

221 1 MR. WARD: I see some of it is on there

\> 2 already.

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: What this slide focuses on is 4- -

---the operations-organization ~under ny superintendent of 5 operations.

6 Looking at the supervisors in operations in 7 that organization that is going to operate the shift, the 8 plant, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, seven days a week, the licensed 9 people, we have 24 supervisors.

10 Ten have previous PNR licensed experience.

11 Six currently hold PWR licenses at plant Farley and Summer.

~

12 Four at Farley, two at Summer.

13 ,We instituted a-special program.where we took If )

14 our people, sent them to those utilities, trained them as 15 SRO's on those utilitics. And those folks will have more 16 than six months of licensed experience at an operating 17 plant.

18 So ten with previous PNR licensed experience; 19 four with previous BWR licensed experience. That comes 20 f rom plant Hatch.

21 Thirteen of the 24 will have greater than six 22 months of hot participation experience. As the NTL Working 23 Group and the Generic Letter meets those requirements 24 there. Fifteen of these people have NRC-SRO instructor 25 certification at Vogtle, meaning to say, we have been i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 requesting and the region has been supporting us in giving v 2 SRO certifications, instructor certifications at Plant 3 Vogtle. on our simulator that you saw the other day.

4 - --- -- Eleven of - the- 24 people ' have Bachelor of 5 Science degrees in engineering or related science.

6 Shift technical advisors --

7 MR. WARD: George, could I ask you a question 8 about that?

9 MR. BOCKHOLD: Sure.

10 MR. WARD: These 24 supervisors are -- I guess 11 I missed -- how many shifts do you have, five, or six?'

12 MR. BOCKHOLD: We,have five shifts. And we i) . have more people up there- than-is . required -to cover five 14 shifts for two units.

15 And one of my last items down here is that 16 what we have done is we have trained our people early in 17 their SRO requirements. We have an interim requalification 18 program.

19 Basically we take them on and off shift, do 20 the requalification program. Basically, rotating them as 21 we would in an operating unit.

22 What we are able to do for those people is to 23 give them the initial test program experience, integrate 24 that in with the whole group. Give them that experience, 25 plus, get them the required training as required for the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

223 1 NRC examinations.

. fr%

\m) 2 MR. WARD: With two units running you would 3 need a minimum of 15 supervisors. You have got 24.

4 . _ . _

. _ . . -- MR.-BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir.- -I have -2 4. Some of-5 the STA's will be promoted to various supervisory levels as 6 we progress on the start up of Units 1 and 2.

7 So I need a minimum of five of these, and 15 8 of these.

9 MR. WARD: Since a number of the people you 10 will be calling assigned as shif t supervisors have B.S.

11 degrees, do you plan to take advantage of the permission to 12 combine STA and an SRO in one person, or are you going to

(}- 13 -

-maintain separate-STA's on every shift?

14 MR. BOCKHOLD: On a limited basis we plan to 15 take advantage of that.

16 We prefer to maintain two career paths to the 17 shift supervis'or position. One up through the operator 18 position, and one through the degreed engineering position.

19 MR. WARD: I see.

20 MR. BOCKHOLD: We feel that is the best way to 21 manage that situation, so we get good operators, but also 22 have good SRA's progressing up to the shif t supervisor 23 position.

24 MR. REED: I think I can understand that five 25 shif ts will work well in initial licensing and start up, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

224 1 and the experience involvement will be beneficial on the (A

(_) 2 five shift basis.

3 This is going beyond where you are, but when

=---4 -

you get-to requalification, out- a couple of years, three 5 years f rom now, where the shif t compliment has a pretty 6 good schedule of work, it will not be as easy to draw 7 people out of the shif t for the required training which is 8 approximately 20 percent of the time.

9 Do you anticipate that you will be going to 10 six shif ts in two or three years?

11 MR. BOCKHOLD: We first feel that we can man 12 five shif ts and stay less than the overtime requirements

() 13 --- .with five shifts. .

14 We have people here, and really our ongoing 15 plans are to have people such that we have more than five 16 shifts.

17 We would organize the shift rotation such that 18 it best relates to the people. Meaning to say we want to 13 19 keep overtime down as a general management philosophy.

20 We want to maximize good, effective training 21 for the people such that they can best do their job in an 22 environment that is conducive to learning.

23 MR. THOMAS: George, don't you think in 24 response to Mr. Reed that, af ter two or three years, if it 25 appears to you that you need more, then you will do so?

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

225 1 But you will evaluate it at that time?

s) i(~T 2 MR. BOCKHOLD: Sure.

3 Just by the math here I have a lot more than 4 -- --five -shif ts-of peop1e-in -this organization.

5 Let's quickly look at the shift technical 6 advisors.

7 ,

We have six with BWR shift technical advisor 8 experience at Plant Hatch. Three of the 11 have greater 9 than six months hot participation experience. Our plans 10 are to send most of these people up for licensing.

11 Therefore, these three would add to these 13 12 up here, giving us a total of 16 to meet the, really, this

(}- >

requirement,rindustry working group that~ our president, Mr.

14 . Miller, presented to the Commission and ended up with 15 Generic Letter 84-16.

16 Three have been certified, again, at the 17 Vogtle, on the Vogtle simulator by the NRC. All hold 18 Bachelor of Science degrees in engineering or related 19 science.

20 In our reactor operator force we have 57

.21 currently, one with a previous BWR license, 21 with greater 22 than three months hot participation experience.

23 I have already talked about our extensive hot fs 24 participation experience program. We have used Farley, 25 Summer and Sequoyah plant for that program.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

226 l

1 1 Have I answered all your question, Mr. Ward?

d 2 MR. WARD: Yes. I have one more, though.

3 I would like to ask about your experience in

---hiring people-f or-the- STA- j obr- Over -the-12stto ~ or - three -

5 years there has been a lot of discussion about whether it 6 was going to be possible for utilities, whether this was a 7 viable program, whether it was possible for utilities to 8 higher engineers and keep them in that slot.

9 In fact, there is -- you say all of yours 10 actually have B.S. degrees. And that is sort of beyond the 11 requirement.

12 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir.

h 13 MR. WARD:- Could you'tell me' a-little bit ,

14 about your experience?

15 MR. BOCKHOLD: Really, when you look back at 16 how we formed this organization, we looked at, as you 17 notice, our staff has a lot of degreed people on it. A 18 number of those people have experience at other plants.

19 Really, what we did is, we asked for 20 volunteers out of the engineering group, the degreed group, 21 to find out what kind of interest there would be.

22 There was a lot of interest in the shif t 23 organization. And there has continued to be a lot of 24 interest in the progression route of STA to shift 25 supervisors.

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 i

2 27 1 So we haven't had any problem, is really the y,,

^>

~ 2 answer to your question.

3 MR. WARD: I see. What are the routine duties 4 you will assign to the STA's?

5 MR. BOCKHOLD: The STA's, of course, their key 6 safety f unction is, during an accident, to be in the 7 control room.

8 A; you saw, our saf ety parameter display 9 system, to utilize that and other board indication, to be 10 an advisor to the shift supervisor to assess an accident.

11~ MR. WARD: But that won't be happening very 12 often..

() 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: Hope it never happens. .

14 We plan to utilize them routinely as part of 15 the operations on shif t organization and utilize them to 16 monitor plant status and use them, for example, to run 17 incore traces and do some of the functions that, in a BWR, 18 reactor engineer does a lot.

19 In a PNR it is not done as heavily. But use 20 him in the operations organization to stay really very 21 closely in touch with the status of the plant and be part 22 of that organization.

23 MR. WARD: I see. He will rotate with the 24 given shift?

25 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 m

228 1 MR. WARD: That is all I have. Thank you.

h

'(/ 2- (Slide.)

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: I would like to,look at our 4 --

-- maintenance-department and-discuss that area with you 5 shortly.

6 Superintendent has a Bachelor of Science 7 degree in electrical engineering. Ten years nuclear 8 experience. He was our I & C superintendent at Plant 9 Hatch. He participated in construction testing, start.up 10 activities at Plant Hatch. Melvin Griffith.

11 Supervision, 32, they have 138 years nuclear 12 experience and 348 years of maintenance and related 13 experience.

14 Maintenance engineering, we have eight of 15 those people, all bachelor degrees. 20 years nuclenr 16 experience. ,

17 Mechanics and electricians, currently we have -

18 79. 82 years of nuclear experience, over 500 years of 19 power plant maintenance experience. All these people are 20 journeymen.

i 21 Instrument and control technicians, 35 of them.

14 22 In our company our normal requirement is they will have an 23 associate degree or higher, two years technical type 24 degree. And they have 47 years nuclear experience.

25 MR. EBERSOLE: Will you comment briefly on the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

229 1 eternal problem of working on devices, take a valve as a gn k- - 2 case.in-point.

3 Or I might even take a circuit breaker, which 5

4 ~-is-a composite--of--both mechanical- and electrical f unctions, 5 and may sometimes involve multiple people maintaining it.

6 I think I have heard of problems with valves, 7 - where the union rules or whatever invoked that it took both 8 mechanical and electrical maintenance man to work on the

'9 same box.

10 How do you manage this problem?

-11 MR. BOCKHOLD: We have a union. We have 12 historical precedences on who works on what equipment.

() 13 Occasionally, in a .similar area, not really on 14 the same box, in a similar area we might have an I & C 15 technician working on a relay type device, and maybe an 16 electrician working on the breaker.

17 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes.

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: And, you know, we work that 19 out.

20 MR. EB ERSOLE: Let me take a valve. A valve 21 is a composite device. It has both electrical and 22' mechanical functions, but it must work as an entity. Yet 23 there is compartmentalization of the repair effort, I hear,

'24 and even struggles.

25 MR. BOCKHOLD: What we do in .that case is we ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

230 l have a team of people. We have an electrician and mechanic px_

b 2 go --

3 DR. KERR: Who is ir charge of saying the valve 4 -

--is ready ~f or service?-Is-it- the- electrician; the 5 mechanical man?

6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Really, the person who is in 7 charge is, at the end we f unctionally test the components.

'8 The foreman supervises their work. And then at the end we I

9 do this functional test to make sure the component will 10 work. And check it in accordance, a saf ety-related system, 11 of course, ISI --

12 MR. EBERSOLE: Who signs on the bottom line?

() 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: The maintenance foreman and 14 finally the shift supervisor.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: Fine.

16 MR. WARD: Wait a minute. You have a 17 maintenance foreman for each craft, don't you?

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: Well, we divide the work up 19 such that the foreman will appropriately cover the work.

20 We do not necessarily always have a one to one relationship 21 there. Most of the time we do.

22 MR. EB ERSOLE: In fact, I have recently heard 23 about some troubles in valves where you couldn't find the rx 24 point of difficulty in any integral sense.

V 25 Somebody said it was problems with adjusting ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

231 1 the gears, which was a mechanical f unction. Others, the

.2 position limit switches, which i.s an electrical function.

3 So I am trying to find the point man, again, on composite -j obs.--Find-the-fellow who has' the signature 5 that says that device, an integral device, is ready for 6 service.

7 MR. BOCKHOLD: The foreman is over-all 8 responsible and is the person who signs.

9 Really, the way we verify that is testing on 10 the components.

11 MR. WARD: So a given foreman might have I & C 12 technicians, electricians and mechanical people reporting l

O 13 .

to ai 2 14 MR. BOCKHOLD: The work package could have all 15 those particular elements.

16 And the completion of the work package would 17 be, the foreman would get information from those 18 journeymen, and he would sign off that the package was 19 complete.

f 20 The package would then be tested.

21 If it's a more complex package, the system

22. engineer, our test supervisor would be ultimately involved

+

23 .with that and would be the person indicating, would have 24 been the person that specified the surveillance testing, 125 testing required to bring that into service.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

232 1 MR. EBERSOLE: How many craf ts work on a N

ff'J 1- - 2 circuit' breaker for the Scram system?

'3 MR. BOCKHOLD: On the breakers, themselves, that-is-j us t- an-el ect ri-cal-f un cti on.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: Not I & C?

6 MR. BOCKHOLD: The cards that feed the relays 7 that trip those breakers are I & C functions.

8 MR. EBERSOLE: All right. The man who does 9 the cards, is he subsidiary to the electrical maintenance 10 man?

11 MR. BOCKHOLD: I & C foreman. That scope of 12 work would be covered by an I & C --

i) 13 MR. EB ERSOLE: The other scope of work in the 14 breaker would be an electrical maintenance man.

15 MR. BOCKHOLD: You have your normal PM's that 16 do cleaning, checking the mechanisms work. That would be a 17 maintenance function.

18 MR. EBERSOLE: Right.

9 19 MR. BOCKHOLD: Really, the key, okay, to 20 making sure that it is all fit, for example, on reactor 21 trip breakers, that they are appropriately tested, is based 22 upon a set of procedures in the work planning group _and 23 that kind of stuff.

24 MR. REED: Since there is some division here, 25 I would like to ask you about cross-training of maintenance f ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

233 15- 1 mechanics and electricians and I & C personnel. Is there fra

's-}

2 an element of cross-training in your program?

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: There are elements of

--4-- cross-training at-thedourneyman~ level; more elements of 5 cross-training at the foreman level. Significant elements 6 of cross-training at the foreman level.

7 Our desire is to bring the foreman up to he 8 being thoroughly proficient in mechanical skills and 9 electrical skills.

10 MR. EB ERSOLE: I am sure you appreciate we are 11 trying to take a view at the compartmentalization of 12 expertise and problem of integrating the multi---

() 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: Sure.

14 (Slide.)

15 Really, I will come back to this slide. We 16 are talking about their communication. Maintenance 17 organization's communication and how we have experts that 18 can do X and Y and Z.

19 Of course, when you have to bring all X, Y l

20 and Z together, you need coordination and team work. In a 21- bigger picture this is our coordination, team work, the 22 overall plant organization.

23 But in this work planning function, their 24 coordination and team work, when I gave this slide I 25 mentioned we had, for example, work planners here. Okay.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 And the largest staffing of this work planning A 2 group was in the maintenance area, because they had a 3 coordination and team work' effort required in a lot of

-4 --

- cases.

5 Who does the work. Where are the boundaries.

6 MR. EBERSO$E: Thank you.

7 MR. THOMAS: We would --

8 MR. BOCKHOLD: I am not sure I finished this 9- slide.

'10 Yes, I finished that one.

11 (Slide.)

12 I 'would just like to hit one of the elements I

h 13

~

of ourimaintenance program. We have a planned maintenance

14 and a predictive maintenance program.

15 Planned maintenance, we incorporate 16 manufacturers' recommendation, previous experience and 17 equipment qualification requirements.

, 18 The program allows us to modify the durations, 19 to really enhance equipment reliability.

20 In our current phase, where we are testing,

! 21 what we do is, we use the construction preventive 22 maintenance program that has been in place.

23 Then, as the preventive maintenance 24 requirements change, the test supervisor, engineer 25 responsible for that system, goes ahead. And we move,

[

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

235 1 then, into the operational preventive maintenance program kl 2 on that equipment.

3 Predictive maintenance, we are seeing that

---these elements-here, vibration analysis, oil analysis and-5 infrared analysis can really improve reliability on our 6 components.

7 So we are enthusiastic about this program.

8 Vibration analysis, we use trending. We can 9 detect reassembly errors, diagnose equipment problems, 10 identify future replacement parts needed.

11 And really, lube oil and inf rared is the same 12 type program as indicated on the slide, (e~s) 13 MR. EB ERSOLE: Is your vibration analysis, 14 does it extend right into the audio frequency range?

15 MR. BOCKHOLD: I will have to find out the 16 exact frequencies of the program. But if you are asking 17 does the --

18 One of the good things is when you hear it, it 19 sounds different. Yes, sir.

20 MR. EBERSOLE: I am talking about remote sound 21 monitoring.

22 MR. BOCKHOLD: We --

23 MR. EBERSOLE: Not j ust putting your ear up 24 against it.

25 MR. BOCKHOLD: We do not have audio pick-ups ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 ,

- . - - . . . - . - .=-. . . - . -- . - - - - - . . -.

-236 1 -throughout the plant.

P k- 2- But, you know, the supervisors, journeymen, good mechanics, good operators, boy, when you listen, it 4 -- sounds different, you -know you have got a problem.

5 We have a loose parts monitoring system, but

'6~ that is actually an installed system.

7 MR. EBERSOLE: Unfortunately, there is lots of 8 equipment you can't get your ear up to.

9 MR. BOCKHOLD: That is true. Sometimes the 10 feel in noisy environments can tell you.

11 Did I answer your question?

12 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes, sure.

1 l )- 13

- ~

MR. BOCKHOLD: That is all I have on my 14 presentation associated with the plant organization.

15 MR. EBERSOLE : Thank-you.

16 MR. THOMAS: We-have had presented the j 17 corporate support and plant organization.

18 In addition to that, the senior management of 19 Georgia Power has an active role in overseeing the 20 operation of Hatch, currently, and are also overviewing the 21 initial test operations for Vogtle.

, 22 About two years now, Georgia Power Company has 23 had a Nuclear Operations Management Overview Board chaired 24 by the Chairman and Chief Executive of Georgia Power

{)

25 Company.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

237 1 It includes the President, Mr. Kelly; the' bk/

y 2 Executive Vice President, Mr. Beckham. And it includes 3 Executive Vice President of Engineering of Southern Company

.-4

-Services, -Vice - President-Nuclear-Southern Company- Services, -

5 and several executives who meet bi-monthly to have a full 6 day overview of the operations of the plant, events that 16 7 have occurred, what the planning is.

8 So they have intimate involvement and 9 information, and question and involve themselves in it.

10 In addition, Georgia Power Company's Board of 11 Directors has a Nuclear Overview Committee consisting of 12 four board members. Those are outside board members.

() 13 -

.They meet, at one-of their activities, they 14 meet annually with the nuclear -- semi-annually, excuse me, 15 they meet semi-annually and chair, the chairman of that 16 board, overview committee, chairs the nuclear operations 17 management overview bogrd meetings twice a year.

18 So that gives clear policy interaction with 19 -the operations of the plant.

20 MR. EBERSOLE: Do they have an intensive 21 program now, or do you have, to examine the cause of 22 unanticipated shut downs and to begin to minimize these,

23 because they are both costly and hazardous.

24 MR. THOMAS: This is one of the key areas 25 discussed at each of these overview meetings. They asked ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

238 1 to have explained the various Scrams and the root causes, KJ 2 and what kind of programs we can have, and have set 3 objectives of reducing the number of automatic Scrams that 4 occur.

5 This has happened at Hatch because it is now 6 in operations.

7 But at each of those meetings Mr. Bockhold 8 also gives the results, and, in time, will give his similar 9 things that are going on, reports at Hatch now.

10 In addition they have other involvements in 11 the industry. They are very active in INPO. Specifically, 12 the President of Georgia Power Company, Mr. Jim Miller, is

() 13 -

- ' Chairman of NUMARCr So -that' involves allot having to do 14 with operations.

15 So Georgia Power Company from top to bottom is 16 very much involved and knowledgeable in the nuclear 17 operations.

18 MR. EB ERSOL E: What has been your spurious 19 shut down frequency, and what do you expect to do to 20 improve it on Hatch, as well as your other plants?

21 MR. THOMAS: It's not been as good as we like.

22 I would let Mr. Beckham speak to the exact numbers.

23 I think somewhere around six or seven a year.

24 They have obj ective to get the first step down to at least 25 three.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

239 1 Did I tell it accurately?

I m

\ >) 2 MR. BECKHAM: Tom Beckham, Georgia Power.

3 For the last several years we have had a very 4 intensive- program -to -bring -the Scram-reduction down.- --

5 Prior to 1985, they were much higher than we 6 liked. In 1984 we had ten Scram totals for the two units.

7 So far this year we have had four. Every one 8 of those gets a report to the president of the company of 9 corrective action.

10 We have seen a very positive influence. We 11 are making progress in this area.

12 MR. EB ERSOLE: In these shut downs, there are

{ (~S 13 two ' classes, one Ir call- benevolenta in- that you have 1

(_)

14 shutdown, but you don't call on emergency heat sinks. You 15 use the condensor and main feedwater.

~ 16 Others, you swing into emergency apparatus aux 17 feedwater.

18 Do you differentiate between these in 19 examining your shutdown logic?

20 MR. BECKHAM: What we do is we look at all 21 Scrams and the cause and what was brought into play. And 22 if there was a challenge to the safety systems, did those 23 safety systems perform properly, was everything as it 24 should be, or did we have to help it along.

25 Our reporting is both manual, when we have to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

240 1 shut it down from a manual shutdown.

p k/ 2 We also report unanticipated automatic Scrams, 3 which normally would be from a hundred percent power, in

-- many- cases are -the ones that tend -to' bring you in to 5 challenge the safety systems faster.

6 MR. EB ERSOLE: Do you deliberately have a 7 policy ongoing that you will avoid the call up of safety 8 systems to the extent you can, and hang on to your standard 9 heat rejection systems?

10 A case in point would be, do you ramp down 11 main feedwater rather than j ust automatically go to aux 12 feedwater?

I 13 - -

If ycu ramp-down main -f eedwater, you, of s

14 course, don't challenge the safety system.

15 That is one of the beneficial aspects of doing 16 that.

17 On the other hand, it brings some problems 18 like you might overfill the boiler, whatever.

19 MR. BECKHAM: Okay, if I understand your 20_ question properly, if there is some reason to believe the 21 safety systems may be challenged, because we may be in some 22 situation that may place us in that mode, we would reduce 23 the power level to place us where we would less likely fT 24 challenge the safety systems if at all possible.

V 25 There are times obviously you are at a hundred ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

241 1 percent power, and you do not have time to perform that

'2 function.

3 Obviously, if. we can prevent challenge to the

._.,__4_..__ ___. safety-systemr we try =to ' do so.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: Fine. You keep up then with 6 the rate of challenge, like aux feedwater?

^

7~ MR. BECKHAM: Yes, sir.

8 -MR. EBERSOLE: You know, that has, I am

! 17

. 9' thinking of other plants. But on demand, we are looking 10- for ten to the minus four or five failure rate. So a p

11 linear' improvement in call-up is an advantageous thing.to

! 12 have.

! 13 - MR. BECKHAM: We do track that. And if'there

, 14- were- any problems, what we have done to fix those problems.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.

16 MR. THOMAS: All right.

{

17 MR. EBERSOLE: I believe you still have the

18 floor.

.19 MR. THOMAS: Yes. Our next presentation will-20 be Paul Rushton, on training for the Vogtle plant.

f 21" MR. RUSHTON: Good morning. I am Paul

! '22 Rushton, Superintendent of Nuclear Training for Nuclear I-23 Operations Department at Georgia Power Company at Plant 24 Vogtle.

O. (Slide.)

25 i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

242 l

1 1 My background briefly is, I have a Bachelor of f%

As 2 Science degree in chemistry and M, aster's degree in business 3 administration. /

4 I received the bulk of my initial nuclear 5 training in the United States Navy where I served as a 6 naval officer for eight years. The last two years of my 7 tenure in the naval nuclear program was as director of 8 training at one of the Navy's nuclear training facilities.

9 I then came to work for the Georgia Power 10 Company, again in the training department, training 11 operators at Plant Hatch.

12 I sought and achieved NRC-administered senior

() 13 reactor operator instructor certification while I was at 14 Plant Hatch.

15 I was given an opportunity to come to Plant 16 Vogtle, and to assist with the start up of of the Plant 17 Vogtle training department.

18 Since I have been there I have also sought and 19 achieved NRC-administered instructor certification at Plant 20 Vogtle.

21 My purpose today is to demonstrate the 22 commitment Georgia Power Company has made to doing training 23 at Plant Vogtle, f-~ 24 I personally believe that training is the

(

25 foundation upon which to build quality in operations. I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

243 1 carry that philosophy with me every day.

t,k I _) -

s 2 It disturbs me very much when I hear of a 3 plant problem or something that didn't go exactly according 4 to plan. My first reaction is, well, that sounds like a 5 training problem.

6 My intention is to be pro-active, rather than 7 reactive, to these daily challenges to nuclear power plant 8 operation.

9 (Slide.)

10 This is my agenda for what I will be 11- discussing this morning.

12 I believe there are three key elements to f} 13 conducting a sound training program. These elements are 14 first of all, the facility-in which to conduct the 15 training.

16 Staff to conduct the training and the process 17 or programs which are used by the staff in the facilities 18 to train the most qualified personnel possible.

19 (Slide.)

20 To begin with, Georgia Power training center, 21 decision was made in 1979 by Georgia Power Company to build 22 a dedicated training f acility at Plant Vogtle.

23 I a'm real glad that you got an opportunity to 24 see it yesterday, because we are very proud of it.

25 To describe it briefly, it's approximately ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

244 1 40,000 square foot facility. Larger than many high

(_) 2 schools. Some of the ones that I attended were smaller 3 than this facility.

4 It houses five laboratories, electrical, 5 skills training, mechanical skills, I & C skills, health 6 physics laboratory and chemistry laboratory.

7 We have gone to great lengths to equip the 8 laboratories with modern state of the art equipment. We 9 have worked very closely with the plant operating 10 department, health physics and maintenance departments to 11 ensure that where we bought a piece of test equipment or 12 piece of analysis equipment, that that was the same type of

() 13- test equipment or analysis equipment as would be used by 14 the individuals on the job.

15 As you saw yesterday, the f acility also houses 16 the Vogtle plant-specific Unit 1 full scope control room 17 simulator. The decision to buy that machine was also 18 made -- well, the machine was ordered in 1979.

19 The decision to purchase it was maiden prior 20 to that.

21 In fact, was made prior to Three Mile Island.

22 So Three. Mile Island and our decision to purchase a 23 simulator were unrelated events, 24 Since its delivery in 1982, our simulator has f S)

(,_

25 been used to conduct over 7000 hours0.081 days <br />1.944 hours <br />0.0116 weeks <br />0.00266 months <br /> of training, 7000 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

245 1 hours of simulator usage for training.

f' 2 To date we have completed training in our 3 simulator f or 121 people. That includes two managers, four 4 superintendents, seven supervisors, 55 engineers, 37 5 licensed operators,13 shif t technical advisors and three 6 instructors.

1 7 So far in 1985 the simulator has been used for 8 training over 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br /> of usage.. If you figure that out, 9 it comes out to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> a day, five days a week all year 10 so far this year.

11 We are getting a great deal of mileage out of 18 12 our simulator. It's proven to be an extremely valuable

'b ss 13 training tool.

14 MR. WARD: Paul, with the advantage of having 15 a simulator early and using it as you have described, do 16 you have an explicit program to feedback experience from 17 the simulator to operations as the design, you know, the 18 use of people in operations or the design and procedures, 19 for example, been influenced by experience in the training 20 simulator?

21 MR. RUSHTON: We have, really, two programs 22 which are both intended to feedback experience gained in 23 the simulator, which is operations organization. I will y-) 24 describe them both briefly.

25 One is, as the procedures, permanent plant ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

246 1 procedures were being draf ted, we used them in the h'V 2 simulator.

3 We operated a program in our simulator with 4 those procedures by which it would be very similar -- let c 5 me say that the program in using the simulator for 6 upgrading procedures is very similar to that he which will 7 be the permanent procedure in the plant for upgrading 8 procedures when there is a problem.

9 A man encounters a difficulty in executing a 10 step in a procedure. We made him stop, fill out a 11 procedure change, markup the procedure as it should be.

12 Get approval of his simulator instructor, and proceed.

f) 13 Those procedure ' changes we made while . in use 14 using the draft procedures in the simulator were fed back 15 to the operating organization and most time incorporated 16 into the actual plant procedures.

17 The second program is human factors related.

18 We have a notebook full of forms in the simulator where 19 anyone who feels that they can improve on a control room 20 design, or has a good idea for moving a switch or changing l

21 something, changing a procedure or a color or a piece of 22 tape or a label or whatever, is afforded the opportunity to 23 fill out a form whereby the human f actors recommendation is 24 documented.

25 Those are transmitted to the operations ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

247 1 department for evaluation as well. So we have two 3

V 2 programs. ,

3 MR. WARD: What about the roles that let's say 4 the individuals in the control room, the two SRO's and the 5 two RO's have?

6 Do you train with the expectation that there 7 is a definite assignment of functions among let's say those

'8 four people?

9 Or do you expect that split of work load to 10 vary from shif t to shif t, depending on the particular, 11 let's say, shift supervisor?

12 MR. RUSHTON: Each individual in the training

() 13 -

situation in the. simulator has a clearly defined 14 responsibility. He will either be a balance of plant 15 operator, reactor operator, shift supervisor or shift 16 analyzeer.

17 During that scenario or during that session of 18 training he is relegated to that role.

19 We rotate all these people f requently so they 20 become experienced at all positions.

21 Did that answer your question, Mr. Ward?

22 MR. WARD: Yes. I guess.

23 But the expectation is that in the plant, each

's 24 of these individuals will -- I mean, if I visited more than

\-)

25 one shif t at the plant when the plant is running, could I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

248 1 expect to find the same split of the work load? Or might p...

() 2 it vary from shift to shift?

3 I know you are the training manager, not the 4 operationing manager. Here he is.

5 MR. RUSHTON: I am not sure I understand the

~

6 question.

7 MR. KITCHENS: Skip Kitchens, and I am the 8 operations superintendent at Plant Vogtle.

9 MR. WARD: Yes.

10 MR. KITCHENS: We have a conduct of operations 11 procedures which are used in the training center for many 12 of the times when we do training. Normally, those conduct

[/]

13 of operations procedures are used as part of the simulator 14 training.

15 Within those procedures, the positions, shift 16 positions that Paul just told you about, there are 17 descriptions of their minimum shift duties. Who does what 18 type of duties on shif t.

19 So I think that your question was, if you went 20 to the simulator would you see people execute duties the 21 same as in the plant.

22 MR. WARD: No. What I am really wondering 23 about is, if I go to the plant when it's operating and I fs 24 visit more than one shift, will I find the similar or L) -

25 identical or rigidly identical division of duties among the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

249 1 personnel in the control room?

6A)

\_ 2 MR. KITCHENS: There are certain duties you 3 would find rigidly the same. Those duties are defined 4 within our procedures.

5 I won't say you will see them all the same 6 because some shif t supervisors may do things slightly 7 different. But within the context of our procedures, you 8 would see them being done in the same way.

9 In othe; words, someone is assigned a specific 10 position, shift supervisor, there are specific duties he is 11 going to do no matter which shift supervisor it is.

19 12 MR. WARD: So with a given procedure is it

) 13 always explicit as to who 'is to perform a given step of the 14 procedure?

15 MR. KITCHENS: I don't v.nt to be evasive, but 16 it really does depend on the procedure. There are some, 17 such as surveillance procedures, that the shift supervisor 18 could assign any one of a number of licensed operators to 19 do.

20 But he would specifically assign it to someone 21 who is responsible for it.

22 MR. RUSHTON: The simulator, we have had an 23 active program to maintain our simulator up to date

- 24 physically and software-wise with the current status of the 25 plant's design.

ACE FEDERAL REPOPTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 1

-250 1 Originally, there was some substantial b)

(_ 2 differences in that design. We shut down our simulator and 3 made major modifications to the simulator twice.

4 -We have one more of those major modifications 5 to complete later this year.

6 Following that there will be an ongoing 7 monitoring program to ensure that the same simulator and 8 plant designs are identical.

~

9 The training facility also houses 12 class rooms, 10 a reference library of technical information. I would say 11 about our library that it contains document control copies 12 of plant procedures, plant drawings, plant vendor manuals,

() 13 plant-tech specs-, and just about anything else that could 14 be needed by a student or instructor in order to design or .

15 conduct training.

16 The second key element of a training 17 organization or training process is the staff.

18 (Slide.)

19 This is the training organization as organized i

20 in the nuclear operations department at Plant Vogtle.

21 ,

I have really two reporting responsibilities.

22 I report first of all to the manager of unit operations 23 under Mr. Bockhold.

24 From the plant I receive direction with regard f-)

V 25 to scheduleing of training programs, budgeting of training ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

251 1 programs, numbers of people to put in training programs, 9)

(_ 2 and a great deal of the scope and content of the training 3 programs.

4 I have another reporting responsibility to the 5 corporate manager of nuclear training, Mr. Jeff Badgett, 6 who reports up the chain ultimately to the senior vice 7 president, Mr. O'Reilly.

8 Mr. Badgett looks after myself and my 9 counterpart at Plant Hatch. He interfaces with the both of 10 us to make sure that we are both doing business in the same 11 general fashion.

12 He's also been a great benefit to us by being

() 13 _ able to -interface with outside Georgia Power Company 14 organizations such as INPO. I receive a lot of direction 15 from Mr. Badgett in the accreditation process.

I s

16 My organization, I will describe briefly. Let 17 me mention, this is the permanent Georgia Power personnel 18 portion of the training department organization.

19 There are others presently working in the 20 training department. I will talk about them briefly after 21 I talk about the permanent organization.

22 First is operations training, organized here.

23 It's responsible for all operator, licensed operator, gr) 24 non-licensed and engineering personnel training.

V 25 The man right here is responsible for program ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

)

1 development. He is kind of a specialist in that area. He f(.)

2 assures our program meets certain requirements we impose on 3 ourselves.

4 Health physics'and chemistry training 5 organized right here.

6 After health physics, chemistry training, m

7 emergency response team training and general employee 4

8 training.

9 Administrative assistance. We have our own 10 group of personnel who are simulator hardware and software 11 modification experts. They do the maintenance and control i

l 12 of our simulator.

13 Plant ~ skills training. - The man looks af ter

-}

14 mechanical, electrical, I & C training, quality control and 15- fire training.

16 What you don't see here is security training, 17 not done by me, or quality assurance training, which Mr.

18_ Rice, who you heard from yesterday, runs his own 19 independent training program.

~

' 2'O Among the staff of 27 technical and 21 supervisory personnel we have five masters degrees,15 21 bachelor's degrees and 135 years of nuclear related 23 experience, r^ 24 I got nine of these people from Plant Hatch.

25 I got ten out of the Navy, and three from Georgia Power 4

1 ,

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

253 1 Company fossil plants.

~ b( )

2 MR. WARD: Included in the professional 3 background, Paul, is there any background in specifically 4 industrial training and education?

5 Any of your degreed people have degrees in 6 something other than engineering or technical studies?

7 MR. RUSHTON: I do not have an instructional 8 technologist specialist on my staff. I do have assistance 9 in that area, though. This man is really a specialist in 10 that area.

11 That is why you see him out here on his own.

12 He doesn't have a degree in the subject but he is quite

{} .13 expert in the field. .

14 Mr. Badgett's staff in the corporate office 20 15 also has available to him instructional technologist 16 c :pertise.

17 MR. WARD: I see. Does Mr. Blair, there, for 18 example, does he belong to a professional organization in 19 this area?

l 20 MR. RUSHTON: No, sir. You are talking about

~

21 the American Society of Training and Development? None of 22 us are members of that organization.

23 MR. W ARD : It's not usef ul to you, you don't gS 24 think? They are not tuned in to your business, or what?

V 25 MR. RUSHTON: Exactly. They are a management ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 training and non-technical related training, for the most L) 2 part.

3 I would like to, I guess, along those lines, 4 the regional, all of the Region 2 training managers have 5 formed an association called Region 2 Training Association, 6 which I am a member of that association.

7 We meet generally twice a year and discuss 8 related issues. We give each other a great deal of advice 9 and assistance. We are somewhat organized.

10 I believe all of the regions have similar 11 associations.

12 MR. W ARD : Yes.

f) 13 MR. RUSHTON: Presently, supplementing what 14 - you see here as the permanent staff, there are 15 approximately 25 contracted personnel. About half of that 16 25 contracted personnel is assisting us with getting over 17 the initial bulk of training, the large cadre of initial 18 training for personnel who are now reporting to the site.

19 We have conducted thousands and thousands of i -

20 manhours of training. Much more training than we 21 ultimately foresee as the permanent, saf, level of training 22 requirements to be given to the permanent staff once 23 trained, qualified and doing their jobs.

24 Most of the other half of that bulk of 25 contractors is assisting Mr. Blair, here, program ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

255 1 development specialist.

h(,j 2 Designing training programs using a systems 3 approach to training sponsored by INPO.

. I 4 It is our full intention to be a credited in 5 our training programs within two years af ter f uel load.

6 Please note that we manage all of these 7 training programs. Georgia Power Company retains authority 8 and responsibility and the management of the training 9 programs conducted for its personnel. We do not routinely 10 contract extensive training programs to vendors to conduct 11 for us.

12 MR. REED: Mr. Rushton, I am having a little

-13 problem:with two different: charts. -A chart that was pa'ssed k)N

\-

14 out earlier on Plant Vogtle, titled Nuclear Operations, and 15 then your chart that you have up on the board.

16 I am just trying to place where maintenance I

17 training f alls, and whether it f alls under you, and whether 18 those very fine electrical, mechanical, I & C labs I saw 19 out at the facility are under your jurisdiction in training 20 programs for these maintenance people are under you or not.

l 21 If I look back at the chart on Plant Vogtle j 22 Nuclear Operations, I see the superintendent of maintenance j 23 doesn't seem to be in the same series of blocks as the l

, 24 superintendent of operations and superintendent of 25 training.

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 t_

1 MR. RUSHTON: Yes, sir, that's true. I do the

) -2 mechanical, electrical and other skills type training.

3 That is covered right (herebylhere by} this -- this group 4 of. people.  ;

5~ MR. REED: So the word skills means 6 maintenance?

7 MR. RUSHTON: Yes, sir, it means mechanical, 8 electrical, fire control and --

9 MR. REED: Those are under you.

10 MR. RUSHTON: Yes, sir, I support that, even 11 though they are not reporting to the same person as I do.

12 (Slide.)

.j .13 The third element of effective training is the 14 process by which you select, train and qualify the 15 personnel. An intangible element. You can't look at it 16 and see it very well, like the staff in a facility.

17 But I submit that. it is the most important 18 element of all.

19 Beginning with our selection process, 20 personnel selection is not the responsibility of the 21 training department, but I will discuss the selection 22 process in use at Plant Vogtle.

23 First, we are unionized and the union bid 24 system is used to fill certain positions. Those positions O 25 are electrical and mechanical. Journeymen positions.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

. . _.. i

257 1 Repairmen, if you will.

D k/ 2 Health physics and chemistry radiation 3 technicians.

4 Non-licensed operators and reactor operators.

5 For professional employees including all 6 technical, supervisory people and all training department 7 people, management staff and engineering staffs, recruiting 8 process is formed internally and externally by our own 9 organization, professional recruiting.

10 The next step is screening of personnel. The 11 first portion is our fitness for duty program which 12 includes background investigation, drug screening and

() 13 psychological evaluation.

14 MR. REED: Could we go what can back to the 15 selection screening for a bit? We hear a lot these days 16 about all thumbs mechanics, and we worry that people may 1

17 not have the simple manual dexterity. Or mechanical 18 comprehension to be trained by your activity.

19 That, in fact, they are more likely to be 20 musicians by natural ability, or otherwise.

21 Did you practice any testing, screening for 22 natural ability? Or is that done in your front office?

23 MR. RUSHTON: There is a pre-employment test.

/T 24 Am I on the right track, Mr. Bockhold?

V 25 I want to make sure I give you the correct l

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

258 I

1 information. There is a preemployment examine I will let

_fi

's /

2 Mr. Bockhold describe.

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: We have a preemployment 4 . screening process for all Georgia Power employees.

5 Specifically, in the operator area as part of 6 Paul Rushton's slide up there, we have a plant operator 7 selection system, a test I believe you are f amiliar with.

8 We have not yet instituted the other selection 9 testing for mechanics or for other people as part of that 10 system.

11 I believe that the mechanical people that we 12 are getting are very trainable based 'pon u our normal

() 13

~

selection process and their journey. man process.

14 Basically, our results in our training of 15 these people have been very good.

16 MR. REED: So you use the POS Value Dated Test 17 for operators.

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir.

19 MR. REED: But you don't have a similar 20 program for maintenance or I & C people?

21 MR. BOCKHOLD: We have not had a similar 22 program to date for those other people.

23 MR. REED: Thank you.

rx 24 MR. RUSHTON: Mr. Beckham is going to describe U

25 the fitness for duty program in a little more detail in a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

259 1 later presentation.

f' 2 Another step of our selection process, 3 individuals are given a medical examination to ensure they 4 are physically capable of doing-the work.

5 . We do use the plant operator selection system 6 examination, and we are talking about the one developed by 7 contract from Edison Electric Institute in 1978 as a

.8 standardized examination for selecting operators.

9 Finally, professional employees are all 10 interviewed. Interviewers are naturally attentive to 11 filling positions with personnel who meet the education and 12 experience requirements of ANSI 18.1.

() 13 ( Slide. )

14 I will describe in part some of our initial 15 training programs. There are quite a number of different 16 programs.

17 For engineers, quality control specialists, 18 health physics chemistry pe- nel, instrumentation and 19 control personnel, mechanical personnel.

20 As an example of what one of these training 21 programs is like, let me tal:e mechanical, for example.

22 Generally, most of the training programs in 23 f act are broken down into two major sections. I would call r~T 24 them basic principals or fundamental or academics or V

25 theory, whatever that may be.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

l 1 Then job-specific and nonrelated training.

