ML20133H113
| ML20133H113 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Haddam Neck, Vogtle File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1996 |
| From: | Bassilakis R, Gunter P, Katz D CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK, NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE |
| To: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133H092 | List: |
| References | |
| 2.206, DD-97-21, NUDOCS 9701170049 | |
| Download: ML20133H113 (33) | |
Text
V -
'. t 3 jT CmZEMS AWARENESS NETWORK Box 83 ShelbumeFalls, MA 01370 T/ F: 413 339-8768
, N uclearInformation and Resource S ervice 142416th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 202-328-0002 I November 25,1996 Mr. James Taylor, Executive Director ofOperations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I Washington, DC20555 PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT, PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.206, TO !
REVOKE NORTilEAST UTILITIES' OPERATING LICENSES FOR Tile CONNECTICUT NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS DUE TO CilRONIC, S YSTEMIC MIS MANAGEMENT RES ULTING IN SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS OF NRC SAFETY REGULATIONS, AND TO INVESTIGATE Tile NRC STAFF'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOT DEALING WITil Tills i
PROBLEM FOR OVER A DECADE L
SUMMARY
RATIONALE FOR REQUESTED ACflONS In the interest of public health and safety, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) and Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), petition the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), pursuant to 10 CFR e 2.206, to suspend or j revoke Northeast Utilities' (NU) licenses to operate the Millstone Units 1,2,3, and Connecticut Yankee nuclear power stations due to over a decade of chronic, systemic mismanagement and violations of NRC regulations that have jeopardized occupational :
and public health and safety.' l
'NU conducted an "in house" audit of the causes of the problems detailed in this petition. See 1 Northeast Utilities System. Event Response Team Rc/x>rt (ACR 7007) (NRC Acc. No.
9603150021) (February 22, 1996). Until NU issued the report, the NRC took no definitive action to resolve the problems detailed therein, despite the blatant safety violations oper.ly taking place on a daily basis for over 10 years!
9701170049 961125 PDR ADOCK 05000213-O PDR t
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, CAN's and NIRS's 10 CFR f 2 206 Petition to 9
\ Rewke NU's licensesfor its Connecticut Reactors and Investigate Neghgent NRC Staff Oversight.
l 1
IL REOUESTED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS l 1
A. Petitioners request that the NRC take the following actions to enforce its !
regulations against Northeast Utilities I
- 1. Petitioners request that the NRC immediately suspend or revoke l Northeast Utilities' license to operate the Connecticut Yankee and Millstone nuclear reactors due to chronic, negligent management of I the reactors which, for over a decade, has endangered and continues to endanger occupational and public health and safety 1
and the environment due to resultant and cumulative major safety problems and violations of NRC regulations.
- 2. Petitioners request that the NRCinvestigate the possibility that NU made material misrepresentations to the NRC concerning l
- engineering calculations and other information or actions relied upon to assure the adequacy of safety systems at Connecticut Yankee and Millstone reactors, said possible material misstatements due to a lack of rigor and thoroughness, or as a result of providing intentionally misleading information.
- 3. In the event that an investigation determines that Northeast Utilities deliberately provided insufficient and/or false or misleading information to the NRC, petitioners request that the NRC revoke Northeast Utilities' oper sting licenses for the Connecticut Yankee and Millstone Unit 1,2 and 3 reactors. If the NRC chooses not to revoke the Northeast Utilities' licenses, the Petitioners specifically request that the reactors remain off-line until a United States Department of Justice independent investigation is complete and the NRC reviews conclusions and recommendations contained therein for potential consequences to the licensee and its agents under NRC regulations.2 2
The Department of Justice report will likely produce information essential to the NRC's evaluation of NU's management problems. Such information should have a direct efTect upon any NRC decision conceming NU's future operation of nuclear reactors in Connecticut.
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CAN's andNIRS's 10 ClR f 7206 Petition to 3
\ Rewsle NU's Licensssfor its C<mnecticut Reactors .
, and investigate Neghgent NRC htaff Oversight. \
- 4. In the event that the NRC chooses not to revoke Northeast Utilities' license to operate Connecticut Yankee and the Millstone Unit 1, 2, and 3 reactors and allows the reactors to return to operation, petitioners request that the reactors remain on the NRC
" watch list" to oversee reactor operations until such time as NU management demonstrates to the NRC's satisfaction that:
1
- a. NU is able to fulfillNRC regulatory requirements;
- b. NU has met all prior commitments concerning the repair, modification, maintenance, and documentation of the nuclear power stations;
- c. NU has retrained all staff in the application and i interpretation of NRC's regulations; and
- d. NU has removed from any positions of responsibility for operation and/or management of the reactors any and all persons whom the Department of Justice, NRC, or other government investigators and/or civil or criminal prosecutions find to have made material misrepresentations to the NRCduring the past decade of mismanagement.
- 5. The Petitioners request that, at a minimum, the NRC keep Connecticut Yankee and the Millstone Units 1,2, and 3 nuclear reactors oft-line until the NU's chronic mismanagement has been analyzed, remedial management programs put into effect, and the NRC has evaluated and approved the effectiveness of the licensee's actions. At a minimum,this should entail:
- a. A thorough analysis of root causes for deficiencies in NU's FSARs, documentation for licensing and design basis, safety analyses, engineering, quality assurance, AL ARA programs, and other necessary or required documentation;
- b. Creation of a complete, accurate, updated FSAR--mere
" reform" is impossible when the basic document is inadequate and inaccurate;
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~
, ' CAN's andNIRS's 10 CfR f 2.206 Petstion to 4 l g Rende Nil's JJcenses for its Connecticut Reactors !
, and investigate Nexhgent NRC Sta)) Uversight.
- c. Re-evaluation of any of NU's activities initiated under (or ;
which NU should have initiated under) 10 CFR Q 50.59 in order to confirm the validity of such activities, particularly to determine the extent to which the updated FSAR does not match "as built" reactor configurations. This requires more than a mere paper audit, and necessitates a component-by- i component and system-by-system check of the actual physical plant against the existing documentation, and the creation of correct documentation where it is lacking and/or l inadequate; i
- d. Institution and documentation of an efTective ALARA review for all operational and non-operational activities which expose or potentially expose workers and/or the l public to radiation;
)
- e. Thorough documentation of the root causes ofNU's chronic l and systemic mismanagement--including documentation of the NRC Region I inspection program's staff and management failures over the past decade to detect and deal with this problem;
- f. That NU demonstrates, over a substantial period of time to the satisfaction of the NRC, NU's commitment to respect NRCregulatory requirements and consistently put them into practice;
- g. NU retrains all personnel involved in day-to-day operations so that they are thoreughly conversant with NRC l regulations; 1
- h. Updating and documentation of Plant Design Changes Requests to l include allchanges to the reactor's design,and that these design changes are verified by the NRC staff, with close-outs of PDCRs receiving the )
highest priority;
\
,~ CAN's und NIRS's 10 ClR $ 7206 l'etation to l $
~, Rewde Nil's IJcenses for oss Connecticut Reactors
{, and Investigate Negligent NRCStag oversight.
Il Petitioners request that, in the event that NU decides to shut-down any or all of the nuclear power reactors at issue herein with the intent to commence the decommissioning process, the NRC does not permit any decommissioning or pre-decommissioning activity to take place until such l
time as:
- 1. Allof the documentation mentioned above is available to the NRC and on-site at the reactors;
- 2. All personnel involved in the decommissioning process have been retrained (ortrained)in the use and interpretation of the applicable NRC regulations contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations;
- 3. The NRC appropriately evaluates, replaces personnel, and restructures the NRC Region I inspection program, its management and the supervising NRC directorate to eliminate the regulatory anarchy that plagued the Connecticut nuclear reactors during the past ten years;
- 4. The NRC makes certain that NU does not employ any persons in management or operations who made material misrepresentations to the NRC about the status of operations, repairs, modifications, or maintenance of NU's Connecticut reactors.
C. Petitioners request that the NRC commences an investigation into how it allowed the illegal situation at NU's Connecticut reactors to exist and continue for over a decade. Particularly, petitioners request that the Commission orders its staff (directors of the responsible directorates, managers, Region I management and staff) to answer the following questions, and hold these persons accountable for their answers and actions regarding the past 10 years at NU's Connecticut nuclear power reactors:
l 1. What documents did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and NRCdirectorate oversight review during ten years of NU's out-of-compliance operation?
i
_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ .__ -~ _ _ _
\.
, CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR f 2 206 Petition to $
l % Revoke NU's Licensesfor its Connecticut Reactors l, and lowestigate Negligent NRC Staff Overstght.
I e
- 2. If NU provided documents that somehow deceived the Region I inspectors, how does the information in these documents relate to the actual everyday workings and activities conducted during the otherwise undocumented decade of operations at the Millstones and Connecticut Yankee?
- 3. 110w did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC directorate oversight find that NU was conducting operations in a way that keeps worker and public exposures to radiation As Imw As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) when NU was not adequately documenting either its licensing bases or the basis of reactor operations?
- 4. Knowing, as Region I inspectors must have known, of excessive workerexposures--for example,due to a long standing problem with leaking pipes as documented by an NU worker in the video tape provided with this petition Exhibit 'A'--how did the Region I inspectors certify that operations at the Millstones and Connecticut Yankeewere being conducted ALARA7 How did their supervisors, and those in the NRC directorate, make the same certifications?
- 5. During the undocumented decade, how did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC directorate oversight manage to track NU'sactivities at the Millstones and Connecticut Yankee under 10 CFR { 50.597
- 6. To what extents have NRC Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC directorate oversight allowed the same type of problems to develop at other nuclear power reactors in New England (i.e.,
Maine Yankee, Pilgrim, Seabrook, Vermont Yankee, and Yankee Rowe)?
l 7. Is there any connection between licensees employing Yankee l Atomic Electric Company's consulting and engineering services j and the existence ofserious problems with documentation and lack
! ofcompliance withlicensing and design bases at any New England area nuclear power stations or those in other parts of the country?
l
9 !
o \
. CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR S 2 206 Petition to y i
\ Remke Nit's 1.icenses for its Connecticut Reactors
, and Invntigate Negligent NRC Staff Overstght.
Ill RATIONALES FOR REOUESTEDACTIONS For the past decade, NU mismanagement of the Millstone and Connecticut Yankee nuclear power stations has compromised the health and safety of workers and the public by subjecting them to increased risks of radiation exposure and the uncertainties of actual exposures on a daily basis, as well as subjecting them to an increased risk of death and illness during and following a major nuclear accident.
During that period of time, NU has operated the Connecticut nuclear power stations in flagrant disregard of fundamental NRCregulations designed to assure that workers and the public are adequately protected from such risks. NU violated NRC regulations, despite a continuing responsibility to assure the safety of the most vulnerable members of the public (i.e., citizens living near the reactors, within the efHuent pathways, and all those within a fifty mile radius of the reactors), protect NU workers, and safeguard its own assets (as a fiduciary obligation to its shareholders).
Over and over, during the decade of mismanagement, NU promised NRC Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC directorate oversight that it would fulfill its obligations under NRC's regulations. NU's unfulfilled commitments--in writing, orally, and even under oath--include, but are not limitedto, promises that NU would:(1) correct mistakes in reports and procedures, (2) correct mechanical and engineering deficiencies, (3) repair or replace equipment,(4) maintain and/or upgrade safety systems,(5) conduct
9 !
, CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR f I20f> l'erstion to g
\ Rew>Le NU's 1.tcensesfor us Connecticut Reactors
, andInvestigate Negitgent NRCStaff Oversight.
engineering and documentation evaluations under 10 CFR { 50.59 to justify tests, modifications, experiments,or changes made to any portion of the Connecticut reactors, and (6) maintain complete and proper documentation on the required safety systems of the reactor, its general operation, and technical specifications. These act: and
- omissions are,at a minimum, violations of10CFR Q 50.4,5 50.5,Q 50.59and @ 50.71.
Safe operation of a reactor necessitates that a licensee (such as NU) maintain a
] properly documented and completely updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
and routinely conduct fullengineering and documentation reviews, pursuant to 10 CFR s 50.590n proposed changes, tests, or experiments conducted in the course of any and all operations. See, e.g.,10 CFR s 50.4, s 50.59,s 50.71. The implications of failing to meet such basic requirements are staggering.
The effectiveness of multiple back-up safety systems which the NRC requires of l
licensees under the" defense in depth" program approach, and basic assumptions relied upon in every probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) utilized to predict the degree of assurance provided by such safety systems, are swept away likea house of cards when i a licensee (such as NU) operates without adequate documentation. This is more than mere paper shuffling. If it were just a matter of giving NU a bit more time to gather papers, the Commission could let NRC Region I take the usual casual approach.
. s
,' CAN's and NIRS's 10 CFR f I206 l'ention to 9
.s Revoke NU's Ixensesfor its Conneestcut Reactors
, andInvntigate Negligent NRCStaffoverstght.