, ()- 2 For mechanical personnel we have conducted a 3 two week course in PNR balance plant systems so they 4 - understand what Plant- Vogtle is all about, how we make 5 electricity, and why it is important certain things are the

6 way they are.

7 We have also conducted very specific hands-on 8 training in say use of cranes, rigging and lif ting 9 practices, use of precision measuring tools, et cetera.

10 These are job functions which they are presently performing 11 on the job as a part of our construction acceptance test 12 and ' initial test programs.

em

() .- .

13 ,

Electricians, similar type training. You saw 14 some of that taking place yesterday. We have conducted 15 training for our electricians in redlining high potential 16 testing, motor operated valves, electrical safety and test 17 equipment.

18 Again, using the same types of equipment and l

19 using the same procedures, et cetera, as they are doing on 20 the job.

21 Train nonlicensed operator, reactor operators, l

! 22 senior reactor operators, shif t technical advisors, fire

, 23 brigade members and eventually, all personnel will 24 - participate in our general employee training.

25 Note the different durations for a couple of l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

261 1 these programs. There are -- we have flexibility to b\~/ 2 conduct some customized training to fit specific needs of 3 diff erent individuals. I will talk more about that in a 4 minute.

5 (Slide.)

6 A little more detail on the operator training 7 program. I'd like to show you the initial training and 8 some of the continuing training of our reactor operators 9 and senior reactor operators.

10 Notice on the right we have some variable 11 durations. These are smeared. That is supposed to be 12 greater than or equal to.

y (m) 13 Notice on the right we have variable 14 durations. Duration varies based on the experience and 15 background of the personnel entering the training program.

16 If we take an SRO experienced person from 17 another pressurized water reactor site, he requires a whole l 2 18 lot less training than the guy who has no such experience.

l 19 We are given the flexibility to somewhat 20 customized the length, scope and duration of the training 21 program based on the needs of the individual.

22 All the programs nevertheless begin with l

23 academics. Reactor theory. Heat transfer fluid flow, l

, 24 followed by systems, of course, Vogtle-specific systems.

25 We try to use a building block approach to i

l i

ACC FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

262 1 training so heat transfer and fluid flow study supports the

\~J 2 understanding of fluid systems.

3 Study of reactor theory supports the 4 understanding of reactivity control systems and 5 instrumentation and control systems, et cetera.

6 Following academics and systems training, 7 personnel go into the simulator. Simulator training is 8 conducted in a fashion of four hours a day classroom and 9 four hours a day in the simulator, hands on the controls.

10 We also have a program of familiarizeing our 11 operator personnel with plant equipment, where it is, what 12 it looks like, how do you get it, how do you find it.

(} 13 Systematically walk' them through -the plant and assure that 14 they can find everything.

15 In order to improve the experience levels of 16 our plant personnel, as Mr. Bockhold described earlier, we 17 fully support the hot participation experience program 18 which was endorsed by the NRC commissioners in Generic 19 Letter 84-16.

20 Of course, that program is a minimum of six 21 weeks.

22 We also have on site chift experience for the 23 same duration. We assign operator candidates to the 24 control room for a minimum of six weeks to ensure that they

(-)S

\_

25 learn about our plant and our routine and our people, they ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

263 1 get to know our people and their capabilities, et cetera.

b d 2 Ultimately, af ter the plant is licensed and we 3 are operating, these two parts of the program will be 4 combined to be equivalent to the three month observation 5 training requirement in NUREG 0737.

6 We started our operator training programs at 7 least three years ago. That was a preplanned strategy, 8 with the obvious advantage of being able to have the same 9 operators complete training and participate in the plant's 10 test program. Then participate in NRC cold licensing.

11 Then participate in plant start up and 12 subsequently in plant operation.

13 So many of our-operators have. completed the 14 bulk of this initial training program right here, gotten 15 their hot participation experience.

16 And these guys are the ones out there right

! 17 now controlling from the control room the plant's test 18 program. They are participating.

19 We feel that experience is going to serve them 20 and be invaluable in the future.

21 We, the training department, are also running 22 right now what I would call the interim requalification 23 program. I call it an interim requalification program 24 because it's slightly different than what will ultimately

< 25 be the so-called license requalification program, although ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

264 l 1 its structure, format and scope are similar.

62%

-(_) 2 An interim requalification program is, as those 3 draft procedures I was discussing earlier are approved for

4. use, we train on them.

5 As systems change or if designs change or the 6 plant evolves, events happen in the industry which we wish 7 to make our operators familiar with, we bring those out in 8 our interim requalification program.

9 In fact, you are going to have a presentation 10 on emergency operating procedures a little later today.

11 And emergency operating procedures training will begin next 12 week. That is a part of our interim requalification

() 13 program.

14 Found a lot of real good experience for the 15 training department in operating thic interim 16 requalification program.

17 As you are aware, there is a great deal of 18 difficulty with conducting operator requalification 19 programs in the industry right now. And it's been 20 excellent practice for us to gear up and be ready when the 21 time comes, to be in great position to conduct an 22 outstanding licensed operator requalification program.

23 ,

Some time prior to NRC cold license 24 examinations, we will have a pre-license review course. We L

25 will audit our personnel.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

265 1 Again these examinations which we administer p

\- 2 to our personnel will be of the same format, scope, similar 3 to NRC-administered license examinations. NRC cold license 4 our personnel.

5 Then they will participate in a formal 6 licensed operator requalification program.

7 MR. EBERSOLE: I was talking to some of your 8 staff members. I understand the requalification program 9 brings some real problems.

10 Many of the excellent operators can't 11 adequately express themselves in the context of written 3

12 responses to exams and so forth, yet they can articulate

((;m) 13 their -knowledge very well.

14 How are you going to resolve that problem?

15 Hate to dump the best operators because, they can't write i 16 well.

l l

17 MR. RUSHTON: That is a problem. I fully 18 agree with you. The problem also goes the other way. Some 19 operators can articulate themselves well on the written, 20 and do poorly on oral examinations. The best way I can say 21 to overcome that is practice. We give our folks plenty of 22 practice in taking these written exams.

23 During conduct of this, they are taking a 24 written exam practically every week. Many class days, 25 final written exams, et cetera.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

r 266 1 We try to structure the exams so that the f*5

(_) 2 questions they see will be similar to those that they will 3 ultimately see when they take the cold license exam.

4 So practice is about- the best way that we can 5 handle that.

6 As far as oral exam techniques go, we also 7 practice doing oral exams during our simulator training.

8 We get them one on one.

9 We put three instructors with three operator 10 candidates in a control room.' We give them oral exams for 11 several days.

12 That has been a tremendous tool.

() 13 MR. BECKHAM: . If.I might comment,' Mr.

14 Ebersole.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

16 MR. BECKHAM: Your comment, of course, is not 17 specific to Plant Vogtle.

18 MR. 03ERSOLE: No.

19 MR. BECKHAM: It is an industry-wide problem.

20 I think the industry and NRC both recognize they have some C

21 difficulty in this area.

22 I think there are some initiatives going on 23 quite extensively within the industry, particularly in the 24 NUMARC area, to try to address these problems.

25 Hopef ully, through that activity, we can ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

267 1 supply to every one in the industry a way to get the best b>

x- 2 qualified person to do the job. That is what all of us 3 want. The best qualified person.

4 Not the-person best qualified to write and an 5 answer; the best qualified to speak. But the best 6 qualified to operate our nuclear plants. We support that 7 totally.

8 MR. EB ERSOLE: Thank you. Does staff have any 9 , observations on this difficult matter? Anyone?

10 MR. BROCKMAN: Ken Brockman, Region 2, 11 Operator Licensing.

12 We certainly agree that the overall goal is to

() 13 get the most qualified people in there.

14 Currently, the regulations require the 15 administration of both operating and written e::aminations.

16 .

We work very closely with utilities, 17 especially during the examination review process which goes 18 af ter the exam to identify any areas that, on the written 19 exam, that may have led to a misinterpretation by the l

l 20 candidates, or something along those lines to assure that 21 we get the most equitable evaluation that goes onto it.

22 As a member of the staff, we are certainly in 23 tune with providing the fairest evaluation, coming up with

r 24 the tool that will give us the assurety we maintain

, \-]/

l 25 qualified people on there. We are working with the l

L ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

268 1 utilitys in t'his arena.

FN 1/ 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Right.

3 MR. BROKEMAN: At the moment we are required 4 by the regulation to go -into these areas. -So we really 5 don't have the option of moving from them.

6 MR. EB ERSOLE: It gets back to whether the 7 regulation is always optimized to safety.

8 Carry on.

j 9 MR. RUSHTON: Thank you, sir. I have a lot of

, 10 confidence in our operator training program.

11 Part of my reason for making that statement is 12 that we have had the NRC visit our site five times now at

! ( 13 - .our'. request,..of. course,-to administer instructor 14 certification exams to some of the graduates of our 15 training program.

16 We have also had NRC administer license 17 examinations to senior reactor operators, as Mr. Bockhold 18 described, for six of our personnel at two other sites.

19 So far, of 51 people that have been examined 20 by the NRC that are on our staff we have had 42 21 successfully complete the examination; 82 percent pass rate 22 overall.

23 It's been a great benefit to us to have the 24 NRC come to our site and give these examinations, 25 specifically in three major ways.

4 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

{

269 1 One, it helps us to provide an outside p

s_ 2 independent quality check on the satisf actoriness, if you 3 will, of our operator training programs.

4 Secondly, it establishes credibility among the 5 operators. They see that once they complete the program, 6 yes, indeed, they can be successf ul.

7 Thirdly, it helps the utility training 8 department to establish what the standards are for operator 9 training.

10 We have been able to refine our process to 11 determine when an individual is indeed ready to take the 12 NRC license examination and ultimately to operate the I 13 plant.

14 As of right now, we have had 36 get instructor 4

15 certifications. 34 are still with the company. One is 16 working in the corporate office, that is Mr. Badgett, the 17 corporate manager of nuclear training. Four are department 18 head level personnel and are working in the training 19 department. One is working in the engineering department.

20 One in maintenance, and there are 17 in operations.

~

21 In closing, I'd like to reiterate my opening 22 statement that I believe training is the foundation of

! 23 quality in operations, and I believe Georgia Power Company

[ g-)

'< j 24 has acted on that belief.

25 During 1984 we conducted 250,000 manhours of ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

27 0

\

1 training. That is about 125 man-years. 125 people report Y"N

~ kJ 2 to the training department to be trained every day. That 3 doesn't include the ones doing the training.

4 - We-are very serious about our training 5 program.

6 Thank you.

7 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.

8 MR. WARD: Paul, could you tell us roughly 9 what the schedule is for INPO accreditation of each facet 10 of training?

11 I think you said it would be a couple of years 12 after, what, f'uel load?

() 13 MR. RUSHTON: Within two years af ter fuel load 14 we will INPO a credit all --

15 MR. WARD: All ten. What are you going to 16 take first?

17 MR. RUSHTON: There is very little difference 18 in what we are doing first. They are all going 19 simultaneously. There shouldn't be more than a month 20 difference between any of them.

21 MR. WARD: What is the critical path item?

22 Some utilities seem to be moving a little faster, frankly,

. 23 in getting a credited, 24 Some already have all or most of the programs r-)s L

25 a credited.

I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

27 1 1 Three years from now seems like kind of a long

() 2 time. .

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: Give him the current schedule.

4 Our commitment is two years.

5 MR. RUSHTON: Our commitment is two years 6 af ter fuel load. Our objective, however, is f uel load.

7 We have had some particularly interesting 8 experiences in doing a systems approach to training in that 9 we find it is very difficult to do a detailed job and task 10 analysis if you don't have a detailed plant out there

_ 11 operating with people doing the operation of the plant.

12 So we initially started to do,it all from the

() 13 . books and drawings, if.you will. Found that to be 14 impractical. It just wasn't working.

15 We have now tied our schedule for training 16 program development to the system completion schedule.

17 So as the systems are completed and turned 18 over to us, that is when we make a detailed study of 19 requirements for operation of that system, develop the 20 training programs to go along with them.

21 Our goal is, as I said, to a credit at the 22 time of fuel loading.

23 MR. WARD: For the control room people you 24 have had the simulator for two or three years.

25 MR. RUSHTON: That's right.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

I 1 MR. WARD: Available to you.

F

(_S ) 2 MR. RUSHTON: That one has gone a little 3 better because of the simulator.

4 ER. WARD: Is that the lead program, then, to 5 be a credited? Licensed operator training?

6 MR. RUSHTON: No, sir, they will all be a 7 credited about the same time. We are pursuing all of them 8 simultaneously.

9 The most difficult one believe it or not-is 10 the non-licensed operator training.

11 MR. WARD: Which is the most difficult?

12 MR. RUSHTON: Non-licensed.

f) 13 MR. WARD: Oh, non-licensed you said. Okay. i 14 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.

15 MR. RUSHTON: Yes, sir.

16 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. It's yours.

17 MR. THOMAS: Our next --

18 MR. EBERSOLE: I am sorry. I forget breaks.

19 Let's call a 15 minute break. We will be back

~

20 at 11:10.

21 (Recess.)

22 23 24

(

25 l

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 l

273 1 MR. EBERSOLE: The meeting will reconvene.

P)

(. 2 Mr. Thomas, you have reorganized the topics?

3 MR. THOMAS: Yes, sir, I have reorganized them 4 to they are more logical- on the -operating subj ect. The 5 next item will be emergency operating procedures by Skip 6 Kitchens.

7 MR. KITCHENS: I am Skip Kitchens, plant 8 superintendent f or Plant Vogtle. I have been on the Plant 9 Vogtle staff for the past six years. Prior to working on 10 the Plant Vogtle staff I worked at Georgia Power Company's 11 Plant Hatch, and I worked at Florida Power and Light 12 Company St. Lucy Nuclear Power Plant.

() 13 All told I have ten years of nuclear power 14 plant experience.

15 Al so , I hold a cenior reactor operator 16 instructors certification from the Nuclear Regulator 17 Commission for Plant Vogtle.

18 I have a Bachelor of Engineering Science 19 degree from Georgia Tech, Master of Engineering degree in 20 nuclear engineering from the University of Virginia.

21 And I am a registered professional engineer in 22 the states of Georgia and Florida.

23 Part of my, -- my main responsibility is the g-) 24 safe and efficient operation of the Vogtle unit. Part of V

25 discharging that responsibility is ensuring that the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

27 4 1 operating crews have the appropriate procedures to use. i

$Pm 1 As 2 What I am here to talk to you about is our emergency I l

3 operating procedures, one subset of our operating 4 procedures.

( Slide. )

5 5

6 I am going to give you an overview of the 7 emergency operating procedures we will use at Plant Vogtle, 8 give you a status of those procedures, describe how we are 9 preparing, have prepared and how we review and approve the 10 emergency operating procedures. Specifically, one of the 11 review processes, validation, I am going to describe that 12 to you. And discuss emergency operating procedure

()) 13 training.

14 (Slide.)

15 Our EOP's at Plant Vogtle are based on the 16 Westinghouse owners group emergency response guidelines, 17 revision 1 version of the E R G. These are the generic 18 procedures that were developed through the Westinghouse 19 owners group to provide operations crew with symptom based

~

20 technical guidance for response to emergency transients.

21 We as part of preparing, developing our EOP's 22 we integrated the control room design reviewsinto the 23 process, specifically into the validation process.

y3 24 We integrated the use of the safety parameter us 25 display system into our EOP's.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

275 1 ( Slide. )

pi

\)

s 2 Here's a brief status of the EOP's for Vogtle.

3 In May 1974 we submitted to the Nuclear 4 Regulator Commission a procedure generation package. The 5 procedure generation package included a description of our 6 method of developing plant-specific EOP's f rom the generic 7 guidelines.

8 It included a writer's guide. Actually, our 9 plant specific procedure f or writer's guide. It included a 10 validation program description and a training program 11 description.

12 We did receive some comments from the staff,

() 13 :and submitted in March of this year, March of 1985, revised 14 procedure generation package, which incorporated response 15 to their comments and some of the administrative changes we 16 had wanted to make in our writer's guide.

17 Our EOP's have been approved and issued as of 18 this month.

19 The formal operator training, as Paul told 20 you, is scheduled to start this Monday. We are scheduled 21 to start formal operator training on our plant specific 22 approved EOP's.

23 We have been using draf ts of the generic g- 24 procedures in our oper.ator training program for over two V) years, so most of the licenseed operator candidates are 25 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

276 1 familiar with the methods the Westinghouse owners group i

e S%i

(/ 2 procedures utilize. So this formal training we will start 3 next week will finalize our training programs for the 4 EOP's.

l 5 MR. WARD: Skip, a couple questions. You sr.id 6 the procedures have been approved. So they have gone, you 7 have performed verification, validation process, whatever 8 you call it?

9 MR. KITCHENS: Yes, sir. I intend to discuss 10 that as part of this, 11 MR. WARD: All right. One other question.

12 The writer's guide was one you developed

()

fs 13 -yourselves, apparently.

14 MR. KITCHENS: Correct.

15 MR. WARD: INPO developed the writer's guide 16 for procedures. Why didn't ycu use that?

17 MR. KITCHENS: There is INPO guidance for 18 writing writer's guide. But we needed to write a plant ,

19 specific writer's guide specifically for Vogtle. But we 20 used -- .

l 21 There is also a writer's guide for the 22 Westinghouse owners group. We used those as guidance in 23 writing our writer's guide.

e3 24 MR. WARD: Thank you.

D 25 (Slide.)

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

277

. 1 MR. KITCHENS: Next I would like to discuss tj , .

A 2 how we prepared the procedures. First off, we had to take 3 the Westinghouse reference plant that was described for use 4 of the procedures for the generic ERG's and compare it to 5 Plant Vogtle design.

6 We did that and found that there were ten 7 differences. We looked and reviewed and assured that those 8 ten differences did not preclude our using the Westinghouse 9 ERG's.

10 This was summarized in our procedure 11 generation package we submitted to the NRC.

12 We obtained Plant Vogtle specific set points

() 13 -- vfor use rin converting the -generic ERG's to-our emergency 14 operating procedures and contracted with Westinghouse to 15 provide us those plant specific set points.

16 We had administrative procedures prepared for 17 writing EOP's from Westinghouse ERG's and our writer's 18 guide I just talked about. -

19 In writing the EOP's from the Westinghouse 20 ERG's, I could summarize that.

21 In that procedure we outlined the references 22 that the procedure writer had to know and had to obtain.

23 We took the ERG he was going to convert into a plant 24 specific EOP.

25 For each step he looked at the ERG and used ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

27 8 l j

l 1 the ERG and used the Westinghouse-supplied set points where 62, kJ 2 necessary.

3 For any deviation whatsoever from the ERG, he 4 was required to -document- and provide a reason for.

5 The overall procedures, then, each procedure g 6 for any discrepancies from the ERG's we had a list and 7 documentation for.

6 8 The writer's guide provided generic, not 9 generic but an overview of how to write them. That is; 10 everything f rom what type of typing to use to the formats.

11 We had a list of acronyms and definitions to be used.

12 We then qualified our procedure writers by a g

13 -

specific checklist to- ensure- they-were qualified to write

(_):

14 the EOP's.

15 ( Slide. )

16 I will next talk about review and approval for 17 the EOP's.

18 MR. EB ERSOLE: Before you get into that, would 19 you say a word about the narrative support to the PID's and 20 elementaries and schematics that were given to you to start 21 the writing process?

22 Did you get extensive narrative support from 23 the designers as to what they intended in respect to 24 operating these systems?

25 MR. KITCHENS: From designers of the plant?

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

279 1 MR. EBERSOLE : Yes, designers of the plant.

(._/ 2 MR. KITCHENS: We used our plant specific 3 drawings. We used our PID's --

4 MR. EB ERSOLE: -You did those.

5 But you can take a set of drawings and operate

. 6 it ten different ways. .

7 MR. KITCHENS: Right. We have not only 8 drawings, but we have design criteria and manual of design 9 criteria that is a project document that we use that is put 10 out by Bechtel.

11 MR. EB ERSOLE: Would you have narrative system 12 descriptions -- I am j ust saying, as an adj unct to the

[) 13 P,ID'5 and:elementaries and: schematics.

14 MR. KITCHENS: We have system descriptions and 15 FSAR descriptions we used.

16 There were a couple cases in writing the 17 procedures where we called engineering and discust;ed 18 things.

19 MR. EB ERSOLE: That gave you a basis to get 20 started.

21 MR. KITCHENS': Yes, sir.

22 MR. EBERSOLE : Now you are going to say how 23 you checked back af ter you got done. I think you are about

< y 24 to tell us now what you did. Go ahead.

\_)

25 MR. KITCHENS: For the actual review process, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

2 80 1 we have what we called verification.

2 We used verification as our detailed review of 3 the procedures, desk-type review.

4 -We prepared a checklist that gave both

'S technical and writing type checklist to ensure that the 6 procedures were accurate, they were technically correct, 7 and that they were written properly in accordance with our 8 writer's guide.

9 MR. EB ERSOLE: At this first stage of review, 10 which is kind of a check on whether you understood the 11 PID's and other supportive material, was there very much, 12 very many corrections to be made, was it pretty clean?

n=

_ Q, 13 Could you comment?

14 MR. KITCHENS: That is a kind of relative 15 thing to ask.

16 MR. EB ERSOL E: I know it is.

17 MR. KITCHENS: As far as verification 18 comments, I would say, I would say there were very few.

19 One or two per procedure would probably be the average.

20 MR. EB ERSOLE: Good. Thank you.

21 MR. KITCHENS: So for every procedure we did 22 complete review checklist and documented any discrepancies 23 that the reviewer found from our writer's guide, from the 24 ERG's that were not recorded and justified in the 25- documentation that the writer provided.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

281 1 And we also performed reviews by comparing CA k_) 2 these procedures against our commitment tracking data base 3 that we have established to ensure that any licensing type 4 commitments, FSAR commitments were incorporated into the 5 procedures. -

6 We performed an unreviewed saf ety question 7 type analysis for each of the procedures. A 50.59 review 8 if you would.

9 The verification process and these reviews I 10 am telling you about comparing to the commitment tracking 11 and 10 CFR 50.59 were performed by someone other than the 12 procedure officer, independent from the person who wrote

() 13 the procedure.

14 Also, these procedures all were reviewed by 15 our plant review board prior to being submitted to the 16 general manager for approval.

17 We value-dated the procedures using our 18 plant-specific simulator, the next topic I would like to 19 talk about.

20 (Slide.)

21 MR. EBERSOLE: I am going to have a little

.22 problem there about validation using the simulator. It's 23 not an engineering simulator. It cranks out the

- 24 preprepared answers you put on tapes. So how do you l k_w) .

l 25 validate?

l I

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

282 1 MR. KITCHENS : You describe what validation q~,.

k- 2 is, and you can ask me again.

3 That was not our intent, to check the 4 simulator for accuracy, but to check our procedures. I 5 believe that we did it.

6 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, it was in that sense. Just 7 check the procedures and see things came out. Okay.

8 MR. KITCHENS: What we call validation, and 9 this is really in agreement with the INPO guidelines in 10 NUREG 057, validation is the process by which trained 11 operators demonstrate that the actions specified in the 12 procedures can be used to manage an emergency situation.

1

()

13 We had three objectives for -the validation of 1

l 14 these EOP's.

15 One of the obj ectives was to ensure the 16 usability of the procedure. By usability, I mean that our 7

17 operators can be -- our operators can use these procedures 18 'without delay and without confusion. They understood what 19 the steps meant in a procedure and why.

j 20 The second objective was to ensure that they 21 are operationally correct for our plant. That using these 22 procedures, that they are compatible with our plant 23 hardware, with our plant manpower and staffing levels, and 24 with our level of training and knowledge of the operators.

br' 25 The third is a check on the performance.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

283 1 Could these procedures be used to place the plant in a safe

/?w

\-) 2 condition? -

3 Those were our three obj ectives in doing the 4 validation.

5 We selected some areas for doing it by using 6 the following criteria. We wanted to exercise the major 7 portion of the EOP set.

8 We wanted to check on that our procedures :ur 9 plant specific differences from the reference plant may 10 have shown --

11 MR. EB ERSOL E: Maybe I misunderstand. Your 12 your simulator, is it that it contains mathematical models

() 13 -and responds. faithfully 1to any evolution you might put in 14 it?

15 I didn't think that was the case.

16 MR. BOCKHOLD: Our plant simulator does 17 contain mathematical models.

18 And in the acceptance testing of the 19 simulator, within the data base that is available, we test l

l 20 those math models and correct and adj ust them.

21 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes.

22 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay. As when you get into the 23 more 6'fficult transients, the answers, of course, are what f^ 24 you expect or not expect. Then you might adjust the

(

25 simulator accordingly.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

284 1 It is not canned tapes. It is mathematical

/ 2 models.

3 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, okay. It's somewhat more 4

sophisticated than just a straight exercise machine, so to 5 speak?

6 MR. BOCKHOLD: It is really a lot more 7 sophisticated.

8 If the operator throws the switch the wrong 9 way, the math model adj usts for that. The controller is 10 out, the math model adjusts to that.

11 This and similar simulators .iave been used at 12 other plants to analyze transients that people, that go 13 - ;really so fast, like you might have a' trip and end up with 14 a saf ety inj ection. And you wouldn't have expected it.

15 Why do you have a safety injection?

16 MR. EB ERSOLE: Okay.

17 MR. BOCKHOLD: In some respects it is quicker 18 to rerun that multiple times on the simulator, put a .

19 freeze, and figure out what the inter-relationships are and 20 why, for example, that saf ety inj ection occurred.

21 MR. EB ERSOLE : Does it faithfully follow the 22 simulator studies done on even more sophisticated machines, 23 such as Westinghouse used to document expected transients?

24 MR. BOCKHOLD: As f ar as we know, and we have 25 some discrepancies against the simulator, so in that case ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

285 1 we have documented where it does not.

P)s

- 2 MR. EB ERSOLE: Okay.'

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: We don't use those types of 4 scenarios in training.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

6 MR. BOCKHOLD: We continue to upgrade our 7 machine te really make it perform as well as we can to the 8 information we have.

9 MR. EB ERSOLE: I see. Thank you.

10 MR. KITCHENS: Another criterion for selecting 11 the criteria we use was we wanted to have scenarios with 12 multiple failures to demonstrate that we could use the

() 13  : procedures and have proper : transition: points between .the 14 procedures.

15 We had some scenarios that were requested by 16 our control room design review group to check as part of 17 the task analysis for the control room design review.

18 We had some scenarios that we selected based 19 on actual industry events.

20 For the selection of teams, people to actually 21 perform the validation, I would like to describe that a 22 little bit.

23 What we had, two teams for validation. Each yw 24 time consisted of normal operating crew, would be four L) 25 people in the control room.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

286 1 We used our operations people, operators who 0,- s k-) 2 are fresh out of license school. Two of the people who 3 acted as shift supervisors were SRO instructor certified on 4 Vogtle.

5 We conducted their operation as closely as we 6 could with the conduct of operation in a normal plant.

7 Also, each team consisted.of four observers.

8 There was one observer assigned to observe each member of 9 the operating crew, and to document any discrepancies or 10 things they thought were problems in the way each guy 11 handled his position and his portion of the procedures.

12 We also had for each time, we had available j

l

()

t' 13 simulator- personnel, that is, people -f rom the training 14 department, to help us ensure that the simulator was 15 working properly and help us keep the simulator running, 16 and put in the proper scenarios.

17 We had subj ect matter expert f rom -- that we 18 had gotten from Westinghouse Electric Corporation, people 19 who had be involved in actually writing the generic ERG's 20 and were more or less the subj ect matter experts and 21 helping us with our validation.

22 The overall leader for the validation was the 23 senior shift technical advisor who reports to me.

r3 24 I have in your hand-out a summary of the

(_)

25 people who worked on the validation teams background for ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

2 87 1 you to see,

?N (d 2 ( Slide. )

3 Really, that is in there to show you that we 4 did heve subj ect matter experts. We had operations 5 department people. We had training department people.

6 People with prior operating experience at other 7 Westinghouse plants, that kind of thing. I won't go down 8 all of those unless you want to. They are in the 9 hand-outs.

10 ( Slide. )

11 Another thing that we did to get this 12 validation program rolling, we had to determine'our support p.

(j. 13 -

requirements, and get everything -that we needed to perform 14 the validation done on schedule.

15 We ensured that we got our safety parameter 16 disdisplay system operational prior to starting validation.

17 You saw that yesterday, or a demonstration of it in the 18 simulator.

19 We used our human factors interface and tried 20 to ensure that the control room in the simulator was as 21 close as possible configuration of it, to that that is 22 going to be in the permanent plant control room. I think 23 you saw our plywood mockups of the operator modules, 24 operator consoles.

-]

-s 25 We did that in the simulator now to put more l

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

288

. 1 realism into this validation program.

2- MR. WARD: What do you mean by you used the 3 human factors interface?

4 -

What does-that mean?

5 MR. KITCHENS: We tried to make the control 6 room in.the simulator look ,at closely, to be exactly like 7 the control room in the plant as much as we could.

8 The human factors --

9 MR. WARD: That is what a simulator is all 10 - about, right.

11 MR. KITCHENS: Right. We had the human 12 factors considerations, considerations of the task analysis T

O.. -13 - ** e -ee1=e verzermea e#-tae emeree cr over time-14 procedures.

15 Some of the task analysis, it was done in 16 concert with our validation. So we had requirements to 17 have certain things in place before we did this validation.

I 18 We used some video tape equipment to actually 19 put the scenarios on video tape so that we could use them l 20 during some debriefings. That kind of thing.

21 Actual performance of the validation was such

j. 22 that the operating crew did not know what scenario was t

23 The going to be performed in their particular scenario.

24 observer crews did know.

25 Prior to performing any scenario, there was a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

.289 1 briefing to let the operating crew know what the status of 2 the plant was, to simulate a shift turnover.

3 We made sure that the equipment was working, 4 support equipment - that we~ needed.- Performed a scenario, 5 .used the procedures.

6 Then we had a post-scenario debriefing for

'7 each one of the scenarios.

8 And the operator crews and the observer crews 9 and subject matter experts and training department people 10 all gathered right after doing a scenario. And went over 4

11 it, critiqued it, came up with comments on how either 12 training could be improved, the procedure could be k) 13 '

improved, you know, -that kind of thing to try to resolve 14 any conflicts that they may have seen in use of the 15 procedures.

16 That was done immediately af ter each scenario.

17 We resolved the comments, made a few changes .

18 to procedures. Have requested our training department to 19 do a few things as a result of this validation, some extra l 20 things that they may or may not have been going to do -

1 l-21 anyway.

l -

22 That was the validation portion of the review 23 of our procedures.

, f- -

24 MR. WARD: Skip, do you have a copy of the 25 procedures with you?

L ACT FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

I 290 I

1 MR. KITCHENS: I have a copy of most of them.

(~) 2 MR. WARD: Could we just get them up here and 3 glance at them?

4 MR. KITCHENS: Sure. You j ust want to see 5 what a procedure looks like?

6 MR. WARD: Sure. We won't delay the meeting.

7 Maybe you can leave them up here for a minute.

8 Do you have a procedure for feed and bleed 9 cooling?

10 MR. KITCHENS: One of the function recovery 11 guidelines uses that method.

12 MR. WARD: How was that value-dated? l f) v 13 ~-

MR. KITCHENS: I wasn't actually. at the 14 validation where we did that.

15 ( Slide. )

16 The question was did we actually do feed and 17 bleed during the validation?

18 MR. KOZINSKY: Ed Kozinsky, Georgia Power.

19 I believe we did.

20 MR. KITCHENS: I would be surprised if we 21 didn't. Why don't we find out later.

22 I wasn't there the whole time during the, 23 validation.

24 MR. WARD: Okay, I guess I have got some k_)g 25 problem with, some doubts, I think, that the software you ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

291 1 have in a 1979 vintage simulator does a very good job of pq

(_) 2 modelling two-phase flow, the whole feed and bleed 3 s equence.

9 4 - So how hard -did you can look at that? Did you 5 validate just by believing whatever the simulator told you 6 was going on, even though the simulator might not know very 7 well?

8 MR. RUSHTON: The simulator has limitations.

9 And we recognize what the limitations of the simulator are.

10 One of the difficulties traditionally is 11 exactly as you noted, modelling the two-phase flow.

12 The simulator does allow feed and bleed

(} 13 operation 'and will allow you to cool down the plant using 14 feed and bleed. I have personally done that .cn1 our 15 simulator.

16_ MR. WARD: I can believe the simulator might.

17 Whether the same procedure would work in the 18 plant is what I am concerned about. I think you ought to 19 '

be concerned about that, rather than j ust accept that as a

~

20 valid validation.

21 MR. BOCKHOLD: Really, part of our basis for 22 accepting that that can happen in the plant is the basis on 23 the URG's. ERG's. Westinghouse owners group ran 24 analytical models and did additional work.

73 G

25 Those procedures are listed such that, you ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 know, we have really our confidence in the ERG's is based 2 upon the Westinghouse owners group work.

3- Then, also, our contract with Westinghouse 4 - where they provided us specific numbers for Vogtle in our 5 ERG's.

6 MR. EBERSOLE: This gets back, Dave, to my 7 earlier questions.

8 Does this simulator faithfully respond to 9- these unusual events, or has it been programmed to respond 10 as it is told to respond?

11 MR. BOCKHOLD: Simulator responds to math 12 models. .The math models truly have -- they are simpler

-h 13

-than a very'. detailed engineering model~that-doesn'terun'in~

14 real time.

15 Because a simulator has to run in real time.

16 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

17 MR. BOCKHOLD: When you look at some of the 18 traditional accident analysis type modelling, a lot of that 19 is always at the worst case end. Certain pumps don' t work, 20 or they work late.

's 21~ The simulator and its math model is running at

.22 the nominal plant response,- and needs to run at the nominal-23 plant response, so when the operator would see a normal 24 transient in a plant, the simulator would respond the same 25 way.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

293 1 So in some respects you end up comparing

.f)

(_ 2 apples and oranges, okay.

3 But I think the overall element is that as we, 4 you -know,- interpret - the data -that we have about transient 5 response on the plant, we correct the simulator to make it 6 as faithfully as we can reproduce that transient response 7 that we understand.

8 MR. EB ERSOLE: You correct it. You don't, 9 however, tell it what to say.

10 MR. BOCKHOLD: We do not tell it what to say.

11 The way we correct it is we might adjust some of the 12 constants in the math models.

() 13 - We might end up producing a whole new math 14 model for one particular area that, before, we had never 15 pushed the simulator into.

16 We have done a bunch of that already, and we 17 continuously update the machine.

18 MR. WARD: I might suggest on this particular ~

19 maneuver, you know, attempt to feed and bleed cool a core, 20 there are some, I think, important uncertanties associated 21 with the timing of the initiation of the maneuver.

22 I don't think you should trust your training 23 simulator to come anywhere near close in helping you get a 73 24 handle on that.

V 25 As a matter of fact, the rather sophisticated f

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

294 1 analyses that Westinghouse owners group has done haven't p)_

( 2 completely resolved all the uncertanties associated with -

3 it, particularly in the timing.

4 So-I think it's-important.-- If you have this 5 procedure in your plant and intend to use it --

6 MR. KITCHENS: We don't intend to use it --

7 MR. WARD: Wait a minute. You have got it 8 there. You intend to use it.

9 Are you going to tell the operators not to use 10 it?

11 MR. KITCHENS: No, sir. It's a last ditch 12 effort. It's one we ask them to do only as a last ditch 13 -

effort.

~ f) .

14 You go through the optimum recovery --

1 15 MR. WARD : How do you define last ditch?

16 MR. BOCKHOLD: Let me add, really, the ERG's 17 and our procedures now push the plant well outside the 18 accident analysis.

19 They say what if that breaks and that next 20 thing breaks and that next thing breaks? And on and on and 21 on.

22 They attempt to handle all those failures.

l 23 Really, that is the approach of the ERG's.

i 24 They handle all the accident analysis, the chapter 15 i

l 25 events. _

l l

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

295 1 Plus , they handle the continuation of major f.p s/ 2 component failures. j 3 We train the operators to use the ERG's. And 4 if you are in a scenario that requires feed and bleed, for 10 5 example, you have gone beyond chapter 15.

And that is 6 something that can help you potentially.

7 It may not help, but potentially, it can help 8 you. And basically you are trying -- in the operator's 9 mind, the person operating'the plant, he is trying to use 10 everything to help him.

i 11 When you have, you know, on and on and on and 12 on-type f ailures that really have a extremely low 13

( probability.

14 MR. EB ERSOLE: May I pursue that a little bit?

15 Just take a classic case. I have a transient. I call on 16 aux feedwater. I may get it for a little while.

17 Eventually I don't have any. Like in ene 18 minute or thereabouts. I have lost all feedwater.

19 Will this simulator f aithfully track the 20 ultimate conse ,. ince and what happens on down the road f rom 21 that particular loss of function? Including the primary 22 phenomena, as you lose cooling and opening of the PORV's 23 and water levels --

. , -s 24

  • MR. BOCKHOLD: We haven' t value-dated the U 25 exact timeframes. But the overall response, meaning to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

296 1 say', when you lose your heat sink, pressure goes up, PORV's 9s V 2 open.

3 You utilize your charging system to inject 4 water to cool the core, the simulator performs all that.

5 And the ERG's, our emergency procedures has 6 the operator respond to that type of transient, when you '

7 can' t get any feedwater into the plant. We are talking 8 about a feed and bleed cooling mechanism.

9 Of course, depending upon the amount of decay 10 heat, depends upon the timeframes and pressure you would 11 end up at. Whether you could cool the plant down using the 12 charging system.

13 'We believe based upon ERG's, that analytical

) ,

14 basis and our simulator response which has another math 15 model, that we could pull using feed and bleed in that 16 particular scenario, rods in, plant shutdown and using 17 decay heat, use being, charging feed and bleed.

18 MR. EB ERSOLE : You have elevated in this plant 19 to safety grade status, which is unusual. Could you make a 20 specific statement about that.

21 MR. BOCKHOLD: We elevated PORV's to safety 22 grade status because we made a commitment early on to go to 23 , cold shutdown using safety grade eqaipment.

24 MR. EB ERSOLE: I see.

25 MR. BOCKHOLD: So it was a design decision.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

297 1 More than that --

2 MR. THOMAS: We have a presentation on the 3 PORV's later.

1 4 MR. EB ERSOLE: Fine. Good.

5 MR. WARD: Skip, you referred, I can't find it 6 in here, but that doesn't mean it's not here at all. You 7 referred to feed and bleed as a last ditch means for 8 cooling the core.

9 MR. KITCHENS : Right.

10 MR. WARD: If you lose all steam generator

. 11 feedwater, is there a time constraint provided in the --

,i 12 I mean, do you tell tae operator he has to 13 start feed and bleed within X minutes after he knows he's

(

14 lost feedwater?

15 MR. KITCHENS: It's bastd upon parameters in 16' the plant. He's lost heat -- he gets to certain parameters

( 17 in the plant.

18 A critical saf ety function r?or core cooling 19 becomes, you know, is his limiting conditLon. He is 20 directed to functional response guideline, one of which is l

l 21 this bleed and feed.

I 22 But it's based on parameters, not time. When 23 temperature, when core thermocouples get this high, then 24 you go to this procedure. You go to optimum recovery l

25 guideline. You go to your emergency contingency action i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 . procedures.

2 There are several other procedures you would j

. I 3 have tried before you got to this particular procedure. i l

. 4 That is what I am trying to say.

i 5 MR. BOCKHOLD: Skip, I'd like to add something 6 to that.

7 When you have a transient, you first carry out 8 your ERG's called EO, that is the trip and SI response i

9 procedure.. That, the operators check various things.

10 Then you end up, and it depends upon the 11 scenario,- there are multiple branches, but depending upon 12 the_ scenario, you would end up with basically a time frame f(} 13 'that the operator is into responding to a particular 14 condition.

4 15 I assume that the condition we are talking

16 about here is loss of auxiliary feed.
17 When he realizes he is in that, he then 18 continues to carry out the procedures, which puts the plant 19 into a feed and bleed situation.

20 So, you know, depending upon the transient, 21 depends upon the timeframe for the response.

22 MR. KITCHENS: Just loss of aux feedwater 23 wouldn't make us go to this bleed and feed procedure. We 24 have some other procedures.

25 We try to regain normal feedwater. We try to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

299 C11 1 put water into the generators with our condensators, b(/ 2 various other things. But it's not a time thing.

3 MR. WARD: No. Well, I'd like to ask you to, 4 or suggest to you, that you look into this a little more 5 deeply, because the last that we have seen of the analysis 6 is that there are some time constraints that are fairly 7 important.

8 And, in f act, you have more time to recover 9 feedwater than the window -- the window for recovering, 10 window for recovering f eedwater is probably considerably 11 broader than the acceptable window for initiating feed and 12 bleed against the chance you never do recover feedwater.

l

() 13 That is the problem. It's a poor last ditch c.coling 14 method.

15 There are some analysis indicate that it's a 16 poor last ditch cooling , method, because you have to decide 17 to use it before you really need it.

18 And if you don't decide to use it early on, it 19 won't work. You end up with considerable loss of inventory 20 and risk of uncovering the core.

21 If I had two big 1100 megawatt PNR's, I would 22 look at it pretty hard.

23 MR. EB ERSOLE: May I ask in this area, now,

-s 24 what you generate is instructions to operators about what i

25 to do in certain circumstances he faces.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

300 1 Do you have an explicit set of, I would call pq I_J1 2 them " negative instructions" to tell him what never to do 3 to counteract his freedom to bypass interlocks, et cetera?

4 You know, you are going to give him a 3egree 5 of freedom, we just talked about it awhile back. But you 6 don' t want to give him too much.

7 How do you limit that degree of freedom other 8 than explicitly writing out "You will never do this or 9 never do that. "

10 MR. KITCHENS: We have as part of our training 11 program some of that involved. For instance, we have 12 reactor coolant pump trip criteria. These criteria apply 13 at certain times.

I( )

14 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes.

15 MR. KITCHENS : We have the background 16 inf ormation f rom the Westinghouse owners group as to why we 17 have this reactor trip criteria.

18 There are a couple of cases, a couple of cases 19 where, if they don't apply, and we have as part of our 20 training program, it's given.

21 MR. EBERSOLE: A case in point would be if I 22 lose sealant cooling water, I better stop the shaft, I i

23 think. Or should I?

24 MR. KITCHENS: That is not -- okay. We have 25 that particular item in our procedures. But not as a l

i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

301 1 negative.  ;

f\

s_) 2 We have criteria for when we would shut down l

3 reactor --

4 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes, you could put it in the 5 other context. Sure.

6 MR. KITCHENS: The last item is EOP training.

7 Paul talked about the training program. He' saved for me 8 some of the specifics on emergency operations procedure 9 training.

10 We are going to start this for our 11 plant-specific procedures next week.

12 Under the method of instruction, we have

.( ) 13 Performance-based instruction based on task analysis of 14 what the operator needs to know how to do in performing the 15 EOP's.

16 It includes self-study, includes group 17 discussions. One on one discussions within instructor, and.

18 practice of the EOP's on the main control room simulator.

19 It will be at least 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> in duration for 20 each licensed operator candidate.

21 Things, just under scope of instruction, things 22 it will cover, this particular training module, rules of 23 use of the EOP's. There are some, and in the background 24 information that the Westinghouse owners group provided us 25 with our ERG set, there are certain rules of usage for the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

302 1 procedures. That will be covered.

  • /~T

'q,/ 2 Use of fold out pages. That is one feature of 3 the ERG's that we use, and we want to ensure that operators 4 know how to use.

5- Differences between the types of EOP's. That 6 is, optimal -recovery guidelines, which are somewhat event 7 specific, versus functional recovery guidelines which are 8 totally symptom based.

9 They have to memorize immediate operator 10 actions of the EOP's. They are trained in performance of 4

11 subsequent actions.

12 The purpose of each procedure is gone over, 13 how the EOP's are used to mitigate transients.

'f )

14 .We don't just provide the procedures for them 15 and tell them to use them without giving them some 16 background as to why each of these types of procedures, 17 methods of use are in it.

18 Specifically, the use of the critical safety i

19 function trees and use of the safety parameter display 20 system as an operator aid in evaluating these.

21 We practice use of the major EOP's in the main 22 control room simulator during this training session.

12- .

23 That concludes my presentation. '

3 24 In summary, I believe that this approach that

()

25 Sne have been provided through our participation in the ACE FEDERAL REFJRTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

303 1 Westinghouse owners group has provided a good approach from in)

(- 2 the operator standpoint for responding to emergency 3 transients.

4 We at Plant Vogtle have spent a lot of effort 5 in making this generic type procedure specific for us so we f .

6 can use it.

7 I don't want to have my operators out there in 8 these emergency transients without some instructions and 9 some guidance as to what they should do.

10 MR. EBERSOLE : Fine, thank you.

11 Mr. Thomas, it's noon. I am open to your 12 proposal as to what to do at this time.

13 MR. THOMAS: I think that we have a short one

)

14 on fitness and duty we could do before -lunch if you like.

15 Right af ter lunch we will start with the 16 control room, because it takes more time.

17 MR. EB ERSOLE: All right.

18 (Slide.)

19 MR. BECKHAM: Tom Beckham,'Vice President, 20 General Manager, Nuclear Operations.

21 The topic I wish to discuss at this time is 22- fitness for duty as it applies to nuclear operations of 23 Georgia Power Company.

i' 24 (Slide.)

25 I would like to use this slide to generally 4

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

304 1 outline our fitness for duty program.

fi 2 The program applies to those people who

(_J -

3 operate in our nuclear plants.

4 -It is also applied to many of our people

>5 outside of the nuclear plants, but it's used very 6 extensively in our nuclear plants.

7 It is a clear written policy we do not allow 8 drugs or alcohol abuse within our plants.

9 That policy is out. It's under the direction 10 of our CEO and in our policy manuals.

11 We have fitness for duty training and behavior 12 observation. We provide that information to our employees O

() 13 through various mechanisms.

14 One of which is a pamphlet that is provided to 15 them. We do it through handouts that provide them 16 information. And we provide it to them by training 17 programs.

18 We give policy guidelines to our employees for 19 what they can and cannot do in the drug program and how 20 they can utilize it as a management tool to get the most 21 effective utilization of our people and the best job 22 performance.

23 We also provide,.I think this is very 4

24 important, an employee assistance program. We provide f-)

C/

25 information to our supervisors through pamphlets, other ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 forms of information, that explain to them how individuals

.Q (msI 2 can be referred to this program.

3 Most of our referrals to the program come from 4 the employees themselves. Over 75 percent.

5 However, a supervisor, if he notes a 6 degradation in job performance can refer an employee into 7 this program.

8 Also, friends, family, ministers, other people 9 can refer people into the program and health personnel such

, 10 as doctors can refer people into the program.

11 However, we are very strong on the use of 12 drugs and alcohol, and the entrants into this program, f) 13 af ter you have been noted using drugs improperly doe's not 14 excuse you from any disciplinary action because we will not 15 tolerate drugs.

16 We do not allow escape route through the 17 assistance program.

18 But we do provide the program so that someone l 19 who has a problem does have a way to seek and to obtain 20 help.

l- 21 We proviae health and saf ety information.

22 Again, that is includud in the small blue booklet that is 23 given to the enployees on just what is the effects of q 24 improper use of these substances.

-(/

25 We try to train our people that fitness fc4 l

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

306 s

l' duties something the co-worker used to be involved in.

p~2q

'(,) 2 That it not only benefits the Georgia Power Company, it 3 benefits each and every person involved in the plant.

4 We have top management support in the area.

, 5 They have been' very active in putting the programs into 6 effect and enforcing them and making sure the program is 7 implemented properly. .

8 We extend our programs to the contractors, 9 make them meet the same requirements.

10 We work closely with the Ir.w enforcement 11 agencies to that if we have problems, for instance, someone 12 trafficing in illegal substances, it will be turned over to I

) 13 the proper authority.

14 We are not a police agency, but we do have 15 liaison to have those people involved.

16 Of course, in order to make any program 17- work, you have to have all the people involved. And we l

18 have had union briefings, union participation. And, I l ~

19 believe, much union support in getting these programs into 20 place.

21 As with anything, a program sounds great. But 22 have you put it in place, and has it done anything? And I f 23 would just like to show you a couple slides to give you l

l rr 24 some idea of what we have seen.

t

( .

25 (Slide.)

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

307 13 1 This happens to be fitness for dut: for the f2)

(_ 2 Vogtle Eaployees. Gives you a feel for the numbers tested, 3 numbers cleared, both for signing logical psychological and 4 drug screening.

5- Fitness for duty involves more than whether 6 you use illegal substances. It also includes background 7 surveys, psychological testing and, of course, the drug 8 screening program.

9 So you can see we have had some people, many 10 people go through the program. And we have detected some 11 and taken action to get those people out of the work force.

12 ,

(Slide.)

f}

13 , We have done t.he same --

t 14 MR. REED: Question. These people are already 15 employ ees. And you apply to them psychological testing, 16 such as MMPT, or something like that.

17 But do you do all employees? Let's say at 18 your Match plant, or will you do all at Vogtle? Will they l 19 be subjected to psychological testing initially, and on a 20 repeat basis?

21 That is one aspect of the question.

22 MR. BECKHAM
At Hatch plant, many are 23 grandf athered af ter three or more years employment with no f

a 24 pr obl ems.

l N 25 Vogtle, because of new staffing, you are ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

308 1 ending up with most of them being screened by the test you q

b 2 mentioned.

3- There is in the fitness for duty capability 4 the ability after a person has worked for you for so many 5 years with no apparent problems, no aberrant behavior 6 observation and so forth.

-7 MR. REED: In your security plan, and this is 8 not breaking security, either, with this question, do you 9 have a commitment, and I know the security commitments are 10 shif ting, and they vary, do you have a commitment for 11 psychological repeat testing?

12 ,

MR. BECKHAM: To my knowledge, we do not. I

(, 13 would have to check to be sure. You are saying " repeat."

14 We have observation of aberrant behavior, but 15 not commitment to repeat psychological testing to the best 16 of my knowledge.

17 MR. THOMAS: That's correct.

18 (Slide.)

19 MR. BECKHAM: This slide represents 20 contractors. Same type of information for drug screening 21 and psychological testing.

22 I would summarize by saying that we at Georgia 23 Power feel fitness for duties an important item. It is 24 important to us from the obvious reasons, obtaining the 25 best qualified person and people to do the work.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

~ ~

~ 309 1 That position is supported in every level of V V 2 management at Georgia Power Company right up to the very 3 top.

4 Thank you.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.

6 At this time we have a request for a public 7 statement by Mr. William Lawless. Where is Mr. Lawless?

8 I will have to ask you to restrain your 9 comments to five minutes, and to be particularly pertinent 10 to the Vogtle plant in the discussion of your topic, okay?

11 We are trying to restrain it to the Vogtle plant. This is 12 a Vogtle hearing.

13 MR. ' LAWLESS : Right.

14 My name is W. F. Lawless, Assistant Professor I 15 of Math at Payne College.

1 I have prepared short comments for today's

! 17 meeting. If the time limit is five minutes, then I will go 18 through the comments. You have already gotten copies of 19 it.

20 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure. If you will highlight l

I 21 what you have said here.

! 22 MR. LAWLESS: Right. First off, I have got 23 two general comments. The meeting notice had insufficient

- 24 notice of time for the meeting.

l 25 It did not allow sufficient preparation for l

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 l i '

310 1 formal comments to this subcommittee.

b

(_) 2 It is hard not to notice that both the NRC and 3 Georgia Power are well-prepared for the meeting. This 4 gives the appearance that both are working with a hidden 5 agenda, whether true or not.

6 Even worse, that the NRC is not interested in 7 studying credible ' technical challenges against Vogtle.

8 Such arrangement would be similar to the cozy relationship 9 between DOE and -- and DuPont at the Savannah River plant, 10 a relationship that may in part have contributed to the 11 gross level of contamination that now exists at SRP.

12 MR. EBERSOLE: I believe I have to call you on f~)- 13 this. You are drif ting away from the Vogtle problem.

x-14 MR. LARLESS: All right. I am addressing the 15 Vogtle problem with this.

16 The quality of the NRC developed issues at the 17 Vogtle facility have in the past appeared to be more 18 procedural than substantial.

19 Yet, it's now clear over the past year many 20 substantial issues concerning the Vogtle f acility and i

21 releases of possible contaminants into the ground water and 22 possibly through the blue marl have been raised.

23 Peer review panel. ACRS functions somewhat as s 24 a peer review panel on technical matters, an important

, N 25 function and something I appreciate.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. ( 20'2) 347-3700

~

311 1 However, the final environmental statement O,. 2 recently written for Plant Vogtle was not peer reviewed.

ss 3 It appears that other. NRC Georgia Power documents for 4 Vogtle were also not peer reviewed before publication.

5 NRC believes the public comment period for the 14 6 documents constituted a peer review. Nothing could be 7 further from the truth. Especially within the time 8 constraints allowed.

9 The public, I feel, is incapable, including 10 myself, of assessing these difficult, very technical 11 documents written by well-paid full-time staffs that 12 carefully massage the data and its presentation to the f) 13 public.

14 For many years a similar situation has existed 15 at SRP where the public was constantly assured that the 16 aquifer could not be contaminated.

17 Unfortunately, it nas been contaminated and 18 likely will continue to be for some years to come.

19 A technical peer review panel would be an 20 important check and balance, and one should be required for 21 all publications e.n Vogtle either by the NRC or Georgia 22 Power.

23 Specific comments, statistical analysis.

-. 24 Georgia Power has not performed statistical analysis on

(

25 their environmental data, yet f reely makes predictions for I

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 '

f 312 1 example on the impermeability of the marl. That it is b

AJ 2 effectively impermeable.

3 The amount of error in these predictions by 4 Georgia Power and NRC on Vogtle should be determined, I 5 calculated and bounded.

6 SRP has in the past made numerous predictions 7 on the impact of these on their environmental releases. It 8 appears most of these predictions have been naive and 9 incorrect.

10 A study of the amount of error existing in 11 predictions concerning Vogtle releases is prudent.

12 Marl penetrations. Georgia Power has not

,pr

,()

t 13 analyzed the well penetrations into the marl as a potential 14 route for contamination of the Tuscaloosa Aquifer.

15 The SRP suggests that the SRP contaminated the 16 Tuscaloosa underneath through such a path way, down well.

17 Such study using statistical inference should 18 be performed.

19 Georgia Power has drilled about 60,000 feet j 20 and 474 exploration holes, an average of 125 feet. In 21 other words, the marl was penetrated on the average each 22 time. Six hundred wells were drilled at Vogtle with more

' Many under the 9.3 than 200 into and possibly through marl.

24 facility.

j 25 Since 1971, over 10,000 feet of marl structure I

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

313 1 has been penetrated. Each into the foot of penetration Q

b 2 represents a potential defeat of the marl as a possible 3 aquifer. ,

4 In addition, over a hundred off-site wells 5 appear to have been penetrated, appear to have penetrated 6 the marl although closure of the wells is not apparently 7 presented.

8 Marl impermeability. Georgia Power still 9 asserts the marl is impermeable. However, Georgia Power 10 has attested no statistical analysis has been performed on 11 their data.

12 SRP for many years made similar statements 13 about clay protecting the Tuscaloosa Aquifer. Statements 14 since found incorrect.

15 Such analysis should be performed on the marl 16 especially concerning possible effects of settling on the 17 marl and underlying Vogtle.

18 The heaviest Vogtle structures sit directly on 19 top of the marl aquifer itself. Uniform or differential 20 settling may defeat what impermeability of the marl is 21 presumed.

22 Coupled with the penetrations of the marl 23 under these structures and with the settling that has 24 already been observed'., p/edicted effectiveness of the marl v

25 to perform as an aquifer vill become more uncertain with ,

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 1

314' I time.

2 Continuous sampling at the interf ace in the 3 backfill between the facility structures and marl itself 4 'should be cataf ully considered as part of the Vogtle 5 monitoring program.

6 MR. EBERSOLE: Mr. Lawless, I believe you have 7 given us your message. And I have doubled your time 8 allowed, anyway.

i i

9 MR. LANLESS: I appreciate that. Two short 10 last comments.

11 I think ground water contamination combined 12 effects have been agreed to be studied. I think that is .

j( ) 13 impor tant. Especially strontium 90 releases.

14 Also, modelling effects are quite important.

15 Vogtle has made what I- think are rather simplistic 16 calculations using, for instance, loads on ground water 17 movement velocity, especially for the release of strontium 18 90 through a possible accident scenario.

19 The Savannah River plant has made similar 20 calculations that have been grossly underestimated. I 21 think this should be studied.

l 22 The models being used and that have been used 23 should be value-dated.

4 24 Thank you for your time. I do appreciate the i

i 25 opportunity to make a presentation.

i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

315 1 MR. EBERSOLE: You are quite welcome.

' b(_) - 2 There may be a better forum than this to take 3 your matter up.

4 MR. LAWLESS: There may be, but there was 5 insufficient notice and inadequate notice of the meeting.

6 MR. EB ERSOLE: I am talking about later 7 opportunities.

8 MR. LANLESS: One of the things that was noted 15-9 was that radioactivity waste would be talked about.

10 I think it's rather difficult for the public

'11 to be prepared to make discussions on nuclear waste in such 12 a short time and without a detailed discussion of what the 0

13 meeting today would be about.

})

14 So these are the best comments that can be 15 generated considering those circumstances.

16 MR. EB ERSOLE : Thank you. They will be a 17 matter of record.

18 I believe we have a response.

19 Mr. Thomas.

20 MR. THOMAS: Ies. I would like to point out 21 to the ACRS subcommittee that we have made very extensive 22 evaluations of the icsues of the drill holes through the 23 marl and characteristic of the marl and permeability and 24 ground water flows, both for the environmental report, as 25 well as the FSAR.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

~

316 1 And those have been extensively evaluated by

'\ ) 2 the NRC staff. We have met with them and there is a very 3 extensive record of the -- to show we do not have a problem 4 of contaminating the Tuscaloosa.

5 The issues he brought up today are the same as 6 are in a contention before the Atomic Safety and Licensing 7- Board at this time.

8 We have responded to them, and will be f

9 litigated and all the facts will be thoroughly explored by 10 the ASLB to the ' extent that the ASLB decides.

11 So I wanted to clarify the fact that this 12 matter is being handled. It has been handled very

() 13 thoroughly by not only us, but the NRC staff, and their 14 evaluations or in the environmental report, and the SER.

15 And the continuing effort is under way with 16 the ASLB.

17 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.

18 MR. LAWLESS: Would you like a comment to his 19 comment, in return?

20 MR. EB ERSOLE: As a matter of fact, I don't 21 believe I would. I will just cut it off at this time.

22 MR. LAWLESS: Just wanted to know one could be 1

23 made available.

24 MR. EB ERSOLE: You can submit a written 25 statement.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

3 17

1. MR. LAWLESS: Thank you. That is a good idea.

h_

. (_) 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Any comments from staff?

3 MS. MILLER: No.

4 MR. EB ERSOLE: Let's have a lunch break until 5 1:20.

6 (Whereupon, the meeting was recessed at 12:20 7 p.m, to return at 12:20 p.m. that same day .)

1 8 MR. EB ERSOLE: Let's resume the meeting. I 9 want to tell you some matters of schedule here. Glenn has 10 to leave about 4:20. Dave and I can stay for awhile.

11 I believe you have reorganized residual 12 programs.

N 13 MR. THOMAS: Yes.

A_)-

) 14 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have a projected time 15 you think you will take?

16 MR. THOMAS : I would assume to around 5:00 17 . o' clock.

18 MR. EBERSOLE: I had guessed about that, just 19 from seeing what is missing here. I know of nothing better 20 to do than to chew right into it.

21 MR. BOCKHOLD: George Bockhold. I am talking 22 about the control room.  ;

23 (Slide.)

24 This topic has four subj ects. Give you review 25 on the detailed control room design review. Talk about l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

318 1 safety parameter display system, remote shutdown. And 9)

(_ 2 .briefly, some considerations we had on control room 3 habitability.

4 (Slide.)

5 We will start with control room design review.

6 Georgia Power started early on our control 7 room. We used our operators from Plant Hatch and some PWR 8 operators.

9 Built a mock-up of the control room and moved 10 the controls around. After TMI, a preliminary design 11 review in the 1980-81 timeframe. Detailed CRDR in 84-85.

12 Program plan submitted to the NRC September

$ 13 24, 84 to the NRC.

14 CRDR includes Unit 1 control room remote 15 shutdown panels, safety parameter display system.

16 Emergency operating procedures Skip talked to 17 you about, and post-accident monitoring instrumentation.

18 It is ongoing.

19 Status today as we have identified 242 total l

20 improvements to the control room. Fifty-three of those 21 potential improvements have already been resolved. I will 22 give you examples of that. 189 remain open.

23 We plan to complete our review and submit a cf 3 24 detailed report by March, '86. And we plan to satisfy or

(_)

25 resolve significant improvements prior to fuel load.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

319 l _

ll' (Slide.)

3 ,

2 Talk about the program. Based on a function

3 and task analysis which was based upon the Westinghouse
.4 owners group emergency response guidelines as part of the

~

5 function and task analysis.

6 Integrated with emergency operating procedures 7 which was value-dated on a simulator. We have talked about -

8 that before.

9 Control room surveys are part of the program.

10 We use INPO NUTAC guidelines as a basis and compare our 11 control room to the guidelines.

12 We plan to in the near f uture factor an I

() 13 ' operating experience into the review. INPO SEh/SOER's, and 14 question and feedback from our operators are being factored 15 into this review, i 16 These three program elements generate what is 17 called the human engineering discrepancies. I will 18 continue with this on the next slide.

i 19 (Slide.)

i 20 When we find a human engineering discrepancy, 21 we resolve it through the means on this slide.

22 We review HED for significance. The key 1

23 elements there are look at the probability of the operator s

24 making that error and the consequences, is it i

25 safety-related or not.

l f

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

_ _ ....._ _____ Washington,

_ __ ._ _ _ D.C. (202) 347

_ __._.___._._ -3700,_. _ _

2 320 1 Really, we focus on safety or operational V'\

'N_/ 2 impacts.

3 We have a categorization system, a five-part 4 system I will show you on another slide.

5 We go ahead and develop a solution based upon 6 nature of 'the discrepancy, consider potential varying types 7 of solutions, look at feasibility aod c_st.

8 We will implement the solutions we decide to 9 implement through our normal ungineering procers design 11 0 changes to the plant and thrnngh normal construction or, l 11 later on, change control procedures for 4he plant.

12 The task force involved with the human f actor

() 13 control room design review will verify the solutions, 14 verify the #nnstruction is complete, verify the HED has 15 been corrected and that it hasn't produced any new HED's.

l 16 MR. W ARD : George, did you describe, did you 1

[ 17 tell us who is on the task force, or review team?

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: I have a slide later in the

( 19 presentation.

20 MR. WARD: All right.

21 MR. BOCKHOLD: HED categories. Category 1 is 22 elements we considered safety significant, meaning to say 23 it had a high probability of a human making that error and 24 it had some impact upon a safety-related system.

(-)

x..-

25 Category 2 is an operational problem known or ACE Frk.ERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

321 1 expected. .

.h)

\_/ 2 Category 3 is simple enhancements.

3 Category 4, not 1, 2 or 3, but enhancement is 4 planned. Category had A, it's a minor deviation from the 5 guidelines, and no action is planned.

6 (Slide.)

2 7 Current status, and as I say, this is ongoing.

8 We have four categories. 4 l's, 10 2's, 89 3's, 21 4's, 55 9 4A's, and 10 open, a total of 189.

10 MR. WARD: Could you give us an example --

11 MR. BOCKHOLD: I give you the four safety 12 significant HED's. Reactor trip switch. Current

) 13 population, normally trip to the.right. One of our 14 switches violates that convention and trips to the lef t.

15 Group monitor lights. These are the extra 16 lights on the control board that indicate the status of the 17 valves and components on a reactor trip or saf ety 18 inj ection. They are not consistent with the functions, and .

19 we plan to fix that.

20 Boron injection tank, some of those valves 21 have been disconnected from the plant. They are not part 22 of the current design. They need to be removed from the 23 board.

,f

, g 24 Simply our control rod drive switch currently

,V 25 sticks, and we need to do a little maintenance on that.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

322 1 MR. EB ERSOLE: Could I ask you a question

-g:e k_ 2 about a critical problem which caused the TMI-2 event?

3 That is the directness or indirectness of the 4 initial signal origin.

5 MR. BOCKHOLD: I didn't hear.

6 MR. EB ERSOLE: The indirectness of the initial 7 origin of the signal, didn't convey to the operator that 8 his vessel was being emptied 9 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir.

10 MR. EB ERSOLE: Valves don' t convey that the 11 disk is gone. They tell them they have a good valve and 12 the disk is gone.

,m

() 13 Depending on the degree of directness, the 14 operator infers or does not infer what is happening.

15 Do you review the degree of indirectness and 16 review that in the context of whether the operator knows or 17 has to speculate on what happened in that parameter of 18 interest? Do you follow me?

19 MR. KOZINSKY: The surveys consider whether 20 indications are actual position or demand indication. They 21 do not go into--the micro switch shows me position of the 22 stem, but whether or not the seat has failed, that is not 23 covered.

r-) 24 But we do look at the question of the demand

~J 25 versus an actual indication, and we look at backup ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

323 1 indications, pressures, temperatures,~ flows.

b

'C) 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

3~ MR. KOZINSKY: Parameters that are indicative, j 4 -that are indirect reporting indications.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: Do the operators know the i

! 6 degree of indirectness?

4 7 When they see a valve position, you know, the 8 worst of all things is to take auxiliary contact and say 9 the valve is closed.

10 The best of all- things is probably shaf t l 11 movement. Or else the ultimate function was resolved and l.

12 ,

sealed where it opened.

-13 Do .the operators have a feel for what in f act 14 was physically measured versus what they need to know?

15 MR. KOZINSKY: There are so many items 16 slightly different, it is different to answer that in a

-17 global answer.

18 The training covers the instrumentation. The 19 system training goes to the indications.

20 The control loops for demand versus actual 21 indication is covered in the training.

22 MR. EBERSOLE: You do tell them what was 23 physically measured?

q 24 MR. KOZINSKY: That this controller is a

.y 25 demand controller, not a position controller.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

324 m .

1 MR. . EBERSOLE: Right. You tell them that?

'2 MR. KOZINSKY: That is in the training.

3 MR. EBERSOLE: It is?

4 PGt. KOZINSKY: The other things, nature of the 5 instrument, is inherent 1y' telling you what is measured, i 6 temperature or position, indication lights, level l

! 7 recorders.

8 MR. EBERSOLE: It's a mixed bag, then. I 9 would like to feel that the operators know the source of -

10- information that comes to the indicator, versus what he I 11 needs to know about what that would cause or not cause.

i' 12 MR. KOZINSKY: I believe that is adequately 13 l 1( ) addressed in the training, in the systems training and in

14 the simulator training as to what the significance of 15 different indications is. That is, which are demand and 16 which are actual.
i. 17 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, all right. Thank you.-

l- 18 MR. 'BOCKHOLD: Ed Kozinsky is our team leader.

19 He is an operations supervisor with a bachelor's degree in L ..

( 20 chemistry, certified SRO by the NRC on Vogtle. Five years F 21- experience in human factors research.

22 He was a U.S. Navy submarine officer, 23 engineering office, watch and engine qualified.

24 Six years nuclear power plant experience, 25 member of the human factors society.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347.-3700

1 He's published 25 publications on nuclear I

f't

(/ 2 power. plant human factors, some associated with national

- 3 labs.

We have other members.

4 I won't go through 5 their information but that is available to you.

6 (Slide.)

7 In one of the first slides I mentioned we had 8 already taken care of 53 improvements associated with the 9 control board. This is a list of some of the improvements.

10 They range from labeling to modified switch 11 design. Just pick out a few of them. Modified some of the 3

12- enunciators. Work space. Use ability of SPDS. That type'

() 13 of stuff. .

14 (Slide.)

15 I'd like to move to the next topic, safety 16 parameter display system.

17 MS. MILLER: Could I make a comment? I think 18 it is important to bring the committee up to date as far as 19 what has been going on with the detailed control design 20 review.

21 Last week the staff did perform an in progress 22 on it of the Vogtle detail control room design review.

23 We did identify some inadequacies in the g- 24 Georgia Power program. *

\_S/

25 However, Georgia Power has committed to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

m 326 j 1- correct these. inadequacies and update the NRC in their 2 summary report submitted in March, 1986.

.3 We did discuss the corrections and changes l 4 they _would be making last week in their audit and the NRC

. 5- has agreed that, yes, if the change are incorporated 6 correctly, the staff -should not have a problem finding the 7 Georgia program acceptable for Vogtle. .

8 MR. WARD: Could you give us an example of a f

9 problem you found and what can be done about it?

L 10 MS. MILLER: All right. The major problem we

! 11 found was that the Vogtle function and task analysis was

.12 not task analysis-based. It was more a procedure based O 12 ao 1 1 i -

14 And that is not in line with the NUREG 737 15 guidelines that we are reviewing the DCA against.

16 Georgia Power, in order to correct that, has.

17 indicated that with the aid of Westinghouse,- they are going 18 to be doing a task based function and task analysis. We-19 have seen a similar procedure that Westinghouse has done on 20 other plants where we found it inadequate.

21 MR. WARD: But they have already identified 22 189 HED's and resolved or classified all but ten. Does 23 this mean they will have to go back and do it over again, 7

24 or is there some way to patch it up?

25 MS. MILLER: It's going to involve

{ ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

327 1 supplemental work.

67

\%J 2- I think work that they have already done is 3 certainly going to help then in the process. But there 4 will be some amount of rework, 'yes.

5 MR. BOCKHOLD: We believe there will be 6 significant overlap such that our rework will not be 7 significant.

8 (Slide.)

9 Safety parameter display system monitors 10_ critical safety functions, displays status trees for those 11 functions based upon, again, Westinghouse owners group 12 guidelines.

13 Supports emergency operating procedures.

{(

14 Computer evaluates the critical safety f unctions against 15 plant parameters: You saw that yesterday.

16 Emergency response facility ERF computer 17 system. Provides the SPDS, displays data. Combines data 18 from process computer, safety monitoring system, radiation 19 monitoring system,. meteorlogical tower and other plant

~

20 sensors. All data is independently available.

21 Control room, technical support center, 22 emergency operations facility.

23 ERP computer collect's pre and post-trip data

,;r S 24 for review. We have a human factors keyboard layout, and L) 25 have reviewed that as part of my earlier discussion.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

328 1 We have had significant operations, operator's

's -2 input during the development.

3 ( Slide. )

4 Looking at some of the features of the 5 program, we are using a Foxboro 1A computer, system 6 designed by Georgia Power, software by Georgia Power.

7 We have color graphic CRT displays. Special 8 function keyboard you saw on the simulator. One button 9 _ call ups, minimum operator input. Input prompts when 10 needed. Hard copy is available of the CRT displays.

11 ( Slide . )

12 This is a listing of those displays. Again,

()

13 in our demonstration the simulator we showed you these 14 various displays on the actual -- well, on the simulator 15 stimulation of that equipment.

16 ( Slide. )

17 I would like to continue to remote shutdown 18 capability. .

19 We have two remote shutdown panels. They are 20 located on level A of the control building. They are train 21 separated. They are capable of bringing the plant to cold 22 shutdown.

23 We have an alternate shutdown indication 24 panel. I would like to show you what that means, that last 25 bullet.

I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 j

329 1 (Slide.)

b)

'/ 2 This is a schematic of the control room and 3 the shutdown panels. Up here on top we have the control 4 room. Shutdown panel A on the lef t, and B on the right.

5 The ultimate shutdown indication cabinet is 6 right here.

7 Basically, the design is, if you have a fire 8 in the control room, that wipes out the control room 9 devices, you can shut the plant down from the B area, here.

10 You can take a fire in any one of these rooms 11 and shut the plant down saf ely.

12 (Slide.)

()

4 13 Show you the functions on this panel.

! 14 Reactivity control, RCS inventory control, pressurizer 15 pressure control, coolant circulation, RCS heat removal 16 short term, which is steam generator aux feedwater 17 indication; long-term RHE, and support systems.

18 ( Slide. )

19 Finally I'd like to briefly cover the control 20 room habitability, what is involved there. If you have 21 some specific fire questions on that, that would be 22 deferred to the fire presentation. We are looking at the 23 heating, ventilating and air conditioning system of the 24 control room.

)

! 25 We have two physically separated trains. The ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

330 1 control room has a positive pressure of an eighth of an

\s' 2 inch.

3 We have separate air intakes, one on the 4 southeast side and one on the southwest side.

5 They are approximately 150 feet in separation.

6 On the intakes we have chlorine, radiation and 7 smoke detection.

8 We have modes of operation, a normal mode, 9 which involves a non-safety grade cooler system that is in 10 normal operation, 11 When you go ahead and detect one of these 12 threats to the control room, f or example, chlorine, the

()) 13 mode shifts over to safet'y grade equipment.

14 Chlorine, you get an isolation, isolates the 15 control room.

16 Radiation, you get an emergency code which 17 takes some outside air in, 1500 cubic feet a minute, in 18 comparison to the total circulation of 25,000 cubic feet a 19 minute.

20 Puts it through filter trains', reduces the  ;

1 21 radiation level, and supplies air to the control room. 1 1

22 Purge is a manual oper7 tion in case of a fire 23 in the control room or excessive smoke betting into the

(~g 24 control room, the operator can purge the system and V

25 basically ventilate the control room.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

' 331 1 MR. WARD: A question about that, George. -

- (_/ - 2 When the system is isolated, does it reach some -- does the 3 control room temperature, air temperature reach some 4 equilibrium value?

5 MR. BOCKHOLD: When it's isolated we still 6 have the chillers on. Isolation means it's isolated from L 7 the outside air. It's simply recircing, and you have 8 chillers and heaters.

-9 The air is conditioned. It's just isolated i

10 from the outside air.

f

, 11 MR. EB ERSOLE: George, the HAV systems are 12 just coming into view as a true safety element of the l( ) 13 overall safety picture, in maintaining environmental 14 controls with critical solid state equipment especially.

15 This means old views about damper reliability 16 may have to be changed, since they- don't open and shut as 17 reliably as we would like. The chiller complex has to be 18 examined for integrity under seismic events, et cetera.

. 19 Have you all given due consideration to the l

l L 20 details of qualifying HAV systems to safety grade

'21 consistency?

! ~22 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir, we have safety grade, 23 in our control building, and normal systems.

4 e 24 MR. EBERSOLE: Some people worry about very 25 cold chill pipe, whether it's brittle or not. Is.it the i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

332 l 1 right material.

2 I am sure we all k,now about the duct work 3 f alling down.

4 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir. We have a safety 5 grade system --

6 . MR. EB ERSOLE: I guess in particular the 7 damper functions are sometimes unreliable. Fuseable links 8 are sometimes used to separate zones. A fuseable link will 9 not close or open the tamper until it gets too hot for the 10 damper to survive, so these have to be tripped by magnetic 11 devices. Have you done all this?

12 MR. BOCKHOLD: The fire protection ih l'3 consideration --

14 MR. EB ERSOLE: It will be part of that 15 presentation?

16 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir.

17 MR. EB ERSOLE: Okay.

18 MR. WARD: One brief question on the control 19 room design review. You had 189 HED's, which I guess 20 sounds like a lot. But my impression is that the average 21 plant has had many more than that, you know, four or 500.

22 To what do you attribute the few that you have.

23 MR. BOCKHOLD: He had, would you talk to that?

24 MR. KOZINSKY: In part the HED number refers 25 to the current survey. It does not include discrepancies ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

333 1 and corrections implemented back in the 1980-81 survey, so

' 's-f) 2 we covered items there in that count of 2509, I think was 3 the slide. They were corrected. They were not identified .

4 as HED's in the current survey.

5 Also, in part, you can write one HED that 6 covers ten things, or ten different HED's. For general 7 items with respect to labeling and engraving, we have one 8 HED, with a long list of specific items on it, rather than 9 a separate HED for every label, f or instance.

10 Those two factors will contribute to that 11 number.

12 MR. WARD: Good. I thought you were going to

() 13 say you just had a good initial design. .

14 MR. KOZINSKY: Well, that, too.

l 15 (Laughter.)

16 MR. BOCKHOLD: Thank you, 17 MR. THOMAS: The next presentation will be on 18 quality concerns program, Vogtle plant. Lee Glenn.

5 19 MR. GLENN: My name is Lee Glenn, quality 20 concern manager for the Vogtle project. I would like today 21 to present to you a brief history of the purpose of the 22 program. Also a brief outline of the organization for the 23 program, and the obj ectives and how we are implementing the 24 program, and some of the results we have obtained.

(-)3 25 (Slide.)

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

334 1 The program was introduced in December of is

- 2 the 83. It is a program established for employees, 3 participants in the project to report concerns that they 4 have on the quality of construction, ability to saf ely 5 operate Plant Vogtle.

6 It is an alternative. There are obviously 7 other programs in place. First and primarily being 8 supervisory channels. If a person has concerns, we would, 9 of course, encourage him to use those channels. Obviously, 10 quality assurance, outside the company, of course, there is 11 the Nuclear Regulator Commission.

12 The program is an alternative in that it

() 13 offers within the company the options of confidentiality or 14 ananonimity in reporting these concerns.

15 The emphasis the program places is to do good 16 work and to report bad work. We try to emphasize to every 17 employee that they have an obligation to the project not 18 only to do their job, but if they identify anything that is 19 abnormal or causes concerns in their mind, that they should 20 report that and receive an answer.

21 If they do not feel comfortable in reporting 22 that to their supervisors, through other channels, then the 23 quality concern program is here to help them.

t 24 Or, if they are hesitant for whatever reason,

(-}

x_-

25 to use these channels, then our program is here. The last ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

335 1 two pages in the hand-out dated February 12, 1985, from the v 2 President of Georgia Power, Mr. Miller, to all those 3 involved in the Vogtle project. I would point out, the 4 letter makes much the same points as the quality concern 5 program. It emphasizes the employes' responsibility that 6 we have to them and they to us.

7 I would also point out we do emphasize that if i

8 they are not satisfied in any way, that they do have a 9 right and may feel free to report any concerns they do have 10 to the NRC.

11 ( Slide. )

12 I will briefly touch on the program 13 organization. I am in the center of this chart. The 14 organization I report directly to, the vice president, 15 proj ect general manager, Mr. Poster.

16 Also reporting responsibi3 ity to the vice 17 president and general manager quality assurance, Mr. Paul 18 Rice.

19 These gentlemen work integrally in providing 20 direction for myself and the overall operation of the 21 program.

22 In addition, if you look on the right of the 23 slide or hand-out there are three committees that serve in 24 support of our quality concern program.

25 I won't go into the full membership in the

^c" "" ""^' """ "T""8' 'NC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

336 1 committees but I will point out the steering committee does

?>)w s_ 2 set policy and procedure for the program. It is chaired by 3 Mr. Foster.

4 The corporate review committee is off-project 5 committee, made up of four individuals, none of which are 6 here on site, involved in the day to day activities of the 7 Vogtle project. It is chaired by Mr. Ron Henson, Vice 8 President of Engineering and Construction Services in 9 Georgia Power Company's general office.

10 - The quality concerns sc'reening committee 11 serves to verify programs in the area of classification, 12 categorization and assignment of investigations for

( 13 concerns. This committee is chaired by Mr. Charles Hayes, 14 Proj ect Quality Assurance Manager.

15 I have a staff of eight people working for me, 16 and in administering the program.

17 (Slide.)

18 Basically, the process we utilize in 19 addressing a concern obviously begins with receipt of the 20 concern f rom an employee.

21 We do have 13 drop boxes around site. We have 22 toll free telephone lines. We have on site extensions, on 23 site offices.

jS 24 We also perform exit interviews for all

(/

25 employees leaving the Vogtle project for whatever reasons.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

4 337 1 All these avenues are available for them to report their b

~x/ 2 concerns and get them into the system.

3 There are a couple of things I would like to 4 emphasize in the process without necessarily going through 5 the wh' ole thing.

6 We do have two times during the processing of 7 a concern, both initially, following investigation, that we 8 do get in touch with known submitters. The first time, of 9 course, is to gain as much information as possible. Also 10 to let the individual know we do have their concern and are 11 taking action on it.

-12 The last time, of course, is to review the

() 13 resul,ts for that individual's satisfaction and input back 14 to our system if they are not satisfied and if we need to

15 take some additional action.

16 One other thing I would point out is the, both 6

17 on receipt and prior to closure, we are reviewing concerns 18 for identification for additional evaluation in areas of 19 reportability.

! 20 Finally I would like to in the closure process 21 point out that we do go through both myself and two 22 committees on closure of concerns and significant concerns.

23 At least myself and the corporate review committee on the 24 closure of all quality related concerns.

25 (Slide.)

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

338 1 Program through July 2, the status on the f)

\_/ 2 numbers. We have received 404 of what we are calling 3 quality relate concerns. These do not necessarily mean 4 they are- saf ety-related concernsment concrete block walls 5 in the turbine building for program credibility and several 6 other reasons we do address as quality concerns. -

7 We have received 404, we have approximately 8 received 270 of what we would call non-quality concerns 9 typically relating to administrative matters, traffic 10 problems. Just about anything you can think of.

11 Of the 404 we have completed 326 12 investigations, and of those, 279 have received full re' view

() 13 of the steering committee and their review process and -

14 closur e.

15 (Slide.)

16 There are four items I would mention that, if 17 you will, I will call successes of the program, things that 18 were identified that we investigated and found in fact they 19 were substantiated allegations and concerns, and, of 20 course, which we have, once identified, taken corrective 21 action to address.