, llowever, the Region I casual approach to auditing operations at NU facilities permitted NU over a decade of operating and profiting from its Connecticut nuclear power stations without adequate evidence that operations met NRCregulations. A lack of documentation directly translates into a continuous elevated risk of radiation
- exposure to NU workers and the public, an unknown and yet to be determined amount
, ofincreased radiation exposure to workers, and a continuing ruk that a combination of operator error and safety system failure willresult in a majornuclear accident.
i i NU's Event Response team told NU,as the NRCnow knows, that during the past l
decade NU did not maintain the required documentation at the Millstone Unit I nuclear i
station. The NRC has since learned of the same shoddy practices at the other Millstone reactors and Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck). This is a large part of the reason why petitioners have requested the NRCto take immediateaction to halt alloperations at the Millstone facilities until the required documentation is on file. NU's Event Response team told NU that:
Most of the engineers and managers contacted during Ithe Event Response Team enalysisl (individuals who should be well-versed in design control requirements) have not read Title 100f the Code of Federal Regulations INRC Regulationsl. Regulatory Guides, or ANSI Standard pertinent to design control. There is a general.. lack _of_ understanding and appreciation.ophe relationship _and_ implications between 10 CFR 50, design _. basis _(50.2)dicensing_ basis,_ind.u_stry _ codes,_and_ NU}
administrative _ programs contro ling _p.onfiguration_an_d_designlof_ reactor 9PClationst
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CAN's andNIRS's 10 ClR f 2 206 l'etitt<>n to l9 x Rewke NU's Licenses for its Connecticut Reactors
, and Investigate Neghgent NRC Staff Oversight.
t l
1 l Event Response Team, Executive Summary at 11 (emphasis added). The Event l
Response team report also states that:
Intemal correspondence and events involving the design basis (e.g.
NOVs,DERs,LERs) from 1985through 1996 show a pattern ofinformation communicated to NU management. This information consistently identified weaknesses and risks associated with the UFSAR [ updated FSAR]and design basis.
/d. at 2(emphasis added). This means that NU management had concrete particularized knowledge of serious on-going violations of NRC regulations. The Event Response Team Report further states that:
NU management _made_ commitments on the docket to correct these deficiencies. The_ actions,[of N.U management] were inefTective, partially implemented or not done._
/d. (Emphasis added). This means that althouch NU management had concrete, particularized knowledge of serious on-going safety violations of NRC regulations. it either acted ineffectively or did nothing at all. Therefore, it is axiomatic that when NU management knowingly led the NRC to believe that NU was taking effective action to come into compliance, or was in compliance with NRC safety regulations, NU was making material misrepresentations to the NRC, misrepresentations directly related to the safe management, maintenance, inspection, repair and operation of the Connecticut Yankee and Millstone facilities under the terms and conditions of NRC's license to NU to operate these nuclear power stations. Over and above allthe underlying violations
. i~
,' CAN's and HIRS's 10 CfR f 2 206 Petition to s Revoke Nil's 1.icenses for its Connecticut Reactors , and Investigare Negligent NRC Staff Oversight. l of other portions of 10 CFR part 50 leading up to them, in and of themselves, such material misrepresentations violate NRC regulation 10 CFR s50.5 (deliberate misconduct), {50.54 (conditions of license), Q50.55a(a)(1)(requirement to meet codes and standards), and Q50.71(e) (requirement to update FSAR and maintain f50.59 4 l documentation). Although NU merely intended that the Event Response Team Report would identify problems at Millstone Unit 1,the Report stated that: , l i The long term pattern of decisions and actions [at Millstone Unit 1] has generic implications for Connecticut Yankee and Millstone Units 2 and 3. A.. sample of. internal and external assessments an_d design eventsje.g., LERs) for Units _2 and 3 an.d. Conn _ecticut Yankee,. support.s_the_ potential for generic implications. Id. at 8(emphasis added). The Report goes on to state that the Team needed more data from each of the NU licensed facilities mentioned in order to determine the " full extent of the implications." Id. Thus, NU's own investigative team, without even having a complete picture of the extent to which the problems at Millstone Unit I apply to other NU operated nuclear reactors, recommended that NU should " conduct a verification elTon similarto the Millstone Unit 1 effort for Millstone Units 2 and 3 and Connecticut Yankee."Id. at 9. 13eyond the efforts that the NRC has already taken to try to deal with the problems described in NU's in-house report, the Commission needs to direct its independent panel to examinecach of the NOVs, DERs, and LERs over the past decade
_ _ _ _. . _ ~ ' * . '.' L
,' CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR f 2206 l'etition to 39
% Remke NU's IJcenses for its Connecticut Reactors
, andInvestigate Neghgent NRCSta]JOverstght.
to determine the actual physical status and documentation for all of the problems (and any of the changes, modifications, tests) at all of the Millstones and Connecticut Yankee,as well as the rest of the New England reactors--certainly any in which NU has an interest, as well as those serviced by NU's primary engineering contractors and consultants--and probably allof the nuclear power stations inspected by Region If This petition calls upon the Commission to face reactor licensee violations more pervasive and serious than any previously confronting the NRC. Not only do the decade-long, serious, chronic, systemic mismanagement problems at the Millstone and ) l Connecticut Yankee nuclear power stations require action against NU, but the ! l Commission must confront its own chronic, systemic failure to enforce its regulations. Specifically, the blatant, abject failure of regulatory oversight by the NRC NRR directorate management and staff, NRC Region I management, staff, inspectors, and l other NRC administrators, management, and staffin failing to assure NU's compliance with NRC regulations. 3 Petitioners believe,as does the NRC, that NU's Connecticut problems may have infected other nuclear power reactors in New England. See S. Varga, Director NRC Division of Reactor 1 projects, Letter to G. Cheney (NRC Acc. No. 9610090036)(October 7,1996). It is not clear to what extent the company-side problems are strictly the responsibility of NU, or should be shared by any and all of the various consultants and contractors utilized by NU--such as Stone and Webster Engineeringand Yankee Atomic Electric Company. Likewise, the NRC needs to take stock of all of the nuclear power stations under the inspection regime of NRC Region I, as well as those persons at headquarters to whom RegionI reports, because RegionI allowed NU to get away with dangerous, flagrant violations of NRC regulations for over 10 years!
- ~ _ . . - . _ - ~. . .- _ _ - . - - - - - -. --- - . - . - . -- .
.. i
,' CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR f 2.206 Petition to }3 s Rende NU's 1.icenses for its Connecticut Reactors
,, and Investigate Negligent NRC Staff 0versight. l l In the event that the NRC determines that the root causes of Northe'ast Utilities' , chronic, systemic mismanagement of its Connecticut nuclear reactors has jeopardized ! public health and safety, petitioners have requested the revocation or suspension of , i Northeast Utilities' licenses to operate these facilities until such time as the NRC Commissioners have reviewed and approved the recommendation of an independent panel appointed by the Commission that unequivocally recommends re-licensing or , lifling the suspension. In the event that the NRCdetermines that its staff (NRR, Region I, and any other i NRC personnel involved) has systematically failed to enforce regulations, not carried ; out inspections which assured the completion of documentation, repairs, upgrades, ! i maintenance, ALARA reviews and procedures, and any activities which licensees i promised to accomplish pursuant to regulation or best practices, petitioners have ; requested that allsuch personnel be permanently removed fromany positions involving oversight authority in reviewing, directing, supervising or carrying-out the NRC's regulatory requirements. The bottom line on the failures of NU and NRC inspections described in this petition and the video Exhibit attached hereto is that these failures culminate in NU's Connecticut nuclear power stations having inconsistent and inaccurate Final Safety Analysis Reports.