22 The first of these had to do with an 23 individual identified the structural members of certain r3 . 24 hangars were being square coped.

V 25 Included identification that this was actually ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

339 1 allowed on the drawing. Also that the QC and draft were 2 not aware it was not allowed practice.

3 This was identified, corrected. It was a 4 complete engineering thorough review to make sure we 5 identified all situations where this was identified.

J 6 We also had a situation in which an individual 7 identified that the design allowed for the tolerances on 8 large high temperature lines, certain high temperature 9 lines, that the clearances, allowing zero clearance as not 10 adequate.

11 This, of course, has been identified and is j 12 currently being reviewed to ensure that again we have 13 caught all the situations where this has taken place.

14 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask a question at this 15 point while you are on hangars and restraints and related 16 snubbers and so forth?

17 Could you give me a statement of your L

18 understanding of the significance of individual pipe 19 hangars? Suppose I arbitrarily fail any one. What happens

~20 to the pipes? Do you have a criteria or --

21 MR. GLENN: All right. I technically am not 22 the one to respond. I can give you my personal belief of 23 what will happen on the failure of a single hangar.

i 24 But what I would really prefer to answer the l

25 question with is that in the program I am not the one that ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

340 I does that.

GA

(_) 2 MR. EB ERSOLE: Okay.

3 MR. GLENN: We have available to us the 4 technical expertise to answer the question.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: Could staff comment? Do you 6 have any criteria for performa'nce of single hangars? What 7 is the concequence permitted by the f ailure of single 8 hangars?

9 MR. BATUM: We do not expect, generally 10 speaking, probably about 99 percent of the cases a single 11 failure of a support will render any system beyond the 12 capability of that syhtem.

I'l' 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

\_/ ,

14 MR. BATUM: It may not meet the code dictated 15 Ellowable.

16 MR. EBERSOLE: I understand.

17 MR. BATUM: But it will not be of any concern 18 to us --

19 MR. EB ERSOLE: It will remain operational?

20 MR. BATUM: As a matter of fact, there are 21 experiences'with some water hammer problems where they took 22 out 30 to 40 percent of the hangars out of the system.

l l 23 Still the pipe remained intact.

24 MR. EB ERSOLE: I am aware of those.

i

() 25 You said in, well, by far, all but maybe a few l

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

341 1 critical ones.

p x/ 2 Do you know which ones they are?

3 MR. BATUM: If one can go around and look at 4 all the piping systems, you may find one support sitting on 5 an elbow or T that could be a critical support.

6 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

7 MR. BATUM: We pretty carefully look at those 8 supports in our verification programs.

9 MR. EBERSOLE: You don't criticly identify 10 that one as worth more than the rest?

11 MR. BATUM: It's not the normal case in a 12 support system --

.~

f( ) 13 MR. EBERSOLE: What about the case of freedom 14 of movement or movement limiters, restraints, the anti-whip 15 constraints?

16 MR. BATUM: It's the same thing. As part of 17 our thermal growth verification program, all the ASME hot 18 lines are verified during the hot functional testing to 19 assure we have clearances.

20 And recent actions that we have been allowed 21 to take with removal of some of the excessive amount of 22 supports, that is going to enhance the situation, further 23 eliminate the safety concern.

24 MR. EB ERSOLE: Lastly, with respect to these 25 things, the snubbers. Do you use dry snubbers, or ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

342 1 hydraulics?

c= .

(- 2 MR. BATUM: We have cans and springs, but they 3 are not acting in the direction of the strange of pipes.

4 They are just seismic supports.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: Unfortunately I understand the 6 dry ones stick solid, rust in place, which produces a new 7 localizer, new f ulcrum, and hydraulics leak and f ail.

8 I was interested more in the failure of the ,

9 snubber in the fixed position, which imposes new stresses 10 on the pipes you would rather not add.

11 MR. BATUM: I cannot specifically talk about  ;

12 failures of snubbers and its effect.  !

(}), 13 But an inservice type of program that will

~

14 eventually have to be -- monitoring system, _ surveillance  ;

15 system will catch that to the extent that whatever is not  !

16 caught, we don't feel it will be detrimental.  !

17 MR. EB ERSOLE: Thank you.

! 18 MR. WARD: I thought he was going to ask you 19 what square coping is. I will ask you.

20 MR. GLENN: Notching of a beam to fit into ,

21 another beam. Basically it should have a rounded corner, l 22 if you will, to prevent stress concentration. , e l

l 23 MR. WARD: Thank you.  :

! t 24 MR. GLENN: I had a lawyer ask me the same 25 question once.

4 ACS FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

343

_. 1 The third one I will identify -- it's

. \

\/ 2 something -- on the lug, it's not so much a quality problem 3 as an enhancement of the quality of the plant.

4 The situation was that we did not have a lug 5 conductor to fit a states company terminal. It was covered 6 by having a splice from number 2 to 4 just prior to the 7 termination.

8 An individual pointed this out to us us, it 9 was an unnecessary splice. That if you could find the 10 proper lug, that you could eliminate that.

11 In fact our engineering department went back 12 to the manufacturer, was able to accomplish that.

,p ,

(_) 13 Like I said, it's an onhancement. Not that it 14 was a quality problem, but it is certainly a better 15 situation today.

16 The last exampic I have horcin involves an 17 incomplete but accepted repair on an ASME line where a 18 linear crack was identified while PT'ing an adjacent line.

19 The repair was done, essentially completed.

20 There was a failure to actually remove a code band under 21 which the crack had run.

22 A craftsman observed that, identified it as 23 being incorrect.

24 And, of course, we have gone back and fully

(~}

(./

25 eliminated the crack and made the proper repair.

ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

~'

344 1 One thing .I would like to point out, all of f^)

W 2 our successes are not necessarily ones that involve 3 hardware changes.

4 I think communications with the people on the 5 project, we have he have we have had any number of 6 legitimate concerns.

7 Individuals who are legitimately concerned, 8 that are just not aware that the problems they saw had been 9 previously addressed by either quality control inspection 10 or an engineer or somebody else identifying the same thing 11 and bring resolution in.

12 The program has served to bring closure to I 13

) thoce concerns in those individual's minds. I think that 14 is as much in some cases a success as actually identifying 15 a deficiency and correcting it.

16 The program is open to anybody who has a 17 concern. We would welcome concerns that have been voiced 18 in any forum, and the opportunity to address them and 19 respond back.

20 With that, if you have any questions, 21 otherwise -- '

22 MR. EB ERSOLE: Thank you.

23 MR.T!!OMAN: On our agenda we will now proceed q'

v 24 toward the engineering oriented issues. Our next speaker 25 will be Ozen Datum, on unique plant features.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

345 e

1 MR. BATUM: I am general manager of

, I(_/'i 2 engineering on the vogtle project. .

3 (Slide.)

4 I am an employee of Southern company Services 5 assigned to Plant Vogtle 150 percent time.

6 Hold a Bachelor of Science in Chemical 7 ' Engineering from Georgia Tech, with a continued nuclear 8 engineering Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering at 9 Georgia Tech, and continue about three years into PhD l 10 program in the same area. However I have never completed i

11 that.

12 Joined Southern company Services in 1969, in

() 13 the Licensing Department. -

l 14 Worked extensively throughout various 15 positions in the licensing of Hatch, Faricy and Vogtle 16 proj ects, particularly Vogtle proj ect f rom its inception.

17 And briefly lef t and worked in Westinghouse

18 Nuclear Safety Department for two years as manager of their 19 fluid systems and mechanical system evaluation group.

20 Returned to Southern Services in 1973, and was 21 the department manager of the nuclear safety and licensing l 22 at Southern Services prior to joining the project in 1981.

23 The brief discussion this afternoon, I am 24 going to try to orient to you about the unique features we i

(-]

s/

25 have in our agenda.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

7-- -

1 (Slide.)

s_/ 2 During your site visit you have been oriented 3 to some of these areas.

4 Just to go briefly, looking north towards our 5 turbine building, the first agenda item is the nuclear 6 service cooling water towers. The four, two per unit, 8

7 there is the unit separation boundary shown. The right 8 side is Unit 1, the left side is Unit 2.

9 MR. REED: Mr. Batum, you must have gone 10 through some decision process to decide to use two per unit 11 and not make common these nuclear service water cooling 12 towers.

({ 13 They are apparently independent, 14 noncross-connected. It seems to me you could have made 15 them common.

16 MR. BATUM: Well, the integral heat sink 17 capability per unit has been maintained. We are trying to 1? follow Reg Guide 127 type criteria here.

19 Yes, they could be made common between you 20 two -- between two units. There are cross-connection 21 capability bitween the two towers. However, we do not 22 have --

23 MR. REED: I was thinking maybe you could have r- 24 had one per unit, and there could be two instead of four.

(-)/

25 MR. BATUM: Oh, no, they are train oriented.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

I l

347 1 MR. REED: They can be train oriented at A,

/ 2 and A is 1 and 2, and B is 1 and 2, also.

3 MR. BATUM: Mr. Reed, I recognize your 4 comment. I am pretty sure you have been in this design 5 process long enough to recognize that there is all kinds of 6 other questions creeps up on you.

7 Like how do you isolate through various 8 f ailures to maintain train integrity. We start building 3 9 Christmas trees --

10 MR. REED: I guess -- I recognize the four as 11 conservative.

12 MR. BATUt!: Right. The other features are the

) 13 main st.eam line isolation valves located i,n th'e north and '

, 14 south areas of the containment. The rad waste transfer 15 building, rad waste trant,for tunnel, and the rad waste 16 building.

17 Refueling storage tank location right here. I 18 believe that covers the specifics of the many features we 19 will, be talking about this afternoon.

20 ( Slide. )

21 Coming back to the towers again, they are the 22 the ultimate heat sink for the plant. As you have seen, 23 they are cooling towers standing over a large basin, 24 approximately 3.6 million gallons of water. There are two 25 independent trains per unit.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

. 348 L

I

l. 1 We operate one of the trains during all modes l

v 2 o'f the plant operation. Again, this goes back to the same

'3 question, the' fact that you want to make your system 4 function during the accident as called upon without going 5 through a lot of isolation transfer and type of situation 6 and maintain your integrity and deliver the water at the 7 specified times.

8 That is part of the reason for this feature 9 that we keep the towers running during normal plant 10 operation.

11 The volume in the basin meets the regulatory 12 guide 1.27 requirements.

13 We have in each tower four cells,100 percent.

14 capacity, each, and only require three cell operation 15 during accident and transient conditions to meet the 16 minimum cooling requirements for the plant.

17 Each tower is -- water f ron each tower is 18 delivered with three 50 percent capacity pumps, with as you 19 can see, one spare'is incorporated into the design.

20' Between the two tower base since there is one 21 transfer pump in the event that we need that capability.

22 (Slide.)

23 As you know, as you probably saw yesterday, 24 most of the tower is underground. Around the tower is the

!O 25 splash ring or parapet wall designed to prevent any kind of ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

349 1 trash or intrusion of material into the basin area.

1 %

Ass / 2 And also the parapet wall around the fans to 3 protect the fan from any kind of inclimate weather 4 operations in the area.

5 The main tower is located, is in this area 6 where the spray headers are located in the bottom of the 7 eliminators, the eliminators are at the top of the tower.

8 MR. EBERSOLE: In super cold weather with the 9 wind blowing like crazy, will those sprinkler lines freeze 10 up?

11 MR. BATUM: We have looked at that, Mr.

12 Ebersole, and designed a system that would control

()

13 operations.

  • 14 We can maintain water temperatures from any 15 freeze protection in the tower.

16 MR. THOMAS: With a bypass capability. You 17 don't go to the fans if you don't need to cool. It goes 18 right straight to the basin. Right.

19 MR. B ATUM : Okay, this sort of shows an 20 engineering view of it.

21 The other question I understand came about was 22 debris protection. This does not really show that 23 capability.

24 St.t there is a silt collection type of a 25 situation at the bottom of the basin where there is about a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

350 1 six inch curve.

R

(_) 2 Before entry into the pump there is a trash 3 screen of about one-half inch openings.

4 The pump has been extensively reviewed with 5 respect to their bearings, design. We have looked at a lot 6 of pumps, this design in particular, to assure ourselves 7 had a that any kind of debris suction into the pump will 8 not degrade it to a level where we will not detect it.

9 9 The pumps are designed, motors are des'igned 10 for any kind of outside service, including mist, rain or 11 any type of a situation.

12 Again, as I mentioned, the volume in this

()

13 basin is approximately 3.6 million gallons.

14 The top view shows the four cell arrangement 15 where any three of these cells would supply the 100 percent 16 needed capacity see capacity.

17 MR. EBERSOLE: The spray headers, when you 18 turn them off and bypass them, do they self-strain?

19 MR. BATUM: Yes.

20 MR. EBERSOLE: They do?

21 MR. BATUM: We did provide provisions to 22 assure we would not have any kind of siphoning effect.

23 MR. EB ERSOLE: I was thinking about residual r3 24 water freezing.

V 25 MR. BATUM: Yes, sir. We looked at that very ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

351 1 thoroughly.

2 MR. EBERSOLE: How about the transition effect 3 when a tornado runs across this complex?

2 4 Only one aspect, the aerodynamic effects on 5 the fan. That is all.

6 MR. BATUM: They are designed for that. We 7 have analyzed the operation of the towers during a tornado, 8 including water suction, what happens to the fans, and any 9 kir.d of air intrusion, I mean water intrusion into the 10 system. Trash coming over here blocking this system, any 11 of that situation.

12 MR. EB ERSOLE: I was thinking more about the es 13 rather quick appearance of the negative pressure transient.

_)

14 MR. BATUM: We looked at that, too.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

16 MR. BATUM: Any other questions about the 17 towers?

18 MR. EBERSOLE: No.

i 19 MR. BATUM: All right.

l I

20 (Slide.)

21 Next subject is the steam generator aux 22 feedwater nozzle incorporated on the project as one of the 23 many improvements that we have undertaken on the project to 24 improve our steam generator performance.

25 And they are numerous in the sense that these ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

. - . - - . - . _ ~ . _ _ - . - . . - - _ . - . - . _ - - - - . _ - - . . _ - . -

352 1 are model F steam generators where initially the plant was 9

-~ kl % 2 started with model B's, later model F's.

3. All of us are f amiliar with the feedwater 4 nozzle cracking issue of three years ago where the
5. stagnation and siphoning at the feedwater nozzle, but the 6 small volume coming f rom the steam generator, aux feedwater 7 system.

g 8 We have some choices, and looked at the owners 9 group effort extensively at that time, and elected to 10 minimize the exposure to cracking at the feedwater nozzle 11 by incorporation of the separate aux feedwater nozzle.

12 This also gave us another opportunity to l

( )- 13 minimize water hammer . potentials .in the steam generator .

l_ 14 with the feedwater intrusion, the main 16 inch line of the i

.15 main feedwater line.

l 16 MR. REED: Mr. Batum, the model F is a 4

17 vendor-supplied steam generator.

18 MR. BATUM: Yes.

19 MR. REED: It has probably a standard design 20 for the model F.

21 Is this auxiliary feedwater nozzle normal 22 standard with the supplier, or is this something that 23 Georgia Power added?

24 MR. BATUM: It was in the normal supply. As a 25 matter f fact we modified the Unit I steam generators in i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

. .= . . - . . . . .

353 i

L 1 the field and Unit 2 steam generators were modified at the

! /Ps U 2 shop.

3 I don't know if Westinghouse provides it as a l

l 4 normal feature right now. I don't think it still is. It's I

i

-5 an added feature. It's'an option.

6 Not only that but the model F has other 7 provisions in it also that are not maybe standard at this

! 8 point in time. It may be. I don't know.

9 Such as the flap land quadrafile tube plates.

i 10 They have incorporated a lot of the owners group effort 11 into the steam generators, improved their performance.

12 As I understand it, Westinghouse can correct l

() 13 me, I don't think it is a common-feature of model'F steam f

14 generators.

15 MR. BENTON: Clancy Benton, Westinghouse 16 Project Engineer.

17 The aux feed nozzle for the model F steam i

18 generators is an optional design we offer to our customers.

19 Our later models do have this included as part of the 20 standard offer.

21 MR. REED: Westinghouse has adopted this l 22 willingly, and there is the appropriate research and belief 23 that it is not going to have negative aspects?

,:r % 24 MR. B ENTON : Yes, that is true.

'O 25 MR. REED
Thank you, i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

- . _ . _ ~ _ . . _ . ~ _ . , _ . _ . _ _ _ . . , - _ - _ . _ . _ . - . - _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - . . . _ - _

T

'354 1 MR. BATUM: The water through this nozzle,

,Q kJ 2 about eight percent of the feedwater flow is continually 3 fed into the steam generator through this nozzle to 4 minimize any kind of thermal gradients during normal 5 operation of the plant.

6 . ( Slide. )

7 The schematic picture of it, it enters and 8 discharges right above the regular normal feed ring in the 9 steam generator. It is a nominal six inch line into the 10 steam generator. We think it's an improvement of the 11 pr oj ect, improvement.

12 Steam generator perf ormance, and will, based

() 13 on the experience, minimize that potential-to feedwater 14 nozzle cracking issue.

15 That is all I have on the feedwater nozzle.

16 Is there any further question?

17 ( Slide. )

10 18 Our rad waste system and volume reduction 19 system, again, during the course of design and formalizing 20 the Plant Vogtle capability with respect to rad waste, a 21 lot of industry or policy making effort was going within 22 the government.

, 23 And there were definitely signs that the 24 burial site availability becoming more uncertain in the

(-]

v 25 nation in the future.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

355 1 Also, due to this possible burial site 2 limitation there was a volume reduction capability needed 3 and was a prudent move with respect to Vogtle vintage 4 plants.

5 At the same time if I remember a regulation 6 was being, either was in the stage of promulgation, or was 7 issued to minimize shipment, or eliminate any kind of 8 shipment with standing water in the rad waste shipments.

9 These, of course, with increased cost of 10 transportation issue, like if we have to ship it to 11 Richland, Washington, and burial costs associated, we have 12 elected in this project to go to the volume reduction 0 13 eretem e=a the eo11eiescetio= erete= i=corvoreeea-14 It's an adder. That is the reason it is sort 15 of stands outside of the plant with the transfer buildincj 16 and transf er tunnel and separate rad waste building.

17 MR. REED: By volume reduction you are 18 referring to burning?

19 MR. BATUM: Yes, sir; incineration.

20 MR. REED: What is your solidification?

21 MR. BATUM: It is the stock system. It uses 22 both the concrete system, as well as the polymer system for 23 the other, the evaporative liquid base since. But the main rw -24 burn stuff is the stock cement. 1 (d '

25 MR. REED: Cement?

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347--3700

356 1 MR. BATUM: Sy stem.

- n k-) 2 MR. REED: It's not an asphalt system.

3 MR. BATUM: No, sir.

4 MR. REED: Where you could get into double 5 burning, maybe?

6 MR. BATUM: That's right. We eliminated that.

7 At the time we were make that decision --

8 MR. REED: How experimental is.your burning 9 furnace? Is it pretty well proven?

10 MR. BATUM: Yes, sir. I think there have been 11 extensive experiments with this type of thing at Byron 4

12 plant, if I remember. It has proven successful.

j;"') ,13 Of cource, we will go through extensive 14 testing at this plant to prove that also before we fully 15 declare the system operational.

16 We have had proof on other proj ects right now 17 . using the similar or same system.

18' MR. REED: Is this natural gas fired type of 19 burner?

i 20 MR. BATUM: Let me see if I can get my brains 21 over here to answer that.

V 22 El ectric.

j 23 MR. REED: To initiate combustion and retain u,-

24 as much burning as you can get? Electric? I have not 25 heard of that before.

}

,' ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

357 1 MR. BATUM: Ed?

!fx>

T .

2 MR. KOZINSKY: It is a fluidized bed 3 combustor.

4 Initial heat up is by electric heaters. The 5 heat of oxidation then contributes to the reaction.

6 If material with insufficient Btu's is 7 available in the fluidized bed, it can be supplemented with 8 waste oil.

9 MR. REED: Just f rom past experience, many 10 ye'ars ago, I certainly recommend as you put this system 11 into operation you watch very carefully the total

~

12 operation.

,+

13 It's n' good idea. Fundamentally, it's fine.

(_)

14 But there have been problems in the past with burning.

L 15 MR. THOMAS: That Aerojet fluidized bed, I

-16 visited a demonstration model about six years ago. So it's 17 been tested a long time.

18 MR. BATUM: It's been tested significantly, as

~

19- I understand in the industry, and especially in Europe, 20 also.

I 21 The next subj ect is the refueling water 22 storage tanks.

23 (Slide.)

24 I guess the reason this tank has been labeled 25 unique is probably its size, 730,000 gallons.

i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

358 1 The other maybe unique feature could be said, Gs

(_) 2 I cannot verify this doesn't exist in other projects, it's 3 a concrete tank with a steel liner. You probably have seen 4 this, constructed in the same concept of a dry containment 5 than it is in a regular steel tank.

'6 As you can see, it is well-analyzed to 7 demonstrate any kind of tornado type of event impacting the 8 tank.

9 The 730,000 gallon, of course, is an evolution 10 of a number of years of changes and in the plant, as well 11 as engineering evolution during the proj ect.

12 We started with 400,000 gallons when the plant I( ) 13' was conceptually designed. In 1975. we revised this to 14 528,000 gallons due to looking at some better assessment of 15 instrument settings and instrument banners.

16 Then revised the volume again for two 575, 17 this time for other instrument errors that were finalized 18 during the design, and went up to 715,000 gallons due to 19 the semi-automatic switch over allowing for sufficient 20 water to discharge the sodium hydroxide tank, as well as

-11.:

21 providing sufficient MPSH in our larger containment than 22 usual, then added another 15,000 gallons, this time for the 23 upper bound of the instrument error. So we are at the

,c3 24 730,000 gallons sitting right now.

V 4

25 That is really any uniqueness that could be ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

359 1 put into this thing. And it has gone just through an

{3 . -

2 evolution of design to get to this stage. -

3 Are there any questions about that?

4 MR. WARD: No.

5 ( Slide . )

6 MR. BATUM: Main steam line isolation valves.

7 Apparently, the comparison to the other plants 8 that was made, we have two main steam line isolation valves 9 in each line. Schematically showing them, they are train 10 ' oriented.

11 (Slide.)

~

12 Each line, A and B trains. And the main

( . s) 13  : purpose of this arrangement is to assure that Westinghouse 14 requirement of one steam generator discharge following a 15 steam line break is assured by train isolation, and the 16 second question, Mr. Ebersole j ust walked out, but one of 17 his questions was to look at some containment 18 pressurization due to back flow type of a situation.

19 Better eliminate or minimize that kind of 20 exposure by the double isolation valve type of approach to 21 the plant.

22 We have --

23 .

MR. THOMAS: Do you want to put that up again?

24 MR. B ATUM: Okay. Mr. Ebersole, while you l 25 were out I was referring, you had a question I believe in

[ ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

, 360 1 your letter to how do we assure that following a steam line p.

v i

(_/ 2 break, back flow does not pressurize the containment.

3 MR. EBERSOLE : Yes. I see you really have 4 four valves in series-to prevent back flow.

5 MR. BATUM: That's right.

6 MR. EB ERSOLE: Those are bi-directional, 7 aren' t they?

8 MR. BATUM: They are. The Rockwell gate 9 valves.

10 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. The next question is, do 11 they work under f ull flow break conditions?

12 MR. BATUM: Yes, sir. We have gone t.hrough

) 13 some extensive testing and analysis in combination on these 14 valves.

15 Ue have tested the valve, not full steam flow, 16 of course. We couldn't accomplish that. But calculated 17 the necessary deflections and reductions in the accumulator 18 pressures, and pressurized the valve to the full pressure 19 transient that that will see, and deflected the stands and 20 stroked them in a hot condition.

21 Then tested the valves on a table under full 22 seismic conditions and gone through an extensive 23 qualification testing of the valves.

24 MR. EBERSOLE: I see.

7

\_,

25 MR. BATUM: The other provision is that this ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

361 I l

I i

1 is a double piston valve. It sort of slows down, this is

. x'

(\ 2 explained in the FSAR pretty elaborately, slows down the 3 slamming of the valve, five second closure as it reaches 4 home.

5 It's a double, this type of a gate valve.

6 MR. EBERSOLE: So you have accounted for the

'7 snubbing function as it seats.

8 MR. BATUM: Right.

9 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.

10 MR. BATUM: Is there any other questions about 11 the main steam line isolation valve?

12 MR. WARD: No, but you describe these as the 13 unique plant f eatures.

(fm)_

14 These are unique compared with, what, the 15 staff said yest'erday they considered the Vogtle similar to 16 Catawba, Millstone 3 and the SNPS design.

17 So are all these features you just described 18 different from any of tho'se?

19 MR. BATUM: I think Millstone, if I am wrong

~

20 correct me, Jim, has a bigger tank than we do, don't they?

21 MR. BAILEY: As far as refueling water 22 storage.

23 MR. BATUM: I think they are up to 1.1 or 1.2

.r s 24 million.

25 I think someliody had exceeded us already on ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

362 1 this.

2 MR WARD: I see.

l 3 MR. BATUM: But the other features, I don't 4 know.

5 MR. THOMAS: I think, Mr. Ward, you should 6 realize that the NRC staff chose those as unique features.

-7 Since they identified them and they were put 8 on the agenda, we are describing them.

9 But I don't put any special significance other 10 than the nuclear service. -- cooling water towers.

11 MR. WARD: That is what you you consider the 12 most unique feature of your design?

O 13 na enon^s= ree- rue oaee ne see described 14 are all in the' direction of conservatism in the design.

15 MR. BATUM: We utilize the same type of 16 concept in steam line isolation on our Farley plant. It's 17 not very unique to us.

18 MR. WARD: Thank you.

19 MR. BATUM: The other question, briefly, I 20 would like to address is the come pressed air system.

21 (Slide.)

22 Come pressed air system is a non-safety grade 23 system. We do not have any backup safety grade 24 accumulators in our design.

25 MR. THOMAS: This is another agenda item.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

363 1 MR. BATUM: I am j umping. Sinca we are 1\ / 2 running out of your time, I will just continue.

3 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

4 MR. BATUM: All the air operated valves are 5 designed to function and f ail in their safe di-ection in 6 'the loss of air.

7 Quality of the air has been substantially 8 r eviewed. And all the s design features such as dryers, 12 9 filters and other filter, air regulators and so forth are 10 incorporated into the design. And to ensure that clean air 11 is coming to these valves.

12 At any rate, even the loss of air, gradual or f) 13 sudden loss, that the systems that woul.d f ail in the safe 14 direction.

15 I don't know whether that answers your 16 question, Mr. Ebersole.

17 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes, it does. I was thinking 18 about the accumulator problem and the presence of leakage l 19 in the accumulators which was blinded by the flow 20 capability of the supply system.

21 I see you also covered gradual loss of air

! 22 pressure probably from remembering your BWR experience.

23 MR. BATUM: Yes, sir.

- 24 MR. EBERSOLE: However, you do have devices 25 which are safety-related which look at the air system, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

364 1 don't you?

Ih x/ 2 But the air is not needed, they go to a 3 fail-safe position?

4 MR. BATUM: Fail-safe position.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: But in the actual operating 6 position they do use air.

7 MR. BATUM: That's right.

8 MR. EBERSOLE: So the air has to be kept as 9 clean as though it were safety-related.

10 MR. BATUM: That's right. As a matter of fact 11 one of the numbers I remember from our system design, like 12 the due point of air supplied to these valves is like minus e

(m) 13 60 degrees. How clean --

14 MR. EB ERSOLE: You keep it clean. You don't 15 care if you lose it or not lose it. Great. Thank you.

16 MR. REED: Mr. Batum, when you mention 17 compressed air systems, are you talking, or compressed air 18 system, are you talking instrument air or service air?

19 MR. BATUM: Both instrument and service air.

20 Both of them.

, 21 MR. REED: Are they cross-connected systems?

22 MR. BATUM: They are one system. They are the 23 same system that go out to both -- serving both fun'etions.

f~ 24 MR. REED: You don't differentiate between air t

25 tools and maintenance air needs versus instrument air? You ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, IliC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

365 1 are tied on to the same header?

.f.

-k/ 2 MR. BATUM: Tom Luke, from Bechtel.

3 MR. LUKE: Tom Luke, Bechtel Power 4 Corporation, mechanical group supervisor.

5 The compressed air system consists of the 6 instrument air system and service air system. Those two 7 systems use common air compress source and common af ter 8 coolers.

9 But then they split into two systems and have 10 separate air receivers and separate dryer systems.

11 From then on through the plant, they come off 12 of, separate piping systems.

.e.

13 MR. EB ERSOLE: Are they oil lubricated

(( ) .

14 compressors?

15 MR. LUKE: We have rotary and reciprocating.

16 Rotaries are air lubricated and have filters to take the 17 contaminants out.

18 MR. EB ERSOLE: So you strip the oil out? l 19 MR. LUKE: Yes, sir.

20 MR. REED: I am a bit surprised they aren't ,

21 teflon ringed reciprocators.

22 ! Do you intend to use this air for health 23 physics air mass purposes?

~

24 MR. LUKE: No, sir.

25 MR. REED: So you have another air system for ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-370{

366 1 health physics mass type?

2 MR. LUKE: Yes.

3 MR. REED: What is that called?

4 MR. LUKE: It's called a breathing air system.

5 A -bottle system.

6 MR. REED: I see. I think that is 7 appropriate, if you don't use teflon ring compressors, 8 because, even though you have all kinds of filtration, you 9 will get odor through it.

10 MR. LUKE: Correct.

11 MR. EBERSOLE: That clarifies the air picture.

12 Thank you.

rs

() 13 MR. THOMAS: The next agenda item, the fire 14 protection systems by Ron George. We will talk about 15 dampers and open item on fire protection.

16 (Slide.)

17 MR. GEORGE: My name is Ron George. I am 18 Project Engineering Manager of Southern Company Services.

19 As said yesterday, we would like to address at 20 this time the open items, as well as a brief overview of 21 the Vogtle fire protection program.

22 (Slide.)

23 There are only two open items as a result of

(~) 24 our detailed description of compliance with the numerous V

25 fire protection criteria. The staff has reviewed and given ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

-L 367 1 an SER.

(?s

(-) 2 As a result we only have two open items.

3 The first involves adequacy of special purpose 4 doors that are not -- that are being used in fire rated 5 barriers.

6 Also, certain fire dampers which have not 7 received a UL rating.

8 In the cases of the doors, we really have 9 three types of doors. Security doors, water tight doors 10 and latches.

11 We have submitted what we hope is an adequate 12 justification on the water tight and security. And the .

13 latches become really our unique problem as it is in most f~]'

u. ,

14 power plants.

15 Response to the staff has been that we are 16 doing a detailed safe shutdown analysis, currently 17 scheduled for September, 1985, which I will discuss as open 18 item number 8. ,

19 ,

So our position is that we will do a detailed 20 room by room hazard by hazard evaluation, taking into 21 account both the doors and the dampers.

22 And at that point we will provide for the 13 23 staff's review and acceptance, our position.

,; - 24 One other note is, the number of over sized 1

25 dampers are just a few. We are in the dozen type category, ACE FEDERAL, REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

368

-1 so it doesn't pose at this point a very large threat.

v 2 MR. EBERSOLE; Let me ask you this question 3 about fire protection. If you use dampers to sectionalize i- 4 a system so you don't get transmission of gasses and hot 1

5 air to a distant area, the typical fire protection system l 6 is intended not to let the fire get to the other region.

J 7 But it freely let's very high temperatures go past the i

8 dampers before they close.

9 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir.

10 MR. - EB ERSOLE : Beyond the damper it may be 11 quite sensitive, some of the solid state equipment which 12 can't take the high temperature transient. One almost

() 13 needs anticipatory information to close it before you have '

14 the fire.

15 How do you overcome this delay? Do you follow 16 me?

l l 17 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir. I fully understand i

18 your concern.

19 Vogtle was very fortunate in the timing of its 20 design, because appendix R, while it was not appendix R at

, 21 that time, the concepts were known well before appendix R 22 became a requirement.

23' MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

24 MR. GEORGE: In the early days of the design 25 of our power plant, trains and fire areas were set up such l

i i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

369 1 that safe shutdown equipment were not in the same areas.

U 2 So by example, the saf ety-related ventilation 3 systems were designed such that they cover only one train.

4 Except for the control room, we don'st have one 5 HVAC system that covers safe shutdown equipment in more 6 than one train.

7 MR. EBERSOLE: I see. Okay, you are not 8 coupled.

9 MR. GEORGE: So this plant is much more 10 f ortunate, say, than Farley, which I worked on a number of 11 years.

12 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, I can understand.

! 13 - MR. GEORGE: Dops t' hat address y'our question?

14 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, it does.

15 (Slide.)

16 MR. GEORGE: A B part to this open concern 17 involves trains, ensuring that the power feed for certain 18 ventilation systems are not disabled by a single fire.

19 Again, as I will touch in open item number 8, 20 we have done--and scheduled to complete in September, an 21 evaluation of the equipment required for safe shutdown.

22 As a part of that system, we have identified a 23 number of the ventilation systems, which are support p 24 systems, but, in our judgment, required to reach and r

Q 25 maintain safe cold shutdown.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

370 1 In those cables, power supplies and control em

'k- 2 cables will be included just like any other safe shutdown 3 equipment and will be addressed in a point to point 4 evaluation in the September review.

5 The last open item is as I pointed out, 6 alternate shutdown as required by the CMEB.

7 (Slide.)

8 We have to do safe shutdown analysis of all 9 areas.

10 If it becomes required where we cannot meet l

11 one of the four criteria, the final criteria would be to 12 provide a dedicated or alternate shutdown system.

() 13 This is the detailed study we are completing 14 or have scheduled to complete in September of this year.

15 As you notice it is more of a confirmatory 16 nature. Not one of significant differences, just one we 17 have to complete.

18 MR. EB ERSOLE: A general question. In the 19 plant tower I noticed things somewhat unusual for me to 20 see. Fire protection of structural columns and beams in 21 areas where it wasn't immediately visible that there was a 22 fire source.

23 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir.

, 24 MR. EBERSOLE: So I guess I raised a question 25 about, if you are going to be this conservative like in the i

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

371 l 1 diesel plant, what did you do in these rubber warehouses we

/ 2 call spreading rooms like under the control room?

3 . MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir, that is a good name for 4 it. Maybe we ought to name it that.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. Does that, did the 6 rationale extend to saying the rubber will burn and the 7 steel support beams will sag?

8 MR. GNORGE: Yes, sir. The position was that 9 where steel is required to support a three hour barrier, 10 even though it does not become a part of the barrier, its 11 failure could threaten the barriers.

12 ,

MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. In this case you s ~

(_) 13 .

recognized 'the combustibility of the rubber cables as a 14 fire source?

15 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir; that's correct.

16 MR. THOMAS: And those columns are coated with 17 flamastic for three hour --

18 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. It's a unique 19 conservatism as far as I am concerned.

l 20 (Slide.)

21 MR. GEORGE: Brief overview of our fire 22 protection plan. We had as the concept of our objective 23 was, number one, that one single fire could not create an 24 unacceptable risk to the health and safety of the public.

l 25 Nor would it prevent safe shutdown, cold ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

372 14 1 shutdown, nor would it significantly increase the risk of v s, V 2 radiological release.

3 In appendix 9 A we provided a detailed fire 4 hazards analysis where we considered a defense in depth 5 approach which has as its goal to prevent fires, early 6 extinguishment.

7 ( Slide. )

8 Ensure safe cold shutdown is not precludeed.

9 And as I pointed out, in Vogtle we were 10 fortunate to have as the basic design philosophy, 11 separation of trains with a three hour fire rating between 12 trains.

p 13 We did the fire area concept which is this

([-4) 14 separation of the trains. In order we could evaluate the 15 specific hazards in each fire area. Then provide unique 16 detection, suppression and, in some cases, alternate 17 shutdown, at least one case.

18 And one other point is that these fires should 19 be able to be handled, shall be able to be handled with or 20 without off-site power.

21 MR. EBERSOLE: In doing this you looked around 22 for fire, combustible materials. There is the 23 transportable fire people cart along with them, like 24 welding -- ny model has been the five gallons of acetone

(~)

v 25 used to clean things up.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

F 373 1 I think in the back of switch boards that g

5-) 2 might be reduced to about a gallon.

3 When you examined the transportable fire 4 source, could I walk around with my bucket of acetone 5 anywhere in the plant and spill it and ignite it and get 6 away with it?

7 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir, because the fire 8 loading considered that magical can of acetone, that the 9 proper man would pour and light a match immediately. Five 10 gallons.

11 MR. EB ERSOLE: That is just out of the blue 12 sky.

()

13 MR. THOMAS: That is why he used it.

14 MR. GEORGE: That was our design basis.

15 (Slide.)

16 A brief summary, not trying to be exhaustive, 17 brief summary of maybe the key areas in the plant.

18 Containment is designed with a seismic oil 19 collection. We have water sprays over our charcoal )

20 filters. We do have detection, stand pipes, hose stations 21 and extinguishers.

l 22 In our control room we have smoke detection, 23 both area and in the main control boards. Then we have the 24 available portable extinguishers.

]

25 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask, in the control room i

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

374 1 emergency ventilation system do you have~ charcoal cleanup 3 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir.

4 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have chillers or coolers 5 on them?

6 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir.

7 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you know this recent 8 fascinating system interaction event where the water pipe 9 burst on the cooling system, and water drained back on top 10 of the control boards and stuck this RV wide open?

11 MR. GEORGE: I believe that was our Georgia 12 Power Company experience.

( 13 MR. EB ERSOLE: You don't have that replication 14 here, I guess.

15 MR. GEORGE: We are doing an analysis at this 16 point to look at that.

17 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.

18 MR. GEORGE: I was hoping you wouldn't ask 19 that question.

20 The cable spreading room, we have pre-action 21 sprinklers, smoke detection. Again, hose stations and 22 portable extinguishers.

23 In our separate shutdown panels which are 24 isolated totally both HVAC and with the electrical 25 separation Mr. Bockhold pointed out.

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

375 1

.1 . We have smoke detection. In this case we have 1 2 a halon system.

3 Then our diesel building, which I understand 4 you visited yesterday, we have again redundant diesels 5- separated from one another, three hour cocoons, with 6 pre-action sprinklers, detection, stand pipes, hose station 7 -and extinguishers.

8 MR. EBERSOLE: We discussed the diesel 9 generator building a little bit there. I might ask you 10 now. The question is kind of a general one.

11 Seismic performance of the fire protection 12 systems and the context of whether you have simultaneous il ) 13 inadvertent spraying of redundant systems.

14 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: What is your rationale for 16 that?

17 MR. GEORGE: You are familiar I am sure with 18 the term 2 over 1 seismic analysis.

19 MR. EBERSOLE: Right.

20 MR. GEORGE: This is the basic design of our 21 sprinkler system. I pointed out that we have seismic stand 22 pipes in the safety-related areas where.at least we know a 23 man can go and hook a pipe up, hose up to and cover.

24 But the question has been posed, and we 25 addressed this in our response, appendix 9 B. We said a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.- Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

376 1 single malfunction of a sprinkler could not cause any

'-) 2 unacceptable shutdown problems. But the question of could 3 two.

-4 Let me make this point. In our judgment the 5 possibility is very low.

6 Again, as I pointed out, as the HVAC system 7 covers just the A train, so do our sprinklers.

8 So what we have is two spray action valves on 9 two separate sprinkler systems that the earthquake, or the 10 event would have to cause both of those to malfunction 15 11 simultaneously to the wrong, or opposition.

12 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

) 13 MR. GEORGE: Then, both of our sprinkler 14 systems that could not fall, but could crack, both would 15 have to crack in a position that the crack would fall down 16 either on the electrical portion or some cabinet try which 17 they themselves would cause a malfunction of the diesels.

18 Then the other point is we have a very 19 elaborate, the most elaborate that I know of in the l

20 country, of alarm and indication. l 21 So as soon as someone got an alarm, then we 22 have people tLat could go manually close another valve that 23 would preclude the eff ect of the f ree buildings --

(~3 24 pre-action valve. So in our judgment that probability is V

25 quite low.

l l

ACE FEDERAL REPOR'{ERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 l

377 1 MR. EBERSOLE: I thought the argument also had 75 kl 2 to include the fact that you had to have a fuseable link at 3~ the individual sprinklers open before you really got -- but

'4 I see you introduced even the crack.

5 MR. GEORGE: The crack in the pipe, yes, sir.

6 MR. EB ERSOLE: That is even~ more conservative.

7 MR. GEORGE: Yes. In our judgment that is 8 very low.

9 MR. REED: I am not so sure I understand the 10 meaning of pre-action.' .

11 But I think I understand automatic sprinkler 12 system in the diesel rooms.

xs f 13 But would this, say, false alarm, or j ust f rom

_)

14 heat actuated condition, where the diesel in operation, 15 jeopardize the f unctioning and operability of the diesel?

16 MR. G EORGE : Let me see if I understand your 17 question.

18 Number one, a little specifics about a 19 pre-action sprinkler. The valve, or system is wet up to 20 the pre-action valve.

21 The pre-action valve is opened by the 22 detection system, smoke detection. Then water fills the 23 system. Then the fuseable link --

24 MR. REED: Backed by a fuseable link. I

(; ~N) 25 understand what you are talking about now.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

378 1 MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir.

2 (Slide.)

3 Now,' in preparing both our signing off of the 4 plan and saying that our plant acceptably meets the FSAR 5 conditions, we have developed very elaborate as-built 6 verification program.

7 The criteria basically is to ensure what is 8 built in the plant has been designed, and that the actual 9 installation.is in accordance with our design documents.

. 10 This provides for an elaborate walk down and a

'll review of documentation. We have a formal tracking and 12 resolution system.

m

'Q 13 For every time we find a variance, we track 14 it, and we will formally resolve it.

15 This will allow our people to have a great 16 f amiliarization of our fire systems, intricasies of our 17 fire systems.

18 We have specific detailed checklists with i 19 acceptance criteria where required.

l

! 20 The specific items as you can see are very 21 numerous. But basically, certainly the key ones are 22 detection, sprinklers, sealing or cocooning each of the 23 fire areas, i

24 Oil collection, emergency lighting.

25 Every aspect of the system we have addressed I

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

37 9 1 or committed to we want to assure to ourselves that what is fN,

\_/ 2 built in that plant actually represents what we committed 3 to.

4 MR. EB ERSOLE: Did you have to do this, in my 5 way of thinking, this undesirable business of coating the 6 cables and cable trays with flamastics?

7 MR. GEORGE: The September study will identify 8 each of those. It's our goal not to do that.

9 Othcr plant I worked at had a great deal. The 10 maintenance of that is a terrible problem.

11 MR. THOMAS: It's a last resort. A lot of

~

12 times we had to do something.

(~)

13 MR. GEORGE: That will be in the September-14 analysis.

15 MR. EB ERSOLE: Thank you.

16 MR. GEORGE: That concludes my presentation.

17 MR. EB ERSOLE: Thank you. I think that is 18 very thorough.

19 Thank you.

20 MR. GEORGE: Thank you.

21 MR. THOMAS: The next item, actually I would 22 like to take up two subjects.

23 We were asked about the concrete seals in the i

24 joints of the safety related buildings. We will describe 25 those to'you. .

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

380 1 I would like to say that the only exposure f

k- ') 2 they have for flooding is from the ground water.

3 The ground water table is about 65 feet 4 underground. It's about at the 155 foot elevation.

5 The maximum conservatively would be about 165 6 feet.

7 So I say we have essentially continuous 8- testing and have no leaking.

9 But we do have the belts and suspenders we are 10 also going to show you.

11 MR. E3ERSOLE: Yes.

12 MR. THOMAS: A second subject I would like to

() 13 have Mr. Houghton discuss is we had some discussion 14 yesterday about settlement. I would like to come back to 15 that and show you some data about how the settlement has 16 progressed.

17 The settlement of the marl is essentially all 18 caused by the backfill. We have about a hundred feet of 19 backfill.

20 It's a rather uniform settlement. The 21 buildings with their equipment actually weigh less than the 22 backfill material. The backfill is more dense than the 23 original soil, so it went down some.

16 24 We would like to show that we have a high 25 confidence level that we are all right in that area. But L

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

3 81 I we would like to show you the information we are basing our 2- judgment on.

3- The question of what are the problems with the 4- settlement, differential settlement. There are two which 5 Mr. Houghton will discuss and show you that we are 6 conservative there, as well.

7 (Slide.)

i 8 MR. HOUGHTON: I am Dave Boughton, an employee 9 of Bechtel Power. I am also the civil structural 10 engineering supervisor in the Vogtle project.

11 I will discuss the subj ect of prevention of 12 water entry in the safety-related structures.

()_ 13 (Slide.)

14 MR. EBERSOLE : That is from an external source

-15 of water, right? Not broken pipes?

16 MR. HOUGHTON - That's right. Next is' maximum 17 river flooding and ground water. I will talk about them in 18 that order.

i 19 (Slide.)

20 As to maximum river flooding, maximum flood

21 level at Savannah River including wind and wave run up, is 22 approximately elevation 165 feet.

23 ,

~ Nominal finished grade level for the plant is

24 approximately elevation 219 feet- 6 inches. Therefore, no

%q l

l 25 flooding can occur at the plant site due to maximum river l

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

382

.1 flooding.

b(A .2 MR. EBERSOLE: I guess this was the kind of 3 slide that threw me off track, because it infers that the 4 only way you can flood a building is to go above the grade, b 5 Yet you can flood buildings through

'6 subterrainian drains and seal failures, and a host of 7 things.

8 However, I understand you don't have that 9 potential either, from later conversation.

MR. HOUGHTON: That's correct.

11 MR. EBERSOLE : That you don't get more than 12 about a ten percent fluctuation above the running water 13 level, is this correct?

14 MR. HOUGHTON: How much fluctuation?

15 MR. EBERSOLE: About ten feet.

16 MR. THOMAS: Minimum to max might be as much 17 as 20 feet over the life of the plant. We are sitting at 18 about the average right now.

19 MR. EBERSOLE: This is why you say you are 20 under continuous test except for the 20 feet.

21 MR. THOMAS: Extra 10 feet. It would only go 22 at the most ten feet higher.

23 MR. EBERSOLE: That would be due to maximum 24 precipitation rate?

l 25 MR. THOMAS: No. You know, it's an integral.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

383 t

1 It integrates water over a long period. Most of it runs 2 off.

3 So in our studies of ground water levels, it 4 takes a _ couple months of ~hard rains.. You can't do it with 5: just a rain. ,

6 MR. EBERSOLE: I can see you have no problem 7 here. Just save your time.

8- -MR. HOUGHTON: Okay.

9 ( Slide. )

10 Next I would --

11- MR. EBERSOLE: I can invite you to mention at 12 least the internal:. flooding problem with the pipes burst.

13 Have you laid that to rest?

14 MR. THOMAS: Yes. We are, as part of the 15 readiness reviev. checking internal flooding.

16 We have a special (group called a hazards 17 analysis group. Bechtel. is part -- as part of their

-18 responsibility, it's to ensurce flooding levels are properly 19 analized.

-20 MR. EBERSOLE:- You don't have full condensor.

21_ You can't deliver water to the turbine wall and get it in 22 the aux building, can you?

23 MR. THOMAS: No.

w 24 MR. HOUGHTON: With your permission, I will go 25 to the settlement topic.

ACE FEDERAL REiORTERS,-INC. _ Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 ,

m 384 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure.

95-b 2 ( Slide. )

3 MR. THOMAS: Let me say while he is preparing, 4 that the difference discussed yesterday about whether the

., [ 5 additional settlement was due to the marl, or the p-6 underlying sands is not of significance.

7-. In other words, it wouldn't really matter 8' which it was, because it's stabilizing. In othe'r words, if 9 it did compress the marl an extra half inch or whatever, an 10 inch.

. 11 , In other words, whatever the process is, it's

. 12 not significant to resolving this issue.

i

13 MR. HOUGHTON: Th3 proj ect addresses both

- (_)

14 total settlement of the safety relate structures, as well 15 as differential settlement between structures. As far as 16; the effects of systems passing the structure, structures

17 ,such as piping. '

18 In order to give you an understanding of the 19 kind of settlement pattern we have been experiencing at our 20 various survey markers, we selected a couple of 21 representative markers representing a potential 1

22 differential settlement situation between the control 23 building and the containment building.

24 - We call them marker 122 for the control

(

25 building and marker 123 for the containment.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

385 1 (Slide.)

M*s

(~f 2 We periodically review the settlement data as 3 it comes to us from the field surveys. )

l 4 Bere you will see the settlement record of 5 marker 123, the containment marker.

6 I call to your attention the relationship 7 between the settlement of that marker relative to the 8 progression of the backfill completion.

9 Notice at the start of this record the 10 backfill was approximately ten percent complete.

17 11 This is the settlement record of the marker 12 122, which is the control building, having an initial start

() 13 of approximately June,1981.

14 . The thing you will see in common is 15 approximately March of 1983, we see a tapering off of the 16 settlement characteristic.

17 This third record or curve is in fact the 18 gross differential settlement between these two markers.

19 Again, the tapering off in this time period 20 between March of '83, and this record currently goes to 21 January, 1985.

22 This information was presented to the staff 23 and is part of the PSAR in response to one of the staff's

r g 24 questions.

\J 25 Again, the status of the backfill completion ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

3 86 1 .in this area is 96 percent complete.

-(- 2 We do not. anticipate any significant changes 3 from the differential settlement record as shown on this 4 particular graph.

5 These two markers, for information, are 6 probably at the higher end of the range of calculated 7 differential settlements to date.

8 This one shows approximately .47 inches of 9 differential settlement between those two markers, and that 10 is at the higher end, as I mentioned.

11 In most cases the differential settlement is 12 smaller than that.

_( ) 13 MR. WARD: Well, Dave, is this behavior what ,

14 you would expect? Do you have an explanation for this sort 15 of behavior?

16 I guess that was the concern about the 17 difference of opinion as to the cause of settlement between 18 the project and the staff.

19 MR. THOMAS: It's within an-inch of the 20 estimates.

21 MR. WARD: It is? Top.

22 MR. THOMAS: And you have got a hundred feet 23 of backfill. Heave, when the old was taken off, cut off 24 some of the marl, then began to put in the engineering 25 backfill.

ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

3 87 i I

l 1 So we estimated what the final settlement ,

6%c )

k) m 2 would be af ter the heave, then it comes back down.

l 3 And to come within an inch, I think, is really 4 remarkable.

5 And but the key thing I wanted you to see is 6 that it has stablized, and we anticipate it will stay that 7 way.

8 He is going to tell you why that will be 9 acceptable.

10 . MR. WARD: All right.

11 (Slide.)

ll 12 MR. HOUGHTON: Design analysis of piping l () 13 systems.

14 We start off with a piping design differential 15 actually used in the piping analysis.

16 MR. THOMAS: This is from building to 17- building.

18 MR. HOUGHTON: Yes.

19 Notice over here we have listed several piping l

20 systems. We have tabulated the gross differential 21 settlements of mat :>ers most adjacent to these particular 22 systems as they cross structures.

i 23 The pipe doesn't really feel those 24 displacements until it's supported. Only in the cases l 25 where the gross differential settlement is of some l

i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 u

388 1 ' significance, such as these above here, .52 inches, would (J 2 you bother to start looking at the net differential 3 settlement, which would be effective as of the date the 4 pipe was install 5d.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: I can't get quite a mental 6 picture here. Let me try to generate one.

7 I have a pipe that goes f rom building to 8 building.

9 MR. HOUGHTON: Yes.

8 10 MR. EBERSOLE: In the intermediate distance 11 it's supported by some supports which may or may not 12 settle.

()

13 MR. THOMAS: No,t necessarily. inside each 14 building.

15 DR. KERR: There is no support in the intervening 16 distance?

17 MR. THOMAS: That's correct.

18 MR. EBERSOLE: Next thing, is it in air or is 19 it in fill, the pipes?

20 MR. HOUGHTON: In some cases the pipes go from 21 building to building through a seismic gap, air.

22 MR. EBERSOLE: Are any in the fill?

l 23 MR. HOUGHTON: There are a few exceptions 24 where they are in the fill, yes.

73

\-)

25 MR. EBERSOLE: In the fill don't you have to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, Il C. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

389 1 measure the distance, calculate the shear and provide some PT

(_) 2 -degree of compression?

3 MR. HOUGHTON: To answer your question, the 4 effects of imbedment into the soil beyond the wall are 5 accounted for in the piping analysis.

6 MR. EBERSOLE: All right. You certainly don't 7 cast them in concrete between them.

8 MR. HOUGHTON: That's correct.

9 MR. THOMAS: No.

10 MR. HOUGHTON: I think we can conclude --

11 MR. THOMAS: Wait a minute. I don' t think you 12 have told them enough yet.

' %i f) 13 You have an allowance. That is how much we 14 have, and that is the margin we have. I want to talk about 15 the margin in the open space of the penetration area.

16 MR. HOUGHTON: We can see here that the 17 allowance in design was up to six-tenths of an inch.

18 In this case, where we had some significance 19 in the gross differential, the net differential is .03, 20 giving us a significant margin.

21 MR. THOMAS: In other words, we wait until 22 near the end of construction to actually make the supports, 23 the anchors, inside each building you hang them, but you gw 24 don't, until near the end, most of them haven't been done O

25 yet.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

390 1 But he had two that had been done. Had been p=

(./ 2 supported. And he has to monitor that clearance. He has 3 to have six-tenths clearance.

4 I mean he is allowed six-tenths differential 18 5- settlement in that opening. He has only used up .03.

6 Of course, you monitor that. If it should 7 change, you just change the way you support it.

8 I mean, it's no problem. Here, we didn't even 9 have to change any support.

10 MR. REED: I am not able to figure out whether 11 or not the fuel storage, spent fuel pit is identified and 12 has marker on it or not. Is that part of the auxiliary 13 building cowl to that --

l() -

i

! 14 MR. HOUGHTON: That would be to the fuel 15 handling.

16 MR. REED: It doesn't show on the little 17 diagram.

18 One thing I would be a bit concerned about is 19 the differential settlement between the reactor building 20 and the spent fuel storage pit.

21 MR. HOUGHTON: Okay.

22 MR. REED: Because of the horizontal tube that i 23 goes from one to the other, and however your tracking is j 24 created, so on.

25 MR. HOUGHTON: For your -- the answer to your ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 - question would be this.

2 The fuel transfer tube has been designed by 3 the_ vendor for a differential displacement vertically of 4: half an inch.

5 To date the differentia 1' settlement markers 6 closest to that transfer tube is-about one-tenth that 7 ' value. About .05 inches. So that has been accounted for.

8 MR. REED: You think likewise you are leveling 9 off here, and that there isn't likely to be much of a  ;

i 10 worsening? /

11 MR. HOUGHTON: That is correct.

12 (Slide.)

13 The other area we are involved in is the  !

I(-{}.

14 differential settlement within a building. You will hear 15 this ratio Delta over L, which is called the slopo ratio, L 16 defined as the maximum net slope of basemat deflection ,

17 curve relative to the structure tilt.

18 The threshold for a structural assessment that 19 we have agreed with the staff to use is the Delta over L of 20 1 over 670. I 21 To date as of January,1985, anyway, it's

  • 22 stayed very close to the same numbers. The actual ratios 23 for the three principal structures show that the i

24 denominator of this ratio, that is what we will look at iI-) 25 here, is a minimum of at least two to two and a half times ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

392 l greater than the denominator in the threshold which shows Q

2 significant margin relative to any potential effects on the 3 structure due to differential settlement within the 4 building.

5 MR. THOMAS: You don't anticipate we will ever 6 get near that 1 over 6707 7 MR. HOUGHTON: That's correct.

8 MR. THOMAS: But if we do, we have a 9 requirement to report it to the NRC and evaluate it.

10 MR. HOUGHTON: That is all I intended to 11 present. Are there any other questions?

12 MR. EBERSOLE: No. Thank you.

( 13 MR. THOMAS: We, are going to cover two agenda 14 items.

15 We were asked to discuss main feedwater 16 control system and AC/DC power systems reliability. Mr.

17 Bockhold will discuss both of those.

18 MR. EBERSOLE: I might comment while he is 19 getting ready, the thrust of the question about this area 20 was mostly the aspect of reducing challenges to aux 21 feedwater. ,

22 And then such topics as automation of high 23 level cut-off to preclude overfill.

24 ( Slide. )

25 MR. EBERSOLE: With these two main steam ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

393 1 isolation valves it would seem you to turn the water off g

v_J- 2 before it gets down into the main steam lines toward the 3 turbines.

4 Otherwise, I would ask you, can the main steam 5 lines support the complete fill of water?

6 You might consider discussing that. It's a 7 standard question now days.

8 MR. THOMAS: I am informed they have analyzed 9 the steamline out to the isolation valves filled with 10 water.

11 MR. EBERSOLE: What about on the back side 12 toward the turbine?

f) 13 MR. THOMAS: I don't think that has been done.

\-

14 MR. EBERSOLE: That is the question now. Your 15 argument may well be that you won't have enough water to go 16 that far.

17 MR. THOMAS: Yes, and we have A-B trains.

18 MR. EBERSOLE: I understand.

19 MR. BOCKHOLD: I am going to first discuss the 20 main feedwater system, talk about the controls and look at 21 some of the features we have to prevent challenges there.

22 (Slide.)

23 This is the piping arrangement into a typical 24 steam generator. I would like simply to describe the 25 system first, then go from there.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

394 1 We have two feed lines into the generator.

\ ,

6(2

_) 2 One a main feed line, one an aux feed line.

3 The auxiliary feedwater comes in a four inch 4 line into a six inch line that goes into the generator.

5 Of course, on this side we have two valves 6 coming off one of the motor operated' pumps, and for -- let 7 me put it this way.

8 For each steam generator we have a motor 9 operated feed into it, and we have a turbine operated feed, 10 Terry turbine aux feedwater into that steam generator.

11 On the main feedwater side we have a main 19 12 feedwater isolation valve, and the main feedwater or

() 13 ,

turbine dri6en pumps come to a common header down here.

14 We have a main feed regulating valve, and a 15 bypass valve that supplies feedwater to that generator.

16 That kind of gives you a background picture on 17 the system, itself.

18 Now, I would like to talk about the design 19 features associated with our system.

20 (Slide.)

21 Main feedwater. We are designed to accept a 22 50 percent load rejection because we have 40 percent steam 23 dumps and ten percent by rods.

7, 24 We can lose one main feed and, through

\s 25 operator action, recover the plant. That type challenge we ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

r .,

1 can handle.

P 2 During start up we would shif t over from aux 3 feedwater system to the main feedwater system, and as shown 4 on the diagram before, we have the main feedwater bypass 5 valve.

6 Let me bring that up again.

7 (Slide.)

8 That in this valve right here, the four inch 9 valve.

10 ( Slide. )

11 That valve, itself, has an automatic feed 12 regulating valve.

b V

13 Some of the transients that Westinghouse 14 plants receive really during start up and steam generator 15 level control in start up.

16 So this feature helps us a lot, helps the 17 operators a lot during the start up of the plant.

18 Operational features, again, 16 inch line and 19 four inch regulating bypass valve.

20 One of the things we did in our control room 21 design review, way back when when we did it, we went ahead 22 and put fast speed recorders on, again for the start up 23 evolution, help the operator manipulate the controls and 24 not get the challenge when the levels are the most 25 difficult to control.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 Main driven pumps are 90 percent capacity FT V 2 pumps and we have two of those.

3 That is kind of the features that we have.

4 Maybe I can answer any specific questions.

5 MR. EBERSOLE: I gather this means that the 6 two are nominally running at about half capacity on line.

7 MR. BOCKHOLD: At a hundred percent power we 8 have two running, yes, sir.

9 MR. EBERSOLE: About 50 percent.

10 MR. THOMAS: Each.

11 MR. EBERSOLE: Each.

12 Okay. So you use the aux feed pumps for start

( 13 ups?

14 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir. Most Westinghouse 15 plants I know of use aux feedwater pumps for start up.

16 We also have one other capability. Our aux 17 steam boiler is large enough to drive the main feed pumps 18 and we can start up using it.

19 MR. EBERSOLE: But you need the main condensor 20 to get rid of the exhaust?

21 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, sir.

22 MR. EB ERSOLE: Right. Box.

23 MR. BOCKHOLD: But in our desire to operate p 24 with the best of all possible chemistry and preserve the L] 25 life of the steam generators, you would want to clean up ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

397 1 the main feedwater system and condensate system, get out as 2 much of the oxygen as you can.

3 So we plan to bring on our aux boiler and 4_ ' operate and clean up our condensate keyboard systems before 5 putting high oxygenated --

6 MR. EBERSOLE: As you rise, when do you make 7 cut over to main feedwater pumps?

8 MR. BOCKHOLD: You bring on the main feedwater 9 pumps fairly low in power, 85 percent power. You make that 10 cut over. If you are making a transition from aux to main 11 feedwater.

12 Again, I say we can start up using main

{ 13 feedwater without the aux feedwater but making that 14 transition, typically it's low in power, and then yoa are 15 on the bypass valve, get those in automatic. You come on 16 up.

17 In our particular case, about 15 to 20 18 percent, we would make the transition to the larger valves, 19 the main valves.

20 MR. EBERSOLE: On the matter of tripping, of 21 which you said you have been getting about six per year, I 22 don't know what the division of tripping might be. But 23 certainly, a substantial part of it is that the reactor 24 trips first.

25 MR. THOMAS: We don't plan to have as many as ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

j 1 six per year.

\d 2 MR. EB ERSOLE: For the case where the reactor

. 3 trips first, you drop all input power to the turbine and f

4 you don't need much feedwater anymore.

. 5 I am going to guess that you cannot ramp the 6 main feedwater down from a reactor trip and hold together.

. 7 Am I right? , '!

8 You must invite the aux feed to take over the 9 emergency function? f 1 10 MR. BOCKHOLD: At low powers you can.

! 11 MR. EBERSOLE: I said at full power.

i 12 MR. BOCKHOLD: Full power, ,you will and up f f3 u/

13 with the aux feedwater system -- i i

{ 14 MR. EBERSOLE: So you _have to challenge the 15 aux feedwater from a Scram, not a turbine trip.

16 MR. BOCKHOLD: The turbine trip -- I 17 MR. EBERSOLE: I am talking about a first step 18 event.

l 19 MR. BOCKHOLD: Tell me your initiating event.

20 I think I got confused.

2 MR. EBERSOLE: I have a Scram from full power.

22 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay. Aux feedwater system 20 23 comes on. Steam generator levels go down. '

24 MR. EBERSOLE: As a matter of fact it's got to l

25 come on.

l 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: On all Westinghouse plants that i l

/P ~

2 I an aware of, high power trip ends up bringing aux i 3 feedwater on because level goes low in the steam 4 generators. .

5 MR. ' EB ERSOL E: And your big feed pumps can't 6 ramp down and hold.

7 MR. BOCKHOLD: They cannot. No.

8 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.

9' MR. BOCKHOLD: They trip as part -- their 10 .feedwater is shut off as part of the over filled design-11 capacity.

12 MR. EBERSOLE: I know, right. They are just 13 too big.

14 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: So that is a part of the 16 challenge f requency, is a standard scram.

17 MR. BOCKHOLD: A trip from high power will 18 bring you aux feedwater system up. Yes, sir.

19. MR. EBERSOLE: I don't know what the 20 distribution of designs are. I think some can ramp back 21 real quick.

22 I don't know what the fraction of these are.

23 Do you happen to know.

24 MR. BOCKHOLD: I personally don't know a 25 Westinghouse plant --

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

r 400 1 MR. EBERSOLE: I am talking about plants at C1 b 2 large.

l 3 MR. BATUM: Mr. Ebersole, I think there is 4 some plants with the 0 percent pump capability that could 5 probably ramp it down.

6 In our case like George said we have 50 7 percent ramp capability.

8 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes.

9 MR. BATUM: In our case we cannot ramp the way 10 you are talking about.

11 MR. EBERSOLE: It's --

12 MR. BATUM: Some Westinghouse plants do have f3 LJ 13 90 percent capability.

14 MR. EB ERSOLE: Right. Thank you.

15 (Slide.)

16 MR. REED: Just to clarify something for you, 17 Jesse, this steam driven feed pump 90 percent capacity 18 arrangement may be a little unique', and where you have 19 electric driven main water feed pumps you do not challenge 20 the aux feed system.

21 The main feed is on a standard trip.

22 MR. EBERSOLE: Right.

23 MR. REED: Putting in the philip wire, g 24 continuing --

(J 25 MR. EB ERSOLE: We don't see very many electric ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

[ 401 1 main feed pumps. Once in a while.

, U 2 MR. BOCKHOLD: My only experience there was on 3 Elon, really the Zion simulator. It responded the same as

4 Indian Point, Sequoyah, Eion and Vogtle.

5 Really, my detailed experience was the aux 6 feedwater systems.

7 , MR. EBERSOLE: What dictates the choice of ,

8 main electric pumps or main turbine pumps, economics?

9 MR. BOCKHOLD: I would really let Ozen answer 10 that, since he made the' choice.

11 MR. EBERSOLE: Why do you ch3ose turbine 12 versus motor driven? The Japanese like .otor driven.

b)

\

13 MR. BATUM: Well-14 . MR. EBERSOLE: You are going to tell me bucks, 15 I guess.

16 MP. . BATUM: I think the -- it's a practice of 17 our company, use main feedwater due to control built 18 feature of turbine driven pumps.

19 It has been the practice in our Southern 20' Company, including fossil plants.

21 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.

22 (Slide.)

23 MR. BOCKHOLD: The next topic is AC/DC power 24 systems reliability. I am going to focus on our plant and 25 the Southern Electric system.

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

m-402 1 ( Slide.)

.A k_)' 2 This is a schematic, in the PSAR of the lines 3 going into Plant Vogtle.

4 As you see, well, currently we have the plant 5 Wilson line. We have the Augusta Newsprint line. Goshen 6 white and black are under construction and will be in 7 . operation in '86.

8 The Wilson line, Goshen white and black and 9 Augusta Newsprint are 230 KV lines feeding the plant 10 feeding into our switch yard.

11 I have a schematic of that also.

12 We also will have coming into the plant two

() 13 500 KV linec, Thalman, Statesboro ccheduled for later and 14 SCE&G is scheduled later also.

15 We have plant Wilson with six 50 megawatt gas 16 turbine units located on our site. That line comes right 17 over to our switch yard.

18 We further have not, at Plant Hatch or Farley, 19 we have not experienced any loss of off-site, total loss of 20 off-site power to those plants in their approximate ten 21 years of operation.

22 (Slide.)

23 When we come into the switch yard, let me tell

i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

427 1 Now, you asked about the main coolant pump

(_) 2 shaf t seal performance.

3 MR. EB ERSOLE : Oh, yes.

4 MR. THOMAS:. Long-term loss of all AC.

5 You also asked about the potential for 6 accidentally charging the U-tubes with nonconventional gas 7 such as after a steam line break, and how our steam 8 generator U-tube -- procedures ir. the absence of the main 9 coolant pumps.

10 MR. TAUCHE: I am Walt Tauche. I will address 11 the discussion you requested on the reactor coolant pump 12 seals.

Efj -13 I have been serving as technical follow for v

14 this issue, generic issue B-23 on reactor coolant pump seal 15 integrity within Westinghouse.

16 (Slide.)

l

~

17 The integrity is really involved with the l 18 cooling of the seals. If you lose cooling, what happens to 19 the design.

20 Within the Vogtle plant they have an eight l

l 21 inch reactor coolant pump shaft seal design which consists i

l 22 of three stages.

23 The first is a main hydrostatic stage in which 1

24 the major pressure drop occurs.

25 Then there are two remaining stages, two face ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

_ -- -- ^ '

428 1 rubbing stages which produce the remaining drop down.

- %) 2 It's a control leakage design seal in which we l

3 normally inject about 8 gpm of seal injection fluid at 4 about 2250 psia, about 150 degrees F.

5 Of the injection, five of that goes down the 6 shaf t and into the reactor coolant system. The remaining 7 three normally goes out the number one leak off line, 8 handled by the chemical and volume control systems.

9 As indicated the reactor coolant pump seals 10 are normally cooled by seal inj ection flow. If you lose 11 seal injection flow there is backup cooling provided by the 12 thermal barrier heat exchanger which is cooled by component

~ ~

( 13 cooling water.

14 If you lose both those sources of cooling, you 15 will tend to increase the leak wage from the reactor 16 coolant pump seals.

17 If that leakage is severe enough, you could in 18 fact do damage to the reactor coolant system, itself.

19 The loss of cooling to both of the seals does 20 subject the reactor coolant pumps to a severe thermal 21 transient.

22 Consequently, the pumps have to be tripped and 23 you must restore cooling before any further pump on 24 operation is allowed.

(q) 25 If increase in leakage during the loss of all ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. 202) 347-3700

g-,

429 1 this cooling is large enough, beyond what the ECCS or make

'2 up capability can restore, then you will have a small LOCA 3 in the reactor coolant system.

4 The typical ECCS design and Vogtle design in 5 particular supplies sufficient make up capability to make 6 up for all- loss of seal cooling leakage rates.

7 MR. EBERSOLE: That is not the point of 8 interest. It's, of course, the total AC power failure 9 case.

10- MR. TAUCHE: If you lose all that, you of 11 course lose all seal cooling as well.

12 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

i) 13 MR. TAUCHE: Consequently, they undergo that 14 severe thermal transient.

15 This is really unresolved safety issue A-4545.

16 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. No. That is not A-45, is 17 it?

) 18 MR. TAUCHE: The generic issue is generic 19 issue B-23. The full station blackout is --

i l 20 MR. WARD: It's A-44. We will forgive.you one 21 number.

-7 22 MR. TAUCHE: Is this leakage severe enough to l 23

'cause core uncovery?

24 To resolve this, Westinghouse has embarked

25 upon a program to try to demonstrate the leakage is small r r (202) 347-3700

{ ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C.

u 430 1 enough 'so that you will get acceptable leakage for the

(==: .

As 2 required duration.

3 (Slide.)

4- The first thing Westinghouse and owners group 5 have done along this issue is to do best estimate reactor 6 coolant pump seal leakage analyses.

7 These analyses are on an eight inch seal 8 design similar to what is installed in the Vogtle plant.

9 Analyses are detailed thermal stress and 10 thermal hydraulic analyses.

11 Our findings were that our best estimate of 12 the leakage was about 21 gpm.

13 I_should emphasize there is a great deal of

)-

14 uncertainty regarding these analyses, consequently wherever

, 15 there is uncertainty, we-try to err on the side of 16 conservatism.

l 17- Our analysis calculated about 21. We expect I-

, 18 the leakage to probably be less.

19 MR. WARD: Walt, let's see. I think-the last l

l 20 time we heard from you on this there was some reason to

r 21 believe the leakage could be as high as 125 gpm. Have you I

22- done some work since then?

23 70R. TAUCHE: That this is our best estimate I

24 leakage.

) ,

25. If _ in fact you postulate the failure of all I

[ ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 L

431 1 three seals to function, the leakage could be much higher.

f)s

(- 2 It could be as high as 480 gpm if you 3 postulate all seal f ailures.

! 4 However, our best estimate of the leakage is 5 21 gpm. Under this best estimate condition there would be 6 more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> available to restore AC power or some 7 form of cooling to the reactor coolant system and the 8 reactor coolant pump seals before you would get into any 9 problem of core uncovery, much less core damage.

10 We did submit these results to the NRC in a 11 WCAP, WCAP 10,541, Westinghouse owner group report on 12 reactor coolant pump seal integrity during loss of all

() 13 power. - .

14 That was reviewed by energy technology 15 engineering center in California. They also performed 16 audit calculations.

17 Their findings were that the Westinghouse 18 analyses were appropriate and conservative.

19 In fact, their findings from their audit i

20 calculations were that our analyses were conservative by 21 anywhere from 7 to 20 percent.

22 Since that time, Westinghouse and owners group 23 did participate in a full scale test of a 7 inch reactor

- 24 coolant pump seal system which is similar in design to the

(

x 25 reactor coolant pump seals which are installed at Vogtle.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

c 432 1 The main difference between the design is b)

's_ 2 basically dimensions of the components. The 7 inch 3 dimension represents the shaf t dimension, whereas Vogtle 4 has an eight inch shaft.

5 In this test conducted in France in May of 6 this year the test simulated conditions expected at the 7 seal inlet during the loss of all AC power.

8 In other words, initially very high 9 differential pressures across the seal. Also very high 10 temperatures.

11 We also went through what we expect to be a 12 longer term condition, slightly depressurized at very high 13 temperature condition.

}

14 Finally we went to a condition which we 15 assumed that the operator had taken some action to cool the 16 plant down by the secondary side.

17 We found the seal performed quite stably for a 18 total of 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of the testing. The leakage was 19 predominantly through the number 1 seal. In fact we found 20 very little leakage.

21 The worst case we observed under stable 22 conditions was 16 gpm. That was at full reactor, what l

23 would correspond to full reactor coolant pressure system 24 and hot conditions of 534 degrees.

Oc 25 Assuming the natural depressurization of the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

O33 1 reactor coolant system which would come down to around 0 to R t U 2 1250 in Vogtle's situation, we would assume less than 12 3 gpm leakage at this condition.

4 If the operator took actions to cool the 5 system the pressure would drop to around the accumulator 6 injection pressure, temperature would be much lower. And 7 there was only about nine gpm under that condition.

8 Roughly double what the normal seal condition was.

9 This is still preliminary. We haven't 10 received the full French data report.

11 Westinghouse has not been able to do a full 12 data reduction.

13 . But this is the leakage we have observed for 14 the 7 inch seal system so f ar.

15 Consequently, we don't expect excessive 16 leakage during the loss of AC power event.

l 17 The owners group does have programs in place 18 to try to resolve this particular issue with the NRC. And 8

19 consequently we don't believe any emergency equipment is l 20 need to provide additional seal coolant for this event.

21 Particularly in Vogtle's case.

22 Can I answer any questions regarding the this 23 particular event?

24 MR. WARD: You apparently had some contact 25 with the French. EDF apparently did decide to provide ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

434 1 additional' route for seal cooling.

P

-b 2 MR. TAUCHE: Yes.

3 MR. WARD: This is this series of tests going 4 to turn around from that?

5 MR. TAUCHE: No. We have received 6 communication from EDF in which they have probably already 7 announced a press release that this will have no impact on 8 their decision to retrofit even the 900 megawatt plants.

9 In fact the people we talked to said the 10 retrofit on their 900 design was about 90 percent complete.

11 What they intend to do with that retrofit at 12 this point is allow operation with one -- with normal seal

'( ) 13 injection pump out of service.

14 So they will use their gas turbine generators-15 or steam turbine seal injection generators to supply the 16 seal cooling.

17 MR. WARD: That sounds very encouraging.

18 Let me make an aside to Mr. McKinley here.

19 It's been awhile since we heard about this

. 20 issue. It looks like a lot has developed. We need to get

- 21 our staff, cracking on hearing some more. ,

l 22 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask about the sensitivity 23 of these leakage estimates?

24 You spoke about simply assuming failure of all 25 three stages. But you didn't mention the causative aspects ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

E~ 435 1 of failure of the number 2 and 3 stage.

. p=.

L(. 2 Is this criticly dependent on the rate of 3 leakage from the number 1 stage as to what happens to 2 and 4 3?

5 MR. TAUCHE: Well the number 2 seal would, if 6 in fact something happened to the number 1 seal, where it 7 would leak more, would see a greater differential pressure.

8 Yes there would be an effect.

1 9 MR. EBERSOLE: It's.a regressive --

10 MR. TAUCHE: To some degree. What we did 11 observe in the French test there was a transient heat up 12 response.

,(} 13 During this response when the seals first saw 14 hot high temperature water, there was a flow spike which 15 resulted in about 64 gpm initial ficw rate through the 16 number 1 seal.

17 That resulted in a pressurization of the 18 number one seal leak off cavity which did lif t the number 2 19 seal momentarily. .

-20 It appears to have fully receded, and normal 21 leakage was then predominantly on number 1.

22 MR. EBERSOLE: If you got in the situation, 23 you would be tempted to run, and a related question we

, 24 didn't quite get to, you run pressure down via depressing 25 secondary.

1 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 l

)

1 Do you have any comments about how far you n

d 2 would* go, how fast you would go in getting the secondary 3 down and not inviting those gas bottles _ to discharge into 4 the primary loop?

5 MR. TAUCHE: In Vogtle's particular case I 6 can't directly address that.

7 Bowever, Westinghouse generic guidelines call 8 for a cool down rate of a hundred degrees per hour.

9 Ultimately to get you down to RBE.

10 MR. EBERSOLE: Wait a minute. It wouldn't do 11 you any good if you have no power.

12 MR. TAUCHE: That's right. We still want you

( 13 down as far as you can.

14 MR. EBERSOLE: You just cut it off at that 15 point. So you are coming down to about 400 pounds.

16 MR. TAUCHE: Right.

17 MR. EBERSOLE: That means the secondary 18 pressure is what?

19 MR. TAUCHE: Would be correspondingly less.

20 You would probably be on the secondary side at saturation 21 type conditions, about 50 degrees or less cooler. Which 22 would correspond to, well, I would have to look it up.

23 MR. EBERSOLE: About a 50 degree differential.

24 MR. REED: I think you two people just lost me 25 on the depressurization of the primary by cooling down the i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

437 {

1 secondary in this case.

'x_) 2 Would you go through that again?

3 You have a condition of no AC. No seal 4 cooling. I guess somebody said you would depreciate rise 5 by way of the secondary?

6 MR. TAUCHE: Yes. I can't address directly 7 for Vogtle but Westinghouse generic guidelines call for 8 manual operation of the secondary fuel --

9 MR. THOMAS: Mr. Bockhold will address that.

10 MR. BOCKHOLD: We have DC power for our Terry 11 turbine aux feedwater pump. Approximately an hour into the 12 transient, our Westinghouse components group emergency ,

(l } 13 procedures that we have now gone through and value-dated, l 14 and Westinghouse has provided us specific plant 15 information. Approximately at that point, ve didn't get AC 16 power back, we would depressurize by using atmospherics and 17 filling the steam generators with aux feedwater from the 18 Terry turbine.

19 That would be the mechanism, at which time we l

l 20 would get additional make up via the accumulators.

21 MR. THOMAS: Do you want to go on to the 22 purging?

23 MR. EBERSOLE: I couldn't envision any way you 24 could do any purging without the main coolant pumps. Maybe 7-)

U 25 you can clarify that.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

=- -- - --- -. .

~

I 438 q' .d T .- 1 (Slide.)

P)'(-

2 MR. TAUCHE: Let me talk about the effects of 3 noncondensible gasses on the Vogtle system.

4 First let me identify the sources of gasses.

5 There are basically seven sources, the first of which is 6 the no'rmal hydrogen kept in solution in the reactor coolant 7 system to prevent radiolytic decomposition of the water in 8 the system.

9 This hydrogen concentration is usually between-10 15 cc's per kilogram to 50 cc's per kilogram.

11 If you began to boil or flash in the system

+ 12 . the hydrogen solution would tend to effervesce out of

() 13 solution.

14 The other place hydrogen exists in if I recall .

, 15 large quantity is the pressurizer vapor space. The reason 16 the hydrogen tends to build up in that space as alluded 17 earlier is that you have got sprays which normally strips 18 out the hydrogen.

19 Consequently, you have a fairly large amount 20 of hydrogen there. Westinghouse calculations indicate you

'~

/ 21 have roughly 4.2 pound molds of hydrogen at the most.

22 That corresponds to roughly five cubic feet of e 23 hydrogen at full system pressure and conditions.

24 The third source of noncondensible gasses is 25 radiolytic heat decomposition. If you no longer have ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

~~ ~'

. 439 y ,

1 hydrogen in solution, decay heat gamma rays could 2 produce -- if,you get to deep foreign uncovery i

3; . situations--- if, of course, if you rupture the fuel rods, 4 you can get the noncondensibles:from the fuel rods.

V ,

5 If you depressurize the accumulators far 16 enough, you could get accumulator nitrogen discharged into 7 the system.

8' MR. EB ERSOLE: I understand that.is stopped by 9 operator response. .

10 MR. TAUCHE: That is normally called for, yes.

11 Our calculations have indicated you would have 12 to get anywhere from 250 psi to 150, depending upon your l(j- 13 normal set point level in the accumulators before you would 14 get any_ nitrogen discharge into the coolant system. That 15 is a fairly low pressure.

16 MR. EB ERSOLE: Is the water also loaded with 17' nitrogen?

~

18 MR. TAUCHE: There is some nitrogen solution

-19 in the water. .That amounts to about.3 cc's per kilogram, 20 considerably less than what is normally in there.

21 Westinghouse calculations again for LOCA's 22- have indicated that is a relatively small contribution to

-23 the amount of noncondensibles introduced into the system.

z-

,q' 24 There is also 1 CC per kilogram introduced l 1

A_/- l

-25 through safety injection, that oxygen and nitrogen, which  !

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

440

. 1 normally goes into solution from the R W S T.

2 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.

3 MR. TAUCHE: This source of noncondensibles of 4 which there are only two which are significant.

5 (Slide.)

6 Basically, accumulator nitrogen which would be 7'- significant at low pressures and zirc water if you got to C

8 prolonged core'uncovery.

tj

/ 9 These types events where you would get the 10 significant amotint of noncondensibles would only occur in 11 ,

cases with severe inventory did he completion.

12 Under main steam line break accident you will 13 depressurize, you will get hydrogen, you in fact may get 14 some of the hydrogen out of the pressurizer coming into the 15 coolant system.

16 That, of course, could migrate to the U-tubes I? i 17 in the Vogtle plant. But the amount of hydrogen, the 18 volume that would occupy is very small at the conditions of

. 19 around 900 psi.