.. . 1
,' CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR f 2206 Petstron to y
l4 Rewke NU's lJcensesfor its Connecticut Reactors , and Investigate Negligent NRC Staff Owrsight. The updated FSAR is the essential document for safe reactor operations. The FSAR demonstrates licensee compliance with NRC regulatory requirements by documenting allchanges to a reactor from construction through operations and for the duration of the license. Along with the Technical Specifications, the FSAR provides a working blueprint against which a licensee may compare the day-to-day condition of the facility. This allows the licensee to be relatively certain that the reactor is operating safely, and efficiently plan for continued safe operation. By documenting modi 6 cations and repairs to a reactor, the FSAR allows a licensee to determine the need for additional desi.n modifications and plan for necessary repairs and maintenance. In this way, the FSAR provides managers and engineers with a guide to determine how to retmin the work force. By encapsulating the history of physical modifications, repairs, and maintenance, the FSAR also protects workers from unnecessary exposure to radiation. It does this by providing a guide for licensees during the planning and reviewing process necessary to implement the NRC's mandatory .ALARA standards in 10 CFR part 50and Appendix 1. Because the FSAR is the blueprint which documents the history of changes to a reactor and its operation, consistent, timely updating is absolutely essential.
.. ' (
," CAN's and NIRTs 10 ClR S 2206 Petillon les
}$
\ Ren>ke NU's licensesfor its Connecticut Reactors
, and Investigate Negligent NRC Staff Oversight.
The updated FSAR allows the licensee to maintain knowledge of the current condition of reactor operations,' make information accessible to reactor staff, and allows staff to effectively handle both routine operations and abnormal events. In the absence of an updated and accurate FSAR, nuclear power station managers, engineers, staff, employees and contractors lack information on how the reactor systems and components operate together. Changes occurring in the reactor design become difficult, if not impossible, to determine, and require case-specific investigation based upon inherently unreliable sources: individual, anecdotal memory. Likewise, absent an adequate, updated FSAR, discovering the impacts of design changes upon other systems requires such time-consuming, case-specific investigation. Under emergency conditions, it would be impossible for operators, engineers, and staff to immediately access the exact cause of a problem or understand the conditions they would find when attempting to make emergency repairs. A time-consuming, case-specific investigative process confronts staff precisely at the moment of crisis, when time is of the essence to avoid catastrophe. A deficient FSAR prevents a licensee from adequately training and retraining workers. By having different and conflicting updates of the FSAR, workers may respond to the wrong condition or at a wrong location, leading to confusion and l conflict in addressing both standard operation and abnormal occurrences. To the
, ' ! ; CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR $ 2.206 Petition}gIt>
., Revoke NU's 1.scenses for its Connecticut Reactors
, andInvestigate Neghgent NRCStaff 0versight. i i extent that the de6cient FSAR forces workers to rely on inherently unreliable anecdotal l i knowledge, such conflicts multiply as different managers, engineers, and operators l l recalldifferent versions ofwhat was done, where, how, and by whom. In an emergency I situation, under these conditions, coordinated efforts by personnel are exceedingly ; 1 difficult ifnot imposs&le. Clearly,the anc:cdotal, case-by-case scenario for problem solving increases the likelihood of unnecessary worker exposure to radiation. Personnel cannot practice a j l
" lessons learned" approach to problems under such conditions. The possibility of l personnel conducting ALARA analyses is completely compromised under such conditions. Absence of an updated FSAR forces workers to constantly reinvent the ;
l wheel whenever problem situations confront them in areas of radioactive contamination. i This directly translates into workers routinely exposed to higher doses of radiation than ; l l they would incur under proper ALARA practices. I Finally, and most significantly, absence of a properly updated FSAR forces the nuclear power station operators and other staff to function in a constant reactive or
" crisis" mode. The result is personnel exercising poor judgment, suffering from excess stress, and making inferior decisions. This translates into higher employee absenteeism, higher turn-over, ar.d lost experience. In this way, the demands placed 1
upon operators and staff by the necessity of maintaining a high level of scrutiny of I
- . 4
,o CAN's andNIRN's 10 GR f120t5 Petition to gy
\ Rende Nil's Licensesfor us Connecticut Reactors
, and Investigate Negligent NRCStaff Overstght. worn and out-dated components and systems in an aging reactor are compound by the problems created when attempting to conduct operations with a deficient FSAR. Ultimately, under such conditions, engineers will find it more and more diflicult to effectively calculate and set conservative limits on already deteriorating systems. This way, the process of deterioration willaccelerate, eventually spiraling out of control. Workers' and the public's health and safety are in constant jeopardy when the NRCallows licensees to operate nuclear reactors without an updatedFSAR. Absent an updated, accurate FSAR, NRC inspectors have no wayto determine that a reactor is in compliance with regulations and technical specifications. For these reasons, and in order to avoid the anarchic situations described above, the NRCmakes a licensee's commitments to maintain an accurate and updaud FSAR (and other necessary documentation) binding, legal requirements under NRC regulations: Each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 50.21 or Sec. 50.22 of this part shall update periodically, as provided in paragraphs (e) (3) and (4) of this section, the final safety analysis report (FSAR) onginally submitted as part of the application for the operating license, to assure that the information included in the FSAR contains the latest material developed. This submittal shall contain all the changes necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission by the licensee or prepared by the licensee pursuant to Commission reauirement since the submission of the original FSAR or, as appropriate, the last updated FSAR. The updated FSAR shall be revised to include the efTects of: all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the FSAR; all safety evaluations performed by the licensee either in su 1 port of rec uested license amendments or in support of conclusions that changes c id not involve an unreviewed safety question; and all analyses of new safety issues performed by or on behalf of the licensee at Commission request. The updated infonnation shall be appropriately located within the FSAR. (1) The licensee shall submit revisions containing updated information to the Commission, as specified in Sec. 50.4, on a replacement-page basis that is accompanied by a list which identifies the current pages of the FSAR following page replacement. 1 1
t 4 , [ '. . C4N's andNIRS's 10 CFR $ 2206 Pettrion Io }g s hende NU's Licensesfor tas Connecticut Reactors
, and investigate Negligent NRCStaff Overstght.