- 20 The amount of volume you would get has been

21. estimated to be about 22 cubic feet under a main steam line 22 break where you have depressurized on the primary reactor e 23 coolant system to around 900 psia that assumes the hydrogen 24 from solution is coming out and some hydrogen has come out

/ 25 '

of the pressurizer.

ls ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

441

~

[

~

1 In fact it assumed the draining and expansion b

LA / -2 of the pressurizer'is nothing -- nothing but hydrogen came 3 out.

4 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. ,

5 MR. TAUCHE: A very small amount of hydrogen 6 you have in the U-tube area.

7 The volume in the Vogtle plant for one steam 8 generator is 90 cubic feet. So we can envision no way this h 9 amount'of noncondensible --

10: MR. EBERSOLE: Could you clarify that point?

11 The U-tubes. .Are you talking about the volume?

12, MR. TAUCHE: Just in the U bend region.

13 MR. EBERSOLE : Where flow would be stopped?

[ J 14 MR. TAUCHE: Right.

15 MR. EBERSOLE: Above the invert.

16- MR. TAUCHE: That's right. Just in the you 17 bend region itself. .

18 MR. EBERSOLE: All right.

19 MR. TAUCHE: The normal loss of natural 20 circulation is induced by pressure drops across the tubes.

21 As you tend to. lose that pressure drop, you 22 will stop natural circulation.

23 For small break LOCA's you would have to get 10 24 almost all the U bend voided before that occurs.

25 MR. EBERSOLE: You are telling me you don't ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

442 1 . have to purge on account it never got there any way.

M

4 /

~2- MR. TAUCHE: That is one thing, yes.

3 1 01. EBERSOLE: I was following the statement 4 that you were going to purge.

5 MR. TAUCHE: What we could do.

6 (Slide.)

7 Consequences are that you lose heat transfer.

8 That could in fact inhibit some of your Delta P driving 9 noncondensibles out of.the system.

10 MR. EBERSOLE: Then you could enter counter 11 flow reflux condensation.

. 12 MR. TAUCHE: You could enter reflux 13 condensation. But the only wdy you would really get there 14 . is if you drained the system enough.

15' If you lose heat transfer, you may swell the 16 system. That tends to increase your Delta P again and 17 would tend to provide the heat transfer to the secondary 18 side you need.

19 Normally, we have observed on an analysis l

20 basis, all the tests in semi-scale we have evaluated, we

[

21 have observed that condensation only when the coolant 4

22 system is depleted to about 50 percent normal mass.

23 We don't believe in any type of steam line

! 24 event you could ever inhibit natural circulation or block l~O i-25 it via hydrogen, 5

' ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

443 1 MR. EBERSOLE: As you went down this mode with

( the PORV's would you deliberately enter enter that 2

3 condition-or go to feed bleed?

4 MR. TAUCHE: If we went down .the mode--if y ou j 5 assume you have lost natural circulation, blocked the

.6 U-tubes by some mechanism, the operator would respond to l-

~7 the emergency response guidelines when he realizes he no l l

8 longer has a heat sink by depressurizing first using the ,

l 9 PORV's to bring system pressure down. Then, if possible,

, 10 restarting the reactor coolant pumps.

. .11 The final mode, of course, make sure your 12- saf ety ' inj ection is on.

So you would enter the bleed

.13 MR. EBERSOLE:

~

14 feed mode first, then descend to the reflux condensation as p.

15 a last resort.

16 MR. TAUCHE: It would not be available if you 17 had to go to feed and plead because you don't have 18 secondary cooling.

19- MR. EBERSOLE: Of course, sure.

.20 (Slide.)

21 MR. TAUCHE: If you have massive amounts of

[ 22 noncondensibles sitting in the U-tubes where you have

[-

23 blocked , natural circulation the only real mechanism is to i

. 24 restart a reactor coolant pump. ,

25 For the other systems, you have events there.

- ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

444 1 But in the U-tubes themselves, it would require massive Q

(,) 2 amounts of noncondensibles to block natural circulation in 3 the first place. Then if you in fact wanted to move that 4 noncondensible around you would have to start a coolant 5 pump.

6 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes. So the answer basically 7 is you don't vent if you don't have the pumps. There is no 8 way to vent. .

9 MR. TAUCHE: That is true. But we don't 10 foresee any problems for that.

11 MR. EB ERSOLE: Yes, right.

12 MR. TAUCHE: I think that answers your l

7"3 13 question. Let me follow up by saying the operators do have

, V 14 guidelines.

15 (Slide.)

16 In the normal course of any event which does 17 result in depressurization of the system where you might 18 get lots of noncondensibles he tries to cool down the f 19 system.

1 20 That is where you could get into the reflux 21 cooling as well.

22 He's also instructed to try and restart the 23 pumps if he doesn't have an effective secondary heat sink.

24 Finally, if restarting the pumps doesn't work

()

25 he then goes and establishes feed and bleed type cooling. j l <

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 l

445

=-

1 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. Thank you.

.k_(I)'t . 2 MR. THOMAS: Mr. Ebersole, the seismic design 3 bases are not on the agenda.

4 However, I have some new information that is 5 somewhat related to what the NRC staff indicated about the 6 standard penetration test on the backfill. It served two 7 pur poses.

8 One was confirmatory of the very dense 9 backfill that we have.

10 MR. E3ERSOLE: Yes.

11 MR. THOMAS: There were 10 borings selected to 12 go all the way to the marl. Blow counts were taken as they

.(j- 13 proceeded down to ,the " marl, in a st'andard methodology.

14 This test was coordinated from an engineering 15 standpoint by Mr. Walter Ferris, a Bechtel soils 16 engineering and Dr. Harris Sead of the University of 17 California at Berkley.

18 Dr. Sead will assess the potential for 19 liquefaction for large earthquakes.

20 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me break in a little and 21 save you some time. It was deliberate we didn't bring up 22 size make seismic here.

23 That didn't mean you wouldn't see the topic at 24 the f ull committee meeting. I am no civil engineering, O 25 seismologist. I am a hardware man. I don't think we have ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

1 any representation here --

g h,4 2 MR. THOMAS: All right. I have a letter of 3 July 3 where Dr. Sead has assessed the liquefaction 4 potential of this site.

.5 I will summarize for you that his evaluation 6 shows that' even for magnitude 7 and a half, which is 7 greater than five-tenths G, shows clearly there is no 11 8 possibility of liquefaction occurring in this soil for any

] 9 level of ground acceleration that may develop at the Vogtle 10 site.

11 Our design bases is two-tenths G at ground 12 level.

13 MR. EBERSOLE: When you say this soil, you

~( h 14 mean this compacted -- backfill?

15 MR. THOMAS: Yes.

16 MR. EB ERSOLE : You don't mean in the region 17 outside the backfill?

18 MR. THOMAS: No.

19 MR. EB ERSOLE: You are standing as a pedestal 20 in the middle of a lot of swampy stuff.

21 MR. THOMAS: Yes. Liquef action is simply not i

22 a credible mode of failure for this fill. That is a letter 23 signed by Dr. H. Sead that I would like to have the other g- 24 ACRS members have a opportunity to read.

l (-)/

25 MR. EBERSOLE: What is the outboard margin of ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

447 1 this cylinder. that you are sitting on? Did you go out 10, aj s 2 20, 30, 40, 50 feet from the buildings?

3 MR. THOMAS: It's much farther than the

~4 buildings. The buildings sit in a group. Hundreds of feet 5 to the edge of the fill.

6 MR. EBERSOLE: You have large external --

7 MR. THOMAS: A thousand feet?

8 MR. EBERSOLE: So you compacted way out beyond 9 the normal building --

10 MR. THOMAS: Oh, yes. Far beyond all the 11 safety-related buildirigs, far beyond the fill boundaries, I 12 mean the fill boundaries far beyond the building.

[) 13 About 200 feet from the edge of the buildings.

m- .

14 So we are--I know there has been some interest expressed by 15 the ACRS. I recall on the Hope Creek ACRS meeting.

16 ,

So with this information I thought it might be 17 of interest to the other ACRS members that there is no 18 liquef action potential at Vogtle.

19 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure. We will carry it back.

20 Also give you at least the first shot at the agenda for the 21 f ull committee meeting. I am sure we will cover that topic 22 at that meeting.

23 MR. THOMAS: Very good.

24 MR. EB ERSOLE: Do you have any comments?

LJ 25 MR. WARD: No.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

448 l

1 -

MR. THOMAS: We have one other topic if you l

7^%

(,) 2 wish to get it.

i 3 Or would you prefer, we have a question here 4 about the failure of the event -- vent line. We wanted, 5 you wanted to know what the situation is at Vogtle we are 6 prepared to discuss that if you wish.

7 MR. EBERSOLE: It only came about as a result 8 of a recent event where they failed to support the vent 9 line. Or they took, as I recall, a section of pipe out and 10 didn't restore it and lost the rigidity.

11 MR. THOMAS: The hangars --

12 MR. EBERSOLE: Right. All we need to know is

() 13 that you recognize that that had happened and are covering 14 that.

15 MR. THOMAS: We do have a story to show that 16 we are in good shape in that regard.

17 MR. EB ERSOLE: I only need to mention the 18 topic.

19 MR. THOMAS: All right. E believe that 20 essentially completes what we had, unless there is 21 something we missed.

22 MR. EBERSOLE: I missed something awhile back 23 there.

24 I thought it was unusual you had on a two and O 25 three-quarter duration for the battery.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

449 1 MR. THOMAS: Actually, I guess most people use As-) 2 two hours. I think the NRC accepts two hours.

3 MR. EBERSOLE: Is that -- ,

4 MR. THOMAS: We voluntarily put in two and 5 three-quarters hours. That is what they evaluated.

6 We didn't give it to them to test, but I think 7 that is what they require.

8 MR. EBERSOLE: That is based on the thesis you 9 will always get some AC power.

10 MR. THOMAS: Yes.

11 MS. ADENSAM: I am not sure about the current 12 staff position. But I do know in past discussions that has (3 13 bcen the timeframe considered.

ul 14 I think a lot of it too goes to the stability 15 of applicant's grid.

16 MR. - EB ERSOL E : There was the proposition that 17 one would look at the diesel sets and have a graded 18 allowance depending on the reliability of the diesel 19 plants. I believe that is passe at the moment.

20 Why don't you look up the expected battery

.21 life and figure whether two hours is something we should 22 extend, which might be just nominal.

23 MR. THOMAS: Of course, they have evaluated 24 against their requirements and said it was acceptable.

25 As far as their position, there is an ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700 L

=

450 ]

l 1 unresolved safety issue potential rule on blackout which

(_) 2 could change those things.

3 But that is just in the process of 4 development.

5 MR. EB ERSOLE: Right.

6 MR. THOMAS: So under the current 7 requirements, two and three quarter hours, and with the 8 strong grid that we have in the southern system in this 9 area, we think we are in good shape, in nearby combustion 10 turbines.

11 MR. EBERSOLE: I have no further topics. Do 12 you, Dave?

() 13 MR. THOMAS: I have bleed and feed if you want 14 it.

15 MR. WARD: I don't think we need to hear any.

16 We had a little discussion af ter the meeting.

17 I guess my concern is reasonably well 18 satisfied. I think there is a better, more awareness, and 19 perhaps sensitivity to the subtleties of the issue than was 20 apparent in the presentation.

21 I would like to call your attention to rule 22 number 6 that Mr. Beckham described to us this morning, 12 23 which is in essence, follow the procedures but develop a 7- 24 questioning attitude.

'V) 25 I think this is one issue in particular which 1

r i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

~

451 1 needs to be questioned.

[i,/

s 2 It probably isn't-fair to focus, I guess, my 3 concern about the feed and bleed issue on the Vogtle 4 plants, since it's a generic issue.

/

5 It is being addressed in a NRC program, and I 6 expect to see it resolved that way.

7 As I said, I think it's something you need to 8 be sensitive to.

9 MR. THOMAS: Okay.

10 MR. EB ERSOLE: I think I can say 'cm behalf of 11- the subcommittee, myself and the other two members here, 12 that we would have no problem with expediteing the full (j 13 committee hearing.

14 We' will try to do that consistent with what 15 the ~ full committee members, they may want to look at some 16 of your paper. I am not sure.

17 That leaves us in a place where we need to 18 have a few words with you I guess about what would be 19 included in the meeting.

20 I attempted to jot down sort of a chronologic 21 coordinated presentation, based on the idea that the rest t

22 of the committee members need to know what is the plant,

! 23 what is involved and what are the issues.

I 24 I draf ted that and haven't copied it yet. I

O l 25 will ask John to get it to you.

l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

452 1 I will quickly read it.

C

!w,4

) 2 Opening statement by staff to set the stage.

3 An overview by you to give us the principal 4 design features, start up, schedules, unique plant features 5 encapsulated in one block.

6 Regional evaluation of construction history.

7 Then staff to discuss all open items, then you 8 to rebut or also pick those which you want to discuss of 9 open items. Something to say about them.

10 Then enter the management philosophy arena of 11- organization, project versus corporate support, QA, 12 training of your operators, handling of allegations,

( 13 readiness revie,w.

14 At that point enter what I call specific areas 15 like geologic, seismic, which we j ust mentioned. Hydrology 16 and flooding.

17 Then the last region is special topics which 18 is sometimes called cat and dogs.

19 It's control room, habitability, remote 20' shutdown, main, aux feedwater, fire protection, AC/DC 21 systems, compressed air, description of safety grade 22 PORV's.

23 Discussion of secondary blowdown to low

, 24 pressure, which we just got through.

25 Discussion of NRC's handling of allegations ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

453 s 1 and contact of staff's overall -- I believe that is yours, i y.

k 2 Dave. I have investigation and discussion of the rather 3 recent new concern about the cracking of cast stainless 4 ' steel, tentative.- Rather embrittling of it, for whatever 5 reason.

6 Emergency preparedness. That is about it.

7 That is as far as I have gotten in defining 8 the full committee meeting.

9 We will refine it and get it back to you as 10 soon as we chn.

11 MR. THOMAS: I appreciate it very much so I 12 can line up peoples schedules.

(} 13 MR. WARD: I guess do we have a date?

us .

14 MS. MILLER: August 8.

15 MR. THOMAS: John, do you know whether that is 16 morning or afternoon?

17 MR. McKINLEY: Not yet.

! 18 I didn't even know we had a particular day.

{ 19 As far as I knew, it was going to be the 8th or 9th. I 20 didn't know we had picked a date yet.

21 I will let you know as soon as I can. .

22 That sounds like a very ambitious schedule for 23 a four-hour session.

24 MR. EBERSOLE: That is his job to cut that to 25 a practical level.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

454 1 MR. WARD: I think four hours may be

,Sq

(-) 2 unrealistic, 3 MR. EBERSOLE: It usually is, anyway.

4 With that, I can only thank you for coming.

5 And 'I must say I think you have a very 6 conservative design. I see no problems in front of us as 7 far as I am concerned.-

8 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, very much. Thank you 9 for having our meeting.

10 MR. EBERSOLE: I adjourn the meeting.

11 (Whereupon, at 4:35, the meeting of the 12 subcommittee was adjourned.)

/T 13

'L) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 7

- 24

(_/

25 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Washington, D.C. (202) 347-3700

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

.n' t r v

~

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter ~of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

, DOCKET NO.:

q PLACE: AUGUSTA, GEORGIA LJ DATE: FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1985

  • were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of -the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Connaission.

l

( siirt ) , dd

~(TYPED) [

CRAIG L. KNOWLES Official Reporter ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Reporter's Affiliation i

O

k PLANT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION ACRS. SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 18-19, 1985 o -

GEORGE BOCKHOLD

-GENERAL MANAGER - V0GTLE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS DEPT.

[ .

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

\

r;-

i e

4 ,

k v

b , s

  1. Nh a e s s

. . s Z '

O haMs5 p s e-8=s a h s!

t I _

5E

  • s s u.i s a g a. b. 2 3  :

O s s. ag g c: s s a s eX s_

g- a5 9

) g

D $5
  • z l5 gl8 ' '

E d b. 9 g  ! __

m e w s s a '

8 11

> ba e ss s H a3 i _

Z gE g j , s s s a e g ,

_ W g agl- l

%a 4 E 4

- s s

>= d i

x a f 5'~$ 8 h ,

l l

l l

. -. -. _ - . _ .=

PLANT V0GTLE - NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

. TOTAL STAFFING (GPC & CONTRACTOR) i NO. OF PERSONNEL ACTUAL O 1288 1000 -

= 111s 3

k 900 N-N-

-\

800 -

700 --

($-

k - -\

600 - - -

s 500 - -

' S- -

\

400 - - -

( -

k - -

300 - -

200 <

-(,

100 - -

) -

JAN FEB NAR APR NAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV OEC 1985

! MONTH OF JUNE DEPMTMENT E G CONTR. 19]AL MJOR COWTRACTOR TA$rs I. OPERATIDMS AGNIMISTRATIG4 Sa 33 93 1. DCC. CONTACL / REFA00. 2. GFFICE ACilIMISTRATIG3 N.P. / CHEN. 46 35 66 1. CHEMISTRY SUPPORT 2. H.P. / CHEN. PLAN.

OPERATIONS IT6 26 239 1. OPEMTIONS PROCEDURES 2. PERSONNEL QUALIF.

RES. ConPL. 30 14 39 1. ELEC. / MECH. INSFECTION 2. TEMP. CLERICAL SPRT.

TRAININ _31 _2R _1g 1. OPERATIONS TRAINI N 2. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

~

!!. STM UP EMINEERIM 82 11T 180 1. PRE 0P PROCEO. OEVELOP. 2. TEST - SCS EMINEERS l

I MAINTENANCE 20T 99 290 1. liGRK PLAMIM GROUP 2. S/U SUPPORT (CATS)

FLUSHIM 1 40 36 1. FLUSHIM C00RD. 2. FLUSHI M PRCOS.

CAAFT SPT. _0 100 1 981 1. FLUSHIM SUPPORT (80) 2. STMTUP SUPPORT (20)

SUBTOTAL 290 355 614 III. REA0! NESS RYV. _ .R _9. . -S. 1. READINESS REVIE'J SL?PCST TOTAL NUC OPTNS 6]1 gi 1116 i PLANT V0GTLE - NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

) GVERTIE (AS A PERCENTAGE OF REGILAR TIE)

PERCENT 28 24

-20 19.33 35,73 16 14.60 15.08 12,67 JAN FEB NAR APR MAY JLW

O WORK PLANNING e

GROUP FLOW CHART o

[ srw 1->learRTon i >I APiam. !

ctatKS r-

  • lNPUTMUTPUT DATA 4- *0BTMN REQUIRED PRCDRS.

I *0BTMN REQURED IAANUALS/

  • PLANT MODE '

2 I

  • TECH. SPEC. R8 PACT DRAWINGS
  • ResnacTouwsPecut -

L_  ; .,

PRecemons/sArm >

  • eeuerunwT ca.museet _ y Iwnm: NANCE l

~

  • ADEQUATE WORK DESCRIPTION
  • DUPUCATE WORK ORDER
  • OUTEIDE SUTPORT l g.y g c. g .
  • E3TILIATE LIANHOURS
  • ESTII. TATE / RESERVE / ORDER

~'

  • SPNiE FMS
  • ASSION HOLD P00ffs 4-- FILL OUT MATERIAL REQUEST
  • IIEVEW G/NON -
  • REVIEW LtA.HTENANCE REQUEST WAltE PARTE _ LilSC. PIAUffS (BURN, CHEMICAL. ECT.)
  • PuwTnesaw enanot _

l y, l lUAINTENANCE/0PERATIONS

  • ONrRTE RWP 4 m.

.

  • REVIEW PACKAGE FOR COMPLETNESS
  • PRIORITY  !

i l

1r M

.M i

a, gT MPERVI R WJ,a"d.$$1 m =c t i

1 L

,eq NUCLEAR OPERATIONS STAFF

'" l QUALIFICATIONS I

KEY MANAGERS AND DEPARTMENT HEADS (12)

  • ALL WITH B.S. DEGREES
  • 5 WITH ADVANCED DEGREES
  • 108 YEARS COMBINED NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE CURRENT TOTAL DEPARTMENT STAFFING NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE MANAGERS 3 39 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 15 70 ENGINEERING 68 279 MAINTENAN.CE 159 314

'd HEALTH PHYSICS 12 70 CHEMISTRY 12 39 QUALITY CONTROL 20 100 TRAINING 27 134 OPERATIONS SUPT 1 10 OPERATIONS SUPERVISORS 7 80 OPERATIONS ENGINEERS 5 24 SHIFT SUPERVISORS 16 74 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISORS 11 .62. '.

REACTOR OPERATORS 57 138 OPERATORS 19

  • 18 TOTAL 432 1,451 O

Q EDUCATION OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS.

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT BACHELORS DEGREES ADVANCED DEGREES ENGINEERING- 68- 7 OPERATIONS 42 2 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 12 1 HEALTH PHYSICS / CHEM. 18 6 MAINTENANCE 12 -

QUALITY CONTROL 3 -

-TRAINING 15 5

... MANAGERS 3 -

'Q- .

TOTAL- 173 21 0F THE 173 BACHELOR'S DEGREES, 127 ARE ENGINEERING DEGREES

- AND 32 MORE ARE TECHNICAL OR SCIENCE RELATED, OF THE 21 ADVANCED DEGREES,'4 ARE DOCTORATES, 17 ARE ENGINEERING OR TECHNICAL RELATED, y  %

O

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION STATUS PER REG GUIDE 1.8/ ANSI 18.1-1971 NO WHICH WILL BE ANSI 18.1 TITLE NO PERSONNEL QUALIFIED IN SEPT 1986 PLANT MANAGER 3 3 OPERATIONS MANAGER 1 1 TECHNICAL MANAGER 2 2 MAINTENANCE MANAGER 1 1 SUPV NOT REQUIRING LICENSE 70 70 SUPV REQUIRING LICENSE 23 23 ENGINEERING PERSONNEL 78 78 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR 11 11 LICENSED REACTOR OPERATOR 57 57 HP/ CHEMISTRY TECHNICIAN 6 -

6 I & C TECHNICIANS 36 29

({)

MECHANIC 31 31 ELECTRICIAN 48 48 QC SPECIALIST 16 16 NON-LICENSED OPERATORS 19 19 402 395 89% OF STAFF C0VERED BY ANSI 18.1 PRESENTLY MEET THE SPECIFIED EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS,

.98% WILL HAVE REQUIRED EXPERIENCE BY FUEL LOAD DATE.

()

1 L..

'0L OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

(]) QUALIFICATION HIGHLIGHTS STAFF

SUMMARY

SUPERVISORS (24)

- 10 with previous PWR licensed experience

- 4 with previous BWR licensed experience

- 13 with >6 months hot participation experience 15 with NRC-SR0 instructor certification VEGP -

- 18 hold B.S. degrees in Engineering or related science SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISORS (11)

- 6 with BWR STA experience (Plant Hatch)

() - 3 with > 6 months hot participation experience 3 with NRC-SR0 instructor certification on VEGP

- All hold B.S. degrees in Engineering or related science REACTOR OPERATORS (57)

- 1 with previous BWR licensed experience

- 21 with >3 months hot participation experience ON-SHIFT EXPERIENCE PROGRAM

- Industry Working Group report to NRC Commissioner by J. H. Miller Jr. (Feb.1984) and resultant generic letter 84-16

- Extensive hot participation experience program (Farley, V.C. Summer and Sequoyah)

, -)

- On-shift experience at VEGP during Initial Test Program

i MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT EXPERIENCE 1Q

~

. HIGHLIGHTS ,

v i

STAFF-

SUMMARY

SUPERINTENDENT'(1) i B.S. Electrical Engineering

-- 10 years nuclear experience

~ Participated in construction / testing / start-up i af Hatch SUPERVISION (32)

- 138 years nuclear experience l 348 years maintenance related experience MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING (8)

A 1 W th B.S. degrees n Engineering O

- 20 years nuclear experience MECHANICS / ELECTRICIANS (79)

- 82 years nuclear experience l

- Over 500 years of power plant maintenance experience l

- All are Journeyman INSTRUMENT a CONTROL TECHNICIANS (35)

All have A.A. degree or 2 year technical degree i l

- 47. years nuclear' experience- .

4 O

___..__-..-_--_.-i_

PLANNED MAINTENANCE PROGRAN

/

  • PROOMNINIERPGMTE&

(e) MANUFACTORS RECONNEPOATIONS (b) PREYl0US EXPERIENCE / FIELD YALIDATION/lHDUSTRY PRACTICE (c) EQUIPMENT QUAllflCATION REQUIREMENTS

  • THE PROCEDURE ALLOYts FCR PR0eRN1 MColTICATICH TO E!3WG EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY.
  • PROOMM USES CONSTRUCTION PM REQUIREMENTS UNTIL SUPERYl50R APPROYES THE USE OF THE OPEMil0NN. PM.

D .

PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

  • Yl8 RAT 10NNW.YSISPROC4#1 f (a) TRENDING TO FORECAST POTENTIAL PROBL EMS (b) DETECT RE-ASSEMBLY ERRORS ,

! (c) DIADNOSE EQUIPMENT PR00LEMS (d) IDENTIFY FUTURE REPLACEMENT PARTS EEDED

  • LUBECllAELYSSPROGRAN l

l (e) DETECT PREMATURE DEGRADATION / CONTN11tMTICH (b) DETERMINE PEED TO FLUSH LU8E Olt SYSTEM

! (c)lDENTIFY BEARING WEAR (d) EVALUATE OIL OIANGE SOfDULE

  • IWRAREDNMLYSS PROCRAN O (e) IDENTIFY LOOSE ELECTRICAL CClNECTIONS (b) DETECT CABLE DEGRADAT10N (c) DtA0 NOSE MOTOR HOT SPOTS i

i, CORPORATE SUPPORT 4

n ACRS SUBCGIRITTEE EETIliG

* 85 O .

.4 J. T. ECKHAM, JR.

VIE-PRESIENT AND GEERAL PUUGWiER .

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS EOR 6IA POER COPFANY . .

d t5 8 e

0 0

0

O O

O i Offsite Organization and Management

l. Back0round utility Information A. OPC General Facts B. Conoration Facilities C. Nuclear Operating Experience l 1. Facilities .

e

2. Vo0tle Electric Generating Plant II. Organization A. GPC Corporate Organization B. GPC Nuclear Operation Organization
1. Experience and Education Levels
2. Responsibilities
3. Technical Support Resources
4. Safety Revicw Programs
a. SafotY Roview Board
b. Indopondent Saloty Engineering Group e

e

- s

s .

1 O

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY GENERATION FACILITIPE (

UN1TS TYPE  % OF TOTAL 2 NUCLEGR UNTE57 ~ 11.0 % .

M F C M IL UIlia d 75.8 %

70 HYDRO RiFCERfC Bi'f.!2rs &9 *. !T l

O M

@MBUSIINE TURBE/E v'W113 8.2 % .

)

e O

60

l . .

O GEORGIA POWER COMPANY \

  • WHOLLY - 0WNED SUBSIDIARY OF TRai" l

SOUTHERN COMPANY

" PUBLIC UTILITYINMRPORATEZF UNDER lie IA WS OF THESIAM GFG%?nGIA

  • ENGAGED IN THE GENM7 ION, O

DISTRIBUTION, AND SAIE GF RLRCTRICITY ATRETAIL Iff 616 CITIESi AND COMMUNITIM AND AT WHOLFSAI2 TO 50 MUNICIPAUTIE5i AND 39 RURAL ELECTRIFICATIONADMINISTRATION COOPERATIVB O

O VOGTER JOINT OWNKPS UN1TS 1 & 2

. GEORGIA POWER CtMtPANY 45.7 g i

OGIETEORPE POWB CC12fEFBATION 30.0 %

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC Aur****'Y OF GA. 27 7 %

CITY OF D#1 TON, GEORGIA 1.6 %

O -

e W

O

O V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT GEORGIA POWER COMAM ISBE!?PONSIBLE FOR HIE DESIGN, CONuiEUC17015 AND OPERA 270N OF TIZE PIANZ. GPC ACIS AS O Assur FOR TIZE OTHER CO - OWNERS.

O i

O

.,,--.rv---.e- , ,,- , - - . , . ,-,,, .--s, - . . , , ,

4 O

CORPORATE NUCLRAR OPRRATIONS STAFF e

EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION I.EVELS

, (PRESENT STAFA' , = .?? ) .

(.iULY 1, 1985)

O ggggga op oggpg BACCAIJ1HREATE .?3 MAb1ERS_

4 e

M' ANYEARS OF ENGINEERING EXPERIENCE 466 O

. ~

O O O

)

General Office Organization Clialtitialt of 1110 Board tiltd Chle! Executivo officer

, lh W. Uclierer President J. H. Millor Jr.

Executive Vice Executive Senior Executive President and Vice President Vice President Vice President General Manager Power Supply Division Operations Finance H. G. Baker Jr. R. J. Kelly J. A. Gantt Jr. W. Y. Jobe i

l I

~

0 0

h I

4

~

i Power Supply 4

i Executive Vien President R. J. Kolly 4

Senior Vice Senior Vice -

. Senior Vice President President President Nuclear Operations Fossil & Hydro Power

R.E.Conway J. P. O'Reilly G.F.Hoad Vice President Vice President &

Engineering & General Manager Construction Services Quality Assurance R. H. Pinson P. D. Rice I

==

Y

O . O O Nuclear Operations General Office Staffing i

Br. V.P.

Nuclear Oper.

J. P. O'Malliy 4

i Asst. to Sr. V.P. Exec. Soc.

i . (Vacant) L. Boazioy l

V.P. & Gen. Mgr.

, Nuclear Oper.

J. T. Beckham l l  ;

~l Manager Manager Manager Nuclear Manager Nuclear Nuclear Training Nuclear Support Performance J. J. Badgett Safety & Licensing T. McHonry L. T. Gucwa

&M ^"

Ma 's sbnA*

O

' ~

O _ O O y,p, 3 Nuclear Operations General. Mgr. General Office Staffing Nuclear Oper.

Asst. lo V.P. St 800.

~

.._L_ l . . _ .

Gen. Mattinget unti. Mattager HATCil V00tLB OPBHAtl0N8 OptHAtl0NS l . I I I Eng eer ng Radi o cal

( & Modi on ij 11 til l g sed,ll ,

Sec. ll Sec. ll ~---

Soc ll

_l_.. . _ . .

._ I .._ . _ _ _ _ _ . . l l Ildfdll Ettgr. Pto). Mgr. Radiological Nuc. Emer.

Lidlsoft Vogtle Engr. Sr. Nuc. En0r. Engr. Scr. I Safety Plan Supv.

Liaison (outago Supervisor (908) plannin0) 566teldry (SCS) Sr. Nuc. Engr. Sr. Rog. Spec.

(909) En0r. (SCS) 1 Health Phy.

Sr. Nuc. Engr. 2$

r, Ettgr, (908) I'"

mo 1f.) 'Nuc. Engr. ' Engr.

~

Nukupv.

Sr.En0r. Nuclear Nuclear Engr.

Assoc. Engineer u . _ _ _ _ _ _

O O O r .

Safety Review Board Execullve Vice Presidelit Power Bupply g- -- p- -e- =mme> -.+6

_sw,,m,__m_ -m-

+Ww -

hm-9h Vies Prosidont Hatch SRB "'

01ornt ns v00II0 Ok0 '

~

Chairman Ollaltmat)

Vice-Chairman Vloe>0haltmati and attd 7 members Vice President 7 members

& General Manager Nuclear Operations

  • General Manager General Manager Nuclear Nuclear .

Operations Operations Hatch Vogtle 4

gge..

d

O O O INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP .

SR. V.P.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS UANAGER NucLEAft PERFoltMANCE as

! ANALYSIS i

NUCLEAR ENGINEER SUPERVICOR (PERFORMANCE) NUCLEAR SAFE 1Y CORPORATE SITE HATCH V00TLE l ENGINEEllS ENGINEERS l

O

~

MANAGOBIT PHILOSOPHY l

l l

ACRS SUES.LswrilltI.i1. rWIE6 O m I8 81S N l

J. T. BECKHAM, JR. '

VIE-PRESIDENT AND ENERAL PUUfAER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

, EORGIA P0ldER C0&ANY 1

i j .

i i O I

i

O O O .~l 1

I i

i Management Philosophy ,

it is the policy of the Georgia Power Company:

l l A. To make nuclear safety the first priority in the construction and operafion i of nuclear generating plants. .

i D. To remove the plants from service when~ safe operation is not ensured. .

l C. To report accurately and timely all necassary matters concerning nuclear

safety and plant operations to the people of Georgia and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

D. To meet the requirements of the NRC in the construction and operation

of nuclear generating plants.

E. To maintain management review and control over plant construction and '

operation to ensure safety and reliability.

,I i

I i

1 k j

' I

,e

f , . , ,

I O

n.

iy w g

w l

l e s as r

o nn n l i

o o n o s i

w s )i w l e e ie a Otc e b r t c Pu r i

v e d a cn e n t

n e Nt r n o u ( s I

f a h f s m n s n o w ba o n o o c l

e a l os r s c e J r re i

v i

t a

r o

o i t

c n it n rf p n e pce a et e r

u r o ha p p s t m e One y r e n h s id h

p ho en .

a p l e t

o rl el o

~

o ti ra t w t

n et a nl t

s wc ox s or o a ner e .

o f e l l p o> g Pe s s

mp t

- l o a r sl eJ o r

r a . ao n rf e sl a i) hd a rd s a e pr n ts l cd p Pe u gn e r

l c t e im ei s ur o

r a u Na0 O t n ni t en pn s u

o n .

l nh at o p

dl t y i

f nt dn i ei o p x

f o bs n nr ao o a ar m c(o esen ri t ct o nu c l t e f o fd pl a t e

g ar r n f

aj t e gan gu t ut se a us t o sv n ng ieg t

n ss n oc i

t a et t c i i ,

nsc ie t r a

shr nga a a i d ae up i

ai r s r

e w I

ehlie M t yt n

a r qs t y nl o he uc

. i ee gh ee t ht hn l

ala l e dr np gb up n ar i ief o t

q g oht rd wv i

n n e a an o ah gl na e n a en i s r

t oeh l

cl ei tho tt uc e s. nn e ua act ra i

a oep pt i

ai dn nc e r pm i i ys td ien i i v pt c poe r

rn el i o y, ea ot p ai kC e af mia i

l rt pe kp er oro ce cd d d oR f

Ta on TN ou Tq Ts oa Ta os orn Toa F G H 1 J K O

! i4 9 i !I  !,

.l(!! !1 l j !!  !;! 4

~

Q S- .

.~

Ten Rules of Plant Operation

1. Know the procedure system well enough to be sure you are using the right procedure.
2. Follow procedures.
3. In an undefined condition, place equipment in a safe condition per procedure. -
4. Remember that in an emergency a licensed SRO can change the intent of a procedure to prevent injuries, to prevent excessive equipment damage, and to protect the core. _,
5. Uphold your individual responsibilitlos under all circumstances as defined by procedure.
6. Develop a questioning attitude but execute procedures correctly.
7. Place safefy in every circumstance above continuity of operation.
8. If it's not covered by a procedure, let safety dictate the action. Also see #1.
9. When you think of better ways to do things initiate procedure changes.
10. Make adherence to procedures a'way of life.

l l

I l

O ,

O O .

THE BIG PICTURE i

DESIGN PROCESS AND CONSTRUCT i

l i

l -_ -_

OPERATE PROCESS -

F E

4 E

D i MONITOR PROCESS B A

i C

! K i

l CORRECT PROCESS I

l

(

a

O FITNESS FOR DUTY

~

ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

-O JULY 18 & 19, 1985 J. T. BECKHAM, JR.  ;

VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER l NUCLEAR OPERATIONS GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  !

O

. -- ._ .~.

O .

.o o -

I j

I i

Fitness for Duty i

1

! 1. Overview

11. Key Elements of an Effective Program A. Clear, Written Policy on Drug and Alcohol Abuse

' B. Fitness for Duty Training and Behavior Observation C. Policy Guidelines for Supervisors D. Employee Assistance Programs f

' E. Health and Safety Information F. Co-Worker involvement j G. Top Management Support H. Contractor Notification

' i. Law Enforcement Liaison J. Union Briefing 111. Results Achieved 1l

O O O Fitness For Duty-GPC Employees i

Psychological April 30,1984-June 15,1985 Number of Employees Tested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 Number cleared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 Nu mber Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Tota l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402

  • Drug Screening April 30,1984-June 15,1985 Number of Employees Tested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 -

1 N u m ber Pa ssed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . 31 9 Number Failed / Separated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 l Number Falled/Not Hired . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 l Nu mber Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1

! Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 27 i

l

  • Note: In September 1985, Nuclear Operations will Drug Screen approxi-j mately 266 employees who came to work at Vogtle before the Fitness for Duty Program started.

i t

e

, ..e-

o' o o -

Fitness For Duty-Contractors Psychological January 1,1985-June 15,1985 Number of Employees Tested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 N u m ber clea red . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 Number Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 Drug Screening ,

January 1,1985-June 15,1985 Number of Employees Tested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496 Nu mber Pa ssed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477 Number Failed / Separated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Number Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Tota l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496 I

h

O UNIQUE PLANT FEATURES ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 18-19, 1985

.O 0 ZEN BATUM-GENERAL MANAGER PROJECT ENGINEERING & LICENSING l

SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES l

l lO 1

I l .

\M VEGP l

_1 I 8

l0 l0 v m

    • UMM i N'."JIMO Il S .! an-:ee A O ran. + i + _ 31- si:<

t (

b echa#On&M a* 42AOE M  !*h One teO'aC .

k[

'8

' MJ .1 1, AJh

  • i i /

r" g

e M

i- a- ,r. an- y g ]E nib EY Fj G.e,=*!' V r ,x p g m =m, uo._ __

z -= ,

N'@ O

_e,..,

'w*~ 1 ep L. (-

- 3t=

/ ,, I f t 12 2.En.

pe-sta ri 7' ,,,- ).

..g e-i. . ;. "-P

-m .

h

\

s-i Nit -ww) e.s.o.~ ,

i',-p ".

  • C -

P t g

,,'} *a.- < S

  • g g I <-.....

V w.ro

~ ' '

~

v '

y te . 5h_.

m~ m j

_ g= i ___

Au st u A GN I *s3 J ' Ce $*

r 8 .

{% .

  • 3 s o -e-( i ' t- '"- ein w34  ?

m-,

3 Q [-Lr,.

, 1 i,s Q  %- . m.

s -. -

Tn.tu

>1 s

@h Q r*V-* 4. ll je, 3 h h .. E'.tecste " 5-".*./.b W'.te gc. 3 lli / @@,

4 m * *:a"i -

$$ 8 g .

I hh i 1',

W && l 1 & ~' , -. . , ,' 3 ~_'*e*:*o* *r[_,.e .

ns:w w..v

-/ ,-' pw. e .

i p r

.'.r.

c=~wu.s:s Q y,R }

r.st, J, pc. , .::.:4-** .

(

llf &-u.3s l i :im .. =

,.... . eD s. _I l g u r.

e : .':  : d

, f, ' k.t -

.spil m g +

S'.Cs.. i i, e I ,, ***9.?*

u l.

g".j l (d\ _0.,_ ,

g v

1

, x! .

.m, e . 4r .

l l

. c 1

O O O 1

VEGP 'l i

]

NSCW TOWERS l:

i

  • ONE TRAIN OPERATES DURING ALL MODES OF OPERATION l

i e WATER VOLUME IN THE BASINS MEETS THE VOLUME 1

i REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.27 -

  • EACH TRAIN CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING:

) ONE FORCED DRAFT COOLING TOWER WITH FOUR CELLS '

i I i j ONE COOLING TOWER BASIN (WATER STORAGE SUPPLY) l THREE 50% CAPACITY PUMPS .

i 1 ONE TRANSFER PUMP

I c VEGP U)

NSCW COOLING TOWERS 1 A AND 1B GENERALARRANGEMENT 7

O 9

.- pp- .

,a

./

  • .I. ll .ll b

, .'s

    • h N . e= e-l

" J,. e w

,/ , [j ,. ' ! .) fi:)l /

'?

..,..___a.,n:-

~

- d;g  ; ~=

, . .h:: ' . .,

'- ,' .)

<-. ,: =-- :.s .w: :E}&:.-.:.=.=:iG -- Gn-*C,

$ I

\

,d

/

n k ^*IO;7bh Mt  %;L:d

,yj

',:.=.- = ,

Q*

= ='-  ;~

...s

.\ Ji n/

l ,}

m=

7% .

/ '

N PL A N 4 7 FAh! CECK a.. gno o uo e M.*~ 1 *r -? *** ,. N~ *"

ii il 4 .

n _. . .c a-I- -

-,e r rea,3_ _

.,,..- / d ,.....N';.;; ;;.d ;;.; ;;;.;;;;,;;.; U ** ,

. ==:--  ;' n:: r.

!!  : m

- . ..u s -: -

- p;&' y f

i i

^

ag ,

. i ~( I,!

i

--- h, . : .: : :.,' n r a--

i ! ~ ----

w '

i

.-ns== u.-sssr.-

l1w! -

m y ~a>eWF

.e .e t*

g,_ a,* i I I; *

  • s i .

u4

a. me. s i

s a s. t i '> ,

. .I

  1. k yb 880est e66 e el ,

0 telt 5 4gl' g M u-9 M p-D g

  • e g4g8 9 g 9 6 6+4'I  %

t 9 . ge e t 6 44i4 e a et -t

- ****-'*B- A 43 4 99 p Y Y & q t

Q * * .

WEST Et.G VA TION l

D

-O vece TYPICAL CROSS SECTION OF NSCW TOWER

. - i l n -

IR DISCHARGE EL.250'-11' l I v

BOTTOM OF ELIMINATORS EL.242'-5'

m 1; ,, m m

/

SPRAY HEADER O -

m - -m

--m g -

Et.23e'-s'

-u - - w - - -

TOPOF SPLASH RING E L. 232' 6"

~

( N TOP OF BOTTOM AIR INTAKE OF . E L. 230* 3" AIR FILL INTAKE EL. 230'-9' i.

l 5

EL. 217'-9' HIGH WATER LEVEL

(

w 9

O O O .

4

. VEGP AUXIL ARY EE WATER NOZZLE

  • FLOW THROUGH THE MAIN FEEDWATER N0ZZLE IS INITIATED AFTER
REACHING ABOUT 18% REACTOR POWER l

1

o VEGP o>

MODEL F STEAM GENERATOR STE AM OUTLET W/ FLOW HESTRICTOR l l

[ .

I SECONDARY STE AM

, SEPARATORS

[

SECONDARY MANW AYS d 3 n~ -

A ,La -

l

,. PRIMARY SEPAR ATORS 8 ELOn ATER INTRODUCED THROUGH iM EdTED J TUBES FEEDWATER RING d ,-

F E E DW A TE R IN LE T --+-Q

.. ~

,=

. -i..' Nh,-:

l AuxlLI ARY FEEDW ATER NOZZLE

\

C' I

/^s ANTIVl8R ATION SARS

\r , r UTUSES

[i

):

WR APPE R I

g SROACHED TUBE y SUPPORT PL ATES FLOW OISTRIBUTION SAFFI,E FLOW SLOCKERS ,

Y Y A i TUBE SHEET HLOWOOWN PIPE & CONNECTION  :~

OlVIDER PLATE  :  : COOLANT CHAMBER O

i  !

's -] PRIMARY COOLANT NOZZLE  :

PRIMARY MANW AYS l

l I

VEGP FE WAT R PIPING O

STEAM GENERATOR 6" 16" -

N /

1 7- l IRC v 1RC l

ORC ORC y/ k! P BYPASS 6" FEEDWATER ISOLATION M AIN 16" FEEDWATER 4" AUXILIARY 4 ISOLATION v'FEEDWATER LINE /- .-

E/H / VALVE 6" BYPASS i l p

FEEDWATER LINE GRADE PIPING FORGING o _ _ I 6"

%g .-

B31.1 p PIPING BYPASS ( F31 IWAVER V C0YTQ. JM E 16" 6"

\MAIN 16" FEEDWATER

% CONTROL VALVE

) h O ~

o' o o

.l VEGP

, CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING- TO SELECTION -

0F VOLVME REDUCTION OPTION

. e UNCERTAINTY OF BURIAL-SITE AVAILABILITY NATIONWIDE IN THE FUTURE e DUE TO POSSIBLE BURIAL SITE UNAVAILABILITY VOLUME REDUCTION CAPABILIT( ,

WAS ADDED '

i i e MINIMIZE SHIPMENT OF WASTE WITil FREE WATER -

, e INCREASED TRANSPORTATION AND BURIAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH GREATER VOLUMES OF WASTE IF NOT VOLUME REDUCED i

i j

i I

4 1 g

O O O e

]

.VEGP REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) i e RWST IS REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURE WITH STAINLESS STEEL LINER o

RWST AND TANK PENETRATIONS ARE TORNADO MISSILE-PROOF

, e NOMINAL RWST VOLUME OF 730,000 GALLONS ACCOMMODATES:

i I -

OPERATING BAND DELIVERING A MINIMUM 0F 300,000 ' GALLONS TO CONTAINMENT SEMI-AUTOMATIC SWITCHOVER VALVE AND PUMP MANIPULATIONS i -

SINGLE FAILURE INSTRUMENT INACCURACIES G

9 1

~

3 VEGP Um RWST SIZING

, tN5106

\ _ OUTSIDE OFTANE OFTAME LNLET OF OV ER PLOW PtPT k HIGH LEVEL \ INETptJedENT ERMOM ALARM SET POINT j ALLOWANCE WATER LOSE OR THERMAL EXPANSPON ANO CONTRACT?ON 4r ALLOWANCE LOW LEVEL INETpuesENT ERROR ALAmed SET POI 8(T \ o ALLOWAdeCE

' MINIMUM INJECTION di

= > QUANTITY PRIOR TO

= OPENING ECC*. SUMP e 2 ISOLATION VALVES g , q (300A00 god NCRMAL INJECTION CUANTTTY PRIOR O

a

g TO OPENING ECCS SUMP ISOLATION g g VALVES (345.216 gad

$ 4 0 m .

5 $

i bJ j d

5 =1 d j Low LCw LEVEL u j $ ' .- ALARM SET PotNT j \ 'b 2

O E

U E 2 OUANTITY ALLOWED

~

\

2 b 3 POR AUTCMAT1 CALL NORMAL TRANEFER

[3 $

C g

OPENseoG ECCS SUMP ISOLATICM VALVES

.6m,qiesynagaggag WMU MC22 M TR ANS FE R VOLUME g j IMM WI FOR ECCS SuvlTCHOVER ,

< j INCLUOf 88G StNGLE y y j ACTIVE F AILUR E SINGLE ACTIVE

> > t1407J2 god FM LUM E 2 4 '

(37,0e8 Wl 3 w x ,6 "I

j g EMPTY LEVEL i , INSTRussENT ERROR _i 2 3 ALARM SET POINT ' i ALLOWANCE 2

2 CONTAINe*ENT 2 SPR AY PUtr5 MANUAL

, SwtTCHOVER

,, VOLUe8E

/

,- /

i Noygy / ,

} VORTEX SUPPRESS 3ON ALLostANCE NOTE 2 , ' --

,1 UesuSASLE VOLUe4! SELOW PfrE INLET

/- :/:.  :-:::/ /. :u:/://:/: .

\ GRADE ELEV

% IN. FLOOR Pt.AT E O NOTES:

\_ 1. MAX ORAW OOWN LEVEL

2. BOTTOM OF SUCTION PtPt i

4 O O O. .

w VEGP MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES [MSIVs?

1 l

  • TWO VALVES IN SERIES ON EACH STEAM LINE, ONE POWERED FROM EACH TRAIN l

EACH VALVE IS PROVIDED WITH AN ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC ACTUATOR

!

  • EACH MSlV IS(1UALIFIED FOR OPERATION IN THE POSTULATED MSLB ENVIRONMENT

!

  • MSlVs CLOSE IN 5 SECONDS

!

  • MSIVs ARE TESTABLE AT POWER BY PARTIAL CLOSURE l

i

.. O O .O .

MAIN STEAM SYSTEM

,.. -- ~~,,

i '

A 0 B A < ,

', hd I

,e i, TURBINE STOP VALVES OOOO i

4 8 A 'i ,e

  • A I k Mk Ik I k

! gggy g \ ,e' MS W ' S s, ,

\ '

CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY 1

l

!- 3/v

g:q ,

' ~

i .; '

v t s

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT

-0UALITY CONCERN PROGRAM 7

)

,h

=- ' ' i PROGRAM INTRODUCED 12/83'  !

i o ~ ALTERNATIVE  !

CONFIDENTIALITY / ANONYMITY .

  • - EMPHASIS fl DO " GOOD" WORK .!
i. kh.-  :

.  ; REPORT " BAD" WORK

  • i MILLER LETTER  ;