(2) The submittal shall include (i) a certification by a duly authorized officer of the licensee that either the information accurately presents changes made since the previous submittal, necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission or prepared pursuant to Commission requirement, or that no such changes were made; and (ii) an identification of changes made under the provisions of Sec. 50.59 but not areviolisly submitted to the Commission. 13Xi) A revisiiin7t le onainal FSAR containIrig those original pages that are still applicable plus new replacement pages shall be filed within 24 months of either July 22,1980, or the date of issuance of the operating license, whichever is later, and shall bring the FSAR up to date as of a maximum of 6 months prior to the date of filingthe revision.
~ (d) Subsequent revisions shall be filed no less frequemiy than annually and shall reflect allchanges up to a maximumof 6 months ririor to the date of filing.
10CFR Q 50.71(e)(emphasis added). The rule makes patently clear the NRC's concern (and requirement!) that licensees have both updated FSAR and #50.59 analyses on hand. Without an updated FSAR in place, NRC staff had (and have) no basis for determining whether NU was in compliance with its technical specifications and NRCsafety regulations. Thus, to the extent that NU failed to provide, and NRC staff failed to demand, an up-to-date and accurate FSAR for the Millstones and Connecticut Yankee, the NRC staff permitted NU to operate the reactors out of compliance with technical specifications and in violation ofcrucial NRCsafety regulations. Recent NRCaction has taken some initiative in attempting to isolate NRC Region I from a continuing role overseeing inspections of NU's nuclear facilities in Connecticut. While this is a beginning, it is hardly comforting to members of CAN and NIRS living throughout New England, where NRC Region I has supposedly been
[%' Y ~ CAN's Rewde and itsNIRS's Ntl's !Jcensesfor 10 ClR S}9 2 206 l'etition to Connectickt Reactors
, and Investigate Negligent NRC Staff Overstght.
inspecting other nuclear power stations. What assurance, if any, is there that NRC Region I has been vigilant outside Connecticut when it has so totally failed to do its job there?' l 1
)
The Commission needs to conduct an audit of all NRC Region 1 inspections and NRCheadquarters oversight of these inspections during the past decade to see if there are the same type of negligent inspection practices throughout NRC Region I as those documented in Connecticut and Maine.5 Moreover, to date, the licensee's responses
'See S. Varga, Letter to G. Cheney, stspra, note 3.
'See NRC, independent Safety Assessment of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company at 1, 74 (October 7,1996). Both the ISA and OfUce of the Inspector General found, in separate investigations, that NRC and its Region I inspection program were deficient in regulatory oversight of Maine Yankee for more than a decade. In its conclusions to the ISA report, the Team recommended that the NRC inspection program should be reviewed in the following areas:
the licensee-implemented testing programs for safety systems relative to its scope, rigor, and analyses of results the periodic review of licensee developed Technical Specification interpretations to assure consistency with the intent of the approved Technical Specifications a assessment of the adequacy of the plant design-basis including a review of the disposition of significant findings from previous licensee efforts such as design-basis documentation or design-basis reconstitution programs
/d. at 74. The striking similarities between the length and depth of the NRC's Maine Yankee problems and solutions, and the problems at the Connecticut nuclear reactors are a bit too close l to pass off as mere coincidences. Clearly, the NRC needs to undertake some major housecleaning in order to assure that it is adequately protecting workers at NRC Region I reactor sites and the citizens livingin reactor communities. Naturally, if the problems with NRR and NRC Region I are due to mismanagement, economic pressure, and other problems endemic to NRC programs,
i . e ., CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR l 2.206 Pension to
,n, l ~ Rende NU's 1.icenses fbr its Connecticut y Reactors o and Investigate Negitgent NRC Staff Overstght.
have been insufficient. DERs, inspection reports, and other documents--as petitioners illustrate below--show an increasing number of serious problems emerging at an alarmingrate. This means that NU has failed to address the root causes of the problems at the Millstones and Connecticut Yankee, and is merely attempting a cosmetic fix. To do the job right, the NRC must initiate a full-scale independent analysis of all reactor systems at NU's Connecticut facilities. I Even ifNU decides to permanently close one of these nuclear reactors--as likely it willdo with Connecticut Yankee--without such a massive audit and re-documentation, l it would be unsafe to attempt to disassemble any portion of a nuclear power station. This is because an updated FSAR provides a blueprint for safe decommissioning. The same applies to the licensee having complete, accurate, and up-to-date 10 CFR #50.59 documentation. Absent these documents, there are no " specs" for a nuclear power station. No meaningful ALARA analysis and review can take place. Thus, decommissioning workers could easily receive extremelyserious radiation exposures by entering highly contaminated areas of the plant, attempting to remove the wrong component, or attempting to undertake decontamination activities in a highly contaminated section of the facility. Furthermore, and fundamentally, without the l I l l the problems " uncovered"at the Connecticut and Maine nuclearpower stations probably exist at i most of the nuclearpower stations under NRC regulatory authority. l
o * ..
o' CAN's andNIRS*s 10 CFR S 2206 Perttlon to os % ~'
h Rew)Le NU's licensesfor its Connecticut Reactors a and investigate Negligent NRCStaff Oversight. , l proper documentation, workers have no way of knowing how the nuclear power station I was put together, so they cannot possibly take it apart safely. The NRC must determine the root causes of such chronic, systemic mismanagement, because the recognized deficiencies presage potential widespread mismanagement compromising safe reactor operation. This applies with no less force to , the same deficiencies in NRC regulatory oversight. The lack of documentation, l inaccuracies in existing documents, and other serious lapses have occurred over i decades, making it difficult to verify system compliance-whether one looks at the ' individual nuclear reactors at issue here, or the NRC Region I inspection program as a whole. The NRC ordered a Connecticut ' Yankee shutdown because NU was operating the reactor outside technical specifications. The NRC's shutdown decision followed a series of NRCinspections and reportable event occurrences [ documented in DERs] at the reactor. Among other safety problems, the inspections uncovered serious i weaknesses and inaccuracies in NU's documentation for operating Connecticut Yankee, particularly NU's failure to maintain an accurate and completely updated Final Safety Analysis Report [FSAR]. The same problem existed at Millstone Unit 1, where NU's own in-house evaluation team found that manage. ment and engineering personnel were . c ..
i
**s' CAN's andNIRS's 10 GR S 2206 l'estrion Io "y Revoke Nil's licensesfor its Connecticut Reactors , and Investigate Negitgent NRC Staff Oversight.
not familiarwith the NRCsafety regulations contained in Title 100f the Code of Federal l Regulations. The NU evaluation team also reported that Millstone Unit I management l carelessly or knowingly neglected to follow-through on mandatory commitments to the NRC staff to assure that particular repairs, modifications, and documentation of changes to the reactor were actually taking place. The same NU evaluation team raised serious questions about mismanagement of Millstone Units 2, 3, and Connecticut Yankee. IV. CilRONIC.SYSTEMICPROBLEMS AT NU'S CONNECTICUTREACFORS l Petitioners contend that NU's Connecticut nuclear power reactors do not exhibit substantial improvement, despite NU's recent efforts to get them back on line. Management and operation at NU's Connecticut reactors continue to be dangerous, substandard, and generally outside NRC's regulations, as the examples cited herein illustrate. Petitioners believe that NU's admitted decade-long failure to maintain an updated FSAR for each reactor facility epitomizes the seriousness of the current state of affairs at the Connecticut reactors. ! Petitioners have assembled but a few of the incredibly numerous inspection l l reports, internal review documents, and licensee event reports for each of NU's I l Connecticut reactors. These documents raise serious concerts about the management l
l , a * ,
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s CAN's and NIRS's 10 ClR l ?206 l'etition to y ' 1 Revoke NU's IJcenses for its Connecticut Reactors 1 a
, and Investigate Neghgent NRC Staff Oversight.
and operation ofConnecticut Yankee and the Millstone Units I,11, & 111 nuclear power stations. In a letter to T. Feigenbaum, Chief Nuclear Officer for NU, William Russell, then NRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation stated: The team identified a number of significant deficiencies in the engineering calculations and analysis relied upon to ensure the adequacy of the design o.,f key systems at Haddam Neck [ Connecticut Yankee]. In some i cases, design-basis calculations and analyses were not sufficient to confirm that the safety system functional requirements would be met. Some of these errors were long-standing, while others were recently l introduced.. Deficiencies were identified in t.he calculations and analyses j supporting the station batteries, the emergency diesel generators..., ! containment air recirculation . . system, service water ... system, and in the I combination of systems and components needed to support the i emergency cooling system transfer from the injection phase to sump l recirculation. These_ deficiencies revealed _ significant_ weaknesses _in the_ defe.nse-in-dppth= principles that the. NRC relies on_to_ ensure _nuglea power plant 1 operation _does not_ jeopard.ize .th.e. health _and safety._of_the.publig. The team concluded that lveaknesses_in your configuration management l processes _and._a lack._o_f _techni_ cal _ rigor,_ thoroughness,_ and attention _to l detail _in the_ des _ign process,_either contributed _to or_directly_ caused _the
-identified _ errors. In addition, design control measures such as 1 supervisory reviews, mdependent design reviews, and reviews b.y oversight committees d.id i not identify these deficiencies.
Inspection Report 50-213/96-201(emphasis added). The team identified several errors in the updated Final Safety Analyses Report (UFSAR) which reflected programmatic weakness in the process for maintaining the accuracy and consistency of the l l i l l
u *
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* *c CAN's and NIRS's 10 CFR f 2.206 l'etition to y y Rewke NU's IJcenses for its Connectscut Reactors e and Investigate Negligent NRC Staff Overstght.
information in the UFSAR. The team also found instances where NU's managers did not meet commitments to the NRC: The team found several instances involving the failure _to_ident,ify, _ cyaluate,,and_conrect condnions adverse,toguality and songinstances in which planned correctiyc actions _were not,promptly_ initiated. In some instances the delays _in _ initiating planned corrective __a_ctionsayere significant because. the .actio_ns included _the evaluatio.n of the _ potential c generic __ implications _of these_i.ssues_for . other _ plant syste.ms_and cquipmeyt. Id. (Emphasis added). The inspection report goes on to note that the February 22, 19%, Event Response Team Report found process issues at Connecticut Yankee' similarto those identified at Millstone 1: LT]he tearn found that_calculati.ons did_not exist to. support _some of_the d.esign-bases _and_the administrative _ control _ program.s at Haddam_ Neck [ Connecticut._ Yankee] _had_not_ maintained an_ accurate _UFSAR.. . 6 These problems were not new to either NU or the NRC. See generally, J. F. Opeka, NU, Letter to T. Martin, NRC RegionI (NRC Accession No. 9407130157) at 1,2 (July 5,1994). During the j first halfor 1994, John F. Opeka, Executive Vice President, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAP), had been exchanging letters with Thomas Martin, then Regional : Administrator for NRC Region 1, attempting to explain prior inaccurate statements conceming service water system problems. Id These statements included: (1) reference to an " engineering
)
evaluation"which Mr. Opeka subsequently admitted was really only a few "related informal discussions" and one engineer's statement that he weuld provide the welding department with any pipe needing replacement,(2) reference to testing of a weld when it was only subject to
" visual" inspection, and (3) reference to all degraded welds being solely in the first nine feet of piping, when, in fact,"all 22 welds inspected (at that time) were degraded to some extent."Id. In Mr. Opeka's opinion these utter mischaracterizations were merely overstatments or "not accurate" or "could have been more clear." Id. Incredibly, it took two inspection reports and three letters before the NRC finally received this " clarification" from Mr. Opeka.
)
I
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**c CAN's andNIRS's 10 CfR f 2.206 Petition to y
', Rewde NU's IJcensesfor its Connecticut Reactors e andInvestigate Neghgent NRCStaff 0versight.
i [L]icensee management oversight did not identify and address the I patterns of corrective action program implementation problems.... la l general lack pf undeIslanding=and appreciation for_the_ rela.tionship l between 10.CIJR 50, design-bases, licensing bases, industry _ codes,,and l NUls a!! mingtrative programs existed.' _ i Id. (emphasis added). Discussing Connecticut Yankee, NRC's Director of Division of '
- Reactor Projects told NU that-1 i
The discovery by design engineering that the service water piping supplying cooling water to the CAR fans would not remain functional l under accident conditions was an example of an issue for which the design= basis for pie plant = had_ not beeg thoroughlygeviewed_or l understood. R. Cooper li, NRC, letter to T. Feigenbaum, NU (September 12,1996)(emphasis added). Other design basis issues discussed in the report included the reliance on high containment back pressure to assure reliable performance of the residual heat removal , (RliR) system under postulated accident conditions and the adequacy of the containment sump screens to limit debris from entering the safety systems. These issues adversely impact the operability of emergency core cooling systems, thus undermining" defense in depth" against a core melt-down and the ensuing catastrophic release of radioactivity into the environment. The report identified these ultimate safety concerns as but two " apparent" violations of technical specifications.