j NRC'-

i 1

m.  %

1 l

i

4 j

O l VICE PRES 40ENT & VICE PRESIDENT &

GENERAL MANAGER - PROJECT GEMMAL QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER F. D. RICE D.O. FOSTER I

I l DEPUTY l- PROJECT GENERAL l MANAGER W. T. NICKERSON l

I l

~~~-~~~~~-~] QUALITY ASSURANCE DIRECTION PROJECT DIRECTION l

i (O/ l QUALITY CONCERNS STEERING COGNMTTEE Q ALI ONCERNS O

& REV W QUALITY CONCEANS MANAGER CORPORATE REVIEW COtnelTTEE QUALITY CONCERNS SCREENiMG COMMITTEE ADMINISTRATION _

INVESTIGATION ANO OOCUMENTATION INVESTIGATION QCP STAFF QCP INVESTIGATION ENTITIES 4

Figure J2-1 Quality Concern Program Organization O

e s N

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT i QUALITY CONCERN PROGRAM FUNCTI(N RECEIVE CONCERN CONTACT SUBMITTER SCREEN QUALITY /NON-QUALITY REPORTABILITY INVESTIGATE CONTACT SUBMITTER CLOSE O LEGAL REV EW REPORTABILITi QCM STEERING COMMITTEE CORPORATE REVIEW COMMITTEE

-t.

6 e

) ,

.f-QUALITY CONCERN STATUS (GPC) \

O STATUS DATE: JULY 2, 1985  !

TOTAL'0UALITY CONCERNS 404 INVESTIGATIONS COMPLETE 326 UNDER INVESTIGATION 78 APPROVED BY STEERING COMMITTEE 279 b O O

. 2- ,

)

QUALITY CONCERN PROGRAM t .

  • SQUARE COPING 0F STRUCTURAL MEMBERS FOR HANGERS DISCOVERED O AND CORRECTED: CRAFT AND SUPERVISION RETRAINED.
  • INSUFFICIENT PIPE TO HANGER CLEARANCES CORRECTED ON LARGE DIAMETER, HIGH TEMPERATURES LINES.

l

  • A LUG FOR #2 CONDUCTOR TO FIT A STATES CO. TERMINAL BLOCK WAS FOUND AND UNNECESSARY CABLE CONNECTIONS ELIMINATED,
  • AN INCOMPLETE, BUT ACCEPTED REPAIR ON AN A.S.M.E. CODE LINE LINEAR INDICATION WAS IDENTIFIED AND CORRESTED.

O -

r i

lO

I

' Acute 2. Scz 299A AttacIEnnt il Waynescoro. Georga 30830 feeecrece 4C4124 8M 4

) 404 554 996i O * * *

February 12, 1985 TO ALL PERSONS INVOLVED WITH THE V0GTLE PROJECT In June of 1979 and again in July of 1983, notices were issued which covered your r ig ht s and obligations and our expectations and requirements with respect to the safety and quality of activities on the Vogtle Project. This letter updates those items and reinforces our commitment to safety and quality.

You are employed or retained because you possess talents, skills and experience which are positive assets to the Vogtle Project, and you are important to our success. Your notifying Georgia Power Company of any conditions that you detect or suspect are adverse to either safety or quality is part of the service which_y.ou are expected to render. In return, you have a right to be heard, and you deserve a considered response to any expressed concerns.

Please notify your immediata Supervisor if, at any time, you O observe or justifiably suspect any work or other operations that are not in ace'ordance with approved procedures, or which are contrary to established quality, safety, regulatory requirements, or good engineering practices. With the knowledge that you are carrying out not only my personal directive, but also the documented objectives of Georgia Power Company, you may bring your concerns to the attention of the Quality Assurance Department, the Quality. Concern Program or higher line managers, myself included, if you feel that your concerns.are not being resolved through normal channels.

If, for any reason, you are hesitant to contact your immediate supervisor, you may and should contact the next higher level of management, the Quality Assurance Department or the Quality Concern Program. On site, you should contact the site Quality Assurance Manager, E. D. Groover at ext. 23 4 , o r t'he Quality Concern Manager, L. B. Glenn 'at ext. 3294. M r.<Glenn can

, 'also be reached, toll free, at 1-800-225-2055. In the corporate office, you should contact the Vice President and General ' Manager of Quality Assurance, Mr. P. D. Rice, at 404-526-7080. Of course, 4

any of the above contacts can be made anonymously if you prefer.

-l

' However, items which are submitted with your name will be answered in writing indicating the disposition of the matter.

O

- - - - , - . , - , . . - - . _ , . , _ - - , _ - - - - - - - - - - - - n.--,_..---,,.,--,.., - . - - - - - , . - - _ - - - -

L f -

Continuation Page Two O

l While working on the Vogtle Project, you should feel an obligation to provide Georgia Power with the first opportunity to address any concern you may have. However, you may also feel free '

to bring matters affecting health and safety of the public, compliance with regulations and requirements, quality, security, or safety to the attention of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). The USNRC's Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement, located in Atlanta, GA. (telephone 404-221-4503), will accept collect calls twenty-four hours a day. Of course, you may also contact the resident USNRC Inspector on site (telephone no. 404-554-9901 or 404-554-9902).

Georgia Power Company is committed to constructing and operating Vogtle in compliance with all safety and quality requirements. Since you are involved with Vogtle, it is your responsibility and obligation te assist Georgia Power in meeting that commitmenc by informing us of any and all conditions which might prevent such compliance.

o_

H. 'ler, c.

T d

O l

l -

- - - - , - e~ ---,.nn_,n..-,,v. ,

~.e I -

sb.d 4 WF A b 7/i4/ss .

^^^^*

?A ^ _^ ,_

M% . _

I

. . u e~=s- -

't. t u k Nc6 Q ' i;L d * 't A .G l h >cd

-t-4 pp  :-c

! sss w ) a& s a % [L p n ._.a. k auAm au pueau.r-

. p& r Y - - u r a c a n u . n a y w + m.&

, & Aa m, b/ ande .d nf as.LJ n '7 c a ts m a s. y . y i<yx&. -

J

,Jaaa a A 4..o a k . A. A . y . M ig.

dlar oce ma.J. y,b y + A 6v A L tbJ ,s shdd f pqu6jJ/dbyaf kL. U>ua m4 Lesat'Is/aL.p d- w. 64

, u I

pa . 9u.D %J L Acas La ' ,u.ua/4. e fu ad.a

& &y u4ut.J D J bk L0.dNth n >s+f ,% y .eg438*:---A,a *i A.. h,

.J y A tcdx ac/2+.9- O .#.nga .

n a.s ~ -a p'.c . . A ac. e. ,,

e n.

a-, nns n

, a. Lu.o n ( FLES'I , f. 4 y). M" W .l~ L ca.JA4.

' h,A.. Js. f 1 a y a g a -}- ) % .. y , y l u%aJ b.~.h, wkk

. s 4 ap >) M G . Q: . . . . .. A r.

, f. an nay m a. .s>>L. ,&- J ks.<41et

' sgP , & a~ s u h.s yn~

ata e.

' w A.Lk

.4% L au u A. Q @ m t . G A 4 c r : &

A .m r, 4 u.~ Asu. m ga t eL J a.J. % . L A .d.

hy w'aa). L ~ . 1 . C

.A ,a #

~

w e , .JL @*c

  • . fm . . . . - . . . .

eee ..ee..

.c ag

. .~

+ . .___ ._

s l

l-r.

~ .. 4 .. .. .- - . . . . .

.. - 1.ht**.IAn M kA. % & nof. . . . . . .__ daiQ n 4 & JJ % f4 nA=

f' A *^4 E

Ip go <46. J4- Mk.%_4A ""# N I g; M. aR 4.A umuus,aD a y k W __ ss p m n).h. NLc n % y (au M . A<. .....W). .

CaAJ A & J ,cu d. . 4k SR hoi &

Tm fJdri. o . L q j %.;==y 1.M %A.

v Q Ccl. eROh- im), aJ.J y %twJ h'u a.

l pkh A% % w< cul Laud. f fg a .tL.

L l6 ,

o n .4 % a , jut uaa cc+a 4 h p .

L Ihst 9nkL G A. Se n L >u.+ l ~. .m tus yInd A L. vuJ a. a p m L cu k a +a j A L c t. - ag . & yp gh Lt A sp cA.m/ 5( -

udu >ucil k up XGuf M ~ "(suun a san : 4 naan ets). ,h u ,

,ps)

< M4p - . . . .

a.pudk at hs fy ~ 44 Q b, im n. fJnPn u r et.Il 4~&akd/ .ML Af

! n 4 L. ' 4 , k L J. J. n k w .

I

, i &RF & m, g - ned ..-.- .

MA .

<h a f e q A & _.

mu.e

. C a tsa7), d ai~ d G - @ _4 yL- .

d ud-(ct.c u e<s). h -e-f n7 4 M L

b'

.L<~LMpgev.=}f_b fpc e Q n A a( =rk,)

yl' . . . . . . . .

j . ..- - .

t . . . . - .

. . ~ .

~

a ...

- - = .. - .

n _

i i'{. W %ks : %J -J esn. a r-es,

! d;bEhdu.W Hw. s+-90 a M,pp set

!u& A a w M 5.-9n A asi a l

I 6w ~ p%

qp ['he.W4 ud v u.t. Gu d k 4.

4 ew A A.

M , _ L ==

n.4 Jqn wMw&

a. ,

Lnu.: $j.bi ag&

% g,uu L pra,A ha sayu -ln:du y a ,A g.* ,

y .sn w yf to p y . y n' .s- vy

, 4f i.a w w a a h h a a y C >)u(.az.4.a.

LLhs,.3 a.a w .

g g b,ss.

.a p 8 "s. bdA} hat, a T~ & & G a f n ~ A M c. -L ~.- 97 ukk cJAxt,

], AAl 6- .q w a . A: Aa & A . -

g b L. y . A uc psm n
  • S pv , g , c4.p m m un p L k W e G 6 cs= A nj.-1 ll afs.au d- y b udy d - b a lu.a M. Wq

\ cM n L J-L sul W &yenwn,)a g 4 44 La L cry 1,.. .' i 14 n a cus (e .

af cMiro a ne hnas; VL.SM k 4. 4., n >-rp

%MLJ p pwe.LJ.L f sup . k c&'n w du -A liu. ~ q %y b 4+cwW 1 en-r~ LaLwL.11 upA= p .

G , w a L , pg n -

s-L a g.m q .

%ll 4 4. c

. Th uuts s1

+ sJ, VM e p &

ha

.u d usJh f !C

& a CJ(e..,

.M6 4 au l Q a J. v dO kt:

4 h ma'a ).

~

. . M .Le -

garfrr 9

)

,Am. Aa,

. Q. M f~W Gk foun (Verrf) L di2&/ r Go,ece hd .: en fy hs., u <.a<.y ganirrh, n a -rs.

}, w s , A ru s 1 a. yksJ u a.may .oaa. L ', .

Goo s.dl-. lan ks Ad&A alrewe A ruu. 4~A L uo 4lh e4 ea' oa.7 Au. Ini &, ~raat 4,Ju y a. a ssa A- n, fud4, am. f k < W. EuL bet y , yl~2 ap- a. .s.xt m , f .&~ye nme a a. o.

p s~ 7 a: aNta~ . .yLa rus ay a- g

. . . v- /.

a b -

.i. . fred A1au,aAh A. BaM t&sP Aur+ . alt h;* nl

. $ & $j L dad a x

f a a ua.

('iues

.s. ia qs As,p.~a2 g 9m w a.s. su at ,

W. u u.2 4 pi kL. a(t) &. /w,~.n l

  • Lee VLnm/.- h.y@

uw.lu e 45- & na. , we w au l A . A l ' d # s ,4 e4ax 4. cjr u ce vu Lu~ g L ease R. . q.

c

9. La u ve n a % g a L c>. a 11.l -f, /d7.... .' . M J -/w ' x d' ara. ,

u,%

i[ M & f .atw./ 4 , i s o. A p 4*r

'S. a y p n 4=4. q t Mew pr &

. y 4 Lt.&

. Hu;. .: a.t usa w'r+q. L J 'Asp es. 49 u,A.

p . &='y L A Adjat .m 'say 9 .n y as.

.W & h-so JL, K A. MPc dhad, k J Sep S>-9o L L.l A 4 Irl

,ts u - % h w JL i !- a n+ cw i d td s,m U y . rk ip6 A . w.; e 6L y . suaAsc. a gn.

\~Q i

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 18 a 19, 1985 F

O . . _ .

O W. F. KITCHENS OPERATIONS SUPERINTENDENT ,

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY 1

O

_ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . - , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . . . . _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ , _ . - ~ ~ . . _ _ . - . -

,4 haa _ - u -

4 a .-.m , _,, - _.. , - - ,

-. j l

'O EERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (E0P'S) t OVERVIEW STATUS PREPARATION REVIEW AND APPROVAL VALIDATION TRAINING O

d t

O

~O top oveaviEW USED WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP, EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES, REY.1, AS MODEL INTEGRATED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW WITH

~

E0P VALIDATION INTEGRATED SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM WITH E0P VALIDATION r

'I O - -

1 i

4 O

,m .--- , . , - , ----.,,,--_-,,,-,,.,-.-,-wan,, , , , , , _ , _ , , .,-e--,.,,, _,,.w,,-,w. - -.-n..-,e_.- --,-, ---- - -_, -~- ---_,,egw- -, , -

.O E0e STATUS SUBMITTED PROCEDURE GENERATION PACKAGE TO NRC MAY, 19811 E0P'S APPROVED AND ISSUED JULY, 1985

  • OPERATOR TRAINING SCHEDULED TO START JULY,1985 DRAFTS OF E0P'S PREVIOUSLY USED IN OPERATOR TRAINING ,

9 O -

4 -e e f

O

O E0P PREPARATION COMPARED V0GTLE DESIGN TO REFERENCE PLANT OBTAINED V0GTLE SPECIFIC SETPOINTS FROM WESTINGHOUSE PLANT PROCEDURES ISSUED FOR WRITING E0P'S FROM WESTINGHOUSE ERG S E0P AND AOP WRITERS GUIDE QUALIFIED PROCEDURE WRITERS O . . . .

5 O

~

REVIEW AND APPROVAL 0F E0P'S

(])

VERIFIED PER PLANT PROCEDURE REVIEW CHECKLISTS DOCUMENTATION OF DISCREPANCIES' VALIDATED USING PLANT SPECIFIC SIMULATOR REVIEWS:

MPARI N ITH COMMITMENT TRACKING DATA PLANT REVIEW BOARD APPROVED BY GENERAL MANAGER, V0GTLE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS O.- -

O

,--.,,--,-,-+,,---,-_w-_,---,- , , _ _ , - , _ - - - - - - - , , . , , ,,, y -.

-, , ., .,,~w -- r ~- - - - ,r = -m,ws

E0P VALIDATION O

  • DEVELOPED OBJEETIVES SELECTION OF SCENARIOS SELECTION OF TEAMS INDEPENDENT TEAM CONCEPT DETERMINE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS SPDS OPERATIONAL HUMAN FACTORS INTERFACE PERFORM VALIDATION C COMENT RESOLUTION DATA REDUCTION O

1 E

l l

O  !

4 VALIDATION TEM SUMARY

6. S. LEE O -

VALIDATION LEADER

- VEGP E0P DEVELOPMENT, SENIOR STA 10 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE B.S. ENGINEERING S. R. PROK0POVICH ERG BASIC AND REY. 1 TECHNICAL PROGRAM MANAGER WOG ERG MAINTENANCE PROGRAM MANAGER 5 PREVIOUS PLANT-SPECIFIC E0P DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS SRO M PWR K. J. VICTOR PARTICIPATED IN ERG BASIC REVISION TO H.P. REY 1 4 P'REVIOUS PLANT SPECIFIC E0P DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS D. W. MAPLES VEGP.EOP DEVELOPMENT O -

SRO LICENSE M PWR ,

10 YEARS NUCLEAR OPERATION EXPERIENCE 16 YEARS NUCLEAR INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE H. M. MALATO VEGP E0P DEVELO'PMENT RO LICENSE M PWR SIMULATOR INSTALLATION TESTING - AN01 10 YEARS NUCLEAR OPERATION EXPERIENCE

- 16 YEARS COMMERCIAL POWER PRODUCTION EXPERIENCE R. D. BRI6 DON SNUPPS NRC INSTRUCTOR CERTIFIED SRO ERG /EOP INSTRUCTOR EXPERIENCE - 2 YEARS 10 YEARS NUCLEAR OPERATIONS EXPERIENCE E. J. K0ZINSKY VEGP SRO INSTRUCTOR CERTIFIED

(]) - MEMBER, HUMAN FACTORS SOCIETY 25 PUBLICATIONS ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HUMAN FACTORS 6 YEARS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPERIENCE

E. M. THORNTON, JR.

VEGP E0P DEVELOPMENT, STA SRO CERTIFIED INSTRUCTOR 3 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXFERIENCE B.S. ENGINEERING B. D. WHITTEMORE STA CERTIFIED - BWR VEGP E0P DEVELOPMENT, STA 3 YEARS ' NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE B.S. ENGINEERING 6.-A. HUTCHERSON LICENSED REACTOR OPERATOR AT PLANT HATCH COMPLETED V0GTLE RO TRAINING 6 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE J. E. KIRBY

() -

COMPLETED V0GTLE R0 TRAINING

_4:5. YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE . .

. R. T. BARLOW COMPLETED V0GTLE RO TRAINING 4.5 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE l

6. L. WHITLEY B.B.A.

L -

COMPLETED YOGTLE RO TRAINING 3.5 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE W.P.STEPHENs COMPLETED YOGTLE RO TRAINING 2.5 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE A. RANDALL bOMPLETEDV0GTLEROTRAINING

) -

5 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE l

R. R. JOHNSON O. -

RO LICENSE PARTICIPANT IN CE PWR 12 YEARS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPERIENCE M. A. GIBSON VEGP SIMULATOR MODIFICATIONS SUPERVISOR 6 YEARS SIMULATOR EXPERIENCE (FOSSIL AND NUCLEAR) 15 YEARS EXPERIENCE POWER PLANT I & C A. M0HAMED

- 4 YEARS EXPERIENCE ON SIMULATOR MATHEMATICAL q0DELS EXTENSIVE WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF FORTRAN 77, PLA AND ASSEMBLY MSME, RUTGERS C. H. LANGE SIMULATOR SOFTWARE MODIFICATIONS AT MIDLANDS, PALISADES, VEGP B.A., COMPUTER SCIENCE MAJOR D. SCU'4A EC

({}

~

SIMULATOR ENGUlsER/ INSTRUCTOR 4 YEARS VEGP.& B'8 W SRO CERTIFIED - VEGP ,

U. S. NAVY NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM (E00W)

W. H. RUSSELL SRO CERTIFIED FOR YEGP AUXILLARY OPERATOR AT FARLEY 5 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE B.S. ENGINEERING J. E. B0WLES V

- SRO INSTRUCTOR CERTIFIED 'EGP VEGP E0P DEVELOPMENT 3 YEARS NUCLEAR PLANT EXPERIENCE B.S. ENGINEERING O

E0P TRAINING ETHOD OF INSTRUCTION PERFORMANCE BASED INSTRUCTION

- INCLUDES SELF STUDY, GROUP DISCUSSIONS, ONE-O'N-ONE DISCUSSIONS AND PRACTICE IN MAIN CONTROL ROOM SIMULATOR AT LEAST 80 HOURS IN DURATION SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION E0P RULES OF USE USE OF FOLDOUT PAGES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TYPES OF E0PS (ORGS VS FRGS)

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS PURPOSE OF EACH PROCEDURE HOW THE E0PS ARE USED TO MITIGATE TRANSIENTS USE OF CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES / SPDS

( -

PRACTICE USAGE OF MAJOR E0PS IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM SIMULATOR i

l

L TRAINING ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 18-19, 1985 Q .

PAUL D. RUSHTON i

SUPERINTENDENT NUCLEAR TRAINING GEORGIA POWER COMPANY iO

0 0

7 me ~%em w

g d i E /

A 0 t

et g

z 0 Z EE < gg mg E E M

.!bsl a s '-

r M

[lg!l b. . z temi wai 9 u gL "'

E E 31W$

9 - QQ fLN!

    • kh b O ,

c i

n G

<C I-O -

d

~

m o o i

W O

(E h .

k -

TRAINING CENTER

[].

140,000 SQUARE FOOT FACILITY-5 LABORATORIES E M IC HP CHEM LABS EQUIPPED WITH PLANT SIMILAR EQUIPMENT

-SIMULATOR HAS BEEN IN USE FOR OVER 3 YEARS COMPLETED TWO MAJOR PANEL MODIFICATION OUTAGES 12 CLASSROOMS LIBRARY

~*

LUNCHROOM

' ASSOCIATED ADMINISTRATIVE AND OFFICE AREAS O

6

,re V

e d - - 5 =

gE; 5a5 *2

  • g d=gs :
  • d E~gg5G3

~55 m- 8 @G=

W5. .att g ma m.

-==

W-m er,.,orm s

, a n

2 a

C b =

Ess een s-282 w- a D 5 5

-m EMU to 5 pt" G t Ghh i ' .S 4 Z 14J -

g a a g

=5 = sn

,n yn 5 a mg 5

9 .

= e s --

N3 $

d = 0 kh du d a w o eg = w s1 - a w a m 8 $

55 i 5 *:

g 8*

m .

D 3

a Q.

u E E - s moh 1-E Z am pe

  • l.C e **

5 5 m =.

-=

yi

-a 2 and W YE$ $w Z v ku NE 4 "30 E-m .....

reasr -

QE.r Z- E

. E g

Y m

=

=

a 5 W "

28 85 28 el =d{s e g" E221MG GE e2_:220 8 v _. W3m - -

5_5:

%gr 1 S J se

- En sm me 03 N5 EM . .

m.M., ea f

n s

PERSONNEL SELECTION PROFESSIONAL RECRUITING ,

UNION BID PROCESS SCREENING FITNESS FOR DUTY BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION DRUG SCREENING PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION MEDICAL EXAMINATION PLANT OPERATOR SELECTION SYSTEM EXAMINATION INTERVIEWS A

v

i t f}

DURATION OF INITIAL TRAINING PROGRAMS JOB CLASSIFICATION DURATION

~

ENGINEER- 1 week QUALITY CONTROL 3.6 weeks HP/ CHEMISTRY -

7 weeks INSTRUMENTATION / CONTROL 4 weeks MECHANIC 5 weeks ELECTRICIAN 8 weeks NON-LICENSED OPERATOR 7 weeks e ,_T

~'

sT REACTOR OPERATOR 43 weeks SENIOR OPERATOR 12.8-30.8 weeks SHIFT TECHNICAL A'DVISOR 11.5 weeks FIRE. BRIGADE MEMBERS 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> ALL PERSONNEL (GET) 6-12 hours

($)

p .-

F' l l

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM ELEMENTS

~~ -

INITIAL AND CONTINUING TRAINING

-COURSE ,

DURATION

  • -ACADEMICS 1 - 12 WEEKS SYSTEMS 1 - 12 WEEKS -

SIMULATOR Li - 6 WEEKS PLANT WALKTHROUGH 3 WEEKS

~

EXPERIENCE

('j

]

ON-SITE SHIFT EXPERIENCE > 6 WEEKS TEST PROGRAM PARTICIPATION VARIABLE INTERI'M REQUALIFICATION VARIABLE c

PRE-LICENSE REVIEW AND AUDIT 11 WEEK CERTIFICATION NRC COLD LICENSE EXAMINATION 2 DAYS LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION VARIABLE o

m

.r i

LO i

CONTROL ROOM t

i ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 18-19, 1985 '

s-i l

i

. i E GEORGE BOCKHOLD 7

!- GENERAL. MANAGER - V0GTLE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS DEPT,  ;

e GEORGIA POWER COMPANY b.

i

.;9 A ..-

4

. . , , , . . . _ , . ' _ . . . ,;____,_.,_,_,_....,__..____._ _ ,_.,___.._ __.,-,__.... _ ...... . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .,.__.._,__.._.,,,___.,.._m..

CONTROL ROOM l

DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW (DCRDR)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY n

k l

1 I

O

,,,,~,-w3 -- - ,- . . , . , - . , - , - . , - - ---,_.m.. -

o CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW q

w FULL SCALE MOCKUP REVIEW - 1979/1980 PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW - 1980/1981 DETAILED CRDR - 1984/1985 PROGRAM PLAN SUBMITTED TO NRC - 9/24/84 CRDR-INCLUDES:

UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM - REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION CRDR STATUS:

242 TOTAL IMPROVEMENTS IDENTIFIED 53 IMPROVEMENTS RESOLVED

/*g -

189 OPEN IMPROVEMENTS LjI -

REVIEli TO BE COMPLETED BY MARCH 1986 SAFETY SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS WILL BE RESCLVED PRIOR '

TO FUEL LOAD O

-,,.--n-, -..-, . - .

DCRDR PROGRAM FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS BASED ON WOG ERGS INTEGRATED WITH EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES VALIDATION IN THE SIMULATOR CONTROL. ROOM SURVEYS USED '.NPO NUTAC GUIDELINES COMPAPED WITH GUIDELINES

. OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW

[]) -

REVIEW INP0 SER/SOER'S QUESTION OPERATORS

-. ALL THREE PHASES GENERATE HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HED) .

O

]

l

(~) HED RESOLUTION j

REVIER HED SIGNIFICANCE ERROR PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR IMPACT ON SAFETY /0PERATIONS CATAGORIZED HED

- C AT .1,2,3,4,4A DEVELOP SOLUTION NATURE OF DISCREPANCY POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FEASIBILITY / COST IFPLETEIT SCLUTION ENGINEERING SOLUTION NORMAL CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES VERIFY SOLUTION CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED HED CORRECTED .

NO NEW HED INTRODUCED O

HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY (HED) CATEGORIES CATEGORY 1 SAFETY SIG IFICANT CATEGORY 2-OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS KNOWN OR EXPECTED CATEGORY 3 SIMPLE ENHANCEMENTS CATEGORY 4 il0T CATEGORY 1,2, OF,3 EUT Ei!HA!! CEMENT PLANiiED CATEGORY 4A MINOR DEVIATION FROM GUIDELINES j -

NO ACTION PLANNED O

4 0

4 D

e-

- bl

,e. - - , . .,,,- ---, , , ,. .-- _ , , . - - ,_ - , ....

.w A # - e .,+&

2  % .a 9

O

SUMMARY

OF HED CLASSIFICATIONS CATEGORY 1 4 CATEGORY 2 10 CATEGORY 3 89 CATEGORY 4 21 CATEGORY 4A 55 OPEN 10 189

() .

i 0

F

($) CATAGORY I HED'S (SAFETY SIGNIFICANT)

REACTOR TRIP SWITCH FUNCTION TO THE LEFT VIOLATES POPULATIONAL STER 0 TYPE GROUP MONITOR LIGHTS ARRANGEMENT NOT CONSISTENT WITH FUNCTIONS (SI, CIA,CVI,CRS)

BORON INJECTION TANK DISCONNECTED VALVE SWITCHES CROWD CONTROL BOARD CONTROL R0D SWITCll STICKS IN WITHDRAW POSITION k

O l

1 CRDR IMPROVEMENTS

(~)

LABELING REARRANGEMENTS (CONTROLS AND INDICATORS)

ADDED GUARDRAIL ADDED

SUMMARY

ALARMS To MCB FROM BACK PANELS REARRANGED MONITOR LIGHTS To FACILITATE E0P'S DELETED " NUISANCE" TYPE AL' ARMS MODIFIED SWITCH DESIGN IMPROYED ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ARRANGEMENT ADDED AssuaCIAToR TEST BuTTcNs (PCP AND HVAC)

CHANGED SCALE OF INDICATORS CHANGED CONTROL HANDLES L'O

  • REVISED PROCEDURES

[ IMPROVED USEAB'ILITY OF SPDS ADDED INDICATOR IMPROVED WORK SPACE IMPROVED IRAFFIC PATTERN O

l.

REVIEW TEAM

SUMMARY

E. J. K0ZINSKY (TEAM LEADER)

~($') -

OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR B.S. CHEMISTRY SRO CERTIFIED BY NRC (V0GTLE) 5 YEARS EXPERIENCE IN HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH U.S. NAVY NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM (E00W) (ENGINEER QUALIFIED) 6 YEARS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPERIENCE MEMBER,. HUMAN FACTORS SOCIETY 25 PUBLICATIONS ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH (ORNL, NURGE, ANS, SANDIA, IEEE)

P. M. K0CHERY (DESIGN MEMBER)

PLANT ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR BSEE, BS (PHYSICS AND MATH)

SRO CERTIFIED BY NRC (V0GTLE) 14 YEARS EXPERIENCE IN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF POWER PLANTS EQUIPMENT 8 YEARS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPERIENCE O

  • G. L. HOOPER (I & C SPECIALIST)

PLANT ENGINEER  ;

BSEE 4 YEARS EXPERIENCE IN POWER PLANT ENGINEERING FIELD ,

TEST SUPERVISOR FOR I & C 3 YEARS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPERIENCE J. D. HOPKINS (REACTOR OPERATOR)

SHIFT SUPERVISOR SRO CERTIFIED BY NRC (V0GTLE)

R0 LICENSED (PLANT HATCH) 8 YEARS NUCLEAR POWER-PLANT EXPERIENCE R. R. JOHNSON-(CONSULTANT)

OPERATIONS SPECIALIST, CONSULTEC SERVICES, INC.

R0 LICENSED (ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE)

{} 12 YEARS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPERIENCE PARTICIPATED IN CRDR FOR WATERFORD III y -~ -__,..-y ,.y , ,- ,

O . SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)

MONITORS CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS (CSF)

DISPLAYS CSF STATUS TREES (CSFST)

CSFSTs BASED ON WOG ERGS SUPPORTS EliERGEl ICY CPERATitiG PROCEDURES

(

V)-

COMPUTER EVALUATES CSFSTs AGAINST PLANT PARAiETERS a

O I ,

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY (ERF)

'[])

COMPUTER SYSTEM PROVIDES THE SPDS DISPLAYS / DATA COMBINES DATA FROM:

PROCESS COMPUTER (PROTEUS)

PLANT SAFETY MONITOR SYSTEM (PSMS)

RADIATION MONITOR SYSTEM (PERMS)

METER 0 LOGICAL TOWER OTHER PLANT SENSORS ALL DATA AVAILABLE INDEPENDENTLY IN:

CONTROL ROOM TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

/g() CCLLECTS PRE / POST TRIP DATA FCR REVIE'.!

HUMAN FACTORS LAYOUT OF KEYPAD / DISPLAYS ..

OPERATIONS INPUT DURIllG DEVELOPMENT C')

e O ERF COMPUTER FOXBOR0 1A COMPUTER SYSTEM DESIGN BY GPC SOFTWARE BY GPC COLOR GRAPHIC CRT DISPLAYS SPECIAL FUNCTION KEYBOARDS ONE BUTTON CALLUPS MINIMUM OPERATOR INPUT INPUT PROMPTS WHEN NEEDED HARD COPY OUTPUT OF CRT L

()

I O

ERF DISPLAYS O

PLANT OVERVIEW (DIGITAL AND GRAPHIC)

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES RADIATION OVERVIEW TABLES OF DETAILED DATA TREND PLOT OF ANY DATA SUBC00 LING-SATURATION CURVE OPERATING LIMITS CURVE x CORE THERM 0 COUPLE MAP U '

C0iiTAINMEitT ISOLATIGN STATUS 1

e l

O REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY LEVEL A 0F CONTROL BUILDING ,

TWO TRAIN SEPARATED PANELS COLD SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN INDICATION ON PANEL B C' _

O f

6 I

i l

0

0 3

0 f

o es

- 1 1

. J 3

2 7

2 f

0 E 2 C C s

t 1 v (

pE 0, D r o

7

/ E N T NO T A WI t

i v

a n

l N OTE R DA I 9

a H

TC 2 D '

A E t

UI S T HO A SN !

C A O O

H S

E TS AT T)

DE " N NRL LC Lt EI BS OS

  • S IT OU SC y EEO NKR I V .

." OAT T

FE E CE IR A

D NC - I EN I O EI TB NC WRO AR OA RP O

N OBC C(

P T RC '

I P H S

N O

I

-/

- T II " d A 8t L L O L E N T DE h R I

U P A A H R S L I'

l s

J O '

N '

YLRNNL BCEI LE RF ON s T E

N A ,

R I

~

{ L DTSHDA P O SD E4 4 CTP i .

L O

N R TOATU /

I I

A T R A

ACRI H N T T

T - uNO O L O

T WS S W L 4

i C D S O o

@i)

C I

D a T t

i U n H u S M

O O

T) R NRL EEO L

_ NKR

. OAT O

. PEN R

_ ~ MRO T OBC C( N N ' , O C

1 / / =

AS OS

" S I T YLRNNL BOEI WE RF ON

. TE E C NC EI DTSHDA ENNCTP ARO TB I

TOATU OA ACRI H RP RC L T WS

/ T P O S

I S

l a A N

" W L OE N D T N

,' D I A E A U P DE TS R H S

( LC AT T .

EI LI I V FE OU I SC D I R I

NC O

N ,

O O O VEGP

! SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS 4

FUNCTION IMPl.EMENTATION

1. BORIC ACIO STORAGE TANK
2. REFUELIIJG WATER STORAGE TANK

, e RCS INVENTORY CONTROL CVCS

1. NORMAL CHARGING
2. BIT INJECTION PATH
3. IlEA0 VEljT AND LET00WN j
  • RCS PRESSURE CONTROL HCS l'ORV's PRESSURIZER HEATERS

! CVCS

  • COOLANT CIRCULATION flATURAL CIRCULATION REACTOR COOLAiVT PUMPS

)

  • RCS HEAT REMOVAL SHORT TERM AFWS I CST MAIN STEAM PORV's LONG TERM RHR IJSCW (IIEAT SINK) e SUPPORT SYSTEMS VENTILATI0lJ

. AC/DC ELECTRICAL. OlSTRIBUTION C00 LifjG WATER i

e O

e

9

. CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY TWO PHYSICALLY SEPARATED TRAINS POSITIVE PRESSURE SEPARATION OF AIR INTAKES SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST CORNERS

-DETECTION DEVICES CHLORINE RADIATION SMOKE MODES OF OPERATION NORMAL ISOLATION EMERGENCY

(]) PURGE 4

4 4

s

O COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM i

ACRS SUBCOMt11TIEE MEETING JULY 18-19, 1985 1

! i 0

\

!. 0 ZEN BATUM GENERAL MANAGER PROJECT ENGINEERING & LICENSING SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES O

VEGP COMPRESS.ED A I R- SYSTEM e NON-SAFETY GRADE 1 e NO BACKUP SAFETY GRADE ACCUMULATORS e NO SAFETY RELATED VALVES REQUIRE AIR TO PERFORM TilEIR SAFETY FUNCTION e ESSENTIAL SAFETY RELATED VALVES ASSUME A FAIL-SAFE POSITION UPON LOSS OF AIR PRESSURE -

e VERIFICATION TESTING 0F SAFETY RELATED PNEUMATICALLY OPERATED VALVES FAIL-SAFE POSITION SUDDEN LOSS OF AIR PRESSURE GRADUAL LOSS OF AIR PRESSURE

-- ~___- __ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

2 .

n L.) VEGP SAFETY RELATED PNEUMATIC VALVE

/* /

A5CO SCLENCID PRES 5URE G AGE A/4 SUPPLY I 1 A II i '% _ /" 1 2.

  • 3 3

,,4 VENT VENT

-TY PE G'78"R L .) l (AIA 257)

ACTUA TOR Y'Q ~ }24 /~ /

lh!C TA L L A rto^t C/CTR.it!,Urt c gf

,gg NE A C ER Alot CET x , ,

Y ,

N A, f. -,e -, I _. -

- -- - l,--- ._ f a C G A/ O / O

+ wjw w a i i

f43/ NPT ppgggygg] l CONCUnT CONN G44E ONE CCNN FCR SCLENCi3

'/4-18 NPT t  !% / VENT CONN ONE CONN DEP. SOLENoiO I il i:,% MouNrtno PL ATE K~ ,

.\,

M OU W TiH G l ORACkET '8

, LIMIT SutrCHES

. f e - -

8 8"- t 1/2 NDT X h-14MPT COMDutT BUSHING CMC COMM PSA swtTCH b(

\

_QL VEGP FIRE. PROTECTION DESIGN ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING r- JULY 18-19, 1985'

( -

,. RON L.-GEORGE

-PROJECT ~ ENGINEERING MANAGER SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES

~

O O'  ; O .

VEGP OPEN ITEM 7A: FIRE DOORS AND DAMPERS l

l SER OPEN ITEM DESCRIPTION l

e JUSTIFY THE ADEQUACY OF THE SPECIAL-PURPOSE DOORS WHEN l

i USED IN RATED FIRE IlARRIERS.

l e PROVIDE FIRE DAMPERSTHAT ARE TESTED AND APPROVED BY A NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED TESTING LABORATORY FOR ALL HVAC

! PENETRATIONS OF FIRE BARRIERS OR FURTHER JUSTIFY THE OVERSIZED DAMPERS.

VEGP STATUS i e THE STAFF WILL BE PROVIDED WITH THE REQUIRED INFORMATION ON UNLABELED DOORS IN FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES BY SEPTEMBER 1985.

I e OVERSIZED FIRE DAMPERS DO NOT BEAR A UL LABEL. THESE DAMPERS BEING REEVALUATED TO DETERMINE SUITABILITY l FOR THE INTENDED APPLICATION. RESULTSWILL BE PROVIDED i TO STAFF IN SEPTEMBER 1985.

'O O O. .

4 VEGP h

OPEN ITEM 7B: POWER SUI) PLIES FOR VENTILATION i

SER OPEN ITEM DESCRIPTION

!

  • DEMONSTRATE THAT A SINGLE FIRE WILL NOT DISABLE BOTH

! TRAINS OF VENTILATION NEEDED FOR SAFETY-RELATED AREAS.

VEGP STATUS l

  • THE POWER SUPPLIES AND CONTROLS FOR VENTILATION REQUIRED' TO SUPPORT SAFE SilUTDOWN IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE WILL BE EVALU ATED TO ENSURE OPEllAlllLITY. THIS EFFORT INCLUDED IN THE ONGOING SAFE SilUTDOWN SEPARATION VERIFICATION REVIEW WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION SEPTEMBER 1985.

~

o O O .

VEGP ,

OPEN ITEM 8: SAFE AND ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY SER OPEN ITEM DESCRIPTION j

4

! e SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ANALYSIS OF SAFE SilUTDOWN CAPABILITY WILL BE COMPLETED IN i

SEPTEMBER 1985.

! e ALTERNATE OR DEDICATED SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY l ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATE 011 DEDICATED SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY

WILL BE COMPLETED IN SEPTEMBER 19fl5.

l l VEGP STATUS i e THE SAFE SHUTDOWN SEPARATION VERIFICATION REVIEW IS >

SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN SEPTEMBER 1985.

I

O O O

^

VEG3 FIRE PROTECTIO \ JES::G s OBJECTIVES A SINGLE FIRE WILL NOT:

l 9 CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO PUDLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY '

8 PREVENT PERFORMANCE OF SAFE SHUTDOWN i

I 4 SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE RISK OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASE i

i

VEg O FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS S FSAR APPENDIX 9A 9 CONSIDERS DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH APPROACH TO VUGTLE FIRE PROTECTION

- PREVENT FIRES FROM STARTING (DESIGN /ADUINISTRATIVE CONTROLS)

- DETECT AND EXTINGUISH FIRES QUICKLY

- DESIGN SUCH THAT IN THE EVEllT A FIRE Sil0DLD OCCUR. ESSENTIAL PLANT SAFETY FUNCTIONS CAN STILL GE ACCCUPLISHED

- BASIC. FIRE PROTECTION CRITERIA INTEGRAL TO V0GTLE DESIGN PROCESS (3 HR. BARRIERS FOR TRAIN SEPARATION) 9 BASED ON FIRE AREA CONCEPT 4 PRESENTS PLANT FIRE HAZARDS 4 IDENTIFIES THE AVAILABILITY OF FIRE DETECTION 9 IDENTIFIES THE AVAILABILITY OF FIRE SUPPL 2ESSION O DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PLANT CAN DE SAFELY SHUTDOWN IN THE EVENT l

0F A FIRE.WITH OR WITHOUT OFFSITE POWER

O O o -

l VEG)

! SPECIFIC PLANT KEY LOCATION FIRE PROTECTION FEATIJRES

! O CONTAINMENT l - RCPs ARE PROVIDED KIT 14 SEIS!.IIC LUDE OIL COLLECTION SYSTEM j - WATER SPRAYS PROVIDED FOR CtlARCOAL FILTERS l

- FIRE DETECTION

- STANDPIPES. HOSE STATION.AND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS i

S CONTROL ROOM

- SMOKE DETECTORS IN RODU AND UAIN CONTROL BOARD

- PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS S CABLE SPREADING ROOMS i - AUTOMATIC PRE-ACTICH SPRINXLEr! SYSTEM

! - SMOKE DETECTION

- HOSE STATIONS AND PollTADLE EXTINGUISHERS

. 9 SHUTDOWN PANELS j - PANELS ISOLATED FROM THE CONTROL RO0tt FIRE i - SMOKE DETECTION AND HALON SUPPRESSION IN ROOM

} $ DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING

]

- REDUNDANT DIESEL GENERATORS SEPARATED BY 3 HOUR FIRE BARRIERS

- AUTOMATIC PRE-ACTION SPRINXLER SYSTEM

- FIRE DETECTION

- STANDPIPES. HOSE STATION.AND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS i

t

l O O- O '

VEGP- .

l I

FIRE PROTECTION DESIGN AND INSTALLATION VERIFICATION PROGRAM l 0 PROVIDES GUIDELINES TO VERIFY THAT SYSTEM 3 MlD FEATURES HAVE BEEN

DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICAULE CRITERIA AND INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESIGN DOCUMlNTS S PROVIDES FOR DISCREPANCY RESOLUTION AllD TRACKING l 9 APPROPRIATE TRAINING WILL BE PERFORMED TO Ft.UILIARIZE ALL PERSONNEL
PARTICIPATING IN WALKDOWN PROGRAM i

j 9 INDIVIDUAL CHECKLISTS DEFIN!llG ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA WILL BE ASSIGNED i FOR EACH VERIFICATION AND WALKD0 rill 9 SPECIFIC ITEMS-TO BE VERIFIED INCLUDE j 8 UNDERGROUND UTILITIES 0 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIRE PROOFING l

0 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM G FIRE DAMPERS

! 8 FIRE WATER MAIN 3 RCP OIL COLLECTION S HALON SYSTEM 0 RACEDAY FIRE PROOFING

e WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEM G lETAL LATH & PLASTER FIRE BARRIERS 8 FIRE HOSE LOCATIONS 3 DRAINAGE l 8 PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS 0 ElERGENCY LIGHTING f 9 FIRE DOOR INSTALLATIONS G C0t10NICATIONS

! O PENETRATION SEALS 0 SAFE SHUTDOWN VERIFICATION I

i

.O DIFFERENTIAL SETTLEMENT - WITHIN A BUILDING o

$/ L = MAX. NET SLOPE OF BASEMAT DELFECTION CURVE RELATIVE TO STRUCTURE TILT 1

o ASTRUCTURALASSESSMENTISMADEWHEN$/L>670 o ACTUALg/ t AS OF JAN '85:

BUILDI!!G MAX 6/ L AUXILIARY 1/2680 0 CONTROL 1/1l190 FUEL HAtlDLING 1/1605

o 1

N n

'd G TWO UNIT PLANT l

3 UNIT 2 I UNIT 1 _

1 l

TURBINE BLDG h%RRER122.'

l I I /

t HAIDL NG EO E

AUXILIARY BLOG l

F._______..__. -

.h.

i I

_q.

_l___ p .

, I Q (.NSCW TOWERS TRAIN A l l l

$_NSCW TOWERS TRAIN B PLANT KEY PLAN O

e o MARKER M1/23 ~ CONTAINMENT UNIT 1 a MARKER NO /22 ~ CO4 TROL BL.DG.

O GROSS D/FFEREN77AL. SE7TLEMENT 10 % 50"/o 92X 96% BlkCKFlLL COMPLETE JM4 '80 JUN'Bl MMR.'83 J AN '85

. , , , c wa . . .

c tw m en a sv no nco 'h-ium _ 9 03

~~1: ""

- . ) .l-:.: .

~ ' "

~' ~ ~ ~

...b..h. --"'>1 * " '

'*I'" 1 " "

l4'h b 4

k F'

~:::.

[ " "

d P 11 p

' ' ~

l F l .J

" " 'b'

r. 7;; L ~

'I J... ..." .. [. , . .

l 'W2" - 2~' '

"'4. ,

-.s. a - - - . . . -

,..:'~~~" ::

~~"~'

- -- '2, ' ' - ,, ~,r' 'j j

~~

4 I " '"" -"

7

--7:-*

..-, . .-.. .. . .. .. ..,. i i.-. ..-.. . L s 4 ..-.. -_ .

q . -, ..-.. . -..

hl '-

c

~

L --.. _

7-g  ::::: q g, 3E E_

l f h I b. f I i4

~'

~

'~' ""

_. - _- -4. . .

,,,--s ', .-..., .

~'~

.. [ [ .,

..-.. - I' I r- _  : -

1 3 -

,y%,,, .

.-- i.. i ,F

p. , p.

i '

m. (-
  • 4 <-J- '

GROSS DIFFERENTIAL SETTLEMENT 431,.9 e@

h

4 l -

PREVENTION OF WATER ENTRY TO SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES Y A

-_. 'ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE' MEETING JULY 18-19, 1985 '

-, . .. . s

)

t

' DAVE HOUGHTON CIVIL-STRUCTURAL GROUP SUPERVISOR s

BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION O

1

o o .

+7 i

i l

) VEGP l PREVENTION OF WATER ENTRY TO ~

l SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES 1

SO URCES 0 F WATER j e MAXIMUM (llVER Fl.00 DING 1

e G110UN DWATER I

l

O & O 1

VEGP MAXIMUM RIVER FLOODING e MAXIMUM FLOOD LEVEL IN THE SAVANNAH RIVER, INCLUDING WIND AND WAVE 110NUP ~ EL.165'-0" e NOMINAL FINISHED GRADE LEVEL FOR THE PLANT

~ E L. 219'-6" e NO FLOODING CAN OCCliR AT PLANT SITE DUE TO MAXIMUM RIVER FLOODING i

9 d

O Gi O_

l l

l VEGP GROUNDWATER .

l 1

LEAK TIGHTNESS OF EXTERIOR WALLS AND BASEMATS i

e THICK REINFORCED CONCRETE '

o PREPARATION OF C0ldSTRUCTION JOINTS IN l ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES PER THE U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION CONCRETE MANUAL FO R MONO LITHIC WK(EllTIGitT CONSTRUCTION 3 JOINTS e IN ADDITION, A WATER STOP iS PROVIDED AT EACH CONSTRUCTION JOINT BELOW GROUNDWATER TABLE

' AND WATERPROOFl.NG TREATMENT IS APPLIED j TO EXTERIOR SURFACES 4

~

O O (m e)

'n- +'* . tapfeEJmftat SmLLl41rf f,.3 StM25J fD*1%E P1P1963 SYSTD6 .

Est Det 4

8.us P4 74e.g Differsattel thepert Sifferential Subseeuent Instst- Subseeuent Ftstne St rf er- Instsi-to Ptetag latten to Suopert Desten ential inttim ante Insta11stten Differential tece- peareer cate Insts11stten awiters Srates Llos uusher *21evatten Settiasant tien

.14* .53' .se*

215'-1* .54* I Wts) 11 Mas 4 Spent Ptsel Deel Caeltslig 1213-929- P A 257/233 93* .64*

213'-l* .lo SUN 33 .22* 95JR44 Causement Coeling lister 1293-491-12*

A 297/213 .13" .60*

.5 F 2ILC32 10' 340C83 Spent Pue1 Seel Caeline 1213-441-le* 215' 4 * -

A 297/233 44*

7 i 1293-442-12* 213' .t P j t 120/151 Causement Coeline laster 60*

1 12e5464-14* 141'-4* .t P l 3 124/151 Sestdual Neet Basevel '

44*

.t P uote: In cases meere the gross Contatsument Serey 12e6-444-t* 212'-s* differential settlement mes

) e 129/151 .60*

sue 11, ne't differenttals i

Safety 2njectlen 1294-017-4* 212'-9* . t. 5" were not coueuted

! S 128/151 .6t*

j 1292-099-14* 134'-6* .L4" a 120/151 sueleer Service Coellne laatse . .60*

193'-3* . (,4 * ,

Spent Fuel Peel Coellne 1213-645-3*

8 128/151 .60* -

1200-421-1 1/2" 213'.-9* .s4*

5 12s/151 Chamencal and volume Centret .5e*

12es-444-8* 241*-11" .34*

151/125 Centatsumant Sprey I C .30*

1292-228-4* 112'-4* .34* .

! C 151/125 auclear Service Caellne laster .Sc 1

12e5-444-14* Ict'-4* 34" C 151/125 tesidual leset sesevel 1299-444-2* 210'-1* .e4*

C 151/125 Chemical and Weltase Centrol .50*

1206-te2-12 I tc5'-4= .84*

C 151/125 Centstament Serey 4, .50*

Safety 2njectlen 1294-937-4* 201'-11" .st*

C 151/125 48" 85* 11 Met 4 62*

1292-187-8* 131*-4* .39" 291trt2 8 128/125 auclear Service Caeltne laster .

40*

92* , Partially 54 1295-Se7-t* 239'-10" .39* 08U84 0 128/125 Besidual Neet Benewal 1nstalled i

Portfally 'B4 48*

289'-10" .39" 25N84 01*

120/125 Cheetcal and Volume Centrol 1208-003-3* installed i 9 mA 4e*

' 11t..te3 .12* Portla11y Safety 2njection 1204-014-4* 202'-6* .19*

i .

9 128/125 Installed ,

4 a

1 .

j ,

.i

n ty MAIN FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEMS ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 18-19, 1985

p. .

O GEORGE BOCKHOLD GENERAL MANAGER - V0GTLE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS DEPT.

l GEORGIA POWER COMPANY l

l l

[

v l

> VEGP FEEDWATER PIPING O STEAM GENERATOR 6" m 18" N /

Z-IRC v IHC a


4----

ONC un6 l q

- l /.

W h

/ k' SYPASS $" F EED*'fATER MAIM 19" ISOLATIOM FEE 0 WATER 4

l

(; Aux;LIAay ,

I:0LATID*1 (JEEDWATER LINE / {p VALVE a _

$"8YPA38i__ .

FEE 0 WATER LINE i GRADE 7914G t

FORGING 4

0 B31.1 g '

PIPING BYPASS 4" FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE g i.-

ga

\ MAIN 18" FEE 0 WATER C CONTROL VALVE 4

4 l l se  !

v - , . . , . , , , . - , . . . - . ..--. , , , . , _ _ , . . - ,,.. , - .---. , _ ..-,. ...,~ _ ,_,, , .n, , , . . _ - _ , - . - - -

4 i

O i

_MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM DESIGNED TO ACCEPT 50% LOAD REJECTI0t1

ACCEPT LOSS OF 1 .FWP OR 1 HDP AUTO F.W. REG. BYPASS VALVE l

i

  • OPERATIONAL FEATURES 16" F.W.' REGULATING VALVE 4" F.W. REGULATING BYPASS VALVE FAST SPEED RECORDER S.G. LEVEL (2) 90% TURBif1E DRIVEf1 PUMPS 4

d I.

4 i

i l

4' I

t t

p l

.m._ i 1

1;; .

hl ,

v. i e AC/DC-POWER SYSTEMS' RELIABILITY  !

k ~:

f. ,

i F.

i l

ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ~ MEETING I JULY 18-19, 1985 f.

i GEORGE-BOCKHOLD GENERAL MANAGER - V0GTLE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ' DEPT.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY O

I I l 1

gtO M GOSHEN BLACK N x N-AUGUSTA NEWSPRINT 1".34 x-Ax '

FUTURE SCE1G

-1936 N

-ms

( l SCHERER 1

' "*C8" Isas VEGP q % ,,,,

5 N N PLANT C 1SEG { Vf!LT.C+8

% IFormerty

-- 230,000 V 1sas ,7,bn TuI 500,000 V bm.i

' r y THALMANN STATESBORO to n.,w voeu wwi.y on Figure 1.2.21, Sheet 1 of 31 Amend. 7 f/84 Amend. 13 1/85 Amend. 14 2/85 VOCTLE A ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT THE SOUTHERN COMPANY GRID SYSTEM Georgia Power al uNir i ANo uNif 2 FIGURE 8.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)

l

] 7'N

\ AUGUST 4 sl GOSHEN GasgE14 Nd NEWS WHITE BLACK WILSON p

)TO500KVYARD /\ /\ /\ /\

N' l1820l h3{ flQ . lTII*] - [1860 l m* <- .- o o- -.. o ,

b?d h?d E3d h3M (1910 l l1710l l1940 l P4% po{ poy g

BUS #2 BUS #2 BUS #1

' BUS #1 0FFSITE OFFSITE SOURCE SOURCE

  1. 2 230KV #1 LLW MAIN u o WY TRANSFORMER e e 21M1A CIRCUIT SWITCHERS 1{313 25KV RESERVE 2NXRA N AUXILIARY yW INXRB #b acN RESERVE 2NXRB LLW AUXILIARY WWINXRA TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER 230KV' SWITCHYARD

'J

'( L S

o7 3

oy 0 0 A N B B' o I R

X C

I N

S U

\

/ Nym g O V

K d

B s V B N .

, K A 3 V 6 N C 1 K T A 1 1 N 0 R . l 3 4 2 oy j O 4

0

\ N A

/ y N I

A o}

R X

N V C I

K N 6

1 4 M E

. T

- S 4 Y 0 S 0 o{ 1 L 1 O 0 A 3

  • N A C 1 B N I -

A o 1 R 0 X

T H Ngq I

C E E

'gq C L G o N E ,

N V g K C T 8 A R

E A A .

U A 3 M C 1 R H 1

O F C S N 1A N

. - op 5 0

R A

  1. T A N A I TN X  : h a

. II N NA I UM 0 S N U

B V \

/

WM L K E 0

3 2

QM g R t O o o7 2 AY T1 A

0 0 R#

E op A A

1 N

E op G

C N

,r! ;l'r . , .

i; .

  • c- M 8! i e  :

8:

-- -- -.~ - ~. [414 ' :r- -r : '

7; i

. i:. l' II I'I:!. >. > .,

h. :: :
!, ,. .s.:... .

3

- ' I.! ,;

.:2  !. .4].;- v 3 D .

3 1. s O un e bw

{YO fI rh l:

.a .-..-.-- .., ha ar.

a .

.!! , i 3

i  ! 88 8

= = .: 2 v&-< y. , ; it,+.

q4 ; I..: I t .

t.

,ln;. -

,: N.

.i t.................;

i !,

i . i: ig :;

a 5

.................. . _ _ . . . gl1:1!g,g : 1_ 'cs; u

,1 s .

4 . ,' a.

- 8;  :

.g:

s...........

,;l il,,l:s* ; ,, l.  : ; . i;l; , 1

.. _ ..... .l4l4

v.  !, :s......!! : (!

, I;

}

I I e

I r,b.

I. * *:, ij ,8l I

. cy 11:..: .

I,b I b , ,I i I I -h lt s*

.  !! "! ((ygj ".i f2

s. 4 2"32  !! .i

~

"+j

  • l,(!

"- la, i I.

i ljf i .ijtj ,,j]

, r r2 A

i: li! se-g.3 gjg; j

{,ggfls.'

42 l8 l8 -

I l,ss'

{ ,N, E'l '4 a+>- er

a. i

-..  ! , ,,I:. ,

g

, ,  !. ;lt g ,r..........,

s a . . .?.;. . s ge ,

g

'!g 3'

  • _

j =r  :.= 1"gg '

. y

.'m' - *I3 lt 8". ;

q'*

2

. 1. e:  : .~.

,' '? I

$ Ar".*r2 ,' ..

g , a,e'd e i*

ar<  :  ;

C 2 .

It e, ! ,

I g.

e

q. 8s..........,.i d< l,,g e

....a 8I l

/  !  %.. . .....

!! }" e..........,

.. ..., M.e  ;  ;

g ,

8 5.. :I a pe: '}8 ! :

sr#

OrG*#2 t l ... fis l:

3 8

!. t: 'ge sg .

. l:  : ,

..-.. 3

......... W gg n I. g l. -

gi

~ ' ' ' ' ' ~

I) -3* i i pl j:;

A

=- y j, ;  :  :

=r v4r-r<

IJ. j. ,.

il '

i. .

l s

l 8

1 li -' :-~

s<  ;

cr . : .= It h. 2 -;s v4r  !; ......, .

rl

s. 1 - .
k. 9 88 !s i

? f i g:. . . - . . . .

a

,g'.

.. i, .

1-ry .i, m ,i s, 6I 1

'! . ,. r..

i t.t:

l9 11*: 8:

p 1

.. . . . ..... . . . j414 ,' :v4r4.

ll1; 1_

. r :.

i... -  :

, e.

{

!i.s s: ...........a

, ++ s,,

t Et l- ....... ....

...I g.... :  ;. . ;i

.l i ::.:; : ...:

  • ".i )- *  : 1.

- .e- ,,,,

., 9 A , f., F

.~ -

e.d. -

I.

1* f s in. .

t I+

4 4 lsf!?

. .*: ..: lli f '!

'4' M-.w# i

- !jjil{

e f;'

3

'e

.  ; , -H+  !,i .i I

h' i

.: I

1': ...: 4li
i d-o .

g p

+

. . ,. 3:

..........<... . l4l4 d ~d< ' li

,4 el e.* . ,

I!ss ...... ............ ..... 4 5

^j PRESSURIZERgWRgATEDRELIEF f

ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 18 8 19, 1985 O

GLEilN LAf1G NUCLEAR SAFETY DEPARTMENT, LEAD ENGINEER WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION O

i

2

~

m'~ e.

. u,;- ;a.>:

b,*

-n

> . . ,:gt. -:n 4 e_ iE I' ~ ' - - - - - -

h -t' k?.i. 5

.k.: e n ie  :

whi;,;!n

!! n ,ii 'p;h t..o

- < a.

m.

e- a i

8 !31:, --t L, .crs ma ,, i g ! 4 I

i .

fa

h. I f 5 ,, . _

> s

'Issl

- i:

, 4 cb d_)  !!

  • s g

= Wij v

.r. '

I

-  !.k

~

Tl i 4

o D

< : lg I ,

9.

ii> T . 7 ty-lW 8 lis i

O g

b___-_______,

y 1

' *d %- , I l

- . . .41,7q,g ,

1l '

LsN .A = -,

[h .. .. . I ,-

fi. ... _ IJ .  !-- -Q' r - ---yy - 4 I'! . . . .{

i t

9._. 4_

dgi sifi, i gi ~

" ,!d.06 ;i a iir '

s- ' --

b.

N  ;

Td I D x . ._a~

f, d,_'., 7 I l.- t.

j',T ~

d 7

iT ~

, I s

fi.

,1u{'8t +

_fm -) i d =D 4m u r"--

I s

nl$a'

S C

~

~

! '; * ,. ' i ?!,*-

$ e

.! i. . . .y *.

r, ... - - ::.

2$

e e.

!!* .g J. , * [ E C , "i'

--_'i..~,'.-

$ c; 2 ' :- i 8 - _

, :, , . :  ; - - - ' ~ -

95I .y$f (,

  • 2 ,[ , __~

n h.

2 !!, Die ,F'U .!E EE 4

!!:;5,<vd , ,: p. ,- s e.; $, Ea 4 g

. C. ,'n . es 3

A

    • I r. =W w

., .yi i,vt

^ j

{g!5I[f/,.f8Eh. s *y;I!!!4!! "

S t4

'f *+ e-

. -M. !!:, . S l ~r~ ~ .> _

e1 U

df ,,

  • lil

~

ir

[8I[aI%.i "i '

Ql, 1

=g x

+<[ i I ': Eu.

y f

~

1 i ((g

  • _L 4 -

N l a

$ C

.9 tt '

4 '

i i

g i

It ; ,, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,

' I i

- p r sY? z ,

. . . . . r- - --C,-<j f:":;":*ylh s.Jf J ...?g..Q' &

J. -

l

,\ , s... ,

-4 I a. _$ ' l Ih J

$$,ypl

. e,

,ap 8 I ~

I

( k

,[

,n ,

.1 .___ i, d

g.T

-- t, y

y

. I( .

i

.BT r j!-_& * -,

't1 D- g .-

+

-sC wg -

rir e e

I -

I

-.w ~

6~ c l

C t

'i.. i

- e.

. i l $j

.: u

___ r

t-I .s

.p -

.. , .E . .... _j!!![-. ..-_rt-..ijfll E

=! leg..

I!! =

t 8

ii.t*  ; E
  • ! jili ~ ;i

' liiP

'.!... ----ig el

. l l- .!!! sa=r - - -T _

i* at i 8

i 45 l..

V~~ .

T Ir -

T I l

..,i ii s

._z_J _a__ -a-' .g!

& =c:

.g 3.. : t.

sV,

.g.I:l__________ . lpg, _______8___llll 4Q i

I

! i -

a >g-i, .

= _3 il il A i g---t-------- !,!:!g

! i g-I,i; g

y .. . . - s_ _ . . - - - - - - . _ - _ .- - - - - - s y y.

,;A

?! T : * *!  :

3 ^1 I

g C,

4 h

n u.

~

't HHi n.

v<

e L g pw _

  • l8
  • 4>

O>

  • g

.e-mo W]

wc c

! '3-T. -[ #a c $.

Q

+. -

ac c

).<,' Wh W 'T m ew

. -e , , .

l

  • e e-w -

El d[

e f

wc eO o

w o.

a r u.

. , i li; g

i

> <=

w .c s

50 gs I,M -O! , i-- ' Id J r-

,  !! s e88 E -2

  • -+--+ 5 g*a r:

g <

=

en go 9-z'@m ,,s

{ ll! 'F I-- {

$ QO" z O .

c. s2m

[ i s 't w> -

1 i < >E d> >

' E30 0o3C gg .a z r " -4 d,i ;1, : - s w= :caguEr u- E e s -

w2<pw>E 1 I oh>

Z ill t il E w E .:

($00>2 5EE:

uwO<

ES W"f ' *I - gw = g W l'I ei L. e wm9 w e- dCs 4 g<9 w> 2 0

, tL_L .. 4e#- , Z u o> su3 < ~E ww I o. O -

e uZe w asa.ay og 2> wg Zw g< 8. g O>

L._<4 - *w wsgA>>www Pdma E q 2 4, e )

2kO*I*2-9 Zws4 Od o$

es

>~E O>*

g 9 W* U O E D >

wS;*o>

d Dw Ze g*I<>O'< Og E " ttE* as _n MwIh 09s=

udg3E'seaafa= 8 O

< <su<5z03W <<><w Z e, n n weem.... e m

lllll{i e

_ H

- B8 P5 4

V

. I D

)

9 1

E H &

R B7

" 8 U P5 S

S )D 4 _ 1 S

E E T 1 FE T

R A 1 E E PS 1 Il m

N D

i L S WE E(

- O LO M

P C

e s

r

/

2 i

s R

E C RO K

R E GA Z

. 's U L S!l S E 9

I /

RD L

e E T R N PI UA S E S

E (L B6 1

> _- A R P5 P 4 1

1 D

H B5 P5 '

. 4 I

D 9

llll

4 O

RCP SEALS 4

1 ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 18-19, 1985 l

f O -

WALT TAUCHE .

SENIOR ENGINEER

, WESTINGHOUSE 4

a-

r., REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL PERFORMANCE U DURING THE LOSS OF ALL SEAL COOLING e MECHANICAL RCP SEAL SYSTEM DESIGN RCP SEAL COOLED BY SEAL INJECTION OR COMPONENT COOLING WATER TO RCP THERMAL BARRIER HEAT EXCHANGER DESIGN PREVENTS OR LIMITS LEAKAGE OF PRIMARY REACTOR COOLANT TO AMOUNTS LESS THAN MAKEUP SYSTEM CAN REPLACE e LOSS OF ALL SEAL COOLING OCCURS ONLY WHEN BOTH SEAL INJECTION AND COMPONENT COOLING WATER TO RCP THERMAL BARRIER HEAT EXCHANGER ARE'NOT AVAILABLE SUBJECTS RCP TO SEVERE THERMAL TRANSIENT AND RCP OPERATION IS PROHIBITED INCREASED RCP SEAL LEAKAGE WILL RESULT CAUSING SMALL SIZE LOCA ECCS DESIGN MAKES TRANSIENT LESS SEVERE THAN FSAR O .

SMALL LOCA RESULTS IF AC POWER IS AVAILABLE e LOSS OF ALL SEAL COOLING DURING STATION BLACK 0UT STATION BLACK 0UT IS AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE (USI-A45)

STATION BLACK 0UT WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL SEAL COOLING WITHOUT ECCS CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE SEVERE CORE DAMAGE IF SEAL LEAKAGE HIGH o RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE DEMONSTRATE THAT SEAL SYSTEM CAN ACCEPTABLY SURVIVE LOSS OF ALL SEAL COOLING CONDITIONS DEMONSTRATE THAT RCP SEAL LEAKAGE DURING LOSS OF ALL SEAL COOLING IS ACCEPTABLY SMALL DEMONSTRATE THAT SIGNIFICANT CORE DAMAGE WILL NOT RESULT DURING THE TIME THAT AC POWER IS UNAVAILABLE O

REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL PERFORMANCE DURING THE LOSS OF ALL SEAL COOLING O,.

8 WESTINGHOUSE AND WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP PROGRAMS i -

WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSES e BEST ESTIMATE RCP SEAL LEAKAGE DURING LOSS OF ALL

- SEAL COOLING IS 21 GPM/ PUMP OR LESS

, TIME TO CORE UNC0VERY IS MORE THAN 16 HOURS FOR THIS LEAKAGE, PROVIDING SUFFICIENT TIME FOR RESTORATION 0F AC POWER

  • INDEPENDENT AUDIT CALCULATION BY NRC CONSULTANT, ETC, 4 - CONFIRMED WESTINGHOUSE CALCULATION CONSERVATIVE PARTICIPATED IN FULL SCALE TEST OF 7-INCH RCP SEAL SYSTEM SUBJECTED TO THE LOSS OF ALL SEAL COOLING IN FRANCE ON MAY 29-30,.1985

_ , TEST SIMULATED EXPECTED CONDITIONS AT SEAL INLET D.URING THE LOSS OF ALL AC POWER STABLE SEAL' SYSTEM PERFORMANCE FOR 20 HOURS J

  • 1 LEAKAGE PREDOMINANTLY THROUGH #1 RCP SEAL i LOW' LEAKAGE OBSERVED AFTER TRANSIENT HEATUP G APPROXIMATELY 16 GPM AT.2270 PSIA and 534 F 0 APPR0XIMATELY 12 GPM AT 1323 PSIA and 534 F l' 0 APPROXIMATELY 9 GPM AT 587 PSIA AND 465 F (PRELIMINARY)

'O CONCLUSIONS EXPECTED LEAKAGE DURING LOSS OF ALL. SEAL COOLING IS LOW CURRENT PROGRAMS ARE IN PLACE TO HELP RESOLVE RCP SEAL INTEGRITY ISSUE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE SEAL COOLING DURING LOSS E j[]h 0F.ALL AC POWER DOES NOT NEED TO BE RETROFIT INTO PLANT

= , ,r--.e.,- --,r -,--- -s--,. *-.,--w -e_-,-,iwww wu msw-n - w mrerit--mee + mwww e -%* sww+ger -- = - - +' - - -'

I SOURCESOFNON-CONDENSIBLES 0.-

~

BOILING / FLASHING DISSOLUTIG1 PRESSURIZER VAPOR SPACE PADIOLYTICDECmPOSITION ZIRC/ WATER EACTION FISSION CAS RElfASE ACCLMJLATOR NITPE91 SIDISSOLVEDOXYG91 Q .

I e

4 4

1 l

L

SIGNIFICANT NON-CQ W EIBLE SOURCES r]%

L, AC01ULATOR NITROGEN AT LOR RCS PRESSURE ZIRChfATER REACTION AND FISSION GAS RElfASE FOLLOWING PROLONGED CORE UNCO /ERY OCCURS ONLY IN TRANSIENTS WITH SEVERE IWENTORY DEPLETION 9

e O

>m CONSEQUENCESOFNON-CONDENSIBLES L)

~

~

NONCONDENSIBlfS COLLECTED IN SG U-TUBES REDUCES EFFECTIVE HEAT TPMSFER AREA STILL SUFFICIENT FOR ADE0JATE RCS COOLING NATURAL CIRCULATION MAINTAINED FOR ALL BUT TE MOST SEVEE TPANSIENTS .

LARGE NUJNTS OF NW-CONDENSIBLES COULD PALT NATURN_ CIRCULATIG REFLUX EAT TPANSFER EFFECTIVE IN REMOVING DECAY EAT Q . .

"g VENTING NON-C0iG1SIBLES U-TUBES - PEACTOR COOLM RFPS .

PRESSURIZER-PORVs UPPER HEAD - HEAD VENT P

7~

NM gs

7-OPERATORRESPONSETONON-CONDENSIBLES g.

FOLLOW EERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES .

C00LDOWN PRIf%RY VIA SECQURY DEPRESSURIZATION ISTART REACTOR COOLANT RIMPS ESTABLISH BLEED AND FEED IF SECONDARY DEPRESSURIZATION INEFFECTIVE N. /

NONCONDENSIBLES h ~

CQlCEFN ONLY FOR TPANSIENTS WITH SIGNIFIC#ff CORE UNCWERY -

PEUNCONDENSATION PROVIDES ADEQJATE HEAT REMOVAL EERGENCY ESPONSE GUIDELINES PROVIDE STEPS FOR RECOVERY 0

.O s

/f7% O On 66 ,

KC. _

f

\\ tsisi as4.aois iII I I l' s2s escissises T nnacs.osman.causen.c4 e4ssa d\\ / // f lur wif// -

o July 3. 1985 Valtst R. yerris 106 Passo Way Greenbras, CA 94904

Dear Mr. Farris,

d d I have received from Zia at the sits of the Yardsni theVogtle results of the stan ar penetration test progrs= corried out Nuclear Project. Ten 5?T borings 4 vara drilled at locationsall show very high pen distributed across the site at resistance values in the cc: pas ted backfill.

My evaluation of the results indicatas the folleving:

Top 10 ft. of fill H-values ran3e from about 30 to 97 with a censervative avers;s value of about 50 Depth ran g 10 cc 30 ft. I N-values range fros about 62 to 200 witha D w'th rsngs 30 to 30 ft.

N-values ranse f rem about f 130. 100 to 200 with

:::n-ntive svarage valua o O- ied out usi=g a saf ety ha==er

,I. nota that the 3?T tests were carr eduro can be snd a ropa sud pullay technique, ao that tha procs.pect4d

beu: 60%).

.)f# the drill-ates (i.e. ths ?.nsrty Ratio 1:

3ased on the above I katerpret th rs:ults as follove:

Average , Effective Overburden. C N (N1) % -

Prenurs Death _ N gg value 1.6 80

... 650 psf 5 ft.

30 0.87 87 2630 psf 20 ft. 100 0.33 80

. " 7800 pel 60 ft. 130 ld be i -values are reasonably consistant as wou

  • l ' Thus ths (N g)60 expected for a reasonably uniform fill.

The field performance of s,itse which have and have h not 5

liquefied during earthquakes with Magnitude ility of71, sut=arized on t ,

attached figura, shows cisarly that_there is no,possib d

__ liquefaction occurring in this soil for any In fact level of groun accelerstion that any develop at the Vogtle sita. liq h this fill.

Sincerely yours, ,,,

k.bM -

H. Bolton Saad

128 1.

O.1

.. . ..y rl 3

3 w

5*y li'3 3 .
i. 3-t, a
  • 2a33 E!aj Aj l 3 ji.iil I8
s.

l ag.,s

.=* ..

an

,egf... .e g g - --

y .,-

g.

, i.s......4.

i.:. sea siaam 4 .

ag

  • [. .;is. 3 :. ]l .l l. g E
ls' I  !.r 1

3'j: '

- =5

!;IB:I . 12

. . :I ll-l _

. j :-:a :!3

.i l :l!

i

5 I

jil I-

]

l]1:

~

E ~i -

I:i :j:

i . I :.

.ti" jji  !

.- 5.- ___  :

j.. $$:i d 2-

lI l-.

~3 .8 l  : .'

E .  ;

]-< i f ^x j

f _-

  • !!!f . *

/

N_j d

- .* l

  • a -[

e a

6:ja .

s

. 5 $'

lie is

!E  !!!! si!!  !!!b es s iig v;s! :

- 0.?:: ?

i
  • e!!

s

  • .a {a!j, - _  :
g

!s ! !*

Ogsi 1 2y *- gga a

ggi

  • 3 .

l 3 .

3 . f.ji l ..

l

t.
  • 3*2 -'

i U!

> 35 _::::l:: 8 ];.

.. s

I g l .:

l l

. 3.>a 8 , '

l 3

.b ,

l 0

l t. .

I: [

.  : l

!. l::.. __

-. .i . .

3: gg83

. g3 -

l":3 1 L- g.3

-:, ..........a

  • r, C  !  !* l .

- . . . i. l

  • 'i

~

_ :132. . . . . . . . . . a!

$  !! E rIi i.

E l,lpa i i!! . .

- 5: .i : .1 .v.  ::, - :,

u  ; ; 1: s i 2.  : X:

iil ;ji

__ _- g We i

! I is a li.  ! si; IIR: ii.

i 2

g

: yj - .. . .

ll1.i,!:i

=

.A E fsaisl i i i i s-i -

ijjj!!!

F w l ;I.  ;  :.: :

  1. : ..... l l _

$> h..

,