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, ' ,l# CAN's and NIRS's 10 CIR f 7206 l'etation to 35 L Rende NU's 1.icenses for its Connecticut Reactors e and Investigate Negligent NRC Staff oversight. i i
l A. InadequateSurveillance Testing' MPl DER 30821(08/01/96) involving inadequate NPSil for the RHR pump during the
]
long term cooling phase of an accident. The intent of the surveillance testing program for safety related equipment is to assure that these components will ful0ll their required i functions in an emergency. This DERdemonstrates that the MPI surveillance testing program was deficient. 1 MP2 DER 311% (10/22/96) involving non-conservative reactor trip setpoints. The l purpose of the surveillance testing program for safety related instruments is to assure that these components will perform as assumed in accident analyses. This DER I demonstrates that the MP2 surveillance testing program was dcDeient and the plant ! safety analyses wereinvalid. MP2 DER 30393(05/01/96) involving a 32" x 9" hole (roughly the size of a large doggie J door)in the auxiliarybuilding wallnear the spent fuel pool. This deficiency, reported as { having existed for some time, demonstrates a significant deHeiency in the surveillance ! testing program. Ignoring the fact that one might reasonably be expected to notice a I gaping 32"x9" hole, the auxiliary building is intended to be a radiologically controlled area and as such is subject to periodic testing. The auxiliarybuilding is, or should have been, pressure tested to con 6rm that all releases are controlled and filtered as necessary. Such testing, had NU conducted it properly, should have detected problems reflective of a gaping hole. MP3 31052(09/24/96) involving nuclear instrumentation high power reactor trip testing l not conforming to design and licensing bases assumptions. The intent of the I surveillance testing program for safety related instruments is to assure that these components willperform as assumed in accident analyses. This DER demonstrates that the MP3 surveillance testing program was de0cient and the plant safety analyses were invalid. l 7 l 1n the following subsections, MP1,2,3 refer to the Millstone reactors, CY refers to the Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck) reactor. ' DER' refers to licensee Daily Event Reports to the NRC.
- [n*a ('AN's and NIRS's 10 ClR f 7206 l'etition Io gy Rende NU's 1.tcenses for its Connecticut Reactors e andInvestigate Negligent NRCSta[TOversaghr.
It Operating Outside Design Hases MPl DER 30821(08/01/96) involving inadequate NPSil for the RIIR pump during the long term cooling phase of an accident. This deficiency, apparently existing for years, meant that the reactor core would not have maintained adequate cooling following an accident. Since the RilR pumps also provide suppression pool cooling (containment cooling), this deficiency could also cause containment failure following an accident. MP2 DER 31167(10/16/96) involving flooding of the emergency diesel generator rooms through a common, connected floor drain line. This deficiency, apparently existing since the plant initially started up, represents a potential failure mechanism for all of the emergency diesel generators. Many other licensees, during the course of their Appendix R fire protection evaluations or in response to the Surry pipe rupture event in 1984, identified commen floor drain line vulnerabilities such as reported in this DER. This DERdemonstrates that the operational experience review program, mandated by the NRC following the TMI accident,is inadequate at Millstone. MP2 DER 31085(10/03/96) involving improper setting of the steam generator safety reliefvalves. This deficiency, apparently existing since the plant initially started up and made worse by the steam generator replacements, represents the potential for over pressurizing the steam generators, thereby invalidating the assumptions that a single tube rupture would not propagate. This DERdemonstrates, among other things, that Millstone's design modification process is deficient because NU replaced the steam generators without detecting the existing problem or recognizing that the new steam generators would make the problem worse. MP2 DER 30350(04/23/96) involving a single failure that could render the enclosure building ventilation system inoperable. Plant safety analyses assume that one of the two redundant ventilation paths functions to filter containment releases. This deficiency, apparently existing for considerable time, challenges that assumption. MP3 DER 31081(10/02/96) involving a spent fuel pool design problem that could cause loss of spent fuel pool cooling aller a seismic event. The NRC issued NRC Information Notice No. 93-81 in October 1993 alening licensees to potential loss of spent fuel pool cooling following design bases events. This DER demonstrates that Millstone's operational experience review program, mandated by the NRC following the TMI accident, is inadequate.
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*e CAN's andNIRS's 10 ClR f 2 206 l'ention to 3g 'k Revoke Mi's Ikensesfor its Connecticut Reactors e andinvestigate Negligent NRCStaff overstght.
MP3 DER 31%2(09/26/96) involving potential failure of 21 safety related air operated valves on loss of power causing diversion of safety injection flow and possible pump run-out. NRC Bulletin 88-xxspecifically requires licensees to review the performance of safety related components for loss of instrument air. This DER demonstrates that Millstone's response to this NRC bulletin is less than adequate. MP3 DER 31008(09/16/96) involving failure of the safety related charging system if instrument air is lost. The charging system performs the essential function of core cooling following an accident. NRC Bulletin 88-xx specifically requires licensees to review the performance of safety related components for loss of instrument air. This l DERdemonstrates that Millstone's response to this NRCbulletin is less than adequate. I MP3 DER 30976(09/06/96) involving failure of 37 solenoid valves upon failure of non-safety related air pressure regulators. The DERstates that the solenoid valves effect many safety systems including the charging system and both the high and lowpressure safety injection systems. NRC Bulletin 88-xxspecifically requires licensees to review the performance of safety related components for loss of instrument air. This DER demonstrates that Millstone's response to this NRCbulletin is less than adequate. l C Decruded Material Condition ' CY DER 30945 (08/31/96) involving a pin hole leak in the RHR heat exchanger inlet ; isolation valve. Following a design basis loss of coolant accident, the RHR piping ! containing this isolation valve extends the reactor coolant pressure boundary outside primary containment. This identified integrity loss provides a pathv ay for radioactive material to bypass primary containment in the event of an accident l MP3 DER 30897(08/20/96) involving fouling of the containment re-circulation system heat exchangers by debris. The DER states that the fouling was thought to have occurred the previous month when system flow was increased to maximum. This DER demonstrates the potential failure of all components cooled by service water if the strainers and other protective measures have not been adequately designed to withstand maximumservice water flow,as this DERapparently indicates. This potential may also apply to MP1 and MP2. i
*l CAN's and NIRS's 10 CIR f I206 Petition to
';, Rew>le Nil's Licensesfor Its Connecticut Reactors
9 e -
andInvestigare Neghgent NRCStaff Oversight. D. Problems Continuing at Connecticut Yankee After Shutdown CY DER 31126(10/09/96,10/21/96) involving a 30-inch longitudinal crack on the water supply line to the spent fuel pool heat exchanger and a bad weld on a 6-inch service water return line from the spent fuel pool heat exchanger. The purpose of the supply line is described in this way: The spent fuel pit cooling system removes residual heat from the spent i fuel stored in the pit. The spent fuel pit pumps draw water from the pit, circulate it through a heat exchanger and return it to the pit. There are two spent fuel pool heat exchangers, a shell and tube type and a plate type. The plate heat exchanger has a greater heat removal capacity than the shell and tube heat exchanger. Section 9.1.3.2of the Connecticut Yankee Updated Final Safety Analysis. This DER raises the concem that the material condition of the system used to cool the irradiated fuel in the Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck) spent fuel pool may have degraded to the point that it is less likely to withstand the loadings imposed by a seismic event. In fact,the identified problems indicate that the material condition of the piping may have l degraded to the point where it may be vulnerable to rupture under normal thermal and dead-weight loadings. NRC Inspection Report 50-213/96-201 stated that the NRC's special investigation team into problems at Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck) found deficiencies which
" revealed weaknesses [in systems) that the NRC relies on to ensure nuclear power plant operation does not jeopardize the health and safety of the public." Id. The team concluded that " weaknesses in your condguration management processes and a lack of technical rigor, thoroughness, and attention to detail in the design process, either contributed to or directly caused the identified errors."Id.
This inspection report in conjunction with recent de-staffing activities at Connecticut Yankee (lladdam Neck) raises the concern that appropriate safety margins may not exist or be maintained at the facility. NU's managers did not correct the weaknesses in the configuration management processes and the inattention to detail during the design process prior to the Configuration Management Project team disbanding. Consequently, there may not be a solid technical foundation to support prudent decisionmaking at this facility, particularly as both the NRC and NU continue to reallocate resources to the Millstone and Seabrook reactors.
_ _ - . , , . . . _ . _ ~ ~ . 6 " ; s
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C4N's and NIRS's 10 ClR S 2.206 Petition to Revole Nil's IJcensesfor its Connecticut Reactors and investigate Negligent NRCStaff Oversight. y F. Inadequate Ouality Assurance Programs l Collectively,the documents summarizedabove provide persuasive evidence that the Quality Assurance programs at NU's Connecticut reactors are significantly flawed. 1 NRCregulations at 10CFRpart 50, Appendix B, require NU to have Quality Assurance programs that assure maintenance of the original design bases and safety margins. j These QA requirements include provisions for testing, auditing, configuration management, and design control. NU must develop an " effective" QA program.
" Effective" means meeting the NRC's Appendix B requirements. l F. Material False Statements The NRCissued 50.54(f) letters to NU in the spring of 1996,concerning all three Millstone nuclear power stations. NU maintained that the Millstone nuclear power stations met all applicable design and licensing bases requirements. The DERs cited ]
above demonstrate that such statements were false at the time NU made them, and in i some cases, have been false since the initial start-ups of the Millstone reactors. The same concerns apply to Connecticut Yankee. G Decommissioning And Design / Licensing Basis Deficiencies The new NRC decommissioning rules will allow Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck)to conduct a!! ofits majordecommissioning activity under 10 CFR Q50.59. To l
. o ,
nj CAN*s andNIRS's 10 CFR f 2.206 Petition Io
* \p 3}
Rewke NU's 1.icensesfor its Connecticut Reactors .t 3 andInvestigate Neghgent NRCStaff Oversight. safely conduct activities under 50.59, the licensee must have its design and licensing l I bases in order. At a minimum,this means having an updated FSAR, and updated, I accurate Technical Specification for any of the nuclear power stations which NU may i 1 l decide to decommission. I The problem is that Connecticut Yankee's design and licensing bases are so i defective that no one can really perform a valid {50.59 safety analysis. During the , , better part of 19%, staff and management at Connecticut Yankee were in the process of rebaselining the design and licensing bases in order to provide reasonable assurance to the NRC that it was safe tr p rmitthe reactor to restart. Despite the licensee's feverish ! activity, the NRC's special Inspection Report of July 31,1996, documented extremely i serious deficiencies in the areas ofdesign and licensing bases. Thus, NU had not even ) l come close to resolving these problems when it announced the shutdown of l Connecticut Yankee and began drastic reductions in staffing levels at the reactor. I The point is that if the NRC decided that NU lacked sufficient knowledge of the I licensing and design bases forstaff and management at Connecticut Yankee to be able I l to safely restart the reactor, NU plainly does not have sufficient information to conduct decommissioning under 10 CFR {50.59 as the new rules allow. The same problem would, of course, apply were NU to attempt to shutdown and begin decommissioning at any of the other Connecticut reactors. Wherever deficiencies in the licensing and
__ . - . . . _ _ . = . _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ ._ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
.5 M CAN's andNIRS's 10 CFR S 2.206 Petition to 39 Q'
Rewke NU's Licensesfor its Connecticut Reactors ,1 g and investigate Negligent NRCStaff Oversight. ! design basis exist, safe decommissioning under Q50.59is not possible without adequate licensing and design bases. t
- V. AHOUTTilEPIXITIONERS i
Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)is a non-profit, public interest group with members located near the Yankee Rowe reactor in Massachusetts, the Vermont Yankee reactor in Vernon, Vermont, the Connecticut Yankee and Millstone reactors in Connecticut, and the Seabrook reactor in New Ilampshire. CAN is concerned with the entire nuclear fuel cycle from mining uranium, through operating nuclear power reactors, to establishing sites for disposal or radioactive waste. CAN represents citizens in many communities that experience the economic, environmental, and health impacts of the uranium fuel cycle. Since 1991,CAN has participated in a variety of NRC proceedings, including NRChearings on reactor embrittlement and decommissioning, rulemakings, workshops, and adjudicatory hearings. Nuclear. Information and Resource Service (NIRS) is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to providing information and assistance to people concerned about the effects. of nuclear power, radioactive waste, and renewable energy alternatives to nuclear power. NIRS membership is world-wide, including Connecticut l residents whose health and safety are a priority of this petition. Since 1978, from its ! headquarters in Washington, DC, NIRS has, among other activities, participated in i nuclear regulatory affairs, including rulemakings, enforcement actions, and i administrative and judicial adjudications on the regulation and licensing of particular i nuclear power stations. !
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y': CAN's and NIRS's 10 CFR S 2.206 Petition to 33 Revole NU's Licensesfor its Connecticut Reactors
% - and investigate Negilgent NRC Staff Oversight, d
VL CONCLUSION 4
- For the forgoing reasons, petitioners ask the United States Nuclear Regulatory l
, Commission to grant this petition by immediately commencing:(1) enforcement action, j as detailed above, against Northeast Utilities, and (2) an investigation, as detailed 1 J
- above, of the role of the NRC directorate management and staff (NRR),and Region I management and staff in permitting NU to operate its Connecticut nuclear power l stations out of regulatory compliance for over a decade.
l' DATED: This 25th day of November,1996 Respectfully submitted:
; ol +w., I aAm .,
f Deborah Katz,Presi'de'nt g Paul Gunter, Mctor Watchdog Project Citizens Awareness Network NuclearInformation and Resource Service } P.O. Box 83 142416th Street, NW 4th floor Shelburne Falls, MA 01370 Washington, D.C. 20036 413-339-8768 202-328-0002 3 i Mv2,%%44 % lAAN Rosemary Bassdkis, Researcher *O 4 Citizens Awareness Network
- 54 Old Tumpike Road lladdam, CT 06438 86 4 345-8431 l
I o _ . . - . .}}